Assessing the U.S.-Qatar Relationship Hearing
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Student Numbers Drop
Recliner, $425 SPORTS In Today’s PAGE 1 Classifieds! AND WEEKLY Charlotte Sun HERALD RAYS WIN AGAIN ON ROAD FLORIDA CITRUS IN CRISIS Evan Longoria singles home the winning run in the 10th inning The $9 billion industry is facing its biggest threat yet, thanks to a as Tampa Bay takes its eighth victory in past 11 away games. mottled brown bug no bigger than a pencil eraser. THE WIRE PAGE 1 An Edition of the Sun VOL. 122 NO. 237 AMERICA’S BEST COMMUNITY DAILY MONDAY AUGUST 25, 2014 www.sunnewspapers.net $1.00 HACKIN’ AROUND Jerry Wilson Student numbers drop By ADAM KREGER enrollment has slipped for funding for education to entire operation.” is all STAFF WRITER the third straight year, and over $19.6 billion, which At the start of the current is down almost 11 percent equates to districts receiv- school year — which began Florida Gov. Rick Scott from nine years ago. ing $7,176 per student — a for most schools last week announced Thursday that “It’s a concern from the $232 per-student increase — there were 15,968 stu- shook up per-student spending perspective that it means over the current school year, dents enrolled in Charlotte should be the highest in the declining revenue,” said according to a press release County’s public schools. erry Wilson loves Elvis Presley. state’s history next year. Doug Whittaker, superin- from Scott’s office. When the 2003-04 Anyone who knows the local car However, the news comes tendent of Charlotte County “That money gets spread school year began, there J dealer knows that. -
TRIP Snap Poll XII January 2020 Introduction
TRIP Snap Poll XII January 2020 Teaching, Research & International Policy (TRIP) Project Global Research Institute (GRI) https://trip.wm.edu/home Principal Investigators: Susan Peterson, William & Mary Ryan Powers, University of Georgia Michael J. Tierney, William & Mary Data Contacts: Eric Parajon or Emily Jackson Phone: (757) 221-1466 Email: i [email protected] Methodology: We attempted to contact all international relations (IR) scholars in the U.S. We define IR scholars as individuals who are employed at a college or university in a political science department or professional school and who teach or conduct research on issues that cross international borders. Of the 4,752 scholars across the U.S. that we contacted, 971 responded. The resulting response rate is approximately 20.43 percent. The poll was open 10/30/2019-12/14/2019. Our sample is roughly similar to the broader International Relations scholar population in terms of gender, academic rank and university type. Our sample includes a higher percentage of men and a higher percentage of tenured and tenure track faculty than the overall scholar population. Introduction By Emily Jackson, Eric Parajon, Susan Peterson, Ryan Powers, and Michael J. Tierney We are pleased to share the results of the 12th Teaching, Research and International Policy (TRIP) Snap Poll, fielded with the support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Our polls provide real-time data in the wake of significant policy proposals, during international crises, and on emerging foreign policy debates. In this poll, we asked questions on the 2020 Presidential Election, President Trump’s foreign policy actions, and impeachment. -
Beyond Boundaries II
Beyond Boundaries II Beyond Boundaries II Pakistan - Afghanistan Track 1.5 and II cc Connecting People Building Peace Promoting Cooperation 1 Beyond Boundaries II Beyond Boundaries II Pakistan – Afghanistan Track 1.5 and II Connecting People Building Peace Promoting Cooperation 2 Beyond Boundaries II Beyond Boundaries II ©Center for Research and Security Studies 2018 All rights reserved This publication can be ordered from CRSS Islamabad office. All CRSS publications are also available free of cost for digital download from the CRSS website. 14-M, Ali Plaza, 2nd Floor, F-8 Markaz, Islamabad, Pakistan. Tel: +92-51-8314801-03 Fax: +92-51-8314804 www.crss.pk 3 Beyond Boundaries II TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. ACRONYMS ..................................................................................................... 5 2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................... 9 3. CONTEXTUALIZING BEYOND BOUNDARIES................................................... 11 4. FIRST MEETING OF THE PAKISTAN AFGHANISTAN JOINT COMMITTEE ........ 56 5. SECOND MEETING OF PAKISTAN AFGHANISTAN JOINT COMMITTEE .......... 72 6. THIRD MEETING OF PAKISTAN AFGHANISTAN JOINT COMMITTEE .............. 95 7. FOURTH MEETING OF PAKISTAN AFGHANISTAN JOINT COMMITTEE ........ 126 8. FIFTH MEETING OF PAKISTAN AFGHANISTAN JOINT COMMITTEE ON BUSINESS/TRADE ........................................................................................ 149 9. SIXTH MEETING OF PAKISTAN AFGHANISTAN JOINT COMMITTEE ............ 170 10. UNIVERSITY -
QATAR V. BAHRAIN) REPLY of the STATE of QATAR ______TABLE of CONTENTS PART I - INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I - GENERAL 1 Section 1
CASE CONCERNING MARITIME DELIMITATION AND TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS BETWEEN QATAR AND BAHRAIN (QATAR V. BAHRAIN) REPLY OF THE STATE OF QATAR _____________________________________________ TABLE OF CONTENTS PART I - INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I - GENERAL 1 Section 1. Qatar's Case and Structure of Qatar's Reply Section 2. Deficiencies in Bahrain's Written Pleadings Section 3. Bahrain's Continuing Violations of the Status Quo PART II - THE GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND CHAPTER II - THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF QATAR Section 1. The Overall Geographical Context Section 2. The Emergence of the Al-Thani as a Political Force in Qatar Section 3. Relations between the Al-Thani and Nasir bin Mubarak Section 4. The 1913 and 1914 Conventions Section 5. The 1916 Treaty Section 6. Al-Thani Authority throughout the Peninsula of Qatar was consolidated long before the 1930s Section 7. The Map Evidence CHAPTER III - THE EXTENT OF THE TERRITORY OF BAHRAIN Section 1. Bahrain from 1783 to 1868 Section 2. Bahrain after 1868 PART III - THE HAWAR ISLANDS AND OTHER TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS CHAPTER IV - THE HAWAR ISLANDS Section 1. Introduction: The Territorial Integrity of Qatar and Qatar's Sovereignty over the Hawar Islands Section 2. Proximity and Qatar's Title to the Hawar Islands Section 3. The Extensive Map Evidence supporting Qatar's Sovereignty over the Hawar Islands Section 4. The Lack of Evidence for Bahrain's Claim to have exercised Sovereignty over the Hawar Islands from the 18th Century to the Present Day Section 5. The Bahrain and Qatar Oil Concession Negotiations between 1925 and 1939 and the Events Leading to the Reversal of British Recognition of Hawar as part of Qatar Section 6. -
Supreme Court of the United States
No. 15-674 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Petitioners, v. STATE OF TEXAS, et al., Respondents. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT BRIEF OF 186 MEMBERS OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND 39 MEMBERS OF THE U.S. SENATE AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS KENNETH L. SALAZAR SETH P. WAXMAN WILMER CUTLER PICKERING Counsel of Record HALE AND DORR LLP JAMIE S. GORELICK 1225 Seventeenth St. PAUL R.Q. WOLFSON Suite 1660 DAVID M. LEHN Denver, CO 80202 SAURABH H. SANGHVI RYAN MCCARL JOHN B. SPRANGERS* WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP 1875 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Washington, DC 20006 (202) 663-6000 [email protected] TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................... ii INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE................................... 1 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ......................................... 3 ARGUMENT ....................................................................... 7 I. THE DAPA GUIDANCE IS A PERMISSIBLE EXERCISE OF CONGRESSIONALLY GRANT- ED DISCRETION ............................................................. 7 A. The Executive Needs Broad Discretion To Adopt Rational Enforcement Prior- ities And Effective Policies For Their Implementation ..................................................... 7 B. Congress Has Directed The Executive To Set Rational Enforcement Priorities And To Adopt Policies To Implement Those Priorities ................................................... 10 C. The -
Sustainable Development Indicators in the State of Qatar 2015
Sustainable Development Indicators in the State of Qatar 2015 WWW.MDPS.GOV.QA Sustainable Development Indicators in the State of Qatar 2015 December 2015 Publisher: Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics All rights reserved for the Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics This study or any part thereof shall not be republished unless prior written consent is obtained from the Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics: [email protected] www.mdps.gov.qa 2 Sustainable Development Indicators in the State of Qatar 2015 Content Preface 5 Introduction 7 Chapter One: Social Indicators Foreward 11 1) Unemployment rate 12 2) Percentage of average female wages to male wages 13 3) Under-five mortality rate 14 4) Life expectancy at birth 15 5) Proportion of population with access to adequate sanitation facilities 16 6) Proportion of population with access to safe drinking water 17 7) Population growth rate 18 8) Total fertility rate 19 9) Dependency ratio 20 10) Proportion of population with access to primary health care 21 11) Proportion of newborns with low birth weight: 22 12) Immunization against childhood infectious diseases: 23 13) Gross intake ratio in the last grade of primary education: 24 14) Adult secondary (tertiary) schooling attainment level of total population 25 15) Adult literacy rate 26 16) Number of crimes per 100,000 of population 27 Chapter Two: Economic Indicators Foreward 31 1) Per capita GDP 32 2) Percentage of investment to GDP 33 3) Inflation Rate 34 -
Blockade Made Qatar Stronger on All Fronts
BUSINESS | Page 1 SPORT | Page 1 World Cup will meet high standards: Football offi cials QFC focusing on driving FDI infl ow to Qatar: Al-Jaida published in QATAR since 1978 THURSDAY Vol. XXXIX No. 11031 December 13, 2018 Rabia II 6, 1440 AH GULF TIMES www. gulf-times.com 2 Riyals Amir chairs meeting of SC board of directors His Highness the Amir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani yesterday chaired the fourth meeting for 2018 of the Board of Directors of the Supreme Blockade made Qatar Committee for Delivery & Legacy at the Amiri Diwan. The meeting was attended by His Highness the Deputy Amir Sheikh Abdullah bin Hamad al-Thani; His Highness Sheikh Jassim bin Hamad stronger on all fronts: al-Thani, Personal Representative of His Highness the Amir and Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors; HE Sheikh Abdullah bin Nasser bin Khalifa al-Thani, Prime Minister, Minister of Argentinean FM Interior and board member; and the other board members. z End the Gulf crisis through dialogue: Faurie Amir condoles with French president QNA between the two countries, refl ected communications, renewable energy, oil His Highness the Amir Sheikh Tamim Doha in the fl ow of high-level mutual visits, and gas and tourism, adding that this is bin Hamad al-Thani sent a cable of pointing out that there are many areas the perfect time for Qatari companies condolences to French President where bilateral relations can be deep- to take advantage of these opportuni- Emmanuel Macron expressing he Gulf crisis that followed the ened mainly through receiving Qatari ties and invest in his country which is his condolences for the victims of siege of Qatar has in fact made investments and increasing exports to a global leader and well known for its the attack that targeted a market Tthe country stronger economi- the Qatari market. -
Afghanistan's Unending Wars
AFGHANISTAN’S UNENDING WARS MARVIN G. WEINBAUM AND AHMAD KHALID MAJIDYAR FEBRUARY 2019 POLICY PAPER 2019-3 CONTENTS * SUMMARY * 1 INTRODUCTION * 3 PHASES OF CONFLICT * 3 HISTORICAL CONTEXT * 6 PRESENT DAY CONFLICT * 7 DIMENSIONS OF THE CONFLICT * 10 EFFORTS FOR PEACE * 13 ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS * 15 CONCLUSION © The Middle East Institute The Middle East Institute 1319 18th Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036 SUMMARY The current conflict in Afghanistan, the latest in a series of perpetual wars and episodes of civil strife over the past 40 years, is strategically stalemated. With the Taliban and other militant groups gradually gaining a grip on large areas of the countryside, the Kabul government and its international allies have recently redoubled their efforts to seek a negotiated peace agreement with insurgents to end the protracted conflict. While the Taliban are willing to negotiate with the U.S. about the withdrawal of foreign troops from the country, they continue to reject direct talks with the Afghan government for a political settlement. Even with inclusive peace talks, there is reason to question whether the Taliban’s vision of a future Afghan state and society can be reconciled with a liberal, democratic constitutional order. An alternative political pathway to a peaceful outcome is through executing better security and governance reforms. With continued support of the international community, the Afghan government may be able to provide the incentives needed to reintegrate insurgent commanders and combatants back into the sociopolitical system. All other scenarios for Afghanistan are dark, especially the prospect of a disintegration of the existing political system that could trigger a wider, more bloody civil war. -
Anti-Corruption Strategies for Authoritarian States 2
U4 Helpdesk Answer 2018:7 Anti -corruption strategies for authoritarian states Author(s): Roberto Martinez B. Kukutschka Reviewer(s): Nieves Zuniga Date: 20 May 2018 Although democracies – particularly weak ones – are not necessarily better than authoritarian states at controlling corruption, most success stories happen in democratic environments. Autocracies that manage to control petty and bureaucratic corruption, often leave in place the corruption that benefits the rulers. We look closer at some successful transformations in authoritarian environments: Qatar, Rwanda and Singapore. U4 Anti-Corruption Helpdesk A free service for staff from U4 partner agencies Query What evidence is there for effective anti-corruption interventions in authoritarian contexts? Contents 1. Background 1. Background In its broadest sense, authoritarian regimes 2. The link between regime type and the levels of encompass all forms of undemocratic rule. corruption Compared to democracies, these regimes do not 3. Why do autocrats engage in anti-corruption? maintain the institutions and procedures of 4. Anti-corruption reforms in Qatar participation and political competition, 5. Anti-corruption reforms in Rwanda fundamental rights and control of power 6. Anti-corruption reforms in Singapore (separation of powers, parliaments, elections, 7. Lessons learned plurality of parties, etc.) characteristic of a 8. References democracy. Juan Linz's (1975) widely cited definition identifies three characteristics through Summary which authoritarian regimes can be differentiated This U4 Helpdesk Answer explores the strategies from democratic and totalitarian ones: and policies used by authoritarian states to counter 1. limited pluralism contrasted with the corruption. It provides an overview of the theory principally unlimited pluralism of democracies and evidence linking the type of government and monism of totalitarianism (democratic vs. -
Afghanistan's Ulema
Women in 2014 Transition A report on the concerns and demands of women and civil society organizations in Afghanistan’s 34 provinces • Reconciliation with Taliban • Transfer of security responsibility • Presidential election • Economic transition Yasin Rasouli and T imurbeg February 2014 About Afghanistan Watch The Afghanistan Watch is an independent, non-governmental, non-political and a leading Afghan civil society organization registered with the Ministry of National Economy of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. It envisions a democratic, peaceful, tolerant and just society in which all citizens have equal opportunities to realize their human potentials. Its mission is to undertake activities that will promote peace, justice, and a culture of mutual tolerance and respect for human rights in Afghanistan. As its core values the organization is strongly committed to democracy, justice, human rights, sustainable and balanced social and economic development of the country and impartiality, independence and professionalism as guiding principles of its activities. For more information and to order publications, contact Afghanistan Watch at: Tel: +93 (0)799 21 55 77, 20 250 31 43 Website: www.watchafghanistan.org E-mail: [email protected] © Afghanistan Watch. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any mean, electronic, recording or otherwise without prior written permission of the publisher, the Afghanistan Watch.Permission can be obtained -
GCC Policies Toward the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa and Yemen: Ally-Adversary Dilemmas by Fred H
II. Analysis Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Abu Dhabi, and King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Saudi Arabia, preside over the ‘Sheikh Zayed Heritage Festival 2016’ in Abu Dhabi, UAE, on 4 December 2016. GCC Policies Toward the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa and Yemen: Ally-Adversary Dilemmas by Fred H. Lawson tudies of the foreign policies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries usually ignore import- S ant initiatives that have been undertaken with regard to the Bab al-Mandab region, an area encom- passing the southern end of the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa and Yemen. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have become actively involved in this pivotal geopolitical space over the past decade, and their relations with one another exhibit a marked shift from mutual complementarity to recip- rocal friction. Escalating rivalry and mistrust among these three governments can usefully be explained by what Glenn Snyder calls “the alliance security dilemma.”1 Shift to sustained intervention Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE have been drawn into Bab al-Mandab by three overlapping develop- ments. First, the rise in world food prices that began in the 2000s incentivized GCC states to ramp up investment in agricultural land—Riyadh, Doha and Abu Dhabi all turned to Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda as prospective breadbaskets.2 Doha pushed matters furthest by proposing to construct a massive canal in central Sudan that would have siphoned off more than one percent of the Nile River’s total annual downstream flow to create additional farmland. -
Automatic Exchange of Information: Status of Commitments
As of 27 September 2021 AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION (AEOI): STATUS OF COMMITMENTS1 JURISDICTIONS UNDERTAKING FIRST EXCHANGES IN 2017 (49) Anguilla, Argentina, Belgium, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Bulgaria, Cayman Islands, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus2, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Faroe Islands, Finland, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Guernsey, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Isle of Man, Italy, Jersey, Korea, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Montserrat, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Seychelles, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turks and Caicos Islands, United Kingdom JURISDICTIONS UNDERTAKING FIRST EXCHANGES BY 2018 (51) Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan3, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Curacao, Dominica4, Greenland, Grenada, Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Lebanon, Macau (China), Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Monaco, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue4, Pakistan3, Panama, Qatar, Russia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sint Maarten4, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago4, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Vanuatu JURISDICTIONS UNDERTAKING FIRST EXCHANGES BY 2019 (2) Ghana3, Kuwait5 JURISDICTIONS UNDERTAKING FIRST EXCHANGES BY 2020 (3) Nigeria3, Oman5, Peru3 JURISDICTIONS UNDERTAKING FIRST EXCHANGES BY 2021 (3) Albania3, 7, Ecuador3, Kazakhstan6