CHAPTER THREE

SOLDIERS

Pronoia holders

The late Byzantine state employed a variety of methods to finance its military forces. Late Byzantine soldiers were maintained through grants of land, cash, tax exemptions, rights to state revenues. That often soldiers were remunerated through a combination of the above- mentioned methods makes impossible any rigid categorisation of the military forces employed by the Byzantine rulers. For instance, there were mercenaries, who received pronoia grants. The categorisation of soldiers becomes more difficult due to the lack of sufficient sources. Almost nothing is known about the financing of the enlisted by John III in 1240 and quite often, it is not clear whether the land possessed by soldiers was related to their military service. Taking into account these developments the Byzantine soldiers can be divided into two broad categories: To landholders, who received their remunera- tion in the form of grants of land, and to mercenaries, who were paid in cash. However there were significant overlaps. The sources show that a large part of the army was maintained through pronoia grants. It would be superfluous to discuss in detail the function and significance of the institution ofpronoia .1 However, it is useful to highlight some important points concerning the importance and impact of pronoia on the late Byzantine military organisation. Pronoia was a grant by the of the state’s fiscal rights over rev- enue sources to an individual or group of individuals.2 The extensive

1 For a detailed discussion of the institution of pronoia and a comparison with the fief, Iqta and timar see Bartusis, The Late , 162–190; See also N. Oikonomides, “Contribution à l’ étude de la pronoia au XIIIe siècle,” REB 22 (1964), 158–175; idem, “The Role of the Byzantine State in the Economy,” in A. Laiou (ed.), The Economic History of Byzantium (Washington, 2002), 1042–1050; idem, “The prop- erties of the Deblitzenoi in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries,” in A. Laiou (ed.), Charanis Studies: Essays in Honor of Peter Charanis (New Brunswick, 1980), 176–198; A. Kazhdan, “Pronoia: The History of a Scholarly Discussion,”MHR 10 (1995), 133–163. 2 J. Haldon, The State and the Tributary Mode of Production (London, 1993), 130; Oikonomides, “The Role of the Byzantine State,” 1048; A. Laiou, Peasant Society in the 76 chapter three use of the institution of pronoia reflects the inability of the Byzantine state to exact resources effectively. As a result, the state had to rely on the consumption of its resources by its troops and administrators directly.3 Some pronoiai consisted the entire payment to the soldiers and others only part of it.4 Moreover, the size of pronoia grants var- ied significantly. There were large pronoiai amounting to hundreds of nomismata, e.g. Pachymeres reports that the value of Constantine ’ (Michael VIII’s son) pronoiai was 60,000 nomismata, whereas other pronoiai were so small that the social status of their holders was not much higher than that of a group of peasants.5 In conclusion, pronoia was the means of financing of both wealthy and smallholding soldiers. From the administrative point of view, the pronoia soldier was inexpensive for the Byzantine state. He was expected to be perma- nently in the service of the state, which would provide him with the ‘immobile’ means of his subsistence.6 From the military point of view, the pronoia system was of important significance. The prospect of a reward in the form of pronoia would have significant impact on the motivation and effectiveness of the individual soldier, who would not only receive significant income but could also afford better equip- ment as an eager defender of the source of his income. Theprostagma Michael VIII issued in 1272 to define Andronikos II’s position and rights as co-emperor, is indicative of this.7 It stipulates that if a soldier appears useful, he may receive an oikonomia (pronoia) increased by 24–26 hyperpyra. In the same manner, if the soldier is not conduct- ing himself well, he loses his oikonomia, which should be granted to a more deserving soldier. It seems that, following the principles of this prostagma, in 1293 Andronikos II accepted the request of Leo Koteanitzes to receive land in the area of Preasnitsa in Macedonia,

Late : A Social and Demographic Study (Princeton, 1977), 6; On the collective pronoiai see Oikonomides, “À propos des armées,” 367–368. 3 Haldon, Tributary Μode, 198. 4 Oikonomides, “The Role of the State,” 1047. 5 Pachymeres, III, 175; Bartusis, The Late Byzantine Army, 174–175; Oikonomides, “À propos des armées,” 354, 362–364; Actes de Docheiariou, N. Oikonomides (ed.), (Paris, 1984), 138–143, 161–162, 234. 6 Oikonomides, “À propos des armées,” 355. 7 A. Heisenberg, Quellen und Studien zur spätbyzantinischen Geschichte (London, 1973), 40–41.