MENA Programme: Event Summary A View from : Elections after the Arab Spring

November 2011

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Event Summary: A View from Tunisia: Elections after the Arab Spring

INTRODUCTION This paper is a summary of a roundtable event that took place at Chatham House on 9 November 2011, which explored the results and possible impact of Tunisia’s first democratic elections since the revolts of the Arab Spring. The speaker analyzed the election results and what they reveal about change and continuity in Tunisia.

For the better part of 40 years Tunisia has been depicted as a homogeneous country, not afflicted by the kind of tensions that have been noticeable in Algeria for example. Once the 'lid' of authoritarianism was removed, however, outside observers have begun to recognize the diversity and particularities of the Tunisian state and society. Tunisians themselves were well aware of the contradictions between what was publicly depicted as a largely liberal economy and a heavily policed society that dominated the country under the kleptocratic regime of Ben Ali. The end of dictatorship meant that revived debates, previously securitized and therefore extremely limited, have now brought to the fore concerns, ideas and divisions within Tunisian society.

Some of the main findings of the meeting include:

 A majority of Tunisians were satisfied with the electoral results.

 Support for the Islamist-inspired Ennahda movement which won the majority of votes in the election stems largely from its clear opposition to the Ben Ali regime –the various parties’ relations to the old regime were clearly reflected in the electoral results.

 The rivalry between Ennahda and the Tunisian secular parties goes beyond religion and should also be understood as a class struggle.

 Key challenges facing Tunisia include a careful restructuring of the country’s economy and the reforming of its justice system.

 While it is fair to assume that Tunisia might provide valuable lessons for other Arab states undergoing political change, the distinctive social and political landscapes that characterize North African states need to be kept in mind.

The discussion was held under the Chatham House Rule and the views expressed are those of the participants. The following summary is intended to serve as an aide-mémoire to those who took part and to provide a general summary of discussions for those who did not.

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The Chatham House Rule

‘When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.’

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ELECTIONS The Tunisian elections have been widely acclaimed for the apparently high turnout, with some early estimates suggesting a participation of up to 90%. Nevertheless, these high figures are not representative of the total number of eligible voters. The confusion arises from the fact that a mere 55% of eligible voters actually managed to register prior to the elections. Out of 7.5 million electors, only 4.1 million made it onto the electoral list. Of those 4.1 million, 77% voted, hence the high turnout figures quoted in early reports.

The voting system was greatly complicated by the large numbers of registered parties (about 110 according to some estimates) and in addition over 100 independent candidate lists. However, this did not alter the predominance of around 10 parties in the results and recent polls conducted just after the elections suggest that around 73% of Tunisians are satisfied with the results.

It was widely predicted that the Islamist party Ennahda would win the constituent assembly elections. By being extremely well organized, this former clandestine movement had the ability to swiftly reactivate and mobilize its supporters. The speaker emphasized, however, that it was not only Ennahda's high levels of efficiency and professionalism that gained it 38% of the vote. The speaker's analysis suggested that the movement's triumph should also be understood as 'the revenge of the hinterlands' on the middle classes and francophone elites. Having interviewed a number of Tunisians, the speaker pointed out that many felt no particular connection to Ennahda's Islamist core. What most people saw, and rewarded, was a party with no connections to the previous regime. Conversely, parties that were perceived to have had ties to the old regime were punished.

A clear display of this tendency can be observed in the surprisingly poor performance of the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP). Widely reported to be Ennahda's only real challenger in the run-up to the elections, the PDP only made it to fifth place, with less than 6% of the vote. This largely unexpected outcome can be very credibly attributed to the PDP's stance towards the overthrown regime. The day before Ben Ali left, in fact, Ahmed Chebbi, head of the PDP, was suggesting that there might be other ways of accommodating the protesters and was urging a compromise solution. Meanwhile, , head of the Congress for the Republic Party (CPR), which came second in the polls, insisted that Ben Ali had to go. In the speaker's analysis, the various parties' relations to the previous regime were clearly reflected in the electoral results. www.chathamhouse.org 4 Event Summary: A View from Tunisia: Elections after the Arab Spring

RELIGION The success of an Islamist party has raised a lot of concern, particularly from left-wing and secular parties, about the future role of Islam and sharia law in Tunisia and the implications for women's rights and personal freedoms. As a result a debate has evolved, almost exclusively among francophone elites, about the concept and meaning of laicité (namely the separation of religion and politics) in Tunisia. While Ennahda has been cautiously reassuring Tunisians and foreign players that it will not limit or deny those freedoms, the speaker argued that consistent actions across the whole movement cannot be taken for granted. This is evidenced in the different dynamics across the movement vis-à-vis the two secular parties (the CPR and Ettakol) which form the governing coalition.

The rivalry between Ennahda and a number of the smaller secular parties goes beyond religion. Recalling the nature and composition of the political rallies that preceded the election, the speaker suggested that political differences in Tunisia represent a struggle based on class rather than religion, despite support from certain sectors of the middle class for Ennahda. This was most obvious in Tunis where in broad terms, the final political rallies grouped the working classes on the outskirts of the city under Ennahda against the mostly secular and francophone elites of the modernist parties of northern Tunis.

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KEY CHALLENGES The speaker went on to outline the main challenges facing the new government.

The Economy

 Unemployment: with 700,000 unemployed – almost half of them graduates – there is an urgent need for economic reform. A failure to produce quick results and meet growing expectations might lead to renewed and prolonged tensions. There has been a lot of emphasis on the ‘Jasmine’ economic and social plan1 to promote small and medium-sized enterprises in the country. While there is a tradition of entrepreneuralism that can be cultivated further, there are doubts as to whether this approach can produce results fast enough.

 Foreign trade: as much as 80% of Tunisia's foreign trade is with Europe. The current downturn in Europe's economy means that Tunisia must look urgently for alternatives – the and seem the most obvious candidates for support.

 Impoverishment: with inflation at 4.5% Tunisia's main problem is not poverty but impoverishment. As the rural and lower middle classes have endured the most suffering over the past few years, expectations for improved conditions are high, and economic reform is a race against time.

 Tourism: although this sector only accounts for 7% of Tunisian GDP it is nevertheless extremely important as it soaks up semi-skilled labour. Tourism fell by about 60% in the first quarter of 2011 but has progressively recovered and by the autumn of 2011 was only 20% down on the same time in 2010. Ennahda, recognizing the critical importance of tourism and foreign investment, has announced plans, as the speaker put it, 'not to ban bikinis and foreign banks'.

Given Europe's dire economic situation and the EU’s recent restrictive immigration policies, Tunisia engaged courageously with the neighbouring

1 Introduced in September 2011 by the Tunisian government, the Jasmine plan aims to reduce unemployment and boost regional development through a series of projects and reforms funded by Tunisia’s own national savings (70%) and foreign credits (30%).

For more information on the Jasmine plan visit: http://www.businessnews.com.tn/pdf/Jasmine- Plan2011.pdf. www.chathamhouse.org 6 Event Summary: A View from Tunisia: Elections after the Arab Spring

Libyan crisis and may reap benefits in energy cooperation, having taken in over 200,000 Libyan refugees from the conflict. At the same time, it is important to realize that French investment in Tunisia is still significant and Ennahda has welcomed official French support for maintaining France’s level of commercial engagement in Tunisia. Tunisians know they need French investment at the moment and that there is no point in being vindictive over the political support France formerly gave to the Ben Ali regime.

On one level, Europe's economic problems are a welcome development for Tunisia in opening up the possibility of establishing relations on a more equal footing in future. European countries have lost much credibility over the past year and are scarcely in a position to dictate moral and economic terms. Overall, there is a sense that Tunisians are assuming responsibility for their own future.

Transitional Justice Justice has emerged as another area in urgent need of reform. Former Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi's appearance before the courts on corruption charges is a sign that steps are being taken to improve the credibility of the justice system. Nevertheless, there is still some suspicion that there might be attempts towards a counterrevolution in places where the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD – the former presidential party) is still present. The justice system certainly needs reforming, particularly since most of the judges, magistrates and ministry officials who were operative during the previous regime have retained their positions. Given the large number of lawyers in Tunisia, the capacity to integrate them into a new system will be a good test of Ennahda's ability to implement reforms.

Long-term Challenges One of the most pressing long-term questions that Tunisians will need to address is what kind of society Tunisia wants to be. At the same time, they will need to reassess the current state of Tunisian society. The speaker suggested that the amount of debate around this topic was a promising sign, and that the balance of debate was also much more optimistic than pessimistic, as Tunisians are engaging with their own future.

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A MODEL FOR ARAB TRANSITIONS? Overall, it was suggested that Tunisia presents an encouraging picture. Several participants expressed hope that the guarded optimism surrounding Tunisia's elections can have a beneficial effect in the Arab world, particularly where transitions are more difficult. Egypt has proved to be of particular concern. While Tunisia might get by, as it is a small country with a well- educated population and a reasonably sound economy, and Libya has vast natural resources, Egypt finds itself with limited funds and an army that is still largely in control.

To what extent, then, can Tunisia provide a model for other transitions in the Arab world? The speaker argued that valuable lessons can be drawn from some of the more technical elements of transition (particularly regarding the elections). Nonetheless, one must realize that the level of horizontal interaction between North African countries has remained very low. Moreover, it is necessary to bear in mind the distinctive political and social landscapes that characterize North African states. Military involvement in Egyptian politics, for example, has been traditionally more pronounced than in Tunisia. In fact, it has been argued that Egypt has not yet reached the state of revolution – while the head has been cut off, the old system is still in place.

Tunisia, on the other hand, has managed to overcome that stage in a very short period of time, even though there are still a number of issues of unfinished business from the past to address. In respect of human rights, for example, it is relevant to quote from the human rights activist placed in charge of Morocco’s transitional justice process in recent years, who said ‘it is good that the page has been turned. But the page also has to be read before it is turned.’

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