Tanforan: a Microhistoric Study of Social Patterns and Resistance in an American Assembly Center for Japanese Americans During World War II
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Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena Philosphische Fakultät Historisches Institut Tanforan: A Microhistoric Study of Social Patterns and Resistance in an American Assembly Center for Japanese Americans during World War II Magisterarbeit zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades MAGISTER ARTIUM (M.A.) vorgelegt von Konrad Linke geboren am 29. Mai 1979, in Jena Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Jörg Nagler Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Thomas Kroll Jena, den 13. April 2007 1 Contents Eidesstattliche Erklärung 2 Introduction 3 Chapter 1 Japanese in America and the Anti-Japanese Movement 17 Chapter 2 From Pearl Harbor to Incarceration 27 Chapter 3 Arrival and Adjustment 49 Chapter 4 The House Managers 66 Chapter 5 Features of Confinement 69 Chapter 6 Life Behind Barbed Wire 79 Chapter 7 The Camp Press 98 Chapter 8 The Struggle for Self-Government 112 Conclusions 131 Epilogue 140 Deutsche Zusammenfassung 142 Glossary & Abbreviations 143 Tables 144 Appendices 148 Bibliography 153 Acknowledgments 161 2 Eidesstattliche Erklärung Hiermit versichere ich, dass ich die vorliegende Magisterarbeit ohne unzulässige Hilfe Dritter und ohne Benutzung anderer als der angegebenen Hilfsmittel angefertigt habe. Die aus fremden Quellen direkt oder indirekt übernommenen Gedanken sind als solche kenntlich gemacht. Jena, den 13. April 2007 Konrad Linke 3 Introduction The serious threat to democracy is not the existence of foreign totalitarian states. It is the existence within our own personal attitudes and within our own institutions of conditions which have given a victory to external authority, discipline, uniformity and dependence upon The Leader in foreign countries. The battlefield is also accordingly here – within ourselves and our institutions. 1 – JOHN DEWEY The wartime incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War II has absorbed generations of historians and experienced numerous shifts in focus and interpretation. At first glance it is a history of a minority singled out for discrimination during wartime. In a wider sense, however, it is a telling example of the zeitgeist of the age of totalitarianism, of the nature of the American democracy, and of problems concerning national and cultural identity in a multi-ethnic society. While the present thesis ineluctably relates to these fundamental issues, the main purpose of this microhistoric study is to examine dominance, resistance, and social patterns in one of the sixteen Assembly Centers for Japanese Americans. In this introduction, I will first delineate how the political leadership of the United States dealt with this episode in hindsight. This leads over to an excursus into the still contested question of terminology. This excursus serves to set apart the summary incarceration of Japanese Americans from other forms of wartime imprisonment; along the way it provides essential facts to this complex of events. Next, I will sketch the main concerns and watersheds in the historical discourse, and comment on a recent debate to illustrate the topicality of the wartime incarceration. After this historiographical survey I will set forth the goals of this study. Following that I lay open my method and discuss the sources used in the analysis. Lastly, by outlining the structure of this thesis I will bridge the gap to the first chapter. Two months after the attack on Pearl Harbor President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 which authorized the Army – without the declaration of martial law – to remove all persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast of the United States. More than 110,000 people, two-thirds of them U.S. citizens, were rounded up and shipped off to prison camps in desolate regions. There most remained until the war ended. In 1976, President Gerald Ford rescinded Executive Order 9066, stating: “We know now what we should have known then; not only was the evacuation wrong, but Japanese Americans were and are loyal Americans.”2 In 1980, his successor Jimmy Carter signed legislation to create the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC). The CWRIC was to conduct an official governmental study of Executive Order 9066 and its impact on 1 John Dewey: Freedom and Culture, New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1939, p. 65. 2 Presidential Proclamation 4417, Feb. 19, 1976. Presidential documents are online at www.presidency.ucsb.edu. 4 the Japanese Americans on the Pacific Coast. In 1982, after lengthy public hearings, the commission concluded: The promulgation of Executive Order 9066 was not just justified by military necessity, and the decisions which followed from it – detention, ending detention and ending exclusion – were not driven by analysis of military conditions. The broad historical causes which shaped these decisions were race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership. Widespread ignorance of Japanese Americans contributed to a policy conceived in haste and executed in an atmosphere of fear and anger at Japan. A grave injustice was done to American citizens and resident nationals of Japanese ancestry who, without individual review or any probative evidence against them, were excluded, removed and detained by the United States during World War II.3 The CWRIC’s recommendation that the survivors be given an official apology and be paid reparations was later passed by Congress and signed into law by Ronald Reagan.4 Scholarly research played a major role in laying open the true reasons of the wartime incarceration. In fact, already in 1967, when the first academic conference on the wartime experience of the Japanese Americans was held at the University of California, Los Angeles, not a single scholar was willing to defend the actions of 1942.5 While today there is a consensus that the incarceration was unjust and unnecessary, terminology for this phenomenon has remained contested to the present. More specifically, historians are still at odds when it comes to find appropriate substitutes for the official euphemisms “Assembly Center” and “Relocation Camp.”6 The following paragraphs explore the meaning of the most common nomenclatures in use. I will discuss their appropriateness and expose the rationale behind their usage. As a starting point of our inquiry, let us have another look at the CWRIC’s report: There is a continuing controversy over the contention that the camps were “concentration camps” and that any other term is a euphemism. The government documents of the time frequently use the term “concentration camps,” but after World War II, with full realization of the atrocities committed by the Nazis in the death camps of Europe, that phrase came to have a very different meaning. The American relocation centers were bleak and bare, and life in them had many hardships, but they were not extermination camps, nor did the American government embrace a policy of torture and liquidation of the ethnic Japanese. To use the phrase “concentration camps” summons up images and ideas which are inaccurate and unfair.7 In the same year Raymond Y. Okamura published an essay in which he elucidated the effects of government euphemisms and defended the usage of “concentration camp.”8 More importantly, while the quote above posits only “concentration camp” as an alternative to government euphemisms, 3 Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC): Personal Justice Denied. Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982, p. 18. 4 The Civil Liberties Act of 1988 provided each survivor with a $20,000 redress payment and a Presidential apology. 5 Roger Daniels: “Words Do Matter. A Note on Inappropriate Terminology and the Incarceration of the Japanese Americans” in Nikkei in the Pacific Northwest. Japanese Americans and Japanese Canadians in the Twentieth Century, ed. Louis Fiset and Gail Nomura, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005, p. 203. 6 In addition to the variations “Assembly Camp” and “Relocation Center,” officials occasionally used “Relocation Project” and “Reception Center” to denote Relocation Camps. 7 CWRIC: Personal Justice Denied, p. 27. 8 Raymond Y. Okamura: “The American Concentration Camps: A Cover-up Through Euphemistic Terminology,” Journal of Ethnic Studies Vol. 10 (1982), pp. 95-109. 5 Okamura proposed another option, namely “internment camp:” An incongruous situation presently exists wherein authors provocatively use internment or concentration camp in their titles, but revert to the old “evacuation-relocation” nomenclature in their text, tables, and illustrations. The record needs rewriting.9 Anxious to avoid government euphemism at all costs, Okamura, and with him many historians, authors, and journalists, paid little attention to the terms they used as replacement – with momentous consequences. Let us set aside for a moment the different views on the matter and examine more closely the three terms proposed: 1) Assembly Center and Relocation Camp; 2) internment camp; 3) concentration camp. “Assembly Center” and “Relocation Camp” represent the terms most commonly employed by the agencies, which operated the camps – that is, the WCCA (Army) and the WRA respectively. The Army, for example, insisted that Assembly Centers were “temporary shelters where evacuees could be assembled and protected.”10 In reality, Japanese Americans were forced to leave their homes to be rounded up in these camps, which were surrounded by barbed wire fences and watchtowers. Armed guards held watch day and night, and anybody who left without