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Russian foreign policy and global security: how Russia defines its international security policy

Prepared by Michael Berk Canadian International Council (CIC) RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND GLOBAL SECURITY: HOW RUSSIA DEFINES ITS INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Prepared by Michael Berk Canadian International Council (CIC)

Prepared for the International Security Research and Outreach Programme International Security Bureau

April 2008

1 About the workshop and report

The following report is a summary of expert presentations and discussions that took place at a policy workshop developed and conducted by the Canadian International Council (CIC) at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) on February 18th, 2008. Sponsored by the International Security Research and Outreach Program at DFAIT, the workshop brought together Canadian and Russian scholars and policy experts to address specific questions developed by the organizers in consultation with DFAIT (see Annex B, page 34). The workshop took place one day after Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia, a day prior to the Armenian presidential elections and two weeks prior to the Russian presidential elections. References to these events throughout the report should be taken in the proper context. This report was prepared by Michael Berk, CIC workshop’s coordinator who specializes in Russian affairs, with the assistance of Margaret Watts and Allison Keating from Carleton University. The views expressed in this report are those of the experts and are not intended to reflect the views of DFAIT or the Government of Canada.

About the Canadian International Council (CIC)

The CIC is a non-partisan, nationwide organization established to strengthen Canada's role in international affairs. Building upon the proud history of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA), the Council aims to advance research and dialogue on international affairs issues by supporting a Canadian foreign policy network that crosses academic disciplines, policy areas, and economic sectors. CIC’s 13 branches promote national foreign policy dialogue by presenting speakers, seminars, roundtable discussions and study groups to interested Canadians. Dialogue and research are combined in highly-regarded publications such as the International Journal and Behind the Headlines.

2 PREFACE

The International Security Research and Outreach Programme (ISROP) is located within the Continental Defence Relations Division of the International Security Bureau. ISROP’s mandate is to provide the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) with timely, high quality policy relevant research that will inform and support the development of Canada’s international security policy in the areas of North American, regional and multilateral security and defence cooperation, non-proliferation (nuclear and non-nuclear), arms control and disarmament. The current ISROP research themes can be found at: www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/ arms/isrop/menu-en.asp.

ISROP regularly commissions research to support Canadian officials by drawing on its think-tank and academic networks in Canada and abroad. The following report, Russian foreign policy and global security: how Russia defines its international security policy, is an example of such contract research.

DFAIT wishes to acknowledge the work performed under contract by Michael Berk, on behalf of the Canadian International Council (CIC).

Disclaimer: The views and positions expressed in this report are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade or the Government of Canada. The report is in its original language.

3 PRÉAMBULE

Le Programme de recherche et d'information dans le domaine de la sécurité internationale (PRISI) fait partie de la Direction de la défense continentale, qui relève elle-même de la Direction générale de la sécurité internationale. Il a pour mandat de fournir au ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international (MAECI), en temps utile, des études stratégiques de haute qualité et pertinentes qui permettent d’orienter et de soutenir l’élaboration de la politique canadienne de sécurité internationale concernant l’Amérique du Nord, la coopération régionale et multilatérale en matière de sécurité et de défense, ainsi que la non-prolifération (nucléaire et non nucléaire), le contrôle des armements et le désarmement. Les thèmes de recherches actuels du Programme de recherche et d’information dans le domaine de la sécurité internationale (PRISI) figurent à l’adresse suivante: www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/isrop/menu-fr.asp

Le PRISI commande régulièrement des études pour faciliter le travail des fonctionnaires canadiens, en faisant appel à ses réseaux de spécialistes et d’universitaires au Canada et à l’étranger. Le rapport suivant est un exemple de ce type d’étude.

Le MAECI souhaite reconnaître le travail exécuté à contrat par Michael Berk, Le Conseil international du Canada.

Déni de responsabilité : Les vues et opinions exprimées dans le présent rapport appartiennent exclusivement à l’auteur, et ne reflètent pas nécessairement celles du ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international, ou celles du gouvernement du Canada. Le rapport est présenté dans la langue de rédaction.

4 Executive Summary

As a security player with both regional and global reach, understanding the Russian Federation and how it perceives its foreign policy and security interests is essential to Canada’s own security interests in and foreign and economic policies towards the region.

In order to develop an adequate approach to Russia, grounded in strategic analysis of emerging global trends and a realization of the existing window of opportunity presented by Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan, the following realities must be accepted:

• Russia is positioning itself as an indispensable actor in Eurasia (East- West relations) and uses its economic, political and military assets to develop and secure the necessary pre-conditions for continuing sustainable growth;

• Devoid of the ideological constraints of the past, Russia is viewing its ‘near abroad’ both as a crucial buffer against external threats and an area of economic influence using consensus–building mechanisms (CSTO, SCO, EurAsEC) to ensure its predominance in the region;

• Aware of the limitations of the current international system, but also of the opportunities such a situation presents, the Russian security doctrine prefers flexible issue-based alliances with partners in both the East and West to fixed ‘block-based’ structures;

• The ability of all FSU countries to pursue direct multi-vector engagements with different partners (NATO, EU, China, US, Iran, Turkey) forces Russia to accommodate and offers ‘out of region’ players significant leverage opportunities, which in turn requires the development of a systemic approach to the region;

• Potential NATO expansion eastward (Ukraine, Georgia) will undoubtedly create a serious rift between Russia and the West on many international arms control and other security issues, including raising opportunity costs for Western engagement in Afghanistan;

• Despite emerging global economic, financial and security threats Canada does not possess clearly articulated priorities regarding engaging Russia on issues such as Afghanistan, arms control, conflict resolution, the Arctic and commerce;

• Given geographic proximity, a similar climate, Canada’s position in the international community, national interests and a wealth of knowledge on many topics of interest to Russia, Canada is well positioned to promote mutually beneficial partnerships between Russia and the West.

5 Any approach to Russia must be based on a realistic assessment of Canadian national interests in the post-Soviet space, such as trade and economic relations, security, promotion of good corporate governance and the rule of law. Such an assessment, long overdue, must link domestic and foreign priorities with the tools at our disposal. The re-emerging Russia, situated in the midst of the most rapidly developing continent of the 21st century – Eurasia - offers many opportunities and poses many challenges. If Canada is interested in seeing a stable and prosperous partner in Russia it must not allow itself to become entrenched in stereotypes of Russia or outmoded Cold War paradigms based on conflict and competition to the exclusion of cooperation.

6 Résumé

En tant qu’intervenant d’envergure régionale et mondiale dans le domaine de la sécurité, le Canada se doit de comprendre la Fédération de Russie et comment elle perçoit sa politique étrangère et ses intérêts en matière de sécurité, afin de mieux promouvoir ses propres intérêts dans la région, ainsi que ses politiques étrangère et économique concernant la région.

Afin d’élaborer une stratégie adéquate à l’égard de la Russie, qui s’appuie sur une analyse stratégique des grandes tendances qui se dessinent à l'échelle mondiale et sur l’exploitation des possibilités existantes offertes par l’engagement du Canada en Afghanistan, il faut admettre les réalités suivantes :

• La Russie s’est établie comme un acteur indispensable en Eurasie (relations Est-Ouest) et elle utilise ses atouts économiques, politiques et militaires afin de développer et d’obtenir les conditions préalables nécessaires pour entretenir une croissance durable;

• Dépourvue des contraintes idéologiques du passé, la Russie considère ses proches voisins comme une zone tampon cruciale contre les menaces extérieures et comme une région d’influence économique qui emploie des mécanismes de recherche de consensus (CSTO, SCO, EurAsEC) afin d’assurer sa prédominance dans la région;

• Consciente des limites du système international actuel, mais également des possibilités qu’un tel contexte offre, la doctrine de la sécurité russe préfère aux structures lourdes et immobiles les alliances souples avec des partenaires dans l’Est et dans l’Ouest, basées sur les enjeux;

• La capacité des pays de l’ex-Union soviétique à poursuivre leurs relations directes à vecteurs multiples avec différents partenaires (l’OTAN, l’UE, la Chine, les États-Unis, l’Iran, la Turquie) oblige la Russie à s’adapter et offre aux intervenants qui ne sont pas de la région d’importantes possibilités d’exercer leur influence, ce qui exige l’élaboration d’une approche systémique concernant la région;

• L’expansion éventuelle de l’OTAN vers l’Est (en Ukraine, en Géorgie) suscitera sans nul doute une forte dissension entre la Russie et l’Ouest sur de nombreux enjeux relatifs au contrôle international des armements et à d’autres questions de sécurité, notamment l’augmentation des coûts de renonciation en ce qui concerne l’engagement de l’Ouest en Afghanistan;

7 • Malgré les menaces mondiales émergentes sur les plans de l’économie, des finances et de la sécurité, le Canada ne dispose pas de priorités clairement formulées concernant le dialogue avec la Russie sur des enjeux comme l’Afghanistan, le contrôle des armements, la résolution des conflits, l’Arctique et le commerce;

• Étant donné sa proximité géographique, son climat similaire, sa position dans la communauté internationale, ses intérêts nationaux et ses solides connaissances sur de nombreux sujets d’intérêt pour la Russie, le Canada est en bonne place pour promouvoir des partenariats mutuellement avantageux entre la Russie et l’Ouest.

Une approche de la Russie doit se fonder sur une évaluation réaliste des intérêts nationaux canadiens à l’ère soviétique, comme les relations commerciales et économiques, la sécurité, la promotion d’une bonne gouvernance institutionnelle et la primauté du droit. Une telle évaluation, qui s’impose depuis longtemps, doit lier les priorités nationales et étrangères aux outils mis à notre disposition. La réémergence de la Russie, située au milieu du continent qui se développe le plus rapidement au XXIe siècle, l’Eurasie, offre de nombreuses possibilités et pose beaucoup de défis. Si le Canada souhaite voir dans la Russie un partenaire stable et prospère, il ne faut pas qu’il s’enracine dans des stéréotypes sur la Russie ou dans des paradigmes démodés de la guerre froide qui sont fondés sur des conflits et la concurrence et qui excluent la coopération.

8 Table of Contents

Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………..10

I. Russia’s ‘near abroad’ and its security interest in the region…………12

New Eastern Europe……………………………………………………………………12

Ukraine………………………………………………………………………………12 Belarus……………………………………………………………………………….13 Moldova………………………………………………………………………………14

The South Caucasus……………………………………………………………………14

Georgia………………………………………………………………………………14 Armenia……………………………………………………………………………..15 Azerbaijan………………………………………………………………………….15

II. Russia’s foreign policy approaches…………………………………………………16

Frozen Conflicts……………………………………………………………………………16 Georgia………………………………………………………………………………17 Armenia……………………………………………………………………………..17 Moldova………………………………………………………………………………17

New Eastern Europe……………………………………………………………………18

III. Russia and regional multilateral organizations…………………………….20

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe……………….20 Commonwealth of Independent States………………………………………21 Shanghai Cooperation Organization…………………………………………..21 Collective Security Treaty Organization…………………………………….22

IV. Regional multilateral organizations in Russian security doctrine…25

V. Possible evolution of Russian security doctrine………………………………29

VI. Conclusion and recommendations for Canada………………………………33

Annex A (speakers bios)………………………………………………………………………35 Annex B (workshop agenda)………………………………………………………………..38

9 Introduction

An economically resurgent Russia has become increasingly more confident about its future in the global economy and its place in the international system. Over the past eight years a resource-rich Russia has seen rapid growth, sharp increases in personal incomes, vast exports of energy, and foreign currency reserves of over US$500 billion - the highest per capita official reserves in the industrialized world. Russia’s continued growth will hinge on its ability to diversify its economy, with particular focus given to the knowledge-based sectors, invest in an ailing infrastructure and create favourable a business environment, while carefully managing inflational pressures and the threat of global economic slowdown.

Despite criticisms of democratic backsliding, Russia has seen a high degree of political stability under President Vladimir Putin compared with the years of turmoil under the late Boris Yeltsin. The pliant Duma (lower house of Parliament) has eagerly implemented President Putin’s policies and the President’s handpicked successor, Dmitry Medvedev, won a landslide victory in the Presidential elections in March 2008.

This more confident Russia insists on being consulted on all international matters. This is particularly the case with respect to Russia’s so-called ‘near- abroad’.1 Russia wants to be assured that its security is not threatened by further rounds of NATO enlargement, which it sees as little more than the encirclement of its territory by states formerly under its sphere of influence and now under Western, writ US, tutelage.

Russia’s self-perception and national interests are undergoing a fundamental restructuring due in large part to its resource interdependency with Europe and Asia, re-assessment of its strategic position in the world and its suspicions regarding the foreign policy objectives of the United States and its allies.

Following the unsuccessful attempts in the mid-1990s to integrate with the West, Russia’s newly acquired confidence, along with a changing geopolitical environment, often manifests itself in what some perceive as disengagement from the West. Recent Western efforts to export democracy through regime change in the former Russian sphere of influence contribute to rising suspicions of Western sincerity. The latest dispute over the international recognition of Kosovo’s claim to independence underlines the divergent views Russia has with several Western countries on the role of international law and stability in the international system. Russia is still weighing its options while attempting to balance the shift that is occurring in the balance of world

1 Traditionally, in the minds of Russian policymakers, the ‘near-abroad’ refers to all republics of the former Soviet Union, with the exception of the Baltic states. However, as a result of the emerging geopolitical order in this ‘near-abroad’, analysts are more inclined to use less Russo-centric terms such as “the post- Soviet space”.

10 economic power with its position in the midst of East-West relations. To date, the West has not acknowledged the value of Russian participation in such developments despite Russia’s vast assets and growing importance in the international arena. This fact, as well as the reality that we are dealing with a different Russia today – a Russia with which we do not feel very comfortable and which can react unpredictably – makes an assessment of potential policy directions for Russian involvement in the world even more important. As Russia comes up with challenging ideas, Canada and other players must be ready to respond. It is time for an exchange of ideas between Canadian and Russian experts on Russian security interests, issues of mutual concern and opportunities for cooperation.

11 I. Russia’s ‘near abroad’ and its security interests in the region

A decade and a half after the end of the Soviet Union the term ‘near abroad’ as a catch-all description of new states that have emerged from the USSR is increasingly less useful. In place of 11 (or 14, if one adds the Baltics) former republics there are as many new states, each one with its own distinct identity, interests, and idiosyncrasies. Despite the many difficulties in defining the various regions within the ‘near abroad’ one could speak broadly about the new Eastern Europe, to include Ukraine, Belarus and possibly Moldova; the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan).

That each of these former republics of the Soviet Union has managed to turn into fully-fledged states is no small feat; so too is the fact that not one of these states is dominated by Russia. Each of the FSU (former Soviet Union) states recognizes that Russia is here to stay and that Russia, though not as threatening as it once was, remains ‘the biggest kid on the block’. However, they are increasingly comfortable with managing their relations with Russia, be they positive or negative. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, for example, have used Russian dependency on their energy sources as a tool for obtaining favourable terms for themselves in trade and other sectors. Georgia, the FSU state with the most conflicted relationship with Russia, sees itself at war with Russia and views Russia as an occupying power in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In any case, these states have learned to manage Russia: they know what they want from Russia, just as Russia knows what it wants from them.

New Eastern Europe

Ukraine

To a pragmatic Russian leadership, the Ukraine is, above all, a transit country en route to ‘Europe’. Gazprom wants to make sure that gas shipments to its main customers in the EU go unimpeded and undiminished across the Ukraine, that the Ukraine itself pays market price for the gas it buys from Russia, and that the transit fees it charges are reasonably low. Gas relationships, usually complex and often murky, form the centerpiece of current Russo-Ukrainian relations.

Moscow wants to see a ‘friendly’ government in Kiev. The Russians have recently learned, at a price, that there can be no such thing as a pro-Russian Ukrainian politician, with the exception of marginal figures. The Kremlin has no hope of dragging Kiev into an economic union, not to speak of a political or a military alliance. Moscow has reconciled itself to the prospect of an

12 economically EU-leaning but neutral Ukraine. However, it remains categorically opposed to Ukraine’s membership in NATO. This is largely due to Moscow’s desire to keep Ukraine as a buffer between itself and NATO.

Though western states now lean toward thinking of NATO in the context of Afghanistan, its image as an insurance policy against a resurgent Russia is not easily erased in Eastern Europe. This image, combined with Russia’s continued distrust of NATO and its failure to take full advantage of the possibilities NATO has made available to it, makes the question of Ukrainian membership a potential catalyst for a power struggle not just within Ukraine but between Russia and the West. Such a struggle would prove both counterproductive and provocative.

The Russian government’s support for Russian business interests in the Ukraine, other than Gazprom, has been slight. Moscow has been more vocal in criticizing new restrictions on the use of the Russian language in Ukraine, Kiev’s steps to ‘revise history’ by honouring anti-Soviet fighters who fought alongside the Nazis during WWII and bringing up Holodomor (the Stalin- inspired 1932-33 famine) as a case of anti-Ukrainian genocide. Furthermore, perennial issues such as dealing with the Black Sea Fleet, the delimitation of the Kerch Strait waters, and so forth still remain.

Having internalized the Ukraine’s independence Russia seeks to keep that country as a neutral buffer between itself and NATO countries while trying to protect Gazprom’s interests and raising flags about other interests which are hurt by Ukrainian policies. Ukraine’s NATO membership is a red rag for Russia. Moscow is now using is manipulation of all the Ukrainian political forces rather than aligning itself with just one camp.

Belarus

Russia’s interests in Belarus are in part similar to those in the Ukraine. Belarus is another transit country for Russian oil and gas and is deemed almost as unreliable as the Ukraine. Hence the rationale for the Nord Stream gas pipeline across the Baltic Sea to connect Russia directly with Germany. Moscow has been more active in pressing Minsk than Kiev to open the country to Russian business expansion but with fewer results. Despite attempts at economic integration between the two countries (a customs union and a single economic space) President Lukashenko controls the Belarusian economy.

The Belarusian leader presents himself as a defender of Russian security interests. In reality he has been trying hard to ‘sell’ this role to the Kremlin for tangible benefits. Belarus lies on the main East-West strategic corridor in Eastern Europe, and it is seen as a buffer between Russia’s heartland and the NATO countries Poland and Lithuania, both having complicated relations with Russia. At present, however, Moscow strategic and military planners see little

13 likelihood of a major military conflict in Europe, and Belarus is more of a virtual than a real stronghold.

The Kremlin has been unhappy about the maverick Lukashenko, but they abhor the idea of a ‘colour revolution’ to replace him with a pro-Western regime. In the past Moscow has flirted with opposition politicians in Belarus, but now they are prepared to stick with the incumbent as a lesser evil. Should the existing regime falter, the Kremlin can be expected to go to great lengths to ensure that Lukashenko’s successor is a friendly and malleable figure.

Moldova

Moldova is a minor transit country and a small customer of Gazprom. Moscow seeks to avoid two things: Moldova joining NATO and Moldova becoming a part of Romania. Both are unlikely in the foreseeable future.

What makes Moldova important in Russian eyes is Transnistria. Russia has been involved in the conflict, and in the attempts to resolve it, for over a decade and a half. At present Moscow sees its interests best served by an agreement to create a common Moldovan state where Transnistria would enjoy an elevated status, be able to help shape the policies in Chisinau, and serve as a conduit of Russian economic and cultural influence on both banks of the Dniester River. Having failed once in 2003, Moscow has resumed its conflict-resolution effort, which should also award it with a symbolic military presence in the area. It is still unclear what precedence the situation in Kosovo will set for Transnistria and other ‘frozen conflicts’ in the region.

The South Caucasus

In many ways the South Caucasus (‘near abroad’) and the North Caucasus (‘home abroad’) form a whole. Russia’s overriding security interest is to overcome separatism and Islamic radicalism in the North Caucasian republics between the Caspian and the Black Sea, stabilize them, and fully integrate them as part of Russia. It is through the prism of the North that Moscow looks at the South.

Georgia

Economically Georgia is of no particular interest to Russia. Its traditional military significance has also diminished - Russia is no longer preparing to fight Turkey. There is no significant Russian minority in Georgia, although there are hundreds of thousands of ethnic Georgians in Russia. There used to be a lot of empathy, especially among Russian intelligentsia circles, for Georgia, but this has been overshadowed in the popular mind by the more recent experience.

14 Russians see Georgian politicians as essentially disloyal to the former metropolitan power, only too eager to make common cause with its rivals - the US, Europe or Turkey. Gamsakhurdia was an ultra-nationalist; Shevardnadze used to be a bête noire to the Russian military and security personnel, and Saakashvili is seen as an American agent. Russians, however, have won friends in the ethnic enclaves of what Sakharov called the “small empire” of Georgia.

Russia formally recognizes Georgia’s territorial integrity and is involved in peacekeeping and conflict management in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, for all practical purposes, both territories have been integrated into Russia, and their relations with Tbilisi look beyond repair. Moscow has long used this situation to pressure Tbilisi, but Georgia’s strong desire to align itself with the West renders this conflict instrumentalization ineffective.

Moscow needs peace and stability south of its Caucasus border. It has no real appetite for territorial aggrandizement. It wants to keep Georgia out of NATO or, at the very least, keep third-party troops out of Georgia. So far, however, it has chosen to maintain the status quo rather than fully engage in a difficult search for conflict resolution in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Armenia

Armenia is a long-time strategic partner and ally of Russia. Moscow has come to regard Armenia as its base in the South Caucasus. By keeping a garrison there, Russia believes it can keep the region under constant watch. Seen from the other side, Russia is home to a sizeable and well-connected Armenian diaspora which has a capacity to influence Russia’s policy actions. The favorable political context has allowed Russia’s economic penetration into Armenia, which, however, is more apparent (property ownership) than real (production).

In the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia has been cooperating closely with the US and France, the other co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk group. It has been also careful not to appear too pro-Armenian so as to not undermine its relationship with Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan

Economically Azerbaijan is more important than Armenia, but for Russia it is a direct competitor in the energy market. Moscow’s prime geopolitical interest lies in keeping Baku from joining NATO or playing host to a US or Turkish military base in its territory. Under both Alievs Azerbaijan has pursued an independent but balanced and carefully nuanced policy toward Moscow, winning them respect in the Kremlin. For its part, Russia has been careful not to alienate Azerbaijan and turn it into an adversary.

15 II. Russia’s foreign policy approaches towards ‘frozen conflicts’ and New Eastern Europe

Russia is seeking to position itself as a modern ‘great power’. Russia’s foreign policy under Putin, particularly since 2004, differs greatly from that of Yeltsin in the 1990s in that the new policy takes into account Russia’s failed attempts to integrate with the West. This failure was largely due to Russia’s desire to integrate on its own terms – terms which were not acceptable to Russia’s partners, especially the US. However, one could argue that integration was in any case never possible simply because Russia is sui generis Russia. Despite its failure to integrate, and the resulting view among some critics that Russia’s foreign policy is anti-western, Russia is not attempting to refashion itself as a Soviet Union redux. It has neither interest nor plans to recreate a great empire – a break with more than 500 years of Russian historical tradition. The internalization of the Ukraine’s independence by Russian elites played a great part in this break with Empire. As a modern great power, Russia’s business is Russia, not Empire.

However, this profound shift in Kremlin thought is not the only major issue driving Russia’s foreign policy. Russia’s desire to retain nuclear first-strike capability and to maintain the integrity of its borders, especially in the Caucasus region, are of significant importance. Russia’s determination to prevent - or in the worst case scenario, manage - foreign intervention within its borders is a critical tenet of its security doctrine.

Russia’s foreign policy has increasingly emphasized bilateral relationships. This is especially true of the ‘near abroad’. These interests reflect the Russian leadership’s current view of their country as an independent global player and a budding center of power and influence in Central Eurasia. The Kremlin also sees itself in stiff strategic competition with other power centers such as the United States, the European Union, China, and other regional powers such as Turkey and Iran. Much of that competition is centered on the newly independent states, which used to be Russia’s borderlands.

Frozen Conflicts

Russia’s stance on ‘frozen conflicts’ in its ‘near abroad’ reflects its renewed confidence in its role as an emergent regional superpower. The term ‘frozen conflict’, despite its conceptual usefulness, can be misleading in that it implies that these conflicts could begin to ‘melt’ and lead to a resumption of conflict. The term also incorrectly implies that these conflicts have been static, without any change over the past several years when indeed, there has been a great deal of change in the relative stature and attitudes of the parties involved.

16 Russia has used military and economic pressure (or economic incentives) to achieve its goals in these conflicts. In each case, there has been some form of Russian military involvement, ranging from overall military support for Armenia’s position, to the stationing of Russian troops and the storage of significant numbers of Russian weapons in other cases. Moscow subsequently claimed to have converted its forces into ‘peacekeeping troops’ and has repeatedly delayed withdrawal or continues to retain forces (as in the case of Moldova) in these frozen conflict areas.

Georgia

In Georgia, Russia has deployed forces in the breakaway regions (prior to withdrawal) or on the border to stir up trouble. Moscow’s influence within these breakaway regions has been significant. Not only has it provided citizenship to a total of 50,000 residents in South Ossetia and some 200,000 in Abkhazia, but it has used military pressure within and on Georgia’s borders to pressure the Saakashvili government. Moscow has been highly concerned by Saakashvili’s Western orientation, Georgia’s clear desire to join NATO (which was reinforced through a popular referendum in January 2008), and the willingness of the Tbilisi government to host American training forces.

Often Moscow’s relations with the states have been delegated to the power ministries, peopled by the so-called Siloviki, but with the clear support of President Putin. At times Russia has exercised harsh pressures. Moscow has often instigated incidents only to then play the role of mediator. By playing both arsonist and fireman the Kremlin has sent a message that it wants to keep the region under its control, particularly in the cases of Georgia and Moldova – a message those wishing to paint Russia as a regional hegemon are only too happy to hear.

Armenia

In Armenia, with Presidential elections scheduled for 19 February 2008 and with Presidents Robert Kocharian barred by the constitution from serving a third consecutive term, there is a possibility that should opposition leader Levon Ter-Petrossian win, he might pursue a less deferential policy toward Russia than his predecessor. However, as President Kocharian has anointed Prime Minister Serzh Saraisian as his successor, the prospect for Ter- Petrossian seems slim.

Moldova

Despite pleas by Moldovan leaders for Moscow to withdraw its forces from Transnistria, Moscow has moved from one excuse to another, citing inter alia the need to protect Russian citizens and the vast quantities of Russian munitions and weapons still stored in the area. Though the government in Chisinau has repeatedly denounced the stationing of Russian troops in separatist Transnistria as illegal and has called on Moscow to fulfill the

17 commitments that it made in Istanbul in 1999, the Putin government has refused to cooperate. In fact, it has used an embargo on Moldovan exports and cutting off oil and gas supplies to pressure the Moldovan government. As the Moldovan President began to make concessions and agreed to a doubling of gas prices and a Russian share in the Moldovan gas company, Moscow eased up. President Voronin, a former Soviet General, and head of Moldova’s Communist Party has recently begun to praise Moscow while further cooling relations with neighbouring Romania (which is a member of both NATO and the EU). This coercive pattern of embargoes and ‘energy diplomacy’ is also evident in Russia’s relations with the new Eastern Europe.

New Eastern Europe

Russia’s foreign policy toward the new Eastern Europe is characterized by a desire to preserve and strengthen its influence, particularly in what used to be called the Slav core (i.e. Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova) of the Soviet Union. A key method of achieving this aim has been the use of pipelines as part of a vigorous ‘petro-diplomacy’.

The EU’s dependence on Russia for 44% of its natural gas and high-profile disruptions of service have led to accusations that Russia is an abuser of its ‘special energy relationship’ and is using it to weaken the position of Eastern Europe or to enhance its control over frozen conflicts. The construction of pipelines under the Baltic and Black Seas to avoid transit through ‘unfriendly’ East European states along with Russian attempts to undermine alternative projects by western consortia that would bring natural gas directly from the Central Asian states to Europe, also contributes to this picture.

Russia is in many respects too dependent on the energy sector for, as President Putin himself admitted, the country lacks a balanced economy. Moscow’s energy advantage is bound to diminish as resources are drawn down and as Russian delivery of energy becomes ever more expensive and difficult. This will make reliance on ‘petro-diplomacy’ at the expense of other forms of engagement difficult.

Other key Russian foreign policy directions in the new Eastern Europe include a harsh reaction not only to the possibility of further NATO enlargement but also to the prospect of the deployment of a U.S. anti-missile defence shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. In October 2007, Putin suggested that deployment in Eastern Europe might be tantamount to another Cuban Missile Crisis and warned that it could lead to a redeployment of Russian strategic weapons.

Russia’s alarm here is more likely political than military. With American deployment of forces in Poland and the Czech Republic, Moscow appears to believe that new East Europeans will be more emboldened to push democratization further east. The Kremlin may also fear that with such a

18 deployment the new East Europeans could claim a larger voice within NATO and press more forcefully for ‘hard security guarantees’ against Russia. This in turn would make the Alliance itself more resistant to Russian pressures and less amenable to Russian manipulation. Moreover, the alarm might just be providing cover for the deeper issue of new eastern European insensitivity toward Russian security issues. Russia claims with some justification that the new Eastern European and FSU states should have been more sensitive to Russian security concerns and pride as should Western states in the enlargement of NATO.

Further tensions between Russia and the West have come to the fore over arms control. The US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002, the fact that neither the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty nor START-2 have entered into legal force, the impending expiration of START-1 in December 2009, as well as Russia’s suspension of its participation in the Conventional Forces of Europe (CFE) Treaty in November 2007 all contribute to this crisis. Some progress has been made under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty under which Russia has eliminated approximately 4,000 nuclear warheads over the last two decades. Should Russia choose to withdraw from this treaty, however, both Russia and the US may recommence production of intermediate-range missiles for use in regional conflicts. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has indicated that “nothing is decided yet”, but the fact remains that Russia and the West are becoming less interested in partnering over arms control and this will have significantly negative consequences. Moreover, Russia has become less and less interested in using the anti-terrorism cooperation framework as a way of working with the West. This has become particularly apparent with the end of the second Chechen war, the continuing lack of cooperation between NATO and the CSTO on Afghanistan and the general change in the political atmosphere of Russia. These underdeveloped partnerships highlight that Russia and the West have had numerous opportunities to build stable, positive relations. The failure to develop these relationships would mean a high historical cost for both Russia and the West.

19 III. Russia and regional multilateral organizations

Russia continues to regard the post-Soviet space (PSS) as the most important priority area in its foreign policy. PSS is viewed as a source of security threats, which must be neutralized, and an area where Russia would like to have more influence than other great powers. Each of the international organizations active in Russia’s so-called ‘near abroad’ region has a specific place in Russian policies, determined mostly by the role it has played in the geopolitical transformations of the past few decades: the dismantling of the Cold War system, the abolition of the Soviet Union, Russia’s return to active geopolitical competition, the rise of the new Russia- China security partnership, and the emergence of the PSS as a complex region of growing geopolitical competition. If the OSCE and the CIS, for all their remaining utility, seem to have largely fulfilled their historic roles, CSTO and SCO, created in the course of Russia’s return to a more active foreign policy, are ‘rising stars’ in Central Eurasia and are only beginning to make their presence felt. At the same time Russia seems to have made little progress in integrating the Caucasus, while Georgia and Azerbaijan have significantly broadened their political and economic outreach with non-post- Soviet partners.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), based on the 1975 Helsinki Accords, was created as a mechanism to facilitate the termination of the Cold War and the gradual integration of Europe’s East and West. Having fulfilled its primary function, the future directions and utility of the organization are currently under debate. In recent years Russia has come to see the OSCE as little more than a Western-dominated organization in which it has become a target of rising criticisms of its domestic and foreign policies. The OSCE is now an arena of Russia-West tensions on a range of issues, including the authoritarian trend in Russian politics, the resolution of the Kosovo dispute, controversies surrounding energy security, and the virtual collapse of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). There is a general consensus among Russia’s foreign policy elites that the current version of CFE, agreed upon at the 1999 OSCE Summit in Istanbul, is outdated and unacceptable. Moscow sees the Treaty as putting it in significant military disadvantage vis-à-vis NATO. Russia’s perception that certain NATO countries have failed to ratify and abide by the terms of the modified Treaty further emboldened the Kremlin in its decision in December 2007 to suspend implementation of its obligations under the CFE. Moscow can be expected to push for further changes in the Treaty that would enable it to have greater flexibility over the placement and number of its forces in the European theatre.

20 Finding itself heavily outnumbered and on the defensive in that organization, Moscow has scaled down its participation in it. Still, the OSCE remains an important forum for Russian diplomacy. Moscow will continue to put forward its positions on key security issues despite the contentious atmosphere which has become characteristic of this organization.

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was set up in 1991 as a framework both for the peaceful dismantling of the USSR and for the development of new forms of cooperation between post-Soviet states. The organization consists of an increasingly loose association of 11 former Soviet states engaged in multilateral cooperation on such issues as trade, transportation, health, and culture. 2 Different member states maintain different levels and forms of participation in it while remaining free to develop ties outside CIS. The CIS has successfully fulfilled its dismantling task – indeed the relatively peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union must be commended as an impressive achievement of the CIS framework – in the past several years and has become an institution of waning importance. Cooperative functions, to date, have been driven mostly by the existence of integrative ties inherited from Soviet times, and member countries should be expected to continue to participate in given arrangements only insomuch as they serve the national interests of each individual member state. The CIS also continues to serve as an important mechanism for ensuring dialogue between the leaders of member states, bringing together leaders such as Presidents Saakashvili and Putin at its summits.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) began as a series of talks held from 1996 to 2000 on the delimitation of the borders between China and its post-Soviet neighbors (Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). After the initial security task was fulfilled it was decided not to dismantle the Shanghai group but rather to redirect its efforts into a broader political and economic dialogue. In 2001 the ‘Shanghai Five’ was restructured as a political inter-state organization and adopted Uzbekistan as its sixth member. During the mid-2000s a new ‘wave of enlargement’ took place, with Mongolia, Iran, Pakistan, and India gaining observer status in the organization. Impressively, SCO member/observer states cover one-fourth of the planet’s land and are home to every third person on the globe. Given the sheer breadth of the organization and the importance of the region to Russia’s security interests, the SCO and the potential forms and directions it may take will continue to dominate the minds of policy-makers in Moscow.

2 Current members of the CIS include: Armenia (1991), Azerbaijan (1993), Belarus (1991), Kazakhstan (1991), Kyrgyzstan (1991), Moldova (1994), Russia (1991), Tajikistan (1991), Ukraine (1991), Uzbekistan (2000). Current members outside the Council of Defence Ministers: Georgia (1993; withdrew from the Council in February 2006). Former members/Associate members: Turkmenistan (1991; withdrew 2005, current associate member).

21 The SCO has evolved into an organization which places primary emphasis on political, economic, social and diplomatic dialogue. Despite its foundations the organization’s current security agenda is rather limited. In terms of security the organization has chosen to focus on ‘soft’ security issues such as border protection; counter-terrorism, -extremism, and –separatism (the latter being a particular concern of Beijing with the Xinjiang-Uyghur region); anti-drug trafficking; and information security. No serious integration of military infrastructures is envisaged. There is cooperation, however, at the ministerial level with frequent meetings between Defence Ministers. The SCO did undertake joint military exercises in 2003, with the first phase occurring in Kazakhstan and the second in China, and, in 2007, in Russia. It is also important to note that the first ever Russian-Chinese bilateral military exercise took place on August 2005, but outside of the SCO framework.

The SCO’s importance for Russia’s foreign policy has steadily grown in recent years, especially as problems accumulated for Russia in OSCE. The SCO’s value for Russia consists in the enhancement of Moscow’s ability to stabilize the situation on its Central Asian borders and exercise influence in Central Asia in partnership with China in the face of Western competition. Prospects for the enlargement of the SCO depend on whether the organization comes to be seen by other countries in the region as a viable framework for development of security and cooperation. Russia is particularly keen to develop an ‘energy club’ within the SCO to coordinate energy policies of the member states, but is also pushing for real advancement on transportation, financial and hydroelectric projects.

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) was formed in 2003 and includes Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The organization was born out of the framework of the CIS Collective Security Treaty, but the military and security integration of the participating states was actually taken out of the CIS framework. The CSTO is an independent and self-supporting mechanism of integration and cooperation in the region.

The CSTO proclaimed three regions of collective security under its mandate: the Eastern (Belarus-Russia), Caucasian (Armenia-Russia) and Central Asian regions. While progress in the first two regions remains nominal, integration in the Central Asian region is actively moving ahead. Indeed the formation of the CSTO was expedited by the growing concerns of the common threat to Russia and Central Asia posed by the strengthening Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Even prior to the creation of the CSTO, in May of 2001, a decision was taken to create a Collective Rapid Deployment Forces (CDRF) under the CIS aegis for the Central Asian Region of Collective Security. In 2001 the initial force strength was set at 1,500 (with battalions from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan). Since being incorporated into the CSTO, the CRDF has been significantly strengthened. In 2004 the CRDF were upgraded to 11 battalions. The CDRF military headquarters in

22 Bishkek are manned by up to 61 officers in times of military exercises. An air force base in Kant with an international staff of up to 800 was added to the CDRF arsenal and has greatly contributed to CDRF mobility. Currently CSTO is working on the creation of two more regional ‘fire brigades’: the collective Russian-Byelorussian Force and a Russian-Armenian Crises Response Force for the South Caucasus.

Another sign of the organization’s determination to promote further integration and interoperability of its member states came with the announcement in January 2004 that CSTO would offer its members military- technical equipment at lower, internal, non-commercial prices. This provided incentives and a new momentum for rearming and re-equipping armies of the CSTO states with Russian-made military equipment and weaponry. Since June 2005 another preferential agreement was introduced the allowing of military cadres from CSTO states to attend free training and re-qualification courses in Russian defence academies and institutions. Joint mechanisms for training peacekeeping, anti-terror and anti-drug specialists from all CSTO countries were organized as well.

One of major goals of the organization is to establish a full-scale interoperable CSTO Force by merging the armed forces of the member countries into one well-coordinated military/security machine. This goal is slated for achievement in the second decade of the 21st century. Currently the CSTO is proceeding with the formation of a system of political and military command structures, which would be able to coordinate in ‘real time’ the defence efforts of member-states. This system includes regular CSTO summits (which substituted for CIS summits), operations of the CSTO Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers, Defence Ministers, Secretaries of Security Councils, and Commanders of Border Guard Services. The CSTO Military Staff in Moscow is well connected to the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. The CSTO has also created a Scientific Expert Council. Managing to complete the job left unfinished by the CIS, the CSTO has recreated an Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence system between the seven member-states, as well as a collective Air-Defence system and a system protecting the key rail and communication links between the member-states. In 2006, the development of a thick package of doctrinal documentation on joint CSTO Peace support system was completed. The system supposes the creation of the Collective CSTO Peace Support Forces to be used under UN mandates or mandates of regional organizations. One more instrument in this formation is the Collective Emergency Reaction Forces, to be used on the territories of CSTO in emergency situations of both a natural and social character.

The non-confrontational character of CSTO military/security arrangements was stressed when the CSTO suggested to the EU and NATO the establishment of cooperative relations based on a common understanding of modern threats and challenges to security and the absence of ideological

23 contradictions.3 Beginning in 2005-06 the CSTO undoubtedly overtook the CIS as the real focus of and mechanism for military-political integration of the group of newly independent states. CSTO positions itself as an organization working first of all in the field of new types of ‘soft’ security threats and challenges such as the fight against terrorism, illegal trans- border migration, drug trafficking, illegal arms trade, and the spread of WMD. There is an ongoing debate among CSTO elite as to whether the organization ought to focus on ‘soft’ security concerns or restructure itself as a traditional collective security organization focusing on countering ‘hard’ threats to its security. At the moment support for each variant is split down the middle, with no final decision having been made.

At the same time some elements of a traditional collective security organization are already evident in CSTO. The ‘Plan for coalition military building up to 2010’ has led to increased ‘horizontal’ integration of member- states’ weapons systems (i.e. artillery, air forces). Such developments reflect the construction of a collective defence organization concerned with territorial defence and large land-air military operations.4

3 In June 2004, following the decision of the CSTO summit in Astana, the Secretary General of CSTO wrote a letter to the Secretary General of NATO containing a formal proposal for cooperation mechanisms. Irrespective of its cautious informational contacts NATO in return remains unwilling to establish organization-to-organization cooperation, preferring bilateral contacts with individual CSTO member-states. Similarly, to date, NATO has refused to establish formal relations with SCO out of concern that such direct dialogue would reinforce and legitimize the latter. 4 In October 2007, the CSTO signed an agreement with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to broaden cooperation on issues such as security, crime, and drug trafficking. In essence, the emerging partnership between the two organizations means a greater degree of coordination between a Moscow-dominated CSTO (collective security; military-driven) with the SCO (economic development and security) where both Moscow and Beijing play dominant roles.

24 IV. The role of regional multilateral organizations in the Russian security doctrine

Although Russian policymakers continue to regard the post-Soviet space as a priority area in its foreign policy, the novelty of the situation is that in the 21st century their goals are expected to be reached not through imposition of Russian imperial will or Sovietization, as in the last two centuries, but through multilateral mechanisms based on a balance of interests of the states involved. In the situation of rising international competition in the post-Soviet space a Russian unilateralism would obviously be self-defeating, while working through multilateral organizations offers Russia modest but ultimately more effective ways of maintaining its influence.

The PSS is characterized by a growing tendency of all states in the area to assert their national interests as they are perceived by the ruling elites, and to form partnerships and associations with other states based on these perceptions. Gone are the days when Moscow could dictate the rules of engagement in the region. Instead, Russia is attempting to build new multilateral partnerships with its neighbors through organizations like the CSTO, SCO, and EurAsEC, where the focus is on consensus building and cooperation in areas of mutual concern. 5 As a result of this new reality Canada must adopt a more nuanced approach to analyzing the region and abandon outmoded and ultimately misleading Cold War paradigms.

In addition to dealing with the emergence of a PSS comprised of increasingly confident and independent states, Russia is also confronted with the reality of the growing presence and activism of what it sees as ‘out of region’ actors in its traditionally defined ‘near abroad’. NATO, the EU, the US, China, Iran, and Turkey are all becoming more involved in the region in terms of conflict resolution, large-scale economic projects such as pipeline construction, and political posturing.

The self-imposed restrictions of NATO and the EU on conducting operations in the FSU have by and large been removed. Since 2002 Moscow has been very concerned with these organizations’ declarations on ‘globalizing’ the spheres of their responsibility and expanding the parameters of potential operations. The US and NATO have emerged as serious players in Central Asia. Other regional powers such as China and Iran intend to play an increasingly active role in the region. Much to its dismay, Russia has not been able to develop an effective mechanism for dealing with the many security issues plaguing the Caucasus. Inevitably, other actors such as the US, NATO, and the EU, have begun to move in and are already deeply involved with Georgia. Turkey

5 In fact, in all three organizations every decision must be adopted by consensus. Such mechanisms, while recognizing the relative dominance of Russia and China on many issues, enable other members to influence or block decisions deemed unacceptable.

25 seems set to play a more visible role in the region. In Eastern Europe, the EU has committed itself to the monitoring of Moldova’s border with Ukraine. The Russian ruling establishment is not ready or interested in political, military and economic withdrawal from these areas. Nevertheless, Russia’s efforts to maintain and increase its influence in the region face rising geopolitical competition at every turn.

Russia’s nominal leadership in the CIS does not translate into Russian control over its members. Russia will continue to support the CIS framework in its current loose shape, aware that this is the only feasible mode of its existence. Any attempt to ‘push’ the CIS toward greater integration would be counterproductive for Russia as it would likely undermine the organization and result in more members leaving it. Conversely, the CIS itself as an inter- state structure may be allowed to peacefully pass over, while the inheritance of some its functions and credentials by narrower structures like CSTO or EurAsEC could be organized on an open and legally transparent basis rather than in a form of unfriendly take-over.

The CSTO perhaps best reflects this new stage in the evolution of the geostrategic composition of the ‘near abroad’ region. Moscow is clearly the leading force in this organization, both as the biggest actor possessing key assets of the post-Soviet military infrastructure and in terms of military spending. Kazakhstan, with the second largest defence budget in the organization with US$1.2 billion does not compare to the US$34 billion spent annually by Russia. However, it would be a mistake to claim that Moscow has a ‘free hand’ in determining the future of the organization and even less so the future of the region itself. But, on the other hand, its existence rests mostly on perceptions of shared interests and threats held by these countries’ elites rather than on Moscow’s ability to compel them to maintain their membership. Indeed, the recent establishment of the CSTO Peace- Keeping Forces under joint command is seen as an embodiment of Moscow’s security guarantees to the existing Central Asian regimes.

It has become impossible for the West to negotiate or resolve military/security issues in the region with Moscow alone – an important part of security issues has been relocated to the ‘CSTO basket’, with its Russia- dominated but already multilateral diplomatic procedures and mechanisms. The defining pattern of international politics in the PSS is not centralized control exercised from Moscow, but rather a set of complex multiplayer games in which Russia is important, but only one of the players. Its dominant role in the CSTO is limited by the ability of most other members to pursue multi-vector foreign policies, and its influence in the SCO is shared with China, which provides the other members with considerable room for manoeuver. Russia’s interests were not well served by some of the methods employed by Moscow and mistakes it has made in its newly assertive policy in the PSS, which have generated anti-Russian trends in the politics of several neighbouring countries. Georgia is a prime example of this. But it seems that no matter how Russia would have tried to reassert its interests in

26 the area, intensification of geopolitical competition was inevitable. In that competition Russia’s main assets are security, economic and cultural ties with post-Soviet states.

However, amidst this competition there is also room for greater cooperation. The new geopolitical situation in the region will require both Russia and the West to readjust their policies and change their attitudes toward cooperation with each other in order to contain and resolve conflict situations in the region. Indeed, the PSS remains largely open for wider international cooperation. Instead of viewing each other through a ‘zero-sum’ paradigm which pits each of these organizations as competitors in the region, we need to begin to think of ways to coordinate NATO, EU and CSTO efforts and potential in the region. Given the region’s importance to overall global security concerns, cooperation between NATO, the EU, and emerging regional security organizations like the CSTO on issues such as regional conflict resolution and joint crisis response may no longer be a question of ‘if’ but of ‘when’ and ‘how’.

The EU and NATO recently created and tested new instruments for rapid reaction and crisis response (NATO Response Forces and EU Rapid Reaction Battle groups). The CSTO on a parallel track also created new instruments for its own crisis response. In certain regions (Central Asia, Caucasus) these instruments could be used jointly. The time has come for Moscow to recognize that the conflict resolution process in Moldova/Transnistria, Georgia/Abkhazia and Georgia/South Ossetia can no longer be conducted without a broader role for the EU, NATO, and the Council of Europe. At the same time Western institutions seeking for a mediatory role in the region should recognize that such mediation may proceed jointly in coordination and cooperation between them and Russia, not instead of Russia.

Fostering cooperation and creating a workable interface between NATO and the CSTO will also be critical to the long-term success of the mission in Afghanistan. Canada and its NATO allies cannot afford to ignore the potential contributions that cooperation with the CSTO could bring. In 2006 some concerns were expressed by the CSTO leadership that under intense domestic pressure NATO would withdraw from Afghanistan sooner rather than later, leaving the CSTO to deal with the threat of a resurgent Taliban. One of the practical proposals debated in CSTO circles is the possibility of obtaining a UN Security Council mandate for post-conflict stabilization of the Tajik-Afghan border. This would enable the CSTO to do this job in a legal and practical interface with NATO’s military. NATO announced in Riga that the mobile NATO Response Forces (NRF) have reached their full scale of 20,000 and full operational capability. Hence, it might be time to begin discussions and planning to create regional interoperability between NATO’s NRF and the CSTO’s CRDF for the Central Asian region. The fact that both of these organizations are presently active in the region without really communicating with each other is a danger in its own right.

27 Aside from the potentially significant benefits to be gained by NATO through such cooperation, if handled carefully, the involvement of the CSTO in joint- regional security operations may also go some way in allaying the fears Russia has of being pushed out of the PSS by what it perceives as ‘out-of- region actors’. At least the possibility of potential cooperation in this area should not be excluded. NATO currently ignores and underestimates the CSTO, but in doing so it commits a political mistake. Opening formal cooperation and coordination between NATO and the CSTO aimed at mutual predictability, transparency, functional interoperability, and potential joint crises response may help significantly in preventing the development of a new dimension of hostilities and unnecessary rivalries.

Likewise, NATO should consider soliciting the cooperation of the SCO in securing the success of the Afghanistan mission. President Karzai expressed his interest in the organization by attending its last summit. Afghanistan is surrounded by SCO countries on all its borders, so engaging SCO countries in the dialogue on Afghanistan will be critical. The SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group, set up in 2005 to promote economic and anti-drug cooperation, was a first step in the right direction. However, despite common threats to all regional players progress to date has been minimal due to a lack of serious interest from other parties involved in resolution of the conflict. If traditional ‘zero-sum’ logic is allowed to prevail in this region, we risk turning the Afghanistan mission into another ‘great game’ of international power rivalry.

28 V. Possible evolution of the Russian security doctrine

The future directions of the Russian security doctrine are under discussion both within and outside of Russia. Though there is no apparent danger of a second Cold War, the picture commonly painted of Russia and its security doctrine in the West remains negative. Policy makers must become aware of the effects that depiction of Russia as an enemy or potential aggressor produces in the minds of the general public and elected politicians. While application of political pressure or calculated ‘conflictization’ is often used in international politics as accepted mechanisms for achieving policy objectives, the use of such tools and their long-term effects should be considered carefully. The internal debate in Russia about its foreign policy options is far from uniform and often includes self-criticism of unnecessarily harsh policies. Recently, Russia’s Finance Minister spoke of the unnecessary toughness of Russian foreign policy vis-à-vis Georgia, the treatment of international organizations within Russia, and threats to European states over missile facilities.

The election of Putin’s successor lends uncertainty both to the question of how Russia’s foreign policy will change, as well as to the question of how quickly it will do so. Though such uncertainties will persist, immediate situations such as the inability of western states and organizations to cooperate with Russia on weighty issues, such as Afghanistan, signal the necessity of understanding Russia’s present and projected security doctrine.

Such an analysis is made difficult by several key factors. First of all, Russian politics are both ‘real’ and ‘virtual’, complete with virtual friends, enemies, elections, and so forth. This dichotomy is particularly problematic for the state if its elites are living in both worlds, without distinguishing one from the other. Secondly, despite Russia’s assertiveness, there are limitations in its capabilities. Russia does not have free reign in its ‘near abroad’. It is increasingly bound by the regional organizations of which it is a part. The former metropole begrudgingly has to learn the art of consensus building and compromise with its former periphery.

Further difficulties in analyzing Russia’s security doctrine stem from viewing Russian policies as ‘grandiose schemes’ rather than breaking them down into smaller sections and very concrete issues on which other actors, including Canada, can engage. Moreover, the world is a different place than it was even two years ago, especially in terms of competition. The restructuring of the world order is causing players to search for new positions, Russia included, and the ultimate choice of direction for Russia remains unclear. Finally, we lack access to the wealth of reports circulating in Russia today, in which the evolution of its security doctrine is actively debated. We are also unaware of the process through which these reports or parts thereof are filtered into the Russian policy-making process and then implemented.

29 Workshops, like the one hosted by the CIC, which enable Canadian policy- makers to solicit the views of Russian insiders, should be a continued priority for Canada.

Russia’s security strategy is in a state of evolution. This process is driven by the following perceptions shaping the international security thinking of Russian elites. Gaps between official doctrinal statements and actual policies are likely to remain – indeed, the current Russian leadership continues to emphasize that Russian foreign policy is ‘pragmatic’, viewing ‘ideology’ as a negative, constraining factor.

1. The perception of an increasingly competitive world in which Russia cannot afford to be weak militarily, economically, and technologically. In such a world perceptions of threats to Russian security, including its soft security, emanate from the imbalance between Russia’s enormous natural resource wealth and its overall power potential, which shrank radically in the 1990s. Russia’s status as the largest state on earth, the fact that it has more direct neighbours than any other state, its shrinking population, and a fear of others seeking to grab its resources also figure in this perception.

2. The perception of Russia’s growing ability to regain its strength, competitiveness, and international influence. This new confidence about Russia’s prospects is a reflection of the ongoing economic recovery, political stabilization, and successful steps toward a more independent foreign policy guided by ‘national interests’. It is combined with wariness about spending too much on defence at the expense of socioeconomic modernization.

3. The perception of Western opposition to Russia’s resurgence as a great power. This perception, partly a reading of the policies of the Bush Administration, is at the root of the growing resentment of the way the US and its allies have treated Russia at a time when its leadership sought the widest possible cooperation with the West, but without compromising Russia’s national interests. The emerging policy of Russia’s containment advocated by some of Russia’s neighbouring states and US neoconservatives is evoking contradictory responses in Moscow. On one hand there is a real fear of Russia’s overall inferiority in the face of combined Western power. On the other hand, the foreign policy setbacks suffered by the Bush administration and the growing sense that American hegemony is failing, have generated a hope among Russian leaders that Western opposition to Russia’s resurgence is a temporary trend that can be countered through diplomatic manoeuvers, continued growth of economic inter-dependence, and modernization of Russia’s defence potential.

These perceptions inform the emergence of more alert, assertive and flexible security policies utilizing the full range of means available to Russia.

30 Moreover, the reality of inter-connectedness, both in terms of energy and security, may create conditions that are conducive to cooperative arrangements in many areas. Changes in Russian security thinking in the coming years depend on a range of international and domestic factors, but it seems likely that such changes will follow the path of a gradual, cautious evolution. The following arguments can be put forward in favour of an ‘evolutionary’ scenario:

• Relative political stability in Russia, assured by the planned transition of the Presidency from Vladimir Putin to Dmitry Medvedev. Changes in the balance of power between competing elites are unlikely to be on a magnitude which would precipitate sharp turns in Russia’s security policy. The likelihood of Putin retaining control over security policy even after he leaves the President’s post.

• Widely shared opinion among Russia’s elites that Putin’s foreign and defence policies have put Russia on track toward regaining the status of a great power capable of protecting and advancing its national interests.

• Prospects for the Democratic Party’s victory in the US Presidential election, which would likely lead to a shift in US policy toward a more moderate and less unilateralist course, which would undercut the more anti-Western factions in Russia’s ruling elite.

• The existence of strong business ties between Russian elites and the West. In order for Russia to continue attracting foreign investments in its resource, manufacturing and services sectors, the overall business environment will have to become more favourable, transparent and predictable.

• Awareness of Russia’s continuing vulnerabilities which make sharp turns and radical changes too dangerous.

Any abrupt changes in Russian thinking on international security may only take place in response to developments which would put in question existing assessments and policies and undermine notions of a properly chosen pragmatic course. Russian threat perceptions are traditionally focused on the West, the South, and the East.

Challenges from the West which may result in significant changes in Russian security thinking include: attempts to undercut and defeat Russia’s new energy strategy by portraying it as a security threat to the West and involving the NATO mechanism in the development of counterstrategies; attempts to neutralize Russia’s nuclear deterrent through stage-by-stage construction of a new US strategic capability for rapid global power projection relying on a combination of offensive forces, ballistic missile defences, and

31 space-based battle components; support of political opposition forces in Russia in their struggle to overthrow the existing regime.

Challenges from the South are manifested in the potential for new destabilization in the North Caucasus region; possibility of radical Islamist challenges in other Moslem republics of the Russian Federation; potential for serious crises in Central Asia, e.g. the overthrow of existing regimes by combinations of Islamist and democratic forces; ethno-political conflicts within and between central Asian states; major regional crises involving Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Iran.

Eastern challenges include the long-term security implications of continued growth of China’s power and the potential for deterioration in Russo- Japanese relations due to the existence of unresolved territorial issue and the ongoing trend toward upgrading Japan’s security relationship with the US.

Also important to Russia’s future security doctrine is its use of the New Great Divide between the West and the Islamic world, and its ‘reserve plan’ to become a ‘Great Asian Power’ in case its initial plan of becoming a ‘Great European Power’ continues to fail. The deterioration of old patterns of integration such as the CIS, GUAM and the Organization for Central Asian Cooperation (OCAC), et al. and the emergence of relatively new patterns such as the SCO, CAREC, Community of Democratic Choice (CDC), and Ukrainian and Georgian initiatives to interface with NATO – all of which extend beyond the post-Soviet space – will also impact Russia’s security doctrine.

32 VI. Conclusion and recommendations for Canada

If Canada is interested in seeing a stable and prosperous partner in Russia it must not allow itself to become trapped in stereotypes of Russia or outmoded Cold War paradigms based on conflict and competition to the exclusion of cooperation. It is not a good policy to exert pressure on or issue demands to Russia in an attempt to force its democratic development. NATO allies should carefully weigh the pros and cons of continued eastward enlargement. Although Russia should not determine the future direction of the alliance, it would be foolhardy to ignore Russia’s legitimate security concerns and perceptions of such enlargement.

Instead, Canada must approach Russia with a constructive attitude. This would open the window to engagement in areas of global security, economic development, finance, and culture. Canada, as well as Russia, is interested in the development of a functional "complementary multi-polarity" in which the poles were not opposed to one another (as in the bi-polarity of the Cold War).

Canada must engage Russia in very real terms by offering to partner on concrete policy issues. Such a strategy will show that Canada really has something to offer. As the host of the G8 Summit in 2010, Canada should start considering its options and priorities now. Areas for concrete cooperation where Russia and global governance issues converge on the Canadian foreign policy list feature the Arctic as one of the top priorities. Northern airspace security, search and rescue operations and the development of an Arctic maritime shipment connecting North America with Eurasia (the “Arctic Bridge” from Churchill, MB to Murmansk and further to European and Asian markets) are just a few of many additional possibilities. The melting of Arctic ice creates new opportunities and challenges for Canada, and requires a re-thinking of the Canadian North from being the ‘end of the map’ to a gateway or bridge to Eurasia. Given the special and fragile ecosystem in the Arctic, as well as significant Inuit populations in both Canada and Russia, cooperation should be the only option available to both countries and their neighbours.

Another practical example is the G8 Global Partnership Program, which during the last five years has played a major role in promoting the shared non-proliferation and security goals of Russia and the West. Canada continues to make a significant contribution to the destruction of chemical weapons, dismantling nuclear submarines, securing nuclear and radiological materials, promoting biological non-proliferation and redirecting former weapons scientists in the former Soviet space. Canada and Russia can build upon existing cooperation to frame next steps in global efforts to combat the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction.

33 It is also important to acknowledge that although Russia is no longer interested in joining the West, it seeks equal partnership with Western nations. To achieve this goal Russia has had to recognize that there are norms, regulations, and rules of engagement with which it needs to comply and it has taken steps to do so. This makes failure by Western states to comply with these rules of engagement potentially detrimental to future cooperation with Russia, particularly in areas of security.

The importance of operating by the same rules of engagement extends to the sphere of business as well. In addition to Russia’s business being Russia, Russia’s business is business. The West should make use of the globalized economy to influence Russia’s continued development. We should encourage greater investment of Canadian capital in Russia and attract Russian investment into Canada. This reciprocity will enable Canada to gain significant influence in areas such as rule of law and corporate governance. Encouraging Russians to travel and participate in foreign exchanges and easing visa application procedures will likewise assist with Russia’s internal modernization.

34 Annex A

Speakers Bios

Dr. Piotr Dutkiewicz is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute of European and Russian Studies at Carleton University. He is also a Permanent Fellow of the Centre for Civilizational Studies, Russian Academy of Science.

Co-organizer of several international conferences, Professor Dutkiewicz was editor-in-chief of a 21 volume series on "Local and Regional Development in Poland and Eastern Europe" (1986-1989), editor (or co-editor) of 12 books, and author of many chapters and scholarly articles. He is also the author of many chapters in books and articles in professional journals. He was a Director of four large scale projects in Russia funded by the Canadian International Development Agency dealing with regional development, unemployment insurance, labour market and social policies, and is currently involved in CIDA-AUCC project on juvenile justice and youth at risk in Russia.

Dr. Dutkiewicz was a member of a Canadian Official State delegation to Russia in 2003 and is a member of a prestigious Valdai Club. In 2006, he received a doctorate honoris causa from the People’s Friendship University in Moscow for his contribution to the development of Canada-Russia relations.

Dr. Dmitri V. Trenin is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment, the deputy director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, and chair of its Foreign and Security Policy Program. He has been with the Center since its inception in 1993.

From 1993 to 1997, he held posts as a senior research fellow at the NATO Defense College in Rome, as a visiting professor at the Free University of Brussels, and as a senior research fellow at the Institute of Europe in Moscow. He served in the Soviet and Russian armed forces from 1972 to 1993, including position as a liaison officer in the External Relations Branch of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany from 1978 to 1983 and as a staff member of the delegation to the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms talks in Geneva from 1985 to 1991.

Among about a dozen books Dr. Trenin has authored are Getting Russia Right (2007); Russia's Restless Frontier: The Chechnya Factor in Post-Soviet Russia (2004, with Aleksei V. Malashenko), and The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization (2001). He edited, with Steven Miller, The Russian Military: Power and Policy (2006), and, with Anatol Lieven, Ambivalent Neighbors: The EU and NATO Enlargement and the Price of Membership (2004).

35 Dr. Aurel Braun is Professor of International Relations and Political Science at the University of Toronto. He is also a senior member of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies and of the Centre for International Studies, and a Fellow and Senator of Trinity College at the University of Toronto.

Dr. Braun has published extensively on communist affairs and strategic studies with a special focus on the problems of the transformation of the socialist systems in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. During the past decade, Professor Braun has lectured widely in North America and Europe and has been asked to testify numerous times before parliamentary committees in Ottawa. He has also participated in the Congressional Program in the United States under the auspices of the Aspen Institute and worked on a project "The Russian Diaspora and the Prospect for Large-Scale Violence" at the Council on Foreign Relations. He has appeared frequently on national television and radio and often contributes to national newspapers.

He is the author and/or editor of several books, including Dilemmas of Transition (1999); The Extreme Right: Freedom and Security At Risk (1997) and The Soviet-East European Relationship in the Gorbachev Era: The Prospects for Adaptation (1990). Dr. Braun has written more than 50 scholarly articles and has contributed more than two dozen chapters to collections of scholarly works. Currently, he is completing work on two books: Building Trust and Strengthening Democracies: NATO-Russia Relations in the 21st Century; and Russia, the Russian Diaspora and Nationalizing States.

Dr. Alexander I. Nikitin is Professor and Director of the Center for Euro- Atlantic Security at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). He is also the Director of the Center for Political and International Studies, President of the Russian Political Science Association and Executive Board member of the Russian Academy of Political Sciences.

From 1979 to 1989, he held various positions in the USA and Canada Studies Institute, including diplomatic posting in the Soviet Permanent Mission to the United Nations. He held posts as an International Research Fellow at the NATO Defense College in Rome in 1996 and at IFRI Institute in Paris in 2003, and as guest lecturer in the University of Iowa, NATO Defense College and Geneva Center for Security Policy.

In addition to his research and teaching, Dr. Nikitin serves as Vice-Chairman of the Russian Pugwash Committee of Scientists for International Security and Disarmament and is elected member of the International Pugwash Council. He is the author of 3 monographs and more than 100 articles and chapters in academic periodicals, journals and books published in Russian, English, French, Korean, Punjabi, Spanish, Portuguese, German languages.

36 Dr. Sergei M. Plekhanov is Professor of Political Science and Coordinator of the Post-Communist Studies Programme at York University, Toronto.

From 1988 to 1993, Dr. Plekhanov served as a Deputy Director of the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada in Moscow and has taught as Visiting Professor at the University of California, Irvine, and Occidental College (Los Angeles). Since his arrival in Canada in 1993, he has combined his teaching and research with consulting work for Canadian government and NGOs, frequent public lectures and media commentaries. Prof. Plekhanov’s expertise includes Russian politics and foreign policy, international politics of Central Asia and Afghanistan, US-Russian relations. He has consulted Canadian and US governments on Russian affairs and testified at hearings at the Parliament of Canada and US Congress. He is serving as Secretary of the Canadian Pugwash Group and is currently working on the book “Russian Nationalism in the Age of Globalization” (Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag).

Chris Westdal is a former Canadian diplomat with over 21 years in the field, including sixteen as the head of different Canadian Embassies, High Commissions and international delegations. This bilateral experience was complemented by nine years in UN and other multinational affairs.

Mr. Westdal was Ambassador to Russia (2003-06); to the UN Office and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (1999-2003); to Ukraine (1995-98); to South Africa (1991-93); and to Bangladesh and Burma (1982-85). Prior assignments abroad included India and Nepal (1973-75), responsible for CIDA programming; and Tanzania (1970-73), as a member of a University of Toronto economic advisory team.

In Ottawa, he was Director General of the Foreign Ministry's International Organizations Bureau (1987-91); Assistant Secretary at the Privy Council Office to the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy and Defence (1976-78, 1985-87); and CIDA Regional Director for East Africa (1978-82).

Mr. Westdal sustains an active interest in Canadian foreign policy, investment and trade, focusing on circumpolar commerce.

37 Annex B

“Russian foreign policy and global security: How Russia defines its international security policy”

An international workshop organized by Canadian International Council and International Security Research & Outreach Program, DFAIT

09:00 - 9:10 Introductions

• Donald Sinclair, Director General, International Security Bureau, DFAIT • Michael Berk, Canadian International Council

09:10 - 9:20 Opening remarks by Dr. Piotr Dutkiewicz, Chair

Panel I: Russia’s interests in its ‘near abroad’ and attitudes towards the region and ‘frozen conflicts’

How does Russia view its near abroad and define its security interests there? How are these interests reflected in Russian’s foreign policy, including frozen conflicts in the Caucasus and Eastern Europe.

09:20 - 9:40 Dr. Dmitri Trenin, Carnegie Moscow Centre 09:40 - 10:00 Dr. Aurel Braun, University of Toronto 10:00 - 10:10 Chris Westdal, former Canadian Ambassador to Russia

10:10 - 10:45 Discussion and Q&A

10:45 - 11:00 Coffee Break

Panel II: Russia’s position in regional security organizations and its international security doctrine

How is Russia pursuing these interests through international organizations in the near abroad region where it is a member (e.g. OSCE, SCO, CSTO, and CIS?)? How far is Russia willing and/or able to go in pursuing its security interests through these organizations? What are the foreseeable changes in the Russia’s international security doctrine?

11:00 - 11:20 Dr. Alexander Nikitin, Centre for Political & International Studies, Moscow and MGIMO 11:20 - 11:40 Dr. Sergei Plekhanov, York University

11:40 - 12:25 Discussion and Q&A

12:25 - 12:30 Concluding remarks by Dr. Piotr Dutkiewicz, Chair and moderator

38