THE PHILOSOPHICAL ANARCHISM of ROBERT PAUL WOLFF By
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STRANGE ANARCHY: THE PHILOSOPHICAL ANARCHISM OF ROBERT PAUL WOLFF by GRAHAM JAMES BAUGH A., The University of British Columbia, 1982 THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTERS OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of Philosophy) We accept this thesis as conforming to_ the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September 1984 ©Graham James Baugh, 1984 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 DE-6 (3/81) Abstract This thesis presents a reconstruction and critique of Robert Paul Wolff's defence of anarchism. In Part One, the underlying moral theory upon which this defence is based is analyzed. The defence of anarchism is then reconstructed on the basis of this moral theory. It is argued that all claims to legitimate political authority are apparently illegitimate because such claims conflict with an overriding obligation of rational agents to be autonomous. Utilitarian and social contract solutions to this conflict are discussed in relation to the same moral theory. It is argued that some forms of authority are compatible with individual autonomy but that the state, due to its inherently coercive nature, is not. Wolff's anarchist alternative to the state is then discussed as the form of society in which people enjoy the fullest autonomy. In Part Two of this thesis Wolff's arguments for anarchism, his underlying moral theory and his instrumental view of reason are criticized. It is argued that Wolff's argument fails as a defence of anarchism and the anarchist status of Wolff's argument is itself put into question. Wolff's position is held to be a form of moral and political scepticism distinct from the political theory of anarchism. Wolff's moral theory is criticized for failing to provide any basis for meaningful moral discourse or for the rational resolution of moral conflict. Wolff's concepts of autonomy, obligation and moral - ii - contractarianism are held to be conceptually incoherent. Wolff's claim that reason functions merely as an instrument for the achievement of nonrational goals is rejected. It is argued that Wolff's instrumental view of reason itself expresses certain moral values typical of modern society. The thesis concludes with a short section outlining some alternative approaches to anarchism which seem more plausible and coherent than the approach taken by Wolff. STRANGE ANARCHY: THE PHILOSOPHICAL ANARCHISM OP ROBERT PAUL WOLFF Abstract ii Aknowledgement vi Introduction 1 Part One 5 Chapter I: Autonomous Ethics 5 Introduction 5 Autonomy and Rational Agency 6 Hypothetical and Categorical Imperatives 9 Obligation, Rationality and Responsibility 14 Moral Contractarianism 21 Chapter II: From Autonomy to Anarchism 30 Introduction 30 De Facto and De Jure Authority 30 The Apparent Conflict Between Authority and Autonomy 38 Possible Solutions to the Conflict 44 The State of Nature as a Viable Alternative 59 - iv - Part Two 67 Chapter III: Strange Anarchy . 67 Introduction 67 Wolff's "Anarchist" Ideal 70 Wolff's Critique of Existing Society 80 Wolff's View of Human Nature 84 Wolff and Political Anarchism 89 Chapter IV: Autonomous Ethics and Instrumental Reason 92 Introduction 92 Autonomous "Obligation" and Moral Contractarianism 95 Critique of Instrumental Reason 102 Conclusion:WhitherAnarchism? 110 Notes 121 Bibliography 135 - v - Ac knowledgement I would like to acknowledge the helpful comments and criticisms regarding this thesis which I have received from Earl Winkler, my thesis adviser, and Robert Rowan, the second reader. Special thanks to Pelar Davidson for preparing the thesis in manuscript form. G.J.B. - vi - Introducti on Robert Paul Wolff has presented an original argument for philosophical anarchism based on the purported incompatibility between political authority and individual autonomy. Wolff holds that because all rational agents have an overriding obligation to be autonomous, all claims to legitimate political authority must be rejected. The plausibility of Wolff's argument ultimately depends on the validity of a separate general moral theory which is meant to establish the fundamental obligation of all rational agents to be autonomous. Consequently, any reconstruction of Wolff's defence of anarchism must first clearly articulate the moral theory upon which that defence is based. Through a formal analysis of rational agency tied to an instrumental view of reason Wolff seeks to demonstrate that insofar as agents are rational and they are to act, they must be autonomous. By autonomy Wolff means acting only on one's self-chosen policies rationally connected to one's self-chosen ends. Thus, autonomy requires rational choice and deliberation and rational action., By rational action Wolff means action based on rational policies which are not self-contradictory, or self-defeating, and which are consistent, taken as a whole, with each other. Two important consequences follow from Wolff's analysis of rational agency. The first is that ultimately the 1 only obligation rational agents have, insofar as they are rational agents, is to be autonomous. The second is that, because of Wolff's commitment to an instrumental view of reason, all choice of ends or goals is ultimately determined by neither reason nor desire, but is both nonrational and uncaused. Wolff describes his position as a form of moral contractarianism but, it is argued, this description is somewhat misleading. Wolff argues that all claims to legitimate political authority are illegitimate for such claims seek to establish a right of authority to command rational agents to act contrary to their own self-chosen policies. For rational agents, obedience to such commands constitutes a heteronomous policy. Because all rational agents have an overriding obligation to act autonomously, they must reject all claims to legitimate political authority. Because all states necessarily claim such authority, rational agents must reject the state and become anarchists. Wolff discusses some purported solutions to the conflict between authority and autonomy but argues that they are failures. He then puts forward some proposals designed to add some plausibility to anarchist claims that rational agents can and must live without the state. However, both the success of Wolff's argument and its anarchist status must be questioned. It is argued that Wolff fails to establish that anarchy is the only form of society compatible with individual autonomy. It is further argued that given the truth of Wolff's moral theory, the sort of rational, 2 anarchist community he envisages is impossible to achieve. Instead, Wolff's moral theory can provide a rational justification for some agents to infringe the autonomy of other agents, and therefore his moral theory provides a possible justification for the state conceived as a group of persons wielding political power over others. Wolff's view of human nature is held to be implausible, providing no rational basis for hope of progress toward the anarchist ideal. Wolff endorses a Marxist political strategy contrary to anarchist ideals and in opposition to the mainstream of anarchist thought. For these reasons, it is argued that it would be inappropriate to describe Wolff's position as an anarchist one. Wolff's general moral theory, analyzed in its own right rather than as a form of anarchism, is held to be deficient for a number of reasons. It is argued that an unintended consequence of Wolff's moral theory is that agents will be unable to engage in any meaningful moral discourse. Therefore, any moral conflict cannot be resolved through rational means. Wolff's concepts of autonomy, obligation, and. moral contractarianism in general are held to be conceptually incoherent. Wolffian agents must treat each other as mere means to their nonrational ends, thus precluding the prospect of any rational community. Wolff's instrumental view of reason is criticized on a number of grounds. It is argued that the claim that reason neither rules in nor rules out any choice of ends is absurd and 3 false. A variety of examples and arguments are presented to substantiate this point. The claim that instrumental reason is itself value-free and objective is rejected on the grounds that any concept of reason is itself based on certain values. Thus, Wolff's attempt to reduce moral reason to instrumental reason fails. Wolff's concept of instrumental reason is itself held to express certain values and a consequentialist moral outlook. This moral outlook is typical of modern techno-bureaucratic society, and exceedingly narrow and impoverished. In the conclusion some alternative approaches to anarchism are sketched out. It is argued that these approaches are more promising and plausible than the approach taken by Wolff. It is suggested that the ultimate anarchist ideal is not absolute liberty or individual autonomy, but a more complex value, communal individuality. 4 PART ONE Chapter I: Autonomous Ethics I. Introduction Since its original publication, Robert. Paul Wolff's, Jji Defense of Anarchism has generated considerable debate in philosophical circles.1 Yet, as Wolff himself admits, in formulating his argument for anarchism he has "simply taken for 2 granted an entire ethical theory." It is only in his later work, The Autonomy of Reason: A Commentary on Kant's "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals", that Wolff provides a sketch of the underlying moral theory upon which the arguments of In Defense of Anarchism ultimately depend.