CEU eTD Collection IN RESPONSETOTHE AUTONOMY-BASEDANARCHIST In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts CHALLENGE TOPOLITICAL PHILOSOPHY Second Reader: Professor Andras Bozoki Professor Reader: Second Supervisor: Professor Janos Kis Janos Professor Supervisor: Science Political of Department Central European University Central European Budapest, Hungary Budapest, Elena Pokrovskaya Submitted to Submitted 2008 By CEU eTD Collection Chapter One: 7 Wolff’s Approach to the ...... Key Concepts 1 Introduction...... ilorpy...... 47 Bibliography...... 45 ...... Conclusion Chapter Three: Back to the 43 Normal Justification Thesis...... Chapter Two: Wolff’s Conflict 28 and the Notion of ...... Rationality 1.1.2 1.1.2 Authority: 1.1.1 Origin of the conceptual conflict: authority...... 7 1.2.4 Explaining forfeiture ...... 23 of autonomy 1.2.3 The initial ...... 20 inconsistency 1.2.2 Autonomy as a moral duty...... 19 1.2.1 Origin of the conceptual conflict: autonomy...... 17 1.1.4 Raz’s normal ...... 15 justification thesis 1.1.3 The initial ...... 11 inconsistency . The Obligation to 1.1 Obey...... 7 2.3 On Reconsidering ...... 40 Authority 2.2 Autonomy and the Need for Introducing Rationality...... 36 2.1 The Meaning of Autonomy...... 28 1.3 Preliminary Assessment...... 25 1.2 The Duty of Autonomy...... 17 de jure and de facto Table of Contents ...... 9 i CEU eTD Collection authority by authority Wolff.asserted outline apossibility of conflict authority deducting betweenautonomyand andpolitical refute will justification normal of idea Raz’s Joseph of framework the within them incorporating and autonomy,the role of of conceptions rationality addressing recognizing adequate the Therefore, reconsideration. their involve must authority legitimate of impossibility the of idea Wolff’s criticize to way aplausible Thus, concepts. key the on placed limitations the to related problems and (political)authority.initial of Evaluation his the of premises view inevitable reveals anarchism assessing aims hisat ofindividual interpretation specific of concepts the autonomy This thesis on theoreticalthe basis of Robert Paul Wolff’s autonomy-based philosophical Abstract ii CEU eTD Collection knowledge of andknowledge of subjects talent. the pedagogical duringPhilosophy my yearCEU. I from benefitedhave greatly at Itook that their exceptional teaching onPolitical courses andObligation Introduction Contemporarythe to Political I would like to thank my Supervisor Professor Janos Kis and Professor Zoltan Miklosi for Acknowledgements iii CEU eTD Collection University Press, 1992), 11-12. 1 society. democratic for notionsthe individual freedom it which of and responsibility a to are crucial appeals since obligations inthe contemporary ideaworld to the authority and plausiblepolitical of threat essay can beviewed of Wolff’s anarchism. manifesto as autonomy-based philosophical a essay Wolff’s institutions such lawsas should be abolished. issued directives never is it that conclude attainable;and itself, authority political legitimate of therefore, possibility moral the question they refute on constraints they place since be abolished should sanctions legal the necessity of the andinstitutionspolitical other state anarchistssuchas authority.claim Philosophical the that state and the duty to comply with state-individual citizens. addressinginconceivable supremacyits ofpoliticalauthority the without concept and over authority must political of subjects most directives: their obey with comply to duty general a have states most lawsThey establish onthe foundation of the claimmost that people who find themselves under jurisdictionoccasions. of The very idea of a liberal democratic state is See, for example, Chaim Gans, Political authority Political authority and obligation political inare the central concepts political philosophy. A noteworthy A noteworthy challenge topoliticalis philosophy in clearly presented Robert Paul obey to obligation the rejects position anarchist autonomy-based the this, to contrast In In Defense ofAnarchism In Defense 1 . Since legitimate authority of de facto states can never be established, state can states facto beestablished, never authority of de legitimate . Since Philosophical Anarchism and Political Disobedience . Although . Although publishedit in 1970, still a remains prominent Introduction 1 individuals’ autonomy. They autonomy. individuals’ (New CambridgeYork: CEU eTD Collection behavior; what is important is that the proclaimed impossibility of a reliable of impossibility proclaimed the is that important is what behavior; organizing the ananarchic society controversy or and problems of dealing with antisocial a well-ordered liberal presuppose that issociety impossible. not does institutions alone of nature state Moreover, authoritative the concept. legitimate bylargepoint theideajustifyingsupported a of to towards of amounts peopleauthority as seems authoritiesby degreesof different individual(distinguished respect andof promotion autonomy) state of mere existence life. hand, the Onthe other of way free and self-determined of condition political philosophy. onehand,autonomyis Onthe viewed andgenerally necessary asavirtue a be retained.if is to autonomy states to becomea individual has nochoice aphilosophical anarchist, but concepts that thinking state authority. deny ultimately will autonomy their value and Theunderstand who people conclusion that natural only is it why the author derivesis that and is impossible, concept of latter the justification Thus, of notions. nature very the the from the impossibility individualthat autonomy nevercan be logically compatible with legitimatethe authority ofdue to harmonizing these The reflectisauthor’s goal problem show fundamental this to on political of philosophy,and to time. same the at individuals free of autonomy moral of value intrinsic the acknowledging and understanding the idea of political obligations. Focusing on the practical side of practical the on undermining side of Focusing ideapolitical understanding of obligations. the of any legal sanctions or institutions. politicalinevitably reasonable obligations leads to individuals rejectingtheauthoritative power Of Of course, and moral both of question relevant and interesting very a on reflects indeed essay The I therefore believe that examining the anarchist arguments is a significant part of arguments isasignificant anarchist examining the that believe I therefore In Defense ofAnarchism In Defense In Defense of Anarchism of In Defense draws attention to the difficulty of justifying the difficulty authority drawsattention political of to does not focus on the practical feasibility of 2 theoretical basefor CEU eTD Collection argumentation argumentation in developed of familiesI will connected first, the structure examinethepremisesand questions: of closely suggest strategy auseful that shall include addressingtwo approachingof thistopic Wolff’sby justified position. I reinforce theidea authority andevaluating of reconstructing institutions.might haveimplications theexisting for political andauthority state philosophy political basis of theoretical crucial for the concepts elaborating on that true certainly is it Besides, organization. social of variant a as anarchism criticizing of instead constructed are premises theoretical essay’s the way assess the to sense more much make itwould why of reason the isalsoapart It society. for ananarchist conditions regarding recommendations scope ofmy evaluating. although worth they paper, are undoubtedly up in brought alternative essay,the arrangements political areoutsideand their plausibility the issue; instead, Iwould ratherengage myself in onthe adebate theoretical grounds. Though being in life canbeensured state practices just isa of real separate how discussion such as anarchism, them. between relationship the and autonomy, and ofauthority those namely crucial concepts, two anarchistitis position, mostly essential to understand howWolff and his opponents approach the supporters of toprovide philosophy.political for plausible grounds order criticismthe of In made arguments by consider counter in the and to expressed the essay, anarchism philosophical problems in Wolff’s account. Thus, my inThus, isconcern torefute this claimpaper specificthe anarchist philosophical and practical of discussion the leaves out his essay that recognizes himself Wolff However, The purpose of the first chapter of my paper is to analyze the particular challenge of challenge analyzeis the particular to my of paper chapter ofthe first The purpose In Defense of Anarchism of In Defense 3 , and second, I will concentrate on the on concentrate will I second, and , CEU eTD Collection Pennock JohnW. and Chapman, eds. issue see, for instance, Patrick Riley, “On the Kantian Foundations of Robert Paul Wolff’sderived Anarchism” from theKantian in view, J.Roland although this point certainly deserves comprehensive consideration. For more on this of the Kantian notion of autonomy, and whether the incompatibility betweenautonomy and authority can be actually 3 Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1986), 3-4. 319. between the two terms related directly to the key notions discussed in this paper see Lindley, paper this in discussed notions key the to directly related terms two the between distinction ofthe explanation more For concept. basic the of scope the to conform to is conception adequate an for different parties, while of the essay Richard Lindley and Scott Shapiro will be employed for reconsidering the theoretical foundation Dworkin, byGerald suggested arguments At this point, autonomy. conceptionof adequate the derive to necessary is it autonomy-based, is anarchism Wolff’s Since rationality. to connection of challenge the of plausibility the in assessing include to point interesting is an it essay, inthe notion Wolff’s essay by elaborating on the concept of rationality. Although itis not treated as a separate itis. suggests author as the as impossible is not authority legitimate of justification that approach theidea soasto and autonomy authority between conflict utter proclaimed on to the casesthe forfeiture of by IwillAfter Wolff. undesirable discussed of the autonomy that, move precisely, highlight Iwill the interpretation of individualautonomy as an moral duty, andturn to focusing of bein notionSecond, anelaboration the More Iwill of autonomy theused essay. on possible way authorityjustifying of state suggested by Joseph in hisRaz 2 between difference the consider also I will obedience. of interpretation the to attention with particular by Wolff employed of authority Due to the limited scope of this paper I will not refer to the question whether Wolff uses the correct understanding correct the uses Wolff whether question the to refer not will I paper this of scope limited the to Due Following Richard Lindley’s logic, Iam referring to In I will secondthe chapter, look closely meaning itson autonomy of the and introduce The rest of this paper will be dedicated to extending the analysis of the starting points of Therefore, following the structure following structure be the of firstTherefore, essay,will the conception addressingthe I 3 In Defense In Defense of Anarchism . Then, I will turn to the relation between authority and rationality. In the third conception represents “a particular interpretation or analysis of a concept”. The requirement The aconcept”. of analysis or interpretation particular “a represents Anarchism: Nomos XIX . de jure and concept 4 (New NewYork: UniversityYork 294-Press, 1978): de facto as a notion that can be basically agreed upon by authority, and pay attention to a Morality ofFreedom Autonomy (Atlantic 2 . CEU eTD Collection be changed to correspond to the present-day correspond tothe present-day bepolitical arrangements. changed to possible concerning propositions wayin the by solutionswhich suggested practical Wolff might well as imply should essay whole the of evaluation a proper Besides, scholars. outstanding accompanied byextensive conceptsin links moral to andphilosophy totheiroffered by accounts muchmore attention requires definitely asauthority and rationality autonomy,concepts this paper.I must a admit that truly understanding approach comprehensive to suchimportant in possible justification legitimate authority of suggested approach. Raz’s the with conceptions revised the incorporating and rationality and authority autonomy, of between establish links main Mymainthe the is concepts. Wolff’s aimedatcriticizingeffort use logicand the toapproachtheir of inorder essay’snature, specific the theoretical premises reconstruct is is necessary itto why That authority. of and notions autonomy placed very on the initial claim itslimitations duetothe will weaknesses his anarchist reveal autonomy-based concepts. these of interpretation essay’s the of out left been has what emphasize and notions.Finally, theproblems conclusion will once enumerate again the discussedinthis paper, individual autonomy and political authority with a specific focus on the interpretation of the key embracing reasons account of Wolffisthe why mistakenin theconflicthis between proclaiming thesis. by justification normal ideathe and proposed the conceptions reconsidered chapter I will briefly away outline of deducting political authority by combining the I would like to finishI wouldlike to introductory with another this reference limitationspart tothe of My guiding thesis statement is that a closer evaluation of the use of the core concepts of Provided the aforementioned framework, I believe, it is possible to construct an 5 CEU eTD Collection conceptions of autonomy and authority. philosophy hat will be discussed in this paper isthat Wolff’s theory appeals specificto strong Anarchism of scope of political asadiscipline.philosophy mainreason addition, find the In why I form philosophical of understanding anarchism certainly ideasto contributes the major and the Nevertheless, I would like to emphasize that examining the foundation of this particular this of foundation the examining that emphasize to like would I Nevertheless, interesting and why it drew my attention to some particular problems of someproblems attention itparticularpolitical of to drew my interesting andwhy 6 In Defense CEU eTD Collection University 103-5. AsforPress, 2001), 5 rejected should be necessarily possesses undesirable and suppressive conditionsits for beingits astate, legitimacy is that of the moral illegitimacy of the state. According to this line of arguments, with concerned since it 4 obligation. political of denial the to leads that legitimacy state of denial this is it Moreover, general. in position anarchist the of element essential very is a illegitimate are states all that claiming Simmons, by A. John authority. Asstressed of state foundations notheoretical are there because anarchism oxymorons. This is imposingthe magnitude of problem the of category the to belongs state just a thus, authority; and autonomy of reconciliation provide to intellect and knowledge of ordinary people. Wolff’s belief is that even a utopian society is unable placedon limitations from for dilemma the derive origin the not does essay the Similarly, is in no sense “the imperfect rationality of men” or association political legitimate genuinely form of denial any the of and,their concepts consequently, failure to pursue what is just and good. 1.1.1 Origin of the conceptual conflict: authority 1.1 ObeyObligationto The A. John Simmons, Robert Paul Wolff, Paul Robert In this sense, Wolff’s essay represents the position of Wolff’sargue is aim is to itthat onlynatural for athinkingacceptand person to support As Wolff himself underlying states, the for incompatibilitythe between reason key the Chapter One: Wolff’s Approach to the Key Concepts Key the to Approach Wolff’s One: Chapter 4 . In Defenseof Anarchism 5 . The type of political arrangement plays no role; it doesnot matter if the state Justification andLegitimacy: Essays andObligations onRights a posteriori (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1970), 70-71. anarchism, itisbased on the idea that all existing states are 7 a priori In Defense of Anarchism In Defense anarchism: its initial claim initial its anarchism: (Cambridge: Cambridge is CEU eTD Collection of his essay in a very specific manner. Since the duty to obey always “conveys an abdication of abdication an “conveys always obey to duty the Since manner. specific very a in essay his of benot logically grounded. following from notion the of individual autonomy” with and “consistent be is itrequired be to legitimate astate For regulations. state-issued by bound peopleare not therefore, justification, legitimate lacks to obey duty the of acceptance and compliance Demanding commands. authoritative to will own their subjecting by it inevitably obey by bindindividualsbecause theunresolvable state to themselves complying with is, is rule asitbutthe duty and autonomy between authority thattheconflictto obey. Heargues may from totime. that happen time “cheating” force from having which means power possessingthe merecompel ability to compliance via or threat distinguished be should it that out points rightfully Wolff obeyed”. be to right the correlatively of authority further will make this side of characteristics of the state more clear. basedThus, eventhestate Examining ondemocratic isconcept the values inherently illegitimate. 142. 8 7 6 of the failure of their legitimacy. illegitimate not because a legitimate one is impossible. It is the contingent characters of states that inevitably results priori is thatno there clearly repeats instance,Wolff For is attack. itself under of existence authority allows substantial freedom repressesindividualof libertiesamount or Overall, altogether. the Rex Martin, “Wolff’s Defence of Philosophical Anarchism,” of Philosophical Defence “Wolff’s RexMartin, Wolff, 4. See, for example, Wolff, 71. 7 reason that makes democratic government superior to other forms of state authority state formssuperior of toother makes government democratic that reason . Unlike power, authority presupposes being acknowledged by its subjects incase subjects even byits of beingacknowledged authority . Unlikepresupposes power, Wolff uses the aforementioned conception of authority formulateto the guiding statement isHowever, it importantthe that problem brought upby Wolff not right the concerns to According to In Defenseof Anarchism , authority stands for “the right to command, and command, to right “the for stands authority , 8 8 : hence, the very concept of concept very the : hence, The Philosophical Quarterly 24, no. 95.(April 1974): de jure state can state 6 a . CEU eTD Collection of of such situations addsnothing conceptual the to legitimacy of mereexistence the claiming authority. However, states existing already to oppose the not prefer contested authority is not facto of existence de the Besides, presupposes because not itdoes resultfrom kind some of a “uniquegrantof exclusive right” political obligations political binding directives andpolicy its subjectson in who, their take on correlative turn, general de jure Philosophy of Law issues the command is “the matter of the is “the matter 15 14 Utopia 13 12 11 10 9 1.1.2 Authority: autonomy and maintain personal freedom and self-determination. itisis forindividuals that natural deny obeyingonly to toexercisein authority order their autonomy” responsible for one’s action and to conduct oneself in the best light of reason” of light best in the oneself conduct to and action one’s for responsible man” an enlightened Joseph Raz, ed., Scott Shapiro, “Authority”, in Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro, eds., Simmons, Nozick, Robert example, for see, generally) be applied can (which wording this precisely For Wolff, 9. Raz, 4. Wolff, 19. (New York: Basic Books, 1974),109. state is the one having political authority, that is, exercising“the general right” toimpose What is more, there is no doubt that the concept of concept the that doubt no is there more, is What Wolff makes avalidby point thatitisemphasizing thelegitimate or Justification and Legitimacy 9 , he concludes that philosophical anarchism is the only plausible “political belief for belief “political plausible only the is anarchism philosophical that he concludes , de jure Authority (New OxfordYork: University Press,2002), 386. de jure 14 authority because it is the former that is taken for the latter by is is its forlatter it subjects. the that former taken the because authority ” 10 right 12 . , that is, a person exercising moral autonomy as “the right and duty to be to duty and right “the as autonomy moral exercising person a is, , that (New York: New York University Press, 1990), 4. . At the general level, a and to command, to correlative andof obligation the de facto , 110. 9 de facto concept is a concept that is that not is a concept concept TheOxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and 15 : in reality, the majority of people of majority the reality, in : de facto de facto authorities. to obey the person whoto obeytheperson authority inevitably de jure 11 . His initial claim initial His . Anarchy, State, and 13 . Thus, only a only Thus, . authority that authority de jure CEU eTD Collection states in some specific cases in specific some states contemporary world. differentiation and integration. As it follows from the essay, such authority is certainly not iscertainly authority such essay, the from follows it As integration. and differentiation of levels high and complexity its with economy industrial maintain to necessity the recognizing outof internal many trafficregulation,or goals involving people etc.), (e.g.city construction, reach needto common the orbecauseof etc.), andeconomic expansion, territorial defense, national (e.g. goals national external of pursuit joint the sakeof for the either arrangement legitimacy” that serves as a compelling tool of tool domination serves as acompelling that legitimacy” tocomply why individual state’scommands. Infact, thedeceivingthe choose “myth with of thereasons governmentare bythe promised effects” “beneficial or defiance” of consequences under which being one of initialthe limitations of his essay stated as early in as introductorythe part 18 17 16 it been has already therefore, of concepts” both key component which is“the authority. The reason at looking suitable isnot when such argumentation that states clearly for such statement heHowever, andlegitimate. authority are true that to certain comes theexistence of claims presuppose simply of fromnotion the Second, supremacy. theauthoritative others’ in factbelieve that the notion of individuals authority isbecause itcertain legitimate someobvious that possess people actually right Simmons, Ibid., 9-10, 79. See Wolff, 9-10. Also, there even may be moral reasons not to confront sanctions issuedbyillegitimate confront sanctions notto evenmaybemoral reasons Also,there Nevertheless, it is important that Wolff specifically refers to particular circumstances particular to refers specifically Wolff that important is it Nevertheless, Wolff takes into consideration situations when it “might be thought”, first of all, that all, of first be thought”, “might it when situations consideration into takes Wolff Justification and Legitimacy de facto states actually make citizens submit to their power. In such cases, “the Insuch evil cases, theirsubmit power. to actuallymake citizens states 18 . What is more, peoplemay actually wish for some type of political , 109. 10 17 is not a rare occasion even in the in even occasion a rare isnot de jure de facto authority itself might itself authority versus deducted 16 . de jure . This . CEU eTD Collection possessing supreme authority possessing acertain supremeauthority over acertain within territory or population as“a ofpersons” from state group the notion addressingauthority of defining of the concept definition of state as some individuals empowered with authority. In fact, Wolff begins with someone’s orders “because of complying matter “obedience” asa idea with of the state the theconceptof of deduction necessity the links immediately Wolff is that point this at significant is what However, concepts. of itselfneed Theisvalid because nature authorities. it for normative deduction the underlines of comply directives authoritative with to feel obliged make individuals circumstances specificsuch Carryingismore requires that concept out than deduction legitimate. demonstrating 21 20 19 impossibility normativeof conditions for states’ existence, and, consequently,for failure the of for the an argument for starting premise is acorrect as a group thestate of such adefinition to Wolff’sreference whether question Iwould appealsto. the essay “deduction” the elaboration on ‘”by man overthe other” authority one to claims any denying mostly involves anarchism of doctrine his that appear might “ on emphasis places he how way 1.1.3 The initial inconsistency obligations. legitimate; but this is what most people consider to be the power enforcing their political Ibid., 72. Ibid., 3. Wolff, 8-9,79. This appears to refer “only to personal commands, not laws” and corresponds to his to laws” corresponds and not commands, personal refer“only to to This appears Another remark regarding Wolff’s conflict between autonomy and authority the between concerns and authority Wolff’s autonomy conflict remarkregarding Another As a result, this tends to efficiently exclude from the very beginning any further any beginning very the from exclude efficiently to tends this aresult, As he tellsyou todo it deduction of the the deduction of conceptstate of 21 . 11 ” 19 . ”. This must prove that the 20 . Thus, it de-facto de jure CEU eTD Collection Wolff harshly treats a Wolff harshly treats legitimate political authority is plausible without accepting that there is a general duty to comply. his arguments. of points starting beobedience justified. to Thus, problem one with his is conception inconsistency the that in the for in concept order legitimate as atruly is of a proof authority what hereally demands freedom” opposed to following ordinary be This a dangerous can compliance extent. unreflective individual autonomy limitto certainly rules (such as traffic regulation)predict elaborate on as“waiting understood one for or commands” which inignorance cannot that do not present “a threat ofservitude” “Connotations concept. becomes unattractive arather authority personal directives, to and of conditions. person slavery-like reminds so does who person perceived as a matter of the rightimpossibility of of toautonomy. issue Moreover, “conditions the essaysuch stresses commands the problem authority, of political of togetherdefinition theoretical with the obligation to follow the more with general with a reference. authority conflict essay it would seem much more plausible to approach the claim of autonomy being in constant 24 23 22 state” the of authority for the justification “any theoretical Lisa H. Perkins, “On Reconciling Autonomy and Authority,” Ibid., 9. Wolff, viii. It is interesting, however, to consider whether the justification of the concept of concept of the justification the whether consider to however, is interesting, It that means state the of deduction of necessity the on insistence Wolff’s Nevertheless, Undoubtedly, if the emphasis is placed on undesirable and unjustified genuinely on emphasis the of absence the in that natural rather seems it Therefore, obedience to 24 . 23 . Thisimmediate linksubmissionanother establishes an one’s willto to prima facie duty of obedience as “merely a superstitious submission to 12 Ethics 22 82, no. 2. (January 1972): 115-16. . Given the overall main focus of the of focus main overall the Given . personal rule” lead to the de jure authority CEU eTD Collection Edmundson, 32. 32 31 30 29 28 27 University Press, 1998), 13. consequences of the actions available and “the law character and on a particular its significance depends tocontent-independent: the actor” at a given time 26 25 state” legitimate no not necessarilyconclusion in“theobligation does canbe there anarchist that philosophical result action of the “full moral evaluation” in weight” the nothas “independent law with no a or in accordance acts whether anindividual factthat the authority” political legitimacy” shouldbe employed involving and true the consistentTriad of propositions. the state any right to rule” basisadequate for a agree that the duty to obey “is instrumental to realizing values” may moral philosophers values, obey and other the duty to between conflict the considering between it and an individual” counting” of favoringreasons leads which to the significance “of the obey the law “whenever there are good independent so” reasons for doing law aregood obey “wheneverthere the de jure proposition “InconsistentTriad” which Edmundson’s problematicof the possibility of describes A. John Simmons, A.John “The Anarchist Position,” 16Philosophy Public 268,and Affairs 268(1987),quoted in 33. Edmundson, Joseph Raz, “Authority and Consent,” 15. 8, Edmundson, Wolff, 105. Ibid. William A. Edmundson, 104. Perkins, authority authority in the absence notion the of of Nevertheless, as Edmundson argues, refuting the refuting argues, Edmundson as Nevertheless, Wolff’s rejection of even a non-absolute prima facie duty corresponds to the second the to corresponds duty facie prima non-absolute a even of rejection Wolff’s 25 . Political philosophy tells us that the duty to obey the law is neither general nor 31 prima facie . The anarchistis challenge on“general founded moral thatdeny reasons Three AnarchicalFallacies: Political An Essay on Authority 32 . However, in order to oppose this assertion, “the correct view of “the correct assertion, this tooppose in order However, . 28 . duty is still an important issue. important duty isan still 67 Virginia Law Review 13 prima facie 27 . Itinevitably involves unjustified “double 103,130(1981), quoted in Edmundson, 14. prima facie obligation. Even though, while 29 26 , and that individuals should de facto . Wolff’s conclusion is that conclusion Wolff’s . nature of political of nature (New York: Cambridge statein any dispute 30 , the need for an need , the CEU eTD Collection while its subjects are bound to obey are two separate questions. separate obey are two while its subjectsareboundto conditions”;bringcommand authority aboutthose thusestablishing hasthelegitimacy that an to authority exercise to de jurelegitimacy and “the question of whetheritis morally justifiable to an for conceivable conditions” are there “thequestion essay.whether fact, in In confused Wolff’s moral combines autonomy authority and legitimate political thatno association heultimately thisconcludes apossiblesolution: for contradicts hope harshly thenextidea heintroduces However, legitimate. its isgenuinely obey commands” to citizen’s the promise “founded upon agreesthatdemocracy Wolff incoherent”. “inherently being authority legitimate his ownideaof actually oppose variousdemocracy types of the statements he makesconcerning But the authority.legitimate political of nature contradictory is more, itis possible to reconcile it with the political authority of states. Therefore, the notion of an individual obligation to a legitimate authority cannot be denied; what autonomy vs. authority is aimed at depicting the latter as undesirable; the discussion of depicting autonomy latterasundesirable; vs.authority is thediscussion the the of at aimed of His consideration firstone. the to answer negative forit a mistaking while secondproblem the individual atproviding is political between and authority autonomy directed anegative answerto laws” state’s just) reasonably (or atleastjust of a administration interferethe not with to 405-6. 35 34 33 isideaa general of part important “the most of this paper the For thepurpose Harry G. Frankfurt, “The Material Anarchism of Robert Paul Wolff,” Wolff, 69. 48-49. Edmundson, see Triad’, Consistent “the on more For As noted by Harry G. Frankfurt, this contradiction arises from two distinct issues being issues distinct from two arises contradiction this Frankfurt, G. by Harry As noted The on ground which Wolff calls himself a philosophical anarchist is assertedself-the 14 34 . Political Theory 35 Wolff’s attention to the conflict tothe attention Wolff’s 1, no. 4 (November1973): prima facie duty 33 . CEU eTD Collection relies, andby kindof the its pre-emptreasons directives acts” of itkinds “the by can restricted directives its are only ornot power”: cannot rightful authority’s an of limit “the control, but they is authoritative forunderstanding This actions isimportant directing suchlegitimate pre-emptive. are also limited considerations of nature the “the torequire action”; power concerns authority which primarily by “the kind of reasons” on which it thesis: justification normal so-called the involves 38 actions based on reasons relating to the contents of its instructions”; simultaneous direct from involves refraining itleads anauthority conclusion “acknowledging tothe that justification, its subjects.reasons alreadyindependentlyapply with Combined which normal the to subject tochallenge certain on grounds. on the establishment of 1.1.4 Raz’s normal justification thesis argument to support logical incoherence of the concept of legitimate authority legitimate of concept of the incoherence support logical to argument 37 36 Therefore, out. left is legitimate being it of possibility For more on the pre-emptive thesis see thesis pre-emptive onthe more For Raz, Frankfurt, 405-6. The Morality of Freedom Raz’s outline of justification is worth mentioning in practical refersmore mentioning detail. to is It worth justification Raz’s outline of to follow the reasons which apply to him directly. alleged authority authoritatively as bindingfollow andtries to them by than rather trying him (other involves showing allegedthe that is subjectperson comply likelybetter to with reasons which apply to thananother over authority has a person that theestablish to way normal [T]he alleged authoritative directives) if he accepts the directives of the According to the dependence thesis, commands issued by authority According dependence tothe by thesis, issued commands shouldbeauthority based on A claiminvolves way opposingof possible Wolff’s Joseph discussing Raz’s arguments de jure , 53. authority. This approach to acknowledging legitimate authority acknowledginglegitimate to approach This authority. The Morality ofFreedom 15 , 46-47. 37 38 In Defense ofAnarchism In Defense . Thus, authoritative decisions are decisions authoritative . Thus, 36 . lacks an CEU eTD Collection 42 41 authorities” of function the of conception “the service reflects 43 40 39 acknowledgement from its for the grounds and emphasis the on authority shifts legitimate possibility states the of thesis of generalizations. level medium” or “low at individuals different uniting by culture pluralistic promoting facilitates actually authority isacting asamediator What more, moral and principles” with practical “compliance subjects’ the improves of authorities mediation justified Thus, involved. reasons subjects and to determine or approve rules that will help people to conform to the balance of its assess applying to the is decisions”. The rolereasons to authority of and“concrete reasons individual identification andwith a group allow rules toactas mediators between “deeper-level” people for itlongworks as as simply justified is authority clarification: offers conceptions service The legitimacy. possess not might they legitimate, are they that claim necessarily directives authority is to serve people which can be expressed, for instance, through coordination efforts. them double counting such means reasons to reference accepting the authority” along with the absence of “reasons not to accept it” accept to not “reasons of absence the with along authority” the accepting for reasons are “there that demonstrating means justification Full only. acknowledgement Ibid. See also Raz, 402. Shapiro, Gans, 37. Raz, Gans, 37. The Morality of Freedom 41 Indeed, thisis avery attractive understanding of Although itauthority. that is true Further reasons for accepting authority thatits directives for reasons Further acceptingarguments include provide authority It isIt nevertheless argued normal justification the that suggests forthesis grounds partial . Otherwise, itbelegitimate. cannot considered . Otherwise, The Morality of Freedom 42 . de facto , 56. to de jure , 56, 94. authority. 16 39 . This combination, as Raz points out, points Raz as combination, . This 40 : the primary goal of legitimate of goal primary the : 43 . However, this CEU eTD Collection Anarchism itsbefor purpose of the not primacyand significance shouldrejected criticizing viewed in the essay as “the primary obligation of man” of obligation primary “the as essay the in viewed authority is first and foremost linked to his distinguishing understanding of moral autonomy. Itis values” other if itserves perform “freedom that isvaluable Raz, purports inonly actions to certain circumstances certain by formulated example, for as, view, This self-explaining. and self-sufficient not are autonomy 1.2.1 Origin of the conceptual conflict: autonomy 1.2 TheDuty ofAutonomy 46 45 is his It foractions. one’s responsibility to take by isobligation accompanied reason to capacity in of conception used autonomy employed whileevaluating besides,it Wolff’sis position; necessarylookclosely alsoto at the does not enslave individuals. freedom deserves argumentation being the This of autonomous 44 describes conditionalitythe de jureof authority and provides guidelines for its conduct normatively authority of serviceconception the addition, In directives. to obey authoritative itimprovementof “one’snotion compliance reinforces reasons”; ofthe significant with duty the Wolff, 18. Ibid., 17. Raz, The Morality of Freedom Wolff’s view can be generally opposed by Wolff’sview canbe opposed asfreedom idea thatsuch generally the concepts and The reason why Wolff’s essay doubts the possibility of the notion of legitimate political Therefore, Raz’s view provides an outline for demonstrating that legitimate authority for demonstrating that view outline Raz’sprovides an Therefore, In fact, the normal justification thesis is about acknowledging authority only if it entails . 45 . However, individual autonomy is the basis of the liberal tradition, and , 63. In Defense ofIn Defense Anarchism 17 46 . ; precisely, individual free will and the and will free individual ; precisely, In Defense of In Defense 44 . CEU eTD Collection means being able to make decisions about what one should do in a certain situation will. individual is Therefore, abouttakingobligation for responsibility one’s which actions mindless obedience”; itis rather voluntary restriction of personal freedom and the ability to act at responsibility.take imply“Forfeitingcase in autonomy” ofservitude “position doesnot this and neverdemocracy,inindividuals is refuse the to shouldand ascaseof agreeing toobey possible, 48 47 presupposes that such doperson always theright chooses to thing) ascertainis duty to of (asWolff out,this attempting right” what ideainnowisely points sense obligation is carried out. In other words, a genuinely and scrutinize one’s decisions actions. responsible person in failing“does with comparison responsibility. totake inBut then,is addition, there alsoa duty to not neglect the is Atthe such very isexcluded. least, behavior advanced actions consequences of the particular decision,may even consider and declare themselves responsible in cases when deliberation about makefree that on their “both them will possessing individuals, every and reason” reflect be such their for Therefore, actions. heldaccountable personshouldresponsible continuously personal obligations unacceptable. theoretically therefore, and, illogical, self-contradicting, to take responsibility.leads political of is Wolff variant reasoningthat autonomy-based conclusion that the authority to It is because of the capacity to reason that the Ibid., 13-15. Wolff, 13. In accordance with this logic, although the essay discusses that forfeiting one’s autonomy To sum up, this is way the how understanding andaccepting the existence of moral their According to the essay, freedom of will (or freedom of choice) by itself does not generate 18 47 . 48 . CEU eTD Collection 52 examples ofany “capriciousoutrageous oranarchic”is conduct. What for crucial viewing 51 50 49 consideration. duty actautonomouslyto isbeing This violated. partof his anarchismdeserves further detailed morallyisexamining andreflecting to obliged onevery life;of moral the aspect otherwise, their moral independentinvolves that duty incessantscrutiny and person An deliberation. autonomous choose” to “the capacity or responsibility” autonomous excludes reasonable anddecisions prevents individuals from fulfilling their duty beto as shouldactingcommandsbe understood self-issued commands, anysubmission upon to “their actions beto determined by decisions that are made by others”. Since exercising autonomy self-made imperatives only freedom Wolff and responsibility”, that,since moral asserts autonomy submission permits to 1.2.2 Autonomy asa moral duty individuals have a duty striveto for reaching maximum autonomy his essay: of ideal moral the as serves self-legislation responsible Thus, for actions. reasons autonomy and the claim that enhance both itisincorporates people must their claim seems imposing because the that the commands issued by others must not be viewed as the moral Shapiro, 387. Shapiro, John Horton, John 407. Frankfurt, Wolff, 14. Wolff does not reject moral constraints placed on the on placed constraints moral reject not does Wolff moral for condition “anecessary just as autonomy viewson tothe As contrasted Claiming to have followed Kant’s logic concerning moral authority as “a combination of John Horton points out that the reason Wolff’s autonomy-based anarchist challenge anarchist autonomy-based Wolff’s reason the that out points Horton John 50 Political Obligation . 49 , autonomous individuals should be contrasted with those allowing (Atlantic Highlands,NJ: Humanities PressInternational, Inc., 1992), 126. 52 , Wolff’s peculiar idea of autonomy treats itas an treats idea of autonomy , Wolff’speculiar 19 responsible 51 . person; this rejects this person; CEU eTD Collection of the notion of autonomy employed in 54 53 interpretation of responsibility as engaging oneselfinto the complicated process of reflection and 1.2.3 The initial inconsistency produced; authoritativethus, commands of statethe have nobinding moral force. condition demands that they refuse to be ruled. Also, individual moral constraints are self- mean abandoning the primary obligation humanof beings. Furthermore, people’s moral would it because do they what for responsibility their up give cannot simply they Next, choices. is actual the requirement another however, behavior; responsible for condition sufficient not but necessary a constitute does of choose course one’s actions being to inable of freedom sense the andattractive. Indeed, reasonable rather is individuals of freedom metaphysical to appeal initial Wolff’s that assumed unreflective acceptance to as contrasted scientist inquiring an by performed arguments mathematical of assessment careful than different no be be should might constraints these what on information acquiring Even individual. the by individual the autonomy moral as isprimary are all duty that constraints judged determined and Ibid., 12. Wolff, 13. One challenge to the plausibility of the essay’s conception of autonomy is exactly the exactly is autonomy of conception essay’s the of plausibility the to challenge One their about reason will to freedom of exercise capacity mustand individuals Therefore, criticizing principles, and forthso burdens additional motives,the of predicting on outcomes, reflecting knowledge, gaining lays do, and[…] one involvesdetermine that upon one oughtto … attempting to what Without elaborating on the essay’s correct relation to Kantian philosophy, it can be can it philosophy, Kantian to relation correct essay’s the on elaborating Without taking responsibility, which, in Wolff’s own words: In Defense In Defense of Anarchism 53 54 . This ideaonly the reflective emphasisadds to nature . 20 . CEU eTD Collection dependent on his idea of autonomy conflicting with authority. Therefore, evaluation of with authority. evaluation conflictingon of the dependentidea Therefore, hisautonomy of heavily is anarchism of favor in evidence Wolff’s politics. actual to attention detailed more in being unattainable reality. information else’s his commands exposes idea person a truly autonomous of to theproblem perfect of Therefore, Wolff’sbetween individual sharpcontrast autonomy someoneand submission to nothing does stress but pointthis autonomy.The example of determining assessing issues and national (such asdefense policies) for retaining required all facts the about informed keep oneself to obligation the with comparison autonomy is that the obligation to control alsothat involve personaldedication and useof theother resources. uses of things one’sand time-consuming important of kinds all of a variety of resources consists life individual’s every rationally isthat fact simple the dueto subject” a on have an opinion to “not preferring people responsible primary in 57 Defense ofAnarchism rational and autonomy,“complete still he to insistsobstacles that there significant is an are obligation there that to act as“the authors” acknowledging of While commands policy. one may nuclear of obey,aware American 56 55 do” required for a responsible individual to make reasonable “final decisions about what one should be can that information necessary the all obtaining of difficulty the leads to This deliberation. to the obligation to preserve autonomy by refusing to submit to another’ssubmit preserve by to commands obligation to the autonomy to refusing to Frankfurt, 408. Frankfurt, See,forinstance, Wolff’s illustrationof individual responsibility referring to the example of a responsible Wolff, 17. 55 and act according to self-legislated laws. Wolff underestimates the possibility of self-legislated accordingWolff laws. underestimates andact possibility the to even of Besides, his interpretation of the notion of autonomy ought to be supplemented with a with be supplemented to ought autonomy of notion the of interpretation his Besides, addition, In by more carefully Wolff inhis Thus, whatshould beconsidered moral of account , 17., For moreon discussionof this example, see Frankfurt, 407-8. In Defense ofAnarchism In Defense 56 . provides no link of the aforementioned obligations 21 57 In . CEU eTD Collection within individual hisassertion thatanautonomous never“unless obeysa himself he command analysis of the notion of authority can not be considered completely systematic Wolff’s unclear, left is institution political asa state of concept if the more, is What society. himself acknowledges he Nevertheless, a arrangement. placementof political a person within adequate provide the that there is a difference appeal theory is themoral value to to autonomy of freeof and individuals,responsible andnotto between types of political organization of the 60 University Press, 1978): 287-9. is autonomy,possible and,judgment therefore, that criteria of these existence to the practices and rules are subject toa public criteria of correct judgment. At the same time, itis due institutionsbe ofsome which existence the conceived governmental itself without cannot “autonomy and authorityinresult problems with applicabilitythe ideathe of ofindividual isautonomy. It that suggested are really just inevitably will two spheres andmoral political between difference the neglecting is here point that sides of the same coin”: the concept of authority emphasizes that Wolff treats the concept of a legitimate state in an state legitimate of a concept the Wolff treats that emphasizes morality from politics distinguishing to appealing criticism of line This analysis. political and autonomy is and of authority individualistic the that is framework inadequatefor essay the social 59 58 relationships” political of analysis the “to is relevant autonomy of conception his which to extent For moredetails on this argument,see Wall, 273-93. Greenville Wall, “Philosophical Anarchism Revisited”, in 407. Frankfurt, Another significant inconsistency in Wolff’s application of the concept of autonomy lies autonomy of concept the of application Wolff’s in inconsistency significant Another Of course, an anarchist following Wolff might object to this by stressing the aim of his of aim the stressing by this to object might Wolff following an anarchist course, Of A veryimportant observation impossibility proclaimedharmonizingconcerning the of 58 appears as an important step of criticizing the essay. the step of asanimportantcriticizing appears 22 Anarchism: Nomos XIX apolitical (New York: New (New York York: manner. The major The manner. 60 . 59 . CEU eTD Collection 63 variety cases variety of forfeiture beof of different Autonomy autonomy. “putcannot aside” their moral condition. Still, forfeiting autonomy perceiveit fail as or itto purpose on acknowledge to may refuse individuals either nevertheless, one’s actions. one’s judging whether they are god orbad must notbe confused with total refusal beto responsiblefor 62 61 dopossible to so. isit be and be andautonomy alwaysshould achievedwherever whenever self-legislating, must individual autonomous an since commands state’s the of legitimacy denies ultimately essay the why majoris reason the that Also, word”. the of sense “in the political free being calls follow” to been hastold he of action the course approves they are told to do by another, but not autonomous individual must acts be self-given. strictly The autonomous person may do what 1.2.4 Explaining forfeiture of autonomy “the goodness or wisdom of what is commanded” while complying individualsjudgment with attempt exerciseorders always independent to of that imply necessarily not does employs Wolff examples the However, another. from commands rational have reasoning would of in resulted samecourse the eveninaction theabsence of Wolff, 13-14. See Wolff’s example of commands to man lifeboats on a sinking ship, a sinking on lifeboats man to of commands example Wolff’s See 409. Frankfurt, However, it is it that remarkable However, According to the general line of the essay’s argumentation, the imperatives on which the which on imperatives the argumentation, essay’s the of line general the to According In Defenseof Anarchism because 23 they have been told to do it. This is what Wolff is what This it. do to told been have they at willat 62 . and deciding to obey and deciding toobey without commands 61 . This means that the individual’s own In Defense of Anarchism certainly does not overlook the , 15-16. 63 ; CEU eTD Collection and to be taken as reasons for action “simply because they have been issued”. An autonomous An issued”. been have they because “simply action for asreasons be taken to and precludedeliberation to both theyaresupposed because directives authoritative of very character the is thatWolff His recognizes criticizing made personsisapproach byShapiro. autonomous autonomy. moral in relinquishing results always law the been carried out are viewedby individualasboth the orders have shouldthat been not have madeand not should if is, is surrender, orders the moral to subject autonomy that a two-fold condition: presupposes against“acts hisher overalljudgment” concerningor his her acts.Initsor turn, this idea moral surrenderhappens individualautonomy”. However,onlywhen suchan undesirablean authority” of acceptance conditional and “limited contrast, In authority. of acceptance they that only are true autonomy is when totally andsuppressed byabsolute unconditional conditionality submitpersonal of commitment to to commands. Individual isautonomy preserved sinceitis individual the determines that reasoning the additional differentfrom “blind” becauseitobedience is justified by individual’s belief the “certain that mean undesirable forfeiture of forfeituremean of autonomy. undesirable factissued of commands being canmake orders “desirable” submission to 68 67 66 65 64 Gans, 17. Ibid. Ibid.,411. 410. Frankfurt, 60. footnote See Another important observation on the reasons for action that can be accepted by be accepted can that action for reasons the on observation important Another This idea reveals a weakness of Wolff’s arguments against political authority in the sense Besides, A rather remarkable point is that, as the aforementioned examples as aforementioned the is that, point remarkable A rather conditions” 68 In Defense ofAnarchism In Defense . Therefore, it is incorrect to imply that the duty to obey the law because it is itlaw because obey duty the the to imply that to is incorrect it . Therefore, 66 he or she regards as being critical are considered in case of heorshe asbeingcritical are in regards considered case compliance. of tends to equal “subjection of the will” to “surrender of thewill” to of equal “subjection to tends 24 64 demonstrate, the very the demonstrate, 65 . This submission is submission . This 67 does not CEU eTD Collection moral obligation to obey virtue is ofautonomy genuinely moral obey The commands. authoritative obligation to prescribes thatfreeachieve individualsmuststrive andresponsible to autonomy, excluding thus 69 individuals mustnever comply lawwith the just imperatives. self-issued andon actions act responsibility is a result of individuals being endowed with the capacity to choose their own obligation of individualsis that viewed asa combination of freedom and responsibility. Personal is it As autonomy. moral as singleprimary is the from autonomy presented essay’sevident argumentation, the moral and authority political between relations theoretical with concern his of laws. just of administration the with interfere to not duty facie prima a involves rather it commands; are they because just obey commands to duty facie imply a prima not sense does correct inthe legitimacy political of concept the Besides, justification). theoretical lacking and undesirable morally being andhis autonomy (described as absolute even and claim authority rigid) inreferenceof to can be duetohis criticized use of very of the inconsistency concepts isautonomy (whereas found 1.3 Preliminary Assessment forone’s actions. responsible not oneself simplyholding matters, that conduct for one’s responsibility infailingtotake results character theperemptory possessing and content-independent as commands authoritative is treating more, what acknowledgereasons; such not does person Shapiro, 389-90. Shapiro, Although some specific circumstances may require obedience to authoritative directives, obedience to may require circumstances some specific Although Thus, a preliminary evaluation of the premises of Wolff’s theory reveals the peculiarities authority legitimate of possibility moral the of rejection Wolff’s overview, ageneral On 69 . It is, in fact, the capacity and eagerness to take responsibility take to eagerness and thecapacity is,fact, in . It 25 because it is the law. The moral condition moral The law. the is it CEU eTD Collection anarchist by claim purported incompatibility that the proving between autonomy and authority rejectthe to in precisely, order More rationality. notion the of by introducing consequently, and, his interpretation autonomy,of be the adequacy authority of can bycontesting achieved requires some preparations. essay the of premises theoretical the to application its However, authority. of justification to Raz’s be related can forandreasons action it to becauseappeals valuable especially upby Theis brought point be is authority will unattainable Shapiro legitimate defeated. challenge Theideamodify irrelevant. is in conceptions to his suchaway these claim that that anarchist his making thus implausible absolutely as them reject to not is idea The authority. Wolff’s of autonomy and alternatives to more conceptions adequate are that there demonstrate itself.of democraticgrounds the liberal state Anarchism a question arises: what will be the response from political philosophy? The logic of legitimate” obviously ideathe of thatunanimity, asthe method arriving recognized “whichismostat decisions action” collective deducted 72 71 70 jure of a concept the rejection of such a forperson, only; anarchist by a philosophical recognized For the previous reference to freedom in the political sense see footnote 52. seefootnote sense political the in freedom to reference previous the For Ibid., 27. Wolff, 22. state is the only plausible and inevitable political belief. political inevitable and plausible only isthe state The ultimate conclusion is that it is never possible for the idea of a legitimate state to be to state legitimate a of idea the for possible never is it that is conclusion ultimate The In particular, further undermining of Wolff’s denial of the theoretical foundations of state defendway a plausibleThus, viewthe is political that Iwould philosophy to to promote . Even democracy as an attempt to extend “the duty of autonomy to the realm of appeals to the true political freedom political freedom true the beings moral to appeals of 70 is an insufficient solution to the problem of autonomy versus authority; even authority; versus autonomy of problem the to solution insufficient an is 71 , establishes state legitimacy does not stand real-life implications. Hence, implications. not real-life stand does legitimacy state , establishes 26 72 ; this seems to undermine the to ; seems this In Defense of In Defense de CEU eTD Collection questions further: cannotbe held as the reason to reject political obligations,it is necessary to address the following 4. 3. 2. This issue entails the need toconsider of subgroups questions:related 1. b) a) jure justifying within be Raz’s approach to Wolff’s situated Howcan this position? undermine authority and autonomy rationality, between relationship the can How authority? and can the linkbetween rationality What establish exactly or same? the overlapping co-extensive, they Are rationality? and autonomy between connection is the What isof conception autonomy? What correct the duty toothers? duty owed moral a follows individual an action every of evaluating critically and commands conferredhim/her to exclusively? isimplied itOr that by adhering toself-made is individual a particular of autonomy of duty a particular that mean it Does it? Can autonomy really be considered a separate specific moral duty? Does it constitute a primary moral obligation of individuals as Wolff understands legitimacy? 27 de- CEU eTD Collection the essay. It will be followed by reference to the paradox of authority and rationality. Also, rationality. and authority of paradox the to by followedreference bewill essay.the It serious doubtsin his theory specificallyrelated theconception strictto of autonomy developed in forgrounds questioning the basis Wolff’sof anarchism further. problems how with (self) and itselfindulginglinguistic intoisacombinationof of kind any word analysis (since the Without means. autonomy exactly what at look to interesting is it ideal, specfic very a implies autonomy of Wolff’s notion Since with relevance. manner can beviewedinanalternative “autonomy” term the how explore to is necessary it all,of First several reasons. to due justified authority. and autonomy in harmonizing role its on reflecting and rationality of notion the introducing legitimate state. I would like to look at itsway address objectionto suchimportantissue to of political asWolff’s justification philosophy of the theory from a specific angle wouldlikeadditional nowtosuggestthat andattention to essay’smainthe is a premises plausible evaluate it via view has become less persuasive; at the same time, political authority appears less intimidating. I anarchist the its argumentation, with inconsistency theoretical havesome serious revealed that 2.1 The Meaning ofAutonomy The second important point is that linking autonomy to rationality will lead to exposing to lead will rationality to autonomy linking is that point important second The I am proposing that starting this chapter from reconsidering the notion of autonomy is that fact the Provided Chapter Two: Wolff’s Conflict and the Notion of Rationality Notion the and Conflict Wolff’s Two: Chapter nomos (law) borrowed from the Greek language), the purpose of this is highlightto the In Defense of Anarchism of In Defense In Defense In Defense of Anarchism treats autonomy moralas a duty, thus providing the 28 has been a subject to numerous criticisms autos CEU eTD Collection individual liberty (a recognized concept that can be understood roughly as the ability to do whatdo to roughly theability as can beunderstood that concept recognized liberty (a individual that shows patient a deceiving of case the instance, one For voluntariness. or ignorance freedom, as such categories essential from other separately anotion derive such needto the in later concerns chapter). this significant of most the as one the be treated will (amongrationality which concepts other to be related might autonomy the foundation forof be establishingthe can used understandinghow suggest rationality ultimately it for will organizing suggestionsarrangements, and political democratic solutions utopia-like 73 claims” as matters while “intuitions, addressing such conceptual issues,and empirical andnormative thoughts, or principles. That is why,in fact, it is possible for us to use the notion “autonomy” might even be associated with actions, beliefs, reasons for acting, rules, the will of other persons, it remarks, Dworkin As Gerald theterm. uses of “incorrect” all other out rule and universally acknowledged thatitis virtually singleimpossible to an out definitionexact could that beapplied of parts interesting such in terms conceptions re-evaluated of the theadequate of place the on in particular concentrating not Although view of “authority” via rationality. focused aon significance the developing into criticizing Wolff’s conceptual theoretical framework. introducing incorporating rationality theway of findings the Raz’s approach will pave towards Gerald Dworkin, de jure In fact,insistence Wolff’s viewing individualautonomy on ideal can beas an justified by Thus, this will chapter beto reconsidering devoted his use of “autonomy” terms the and Before movingBefore on to theissue of true the meaning of itautonomy,beshould 73 . Nevertheless, this section is dedicated to investigating how the nature of Wolff’sinvestigating thenaturehow of is to dedicated . Nevertheless, this section state authority - the idea which Wolff’s theory is highly suspicious and critical of. The Theory and Practice of Autonomy In Defense of Anarchism of In Defense 29 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 6-7. as those devoted to discussion of variousdiscussion devotedto of as those CEU eTD Collection 79 useful: be can “autonomy” term the of (characteristics) definitions relevant several on elaborating strict,too and, thus, over-limited initsappeal applicability, thenotion to and to of rationality, ideal. it whetherdoubt really separate than is to a significantly rather lacking is autonomy of notion his way in what examine to is concern primary the is why problemthe inlies Wolff’s account hisspecific viewwithin on autonomy as a moral That duty. 78 (London: Routledge and Keagan Paul, 1972), 162, quoted in Dworkin, 5. decision or is voluntary act thegenuinely idea what high degree,and this questions (this also refers to preferences, desires, values and ideals); they may contradict each other to a aseparatemoral constitute duty. ability to choose theirmeans preventing from them altogetherself-determination (precisely, from one’s exercising “mode of life” necessarily not does character in a voluntary actions their exercising from someone preventing 77 76 75 74 fromis have andone wants, individualautonomy options) different to John Rawls, John J. R. Lucas, Joel Feinberg, “The Idea of a Free Man”, in Man”, Free of a Idea “The Feinberg, Joel Ibid., 15. Ibid. For moreon this example see Dworkin, 14. rational beings, and that we are to understand in this way (iii) [A]cting autonomously is acting from principles that we would consent toas free and sense autonomous (ii) I, and I alone, am ultimately responsible for the decisions I make, and I am in that (i) Iam autonomous if I rule me, and no one else rules I being from suffers of key the useconcepts essay’s emphasize the that in to Thus, order Next, it is useful to consider the difference between first- and second-order motivations andsecond-order first- between difference consider the is itto Next, useful Principles of Politics A Theoryof Justice 78 . (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 453. (Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1966), 101. 75 ). Therefore, at this point it seems that autonomy does EducationDevelopment and the Reason of 30 77 79 . . 74 . Also, it is true that , ed. R. F. Dearden 76 . However, CEU eTD Collection responsible for the consequences of their actions. Moreover, the very principles that best express best that principles very the Moreover, actions. their of consequences the for responsible principlesbe arebeingfollowedand correctly consistently,andagree to individual agents if objective violated not is autonomy following: the is conclusion Rawlsian the is that paper) this Categorical Imperative. However, the most essential part of the argument (for the sole purpose of which objectivity is encouraged while personal autonomy is affirmed befollowed by everyone.is It also used torefer to the Rawlsian idea of a well-ordered society in and freedom between no contradiction is there implies that by JohnRawls proposed (iii) Definition rationality 80 behavior.makes people responsible adopt supplemented by responsibilitywhat originthe take must actions of their mightbe.Beingableto particular be some kind of because specify theydonot anwhat the drivingforce determining individuals’ decisionsis, and idea of guiding principles;responsibility evident in definitions (i) andotherwise, (ii) respectively. to aswell freedom self-determination reference the theappeal and absolute incorporates to it is not clear this paper certainly in earlier1.2 of Section presented conception adequacy.Wolff’s its ensuring what thus unfurlingmeaning step-by-step, ideas to of the contribute autonomy will consequent Rawls, 456, emphasis added. reason Of course, the meaning of definition (iv), in its turn, refers back as far as to the to as far as back refers turn, its in (iv), definition of meaning the course, Of What I am WhatI am a numberhereby suggesting to referring is such list of that definitions of Therefore, the next step takes us further by acknowledging the notions of by the usfurtheracknowledging takes nextstep the Therefore, However, (i) and (ii) alone do not provide a sufficient account of the notion of autonomy . These are the crucial characteristics of people that determine their behavior. their determine that people of characteristics crucial the are . These because individuals act in with accordance act becauseindividuals 31 objective principles that are supposedto that principles 80 . freedom and CEU eTD Collection moral condition to the full degree. They are politically free, but “parasitic upon the obedient, the upon “parasitic but free, are politically They degree. full the to condition moral society has very few autonomous individuals whoareable of realizing the importance of their nominal rulers different: using Wolff’s own words, most people comply with the claims of authority made by in is, actual quite But the fact, andbehavior. situation on theirsuccessful reasons reflecting autonomy. some Perhaps, distinguished are individuals genuinely incessantcapable both of change. isit todo Wolff’s second, from unclearonce whatthisperson ought conception; their reasons derived 1.2.2) (see Section scrutiny of inconstant kind the imagine engaged aperson difficultto how and when processthe scrutiny and of deliberation be shouldcan it happening:isor first, directives. In addition, individuals such possessreflective capacity. not However,itdefinedoes because uppursuingtheirgoalsgive be of external persons wouldto extremely who reluctant 83 82 81 need expressedin their awill possessing andachievetheirof own striving whatthey to they think autonomous individuals’ obtaining of mustfreefrom these ends be Thisexternal constraints. is as a conscious being acting This“developed whom actions involves benotion self” one’s to can attributed. realizing oneself on reasons: one’s own ends can explain his or herindividuals behavior. Also, accountability natureof the the promote astheoneof“freebeings” rational people of equal and Wolff, 16. Lindley, 6. Rawls, 455. 82 . Of course, it is always possible to speculate within the frame of the essay’s account of self-legislating and responsible, reasonable, to autonomy attributes approach Wolff’s As rightfully pointed out by is importantcondition of Lindley,autonomy As out aproperly an rightfully pointed 81 . 83 . This may even lead to the extremely unattractive observation that in reality our in reality that observation unattractive extremely the to lead even may This . 32 and CEU eTD Collection autonomy while others result in forfeiting it. Thus, aperson’s decisions cannot have just “any particular content”. expertise and objectivity,love and commitment, etc. are “inconsistent with being autonomous” it also has a consequenceinevitably presupposes forfeiture of by unreflectiveautonomy compliance with state-issued laws; that it some because authority political legitimate a undoubtedly of possibility the reject sense Wolff’s in autonomy for crucial values, only being.moral respect does Not for a essential categories with are that inconsistent issince it such as loyalty and tradition, of their own reflection, and to make these changes outcomes altered the motivations, accept deliberate on own one’s capability the to presupposes always capable of changingabandoning or first-order preferences. their Instead, itonly is everyone that imply not does point This will. a having of proof is the impulses immediate control one’s to capacity The modify whennecessary. andto motivations, them first-order their 87 86 85 84 atallmeans: self-determination than rather reflection second-order human beings. itview,but questionsalsomight produce autonomy mustwhether be universal the duty of all masses” authority-respecting Ibid., 16, 17, emphasis added. Dworkin, 20. Wolff, 82. See12, 21, ibid.,109. The Moreover, itis suggested substantive that autonomy beshould not idealthe conception Thus,beingindividuals means autonomous that should beableboth critically to evaluate attempt to changeinattempt to preferences lightand these of valueshigher-order accept […] and or capacity the preferences,to desires, wishes, first-order upon their reflectcritically to capacity persons asecond-order of is of as (iv)conceived Autonomy on emphasis more involves autonomy understanding of level another further, Moving substantive 84 . Not only is such conclusion undesirable from the moral point of point moral the from undesirable conclusion such is only Not . notionof autonomy implies that only certain decisions allow retaining 33 effective in their actions intheir 86 . 85 . 87 . CEU eTD Collection contradiction between autonomy authority. and autonomy between contradiction unresolvable the is which claim main Wolff’s on based is that state) the of deduction authority legitimate in rejection (or commitments. Thisinevitably doubtingof the results is itleads underestimation more,submission and What traditions). to of promises to values acquiredfrom should (this not outside bethe confused with such casesasunreflective notdo learnmake to decisions in a vacuum;ourdecisionssome are to extentinfluenced bythe people that sense in individual the choices formation of the actual neglects autonomy substantive value” that it is the substantive nature of Wolff’snecessary view of autonomyis only notions other that with autonomy of fails conflict the Thus, to individual. make autonomous the by it “the supreme taken decisions tothe links content tothespecific it no sinceprovides insufficient be considered moral Also,duty. animportantrelated question arises: whom individualsdo owethis duty to? 89 88 in used notion to the aserious contradiction autonomy constitutes substantive of reason Dworkin’s the why criticism is That values. significant other some and autonomy between relation the approaches Wolff how that one’s promise toobey cannotbe the sole ground for one’s duty obey.to Nevertheless, this is deviation and issued legitimacydemocracy from directives, that annihilates demonstrate of direct butobligation deprives the person of autonomy Ibid., 25-6, emphasis added. 29. of Anarchism, Defense In democracy, of representative critique Seehis 89 Therefore, it should be taken into consideration that adhering to the strict notion of notion strict the to adhering that consideration into be taken should it Therefore, Of course, Dworkin himself acknowledges that his characterization of autonomy (iv) may In particular, Wolff mentions that a personal promise to obey laws generates political generates laws obey to promise a personal that mentions Wolff particular, In . if the former is perceived as a substantive notion. However, it isagree itis However, if reasonableto perceivedasnotion. former the a substantive In Defense of Anarchism Defense of In , since the essay’s emphasis is on autonomy as a as autonomy is on emphasis essay’s the since , 34 88 . Idoacknowledge thathismain is to purpose CEU eTD Collection noteworthy advantages in comparison with the strict understanding. This “weak” understanding. This presumably strict with incomparison the noteworthy advantages several has it motivation, moral their reconsider and on reflect to responsibility and ability remains. 90 autonomy of nature change by ispresupposed think substantive ownpreferences the overand/or refusing one’s recognize, failurenor in to command, on acting caseof someone’s absence responsibility of neither speaking, Generally andactions. decisions their of consequences for the responsible responsible moral beings. vigorously stressed byWolff: asithasbeen mentioned is before, autonomy a personal duty of is thevaluelatter of fact, the In responsibility. torecognizein individual justified, order perfectly and,therefore, isabsolutely required independence substantive autonomy acknowledges that isperson toexperience. supposed of premises theoretical the of evaluation of critical part important is an autonomy of conception alternative thatjustifying an indicates scholars. selective approach evensuch prominent Nevertheless, by other is notion characterized examine this how to desirable) (and plausible certainly shouldis it be, that have admitted It understanding however, revealed. strict of been autonomy essay’s the to specifically tied difficulties significant that above, demonstrated as definition, conflict with the existence (or the possibility of the existence) of the Dworkin, 28. Thus, ifThus, moral autonomy as isan primarilyindividualsobligation of understood as their So far it is quite clear, even on the preliminary observation starting from the level of the However, lack of substantive independence does not free people from beingfrom actually free not people does lack independence substantive However, of of a conception may bethat above presented arguments the to objection A possible In Defense ofAnarchism In Defense 90 . Therefore, the required connection between autonomy and responsibility autonomy between required. Therefore, the connection . After all, it is ultimately aimed at resolving the utter the atresolving isitaimed ultimately all, . After 35 de jure de state an autonomous state CEU eTD Collection 92 91 people bydifferent andpreferred life accepted of alternative meanings etc. equality, forisa variety it view others,achieving moral of point dueto respect reasons: compatible with notion of autonomy (as contrasted with Wolff’s conception) is also more attractive from the owed to everyone” to owed as is ismorality nature“what of besttreated very the remarkable universality, and degree of is bya notion “weak” characterized this Indeed, lifestyles. of diversity mustthe recognize of authority. claims facing being rational and autonomous an considering by authority and rationality between the main step in this paradox of rationality and linking Isuppose that authority. andrationalitybe should autonomy approach because and,subsequently, placethe ideaofrationalitythe inhisargumentation addressing of the after that it will be easier to rationality). move of notion the through defined is again onmotivations to the relation of such nature irrational the as in passions, (and ifnot, caseof some extent overwhelming the exercise to rationality moral aresupposedto beings that is accepted generally philosophy. It discussing theconcept of rationality notionsamong within other ofmoral theimposing scope considers freedom, responsibility whichand on the reasons Itpeopleshould act. involve also 2.2 Autonomy and the Need for Introducing Rationality is. (iv) definition way in the act individuals which on reasons the reconsidering on Ibid., 31. Dworkin, 31. Most importantly, this conception is highly conducive to the acknowledgment of Thus, a very useful approach to evaluating Wolff’s position incorporates evaluation of incorporates Wolff’sevaluating position approach Thus, averyuseful to only if it sufficient not is autonomy moral of view correct the of analysis an fact, In 92 . Wolff’s account tends to overlook this idea, also because it is not focusednotisit because idea, this also tooverlook tends account . Wolff’s 36 91 . In any case, morality CEU eTD Collection possessing a possessing will virtuein of “simply is theiragain, a rationality”; this reference tothe i.e. based on purely rational universal reasons for action that apply to all rational beings abstract: following inthe demonstrated is rationality and autonomy between link “Kantian” the brief, naturelegislation; of autonomousmotivation by. this individualsare the alsodriven defines In reasonable decisions on their own. Being andmake among choose alternatives to have capacity the beings only rational that accepted autonomous means acting at will and relying on self- 94 93 should result from the them? between asserted Kantiannotion of rationality foundation is obey may one tolaws the address of author” “the the notion of autonomy? of Ifacknowledging not, what is the adequatethe power relation actions, for one’s responsibility recognizing while obstacles insurmountable experience of one’s reason and acceptsaying the incessant obligationhow a into the conceptiontoperson of makeautonomy. Precisely, Wolff oneselfis emphasizing the role of rationality by striving to achieve “a complete and rational autonomy” will have to Lindley, 28. Wolff, 17. An important remark concerning the notion of rationality is that it is supposed be itless well makes use better of ability this is in more control of his than decisions a person uses who which enables a personTo be autonomous to ismake to act on self-chosen the principles. best Rationality use is,least, at of the facultyhis ability to choose, and someone who One of the essay’s most noteworthy references to the notion of rationality incorporates it incorporates rationality of notion the to references noteworthy most essay’s the of One At first glance, the initial connection between the concepts of autonomy and rationality and autonomy of concepts the between connection initial the glance, first At 94 . 93 . Then, does this mean that the purpose of using the 37 In Defense of Anarchism of In Defense . It can be can It . perfect , CEU eTD Collection inclinations or with irrelevantto rationality, view this acknowledges importancethe of individual genuinely contradicting as inclinations personal of critical outright is which account “Kantian” the unlike Thus, characteristics. distinct individual’s this to relative are goals such individual, structured reasons are influenced by non-rational inclinations: while being rational for the differentiating orders motivation,of inclinations, beliefs and suchlike. in involvesdemonstrated section,autonomy the recognizing of previous the significance 97 96 95 etc.) impulses, (inclinations, motivations on any other not and reasons presupposing that individualsmorally are onlyfor actions performedresponsible onrational tends to resultin conflating moral responsibility for action with autonomy as well as autonomous being. an for appropriate and decisions makereasonable choose exercisingto the capacity isnot one view“Kantian” concepts by these Lindley) as two considers co-extensive the as (described rationality and autonomy of account such Therefore, Imperative. Categorical the same as to be a is sense full in the autonomous being that out turns ultimately it further, approach “Kantian” the on reflection Lindley’s consider if we However, means. all by it for strive must individuals most: autonomy is he the humanduty beings, but primary alsoinsistsof onextending autonomy to the Ibid., 43, 52, 63. This view reflects what Lindley refers to as “Mill’s conception of Ibid., 20, 24.autonomy”. Lindley,16, 18-9, 21. Hence, it should be taken into account that a person’s goals serving as the basis fora person’s asthe basis it that serving account intoshould beHence, goals taken Moreover, equating moral autonomy with pure rationality within the “Kantian” frame the “Kantian” within rationality pure moral with autonomy equating Moreover, As ithas been shown in previousthe chapter,notonly Wolff from does start stating that 97 . fully rational fully agent. Otherwise, in the absence of genuinely pure rationality, pure genuinely of absence in the Otherwise, agent. 38 95 . 96 . However, as . However, CEU eTD Collection 99 commands. 98 concerned has a moralin peremptory reasons only.thereisnopointBesides, individual autonomous thatthinking the duty autonomous means either content-independent or words, In agency recognition of other towards onethat personowes another;to beingmorally only autonomous defines “the others: since have been discussed. one’s actionsaddressed a fullerto extent, provided that such notions as autonomy, reasonability and rationality making forreasons decisions are correct,peremptory and content-independent as directives authoritative accept not do who are those othersacts it requires; itis only the content of the command that matters. Therefore, autonomous people should An others. no commandauthoritative role plays intheindividual perform to deciding whether of will the by determined never is will their is that individuals not autonomous of characteristic be elaborating on Shapiro’s approach because it offers a clear distinction between the notions. nowperceiving is. to tooutline turn like this, Iwould Inorder autonomy and to agency rational way of preciseadequate iswhatthe question Then, next the latter. of the conception of a strict balanceis, of reasons, that have suchindividuals the makeobligation to suretheir actions a on act to aim agents Rational autonomy. from it distinguishing remarkably by rationality revealing rationality, thus avery with difficulty serious of his autonomy. conception Ibid., 387, 390. Shapiro, 390. See also Wolff’snote 56on of examples autonomousan persondeciding to comply with Therefore, although rationality and autonomy are related, this does not result in any kind in any result not does this related, are autonomy and rationality although Therefore, Thus, itis most remarkable that, if perceived in this way, autonomy is not aseparate duty distinguishing the argumentation, Wolff’s on reflection his in emphasized As This emphasis on the reasons for action also sheds additional light on the very concept of 99 . This idea rejects the specific strictness of Wolff’s account and clarifies the role of role the clarifies and account Wolff’s of strictness specific the rejects idea This . 98 . This mentioned(already point inSection can 1.2.4) be now 39 space of reasons space of ”. CEU eTD Collection 101 100 and viceversa autonomously, not but rationally act to is itpossible since autonomy with interferes itwhat degree decide to to need no is there above: discussed rationality of notion the clarifies significantly This abandoned. is rationality while is preserved autonomy individual; by the defeated are considered that reasons act oncontent-dependentitis possibleto hand, autonomous behavior. other butnot Onthe rational constitutes as undefeated are perceived that reasons andperemptory content-independent reasons. non-peremptory and non-content-independent on acting all, of first is, autonomous beingaim”, that “in with accordance and acton “undefeated reasons” to means aiming to committed are personally they standards substantive the conform to to the agent’s substantive standards. substantive agent’s the to aforementioned approach, andhow emphasis on reasons for actionthe affects provided the conceptionauthority and of the rationality between connection is the what mentioning: 2.3 On Reconsidering Authority paper. of this chapter in be next the which will considered thesis Raz’s normal justification back to different reasonsfor action. Thisline shouldbeof inargumentation kept mind while appealing of nature the to reference is the rationality and autonomy between distinction Shapiro’s of claim of the impossibility of legitimate authority. To be precise, the most significant implication Ibid., 392. Rationality is a 393. Shapiro, Hence, an autonomous agent is not necessarily a rational one. On the one hand, following hand, one the On one. rational a necessarily not is agent autonomous an Hence, Before moving on to outlining possible justification of authority, one more pointis worth autonomy-based Wolff’s resolving to greatly contribute can clarification such Overall, formal 101 ideal: it does not presuppose any particular standards for actions; the appeal is appeal the actions; for standards particular any presuppose does not it ideal: . 40 100 . Also, if being rational being if Also, . CEU eTD Collection that is referred to by Shapiro: the requirement to prefer only undefeated reasons for action leads action for reasons only undefeated to prefer requirement the by to isShapiro: that referred 104 103 102 standards substantive her or his following to committed is individual an that demands rationality directive is obey well as that why authoritative precisely reasons; content-independent an a decision to with “wrong”remark is that the balance of reasons, by its definition,includes all of them,content-dependent content as might be autonomousa does not always impliesrational being rational at the same time. independentupon Also, logicthe being deliberation. in above, according to section the presented one. This bythemselves, reasons such determine should agents autonomous action: for asreasons serve is because the obligation content(content-independence) acttheir on reasons to some good are there because of (thus subjects serving asperemptory reasons). commands should Second, be obeyed,and not prevent from deliberation sideof aresupposed onceissued,the commands to made. the First, supremacy individualsover because: latter. According to Shapiro’s approach, Wolff disagrees with the claim of authoritative Ibid., 393. Ibid. 389. Shapiro, At this point itis useful to recall the so-called general paradox of authority and rationality Besides, rational individuals must always act on undefeated reasons. An important never can are they as commands authoritative that stress to intends essay Wolff’s Indeed, be of nature can authority the important concerning observations two Following this, they justifiable are independently that toperform subjects actions directbecause not and issued been have they because simply be reasons they to that meaning supposed are action, for reasons “content-independent” be to intended are Directives 104 . 41 102 . 103 . CEU eTD Collection 105 of Wolff’s anarchism. character based autonomy- the with concerned mainly am I since issue this on elaborating omit will I thesis. my scopeof will the extendbeyond concept latter reconsideration a proper the of However, reasons following: demands authoritative are neither content-independent and peremptory nor undefeated the turn, its in is, account Wolff’s in obedience with problem specific the However, command). (in of an adequate case and command redundant the isirrelevant andcompliance reasons, balanceof totheiraccording own anyway, rational performingactions required the to agents to either compliance with commands being unreasonable (in case of an inadequate command), or Shapiro, 391-2. Shapiro, Therefore, itis again what nature the provides a linkbetween rationality and authority. 105 . 42 CEU eTD Collection 109 108 deliberation. from reasons certain 107 excludes only reasons “peremptory” while ones; latter the replace they moreover, reasons, other on act” to “not reasons the are reasons “pre-emptive” his However, of “content-dependency”. idea the 106 via testing it with the normalnotion of rationality, itis justificationtime now to re-emphasize how Raz’s approach of justifying authority thesis refutes the claim of following points: following inLookingback Iwould atthe logiclikethesis’s presented 1.1.4, Subsection highlight the to Shapiro, 406-7. Shapiro, Ibid., 61. Raz, Morality of Freedom, 46. to correspond account Raz’s in reasons “dependent” The 404. Shapiro, See also 47. Freedom, of Morality Raz, After having reconstructed the adequate conception of autonomy and discussed the and discussed autonomy of conception adequate the having reconstructed After 3. 2. 1. Chapter Three: Back to the Normal Justification Thesis Justification Normal the to Back Three: Chapter on on independenttheirjudgment own concerning required the actions reasons” judgment of reasons: “itis more likely than its subjects to act correctly for the right justification. means Following thesis,such better from itthe authority out carries that Supposedly, is there an authority legitimacywhose is by confirmed normal reasons relevant other all replaces and overrides that actions for such areason constitutes actions require commands authoritative that fact very the that prescribes thesis pre-emptive The reasons dependent of balance the on based be should directives such words, other in aparticular tothe subjects situation apply independently and of authority.In the actions to the are relevant that from reasons derived be should serviceconception) the dependencethe According the issued sense of (in thesis, the directives to byauthority 108 . That is would. That whyrational not deliberate oncommandssubjects orrely 107 . 43 In Defense ofIn Defense Anarchism 109 . 106 . . CEU eTD Collection 110 well referencecorresponds the linkingwith to the autonomy with and authority rationality. Shapiro, 408. Shapiro, Therefore, along with the virtues of the service conception of authority, Raz’s approach authority, of conception virtues of service the the with along Therefore, 4. acknowledging authority. conception reasons” of space the about “thesis asa autonomy with treating comparedcontradicting not is justification Raz’s that important is it Shapiro, by emphasized As to Wolff’s ideal; and that is why it does not clash with 44 110 . It isless strict . It CEU eTD Collection might contribute to constructing aframe for justifying legitimate authority.Keeping in mind that rationality. of concept distinguishing the supposedly conflicting notions, Iidentified the need forfurther deliberation through seems impossible; legitimate authority is unattainable. Havinganalyzed the problems with the rule. Hence, harmonizing the obligation to be autonomous with the commands of authority inauthoritative moral inevitably the rejection viewed submission duty of to asaprimary results correlative duty to obey is considered to be the hallmark of the state. Conception of autonomy incompatible. imposing claimIhavecrucial examined thethathe twoconcepts presents as being intrinsically analyze losesphilosophy but to anarchist simple inevitably Wolff’s tothe challenge. In order Anarchism of Defense possible justification of legitimate authority in possible justification legitimate authority of suggested approach. Raz’s the within conceptions revised the of incorporation to turning to eventually, and, rationality and is it implausible. rather that why reasons the of account a detailed organize to Iwasable concepts core the of hisuse on autonomy-basedview anarchist expressedbyWolff. Through close examination and reflection Thus, inThus, secondthe andthird Ihave chapters examined thewayintroducing rationality The essay’s conception of authority perceived as the right to rule together with the Therefore, in the first chapter I have reconstructed the logic of the starting points of My goal in this paper was to reconstruct and in to My goal theoretical evaluatethe foundation the thispaperwas of My mainwas effortdedicated criticizingto Wolff’s limited use of autonomy, authority , and showed how their specificity results in the conclusion that political that conclusion in the results specificity their how showed and , Conclusion 45 In CEU eTD Collection way respondto tohis challenge of philosophical anarchism. andconcepts appealing a actual the be to de-jurehasof possibility aplausible to proved authority complexity of the concepts involved I would suggest that it is a matter of a separate inquiry. separate discussion. a of a subject is also authority of evaluation mayhaveonthe introducing rationality that impact embracing scope of Joseph Raz’s logic theentire justifying of the political authority. Besides, Due to the limitationscitizens. its with relation its and state democratic liberal the resultingadequate from the length therevised citizens’Besides, applying relation rationality. to their berevisedalso byassessing of this feasibility his latterformof own propositions concerningthe inevitableand its restrictions) can thesis anddirect the forms of democracy Wolff’spart of essay.Indeed, the onmajoritarian, reflections unanimous and representative (undoubtedly, notway to necessarilydevelop the ideas limiteddiscussed into this criticizing thesis further involvesthe reinforces the ideaframework ofjustifiedauthority. legitimate validity closer attention and to theRaz’s into notions these incorporating how have outlined paperI at thevery end of this second the space authority.as autonomy ismuchmorereasons forof actions Understanding promising: of concept have forthe might itimplications the and rationality, and autonomy of differentiation conception of autonomy by reflecting on a sequence of characteristics attributed to autonomy. alternative the on elaborating on concentrated I autonomy-based is position anarchist Wolff’s Nevertheless, emphasis on the analysis of the starting involve should challengingdirection and possible another acknowledgealso that must I points of Wolff’s essay core its clear was actions for reasons of account Shapiro’s to referred I why The reason As for the broader implications of such approach challenge, a assessing implicationstheanarchist approach of thebroader to As for such conception of autonomy is a plausible way establishto further discussion on the idea of 46 CEU eTD Collection 1999. Rawls, John. Raz, Joseph. Raz, Raz, Joseph, ed. Raz, Joseph, 23. Perkins, Lisa H. On Reconciling Autonomy and Authority. University Press, 1978. Pennock, J. Roland, and John W. Chapman, eds. Nozick, Robert. Nozick, 95. (April 1974): 140-9. Martin, Rex. Wolff’s Defence of Philosophical Anarchism. Lucas, J. R. Lindley, Richard. Lindley, 1992. Horton, John. Horton, University Press, 1992. Gans, Chaim. Gans, (November 1973):405-14. Frankfurt, Harry G. “The Material Anarchism of Robert Paul Wolff.” CambridgeYork: University 1998. Press, Edmundson, William A. Press, 1988. Bates, Stanley. “Authority Autonomy.”and Stanley. “Authority Bates, Bibliography Dworkin, Gerald. Law Coleman, Jules, and Scott Shapiro, eds. 175-79. . New York: Oxford. NewYork: University Press, 2002. 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New York: Cambridge . New York: NewYork . NewYork: 1,no. 4 24, no. . New CEU eTD Collection Wolff, Robert Paul. Cambridge University 2001. Press, Simmons, A. John. Justification andLegitimacy: Essays and onRights Obligations In Defenseof Anarchism . New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1970. 48 . Cambridge: