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CONCLUSION: the Virtues of Majoritarian Democracy

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CONCLUSION: the Virtues of Majoritarian Democracy DEPARTAMENTO DE CIENCIA POLÍTICA Y RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES Facultad de Derecho Universidad Autónoma de Madrid Working Papers Online Series www.uam.es/centros/derecho/cpolitica/papers.html Estudio/Working Paper 25/2004 Democracy in Comparative Perspective Jan Erik-Lane Dpto. de Ciencia Política Univesidad de Ginebra Seminario de Investigación de Ciencia Política C u rso 2003-2004 δ Una versión anterior (co-autorada) de este trabajo se presentó en el congreso internacional ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops celebrado en Edimburgo (marzo-abril 2003). Agradezco a todos los participantes en dichas sesiones, y en especial a su director Daniele Caramani, todos los comentarios y sugerencias que hicieron al texto y que han sido incorporadas en esta versión revisada. Igualmente, mis co-autores en aquel trabajo (Górniak, Kosic, Kiss y Kandulla), son en parte responsables de los méritos que esta investigación pueda reunir. José Ignacio Torreblanca Payá, profesor de la UNED, ha comentado y criticado varias versiones de este trabajo. Agradezco también los comentarios y críticas de los evaluadores anónimos de la RECP. Todos ellos han contribuido a mejorar sustancialmente este artículo. Por supuesto, los fallos que puedan subsistir son atribuibles únicamente a la autora. Por ultimo, la mayor parte de la investigación empírica en este trabajo se ha realizado dentro del grupo de trabajo EURONAT, financiado por la Comisión Europea (HPSE-CT2001-00044) [http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/EURONAT/ Index.shtml]. 1 “Il faut en outre connaitre la vrai nature des choses par rapport a l’ordre de faits sur lesquels on veut etre instruit; il faut les classer methodiquement, pouvoir en montrer la liason, c’est-a-dire les rapports qui font de l’un une cause et de l’autre un resultat.” (Say 1996: 84-5) INTRODUCTION ”Democracy” is first and foremost a word. It has today an immense positive evaluation but what we are searching for is what it refers to in reality. We will take the normative meaning of ”democracy” as given, and then look for what it stands for in the real world which we observe with out senses. Alas, it is all too well known that ”democracy” is an ambiguous word with many meanings. How can one enhance conceptual clarity in relation to the various concepts of democracy? The uses of ”democracy” have been examined in several major semantical investigations. A number of scholars have distinguished between various meanings of the word in order to have a set of different concepts. We will not multiply these enquiries into the meaning of ”democracy”, but we do accept that the word is ambiguous. We will separate between three key concepts of democracy: 2 - Democracy as constitutional government today - Democracy as citizen participation in politics - Democracy as an egalitarian society It is quite obvious that ”democracy” is used in all three meanings above. What is perhaps not equally clear is that these three concepts 1) –3) overlap only to a certain extent. In reality, these conceptions are quite distinct as a country may practice constitutional government but give a little role to citizen participation in politics and embrace an economy which contains lots of inequalities. Perhaps this is a description of the United States or Switzerland today where less than 50 per cent of the population participates in ordinary elections? However, both these two countries employ the referendum institution to express citizen preferences which is a positive. Most so-called democracies concentrate upon representation by providing Parliaments with a major role in channelling citizen preferences into government policies. Finally, some demo cries underline equality more than others, like the Nordic countries where both income equality and gender equality is higher than in many other democratic countries. Constitutional democracy may be practiced in different ways. The political system of democratic countries offers a large set of different institution in terms of which the Rule of Law may be guaranteed. Usually two questions are raised in relation to institutions that guarantee the”Rule of Law” or ”Rechtsstaat”, namely: 3 - Why is constitutional democracy stable in some countries but not in others? - Are different institutions for constitutional democracy conducive to different policy outputs or outcomes? Constitutional democracy is a system of government where procedures are respected and citizens can seek redress against wrong decisions as well as express grievances against the administration. Constitutional democracy is government through checks and balances, where centres of power constitute counter-veiling forces. Why is it the case that constitutional democracy works in some democracies but remains fragile in others? A number of hypotheses have been suggested to account for the probability that one country succeeds in establishing the Rule of Law. We will examine these hypotheses here using as recent available data as possible about almost all the countries of the world. Interestingly, one finds that all the major factors employed in social science theories have been suggested such as economic ones, social structure, culture, history and the very institutions of constitutional democracy themselves. Another major problem in relation to constitutional democracy is whether certain institutions matter more than others, or if some institutions have a different impact than others. Constitutional democracy may be based upon a plethora of institutions safeguarding decentralisation of power as well as human rights. A country may opt for a thin or a thick institutional set-up to protect and enhance its Rule of Law. Does it matter for outcomes? There are a number of theories that argue that democracy can be done under various institutions and it matters which institutions a country chooses and 4 implements. Thus, Robert Dahl opposed Madisonian democracy to Rousseau democracy and Arend Lijphart suggested that Westminster democracy operated very differently from Consensus democracy. What evidence is there actually that confirms these ideas that alternative models of democracy result in different styles of decision-making or outcomes? We have here three sets of problems concerning the interpretation of democracy today. The first set includes all kinds of questions about the stability of the democratic regime. What are the sources of political stability in a democracy and what do some democratic countries hover between the Rule of Law and authoritarianism? The second set deals more with democratic politics than with democratic procedures. It asks a number of questions about who participate in politics and how citizen preferences are translated into government decisions. Third, there is the problem of inequality in democratic countries, which calls for an analysis of whether democratic policy-making can reduce social and gender inequalities. THREE PERSPECTIVES UPON DEMOCRACY While it is true that these three sets of problems of democratic government do not constitute an exhaustive listing of questions social scientists tend to raise in relation to democracy, they cover a fair amount of territory. Thus, they include the constitutional perspective upon democracy, the behavioural perspective as well and the policy view as well. Let us comment somewhat more upon each of these perspectives. 5 The Constitutional Perspective To a constitutionalist the rules of democracy are at the centre of interest. They must satisfy a number of requirements including transparency, stability, procedural accountability, human rights and division of power. In a constitutional approach to democracy these requirements are not only means to the accomplishment of citizen rule but they are regarded as goals in themselves. When they collide with the expression of the will of the people, then institutionalism would favour that the rules prevail. The constitutional perspective focuses upon the Rule of Law in the context of a democratic regime. The idea of a Rechtsstaat was launched before the advent of democracy, however. Universal male and female suffrage was introduced everywhere after the erection of Rule of Law. Thus, the constitutional monarchies in Western Europe practiced the Rechtsstaat before they accepted universal suffrage. And the theory of the constitutional state underlined the requirements of Rule of Law without emphasizing universal suffrage or even demanding it. The great theoreticians of the constitutional state in the 19th century underlined other things than one man – one vote or one woman – one vote. They focussed upon the exercise of power within the limits of the law – the requirement of legality. As a consequence they demanded that the state should be based upon a fundamental law – lex suprema – which outlined the structure of government and identified both its possibilities 6 and limits. Such a basic law could be codified as with Continental Europe or it could consist of conventions as in the United Kingdom. Constitutionalism in the early 19th century dealt more with the procedures of government than with universal human rights. A constitutional state would respect certain human rights like the classical negative freedoms but it was not considered essential that all people could vote. Freedom of thought, of expression and of religion together with property rights constituted vital elements of a constitutional state, but it was not until late 19th century that universal suffrage was made part of the constitutional state. Several constitutional scholars pressed more for parliamentarism
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