Ethnic Minority Elites in Post-Communist Countries: the Case of Estonia

ETHNIC MINORITY ELITES IN POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF ESTONIA

Jüri Ruus

I. Introduction and Background The elite theories maintain that elites Interethnic relations and multicultural are the decisive force for regime change and policies are one of the major factors for se- democratic development. The role of new curity and stability in the Baltic region. Es- political elites is of particular importance in tonia has considerable ethnic diversity com- multiethnic societies and in transition to lib- prising 32% of ethnic minorities and 68% of eral democracy or in acguiring liberal values. Estonians. These people are not recent im- Each of the post-communist states had migrants common to many European coun- its peculiar and complex process for estab- tries, but living permanently in Estonia the lishing new political elites. Common to most second or third generation after forceful in- post-communist states, however, is that new clusion into USSR. How to integrate the two elites broadly and effectively exploited na- numerous communities — this is the acute tionalistic rhetoric to win over and mobi- question that has caused wide and lively de- lize electorate. In this respect recirculated bates for many years after regaining indepen- old communist elites were often more rad- dence and today. In this situation the state`s ical than the new ones.Their emphasis on main concern is to avoid any potential in- ethnic solidarity and the rights of nation al- terethnic conflict and separatist movements. lowed them in some sense to justify commu- In the context of Estonia national and local nist past. community should be open to the dialogue After Estonia regained independence in between different ethnic groups. 1991, the political elite adopted the state res- Robert A. Dahl`s five criterias for evalu- toration model in order to guarantee the con- ating democratic processes are widely recog- tinuity of the Republic of Estonia as a sub- nized by international community of social ject of international law. The restorationist scientists. These five criterias are: effective approach, however, constituted the rejection participation, voting equality, enlightened of democratic inclusive approach to the legal understanding, control of the agenda, and status of ethnic minorities. According to the inclusion of all adults. They are criterias that declared principle of legal restoration, only a process for governing association would pre-1940 Estonian citizens and their descen- have to meet in order to satisfy the require- dants were recognized as having automat- ments that all the members are equally en- ic right to citizenship. Thus, Estonia’s quite СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ ПОЛИТИКА • 3 (9) / 2012 ПОЛИТИКА СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ titled to participate in the associations deci- large population of permanent residents sion about his policies1. without roots in pre-1940 Estonia became Political equality (equal consideration) stateless. The policy of “leave aside” was not is the underlying key terms (rationale) for the so much intentional, as it reflected the situ- choice of these five. Although most elites lack ation among political elites-there were sim- strong unity in a democracy, the main issue is ply not any constructive ideas how to deal to what extent elite agrees on basic values re- with those highly complicated issues. After lated to the political regime. Political stabil- new parliamentary elections in 1992 (also in ity in democracies rests on a minimum lev- Latvia 1993) the takeover of ethno-political el of normative integration among the elite. power was complete: all 101 deputies in the 126 СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ ЛОКАЛЬНОГО ОПЫТА new Estonian parliament (Riigikogu) were 2000 those problems were transformed in- ethnic Estonians, some 90 percent of the to ordinary subjects of discussion, standing deputies in the Latvian parliament (the Saie- side by side with questions of educational ma) were ethnic Latvians2. The democrat- options, job preferences, crime rates, joining ic ideal of the representativeness of minority EU and NATO4. Therefore, the paradigm of groups was perceived to be a direct menace to collective fear and danger has gradually been national independence. The new legal regu- replaced by the paradigm of increasing indi- lations changed dramatically the situation in vidual recources and social capital. society. At the same time it created high un- Today Estonia has considerable ethnic certainty among Russians as it was common diversity comprising 32% of ethnic minori- in those time to suspect some sort of hidden ties and 68% of Estonians. These people are agenda concerning repatriation or indirect not recent immigrants common to many Eu- expulsion. The need of securing national in- ropean countries, but living permanently in dependence from Russia has resulted in an Estonia the second or third generation after indigenous elite consolidation by ethnic re- Soviet occupation. How to integrate the two cruitment, safeguarding basic national inti- numerous communities — this is the acute tutions from external influence. question that has caused wide and lively de- After years of silence, in 1996, the first bates for many years after regaining indepen- official efforts involving the elaboration of dence and today. In this situation the state`s future models for the Russian minority in main concern is to avoid any potential in- Estonia was launched. Importantly the bod- terethnic conflict and separatist movements. ies elaborating the first principles of minori- In the context of Estonia national and local ty policy were not so much political parties community should be open to the dialogue but rather academic circles. At the beginning between different ethnic groups. of the year 2000 the most observable chang- Social science is defining the elites as so- es occurred at the level of political as well as cial category possessing power and influence public discourse. A serious attempt was made and minority is regarded as a group not be- at switching the paradigm from the ethnic ing politically dominant. Elites have exten- centered model to a liberal (civic) one. The sive effects in socio-political development. interstate aspect in the Estonian citizenship The thinking, mentalities, appeals and ac- policy was represented by the internation- tions of elites are prime shapers of collective al security and political policies of the EU, consciousness, identities, and actions out- the OSCE, the Council of Europe, which side the political arena. became more visible. Imposed political stan- According to V. Pareto and H. Lasswell dards on citizenship legislation, minority understanding the elite is not homogenous protection and human rights, as well as their block but segmented into various elites re- framework of interstate mediation and con- lated to functional systems- politics, busi- COMPARATIVE POLITICS • 3 (9) / 2012 COMPARATIVE sultation started to contribute to the shaping ness, science, culture etc. G. Mosca (1939) of nationality policies of Estonia3. stressed the variability of elite organisation, Integration as a prospective and polit- cohesion and collective will. In many Euro- ical concept became natural part of Esto- pean countries the dominant focus on ethnic nian political opinion. At the same time the minorities has been so far in terms of under whole field of relations between Estonians class with low educational level, unemploy- and Russians lost gradually its vital and ex- ment etc. The vertical mobility of minorities tremely emotional position in public debate. is largely underresearched. Current research While in 1990’s the majority of Estonians and is unique since the issues of ethnic elites in non-Estonians considered the majority–mi- multiethnic societies have not been sepa- nority conflict to be one of the most critical ratley included to the focus of elite studies. in the country, at the beginning of the year So far the research done in this area is incor- 127 СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ ЛОКАЛЬНОГО ОПЫТА

porated into political elites framework. The as non-unified elites, the criteria leading a scientific literature dealing with elites ad- state away from consensus democracy. For dresses many key questions such as: Who are non-unified or divided elite is characteris- they and how unified they are? How impor- ic weak or no shared ethos, reciprocal dis- tant they are for democratization and policy trust and suspicion, dense and segmented outcomes? Whether there exist identifiable network6. power elite marked by continuity, cohesion Thus, the focus is on patterns of elite re- and joint interests? How integrated or divid- cruitment, representation, orientations, how ed the elites are? they are shaped and their consequences for Elite theory is promoting the idea that democratic stability and rebuilding of the in democratic society the ruling class must state. This is done by analyzing the empirical be able to integrate multiple social forces. data from minority elite interviews carried In new democracies a consensual unifica- out in the fall 2009- 2011 in Estonian Riigik- tion of disunified elites is a vital step in cre- ogu and Ida-Virumaa. Total amount of re- ating democratic stability. Only consensual spondents was 64 (42 females, 22 males) rep- elites provide the “unity in diversity” that is resenting wide variety of high social statuses essential for a Schumpeterian democratic re- and professions — members of parliament gime that is also stable5. Hence the shape of (elected 2007), civil servants, members of lo- elites matters. It might matter for example, if cal municipal governments and city councils. the leadership class is more or less represen- Several cities and towns were included into tative (demographically) of the general pop- the sample: Narva, Kohtla-Järve, Sillamäe, ulation. It might matter if the elite is unified Tallinn. In these cities and towns the propor- or divided, well educated or poorly educat- tion of those speaking the Russian language ed, cosmopolitan or parochial, etc. Open- is bigger than 30%. For example in Narva ness, where the “elite doors” are open for all (remote city in EU Eastern border) 98% of talented persons, assumes high level of free the population is Russian-speaking. Struc- circulation of elites and vice versus closeness tured interview strategy was chosen. The in- of elite group is one of the key characteris- terviews proceeded thematically and covered tics of non-democratic regime. The circula- the following topics: elite recruitment pat- tion itself might be shallow or deep depend- terns and continuity, democratic participa- ing to what extent recirculation is actually tion and inclusiveness, integration and citi- happening. zenship attitudes. Research follows the general meth- Thus, the research instrument contains odology of elite studies and neoelitist ap- the sections on elite studies, interethnic rela- proach. Empirical analysis is complet- tions and general democratic theory. ed by investigating three four basic aspects of elite configurations: recruitment pat- II. Ethnic Elite recruitment patterns terns and continuity, minority representa- and representation tion, attitudes and orientations of minor- In multiethnic societes elite recruit- СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ ПОЛИТИКА • 3 (9) / 2012 ПОЛИТИКА СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ ities in Estonia. One of the main tasks is ment is of interest because the kind of elites to detect which orientations are dominat- are attracted to politics and the ways in ing among the elites and therefore will have which they are attracted, are revealing in- consequences for policy making and im- dicators of the regime and its policies. Fa- plementation. We expect the recruitment mous Robert D. Putnam`s question “Does patterns, the perceptions and attitudes of social background matter?” should be an- ethnic elites to be relatively homogenous swered affirmatively. It matters who decides without remarkable differentiation. On and governs. The relevance of representa- the other hand high level of differentiation tives selection and recruitment is twofold: prompts to the category which is classified At an individual level their social and po- 128 СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ ЛОКАЛЬНОГО ОПЫТА litical backgrounds and career trajecto- and file workers (82%) in Soviet time. On- ries have supposedly an impact on their at- ly 6% of elite members were recruited from titudes-orientations and qualifications, at families where one or another parent had an a systemic level the ways in which politi- elite position by holding high social positions cal elites structure adopt to the challeng- as engineers, principals, managers etc. Nor es posed by social, economic and political did the ethnic local elite hold high social po- change are constitutive for political sys- sitions before beeing elected or appointed to tems performance, legitimacy and stabili- current position. More than half of the local ty7. Elite recruitment is of interest because elites were recruited rather recently during the kind of elites attracted to politics, and the years 2004–2010, they were elected to the ways in which they are attracted, reveal their positions or nominated by municipali- what interests, beliefs and policy preferenc- ties and they are largely middle-aged (av.age es enter into national and local level policy for local ones is 43 and 55 years for parlia- making process. It takes time to recruit and mentary ethnic elites), with high education. train a new elite and procedures to bring Thus, the tendency of elitist recruitment is them into elite positions. The occupation- not valid rather one could follow more up- al experience of the members of elites is an ward mobility. They are largely newcomers important indicator of recruitment paths. without much political experience. Although The degree of „openness of elite structure“ most of the national legislative elites had high may vary from low, elites being recruit- social position before being elected and po- ed from one single social stratum, to high, litical experience previously in local munic- where elites are not dominated by any sin- ipalities, only few represesentatives of ethnic gle social stratum. The „openness“ also im- legislative elites had considerable long-term plies the circulation of elites, which is vital electoral experience in previous terms of Ri- for both their renewal from the people and igikogu (see app. I). Therefore the parliamen- the implementation of stable and effective tary ethnic elite high political reproduction decision-making8. There are many specif- has been quite modest, though their status ic questions that one usually asks as far as continuity is high. the elite recruitment is concerned. For in- Most political scientists agree on the stance, who can be linked to previous re- importance of education for active citizen- gime and what percentage are new? Wheth- ship and participation. In liberal democra- er young, middle-aged, elder people are cies education is closely related with elite prefered in recruitment? Is there any aver- status. Elite members have much higher, age patterns in terms of age, profession, so- usually academic education as compared to cial status that might be considered as pre- the people. Similarities in ethnicity and ed- vailing patterns? ucation account for similar orientations and The mobility problem must be tackled activities. Professionalism is usually based COMPARATIVE POLITICS • 3 (9) / 2012 COMPARATIVE in any elite studies. In an open societies in- on educational level, the quality of educa- dividuals should be free for social mobili- tional establishment he, she has attended, ty and make careers. Therefore, an impor- political experinece he/she has acquired. tant aspect of democratic elite recruitment Relatively long lasting social status and po- is social mobility of the elites. The question litical experience contributes professional- is: is it so that elites are self-recruited from ization of politics and individuals in a soci- high social strata or is social mobility tak- ety. How well trained is the political elite? ing place from low social groups? Usually Political elites in Estonia (also in Latvia and the new elites are coming from earlier high Lithuania) are highly educated. Higher ed- social positions. However, ethnic elite con- ucation has 88,3% of respondents, 5% tinuity is hardly visible in Estonia since most don,t have, 7% are still studying at the col- of the local elites minorities parents were rank lege (see chart I). 129 СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ ЛОКАЛЬНОГО ОПЫТА

Chart I political parties, such as Vene Erakond Ees- Local elites tis (Russian party of Estonia,VEE, later re- „ Do you have high education“? named Vene Balti Erakond Eestis — Baltic Russian party of Estonia) and Eesti henda- tud Rahvapartei (Union People,s party) were founded and ran in a coalition „Our Home is Estonia“ receiving 5.87% of the votes which correspond to six Riigikogu seats out of 101. In 1999 elections E R gained 8.13% of the vote and 6 seats during the elections. Since then, the representatives of Russian parties have failed to pass the required electoral treshold (5%) in 2003, 2007, 2011 elections. Nevertheless, six minority representatives Compiled by the author were elected through the lists Estonian mainstream parties in the last (2011) Riigikogu Top legislative elites have all high educa- elections. See app. II (http://www.vvk.ee/). tion. Therefore high education seems to have Political analysts have hypothesized that been important determinant of recruitment the possibility of participating in the local paths. It should be kept in mind that high elections in Estonia gave the local Russian education in Estonia as well as in many elite an opportunity for local self- realization other EU states is mandatory requirement and moreover motivated many political par- for appointment to higher social positions. ties to target political marketing on the Rus- As a rule (with some minor specific excep- sian speaking electorate. For instance, the tions) only Estonian citizens are eligible to Centre party headed by Edgar Savisaar suc- hold high social positions of civil servants in ceeded in gathering major part of the Rus- state structures. sian-speaking electorate nearly in all elec- The construction of politics in Estonia tions since 19919. and elsewhere in the Baltics, even in smaller Generally speaking Estonian Russian- communities is influenced by political par- speakers tend to prefer a variety of parties not ties. In consolidative democracy with each necessarily those advocating purely minority election after regaining independence, the issues. The reason for that is probably in ac- trend of each parties range of voters is be- knowledment of limited efficacy of Russian coming more and more homogenous and parties due to splits and merges so far focus- more distinct, with parties attracting mem- ing on minority issues. The lack of legitimate bers of national minorities and core-nation- popular leaders clearly undermines the ac- als. Ethnically homogenous party affilia- tivities of minority parties. Even in minori- tion in multicultural heterogenous societies ty dominated Ida-Virumaa region, the voters is more likely to be source of unstablity in elected the candidates running on the lists of СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ ПОЛИТИКА • 3 (9) / 2012 ПОЛИТИКА СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ consolidative democracy rather than stabil- main Estonian parties to promote their inter- ity hindering in policy-making to find con- ests more effectively on national level. Thus, sensus and common agenda. For example, voters across Estonia demonstrate the same in Latvia one can speak about ethnically di- model of electoral behaviour regardless of vided parties whereas in Estonia the Rus- their ethnic affiliation. For instance the elec- sian parties have not succeeded in gaining tions for the Riigikogu (2007) and also Latvi- a voice in parliamentary elections. No Rus- an Saeima (2005) after the heated debates on sian parties were elected in the first post-So- education reforms, the development of in- viet Riigikogu (1992) due to peak time of na- tegration programmes and the consequenc- tionalistic ideology. In 1995 several Russian es of the EU membership stressed the grow- 130 СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ ЛОКАЛЬНОГО ОПЫТА ing propensity of non-core ethnics to vote if there are ideological differences, the mis- for mainstream parties, whose focus is on trust is also focused on those who take deci- minority social problems rather than mere- sions12. Because of the mistrust and hatreds ly promoting a minority agenda. Similari- that pervade a divided elite, breaking out of ly to Latvian situation, the Estonian govern- the configuration is rather difficult, it prob- ment coalitions after 2007, 2011 elections ably requires a sudden, deliberate, and fun- were formed without the Centre party, which damental elite settlement that can occur in a represented large sections of the Russian- profound crisis that threatens the interests of speaking electorate, despite it holding ap- all main elite groups more or less equally13. proximately quarter of the votes in last (2007, During the last 20 years the cleavage line 2011) elections. In part, the political situ- lies between those parties supporting more ations has been interpreted as a projection nationalistic mainstream of policy (Reform, of everyday beliefs into the realm of politics, ProPatria —Respublica Union) and the par- with minority/majority parties holding con- ties arguing in favor of more moderate eth- troversial views on the geopolitical situation nic policy. (Centre, Social-Democratic par- of Estonia, educational reforms, citizenship, ty). The office holding parties have been firm language policies etc.10 supporters of clear-cut nationstate policy, However, power sharing is the hall- whereas opposition and center-leftist par- mark of consensually united elite, and the ties propagated further concessions in eth- periodic, peaceful alternations in execu- nic policy. Big parties are not treating Rus- tive power that mark liberal democracies are sian-speaking electorate as separate interest its principal manifestations. Many promi- group, since vital problems of all people re- nent researchers such as Highley and Bur- gardless of their ethnicity are similar. ton, Steen, Perry11 insist that elite can oper- For some political actors alignment with ate successfully if there is a trust among its ethnic values has been to considerable extent members, if members with different ideolog- a means of remaining in power. As Boris Tsi- ical views can debate their ideas and compete levich argues „In any event belonging to- or with one another and if at the same time ev- at least articulating ones loyalty to-the titular eryone accepts the rules of the game of de- groups, the „masters of their land“ seems to mocracy. This type is classified as integrated be necessary prerequisite for becoming part or unified elite. Among disunified–conflict- of the new political elites in many of the post- ing elites there is mistrust. There are doubts communist countries. Instead of playing a about the elite groups and their competence, role as the avangarde of liberal principles, the

Table I Turnout in local and nationwide elections (2007–2009) (Percentage) COMPARATIVE POLITICS • 3 (9) / 2012 COMPARATIVE Ethnic Minorities, Non- General Estonians who have Estonian Estonian Russian turnout citizenship citizens citizens Participated in local elections (2009) 61% 74% 80% 81 72% Participated in Europarliament (2009) 44% 68% 68% 0 0 elections Participated in Riigikogu (2007) elections 62% 71% 72% 0 0 Source: http://www.vvk.ee/, Monitooring 2010, http://www.slideshare.net/kultuuriministeerium/limumiskava-monitooring 131 СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ ЛОКАЛЬНОГО ОПЫТА

new elites often stired up nationalistic emotional. However, the long-term effect on the tions within their constituencies in order to decision making process and conflict solu- maintain power“14. tion, remains to be seen. However, willingness to participate in The state should treat the minority rep- politics is high among non-Estonians. Su- resentatives equally with other nationals by prisingly some of the minorities turnout fig- giving them chance to work both in top ex- ures exceed even that of core nationals ones ecutive power as well as in high positions in (see table I). state administration. This will make minor- Modern liberal constitutionalism incor- ities more valued and equal with titular na- porates the concepts of equality and society tionality. At the same time there need to be within a common conceptual framework. minority pioneers that pursue and achieve The dynamic of liberal equality is biased high level positions in order to show other in the direction of inclusiveness. Initially non-Estonians that such things are possible. (historically) the application of the idea of This will contribute to the creation of a Rus- equality was quite narrow, but gradually the sian speaking elite, which is still underway scope of application is enlarged. Obviously and flimsy17. However, Estonian legal regu- the outcome of higher level of elite circula- lations do not differ from European practice tion and differentiation is greater representa- and contribute for further involvement of mi- tion of different sectors of society at the po- norities in state apparatus. Every individual, litical elite level. Highley and Burton point who wish to obtain citizenship and partici- out the importance of high levels of repre- pate in political life, is free to do so. However, sentation for regime stability15. Minority un- the hidden perceptions and understandings derrepresentation among higher social stra- of two large communities are hard to change ta enhances the potential of unstability and and might be fully acknowledged only after conflicts in the country. It goes without say- new generation, who have not witnessed So- ing that in the Baltic states, at least in Esto- viet occupation, steps in. Therefore, the an- nia, also in Latvia the minority communities swer to the question „do we witness irrevers- are not represented proportionally to their ible trend towards minority participation in size among the top political and social elites. the government and if yes, what are its impli- The ethnic minorities are not represented cations?“, is still under question mark. The much in executive nor legislative power. In 2002 and 2005 integration monitoring re- Estonia after regaining independence there port suggested that Estonians and non-Esto- has been only few (4) ethnic Russian or oth- nians have fundementally different attitudes er nationality ministers in top executive with respect to the participation of non-Es- power, scarcely were minorities represent- tonians in the Riigikogu, the government, ed in state administration and governmental defence forces. While non-Estonians tended structures (see app. III). The problem is that to support greater involvement in these insti- in the contect of specific nation-state con- tutions, Estonians consistently favoured lim- cept in Estonia, as well as the regular ten- ited participation18. On the other hand, the СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ ПОЛИТИКА • 3 (9) / 2012 ПОЛИТИКА СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ sions between Estonia and Russia which fu- structural limits do exist for minority partici- el the ethnic connotation of the concept, the pation in political processes.First of all, their representation of the specific political inter- legal status and social status. Secondly, the ests of Estonian Russians and the advance- centrality of language knowledge for employ- ment of Russian culture are regarded rather ement in public office limits access to many suspiciously by the larger society16. The fig- governmental positions for the members of ures indicate a policy of protecting the core noncore ethnic group. activities of the state from influence of other Democracy rests on three pillars: broad groups. As a strategy of nationbuilding and participation, free and fair regular election promoting national interests it tend to be ra- and competition for power institutional- 132 СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ ЛОКАЛЬНОГО ОПЫТА ized as a multi-party system. Although pres- Policy making environment assumes ent-day democracy still requires the equal- that each politician has certain impact on ity of individuals to their electoral right, political decisions. More the idividuals have the meaning of electoral participation is of impact, more rational the political deci- much more limited importance for over- sion-making potentially would be. Ideally all all understanding of contemporary democ- members of the political community should racy19. Participatory democracy by defini- have an equal impact towards decisions they tion, implies that universal participation is make. However, in practice it does not work the main foundation throughout the po- out to large extent. In this case rather weak litical process and is not restricted to elec- or no impact of an individual in municipal- tions20. For some elite oriented theorists like ity decision making was assessed by half of Schumpeter21 competing elites are more im- the local elites. Parliamentary elites assessed portant than mass participation. However, their impact to decison-making to be rather the bottomline argument in liberal democ- intermediate (see table III). racy is inclusion, equality of citizens and acceptance of divergent views are all nec- Table III essary for a country to be a liberal democ- Assessment of indivual impact in city/ racy. Thus, in liberal democracies partic- municipality, parliamentary decisions? ipation as a value is firmly rooted and the (Percentage) political elite in general is rather positive Local elites parliamentary elites about popular influence in the political pro- Strong impact 5 0 cess. Inclusiveness is a part of more broader conception of participatory democracy Rather strong 20 25 (see app. V). When it comes to inclusiveness, the elite responses to the question: “wheth- Intermediate 25 75 er to use certain quatas among high officials Weak 30 social positions to involve more Russian- No impact 20 Speakers in local municipality affairs and Total 100 100 parliament?“, was answered affirmatively (63,3%), whereas top elites were mostly in Compiled by the author. Intermediate influ- disfavor of establishing special quata system ence means that sometimes the proposals are tak- (see table II). The discourse „there is no vi- en into account by incumbent elites but not necces- tal need to set up additional quatas, since sarily always. democratic legal procedures are firmly rooted on state level“ is widely spread among One quarter of the local elites assessed among parliamentary elites“ (interviews). their impact to be strong or rather strong on municipality decisions. Consequently the COMPARATIVE POLITICS • 3 (9) / 2012 COMPARATIVE Table II concern to make his/her voice to be heard Special quatas of minority representation more is pretty high among ethnic elites. (percentage) Local elites Riigikogu minority elites III. Elite Attitudes and Orientations Towards In favour 63,3 (25%) Integrational Issues and Citizenship policy. Mutual Trust Rather in fa- 2 0 vor Within democratic theory it is often argued that democracy requires a certain set of Disfavor 0 (75%) attitudes and orientations. Integration and No answer 34,7 0 integrated seems to have an apparent pos- total 100% 100% itive connotation, while opposite expres- Compiled by the author sions like slow integration,weakly integrated 133 СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ ЛОКАЛЬНОГО ОПЫТА

or unintegrated connotate a lack of harmony opment of the state and participating in so- and social problem. The concept of integra- cial life, regardless of their ethnic origin24. tion in multicultural societies is frequently Political scientists emphasize that the lack the basis of mutual mistrust and non-con- of effectiveness in national integration pol- fidence between majorities and minorities. icies can be often blamed on political par- The guiding principle, in line with liber- ties and politicians, whithin the struggle al democracy which representatives of ma- over political power, frequently made vast jority often invoke in similar contexts is„ use of ethnic and linguistic belonging as an integration yes, forcible assimilation no.“ effective form of political capital, polaris- The institutional solutions, however, short ing this way society. of assimilation and secession at the same The integration of Estonian Rus- time, which could give concreteness to the sians in the political or cultural spheres, principles, keeps the competing communi- in which successful adaptation depends to ties entrapped in a strange vicious circle, in a large extent also on the attitudes of larg- which the minimum of minority demands er community, is highly problematic. This are perceived by majority as the first step to is the reason why even the term integra- secession, while the maximum of what ma- tion sometimes has negative connotation jority can offer, consistent with its percep- among Estonian Russians. The ethnical- tion of democracy, is usually interpreted by ly connoted nation-state model equates in- minorities as the first step to assimilation22. tegration with forced acculturation, and as The indigenous incumbent elite wish is to the majority of Estonian Russians do not adopt the minorities to the „host“ society wish to assimilate, integration for them dominant way of thinking, speaking and means something to avoid25. Integration behaving, when integration becomes dif- is still not viewed as a two-way process by ficult there arises a social problem, a func- most of the elites and the questions about tional error in the social apparatus. the willingness of the government to in- Estonian government continues to clude Russian speakers into decision-mak- place great emphasis on its commitment to ing process still persist. Estonian as well as building multicultural society as it is stressed Latvian elite agree that their societies are in National Integration programme. The only partially integrated societies and the programme (2008–2013) aims to encour- serious obstacles to integration remains26. age people to share common values, partic- Thus, the national elites are not so much ipate more actively in civil society. A crucial interested in content rich integration rath- part of the integration policy is focused not er instigating assimilation under the cover only on encouraging Russians to accept in- of integration. tegration, but also on persuading Estonians In 2005 survey the success of inte- to allow the Russians to integrate and to ac- grational policies was emphasized by on- cept them as equal members of common Es- ly 45% of Estonians and 31% of Russians. tonian-language institutions. Should this ef- The important role and place of integration СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ ПОЛИТИКА • 3 (9) / 2012 ПОЛИТИКА СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ fort fail, so that Russian-speakers become is more stressed in localities where the in- more and more disillusioned about the pros- dividual lives and when he/she realizes the pects for successful integration, the poten- practical changes of the process. In big cit- tial exists for the Russian-speaking com- ies and Ida-Virumaa region people tend to munity to reorganize itself as a national be more sceptical about the efficiency of minority and to mobilize for territorial and integration27. This is clearly seen from em- cultural autonomy23. pirical data, when most of the elites as- Integration means that all residents of sessed the outcome of current integra- Estonia have an equal interest, desire and tions policy being the same or even worse opportunities for contributing to the devel- (see table IV). 134 СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ ЛОКАЛЬНОГО ОПЫТА

Table IV al life. The answers to the question „Whether Ethnic Elites assessment of current mutual trust and wish to cooperate between integration policy in 2010,2011 (percentage) two communities have been improved?“ is responded rather sceptically by both elite Local elites Parliamentary groups. More than 80% of the elites assessed Has become 36,6% 33,3 mutual trust and wish to cooperate between worse two communities being on the same level or Has remai- 50% 50 even became worse. The low level of trust is ned the same reflecting divided (fragmented) elites, who level,no change are bound together not so much with prag- Improved 8,1% 33,3 matic considerations but rahter natonal elite consensus. No answer 5% The reactions to the question: „What Total 100% 100 should Estonians do in order to trust more Compiled by the author. Russian community“ revealed for both elite groups the angle of enlightened understand- However, many argued the integration ing of two cultures, inclusiveness and mutu- program launched by the state is highly nec- al tolerance. essary to overcome the cleavages and misun- derstandings that exist between the two com- „Estonians should be more tolerant to oth- munities. er cultures and ethnic groups, no state is purely We assume that the elites perception national, other experiences of interethnic rela- of an open and transparent government is tions should be studied more carefully. Esto- one important aspect of a democratic sys- nians should trust more Russian-speakers since tem. Furthermore we consider the degree most of the leading positions in state apparatus of trust people have in different political in- are occupied by Estonians, not blame the oth- stitutions to be important indicators of sup- ers (minority) as occupants and enemies rath- port for democracy. Democracy to be stable, er consider Russian community to be great po- leaders and the masses must have minimum tential for fostering life in the country, internal level of confidence in institutions and mem- enemy seeking paralyses the assessmant of re- bers of the elite must have basic level of trust al situation, listen more and take into account in each other. Trust is a core aspect of elite the minority opinions in policy making, im- integration. According to Almond and Ver- prove relations with Russia as long as this is the ba28, Putnam29 certain level of basic trust in homeland of our ancestors, change the politi- other persons is prerequisite for a democrat- cal nationalistic mainstream, which has been ic political culture. Therefore trust in oth- performed by the government ever since Esto- er political actors and people in general,

nia regained independence. It,s time to finish POLITICS • 3 (9) / 2012 COMPARATIVE that is, interpersonal trust has been seen as the fears, forget about insults and think more, an essential prerequisite for democratic de- how to move on together, how to build up com- velopment. Theoretically trust is a founda- mon future.“ (interviews) tion of cooperation30. It means that people tend to behave in a democratic spirit to the Generally speaking many EU states in- extent that they believe other can be trusted cluding the Baltics are facing new challenge to behave likewise31. Democratic consolida- today.This challenge does not come from en- tion assumes high level of interpersonal trust emies within or outside the nation. Instead, and tolerance in a society, it evaluates ac- the challenge comes from democracy’s own tive citizen and citizen participation. Elites citizens, who have grown distrustful of pol- are somewhat responsible how these orien- iticians, sceptical about democratic institu- tations and attitudes are implemented in re- tions, and disillusioned how the democrat- 135 СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ ЛОКАЛЬНОГО ОПЫТА

ic process functions32. Experience shows that Fourth, the removal of bronze soldier confidence in the political institutions corre- in 2007 symbolizing the victory of Russians lates with viable democracy33. It is the pol- in the Second World War enhanced sceptit- icy performance of democratic institutions sism towards state authorities and govern- over a period of time that gives legitima- ment. President and the government have cy to the political system. Belief in demo- the lowest amount of trust compared with cratic institutions depends on symbolic at- other other institutions. tractiveness, the general performance of the On the other hand majority of Russian- system, and how the leaders ability to form speakers (80%) are considering Russians to consensus touches upon the interests of so- be loyal to Estonian state, whereas among cial groups. The crucial question is how dif- Estonians the contention is agreed only by ferent strata of the population react to insti- 40 percent36. tutions, and how dependent the authorities In Eastern part of Estonia (Ida-Viru- are on support from different groups for maa) integrational issues are closely linked stability34. Much of the public attention with other city affairs. Local municipali- so far has emphasized the question of po- ties are usually supporting financially all litical allegiance of the Russian-speaking the acting ethnic communities and their minority. Since parliament, government, activities. Local authorites are providing president,etc. are key state institutions of rooms for meetings. As a rule flats are giv- any democracy the low level of support for en to Estonian language teachers free of these institutions is a cause for concern. charge. The data from 2009 indicate that the Rus- Celebration of joint anniversaries con- sian-speakers are three times less trusting tributes to mutual understanding of each state institutions than Estonians regard- other. less of their citizenship status (see app. VI). Both elite groups stressed the point The question is, what are the reasons for that first, integration program implemen- the persistent mutual distrust between mi- tation plan should firstly be elaborated on nority populations and the state institutions grass-roots level. Secondly, this programm in Estonia? should be included into general develop- First, there are reasons connected with ment plan of the city. Thirdly, development insufficient command of state language and plans of schools as well as other education- the lack of trust towards high state institu- al programs should contain special sub- tions. division „Integration“. Fourth, local me- Secondly, general passivity among dia should contain more information about aliens and non-Estonian citizens. Rikmann the relationship between two communities. and Lagerpetz suggested that the passivity Fifth, integration starts from early child- of Russian speakers is different from the an- hood, in kindekardens and schools. Hence alogues passivity of the economically weak mixed composition of kindekardens would groups of the titular population. The re- contribute to mutual understanding of each СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ ПОЛИТИКА • 3 (9) / 2012 ПОЛИТИКА СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ searchers interpret the general political pas- other. (interviews) sivity of minorities as a result of their disil- The elites vision with regard of fur- lusionment with the political system, which ther scenarios and potential outcomes of has failed to provide them with channels integration is diverse. As one can see from for the participation needed to bring causes the table V, the second option prevails closer to policy-makers35. Thirdly, the low thus giving credit to mainstream of inte- level of general trust in institutions is ob- gration strategy. Integration starts first of viously reflecting divided elites, who are all from equal civic rights and continues bound together more by ethnic affiliation with free development of different cul- rather than by the loyalty to the state. tures. 136 СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ ЛОКАЛЬНОГО ОПЫТА

Table V Possible outcomes of integration ( percentage) Local elites Parliamentary elites Estonians and minorities share common values, ethnic minorities preserve and 6,7 50 develop their culture. Estonians and minorities share common values, they have equal civil rights and possi- 75 50 bilities to preserve and develop their culture. Estonians and minorities have equal civil rights, however, they live and act separa- 15 tely in accordance with their cultural background, customs and traditions. Ethnic minorities are merging into Estonian society by taking over their culture 3,3 and identity. Total 100 100

Compiled by the author.

In fact among Russian minority NGO’s, this knowledge to their kids. Raising children members of ethnic elites there are four key in an Estonian environment and culture enable elements that are mentioned by almost all them better to understand core nations values respondent groups: integration as a two-way and mentalities.“ (interviews). process; equality between ethnic groups; The local elites stressed the idea that common values; and mutual respect. Russians should more communicate with Es- The first is the idea that integration tonians by working even temporarily in Esto- should be a two-way process between Esto- nian language speaking environment. nians and minority groups, and that Esto- „They should convince the other country- nians must not resist the idea that they too men of being unseparable part of Estonia (not must be integrated. Several elite persons em- Russia). Big mistake was made when Estonians phasized that while Russians are learning to received long-expected freedom by dividing the speak Estonian and making Estonian friends, society on ethnic grounds. We are able to un- very few Estonians are making any effort to derstand them, since they got back their own learn Russian or to mix with Russians so- state, however, they forgot the state belongs also cially37. to the others. Integrational programs should be Minority NGO’s leaders standpoint co-

joint dialoque between two communities on ab- POLITICS • 3 (9) / 2012 COMPARATIVE incides with ethnic local elites. As they ar- solutely equal basis. It’s time to finish the divi- gued. sion of population into Estonians and non-Es- „Integration itself is “two-ways traffic“ tonians. We all work for the same end to make means that the government should carry out Estonia richer and prosperous.“ (interviews) more efforts in order to introduce majority of Citizenship is one of the most important, population Russian culture, history, on the oth- but elusive concepts of modern political dis- er hand the image of enemy and prejudices course and practice. It’s often understood as a should be left aside, one should bear more ef- universal concept. All citizens in a nation state forts to set up „round tables“ of discussion be- are equal before the law. Simply put, citizen- tween interethnic communities. The schools ship is membership of a nation state, which and studying programs should get rid of the is deemed as the solitary locus of the political term occupant, young people tend to transfer community38. Membership of a political com- 137 СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ ЛОКАЛЬНОГО ОПЫТА

munity gives an identity to an individual that Finnish 1,6 supersedes all the other identities such as reli- Bulgarian 1,6 gion, gender, class etc. It is important because dead 8,3 50 citizenship, or the lack of it, determines peo- total 100 100 ples political legal and social rights. It is both a source and a result of inclusion and identi- Compiled by the author. fication, as it demarcates groups of individuals, who have certain privileges and responsib- Article 3 of citizenship law on avoidance lities in common39. In political process efforts of multiple citizenship states that any person to build nation-state inevitably involve either who by birth in addition to Estonian citizen- assimilating or excluding minority identities ship acquires the citizenship of another state and cultures, rendering them invisible in pub- must within three years after attaining the age lic sphere. For the multiculturalist this is un- of 18 years renounce either Estonian citizen- fair, and a denial of peoples, legitimate inter- ship or the citizenship of another state. How- ests in their identity and culture. The only way ever, article 5 section 3 states that no person to build truly inclusive democracies, therefore, may be deprived of Estonian citizenship ac- is to challenge this ideology of nationhood in quired by birth. There is no legal mechanism the name of more multicultural conception of to deprive native multiple citizens of Esto- citizenship. Such conception of citizenship at- nian citizenship. Therefore, Estonia uses tempts to replace or supplement nation-build- moderate ius sanguinis with a recently intro- ing policies with policies that explicitly recog- duced complementary ius soli in the case of nize and accommodate groups whose cultural children born in Estonia41. differences have been excluded from the na- Among Baltic states Estonia has a bit tional imagenary, whether they be national mi- more liberal approach than Latvia since the norities, religious minorities etc.40 state allows residents, who have permanent Before regime change overall majority of residence permits — lived for five or more the respondents parents had Soviet citizenship. years to vote in local elections, but they do However, the legal status of many people liv- not have the right to be elected (only EU cit- ing in Estonia changed substantially after re- izens have). In Latvia, the non-citizen popu- gime change. Citizenship policy derived largely lation is not allowed to participate in politics its core from restitution of pre-war citizenship at either the national or local level,which is policy by excluding most Russian speaking set- problematic for democracy, considering the tlers during the Soviet period. Many former large number of persons who remain stateless Soviet citizens chose Russian citizenship (see and the fact the naturalization rate is steadi- table VI). In principle multiple citizenship is ly declining42. In Estonia citizenship is cru- not allowed in Estonia with the exception of cial when individuals are running as candi- emigree Estonians living in US, Sweden, Can- dates in local elections or pursue high social ada, Australia, elsewhere. Most of these people positions in state apparatus. Lithuania has left the country after German and prior to So- also used a different approach compared to СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ ПОЛИТИКА • 3 (9) / 2012 ПОЛИТИКА СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ viet occupation in 1944. Estonia and Latvia when it comes to the issue of citizenship and the right to take part in Table VI local elections. All residents in Lithuania are Citizenship of the elites parents today allowed to vote and run in elections to local (percentage) councils. In Latvia every citizen of the coun- Citizenship Local elites Parliamentary try or every citizen of any European Union Russian 65 country living in Latvia can take part in the elections to municipality councils and also Estonian 21,6 50 run as a candidate. Today quick natuaraliza- Ukranian 1,6 tion of non-citizens and aliens living in the 138 СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ ЛОКАЛЬНОГО ОПЫТА country is one of the priorities of Estonian all underepresentation of minority groups in integrational program. top executive power as well as in state appa- However, as the current research find- ratus discourages non-Estonians to natural- ings indicate many individuals (63%) still ize and to take an active part in political de- argue in favor of more concessions in cit- cision making. izenship policy towards Russian-speaking Since Estonia has more than 100 000 minorities. In favor of more liberalization of Russian citizens and aliens (stateless per- naturalization requitrements of citizenship sons) living in the country, who comprise all policy argued all ethnic representatives of togerher aprox. 20% of the grown up pop- parliamentary elites. ulation of Estonia, the question was asked After regime change citizenship should „Why some of the Russian speakers choose have been given to all inhabitants, who were Russian citizenship and what kind of steps born in Estonia regardless of their year of should the state undertake in order to get rid birth, 91,7 % of elites argued in favour of giv- from so called „stateless (non-citizenship) ing citizenship automatically. Historical ar- problem?“ guments enhanced the convincingness of the Parliamentary elites emphasized that the elites point. state should impone more in explaining citi- „Estonia lost considerably by denying cit- zenship policy. Both elite groups argued that izenship for those people who have been born Russian citizenship simplifies the travel to and lived in Estonia their entire life. In 1918 all abroad, many minority representatives have the inhabitants living in Estonia received citi- relatives cross the border. zenship. After 1991 many of those people, who „Economically it’s beneficial to travel considered themselves aliens, left the country. since many goods in Russia are much cheap- Most people, who stayed, have proved them- er than in Estonia. It is easier to visit relatives, selves being loyal to Estonian state, its hardly since visa applying takes time. On the other imaginable that Estonia would have received hand passing exams in Estonian language is independence without the support of these peo- a tough challenge and time consuming. Rus- ple.“ (interviews) sian side is not setting up any naturalization requirements, except to write an application Many Russian speaking people have ac- for citizenship and wait. Russia’s attitudes to- quired citizenship to feel social protection of wards their citizens are more friendly than in the state. However, empiral data shows that Estonia. Therefore persons always choose more today the wish to receive Estonian citizen- convenient and more simple option. If Estonia ship is in serious decline. Whereas in 2005 would have had more democratic state, then the amount of people wishing to obtain Esto- the amount of Russian citizens living in Estonia nian citizenhip was 74%, the figure dropped would have had considerably decreased spe- in 2010 to 34% ( This could al-

see app. VII). cially among younger generation.“ (interviews) POLITICS • 3 (9) / 2012 COMPARATIVE so be explained by general citizenship policy of Estonian state as well as by purely practical Indeed, the current interethnic situation reasons — opening up visa free traveling with in long run does not serve the security inter- EU countries. Estonia became member of ests of Estonia but rather vice versus. Big per- Schengen area in 2007 enabling stateless percentage of Russian citizens as well as stateless sons to travel freely all over EU. Elites recog- persons living in the country do not enhance nized that Russian citizenship policy and visa internal nor external security. In crisis situ- regime has reduced incentives for non-citi- ation with Russia some members of the big zens to naturalize43. Low trust of state insti- Russian-speaking community might be used tutions indicated above affects naturally the as a „trump card“ against Estonia. Conven- low interest of obtaining Estonian citizen- tional wisdom forecasts further interetn- ship. It seems that similarily to Latvia over- ic cleavages if the state is not capable to re- 139 СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ ЛОКАЛЬНОГО ОПЫТА

duce considerably first of all stateless persons this particular step increases trust towards each and increase Estonian citizenry. Fortunate- other.“ (interviews) ly the number of former category has steadi- Indeed, integration policy needs more ly decreased. flexibility. The state should derive its policy The vast majority of local leaders (90%) from the needs of individuals by taking into argued in favor of giving citizenship automat- account the age of an individual. The minori- ically to those, who have lived in the coun- ty elites emphasized that „one cannot be sure try twenty five or more years and to all kids of how interested the elder people are in obtain- the parents, who live permanently in Estonia, ing the citizenship“. even without knowing Estonian language and It’s problematic to require the state lan- the main law, only 7% percent denied such guage knowing from those people, whose age is state option (see chart II). 55 and more years. The people, who have con- tinous health problems, should be dispensed Chart II from exams. There is no point of „torturing“ What about these kids, who have been born pensioners. They have already finalized their in Estonia and whose parents had Russian career and work. If they don’t receive citizen- or Soviet citizenship — is there necessity to ship automatically, this again is to emphasize give to this category Estonian citizenship the alien status of personality which in turn automaticaly (percentage)? does not enhance patriotism, affection and loyalty to the state.“ (see chart III, interviews)

Chart III Should elder people acquire citizenship without passing exams? (Percentage) Note: under elder people is meant the age 55 and more

Different age categories did not affect the case. „People feel him/herself more secure, pro- tected while having citizenship. Many feel like „suffering“ in uncertain situation without feel- ing any state protection. If the state is not push- ing individuals aside, there,s no need to turn backs to the state.“ (interviews) СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ ПОЛИТИКА • 3 (9) / 2012 ПОЛИТИКА СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ In other words strong willingness is to However, both elite groups argued that achieve citizenship without knowing the lan- some of the risks do exist: guage or to deal with much more simplified „The state is receiving quite a lot of aged language exam procedure Majority of both people who have old Soviet way of thinking and elite groups denied any risks the state faces who do not understand the essence and logic of in this respect emphasized the benefits-more free market economy. The officials is obvious- people are eligible for citizenship. ly having greater problems in dealing with this „More citizens — less tensions, broader category of people and spend more time in ex- their political rights to elect parliament and to plaining things compared to young or middle- run as a candidates in local elections. In turn aged generation.“ (interviews) 140 СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ ЛОКАЛЬНОГО ОПЫТА

Conclusions als and and policy-makers in Estonia and Political stability in democracies rests elsewhere in the Baltics and Eastern Europe on a minimum level of normative integra- have no clear idea of the principles under- tion among the elite. First, national uni- lying western standards. They are told that ty, where vast majority of the citizens have respect for minorities is an essential part of no mental reservations as to which politi- democratization, but are not told why mi- cal community they belong, is of great im- nority rights are linked to democracy or portance both in multiethnic as well as in how these rights relate to principles of jus- a nation state. Secondly, in Robert Dahl’s tice and freedom46. Ethnicity itself cannot understanding „Basic Agreement“ among be basis of a democratic state. Moderation elites and in society in general is vital pre- in claims, as well as in responses, negoti- condition for democratic stability. Lack of ation and common identification of solu- understanding and consent, in fact, erodes tions are the keys to dealings with differenc- state capacity, which is essential for sustain- es in a society. ing coherence. It seems that the formation In order to understand Estonian de- of competent leadership and tolerant polit- mocracy one should take into account the ical stratum is a precondition to viable in- legacies of the past. Historical legacy of ternal consensus. Geraint Parry is certain- Estonia and perceptions of most nation- ly right by stressing the idea that in certain al elites do not allow to introduce conso- conditions the elite may share similar values ciational solutions of interethnic relations. that nationality can be even more impor- Statehood was understood in ethnic rath- tant factor than social background in influ- er than liberal civic terms. After regime encing attitudes44. On the other hand eth- change the term „liberal“ simply meant an- nicity itself cannot be basis of a democratic ti-communist nature of elites, but not not state. Moderation in claims, as well as in re- necessarily those defending liberal-demo- sponses, negotiation and common identifi- cratic values. The presence of a huge and cation of solutions are the keys to dealings dominating neighboring Russia, combined with differences in a society. with large Russian-speaking minority in- After regaining independence Estonia side Estonia, has been so far inducive to na- as well as other Baltic states have shown re- tional elite cohesion. markable success of socio-econonomic and Despite differences in population, a political reforms. Joining the Western secu- certain state loyalty must exist. Although rity alliances such as NATO and EU con- Estonia is ostensibly multietnic state, Rus- tributed to the revison of Estonian relative- sians do not identify with the state and its ly etnocentric perceptions of nationhood symbols. towards more civic side of interethnic re- Political parties tend to be ethnically lations. The Baltic membership in EU, divided, which make adeguate democratic COMPARATIVE POLITICS • 3 (9) / 2012 COMPARATIVE NATO, OSCE do prove the lasting trends relations difficult.In order to reduce the po- in democratic development. However, as- tential for ethnic conflict in a democracy is sesing whether or not EU membership has the need to avoid complete exclusion from impacted minority integration in the post- political power for minority groups. All accession period also requires examining groups must be given some stake in the sys- the degree to which international minority tem. The low number of minority represen- standards are internalized by elites. The vast tatives among political elites condition the majority of Estonian elites are not familiar majority’s perceptions of this group. Few with the various European Conventions on non-indigenous people are taking part in minority rights and could not describe what top executive, legislative and judicial power. „minority rights norms“ in Europe are45. Widely spread notion is that the deci- Even today it appears that many intellectu- sions of the representative institutions are 141 СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ ЛОКАЛЬНОГО ОПЫТА

heavily influenced by characteristics and The analyzed empirical data helps to perspectives of its members. Current ethnic understand that integration in multiethnic elites are middle-aged and highly educated. societies can only take place on reciprocal Most of them have been born, educated and basis, if “both sides” equally take actions raised up in Estonia, thus mastering well the (two-ways traffic). An integrated society is state language. one in which there is mutual respect and Usually the new elites are coming from trust on both personal and a group level. earlier high positions. This is not the case Majority of ethnic elites assessed trust and with ethnic elites, particularly local ones, feelings of cooperation between two ethnic where majority of them had earlier low so- communities being the same or even worse cial positions. The tendency of elitist re- as the result of current integration policy cruitment is not valid, rather one could fol- proving rather well it’s relatively poor effi- low more upward mobility. Generational ciency. Anti-bronze soldier riots and dem- status continuity was characteristic to on- onstrations in 2007 clearly diminished it`s ly 16%, whereas most of the local actors importance. Therefore, the desintegra- are relatively recently recruited to their po- tion of society and elites in general must be sitions, without remarkable social and po- source for further concern in the society. litical experience.When it comes to par- The low level of trust is reflecting divided liamentary elites many of them had high (conflicting) elites, who are bound together social positions even in Soviet time, where- not so much with pragmatic considerations as among Russian-speaking local elites high but rahter national elite consensus. reproduction and status coninuity is rela- Current research findings indicate, de- tively undeveloped. Vice versus, majority of spite the general heterogeneity of elites, the them are newcomers.Thus the vertical mo- recruitment patterns, perceptions and ori- bility of ethnic elites seems to be high. This entations of both ethnic elite groups are could be seen as „inflow“ of elites, the trend relatively similar, they have pretty common vitally important for circulation in democ- understanding of the problems, similar ori- racies and multiethnic societies. entations towards integrational and citizen- In contrast to widely spread notion of ship issues. Hence Estonian ethnic elites non-citizenship among the Russian com- tend to be more unified, whereas the over- munity, the Russian speaking elite do have all political elite seems to be divided. Ideo- Estonian citizenship. Both elite groups em- logically the cleavage line lies still between phasized the necessity to give Estonian cit- nation-state centered and inclusive (liberal) izenship automatically to those, who have understanding of interethnic relations. The been born in Estonia. From this and pre- insuffieciency of the main prerequisites of vious empirical data we know that the mi- consensus democracy hinders the consoli- norities complain about the tough natu- dation of Estonian society. The most stable ralization requirements: citizenship exam development is expected to come from re- incl. language fluency etc. The elites see the structuring the elites by recruiting Russian- СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ ПОЛИТИКА • 3 (9) / 2012 ПОЛИТИКА СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ most important purpose of the integration speakers more into influencial (top) elite policy in guaranteeing equal rights both to persons. Otherwise convential wisdom will natives and minorities. Therefore, the eth- predict unstability (not excluding confon- nic elites orientations give credit to more tations) between ethnic communities when liberalization of citizenship policy, which is non-Estonians are not representated pro- regarded to contribute to general improve- portionally (or close to) to their size in de- ment of interethnic relations in Estonia. cision-making. The research findings once The state should carry on with the reforms again demonstrated the existence of two to impone even more towards interethnic parallel communities, with relatively scant relations. underexposure in between. 142 СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ ЛОКАЛЬНОГО ОПЫТА

Аpp.I

Socio-demographic data of Riigikogu minority legislative elites, elected in 2007,2011 Ti- Place of Parlia- Local Place Educ- Party me of Gender obtaining mentary munipality of birth ation affiliation birth education experience experience Muravjova, 10, 11 Riigi- Center Est. 1949 F H Leningrad + Tatjana kogu party Efendijev 10, 11, 12 Center Est 1954 M H Leningrad + Eldar Riigikogu party Velmann, 8, 9, 10, 11, Center Vladimir Est 1945 M H Tallinn 12 + party Riigikogu Sõtnik, 11, 12 Center Est 1980 F H Tallinn + Olga Riigikogu party Privalova, Center Est 1945 F H Leningrad 10, 11 RK + Nelli party Lotman, Lenin- Green 1960 M H Tartu 11 RK + Aleksei grad party Korb, Center Est 1954 M H Leningrad 11 RK + Valeri party Vassiljev, Center Est. 1953 M H Tartu 12 RK + Viktor party Borodits, D. Center Est. 1979 M H Tallinn 12 RK + party Stalnuhhin,M. Center Est. 1961 M H Tallinn 9,10,12 RK + party Ossinovski, Social- Jevgeni democ- Est. 1986 M H Tartu 12 RK - ratic party

App. II Parliamentary Representation of Ethnic Minorities Cross Different Electoral Terms 1992–2011

Figures Parties COMPARATIVE POLITICS • 3 (9) / 2012 COMPARATIVE 7. Riigikogu 1992–1995 0 0 8. Riigikogu 1995–1999 6 Russian parliamentary fraction 9. Riigikogu 1999–2003 8 2 members of Centre party, 6 members of Uni- ted People party fraction 10. Riigikogu 2003–2007 7 5 members of Centre party fraction, 2 members Reform party 11. Riigikogu 2007–2011 7 6 members of Centre party fraction, 1 members Greens party 12. Riigikogu 2011–2015 6 5 members of Centre party fraction, 1 members social-democratic party Note: The size of Estonian Riigikogu is 101 members. 143 СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ ЛОКАЛЬНОГО ОПЫТА

App. III Members of ethnic elites in Estonian governments after regaining independence Governments titular nation ethnic minorities total 1990 E. Savisaar 24 2 26 1992 T. Vähi 24 1 25 1992 M. Laar 27 0 27 1994 I. Tarand 15 0 15 1995.T. Vähi 16 0 16 1997 M. Siimann 18 0 18 1999 Mart Laar II 17 0 17 2002 S. Kallas 15 1 16 2003 J. Parts 19 0 19 2005 A. Ansip 16 0 16 2007 A. Ansip 13 0 13 2011 A. Ansip 13 0 13

Compiled by the author

App. IV Estonians do not see non-Estonians in the leading position (percentage) Parliament Government Estonians Other ethnicity Estonians Other ethnicity Should not be related to the num- 24 23 23 28 ber of non-Esto- nians 20–30% 10 59 6 57 10% or less 34 4 27 3 None 18 0 30 0 Hard to say 14 12 14 12

Source: Vetik, R. (2009), “Ten years of Integration policies and processes in Estonia“, in National Integration and Formation of Multi-Ethnic Society: Experiences in Estonia and Latvia after EU enlargement by Nobuya Hashimoto, Hiromi Komori (eds) Kwansei Gakuin University, Nishinomiya, Japan

СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ ПОЛИТИКА • 3 (9) / 2012 ПОЛИТИКА СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ What do you think, to what extent non-Estonians have to be represented in local municipalities in Estonia? (percentage, %) Estonians Russians 2002 2005 2002 2005 One third or more 4 3 48 43 One fourth 8 4 9 17 One tenth or less 28 24 3 9 No representation 23 25 1 1 at all 144 СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ ЛОКАЛЬНОГО ОПЫТА

Repres. should not be dependent from non- 28 28 31 24 Estonians number Can’t say 91686

Total 100 100 100 100

Source: Monitooring ( 2005) research findings, Institute of International and Social Studies, Tallinn University

App. V Political inclusion of core nation and minoritis in Ida-Virumaa, those, who have participated at least in one political activity during the last three years (2005 survey data, percentage) Estonians non-Estonians Non-inclusion, no participation 23 57 Minimal inclusion, at least in one 64 33 political activity Active inclusion, more than one 13 10 political activity

Under political activity is meant: voting in elections, participation in political meetings, signa- ture gathering, joint statements to press, participation in demonstrations, strikes. Source. Monitoor- ing 2005 (research findings), Institute of International and Social Studies, Tallinn University

App. VI

Estonian Trust index value Estonians citizens of other Stateless Russian citizen ethnicity Not too trusting 18 54 53 48 (0-1) POLITICS • 3 (9) / 2012 COMPARATIVE Somewhat trusting 33 31 35 35 (2-4) Mostly trusting (5-7) 31 9 7 10 Very trusting (8-9) 17 6 4 7

Source: Vetik, R. (2009), “Ten years of Integration policies and processes in Estonia“, in Na- tional Integration and Formation of Multi-Ethnic Society: Experiences in Estonia and Latvia after EU enlargement, p. 16 by Nobuya Hashimoto, Hiromi Komori (eds) Kwansei Gakuin University, Nishinomiya, Japan 145 СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ ЛОКАЛЬНОГО ОПЫТА

Trust of State Institutions (Percentage)

Monitooring 2010, Institute of International and Social studies

App. VII (percentage) 2005 2008 2010 Ethnic minorities, who would like to obtain Estonian ci- 74 51 34 tizenship

Source: Monitooring 2010, http://www.slideshare.net/kultuuriministeerium/limumiska- СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ ПОЛИТИКА • 3 (9) / 2012 ПОЛИТИКА СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ va-monitooring

1 Dahl R. On Democracy. New Haven and London : Yale University Press, 1999. 2 See Pettai V. Estonia and Latvia // Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe / ed. by J. Zielonka, A. Pravda. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2003. P. 265. 3 See Kalev L., Ruutsoo R. Citizenship policies between Nation-state building and Globalization: Attitudes of the decision Makers in Estonia // Studies of Transition States and Societies. 2009. № 1. 4 See also Lauristin M., Heidmets M. Learning from the Estonian case // The Challenge of the Russian Minority, Emerging Multicultural Democracy in Estonia / ed. by M. Lauristin, M. Heidments. Tartu : Tartu University press, 2002. P. 322, 327. 146 СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ ЛОКАЛЬНОГО ОПЫТА

5 Higley J., Burton M. The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns // American Sociological Review. 1989. № 9 ; Higley J., Lengyel G. Elites After State Socialism. Theories and analysis. N.Y.Oxford : Rowman and Litttlefield, 2000. 6 Higley J., Lengyel G. Elites After State Socialism. Theories and analysis. N.Y.Oxford : Rowman and Litttlefield, 2000. P. 7. 7 Best H. Changes in European Representative Elites // Elites: New Comparative Perspectives / ed. by M. Sasaki. Leiden, Boston : Brill,2008. P. 73. 8 Ruostetsaari I. Nordic Elites in Comparartive Perspective // Elites. New Comparative Perspectives. Leiden, Boston : Brill, 2008. P. 145–146. 9 Vihalemm T. Crystallizing and Emancipating Identities in Post-Communist Estonia // Identities, nations, and politics after Communism / ed. by R.E. Kanet. N.Y. : Routledge, 2008. P. 77. 10 See also Agarin T. A Cats Lick. Democratization and Minority Communities in the Post-Soviet Baltic. Amsterdam, N.Y. : Rodopi, 2010. P. 270, 273. 11 Highley J., Burton M. Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy. Boulder : Rowman and Litttlefield, 2006 ; Steen A. Between Past and Future: Elites, Democracy and the State in Postcommunist Countries. A Comparison of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. Farnham : Ashgate, 1997 ; Parry G. Political Elites. Colchester : ECPR Press, 2005. 12 Zepa B. Integration Policies in Latvia: Acquisition and Failures // National Integration and Formation of Multi-Ethnic Society: Experiences in Estonia and Latvia after EU enlargement / ed. by Nobuya Hashimoto, Hiromi Komori. Nishinomiya, Japan: Kwansei Gakuin University, 2009. P. 28. 13 Burton M., Higley J. Political crises and elite settlements // Elites, Crises and the Origins of Regimes / ed. by M. Dogan, J. Higley. Oxford : Rowman and Litttlefield, 1998. 14 Tsilevich B. New democracies in the Old World: Remarks on Will Kymlicka’s Approach to Nation Building in post-Communist Europe // Western Political Theory and Ethnic relations in Eastern Europe. Can liberal pluralism be exported: Western Political Theory and Ethic relations in Eastern Europe / ed. by W. Kymlica, M. Opalski. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2001. P. 157. 15 Highley J., Burton M. The Study of Political Elite Transformations // International Review of Sociology. 2001. № 2. P. 181–200. 16 Kruusvall J.,Vetik R., Berry J. The Strategies of Interethnic adaptation of Estonian Russians // Studies of Transition and Societies. 2009. № 1. P. 14. 17 See also, Schulze J., Petersoo P. Interview Analysis: Media, NGO’s and Opinion Leaders. 2009 (unpublished). P. 12. 18 Hallik Klara. Kodakondsus ja Poliitiline Kaasatus // Monitooring (research findings). Tallinn : Institute of International and Social Studies, Tallinn University, 2005. P. 83 ; see also app. IV. 19 Dahl R. Democracy and its critics. New Haven and London : Yale university press, 1989. P. 221. 20 Pateman C. Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge : Cambridge University press, 1970. 21 Schumpeter J.A. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. London : Allen and Unwin, 1943. 22 A new balance: Democracy and Minorities in Post-Communist Europe / ed. by M. Robotin, L. Salat. Budapest : LGI books, Open Society Institute, 2003. P. 29. 23 See Kymlica W. Western Political Theory and Ethnic relations in Eastern Europe // Can liberal pluralism be exported: Western Political Theory and Ethic relations in Eastern Europe / ed. by W. Kymlica, M. Opalski. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2001. P. 79. COMPARATIVE POLITICS • 3 (9) / 2012 COMPARATIVE 24 Vetik R. Ten years of Integration policies and processes in Estonia // National Integration and Formation of Multi-Ethnic Society: Experiences in Estonia and Latvia after EU enlargement / ed. by Nobuya Hashimoto, Hiromi Komori. Nishinomiya, Japan : Kwansei Gakuin University, 2009. P. 8. 25 Kruusvall J., Vetik R., Berry J. The Strategies of Interethnic adaptation of Estonian Russians // Studies of Transition and Societies. 2009. № 1. P. 15. 26 Schulze J. Understanding the “Conditionality Gap” in Estonia and Latvia The Influence of EU Conditionality and Russia’s Activism on Minority Inclusion. PhD thesis. Washington : George Washington University, 2009. P. 284, 304. 27 Kruusvall J. Hinnang Lõimunise Edukusele,Tulevikuohud ja Tõrjuva Suhtumise Ilmingud // Monitooring 2005 (research findings). Tallinn: Institute of International and Social Studies, Tallinn University, 2005. P. 43, 44 28 Almond G., Verba S. The Civic Culture. Boston : Little Brown, 1965. 29 Putnam R. Making Democracy work. Civic traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, NY : Princeton University press, 1993. 147 СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ ЛОКАЛЬНОГО ОПЫТА

30 Diamond L. Developing democracy. Toward Consolidation. Baltimore : John Hopkins University press, 1999. P. 207. 31 Aström L. Local Elites support for Democracy in the Baltic states. Örebro University, unpublished. 2001. P. 3. 32 Dalton R.J. Democratic Challenges. Democratic Choices. The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford : Oxford Un.Press, 2004. P. 1. 33 Almond G., Verba S. The Civic Culture. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1963 ; Dahl R. Polyarchy; participation and opposition. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1971 ; Dahl R. On Democracy. New Haven and London : Yale University Press, 1999 ; Inglehart R. Culture shift in advanced industrial society. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1990. 34 Steen A. Recirculation and Expulsion: The New Elites in the Baltic States, working paper, forsningsnotat. Oslo University, 1994. P. 5. 35 Laagerpetz M. From NGO’s to Civil society: A Learning process // Non-Profit Sector and the Consolidation of Democracy. Studies on development of Civil society in Estonia / ed. by M. Laagepetz, A. Trummal, R. Ruutsoo, E. Rikmann. Tallinn : Kunst, 2004. P. 68 ; Agarin T. A Cats Lick. Democratization and Minority Communities in the Post-Soviet Baltic. Amsterdam, N.Y. : Rodopi, 2010. P. 287. 36 Monitooring 2010. URL: http://www.slideshare.net/kultuuriministeerium/limumiskava-monitooring 37 Schulze J., Petersoo P. Interview Analysis: Media, NGO’s and Opinion Leaders. 2009 (unpublished). 38 Carens J.H. Citizenship in multicultural Societies // International seminar on Democracy, Multiculturalism and Armed Forces: “The Challenges to Human Security”. La Paz, Bolivia, March 2004. P. 4. 39 Ellis S.G., Halfdanarson G., Isaacs A.K. Citizenship in historical perspective. Pisa : Edizioni Plus, 2006. 40 The politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural societies / ed. by W. Kymlica, B. Bashir. Oxford : Oxford University press, 2008. P. 11. 41 See Kalev L., Ruutsoo R. Citizenship policies between Nation-state building and Globalization: Attitudes of the decision Makers in Estonia // Studies of Transition States and Societies. 2009. № 1. P. 6, 8. 42 Schulze J. Understanding the “Conditionality Gap” in Estonia and Latvia The Influence of EU Conditionality and Russia’s Activism on Minority Inclusion. PhD thesis. Washington : George Washington University, 2009. P. 289. 43 Ibid. P. 285. 44 Parry G. Political Elites. Colchester : ECPR Press, 2005. 45 See Schulze J. Understanding the “Conditionality Gap” in Estonia and Latvia The Influence of EU Conditionality and Russia’s Activism on Minority Inclusion. PhD thesis. Washington : George Washington University, 2009. P. 272. 46 A new balance: Democracy and Minorities in Post-Communist Europe / ed. by M. Robotin, L. Salat. Budapest : LGI books, Open Society Institute, 2003. P. 28. СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ ПОЛИТИКА • 3 (9) / 2012 ПОЛИТИКА СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ

148