ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS Fifth Series/Cinqui`Eme S´Erie Recueil De Jurisprudence En Droit Administratif

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS Fifth Series/Cinqui`eme s´erie Recueil de jurisprudence en droit administratif

VOLUME 73 (Cited 73 Admin. L.R. (5th))

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CARSWELL, A DIVISION OF THOMSON REUTERS CANADA LIMITED One Corporate Plaza Customer Relations 2075 Kennedy Road Toronto 1-416-609-3800 Toronto, Ontario Elsewhere in Canada/U.S. 1-800-387-5164 M1T 3V4 Fax 1-416-298-5082 www.carswell.com Contact www.carswell.com/contact ASSISTANT EDITORS/REDACTEURS´ ASSISTANTS David N. Jardine, Philip Bryden, B.A.(DALHOUSIE), LL.B.(ALBERTA), LL.M.(BRITISH COLUMBIA) B.A.(JURIS.), B.C.L.(OXON), Shores Belzil LL.M.(HARVARD) Edmonton, Alberta Dean, Faculty of Law, University of Alberta Edmonton, Alberta Karen M. Munro, William W. Shores, Q.C., B.SC. (H. EC.), LL.B.(ALBERTA),B.A.(HONS.), M.P.M., LL.B.(ALBERTA) LL.M.(OSGOODE HALL) Shores Belzil Alberta Justice, Civil Law Branch Edmonton, Alberta Edmonton, Alberta Kathy Cherniowsky, Glenn D. Tait, B.COMM., LL.B., LL.M. B. COMM. (ALBERTA), Edmonton, Alberta LL.B.(QUEEN’S), LL.M.(TORONTO) McLennan Ross Yellowknife, Northwest Territories Dawn M. Knowles, B. ADMIN. (REGINA), LL.B.(ALBERTA) de Villars Jones Edmonton, Alberta

CARSWELL EDITORIAL STAFF/REDACTION´ DE CARSWELL Cheryl L. McPherson, B.A.(HONS.) Director, Primary Content Operations Sarah Bourne, B.A., LL.B. Product Development Manager Nicole Ross, B.A., LL.B. Jennifer Weinberger, B.A.(HON.), J.D. Supervisor, Legal Writing Supervisor, Legal Writing Martin-Fran¸cois Parent, LL.B., LL.M, Samantha Barr, B.A., J.D. DEA (PARIS II) Senior Legal Writer Bilingual Legal Writer Anne Simpson, B.A., M.L.S, LL.B. Lead Legal Writer Angelique Prada, B.A. Content Editor Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) 179

[Indexed as: Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)] Canadian Arab Federation (CAF), Applicant and The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent Federal Court Docket: T-447-09 2013 FC 1283, 2013 CF 1283 Russel W. Zinn J. Heard: May 28-30, 2013 Judgment: December 23, 2013 Administrative law –––– Discretion of tribunal under review — Distinction between ministerial and discretionary acts –––– Political acts — Applicant was non-governmental organization which provided services to persons of Arab ancestry, including new arrivals to Canada — In furtherance of that service mandate, for some time applicant had been party to funding agreements with respondent Minister for Citizenship and Immigration, pursuant to Language In- struction for Newcomers to Canada program, to provide language training services — Members of applicant described Canadian politicians of all stripes as “professional whores of war” for supporting Israel — In personal capacity, Vice-President of applicant attended “peace conference” in Egypt which also received delegations from Hamas, Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad, terrorist organizations — Applicant’s website contained links to training videos displaying paramilitary activities of Hamas and Islamic Jihad — Applicant honoured one B, who had described Canada as country of “infidels or non-believers” and was considered apologist for September 11, 2001 terror attacks in United States — Applicant sponsored essay contest on subject of “ethnic cleansing” of Palestin- ian peoples by Israel — On basis of above-noted actions, Minister declined to renew language training funding agreement, stating that applicant appeared to support terrorist organizations and its representatives were associated with arguably anti-Semitic statements — Applicant commenced proceeding for judicial review of decision of Minister — Application dismissed — Standard of review was reasonableness — Minister had clear political discretion to decline to associate Crown in Right of Canada with support for terrorist organizations or offensive and pejorative utterances — Applicant likewise could not rely upon submission that applicant did not formally authorize authors of impugned statements to make statements, inter alia given presence of statements on applicant’s own website — This was particularly so given that impugned statements were au- thored by members of applicant’s executive — Record was “replete with news articles and statements of others” indicating that applicant apparently endorsed or supported named terrorist organizations and knowingly associated itself with 180 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

members uttering arguably anti-Semitic statements — Accordingly, Minister’s decision was within range of reasonably expected outcomes in present case and application was accordingly properly dismissed. Cases considered by Russel W. Zinn J.: Baier v. Alberta (2007), 2007 SCC 31, 2007 CarswellAlta 853, 2007 Carswell- Alta 854, [2007] 9 W.W.R. 389, 76 Alta. L.R. (4th) 1, 283 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 365 N.R. 1, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673, 412 A.R. 300, 156 C.R.R. (2d) 279, 404 W.A.C. 300, [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 254, [2007] S.C.J. No. 31 (S.C.C.) — considered Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1999), 1 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, 14 Admin. L.R. (3d) 173, 174 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 1999 CarswellNat 1124, 1999 CarswellNat 1125, 243 N.R. 22, [1999] S.C.J. No. 39 (S.C.C.) — followed Cardinal v. Kent Institution (1985), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643, [1986] 1 W.W.R. 577, 24 D.L.R. (4th) 44, 63 N.R. 353, 69 B.C.L.R. 255, 16 Admin. L.R. 233, 23 C.C.C. (3d) 118, 49 C.R. (3d) 35, 1985 CarswellBC 402, 1985 CarswellBC 817, [1985] S.C.J. No. 78 (S.C.C.) — referred to Cie pétrolière Impériale c. Québec (Tribunal administratif) (2003), 5 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, 310 N.R. 343, (sub nom. Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Quebec (Minister of the Environment)) 231 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 2003 SCC 58, 2003 CarswellQue 2315, 2003 CarswellQue 2316, (sub nom. Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Quebec (Minister of the Environment)) [2003] 2 S.C.R. 624, 5 C.E.L.R. (3d) 38, REJB 2003-49134, [2003] S.C.J. No. 59 (S.C.C.) — considered Davis v. Guelph (City) (2011), 2011 CarswellOnt 13588, 2011 ONCA 761, 6 C.L.R. (4th) 75, 92 M.P.L.R. (4th) 163, 286 O.A.C. 127, 345 D.L.R. (4th) 1, [2011] O.J. No. 5439, [2012] S.C.C.A. No. 41 (Ont. C.A.) — followed Irving Shipbuilding Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) (2009), 2009 Car- swellNat 5610, 2009 CAF 116, 2009 FCA 116, 314 D.L.R. (4th) 340, 2009 CarswellNat 920, 389 N.R. 72, [2010] 2 F.C.R. 488, 98 Admin. L.R. (4th) 51, [2009] F.C.J. No. 449 (F.C.A.) — followed Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19 (1990), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 653, 69 D.L.R. (4th) 489, [1990] 3 W.W.R. 289, 30 C.C.E.L. 237, 90 C.L.L.C. 14,010, 43 Admin. L.R. 157, 83 Sask. R. 81, D.T.E. 90T-475, 1990 Car- swellSask 146, 1990 CarswellSask 408, 106 N.R. 17, [1990] S.C.J. No. 26, EYB 1990-67929 (S.C.C.) — considered Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General) (2011), 2011 CarswellOnt 4429, 2011 Cars- wellOnt 4430, 2011 SCC 30, 332 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 417 N.R. 126, 97 Imm. L.R. (3d) 173, (sub nom. Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi) [2011] 2 S.C.R. 504, 19 Admin. L.R. (5th) 1, 279 O.A.C. 63, 108 O.R. (3d) 240, [2011] S.C.J. No. 30 (S.C.C.) — considered New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir (2008), 372 N.R. 1, 69 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, 69 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 844 A.P.R. 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn J. 181

Brunswick) 2008 C.L.L.C. 220-020, D.T.E. 2008T-223, 329 N.B.R. (2d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 170 L.A.C. (4th) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 291 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 2008 CarswellNB 124, 2008 CarswellNB 125, 2008 SCC 9, 64 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 95 L.C.R. 65, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, [2008] A.C.S. No. 9 (S.C.C.) — followed Newfoundland Telephone Co. v. Newfoundland (Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities) (1992), 134 N.R. 241, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 623, 89 D.L.R. (4th) 289, 4 Admin. L.R. (2d) 121, 95 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 271, 301 A.P.R. 271, 1992 CarswellNfld 179, 1992 CarswellNfld 170, EYB 1992-67349, [1992] S.C.J. No. 21 (S.C.C.) — referred to Old St. Boniface Residents Assn. Inc. v. Winnipeg (City) (1990), 2 M.P.L.R. (2d) 217, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 145, 75 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 116 N.R. 46, 69 Man. R. (2d) 134, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1170, 1990 CarswellMan 383, 46 Admin. L.R. 161, 1990 CarswellMan 235, EYB 1990-67192, [1990] S.C.J. No. 137 (S.C.C.) — considered Wells v. Newfoundland (1999), 99 C.L.L.C. 210-047, 180 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 269, 548 A.P.R. 269, 46 C.C.E.L. (2d) 165, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 199, 15 Admin. L.R. (3d) 268, 1999 CarswellNfld 214, 1999 CarswellNfld 215, 177 D.L.R. (4th) 73, 245 N.R. 275, [1999] S.C.J. No. 50 (S.C.C.) — considered Statutes considered: Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 s. 1 — referred to s. 2(b) — considered Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 Generally — referred to s. 3 — referred to

APPLICATION by non-governmental organization for judicial review of decision of respondent Minister for Citizenship and Immigration declining to provide applicant with funding pursuant to Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada program.

Barbara Jackman, Hadayt Nazami, for Applicant Mary Matthews, Nur Muhammed-Ally, Eleanor Elstub, Melissa Mathieu, for Respondent

Russel W. Zinn J.:

1 This is an application for judicial review by the Canadian Arab Feder- ation [CAF] of a decision by The Minister of Citizenship and Immigra- 182 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

tion, then Jason Kenney [the Minister], not to enter into a funding agreement under the Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada [LINC] program for the year 2009-2010. This decision was made by the Minister despite the fact that Citizenship and Immigration Canada [CIC] had previously entered into similar funding arrangements with CAF for many years; the most recent of which expired March 30, 2009, just days after the decision under review was made. 2 The reasons for the Minister’s decision are set out in a letter to CAF dated March 18, 2009, from the Associate Assistant Deputy Minister of CIC to Khaled Mouammar, President of CAF at that time: As you are also aware, serious concerns have arisen with respect to certain public statements that have been made by yourself or other officials of the CAF. These statements have included the promotion of hatred, anti-semitism [sic] and support for the banned terrorist organizations Hamas and Hezbollah. The objectionable nature of these public statements — in that they appear to reflect the CAF’s evident support for terrorist organizations and positions on its part which are arguably anti-Semitic — raises serious questions about the integrity of your organization and has un- dermined the Government’s confidence in the CAF as an appropriate partner for the delivery of settlement services to newcomers.

Background Nature of CAF 3 CAF’s objectives as set out in its Letters Patent, relate to advancing the interests of Arabs and Arab communities in Canada in various ways, including “[t]o promote ties and mutual understanding between Arab societies, organizations and communities in Canada and the Arab homeland... to provide assistance to new immigrants to Canada from the Arab homeland... [and] to disseminate information about and encourage support for Arab causes in Canada and the Arab homeland, particularly the cause of the suffering Palestinian people.” 4 CAF’s operation had two branches: Settlement Services and Immi- grant Support, and Community Engagement. Settlement Services and Immigrant Support was directed towards assisting both Arab and non- Arab newcomers integrate into the community. Community Engagement was directed towards capacity building, advocacy, and community services. Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn J. 183

5 CAF delivered two main programs under its Settlement Services branch: LINC, which provided English as a second language training to newcomers, and Job Search Workshops [JSW]. Most of the newcomers attending these programs were originally from non-Arab countries. CAF received funding for both of these programs from CIC by way of contribution agreement arrangements.

CIC Contribution Agreements 6 CIC contracted with CAF and others as private service provider organizations for the provision of settlement services to newcomers to Can- ada. The contracts provided for an amount of funding allocated to the service provider for reimbursable expenses. An expense unrelated to the LINC or JSW programs cannot be recovered from the funds earmarked in the contribution agreement. As was noted by the Minister in his mem- oranda, a party to a contribution agreement does not financially benefit from the agreement; however, there may be indirect benefits: None of the funds provided by Canada through the contribution agreement was [sic] intended to benefit the CAF. An organization may attain incidental advantages as a result of settlement funding; for example, there may be legitimacy attached to organizations who receive government funds and there may be an opportunity to share infrastructure costs with the settlement program. The full amount of the contribution agreement, however, is intended to directly benefit newcomers taking LINC classes. 7 It is also relevant to this application and it is the Minister’s position, that the LINC program offers newcomers more than just language training. The Minister points out that it is intended that the program will also provide newcomers with an orientation to the Canadian way of life including “social, economic, cultural and political integration,” and therefore the suitability of the program provider in this respect is critical. The CIC Application Package given to service providers sets out this facet of the program, as follows: By providing basic language instruction to adult newcomers in En- glish or French, LINC facilitates the social, cultural[,] political and economic integration of immigrants and refugees into Canada. In addition, LINC curricula include information that helps newcomers become oriented to the Canadian way of life. This, in turn, helps them to become participating members of Canadian society as soon as possible. 184 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

8 CAF had most recently negotiated a contribution agreement and signed a contract with CIC for the period April 1, 2007 to March 31, 2009. On December 2, 2008, CIC wrote to all parties in receipt of LINC funding at that time, informing them that a new settlement program would be forthcoming but its implementation was still underway. As a consequence, “CIC has decided to extend current LINC contribution agreements to March 31, 2010.” Each service provider was asked to submit a budget application and propose revised activities to CIC, which application was subject to an approval process. 9 In the information accompanying this request for applications for amendment, CIC cautioned CAF and other applicants not to assume approval for the 2009-2010 year, unless and until such approval was received in writing from CIC: Do not assume that your application for amendment is approved until you are notified in writing by CIC. Any expenditures incurred prior to the approved start-up date are your own responsibility and will not be reimbursed. We also ask you not to hire staff or make any com- mitments until you have been informed of CIC’s approval. If your application is approved, it will then be used to amend your current Contribution Agreement between your organization and Citizenship and Immigration Canada. 10 CAF submitted a proposal for 2009-2010 on December 9, 2008. On February 12, 2009, a settlement officer from CIC recommended its approval. He noted in that recommendation that “[t]he Canadian Arab Fed- eration delivers a good quality LINC program” and that despite a request for an annual increase to salaries of 2.5%, the proposal for 2009-2010 was $50,000 less than the previous year. The settlement officer emailed an unexecuted final draft of the further agreement to CAF; however, given the value of the proposed contract, final approval was required by the Minister or his delegate. 11 There is nothing in the record, nor was it submitted by CAF, that CIC ever represented that final approval had been given. In fact, even though contractual negotiations had been concluded and the proposal endorsed by a settlement officer, the proposal still had to be approved and endorsed by a review officer, the local manager, and the regional director before CIC National Headquarters and the Minister’s office would be notified of it. If the regional director endorsed the proposal, he had authority to approve and execute the agreement at that stage; however, CAF’s proposal never made it to this stage of the process. CAF’s proposal had been approved by a settlement officer on February 12, 2009 and a review Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn J. 185

officer on February 16, 2009, but before it was sent to a local manager, CIC National Headquarters intervened and raised concerns about continuing to fund CAF.

Events Prior to Minister Kenney’s Appointment as Minister of CIC 12 Jason Kenney became the Minister of CIC, responsible for the Immi- gration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [the Act] on October 30, 2008. He was preceded in that office by Diane Finley. On August 7, 2008, Minister Finley issued a Press Release in which she stated that “[t]o help newcomers settle in the community of Scarborough in the City of Toronto, the Government is committing more than $10 million over the next two years (through to 2010) to six agencies that provide settlement services.” The Press Release went on to list the “six agencies receiving the funding in today’s announcement.” CAF was one of the listed agencies, and was adjacent to the figure of $2,544,815. 13 Mohamed Boudjenane, National Executive Director of CAF, attests in his affidavit that this announcement led CAF to believe that it was to be funded for 2009-2010 and the finalization of the details would be a mere formality: The funding was originally meant to continue for two years but in the second year, 2008, there was an announcement that it was to continue into a third year to 2010. The Minister of Citizenship and Im- migration, Diane Finlay [sic], made a public announcement on Au- gust 7, 2008 to this effect... It was certainly the basis upon which CAF operated. Both myself and Sara Amash, the project and program manager for CAF were led to believe that the funding for 2009- 2010 would continue as previously approved and that it was merely a formality to finalize the details of the contract for that year. 14 In contrast, Lee Bartlett, Director of Operations for Settlement Ser- vices for the Toronto and York offices of CIC, attests in his affidavit, sworn September 22, 2009, that the breakdown of the $2,544,815 figure in the Minister’s Press Release is made up of funding to CAF under both the LINC program and under the Immigration Settlement and Adaption Program [ISAP], as follows, none of which relates to LINC funding for 2009-2010: FY1 07/08 FY2 08/09 FY3 09/10 TOTAL LINC $1,045,782 $1,037,505 N/A $2,083,287 ISAP $ 130,804 $ 166,581 $164,179 $ 461,564 186 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

15 The total of the funding in Mr. Bartlett’s chart is $2,544,851 - $46 greater than the Minister’s announced funding for CAF. Nevertheless, I find that the Press Release could not have led CAF to believe that it had secured LINC funding for 2009-2010, as is alleged by Mr. Boudjenane. The reference to funding for 2009-2010 in the Press Release referred to ISAP funding. Mr. Bartlett was cross-examined on his affidavit and his evidence was unshaken that the figure did not include 2009-2010 LINC funding because no decision had been made to extend previous LINC agreements, nor had any such announcement been made at the date of the Press Release: In August 2008, not even a negotiation or even a call for proposals around an extension or even decisions around how we would extend LINC for 2009/10 had been made or announced, and the LINC agreement that was in place at the time of August for CAF ran for 2007/08 and 2008/09, whereas the ISAP agreement for CAF ran 2007/08 to 2009/10, inclusive. ... [T]he Minister would not make an announcement that agreements had been reached around funding until such an agreement had been put in place....[I]t wouldn’t have been possible for the Minister to have made an announcement around LINC for 2009/10 for CAF if we hadn’t even — or CIC, sorry, hadn’t even at that point set out the process for entering into further agreements, and equally hadn’t received any proposal from CAF at that point in relation to the amounts that it would seek for LINC in 2009/10 for further agreements.

The Minister’s Position on Government Funding 16 Alykhan Velshi, the Minister’s Communications Director, attests in his affidavit, that since he began working for the Minister in 2007 (the Minister at that time was the Secretary of State for Multiculturalism), the Minister has held the view that the Crown should not be funding certain organizations: [W]hile private citizens and organisations are free to express their opinions, no individual or organisation is entitled to a financial subsidy from taxpayers. To that end, groups that promote hatred, including anti-Semitism, or excuse terrorism and violence should not receive any official recognition or subsidy from the state. 17 Mr. Velshi points to a number of public statements by the Minister in support of this assertion. For example, on February 17, 2009, at a confer- Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn J. 187

ence in London, England, the Minister gave a speech in which he made the following statement: There are organisations in Canada, as in Britain, that receive their share of media attention and public notoriety, but who, at the same time as expressing hateful sentiments, expect to be treated as respect- able interlocutors in the public discourse. ... I think as well of the leader of the Canadian Arab Federation, who notoriously circulated an e-mail when my colleague, our shadow For- eign Minister, Bob Rae, was running for the leadership of his party, calling on people to vote against Mr. Rae because of Arlene Perly Rae’s involvement in Canada’s Jewish Community. The same individual, the same organisation, the Canadian Arab Federation, just last week circulated — including to all parliamentarians — videos which include propaganda, including the inculcation to hatred, of children by organisations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. These and other organisations are free within the confines of our law and consistent with our traditions of freedom of expression, to speak their mind, but they should not expect to receive resources from the state, support from taxpayers or any other form of official respect from the government or the organs of our State. [emphasis added] 18 A week later, on February 24, 2009, during Question Period, the Min- ister was asked about funding for certain organizations. The Member asking the question stated that “the Canadian Arab Federation recently circulated videos from banned terrorist organizations, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, called Israel a ‘racist state’, and attacked a member of the House because of his wife’s involvement in the Jewish community.” He then asked: “What is the government’s position on whether such groups should receive taxpayer support?” The Minister responded: “[T]he Gov- ernment of Canada should take a zero tolerance approach to organizations that make excuses for terrorism, for violence, for hatred and for anti-Semitism.... From our point of view, these groups do not deserve and have no right to taxpayers’ dollars to promote their kind of extremism.” The Minister expressed similar sentiments during radio interviews he gave on March 2, 2009, and March 6, 2009. 188 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

19 On March 10, 2009, at the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, the Minister outlined his reason for refusing to extend funding to CAF for 2009-2010: The very first day I arrived at Canadian Heritage as the secretary of state responsible for the multiculturalism program, I received a brief- ing on grants and contributions. I indicated to the officials that I wanted to ensure that we were not providing grants and contributions to organizations that make excuses for, or apologize for, violence or terrorism, or organizations that are terrorist or that promote hatred. I mentioned, in particular, Mr. Mohamed Elmasry of the Canadian Is- lamic Congress because of his remarks that Israelis over the age of 18 are legitimate targets for elimination. I further mentioned, in particular, Mr. Khaled Mouammar, president of the Canadian Arab Federation - this was a discussion I had with my officials in January 2007 - because of his circulation, during the 2006 Liberal leadership convention, of a flyer that attacked Bob Rae, a respected member of this Parliament, because of his wife’s involvement in the Jewish community. Following the circulation of that flyer, Liberal Senator Yoine Goldstein referred to this flyer as “racist filth”. It was my view then, and it’s remained my view since, that we ought not to finance organizations that promote extremism or hatred - in this case, hatred toward Jewish people in particular - or who publicly support a banned, illegal terrorist organization. Mr. Mouammar has a long record of public comments expressing support for Hamas and Hezbollah, which are two banned, illegal, and essentially anti-Semitic terrorist organizations. He has referred to Israel as a racist state and he has called for the end of Israel as a Jewish state. In my judgment, these and other comments of his are beyond the pale. Do I suggest that we should have a test on political opinions for the office-holders of NGOs that receive grants and contributions? No, absolutely not. People are free to say what they like within the bounds of our laws. People are free to criticize cabinet ministers or the government. But I do not believe we have any obligation to provide subsidies to individuals who use their organizations as platforms to promote extremism or hatred or to apologize for terrorism. That’s the view I articulated in January 2007 at Canadian Heritage. As a result, we provided no funding to these organizations. That’s also the view I articulated recently at the London conference on anti- Semitism. I have also articulated this to my officials. I have asked my department to find ways in which we can include the promotion of Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn J. 189

hatred or apologizing for terrorism as some of the criteria used in considering applicants for grants or contributions.

The Minister’s View of CAF 20 The Minister was clearly aware of CAF before he became Minister of CIC; however, he only became aware that CIC was funding CAF on Feb- ruary 2, 2009. Upon the Minister becoming aware, he emailed his Chief of Staff expressing his position on CAF and the funding agreement, as follows: ... I am unclear who in our office has the lead on settlement funding. In any event, please ask the Dept to bring forward complete information on the contribution embarrassingly approved by our government for the radical and anti-semitic [sic] Canadian Arab Federation This is the same group whose President attacked Bob Rae because his wife is jewish [sic], and who now is calling me a “professional prostitute” (I guess that’s better than being an amateur!) I would like to know the status of their contribution agreement with CIC to see if they are in breach in any possible respect. I want to pursue all legal means to terminate this shameful funding arrange- ment, and to ensure that it is not renewed. [internet references omitted] 21 The decision under review does not set out the specific conduct or events that the Minister took into consideration in reaching his decision not to fund CAF. Alykhan Velshi, the Minister’s Communications Direc- tor, testified that the statements relied on to reach the conclusion that CAF’s statements “have included the promotion of hatred, anti-semitism [sic] and support of the banned terrorist organizations Hamas and Hezbollah,” included the following six matters.

1. The Bob Rae Flyer 22 In 2006, during the Liberal Party Leadership Convention, CAF’s President, Khaled Mouammar, using his personal email account, forwarded a leaflet that attacked Bob Rae and his wife for involvement in the Jewish community. The flyer was originally produced and emailed by a man who was not associated with CAF. The flyer contains the following text over a picture of Bob Rae: Bob Rae was a keynote speaker for the [Jewish National Fund of Canada], a group shown by Israeli scholars to be complicit in war crimes and ethnic cleaning. 190 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

Rae’s wife is a Vice President of the [Canadian Jewish Congress], a lobby group which supports Israeli Apartheid and Israel’s illegal Apartheid Wall. President Carter has condemned Israeli Apartheid. Bob Rae supports Israeli Apartheid. Don’t elect a leader who supports Apartheid! 23 The distribution of the Bob Rae Flyer to delegates was reported by Canadian Press: “Bob Rae was the target of anti-Semitic attacks during the Liberal leadership contest, motivated at least in part by the fact that his wife is Jewish.” When contacted by Canadian Press, CAF denied pro- ducing or distributing the flyer but later issued a press release stating: “CAF believes that Canadians have a right to know the factual information provided” in the flyer. 24 Mr. Velshi testified that the Bob Rae Flyer formed part of the basis for the Minister’s decision as it attacked Mr. Rae because of his wife’s involvement in the Jewish community, and specifically the Canadian Jewish Congress. In Mr. Velshi’s view, the Bob Rae Flyer was anti-Se- mitic and thus a form of hatred.

2. Rallies in January 2009 25 In January 2009, CAF in conjunction with other organizations, organized several rallies where some protestors (who were not related to CAF) held offensive placards and shouted repugnant slogans. Some participants were seen holding signs equating Israelis to Nazis, some were screaming vulgarities like “Jewish child, you are going to fucking die. Hamas is coming for you. Fuck off.” Hezbollah flags were flying in the background, and some signs likened Zionism to Nazism and terrorism. 26 It was during one of these rallies that Mr. Mouammar described the Minister, among others, as a professional whore of war: We have politicians who are professional whores who support the war [i.e. the Israel-Palestine conflict] as Norman Finkelstein said at that lecture at the University of Toronto. These are, these are people like Peter Kent across the street, like Jason Kenney, like Michael Ignatieff, who only had to say while Israel was murdering women and children with phosphorous bombs burning their fleshes, the only thing these, these, professional politicians; who are whores, whores of war, the only thing they had to say was that Israel had the right to defend itself by killing women and children with phosphorous bombs. Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn J. 191

The Minister denies that this derogatory name calling triggered or played a part in his decision. Given that he had made statements regarding government funding to CAF as early as 2007, there is no reason to question his assertion.

3. The 2007 Cairo Conference 27 Ali Mullah, Vice President of CAF at the time, attended the Cairo Conference, which described itself as an “international peace conference.” It was attended by many people with different backgrounds, including some Jewish participants. The conference was also attended by delegates from Hamas, Hezbollah, Jemaah Islamiyya, and the Palestine Liberation Front - four organizations on Canada’s list of terrorist organizations. Although it was reported that CAF had sent Mr. Mullah as its delegate, it was later confirmed that he attended in his personal capacity, and not as a representative of CAF.

4. Distribution of Links from Terrorist Organizations 28 On February 2, 2009, the Minister became aware that CAF, in its Daily Gaza Bulletin and its webpage, had links to web sites that featured videos with images of Hamas operatives undergoing training and which depicted flags of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. CAF asserts that it never endorsed the contents of the videos in the links it posted and transmitted; rather it simply directed readers to facts so that they could form their own opinions on the issues.

5. Honouring Zafar Bangash 29 CAF, at its 40th Anniversary Gala, honoured Zafar Bangash, who is otherwise not affiliated with CAF. Mr. Bangash has referred to Canadi- ans as “infidels or non-believers” in the past and reported on the Septem- ber 11 attacks in a way that was unsympathetic to the victims.

6. Essay Contest 30 CAF sponsored an essay contest (with two other organizations) on the “ethnic cleansing” of Palestine. The timing of this contest coincided with the 60th anniversary of the establishment of Israel as a state. The Minister contends that the use of the term “ethnic cleansing” assumes that Jewish people are engaged in genocide and constitutes anti-Semitism. 31 Collectively, these six incidents formed the basis for the Minister’s decision. 192 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

CAF Requests to Meet with the Minister 32 On March 2, 2009, the President of CAF wrote to the Minister requesting a meeting: It is important that CAF’s working relationship with you and the Ministry of Immigration is based upon mutual respect and proactive outreach on both sides to the benefit of Arab Canadian communities on the whole. CAF is therefore requesting a meeting with you in the presence of other concerned Arab Canadians. This meeting will be a great opportunity to enhance and strengthen our working relationship. The Minister did not respond. 33 The letter does not indicate why it was sent at that time; however, it is noteworthy that it was sent two weeks following the Minister’s speech in London where he said, with reference to CAF and others, that while they are at liberty to engage in free speech within the law, “they should not expect to receive resources from the state, support from taxpayers or any other form of official respect from the government or the organs of our state.” 34 It is against this backdrop that the following issues arise.

Issues 35 The six issues raised by CAF in its written memorandum can be col- lapsed and addressed within a discussion of the following four questions: a. Did the Minister owe CAF a duty of procedural fairness, and if so, was it breached? b. Is the Minister’s decision not to enter into a funding agreement with CAF under the LINC program tainted by a reasonable apprehension of bias? c. Was CAF’s section 2(b) Charter right to freedom of expression engaged, and if so, was that right infringed, and, was the infringement justified? d. Was the Minister’s decision reasonable?

1. Did the Minister owe CAF a duty of procedural fairness? 36 CAF submits that the Minister owed it a duty of fairness because: 1. A duty of fairness is imposed on every public authority making an administrative decision which is not of a legislative nature and which affects the rights, privileges or interests of an individual: Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn J. 193

Cardinal v. Kent Institution, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643 (S.C.C.), at 653 [Cardinal]; 2. CAF had received funding for the LINC program without any issues for twelve consecutive years; 3. CAF had a legitimate expectation that funding would be renewed because of its history with CIC and because the contract for 2009- 2010 had been negotiated and was awaiting final approval; and 4. Final approval had historically been a formality after the contract’s terms had been negotiated and the Minister rarely intervened at any stage. 37 The Minister submits that no duty of fairness was owed to CAF because: 1. The relationship between CAF and CIC was purely contractual in nature and no duty of fairness is owed by the government when it is exercising its contractual rights in the same manner as an ordinary citizen: New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dun- smuir, 2008 SCC 9 (S.C.C.) at paras 103-104, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.) [Dunsmuir]; 2. The funding period under the last executed agreement between CIC and CAF for the provision of LINC services expired on March 31, 2009, no new agreement had been executed, and CAF was specifically advised that approval could not be taken for granted; and 3. There is no obligation on CIC to enter into a new agreement with any party, or to renew an existing agreement that is set to expire, merely because it is a government institution. 38 The following provides the reasons for my conclusion that the Min- ister did not owe a duty of procedural fairness to CAF. In summary, it is because the nature of the relationship was strictly commercial. There is no statutory provision that imposes procedural fairness obligations in relation to contribution agreements, nor is there any contractual provision set out in the call for proposals or the contribution agreements themselves that stipulates that service provider organizations will be treated in a procedurally fair manner. Finally, according procedural rights in what is essentially a strictly commercial context would unduly burden the Minister, particularly where the window for making a decision is short and there are greater public policy considerations which the Minister must weigh. In such a context, the parties’ rights are best protected by a 194 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

reviewing court’s assessment of the reasonableness of the decision, not by extending procedural rights where none would otherwise exist. 39 When determining whether a duty of procedural fairness applies to the decision under review, one must first determine the nature of the relationship between the affected person and the public authority. 40 In Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 653 (S.C.C.), at 669, the Supreme Court, relying upon the decision of Justice LeDain in Cardinal at 653, stated that whether the duty of fairness exists will be dependant upon “the consideration of three factors: (i) the nature of the decision to be made by the administrative body; (ii) the relationship existing between that body and the individual; and (iii) the effect of that decision on the individual’s rights.” 41 In Dunsmuir at para 114, the Supreme Court noted an exception to this broad statement of principle [the Dunsmuir exception]. Dunsmuir involved the dismissal of an employee from his employment with the province: The principles expressed in Knight in relation to the general duty of fairness owed by public authorities when making decisions that affect the rights, privileges or interests of individuals are valid and important. However, to the extent that the majority decision in Knight ignored the important effect of a contract of employment, it should not be followed. Where a public employee is protected from wrongful dismissal by contract, his or her remedy should be in private law, not in public law. [emphasis added] 42 CAF submits that the Dunsmuir exception does not apply to the relationship between CAF and CIC. CAF relies on the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Mavi v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 30, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 504 (S.C.C.) [Mavi] for the proposition that the Dun- smuir exception to the duty of fairness was intended to be narrow and specific to the employment context and therefore does not apply to this case. In particular, the Supreme Court in Mavi held, at para 51, that: The situation here does not come close to the rather narrow Dun- smuir employment contract exception from the obligation of procedural fairness. As the Dunsmuir majority itself emphasized: This conclusion does not detract from the general duty of fairness owed by administrative decision makers. Rather it acknowledges that in the specific context of dismissal Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn J. 195

from public employment, disputes should be viewed through the lens of contract law rather than public law. [Emphasis added; para. 82.] Dunsmuir was not intended to and did not otherwise diminish the requirements of procedural fairness in the exercise of administrative authority. [emphasis in original] 43 In my view, the Dunsmuir exception is not as narrow as CAF submits. I find support for this view in the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Irving Shipbuilding Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 FCA 116, [2010] 2 F.C.R. 488 (F.C.A.) [Irving Shipbuilding], wherein Justice Evans for the Court and with reference to Dunsmuir, stated at para 60 that the broader point made in that case “is that when the Crown enters into a contract, its rights and duties, and the available remedies, are generally to be determined by the law of contract.” I also agree with Justice Evans’ statement at para 45 that “[t]he common law duty of fairness is not free-standing but is imposed in connection with the particular scheme in which the impugned administrative decision has been taken.” 44 In Mavi, unlike in Irving Shipbuilding, while the parties’ relationship was governed by a contract, it was also inextricably rooted in statute, as was noted by the Court at para 2: The present proceedings were initiated by eight sponsors who denied liability under their undertakings. As will be explained, the undertakings are valid contracts but they are also structured, controlled and supplemented by federal legislation. The debts created thereby are not only contractual but statutory, and as such their enforcement is not exclusively governed by the private law of contract. The issue raised by this appeal is the extent to which, if at all, the government is constrained by considerations of procedural fairness in making enforcement decisions in relation to these statutory debts. [emphasis added] In my view, the fact that the contracts were grounded and rooted in statute distinguishes Mavi from Irving Shipbuilding and from this case. The undertakings in Mavi were not of a strictly contractual nature. In fact, the Supreme Court in Mavi distinguished Dunsmuir on this basis, stating at para 47: The Attorneys General resist the application of a duty of procedural fairness in part on a theory that the claims against the sponsors are essentially contractual in nature. Dunsmuir, they say, stands for the proposition that procedural fairness does not apply to situations gov- 196 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

erned by contract. However, in this case, unlike Dunsmuir, the gov- ernments’ cause of action is essentially statutory. [emphasis added] 45 Unlike in Mavi, one cannot say that the relationship of the parties in this case is “structured, controlled and supplemented by federal legislation,” or that the cause of action is essentially statutory. The Settlement Manual — a guidebook given to settlement officers for evaluating applications for funding — states that “[w]ith the establishment of the Depart- ment of Citizenship and Immigration in 1950, the federal government made provisions in its Annual Estimates for payments to not-for-profit organizations in order to provide settlement services to immigrants in Canada.” These settlement programs fall within the Act’s objectives in section 3, most particularly the objective “to promote the successful integration of permanent residents into Canada.” The parties have not pointed to any other statutory provision relevant to LINC funding. Ac- cordingly, there is no statutory provision governing procedural fairness in relation to the possible extension of the term of an existing contribution agreement. 46 In this case, the parties were in a purely contractual relationship at the time the Minister made his decision. CAF was a party to a LINC funding contract with CIC, ending March 31, 2009. There was no provision in that contract for the automatic renewal or extension of that term. How- ever, as a consequence of that contractual relationship, CAF was invited to submit a proposal for an amendment to the contract to extend its term for one year. CAF was informed that its contract with CIC would be extended to March 31, 2010, subject to an application being submitted and “approved.” Despite the negotiations for 2009-2010 having been completed, the fact remains that no contract for funding for 2009-2010 had been approved or executed, and it had been made clear to CAF in both the Guidelines for Amendments: Language Instruction for Newcom- ers to Canada (LINC) 2009-2010, and subsections 4.6 and 12.5 of the 2007-2009 contribution agreement, that it should not expect any additional funding beyond March 31, 2009, until it was notified in writing that the application for an amendment to extend the term of the existing contract had been approved. 47 There was nothing in the documents sent to CAF that committed CIC to amend the existing contract. The letter from CIC indicating that the contract term of CAF’s existing contribution agreement could be extended is akin to a request for the submission of a proposal and, as was Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn J. 197

held in Irving Shipbuilding, arguably creates a contract when the recipi- ent responds. In this case, that contract contains no express promise that parties responding will be treated in a procedurally fair manner. 48 CAF points out that there was nothing in the document package to indicate that organizations that were considered by the Minister to be anti-Semitic or supporters of terrorism would not be granted a contract extension. Equally there was nothing in the package that indicated that approval by the Minister would be automatic even if his officials were otherwise satisfied with the proposal. 49 Accordingly, to the extent that the parties’ relationship was a commercial and contractual relationship, there is nothing in the record that suggests that there was any obligation on the Minister to engage with CAF about his concerns prior to making his decision not to extend the existing contract’s term. There is neither a statutory or contractual basis on which this Court can impose on a duty of procedural fairness on the Minister.

Implied Duty of Fairness 50 The question remains whether there is any implied duty of procedural fairness. I find that there is no implied duty in this case for many of the reasons the Court found that there was no implied duty of fairness in Irving Shipbuilding. 51 First, this is essentially a commercial relationship, notwithstanding the fact that the service provider makes no profit from the agreement. As Justice Evans stated at para 46 of Irving Shipbuilding: “It will normally be inappropriate to import into a predominantly commercial relationship, governed by contract, a public law duty developed in the context of the performance of governmental functions pursuant to powers derived solely from statute.” 52 Second, if CAF is awarded procedural rights in this context, it would open the door to every failed applicant for a contribution agreement being entitled to at least notification that their proposal was not going to be accepted and an opportunity to address the reasons why. Such an obligation on the Minister would unduly delay his decisions in a process when, as in this case, the time for a decision is short. Further, it opens the door to what Justice Evans called a “cascading array of potential procedural rights-holders.” Where there are more persons seeking funding than funds available, any change in decision by the Minister leads automatically to a subsequent failed applicant. If procedural fairness is extended 198 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

to the initial failed applicant, the same safeguards must be extended to the subsequent failed applicants. 53 Third, as was submitted by the Minister, a decision on funding settlement programs for newcomers to Canada involves broader public policy considerations; there is more at stake than just the relationship between the service provider and CIC. Those who enrol in the LINC program are to be orientated to the Canadian way of life and therefore the suitability of the program provider is critical. The question of whether a particular organization is best suited to act as a beacon of Canadian values in the provision of settlement services (even when its second-language training program is otherwise fully acceptable), is not something subject to judicial review on procedural grounds. The Applicant’s interests - to the extent that they have interests at all - are protected from capricious decision-making under the reasonableness standard, not by affording it procedural fairness. 54 Even if the nature of the relationship between CIC and CAF was other than that of a commercial contract, and even if the Dunsmuir exception was read to apply as narrowly as CAF submits, I nevertheless would have found that CAF does not have a right, privilege, or interest that is affected by the decision sufficient to impose a duty of fairness on the Minister. 55 The Supreme Court held in Cardinal that a duty of fairness is imposed on every public authority making an administrative decision which is not of a legislative nature and which affects the rights, privileges or interests of an individual. This language was tracked in the Supreme Court’s decision in Knight, when it stated that the effect of the decision on the individual’s rights is a factor to be considered when determining whether a duty of fairness applies. In Wells v. Newfoundland, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 199 (S.C.C.) [Wells], the Supreme Court again reaffirmed the concept that a right, interest, or privilege must be engaged before a duty of fairness will be imposed, when at 224, it said that “[t]here is no vested interest at stake causing a duty of fairness to arise (Knight, supra). The respondent did not show any basis on which he could have formed a reasonable expectation to be consulted in the process.” 56 Although the Court’s comments in Wells were directed towards the issue of procedural fairness in the context of reappointment of a public official following lawful termination, the message is still instructive — there must be some valid interest that stands to be affected by the decision for there to be a duty of fairness owed. Here, CAF (or any other Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn J. 199

service provider organization for that matter) does not have a right to LINC funding. While the Minister conceded that there may be indirect benefits to CAF as a result of the contribution agreements such as in- creased legitimacy of the organization as a result of its contractual relationship with the government, or the sharing of infrastructure costs with CAF’s other operations, I find that these are not sufficient privileges or interests so as to engage an obligation of fairness. 57 If the added legitimacy resulting from the very act of contracting with the government is a sufficient interest to impose procedural fairness obligations, virtually every party that contracts with the government in any fashion will suddenly acquire procedural rights. Furthermore, part of the reason that the Minister decided not to continue to fund CAF was because he did not think it was appropriate for the government to appear to support, endorse, or legitimize an organization that might be viewed as anti-Semitic or that might support terrorism. 58 The sharing of infrastructure costs is similarly not a sufficient interest to impose an overarching duty of fairness on the Minister. In this case, the actual financial benefit to CAF cannot be significant — it was already renting a separate building for its other operations and the majority of the LINC staff played no additional role in CAF’s other operations. Furthermore, funding for the LINC program was provided on a cost-recovery basis for recoverable expenses related to the LINC program only. This effectively limited the extent to which costs unrelated to the program could be reimbursed. On the other hand, as I have already indicated, imposing a duty of fairness on the Minister would significantly constrain his ability to expeditiously make broad, policy-based decisions. Any incidental interest CAF may have had was heavily outweighed by the public’s interest in a Minister with the discretion to make decisions swiftly, instead of one who is paralyzed by procedure. 59 For these reasons, I find that CAF was not entitled to procedural fairness in the Minister’s decision not to accept their proposal and extend the term of its contribution agreement with CIC under the LINC Program.

Content of the Duty of Fairness 60 Had I found that it was entitled to procedural fairness, I would have found that this case attracts no more than minimal procedural protections and that those requirements were met. The five factors set out in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 (S.C.C.), which the Court is to consider when determining what procedu- 200 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

ral rights the duty of fairness requires in a particular context, all point to such a conclusion. 61 The decision not to approve an extension of CAF’s LINC funding is not close to judicial decision-making. It is discretionary and purely administrative. Although there is no appeal from such a decision, there is no impediment to CAF applying in the future for funding and this, in my view, points to a lower duty of fairness. 62 Despite the fact that LINC funding comprised roughly 74 percent of CAF’s annual budget, the LINC funding was not critical to CAF’s operations as the provision of LINC training was not within its main mandate nor did the contribution agreements generate income for CAF’s activities as funding was provided on a cost recovery flow-through basis. CAF had no legitimate expectation that the contract extension would be provided. In fact, it was aware from the Minister’s statements that funding was in jeopardy. Further, CAF had no legitimate expectations in the process - on the contrary, CAF was explicitly told not to expect approval until it was notified in writing and similarly, not to incur any expenses or hire any staff until final approval was received. Despite approval appearing to be a formality in years past, it does not change the fact that the Minister always had ultimate discretion. 63 Lastly, the choice of procedure used by CIC and the requirement of the Minister’s approval given the value of the contract, are left to the Minister. All of these factors indicate that minimal procedural protections would have been appropriate in this case. 64 Had it been entitled to fairness, in my view, the following are the procedural rights CAF would have been entitled to receive: (1) to know the reasons why the Minister did not approve its proposal, (2) to know the Minister’s concerns regarding it and the fact that those concerns could lead to it not being approved for future funding, and (3) to be given an opportunity to respond to those concerns. 65 Here, a letter was provided to CAF outlining the Minister’s reasons for his decision. The Minister submits that the other two elements are also satisfied. He says that CAF was aware of his concerns and it had the opportunity to respond to them. The notification and response, he says, were the numerous public statements he and CAF officials made. 66 The Minister made many public statements detailing the specific statements and activities of CAF that he says he considered when making the decision. He also made it clear that CAF’s LINC funding was in jeopardy as a result of those statements and activities. Further, CAF was Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn J. 201

aware of the Minister’s specific concerns, it addressed them, and offered its response in various statements and press releases. In a radio interview on February 17, 2009, nearly a month before the decision, the interviewer put directly to Mr. Mouammar that the Minister was “poised to slash federal funding to Canada’s largest Arabic group” because “groups whose leaders say intolerant or hateful things should not get taxpayers’ funding.” Mr. Mouammar responded: It does not belong to Jason Kenny [sic], and it’s up to Canadian taxpayers to decide who gets this money to provide such settlement services, not Jason Kenny [sic]. His approach is really a fascist approach. He is threatening people that you cannot criticize government policies, and if you do, you are therefore banned from receiving funding from settlement services, which are not under his jurisdiction, because as I said, this is taxpayers’ money. 67 No authority was provided for the proposition that public statements provide notice of the sort required to satisfy the duty of procedural fairness. However, I can see no principled basis to reject the adequacy of notice through public statements provided they are sufficiently detailed, the receiving party is made aware of them, and the receiving party provides a response. In this case, I find all of the requirements were satisfied and the notice was adequate. 68 I cannot see how the fairness of the decision-making process would have been enhanced had the Minister sent a formal notice to CAF detailing the very statements and concerns he had publicly expressed, and given it an opportunity to respond. The function of notice had clearly been served as evidenced by Mr. Mouammar’s response during the Feb- ruary 17, 2009 interview. Further, it is not suggested by CAF that it could have or would have offered a response that differed from the public response it had given. 69 In my view, CAF was aware of the Minister’s concerns and the possible result. CAF responded publicly to those concerns. The Minister had CAF’s public responses before him when he made his decision. The three elements required by the duty of fairness were therefore satisfied in these unique circumstances. Had I found otherwise, on these facts, I would have found the breach to have been a technical, inconsequential breach, and the result unlikely to have been different in light of the parties’ public discourse. For those reasons, I would not have exercised my discretion to award CAF a remedy. 202 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

2. Was the Minister’s Decision Tainted by a Reasonable Apprehension of Bias? 70 Regardless of whatever else the duty of fairness may require in terms of procedural protections, where fairness applies, the decision maker must in all cases be impartial and free from a reasonable apprehension of bias. Because I have found that no duty of fairness applied here, I need not explore whether the decision was tainted by a reasonable apprehension of bias. However, should a reviewing court determine that fairness did apply, I shall provide my assessment of CAF’s allegations of bias. 71 The test to be applied in determining whether an administrative decision-maker is biased will vary depending on the nature of the decision- making body: Newfoundland Telephone Co. v. Newfoundland (Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 623 (S.C.C.), at 637- 640 [Newfoundland Telephone]. 72 The Ontario Court of Appeal in Davis v. Guelph (City), 2011 ONCA 761 (Ont. C.A.) at para 71, (2011), 345 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (Ont. C.A.), summarized how to determine the appropriate test for bias: At the adjudicative end of the spectrum, the traditional “reasonable apprehension of bias” test will apply in full force. At the other end of the spectrum, however - where the nature of the decision is more of an administrative, policy or legislative nature - the courts have held that a more lenient test, known as the “closed mind” test is applicable. [references omitted] 73 Additionally, the Supreme Court of Canada stated in Cie pétrolière Impériale c. Québec (Tribunal administratif), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 624 (S.C.C.), at 646-647 that: The appellant’s reasoning thus treats the Minister, for all intents and purposes, like a member of the judiciary, whose personal interest in a case would make him apparently biased in the eyes of an objective and properly informed third party. This line of argument overlooks the contextual nature of the content of the duty of impartiality which, like that of all of the rules of procedural fairness, may vary in order to reflect the context of a decision-maker’s activities and the nature of its functions. [emphasis added] 74 CAF submits, without analysis, that the appropriate standard is a reasonable apprehension of bias and not the closed mind test. The Minister says that this was a policy driven decision - he exercised a broad discretion, weighed competing interests, and made a decision respecting a Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn J. 203

commercial relationship - and therefore the higher standard of a closed mind is appropriate. 75 I agree with the Minister that the closed mind test is the appropriate standard by which to judge his decision because the Minister is a demo- cratically elected official and this particular decision comes in the context of the administration of the Act. The question to be asked is whether the Minister had prejudged the matter “to the extent that any representations at variance with the view, which has been adopted, would be futile:” Old St. Boniface Residents Assn. Inc. v. Winnipeg (City), [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1170 (S.C.C.), at 1197. For the following reasons, I find that the Minister’s mind was closed. 76 The Minister says that he did not make up his mind until March 18, 2010, and he was impartial when he rendered his decision. The Court was pointed to comments he made in numerous radio interviews leading up to the decision, including the following: a. In an interview on March 2, 2009 the Minister made clear to the host that he had not yet made a decision; and b. The Minister stated in an interview on March 14, 2009 that if the character of CAF were to change and there was to be new leadership that was more in keeping with Canadian values, he would be”...entirely comfortable with [CAF] being a service delivery partner.” 77 The Minister submits that while he expressed strong opinions prior to the decision, these statements did not indicate that his position could not be dislodged. He reminds the Court that in Newfoundland Telephone, the Supreme Court of Canada stated at 639 that “a member of a board which performs a policy formation function should not be susceptible to a charge of bias simply because of the expression of strong opinions prior to the hearing.” 78 However, the Minister’s public statements are only part of the evidence that must be examined to determine whether he had a closed mind regarding CAF. Private statements are often more indicative of a person’s true state of mind, than public statements. This may be especially true of political figures. 79 I agree with CAF that particularly telling is the Minister’s February 2, 2009 email in which he requests “information on the contribution agreement embarrassingly approved by our government for the radical and anti-semitic [sic] Canadian Arab Federation.” He goes on to say that he 204 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

wants “to pursue all legal means to terminate this shameful funding ar- rangement, and to ensure that it is not renewed.” [emphasis added] 80 Any reasonable person reading this would conclude that the Minister had made up his mind about the issue of future funding for CAF; his only interest was in pursuing the means to reach his end goal of terminating the relationship CIC had with CAF. 81 I conclude, despite the Minister’s public statements and assertions to the contrary, that his private actions revealed that he would not truly consider CAF’s submissions - that any efforts by CAF short of changing its leadership were futile. His mind was closed.

3. Was CAF’s Freedom of Expression Infringed? 82 There is no doubt, and it was undisputed by the Minister, that CAF’s advocacy activities are protected expression. Additionally, the expression surrounding the LINC program is also protected. Nevertheless, I find that CAF’s freedom of expression was not infringed. 83 The Supreme Court of Canada in Baier v. Alberta, 2007 SCC 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673 (S.C.C.) [Baier], set out how one determines whether a right claimed is a positive entitlement to a particular platform or benefit, or a negative right to be free from government restraint. The claim is a positive entitlement claim if the government has to legislate or otherwise act to support or enable an expressive activity; the claim is a negative rights claim if what is being sought is freedom from government restriction on activity that people would otherwise be free to engage without any need for government support or enablement. 84 CAF contends that by cancelling its LINC funding, the Minister re- stricted its expression surrounding the Israel-Palestine conflict and therefore, that this is a standard negative rights freedom of expression claim. CAF is asking that the Minister be restrained from restricting expression in which it would otherwise be free to engage. The Minister contends that this is a positive rights claim because CAF is seeking positive entitlement to funds for its LINC program and by extension, its expression. 85 I agree with the Minister that this is a positive rights claim for three reasons. 86 First, only the expression through the LINC program is engaged by the decision to cut funding. There is no link between the discontinuation of funding for LINC training and CAF continuing its advocacy surrounding the Israel-Palestine conflict. The funding provided by the contribu- Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn J. 205

tion agreement was intended only for expenses related to the LINC program, and for no other purpose. CAF was reimbursed only for eligible costs actually incurred in carrying out the services during the term of the contract - the funds were not provided to be used at CAF’s discretion. It is notable that CAF’s LINC contract was not terminated as a consequence of its speech, it was merely not extended. Further, CAF’s other contribution agreement for ISAP continued. In addition, the LINC program was run by CAF’s Settlement Services branch which is entirely separate from its advocacy branch. The two were essentially wholly independent, even operating out of entirely separate geographic locations. These factors demonstrate the separation between CAF’s LINC operation and its advocacy operation. 87 Second, the LINC program is a platform that the government created. Since access to the LINC program requires enablement by the government, this points to a positive rights claim. 88 Third, Baier makes clear that a claim does not become a negative rights claim simply because the applicant historically had access to the platform of expression prior to the legislation or decision to disentitle the applicant. In this case, CAF’s access to the LINC program for 12 years prior to the Minister’s decision does not automatically convert the claim into a negative one. The Court in Baier said that “to hold otherwise would mean that once a government had created a statutory platform, it could never change or repeal it without infringing s. 2(b) and justifying such changes under s. 1.” 89 Baier held that an applicant must establish the following factors to successfully claim a positive entitlement under s. 2(b) of the Charter: 1. The claim is grounded in a fundamental freedom of expression rather than in access to a particular statutory regime; 2. The claimant has demonstrated that exclusion from a statutory regime has the effect of a substantial interference with s. 2(b) freedom of expression, or has the purpose of infringing freedom of expression under s. 2(b); and 3. The government is responsible for the inability to exercise the fundamental freedom. 90 In Baier, legislation was passed that disqualified school employees from running for positions as school trustees of any school board unless they went on a leave of absence and resigned from their positions as teachers if elected. The Alberta Teachers Association alleged that this 206 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

was an infringement of the employees’ freedom of expression. It argued that the role of a school trustee was a unique platform for advocacy surrounding educational issues and therefore constituted a fundamental freedom. 91 The Court rejected this characterization saying that “claiming a unique role is not the same as claiming a fundamental freedom. The appellants’ claim, as they have articulated it, is grounded in access to the particular statutory regime of school trusteeship” (at para 44). Similarly, CAF’s access to LINC funding is a particular platform created by the government, not a fundamental freedom. 92 The Court in Baier also stated that even if eligibility for trusteeship was a fundamental freedom, removing eligibility was not a substantial interference with freedom of expression because even without the position, teachers could still engage in advocacy surrounding educational issues. This is analogous to CAF’s situation: even without access to the LINC program, CAF can still engage in, and has still engaged in, its advocacy surrounding the Israel-Palestine conflict. Discontinuing LINC funding has not created an “inability” to engage in expression or substan- tially interfered with CAF’s expression. 93 In summary, there is no positive entitlement to funding because the right to administer the LINC program is not grounded in a fundamental freedom. There is also no substantial interference with CAF’s advocacy efforts because CAF has continued to express its ideas surrounding the Israel-Palestine conflict despite not receiving funding for LINC training. 94 Having found that there is no breach of s. 2(b) of the Charter, it is unnecessary for me to conduct a section 1 analysis.

4. Was the Minister’s Decision Reasonable? 95 There is no jurisprudence on the applicable standard for reviewing a decision (Ministerial or not) to reject a funding request under the LINC program. After undertaking the analysis set out in Dunsmuir, I determine the applicable standard of review to be reasonableness. The factors to be considered are: (i) the existence of a privative clause, (ii) any special expertise of the decision- maker, and (iii) the nature of the question being decided. 96 First, there is no privative clause at play and thus there is no reason to extend to the Minister any added deference. Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn J. 207

97 Second, one could argue that the Minister has no particular expertise that is relevant to the determination of whether or not funding should be granted to CAF for administering the LINC program, and therefore little deference is required. However, the Minister is an elected official making a decision in the administration of the Act that involves broader policy considerations and therefore he should be granted deference by virtue of his position. This factor points to a reasonableness standard of review. 98 Third, the nature of the question being decided also points to reasonableness. In this case, this is a policy-driven commercial decision made with the intent of giving effect to the broad purposes of the Act. There is no question of law central to the importance of the legal system. There- fore, much deference is owed. 99 Accordingly, the applicable standard in this case is the reasonableness standard. The fact that this is a broad policy-based decision by an elected official warrants a high degree of deference for his decision. 100 The reasonableness standard of review requires only that the Min- ister’s decision fall within a range of reasonable outcomes to avoid being overturned. 101 In assessing whether the decision falls within that range, one must first correctly determine what is being assessed. The parties differ in their characterization of the Minister’s decision. CAF submits that the Min- ister’s decision is that CAF is anti-Semitic and supports terrorist organizations and it is that decision which is unreasonable. The Minister submits that he decided not to distribute finite resources to fund CAF because it is not an appropriate service provider organization as it appears to be engaged in extremism contrary to Canadian values, and that decision was reasonable. 102 In the March 18, 2009 letter, it is stated that the Minister decided not to renew CAF’s funding, because: Serious concerns have arisen with respect to certain public statements that have been made by yourself or other officials of the CAF. These statements have included the promotion of hatred, anti-semitism [sic] and support for the banned terrorist organizations Hamas and Hezbollah. The objectionable nature of these public statements — in that they appear to reflect the CAF’s evident support for terrorist organizations and positions on its part which are arguably anti-Semitic — raises serious questions about the integrity of your organization and has un- 208 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

dermined the Government’s confidence in the CAF as an appropriate partner for the delivery of settlement services to newcomers. [emphasis added] 103 Based on the express wording of the decision letter, I agree with the Minister’s characterization of the decision. The question that must be addressed is whether or not it was reasonable to not continue funding CAF’s LINC program because it is an organization that appears to be anti-Semitic and support terrorist organizations. I find that the Minister’s decision in this case falls within the range of reasonable outcomes. 104 CAF filed many affidavits from academic scholars, legal professors, Jewish advocacy groups, and people who have worked closely with CAF, stating that they have never witnessed anti-Semitism, promotion of hatred, or support for terrorism from CAF. While this evidence is compelling, it must be considered in light of the conflicting opinion and evidence in the record on the question of what constitutes anti-Semitism and evidence of how other Canadians have perceived CAF’s actions. The only thing that is clear from the record is that there is no consensus. 105 The Court is not required to resolve the question of what constitutes anti-Semitism because the Minister did not say that CAF is anti-Semitic, rather he said that public statements made “appear to reflect the CAF’s evident support for terrorist organizations and positions on its part which are arguably anti-Semitic.” The Minister does not have to prove that CAF is anti-Semitic, only that they could appear to be anti-Semitic. There is an abundance of evidence in the record to show that, although many do not consider CAF’s actions to be anti-Semitic, including people of Jewish ethnicity, there are many others that hold the opposite view, including a former CAF president. In this context, it is especially important to be deferential to the Minister’s decision. 106 With respect to the six specific matters relied on by the Minister, it is submitted by CAF that it did not authorize them, the persons involved were not officially representing CAF at the time, or the actions and content were not endorsed or approved of by CAF. In many cases, this de- fense ignores the maxim that “one is known by the company one keeps.” Quite simply, CAF cannot completely disassociate itself from the content of web links it includes in its materials, or from comments, distribution of materials, or attendances at meetings and conferences by its executive. 107 All of the statements and actions raised by the Minister can, in my view, reasonably lead one to the view that CAF appears to support organizations that Canada has declared to be terrorist organizations and Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn, J. 209

which are arguably anti-Semitic. Aside from the Minister himself reaching this view, the record is replete with news articles and statements of others to the same effect, all of which support that it was not unreasonable for the Minister to reach that conclusion. 108 The decision, for these reasons, falls within the scope of reasonableness, as described in Dunsmuir at para 47.

Costs 109 The Minister is entitled to his costs. If the parties cannot reach an agreement on quantum, they are to advise the Court within 30 days of this decision. The Minister shall provide his written submissions on costs, not exceeding ten (10) pages, within ten (10) days thereafter, and CAF shall have twenty (20) days from receipt of the Minister’s submissions to provide its written response.

Judgment THIS COURT ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that: 1. The application is dismissed; and 2. Costs are awarded to The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration.

Russel W. Zinn, J.:

1 Il s’agit d’une demande de contrôle judiciaire présentée par la Fédéra- tion canado-arabe (la CAF) a` l’encontre de la décision rendue par le ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l’Immigration d’alors, M. Jason Kenney (le ministre), de ne pas conclure d’accord de financement aux termes du programme Cours de langue pour les immigrants au Canada (le CLIC) pour l’année 2009-2010. Cette décision a et´´ e rendue par le ministre mal- gré le fait que Citoyenneté et Immigration Canada (CIC) avait aupara- vant conclu des accords de financement similaires avec la CAF pendant de nombreuses années; le plus récent de ces accords a expiré le 30 mars 2009, seulement quelques jours après que la décision faisant l’objet du présent contrôle a et´´ e rendue. 2 Les motifs sous-tendant la décision du ministre sont enonc´´ es dans une lettre, datée du 18 mars 2009, que le sous-ministre adjoint associé de CIC a adressée a` Khaled Mouammar, président de la CAF a` cette epoque:´ [TRADUCTION] 210 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

Comme vous le savez egalement,´ certaines déclarations que vous et d’autres dirigeants de la CAF avez faites publiquement ont soulevé de graves préoccupations. Ces déclarations comprenaient la fomentation de la haine et de l’antisémitisme ainsi que le soutien au Hamas et au Hezbollah, des organisations terroristes interdites. La nature désobligeante de ces déclarations publiques — en ce qu’elles semblent refléter le soutien evident´ accordé par la CAF a` des organisations terroristes et des positions qu’elle a prises qui sont probablement antisémites — soulève de sérieuses questions quant a` l’intégrité de votre organisme et a ebranl´´ e la confiance du gouvernement en la CAF en tant que partenaire convenable pour la prestation de services d’établissement aux immigrants.

Le contexte La nature de la CAF 3 Les objectifs de la CAF, tels qu’ils sont enonc´´ es dans ses lettres patentes, ont trait a` la promotion des intérêts des Arabes et des com- munautés arabes au Canada de diverses manières, notamment [TRA- DUCTION] « [d]e promouvoir les liens et la compréhension mutuelle entre les sociétés, les organisations ainsi que les communautés arabes au Canada et les pays arabes [...] de fournir de l’aide aux nouveaux immigrants au Canada provenant des pays arabes [...] [et] de diffuser des informations au sujet des causes arabes et d’encourager le soutien de ces causes au Canada et dans les pays arabes, en particulier la cause du peuple palestinien qui souffre ». 4 Les activités de la CAF etaient´ partagées entre deux directions: Ser- vices d’établissement et soutien aux immigrants; Action communautaire. La direction Services d’établissement et soutien aux immigrants se con- sacrait a` aider tant les immigrants arabes que ceux qui n’étaient pas arabes a` s’intégrer dans la collectivité. La direction Action communautaire etait´ vouée au renforcement des capacités, a` la défense collective des droits et aux services communautaires. 5 La CAF exécutait deux programmes principaux par l’entremise de sa direction des services d’établissement: le CLIC, qui fournissait des cours d’anglais, langue seconde, aux immigrants, et le programme Atelier de recherche d’emploi (l’ARE). La plupart des immigrants qui participaient a` ces programmes provenaient de pays non arabes. Le financement que la CAF recevait pour les deux programmes venait de CIC, par l’entremise d’arrangements dans le cadre d’ententes de contribution. Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn, J. 211

Les ententes de contribution de CIC 6 CIC a conclu des contrats avec la CAF et d’autres organismes a` titre de fournisseurs de services privés pour la fourniture de services d’établissements a` ceux qui immigrent au Canada. Les contrats prévoyaient l’allocation d’un financement au fournisseur de services pour des dépenses remboursables. Une dépense sans lien avec les programmes CLIC ou ARE ne pouvait etreˆ récupérée a` partir des fonds affectés dans l’entente de contribution. Comme l’a fait remarquer le ministre dans ses mémoires, une partie a` une entente de contribution ne retire pas d’avantage financier de l’entente; cependant, il peut y avoir des avantages indirects: [TRADUCTION] Les fonds fournis par le Canada par l’entremise de l’entente de contribution n’étaient aucunement destinés a` profiter a` la CAF. Un organisme peut retirer des avantages accessoires d’un financement relatif a` l’établissement; par exemple, il peut y avoir une légitimité liée aux organisations qui re¸coivent des fonds gouvernementaux, et il peut etreˆ possible de partager des coûts d’infrastructure dans le cadre du programme d’établissement. Le montant complet de l’entente de contribution, cependant, visait a` profiter directement aux immigrants suivant les cours du CLIC. 7 Cela s’applique egalement´ a` la présente demande, et la position du ministre est que le programme CLIC offre aux immigrants plus qu’une simple formation linguistique. Le ministre souligne qu’il est prévu que le programme fournisse egalement´ aux immigrants une initiation au mode de vie canadien, notamment a` [TRADUCTION] « l’intégration sociale, economique,´ culturelle et politique », de sorte que le caractère approprié du fournisseur de programme a` cet egard´ est crucial. La trousse de demande que CIC donne aux fournisseurs de services fait etat´ de cette facette du programme: [TRADUCTION] En offrant une formation linguistique de base, en anglais ou en fran- cais,¸ aux immigrants adultes, le CLIC facilite l’intégration sociale, culturelle, politique et economique´ des immigrants et des réfugiés qui arrivent au Canada. En outre, les cours du CLIC comprennent des informations qui aident les immigrants a` comprendre le mode de vie canadien et, ainsi, a` devenir au plus tôt des membres actifs de la so- ciété canadienne. 8 La CAF avait récemment négocié une entente de contribution et signé un contrat avec CIC pour la période du 1er avril 2007 au 31 mars 2009. 212 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

Le 2 décembre 2008, CIC a ecrit´ a` toutes les parties, une fois le financement relatif au CLIC re¸cu a` ce moment-là, pour les informer qu’il y aurait un nouveau programme d’établissement, mais que sa mise en œuvre n’était pas encore terminée. Par conséquent, [TRADUCTION] « CIC [avait] décidé de prolonger les ententes de contribution actuelles relatives au CLIC jusqu’au 31 mars 2010 ». On a demandé a` chaque fournisseur de services de présenter a` CIC une demande d’autorisation budgétaire et de lui proposer des modifications aux activités, la demande d’autorisation budgétaire etant´ assujettie a` un processus d’approbation. 9 Dans les renseignements accompagnant cet appel de demandes de modification, CIC a averti la CAF et d’autres demandeurs de ne pas tenir pour acquise l’approbation pour l’année 2009-2010, tant et aussi longtemps qu’une telle approbation ecrite´ de CIC n’aura pas et´´ e re¸cue: [TRADUCTION] Ne tenez pas pour acquis que votre demande de modification est ap- prouvée, tant que vous n’aurez pas re¸cu d’avis ecrit´ de CIC. Vous devrez assumer toutes les dépenses engagées avant la date approuvée de mise en place, lesquelles ne seront pas remboursées. Nous vous demandons egalement´ de ne pas embaucher d’employés ou de faire quelque engagement que ce soit, tant que vous n’aurez pas et´´ e avisé de l’approbation de CIC. Si votre demande est approuvée, elle servira alors de modification a` l’entente de contribution, en vigueur actuelle- ment, qui a et´´ e conclue entre votre organisme et Citoyenneté et Im- migration Canada. 10 Le 9 décembre 2008, la CAF a présenté une proposition pour 2009- 2010. Le 12 février 2009, un agent d’établissement de CIC en a recom- mandé l’approbation. Dans sa recommandation, il a fait remarquer que [TRADUCTION] « [l]a Fédération canado-arabe exécute un programme CLIC de bonne qualité » et que, malgré une demande d’augmentation des salaires de 2,5 p. 100, la proposition pour 2009-2010 etait´ inférieure de 50 000 $ a` l’année précédente. L’agent d’établissement a expédié a` la CAF, par courriel, une version définitive, non signée, de la nouvelle entente; cependant, etant´ donné la valeur du contrat proposé, il etait´ néces- saire d’obtenir l’approbation finale du ministre ou de son délégué. 11 Rien dans le dossier ne démontre que CIC ait jamais déclaré qu’il y avait eu une approbation finale, et la CAF n’a jamais soutenu que c’était le cas. En fait, bien que les négociations contractuelles aient et´´ e menées a` terme et que la proposition ait bénéficié de l’appui d’un agent d’établissement, celle-ci devait tout de même etreˆ approuvée par un agent de révision, le gestionnaire local ainsi que le directeur régional Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn, J. 213

avant que l’administration centrale de CIC et le bureau du ministre n’en soit avisés. Si le directeur régional appuyait la proposition, il avait le pouvoir d’approuver et de signer l’entente a` cette etape;´ toutefois, la proposition de la CAF ne s’est jamais rendue a` cette etape´ du processus. La proposition de la CAF avait et´´ e approuvée par un agent d’établissement le 12 février 2009 et un agent de révision le 16 février 2009, mais, avant qu’elle soit transmise a` un gestionnaire local, l’administration centrale de CIC est intervenue et a soulevé des préoccupations quant a` l’opportunité de continuer a` financer la CAF.

Les faits qui ont précédé la nomination de monsieur Kenney a` titre de ministre de CIC 12 M. Jason Kenney est devenu ministre de CIC, responsable de la Loi sur l’Immigration et la protection des réfugiés, LC 2001, c 27 (la Loi), le 30 octobre 2008. Il succédait a` Mme Diane Finley. Le 7 août 2008, la ministre Finley a publié un communiqué de presse, dans lequel elle déclarait qu’« [a]fin d’aider les nouveaux arrivants a` s’établir dans la col- lectivité torontoise de Scarborough, le gouvernement s’engage a` verser plus de 10 millions de dollars au cours des deux prochaines années (soit jusqu’en 2010) a` six organismes offrant des services d’établissement ». Le communiqué de presse enum´´ erait ensuite les « six organismes qui se partager[aient] les fonds annoncés [ce jour-là] ». La CAF faisait partie de ces organismes, et le chiffre adjacent a` son nom etait´ 2 544 815 $. 13 Mohamed Boudjenane, directeur administratif national de la CAF, déclare dans son affidavit que cette annonce a amené la CAF a` croire qu’elle obtiendrait du financement pour 2009-2010 et que la finalisation des détails ne serait qu’une simple formalité: [TRADUCTION] A` l’origine le financement devait se poursuivre pendant deux ans, mais, au cours de la deuxième année, en 2008, il y a eu une annonce que cela se prolongerait pour une troisième année jusqu’en 2010. La ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l’Immigration, Diane Finley, l’a an- noncé publiquement le 7 août 2008... C’est certainement le fondement sur lequel la CAF exer¸cait ses activités. Sara Amash, la gestionnaire de projet et de programme pour la CAF, et moi avions tous les deux et´´ e amenés a` croire que le financement pour 2009-2010 con- tinuerait selon ce qui avait et´´ e approuvé antérieurement et que la finalisation des détails du contrat pour cette année-là n’était plus qu’une simple formalité. 214 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

14 En revanche, Lee Bartlett, le directeur des opérations des Services d’établissement pour les bureaux de Toronto et de York de CIC, déclare dans son affidavit, souscrit le 22 septembre 2009, que la ventilation du chiffre de 2 544 815 $ dans le communiqué de presse de la ministre est composée du financement octroyé a` la CAF pour deux programmes, soit le CLIC et le Programme d’établissement et d’adaptation des immigrants (le PEAI), selon le tableau qui suit, et que cela n’a rien a` voir avec le financement relatif au CLIC pour 2009-2010: FY1 07/08 FY2 08/09 FY3 09/10 TOTAL CLIC 1 045 782 $ 1 037 505 $ S/O 2 083 287 $ PEAI 130 804 $ 166 581 $ 164 179 $ 461 564 $ 15 Dans le tableau de M. Bartlett, le financement totalise 2 544 851 $ — soit 46 $ de plus que le financement annoncé par la ministre pour la CAF. Néanmoins, je conclus que le communiqué de presse n’aurait pas pu amener la CAF a` croire qu’elle avait obtenu le financement relatif au CLIC pour 2009-2010, comme l’a allégué M. Boudjenane. Le financement pour 2009-2010 dont il etait´ question dans le communiqué de presse concernait le financement relatif au PEAI. M. Bartlett a et´´ e contre-interrogé sur son affidavit et son témoignage etait´ solide lorsqu’il déclarait que le chiffre ne comprenait pas le financement relatif au CLIC pour 2009-2010, parce qu’aucune décision n’avait et´´ e prise quant a` la prolongation des ententes précédentes relatives au CLIC et qu’aucune annonce de ce genre n’avait non plus et´´ e faite au moment du communi- qué de presse: [TRADUCTION] En août 2008, il n’y a même pas eu de négociations ou d’appel de propositions quant a` une prolongation et aucune décision n’a même et´´ e prise ou annoncée quant a` la manière dont nous prolongerions le CLIC pour 2009-2010, et l’entente relative au CLIC qui etait´ en vigueur en août pour la CAF couvrait les années 2007-2008 et 2008- 2009, alors que l’entente relative au PEAI pour la CAF couvrait les années 2007-2008 a` 2009-2010, inclusivement. [...] [L]a ministre n’aurait pas fait pas une annonce selon laquelle des ententes ont et´´ e conclues quant au financement, tant qu’une telle entente n’aurait pas et´´ e pas en place. [...] [L]a ministre n’aurait pas pu avoir fait une annonce concernant le CLIC, pour l’année 2009-2010, pour la CAF si nous n’avions même pas — ou CIC, désolé, n’avait même pas, a` ce moment-là, etabli´ le processus pour conclure d’autres Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn, J. 215

ententes et, egalement,´ n’avait pas re¸cu de proposition de la CAF a` cette etape,´ relativement aux montants qu’elle solliciterait pour de nouvelles ententes quant au CLIC en 2009-2010.

La position du ministre quant au financement public 16 Alykhan Velshi, le directeur des communications du ministre, déclare dans son affidavit que, depuis qu’il a commencé a` travailler pour le ministre en 2007 (celui-ci etait´ a` ce moment-là le secrétaire d’Etat´ au Multiculturalisme), le ministre etait´ d’opinion que la Couronne ne devrait pas financer certains organismes: [TRADUCTION] [A]lors que les citoyens et les organismes privés sont libres d’exprimer leurs opinions, aucun particulier ni organisme n’a droit a` une aide financière des contribuables. Par conséquent, les groupes faisant la fomentation de la haine, dont l’antisémitisme, ou qui excusent le terrorisme et la violence, ne devraient pas bénéficier que quelque reconnaissance officielle ou subvention que ce soit de la part de l’Etat.´ 17 M. Velshi souligne un certain nombre de déclarations publiques que le ministre a faites et qui appuient cette affirmation. Par exemple, le 17 février 2009, lors d’une conférence tenue a` Londres, en Angleterre, le ministre a prononcé un discours, dans lequel il a fait la déclaration suivante: [TRADUCTION] Il y a des organismes au Canada, tout comme en Grande-Bretagne, qui ont leur part de l’attention médiatique et de notoriété publique, mais qui, tout en exprimant des sentiments haineux, s’attendent a` etreˆ traités comme des interlocuteurs respectables dans les débats publics. [...] Je pense egalement´ au leader de la Fédération canado-arabe, qui a notoirement fait circulé un courriel lorsque mon collègue, le porte- parole de l’opposition en matière d’affaires etrang`´ eres, Bob Rae, se présentait a` la course au leadership de son parti, lequel courriel appe- lait les gens a` voter contre M. Rae en raison de l’engagement d’Arlene Perly Rae au sein de la communauté juive du Canada. La même personne, le même organisme, la Fédération canado-arabe a, la semaine dernière, fait circuler — notamment parmi l’ensemble des parlementaires — des vidéos comprenant de la propagande, dont l’inculcation de la haine, sur des enfants par des organismes tels le Hamas et le Jihad islamique. 216 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

Ces organismes et d’autres sont libres, dans les limites de notre droit et conformément a` nos traditions relatives a` la liberté d’expression, de faire connaˆıtre leur opinion, mais ils ne devraient pas s’attendre a` recevoir des ressources de l’Etat,´ du soutien des contribuables ou toute autre forme de respect officiel de la part du gouvernement ou des organes de notre Etat.´ [Non souligné dans l’original.] 18 Une semaine plus tard, le 24 février 2009, au cours de la période des questions, on a questionné le ministre au sujet du financement de certains organismes. Le député posant la question a déclaré que « [...] récemment, la Fédération canado-arabe a fait circuler des vidéos d’organisations terroristes interdites telles que le Hamas et le Jihad islamique, a traité Israël d’ “Etat´ raciste” et a attaqué la femme d’un député parce qu’elle est active dans la communauté juive ». Il a ensuite demandé ceci: « Quelle est la position du gouvernement sur l’octroi a` ces groupes de subventions? » Le ministre a répondu: « [L]e gouvernement du Canada devrait adopter une politique de tolérance zéro a` l’égard des groupes qui excusent le terrorisme, la violence, la haine et l’antisémitisme. [...] Nous pensons que ces groupes ne doivent recevoir aucun soutien financier des contribuables pour nourrir l’extrémisme. » Le ministre a exprimé des sentiments semblables lors d’entrevues radiophoniques qu’il a accordées les 2 et 6 mars 2009. 19 Le 10 mars 2009, devant le Comité permanent de la citoyenneté et de l’immigration, le ministre a exposé ses motifs pour refuser de prolonger le financement de la CAF pour 2009-2010: [...] Le premier jour de mon arrivée a` Patrimoine canadien comme secrétaire d’Etat´ responsable du programme de multiculturalisme, j’ai eu un breffage sur les subventions et contributions. J’ai dit aux fonctionnaires que je voulais etreˆ sûr que nous ne versions pas des subventions et contributions a` des organisations qui excusent ou font l’apologie de la violence ou du terrorisme, a` des organisations qui sont terroristes ou répandent la haine. J’ai mentionné, en particulier, M. Mohamed Elmasry, du Canadian Islamic Congress, parce qu’il a déclaré que les Israéliens de plus de 18 ans sont des cibles légitimes a` eliminer.´ J’ai mentionné ensuite, en particulier, M. Khaled Mouammar, prési- dent de la Fédération canado-arabe — c’est une discussion que j’ai eue avec mes fonctionnaires en janvier 2007 — parce qu’il a fait circuler, lors du congrès a` la direction du Parti libéral de 2006, un tract attaquant Bob Rae, un membre respecté de ce Parlement, a` cause du rôle de sa femme dans la communauté juive. Suite a` la distribution de Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn, J. 217

ce tract, le sénateur libéral Yoine Goldstein a qualifié ce texte de « saleté raciste ». J’estimais alors, et je n’ai pas changé d’avis depuis, que nous ne devons pas financer des organisations qui promeuvent l’extrémisme ou la haine — en l’occurrence, la haine des Juifs en particulier — ou qui soutiennent publiquement une organisation ter- roriste interdite, illégale. M. Mouammar a multiplié en public les expressions de soutien au Hamas et au Hezbollah, deux organisations terroristes essentiellement antisémites qui sont interdites et illégales. Il a qualifié Israël d’Etat´ raciste et a appelé a` la destruction d’Israël comme Etat´ juif. A` mon sens, ces propos et d’autres dépassent les bornes. Est-ce que je préconise de rendre l’octroi de subventions et de contributions a` des ONG conditionnelles aux opinions politiques de leurs dirigeants? Non, absolument pas. Chacun est libre de dire ce qu’il veut dans les limites de nos lois. Les gens sont libres de critiquer des ministres ou le gouvernement. Mais je ne pense pas que nous ayons une obligation de verser des subventions a` des individus qui utilisent leurs organisations comme plates-formes pour promouvoir l’extrémisme ou la haine ou faire l’apologie du terrorisme. C’est le point de vue que j’ai enonc´´ e en janvier 2007 a` Patrimoine Canada. De ce fait, nous n’avons accordé aucun financement a` ces organisations. C’est aussi le point de vue que j’ai exprimé récemment a` la conférence de Londres sur l’antisémitisme. Je l’ai fait savoir aussi a` mes fonctionnaires. J’ai demandé a` mon ministère de trouver des fa¸cons d’englober la promotion de la haine ou l’apologie du terrorisme dans les critères selon lesquels sont evalu´´ es les demandeurs de subventions ou contributions.

L’opinion du ministre sur la CAF 20 Le ministre connaissait manifestement la CAF avant d’être nommé ministre de CIC; toutefois, il n’a et´´ e informé du fait que CIC finan¸cait la CAF que le 2 février 2009. Dès qu’on l’a mis au courant, le ministre a envoyé un courriel a` son chef de cabinet, lui exprimant ainsi sa position concernant la CAF et l’accord de financement: [TRADUCTION] [...] Je ne suis pas certain quant a` savoir qui, dans notre bureau, pilote le dossier sur le financement relatif a` l’établissement. De toute fa¸con, veuillez demander au ministère de nous fournir les renseignements complets sur la contribution qui a et´´ e honteusement approuvée par notre gouvernement pour la Fédération canado-arabe radicale et antisémite. 218 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

Il s’agit du groupe dont le président a attaqué Bob Rae du fait que sa femme etait´ juive, et qui, maintenant, me traite de [TRADUCTION] « prostitué professionnel ». (Je pense que c’est mieux que d’être un amateur!) J’aimerais connaˆıtre le statut de leur entente de contribution avec CIC pour voir s’ils sont en défaut a` quelque egard´ que ce soit. Je veux que l’on prenne tous les moyens légaux pour mettre fin a` cette entente de financement honteuse et pour s’assurer qu’elle ne sera pas renouvelée. [Renvois dans Internet omis.] 21 La décision faisant l’objet du contrôle ne fait pas etat´ de la conduite ou des faits que le ministre a pris en compte pour prendre sa décision de ne pas financer la CAF. Dans son témoignage, Alykhan Velshi, le directeur des communications du ministre, a affirmé que les déclarations sous-tendant la conclusion selon laquelle les déclarations de la CAF [TRADUCTION] « comprenaient la fomentation de la haine et de l’antisémitisme ainsi que le soutien au Hamas et au Hezbollah, des organisations terroristes interdites », incluaient les six sujets qui suivent.

1. La circulaire relative a` Bob Rae 22 En 2006, au cours du congrès a` la direction du Parti libéral, le prési- dent de la CAF, Khaled Mouammar, en utilisant son compte de courriel personnel, a fait suivre un tract qui attaquait Bob Rae et son epouse´ pour une question d’engagement au sein de la communauté juive. La circulaire avait et´´ e, a` l’origine, produite et envoyée par courriel par un homme lié a` la CAF. La circulaire contient le texte suivant au-dessus d’une photo de Bob Rae: [TRADUCTION] Bob Rae etait´ un orateur principal pour le [Jewish National Fund of Canada], un groupe qui, selon les universitaires israéliens, est com- plice de crimes de guerre et de nettoyage ethnique. L’épouse de M. Rae est une vice-présidente du [Congrès juif canadien], un groupe de pression qui soutient le régime d’apartheid d’Israël et son mur d’apartheid illégal. Le président Carter a condamné l’apartheid israélien. Bob Rae appuie l’apartheid israélien. N’élisez pas un chef qui soutient l’apartheid! 23 La Presse canadienne a fait etat´ de la distribution aux délégués de la circulaire relative a` Bob Rae: [TRADUCTION] « Bob Rae a et´´ e la cible Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn, J. 219

d’attaques antisémites au cours de la course a` la direction du Parti libéral, entre autres parce que son epouse´ est juive. » Lorsque la Presse canadienne a communiqué avec elle, la CAF a nié avoir produit et dis- tribué la circulaire, mais elle a ensuite publié un communiqué de presse qui affirmait ceci: [TRADUCTION] « La CAF croit que les Canadiens ont le droit de connaˆıtre les renseignements factuels fournis » dans la circulaire. 24 Dans son témoignage, M. Velshi a déclaré que la circulaire relative a` Bob Rae faisait partie du fondement de la décision du ministre, puisqu’elle attaquait M. Rae en raison de l’engagement de son epouse´ dans la communauté juive, en particulier au sein du Congrès juif canadien. Selon M. Velshi, la circulaire relative a` Bob Rae etait´ an- tisémite et représentait, par conséquent, une forme de haine.

2. Les rassemblements de janvier 2009 25 En janvier 2009, la CAF, conjointement avec d’autres organismes, a organisé plusieurs rassemblements au cours desquels quelques manifes- tants (qui n’étaient pas liés a` la CAF) tenaient des pancartes insultantes et criaient des slogans répugnants. Quelques participants ont et´´ e vus tenant des ecriteaux´ qui assimilaient les Israéliens aux nazis, certains criant des vulgarités comme ceci: [TRADUCTION] « Enfant juif, tu vas mourir en sacrament. Le Hamas vient te chercher. Va te faire foutre. » Des drapeaux du Hezbollah flottaient en arrière-plan et des ecriteaux´ com- paraient le sionisme au nazisme et au terrorisme. 26 C’est au cours d’un de ces rassemblements que M. Mouammar a décrit le ministre, entre autres, comme une pute de guerre profession- nelle: [TRADUCTION] Nous avons des politiciens qui sont des putes professionnelles qui appuient la guerre [c.-à-d. le conflit israélo-palestinien], comme l’a affirmé Norman Finkelstein lors de cette conférence a` l’Université de Toronto. Il y a, il y a des gens comme Peter Kent de l’autre côté de la rue, comme Jason Kenney, comme Michael Ignatieff, qui n’avaient rien d’autre a` dire, alors qu’Israël assassinait des femmes et des enfants avec des bombes au phosphore brûlant leur chair, la seule chose que ces, ces politiciens professionnels, qui sont des putes, des putes de guerre, la seule chose qu’ils avaient a` dire, c’était qu’Israël avait le droit de se défendre en tuant des femmes et des enfants avec des bombes a` phosphore. 220 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

Le ministre nie que cette injure désobligeante ait provoqué sa décision ou qu’elle y ait joué un rôle. Etant´ donné qu’il avait fait des déclarations concernant le financement accordé a` la CAF par le gouvernement dès 2007, rien ne permet de remettre en question son affirmation.

3. La conférence du Caire de 2007 27 Ali Mullah, vice-président de la CAF a` cette epoque,´ a assisté a` la conférence du Caire, qui se décrivait elle-même comme une [TRADUC- TION] « conférence de paix internationale ». Y etaient´ présentes de nombreuses personnes d’origines diverses, dont quelques participants juifs. A` cette conférence, il y avait aussi des délégués du Hamas, du Hezbollah, de la Jemaah Islamiyya et du Front de libération de la Palestine — quatre organisations se trouvant sur la liste canadienne des organisations terroristes. Bien qu’on ait rapporté que la CAF avait envoyé M. Mullah en tant que délégué, il fut ensuite confirmé qu’il y assistait a` titre personnel, et non comme représentant de la CAF.

4. La distribution de liens provenant d’organisations terroristes 28 Le 2 février 2009, le ministre a appris que la CAF, dans son Daily Gaza Bulletin et sa page Web, avait des liens vers des sites Web qui affichaient des vidéos contenant des images d’agents du Hamas en en- traˆınement et représentant des drapeaux du Hamas et du Jihad islamique. La CAF affirme qu’elle n’a jamais approuvé le contenu des vidéos dans les liens qu’elle affichait et transmettait; elle attirait plutôt l’attention des lecteurs sur les faits afin qu’ils puissent former leur propre opinion les questions en cause.

5. Les honneurs faits a` Zafar Bangash 29 La CAF, lors du gala célébrant son 40e anniversaire, a fait honneur a` Zafar Bangash, qui, par ailleurs, n’est pas lié a` la CAF. M. Bangash, dans le passé, a fait référence aux Canadiens en disant qu’ils etaient´ [TRA- DUCTION] « infidèles ou non croyants » et a parlé des attaques du 11 septembre d’une fa¸con qui ne montrait pas de compassion pour les victimes.

6. Le concours de rédaction 30 La CAF a parrainé un concours de rédaction (avec deux autres organismes) sur le [TRADUCTION] « nettoyage ethnique » de la Palestine. Le moment choisi pour ce concours co¨ıncidait avec le 60e anniversaire de Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn, J. 221

l’établissement d’Israël en tant qu’Etat.´ Le ministre prétend que l’utilisation du terme [TRADUCTION] « nettoyage ethnique » suppose que le peuple juif se livre au génocide et que cela constitue de l’antisémitisme. 31 Ensemble, ces six incidents formaient le fondement de la décision du ministre.

Les demandes de la CAF visant a` rencontrer le ministre 32 Le 2 mars 2009, le président de la CAF a ecrit´ au ministre pour lui demander une rencontre: [TRADUCTION] Il importe que le lien de collaboration que la CAF a avec vous et le ministère de l’Immigration soit fondé sur le respect mutuel et une action proactive des deux côtés au profit de l’ensemble des com- munautés canado-arabes. La CAF sollicite donc une rencontre avec vous en présence d’autres Canado-arabes intéressés. Cette rencontre serait une belle occasion d’améliorer et de consolider notre lien de collaboration.

Le ministre n’a pas répondu. 33 La lettre ne précise pas pourquoi elle a et´´ e envoyée a` ce moment-là; toutefois, il convient de noter qu’elle a et´´ e envoyée deux semaines après le discours du ministre a` Londres ou il a déclaré, en parlant de la CAF et d’autres organismes, que, bien qu’ils aient le droit a` la liberté d’expression dans les limites du droit, [TRADUCTION] « ils ne devraient pas s’attendre a` recevoir des ressources de l’Etat,´ du soutien des contribuables ou toute autre forme de respect officiel de la part du gouvernement ou des organes de notre Etat´ ». 34 Voilà la toile de fond où se situent les questions qui suivent.

Les questions en litige 35 Les six questions soulevées par la CAF dans son mémoire ecrit´ peuvent etreˆ ramenées a` une analyse qui traitera des quatre questions suivantes: a. Le ministre avait-il, a` l’égard de la CAF, une obligation d’équité procédurale et, le cas ech´´ eant, a-t-il manqué a` cette obligation? b. La décision du ministre de ne pas conclure d’accord de financement avec la CAF aux termes du programme CLIC est-elle en- tachée d’une crainte raisonnable de partialité? 222 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

c. Le droit a` la liberté d’expression garanti a` la CAF par le paragraphe 2b) de la Charte entrait-il en jeu; le cas ech´´ eant, a-t-on violé ce droit, et la violation se justifiait-elle? d. La décision du ministre etait-elle´ raisonnable?

1. Le ministre avait-il, a` l’égard de la CAF, une obligation d’équité procédurale? 36 La CAF soutient que le ministre avait une obligation d’équité a` son egard,´ car: 1. une obligation d’équité est imposée a` tout organisme public qui rend des décisions administratives qui ne sont pas de nature légis- lative et qui touchent les droits, privilèges ou biens d’une personne: Cardinal c Directeur de l’Etablissement´ Kent, [1985] 2 RCS 643, a` la page 653 (Cardinal); 2. la CAF recevait du financement du programme CLIC sans aucun problème depuis douze ans consécutifs; 3. la CAF avait une attente légitime que le financement soit re- nouvelé, en raison de ses antécédents auprès de CIC et parce que le contrat pour 2009-2010 avait et´´ e négocié et qu’on attendait l’approbation finale; 4. l’approbation finale avait traditionnellement et´´ e une formalité par suite de la négociation des modalités du contrat, et le ministre est rarement intervenu a` quelque etape´ que ce soit. 37 Le ministre soutient qu’il n’a aucune obligation d’équité envers la CAF, car: 1. la relation entre la CAF et CIC etait´ de nature purement contractuelle et le gouvernement n’a aucune obligation d’équité lorsqu’il exerce ses droits contractuels de la même fa¸con qu’un citoyen ordinaire: Dunsmuir c Nouveau-Brunswick, 2008 CSC 9, [2008] 1 RCS 190, aux paragraphes 103 et 104 (Dunsmuir); 2. la période de financement aux termes du dernier accord signé entre CIC et la CAF pour la fourniture de services relatifs au CLIC a expiré le 31 mars 2009, aucun nouvel accord n’a et´´ e signé et la CAF a et´´ e expressément avisée qu’il ne fallait pas tenir l’approbation pour acquise; Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn, J. 223

3. Rien n’oblige CIC a` conclure un nouvel accord avec quelque partie que ce soit, ou a` renouveler un accord existant qui expire, simplement parce qu’il s’agit d’une institution gouvernementale. 38 Ce qui suit constitue les motifs de ma conclusion selon laquelle le ministre n’a aucune obligation d’équité procédurale a` l’égard de la CAF. En résumé, c’est parce que la nature de la relation etait´ strictement commerciale. Rien dans la loi ne prévoit l’imposition d’obligations relatives a` l’équité procédurale en ce qui concerne les ententes de contribution, et il n’y a pas non plus de stipulation contractuelle enonc´´ ee dans l’appel de propositions ou dans les ententes de contribution mêmes qui prescrit que les organismes fournisseurs de services soient traités dans le respect de l’équité procédurale. Enfin, le fait d’accorder des droits procéduraux dans ce qui est, pour l’essentiel, qu’un contexte strictement commercial occasionnerait un fardeau excessif pour le ministre, en particulier lorsque la fenêtre pour rendre une décision est etroite´ et qu’il y a de plus grandes considérations en matière de politique publique que le ministre doit soupeser. Dans un tel contexte, les droits des parties sont mieux protégés par l’appréciation d’une cour de révision quant au caractère raisonnable de la décision, et non par le développement de droits procéduraux lorsqu’il n’y en a aucun qui existe par ailleurs. 39 Pour déterminer s’il y a lieu d’appliquer une obligation procédurale a` la décision faisant l’objet du contrôle, il faut d’abord etablir´ quelle est la nature de la relation entre la personne touchée et l’organisme public. 40 Dans l’arrêt Knight c Indian Head School Division No. 19, [1990] 1 RCS 653, a` la page 669, la Cour suprême du Canada, s’appuyant sur les motifs du juge LeDain dans l’arrêt Cardinal, a` la page 653, a déclaré que la question de savoir si une obligation d’agir equitablement´ existe dépen- dra « de l’examen de trois facteurs: (i) la nature de la décision qui doit etreˆ rendue par l’organisme administratif en question, (ii) la relation existant entre cet organisme et le particulier, et (iii) l’effet de cette décision sur les droits du particulier ». 41 Dans l’arrêt Dunsmuir, au paragraphe 114, la Cour suprême a pris acte d’une exception a` cet enonc´´ e de principe général (l’exception de l’arrêt Dunsmuir). L’arrêt Dunsmuir concernait le congédiement d’un employé provincial: Les principes formulés dans l’arrêt Knight relativement a` l’obligation générale d’équité a` laquelle est tenu l’organisme public dont la déci- sion touche les droits, les privilèges ou les biens d’une personne demeurent valables et importants. Toutefois, dans la mesure où les 224 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

juges majoritaires n’ont pas tenu compte de l’effet déterminant d’un contrat d’emploi, l’arrêt ne devrait pas etreˆ suivi. L’employé qu’un contrat protège contre le congédiement injuste devait pouvoir exercer un recours en droit privé, et non en droit public. [Non souligné dans l’original.] 42 La CAF soutient que l’exception de l’arrêt Dunsmuir ne s’applique pas a` la relation entre la CAF et CIC. La CAF s’appuie sur l’arrêt rendu par la Cour suprême du Canada dans l’affaire Canada (Procureur gén- eral)´ c Mavi, 2011 CSC 30, [2011] 2 RCS 504 (Mavi), pour affirmer que l’exception de l’arrêt Dunsmuir a` l’obligation d’équité etait´ censée etreˆ etroite´ et spécifique a` un contexte d’emploi et que, par conséquent, elle ne s’applique pas en l’espèce. Plus particulièrement, dans l’arrêt Mavi, la Cour suprême a jugé, au paragraphe 51, que: Il n’y a pas la moindre ressemblance entre la situation en l’espèce et l’exception de portée passablement etroite´ qui, dans l’arrêt Dun- smuir, soustrait le contrat d’emploi a` l’application de l’équité procédurale. Les juges majoritaires soulignent eux-mêmes dans cet arrêt: Cette conclusion n’affaiblit pas l’obligation générale faite aux décideurs administratifs d’agir avec equit´´ e. Elle reconnaˆıt plutôt que dans le contexte particulier du renvoi de la fonction publique, c’est le droit contractuel, et non le droit public, qui préside au règlement des différends. [Je souligne; par. 82.] Dans Dunsmuir, la Cour n’entend pas réduire par ailleurs l’obligation d’équité procédurale dans l’exercice du pouvoir de l’administration, et elle ne le fait pas. [Souligné dans l’original.] 43 A` mon avis, l’exception de l’arrêt Dunsmuir n’est pas aussi etroite´ que le soutient la CAF. Je m’appuie en cela sur l’arrêt rendu par la Cour d’appel fédérale dans l’affaire Irving Shipbuilding Inc c Canada (Procureur général), 2009 CAF 116, [2010] 2 RCF 488 (Irving Ship- building), dans lequel, au paragraphe 60, le juge Evans a déclaré au nom de la Cour, en faisant référence a` l’arrêt Dunsmuir, que le raisonnement général formulé dans cette affaire « tient a` ce que lorsque la Couronne conclut un contrat, ses droits et obligations, ainsi que les recours dont elle dispose, doivent généralement etreˆ déterminés par le droit des contrats ». Je souscris egalement´ a` l’énoncé fait par le juge Evans, au paragraphe 45, selon lequel « [l]’obligation d’équité en common law Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn, J. 225

n’est pas autonome, mais elle est imposée selon la situation particulière dans laquelle la décision administrative contestée a et´´ e prise ». 44 Dans l’arrêt Mavi, contrairement a` l’arrêt Irving Shipbuilding, bien que la relation des parties etait´ régie par un contrat, elle etait´ aussi inex- tricablement fondée sur la loi, comme la Cour suprême l’a fait remarquer au paragraphe 2: Les instances a` l’origine du pourvoi ont et´´ e engagées par huit ré- pondants qui niaient toute responsabilité résultant de leurs engagements. Comme je l’explique ci-après, l’engagement constitue un contrat valide, mais, par ailleurs, des dispositions législatives fédérales déterminent sa forme, le régissent et le complètent. La dette qui en résulte n’est pas seulement contractuelle, mais aussi légale, de sorte que son recouvrement n’est pas uniquement assujetti au droit contractuel privé. Dans la présente affaire, la Cour doit décider si, lorsqu’il entreprend de recouvrer une telle créance légale, l’Etat´ doit respecter l’équité procédurale et, dans l’affirmative, dans quelle mesure il y est tenu. [Non souligné dans l’original.] A` mon avis, le fait que les contrats etaient´ fondés sur la loi distingue l’arrêt Mavi de l’arrêt Irving Shipbuilding et de la présente espèce. Les engagements dont il etait´ question dans l’arrêt Mavi n’étaient pas d’une nature strictement contractuelle. En fait, dans l’arrêt Mavi, la Cour su- prême a fait la distinction d’avec l’arrêt Dunsmuir sur ce fondement, en déclarant, au paragraphe 47: Les procureurs généraux invoquent la nature essentiellement contractuelle des réclamations pour contester l’existence d’une obligation d’équité procédurale envers les répondants. Ils avancent que l’arrêt Dunsmuir ecarte´ l’équité procédurale lorsqu’un contrat s’applique. Or, en l’espèce, le droit d’action de l’administration est essentiellement d’origine législative, ce qui n’était pas le cas dans l’affaire Dunsmuir. [Non souligné dans l’original.] 45 Contrairement a` l’affaire Mavi, on ne peut pas, en l’espèce, affirmer que, en ce qui concerne la relation des parties, « des dispositions législa- tives fédérales déterminent sa forme, l[a] régissent et l[a] complètent », ou que la cause d’action est essentiellement légale. Le manuel relatif a` l’établissement — un guide fourni aux agents d’établissement pour l’appréciation des demandes de financement —enonce ´ que [TRADUC- TION] « [e]n créant le ministère de la Citoyenneté et de l’Immigration en 1950, le gouvernement fédéral a fait des provisions dans ses prévisions 226 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

budgétaires annuelles pour des versements a` des organismes sans but lucratif, dans le but de fournir des services d’établissement a` ceux qui immigrent au Canada ». Ces programmes d’établissement sont visés par les objets enonc´´ es a` l’article 3 de la Loi, plus particulièrement celui « de promouvoir l’intégration des résidents permanents au Canada ». Les parties n’ont souligné aucune autre disposition législative applicable au financement relatif au CLIC. Pa conséquent, il n’existe aucune disposition régissant l’équité procédurale concernant la possible prolongation de la durée d’une entente de contribution existante. 46 En l’espèce, au moment où le ministre a rendu sa décision, la relation des parties etait´ purement contractuelle. La CAF etait´ partie a` un contrat de financement relatif au CLIC avec CIC, contrat se terminant le 31 mars 2009. Aucune stipulation dans ce contrat ne prévoyait le renouvellement automatique ou le prolongation de la durée. Cependant, en raison de cette relation contractuelle, on a invité la CAF a` présenter une proposition de modification du contrat afin d’en prolonger la durée d’une année. On a informé la CAF que son contrat avec CIC serait prolongé jusqu’au 31 mars 2010, sous réserve qu’une demande soit déposée et [TRADUC- TION] « approuvée ». Malgré le fait que les négociations pour 2009- 2010 avaient et´´ e menées a` terme, il demeure qu’aucun contrat de financement pour 2009-2010 n’avait et´´ e approuvé ou signé, et on avait clairement fait savoir a` la CAF, tant dans les Guidelines for Amend- ments: Language Instruction for Immigrants to Canada (LINC) 2009- 2010 (les Lignes directrices pour les modifications: Cours de langues pour les immigrants au Canada (CLIC) 2009-2010) que dans les paragraphes 4.6 et 12.5 de l’entente de contribution 2007-2009, qu’elle ne devrait pas s’attendre a` recevoir quelque financement additionnel que ce soit après le 31 mars 2009, jusqu’à ce qu’elle ait et´´ e avisée par ecrit´ que la demande de modification pour prolonger la durée du contrat existant avait et´´ e approuvée. 47 Dans les documents envoyés a` la CAF, CIC ne s’engageait aucunement a` modifier le contrat existant. La lettre de CIC mentionnant que la durée de l’entente de contribution existant de la CAF pouvait etreˆ pro- longée ressemble a` une demande de présentation d’une proposition, et, comme il a et´´ e décidé dans l’arrêt Irving Shipbuilding, on peut prétendre qu’elle crée un contrat lorsque le destinataire répond. En l’espèce, le contrat ne contient aucune promesse expresse que les parties qui répondent seront traitées de manière equitable´ sur le plan procédural. Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn, J. 227

48 La CAF souligne qu’il n’y avait rien dans la trousse de documents qui mentionnait que les organismes que le ministre considérait comme etant´ antisémites ou partisans du terrorisme n’obtiendraient pas de prolongation de durée de leur contrat. De même, la trousse ne contenait rien indi- quant qu’il y aurait une approbation automatique de la part du ministre, même si ses fonctionnaires etaient´ par ailleurs satisfaits de la proposition. 49 Par conséquent, dans la mesure où la relation des parties etait´ de nature commerciale et contractuelle, rien dans le dossier ne donne a` penser que le ministre avait quelque obligation que ce soit de s’engager auprès de la CAF au sujet de ses préoccupations avant de rendre sa décision de ne pas prolonger la durée du contrat existant. Il n’y a aucun fondement, ni légal ni contractuel, permettant a` la Cour d’imposer au ministre une obligation d’équité procédurale.

Une obligation d’équité implicite 50 La question demeure quant a` savoir s’il existe une obligation tacite quelconque relative a` l’équité procédurale. Je conclus qu’il n’y en a aucune en l’espèce pour un certain nombre des motifs que la Cour d’appel fédérale a prononcés dans l’arrêt Irving Shipbuilding lorsqu’elle a conclu qu’il n’y avait aucune obligation d’équité implicite. 51 Premièrement, il s’agit essentiellement d’une relation commerciale, malgré le fait que le fournisseur de services ne tire aucun profit de l’entente. Comme l’a déclaré le juge Evans au paragraphe 46 de l’arrêt Irving Shipbuilding: « [...] il serait en règle générale inapproprié d’incorporer une obligation provenant du droit public con¸cue dans le contexte de l’exécution des fonctions gouvernementales conformément a` des pouvoirs conférés uniquement par la loi dans une relation de nature principalement commerciale, régie par un contrat ». 52 Deuxièmement, si on accordait a` la CAF des droits procéduraux dans ce contexte, cela ouvrirait la porte a` chaque demandeur n’ayant pas obtenu une entente de contribution lui donnant le droit a` au moins un avis que sa proposition ne serait pas acceptée ainsi qu’une occasion de répondre aux motifs a` l’appui. Une telle obligation imposée au ministre retarderait indûment ses décisions dans un processus où, comme en l’espèce, il n’y a pas beaucoup de temps pour rendre une décision. En outre, cela ouvre la porte a` ce que le juge Evans a appelé un « déferle- ment alarmant de poursuites de la part de titulaires de droits procéduraux eventuels´ ». Lorsque le nombre de personnes sollicitant du financement excède les fonds disponibles, tout changement dans la décision du minis- 228 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

tre conduit automatiquement au refus subséquent de la demande d’un demandeur. Si l’équité procédurale est etendue´ au premier demandeur es- suyant un refus, les mêmes mesures de sauvegarde doivent etreˆ accordées aux demandeurs subséquents n’ayant pas eu gain de cause. 53 Troisièmement, comme l’a soutenu le ministre, une décision sur les programmes de financement relatif a` l’établissement des immigrants au Canada implique des considérations plus générales en matière de politique publique; ce qui est en jeu ne se limite pas a` la relation entre le fournisseur de services et CIC. Ceux qui s’inscrivent dans le programme CLIC doivent etreˆ initiés aux modes de vie canadiens et, par conséquent, le caractère approprié du fournisseur de programme est crucial. La question de savoir si un organisme en particulier est plus approprié pour agir en tant que modèle des valeurs canadiennes dans le cadre de la fourniture de services d’établissement (même lorsque son programme de formation langue seconde est par ailleurs tout a` fait acceptable) n’est pas quelque chose qui est assujetti au contrôle judiciaire pour des motifs procéduraux. Les intérêts du demandeur — dans la mesure où il a des intérêts — sont protégés contre le processus décisionnel arbitraire selon la norme de la raisonnabilité, et non en lui octroyant l’équité procédurale. 54 Même la relation entre CIC et la CAF etait´ d’une nature autre que celle d’un contrat commercial, et même si l’exception de l’arrêt Dun- smuir etait´ interprétée comme s’appliquant aussi etroitement´ que le soutient la CAF, j’aurais néanmoins conclu que CAF n’avait pas de droit, de privilège ou de bien touché par la décision qui serait suffisant pour imposer au ministre une obligation d’équité. 55 Dans l’arrêt Cardinal, la Cour suprême du Canada a jugé qu’une obligation d’équité etait´ imposée a` tout organisme public qui rend des déci- sions administratives qui ne sont pas de nature législative et qui touchent les droits, privilèges ou biens d’une personne. Ce principe a et´´ e relevé dans l’arrêt de la Cour suprême du Canada dans l’affaire Knight, où elle a déclaré que l’effet de la décision sur les droits de la personne etait´ un facteur a` examiner pour décider si une obligation d’équité s’applique. Dans l’arrêt Wells c Terre-Neuve, [1999] 3 RCS 199 (Wells), la Cour suprême a, encore une fois, réaffirmé le concept qu’un droit, un intérêt ou un privilège doit etreˆ en jeu pour qu’on impose une obligation d’équité, lorsqu’elle a déclaré ceci, a` la page 224: « Il n’existe aucun intérêt acquis en jeu donnant lieu a` un devoir d’équité (Knight, précité). L’intimé n’a etabli´ l’existence d’aucun fondement sur lequel il aurait pu former une attente raisonnable d’être consulté dans le processus. » Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn, J. 229

56 Bien que les commentaires faits par la Cour suprême dans l’arrêt Wells aient et´´ e orientés vers la question de l’équité procédurale dans le contexte d’une nouvelle nomination d’un fonctionnaire après un licencie- ment licite, le message est tout de même instructif — pour qu’il y ait une obligation d’équité, il faut que quelque intérêt valable soit susceptible d’être touché par la décision. En l’espèce, la CAF (ou tout autre fournisseur de services dans ce domaine) n’a pas de droit au financement relatif au CLIC. Bien que le ministre ait concédé que la CAF peut tirer des avantages indirects des ententes de contribution, comme une légitimité accrue de l’organisme du fait de sa relation contractuelle avec le gouvernement ou le partage des coûts d’infrastructure avec les autres ac- tivités de la CAF, je conclus qu’il n’existe pas de privilèges ou d’intérêts suffisants pour faire entrer en jeu une obligation d’équité. 57 Si la légitimité ajoutée qui résulte du fait même de passer un contrat avec le gouvernement constitue un intérêt suffisant pour imposer des obligations relatives a` l’équité procédurale, pratiquement toute partie qui a un contrat avec le gouvernement, quel qu’il soit, acquerra tout a` coup des droits procéduraux. En outre, ce qui fait, en partie, que le ministre a dé- cidé de ne pas continuer de financer la CAF etait´ qu’il ne pensait pas qu’il etait´ approprié que le gouvernement semble soutenir, approuver ou légitimer un organisme pouvant etreˆ considéré comme antisémite ou pouvant soutenir le terrorisme. 58 Le partage des coûts d’infrastructure n’est, de même, pas un intérêt suffisant pour imposer une obligation globale d’équité au ministre. En l’espèce, l’avantage financier réel tiré par la CAF ne peut etreˆ significa- tif — elle louait déjà un immeuble distinct pour ses autres activités et la majorité du personnel affecté au CLIC ne jouait aucun rôle additionnel dans les autres activités de la CAF. En outre, le financement pour le programme CLIC etait´ offert selon le principe du recouvrement des coûts pour les dépenses liées au programme CLIC seulement. Cela limitait de fa¸con efficace la mesure dans laquelle les coûts non liés au programme pouvaient etreˆ remboursés. D’un autre côté, comme je l’ai déjà men- tionné, le fait d’imposer au ministre une obligation d’équité restreindrait sa capacité de rendre promptement des décisions générales, fondées sur des politiques. L’intérêt du public l’emportait largement sur tout intérêt accessoire que la CAF peut avoir eu pour un ministre ayant le pouvoir discrétionnaire de rendre des décisions rapidement, par opposition a` un autre qui est paralysé par la procédure. 230 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

59 Pour ces motifs, je conclus que la CAF n’avait pas droit a` l’équité procédurale relativement a` la décision du ministre de ne pas accepter sa proposition et prolonger la durée de son entente de contribution avec CIC aux termes du programme CLIC.

La teneur de l’obligation d’équité 60 Si j’avais conclu qu’elle avait droit a` l’équité procédurale, j’aurais décidé que la présente affaire ne commandait rien de plus que les protections procédurales minimales et que ces exigences etaient´ remplies. Les cinq facteurs enonc´´ es dans l’arrêt Baker c Canada (Ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l’Immigration), [1999] 2 RCS 817, que la Cour doit examiner pour déterminer quels droits procéduraux l’obligation d’équité requiert dans un contexte en particulier, vont tous vers une telle conclusion. 61 La décision de ne pas approuver une prolongation du financement de la CAF relatif au CLIC ne s’apparente pas au processus décisionnel judiciaire. Cela relève d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire et purement administratif. Bien qu’il ne soit pas possible d’interjeter appel d’une telle déci- sion, rien n’empêche la CAF de demander un financement dans l’avenir, et cela, selon moi, indique une obligation d’équité moins lourde. 62 Malgré le fait que le financement relatif au CLIC constituait a` peu près 74 p. 100 du budget annuel de la CAF, le financement relatif au CLIC n’était pas crucial pour les activités de la CAF, puisque la fourniture de la formation du CLIC ne faisait pas partie de son mandat principal, et les ententes de contribution ne généraient pas non plus de revenus pour les activités de la CAF, puisque le financement etait´ offert par trans- fert selon le principe du recouvrement des coûts. La CAF n’avait aucune attente légitime qu’il y ait prolongation de la durée du contrat. En fait, les déclarations du ministre l’avaient informée du fait que le financement etait´ menacé. En outre, la CAF n’avait aucune attente légitime dans le processus — au contraire, on avait expressément dit a` la CAF de ne pas escompter une approbation avant d’en avoir et´´ e avisée par ecrit´ et, par le fait même, de n’engager aucune dépense ni embaucher du personnel tant qu’elle n’aurait pas re¸cu l’approbation finale. Quoique l’approbation ait semblé etreˆ une formalité dans le passé, cela ne change pas le fait que le ministre a toujours eu un pouvoir discrétionnaire ultime. 63 Enfin, le choix de la procédure utilisée par CIC et l’exigence d’une approbation par le ministre, en fonction de la valeur du contrat, appar- Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn, J. 231

tiennent au ministre. Tous ces facteurs montrent que, en l’espèce, de faibles protections procédurales auraient et´´ e appropriées. 64 Si elle avait eu droit a` l’équité, a` mon avis, voici les droits procéduraux dont la CAF aurait eu le droit de bénéficier: (1) de connaˆıtre les raisons pour lesquelles le ministre n’avait pas approuvé sa proposition, (2) de connaˆıtre les préoccupations du ministre a` cet egard´ et le fait que ces préoccupations pouvaient conduire a` un refus d’approbation d’un futur financement, et (3) d’avoir la possibilité de répondre a` ces préoccupations. 65 En l’espèce, la CAF a re¸cu une lettre exposant les motifs de la déci- sion du ministre. Le ministre soutient que les deux autres critères ont et´´ e remplis. Il affirme que la CAF etait´ au courant de ses préoccupations et qu’elle a eu l’occasion d’y répondre. L’avis et la réponse, affirme-t-il, c’étaient les nombreuses déclarations que lui et les représentants de la CAF avaient faites publiquement. 66 Le ministre a fait de nombreuses déclarations publiques exposant en détail les positions et activités particulières de la CAF dont il prétend avoir tenu compte pour rendre sa décision. Il a aussi etabli´ clairement que le financement de la CAF relatif au CLIC etait´ menacé en raison de ces positions et activités. En outre, la CAF etait´ au courant des préoc- cupations spécifiques du ministre, elle les a examinées et y a répondu au moyen de plusieurs déclarations et communiqués de presse. Lors d’une entrevue a` la radio qui a eu lieu le 17 février 2009, près d’un mois avant la décision, l’interviewer a dit directement a` M. Mouammar que le ministre etait´ [TRADUCTION] « prêt a` couper net le financement fédéral du plus grand groupe arabe au Canada », parce que [TRADUCTION] « les groupes dont les leaders disent des choses intolérantes ou haineuses ne devraient pas obtenir du financement des contribuables ». M. Mouammar a répondu ceci: [TRADUCTION] Cela n’appartient pas a` Jason Kenney, et c’est aux contribuables canadiens de décider a` qui va cet argent pour fournir de tels services d’établissement, et non a` Jason Kenney. Son approche en est une qui est vraiment fasciste. Il menace les gens en disant que vous ne pouvez pas critiquer les politiques du gouvernement, et, si vous le faites, il vous est donc interdit de recevoir du financement du programme relatif aux services d’établissement, lequel ne relève pas de lui, parce que, comme je le disais, c’est l’argent des contribuables. 232 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

67 On n’a fourni aucune source a` l’appui de la proposition selon laquelle les déclarations publiques donnent un avis du genre qui est requis pour remplir l’obligation d’équité procédurale. Toutefois, je ne vois aucun principe permettant de nier le caractère adéquat d’un avis donné au moyen de déclarations publiques, pourvu qu’elles comportent suffisam- ment de détails, que le destinataire en a connaissance et qu’il y répond. En l’espèce, je conclus qu’on a satisfait a` toutes les exigences et que l’avis etait´ adéquat. 68 Je ne peux pas voir comment l’équité du processus décisionnel aurait pu etreˆ améliorée si le ministre avait expédié a` la CAF un avis officiel exposant les détails des déclarations et préoccupations mêmes qu’il avait enonc´´ ees publiquement et s’il lui avait donné l’occasion d’y répondre. L’objet de l’avis avait et´´ e clairement signifié, comme l’a démontré la réponse faite par M. Mouammar lors de l’entrevue du 17 février 2009. De plus, la CAF ne laisse pas entendre qu’elle aurait pu ou qu’elle aurait effectivement offert une réponse différente de celle qu’elle a donnée publiquement. 69 A` mon avis, la CAF connaissait les préoccupations du ministre et la conséquence pouvant en résulter. La CAF a répondu publiquement a` ces préoccupations. Le ministre etait´ au fait des réponses publiques lorsqu’il a rendu sa décision. Les trois critères de l’obligation d’équité etaient´ donc remplis dans ces circonstances particulières. Si j’avais conclu autrement, en fonction de ces faits, j’aurais jugé le manquement comme ayant et´´ e technique et sans conséquence, et le résultat comme n’étant pas susceptible d’être différent, a` la lumière du discours public des parties. Pour ces motifs, je n’aurais pas exercé mon pouvoir discrétionnaire dans le but d’accorder une mesure de redressement a` la CAF.

2. La décision du ministre etait-elle´ entachée d’une crainte raisonnable de partialité? 70 Quelles que soient les autres exigences possibles de l’obligation d’équité en matière de protections procédurales, lorsque l’équité s’applique, le décideur doit, dans tous les cas, agir de manière objective et ne doit pas susciter de crainte raisonnable de partialité. Du fait que j’ai conclu qu’aucune obligation d’équité ne s’appliquait dans la présente affaire, il n’est pas nécessaire que j’examine la question de savoir si la décision etait´ entachée d’une crainte raisonnable de partialité. Cependant, pour le cas où une cour de révision déciderait qu’il y avait effectivement Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn, J. 233

lieu d’appliquer le principe d’équité, je dois fournir mon appréciation des allégations de partialité avancées par la CAF. 71 Le critère a` appliquer pour décider si un décideur administratif est partial variera selon la nature de l’organe de décision: Newfoundland Telephone Co c Terre-Neuve (Board of Commissioners of Public Utili- ties), [1992] 1 RCS 623, aux pages 637 a` 640 (Newfoundland Telephone). 72 Dans l’arrêt Davis c Guelph (City), 2011 ONCA 761, 345 DLR (4th) 1, au paragraphe 71, la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario a résumé la manière de déterminer le critère approprié pour la partialité: [TRADUCTION] A` l’extrémité judiciaire de l’échiquier décisionnel, le critère tradi- tionnel de la « crainte raisonnable de partialité » s’appliquera dans toute sa rigueur. A` l’autre bout de l’échiquier, toutefois — où la déci- sion est plus de nature administrative, politique ou législative — les cours ont jugé qu’un critère plus souple, connu comme etant´ le critère de « l’esprit fermé » s’applique. [Renvois omis.] 73 De plus, dans l’arrêt Cie pétrolière Impériale Ltée c Québec (Ministre de l’Environement), [2003] 2 RCS 624, aux pages 646 et 647, la Cour suprême du Canada déclarait ceci: Le raisonnement de l’appelante traite ainsi le ministre, a` toutes fins utiles, comme un juge de l’ordre judiciaire, que son intérêt personnel dans une affaire rendrait apparemment partial aux yeux d’un tiers objectif et correctement informé. On oublie alors que le contenu de l’obligation d’impartialité, tout comme celui de l’ensemble des règles d’équité procédurale, est susceptible de varier pour s’adapter au contexte de l’activité d’un décideur administratif et a` la nature de ses fonctions [...] [Non souligné dans l’original.] 74 La CAF soutient, sans donner de détails, que la norme de contrôle appropriée est la crainte raisonnable de partialité, et non le critère de l’esprit fermé. Le ministre affirme qu’il s’agissait d’une décision rendue en fonction des politiques — il a exercé un pouvoir discrétionnaire etendu,´ a soupesé les intérêts opposés et a rendu une décision concernant une relation commerciale — et, par conséquent, la norme plus elev´´ ee de l’esprit fermé est appropriée. 75 Je conviens avec le ministre que le critère de l’esprit fermé est la norme appropriée servant a` juger sa décision, parce que le ministre est un 234 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

représentant démocratiquement elu´ et que cette décision en particulier se trouve dans le contexte de l’administration de la Loi. La question a` poser est de savoir si le ministre avait préjugé de l’affaire « de sorte qu’il ne servirait a` rien de présenter des arguments contredisant le point de vue adopté »: Assoc. Des résidents du Vieux St-Boniface Inc c Winnipeg (Ville), [1990] 3 RCS 1170, a` la page 1197. Pour les motifs qui suivent, je conclus que l’esprit du ministre etait´ fermé. 76 Le ministre affirme qu’il ne s’était pas fait une idée avant le 18 mars 2010 et qu’il a et´´ e objectif au moment de rendre sa décision. On a attiré l’attention de la Cour sur des commentaires qu’il avait faits lors de nombreuses entrevues a` la radio qui ont conduit a` la décision, dont ce qui suit: a. Dans une entrevue donnée le 2 mars 2009, le ministre a clairement dit a` l’animateur qu’il n’avait pas encore pris de décision; b. Le ministre a déclaré dans une entrevue, le 14 mars 2009, que, si la moralité de la CAF devait changer et s’il devait y avoir une nouvelle direction plus proche des valeurs canadiennes, il serait [TRADUCTION] « [...] parfaitement a` l’aise avec le fait que [la CAF] soit une partenaire pour la prestation de services ». 77 Le ministre soutien que, bien qu’il ait exprimé des opinions bien ar- rêtées avant de rendre sa décision, ces déclarations ne montrent pas que sa position ne pouvait pas changer. Il rappelle a` la Cour que, dans l’arrêt Newfoundland Telephone, la Cour suprême du Canada a déclaré, a` la page 639, que « le membre d’une commission qui remplit une fonction d’élaboration des politiques ne devrait pas etreˆ exposé a` une accusation de partialité du seul fait d’avoir exprimé avant l’audience des opinions bien arrêtées ». 78 Cependant, les déclarations publiques du ministre ne font partie que de la preuve qu’il faut examinée pour décider s’il avait un esprit fermé a` l’égard de la CAF. Les déclarations faites en privé sont souvent plus révélatrices de l’état d’esprit d’une personne que les déclarations publiques. Cela peut se révéler particulièrement vrai dans le cas de person- nages politiques. 79 Je conviens avec la CAF que le courriel du ministre, daté du 2 février 2009, dans lequel il demande [TRADUCTION] « les renseignements [...] sur la contribution qui a et´´ e honteusement approuvée par notre gouvernement pour la Fédération canado-arabe radicale et antisémite » [non sou- ligné dans l’original] est particulièrement eloquent.´ Il ajoute qu’il veut [TRADUCTION] « que l’on prenne tous les moyens légaux pour mettre Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn, J. 235

fin a` cette entente de financement honteuse et pour s’assurer qu’elle ne sera pas renouvelée ». [Non souligné dans l’original.] 80 Toute personne raisonnable lisant cela conclurait que le ministre avait déjà son idée sur la question du financement futur de la CAF; son seul intérêt etait´ de prendre les moyens pour atteindre l’objectif final de mettre fin a` la relation que CIC avait avec la CAF. 81 Je conclus, malgré les déclarations faites publiquement par le ministre et les prétentions contraires, que ce qu’il a fait en privé révélait qu’il n’examinerait pas vraiment les observations de la CAF — que tous les efforts déployés par la CAF, allant jusqu’à faire des changements a` la direction, etaient´ futiles. Son esprit etait´ fermé.

3. Le droit de la CAF a` la liberté d’expression a-t-il et´´ e violé? 82 Il ne fait aucun doute, et cela n’a pas et´´ e contesté par le ministre, que les activités de défense collective des droits de la CAF constituent une forme d’expression protégée. De plus, l’activité d’expression entourant le programme CLIC est egalement´ protégée. Néanmoins, je conclus qu’il n’a pas et´´ e porté atteinte a` la liberté d’expression de la CAF. 83 Dans l’arrêt Baier c Alberta, 2007 CSC 31, [2007] 2 RCS 673 (Baier), la Cour suprême du Canada etablissait´ la fa¸con dont on devait déterminer si un droit invoqué est un droit positif a` une tribune ou a` un avantage en particulier, ou un droit négatif de ne pas etreˆ assujetti a` des mesures gouvernementales restreignant la liberté d’expression. Le droit invoqué est un droit positif si le gouvernement doit légiférer ou prendre d’autres mesures pour appuyer ou permettre une activité expressive; il s’agit d’un droit négatif si ce qu’on cherche, c’est de ne pas etreˆ assujetti a` des mesures gouvernementales restrictives quant a` une activité qu’on serait autrement libre d’exercer sans appui ou habilitation de la part du gouvernement. 84 La CAF prétend qu’en annulant son financement relatif au CLIC, le Minister a restreint sa liberté d’expression relativement au conflit israélo- palestinien et que, par conséquent, ce qui est invoqué est un droit négatif standard de liberté d’expression. La CAF demande qu’il soit interdit au ministre de restreindre son activité d’expression qu’elle serait autrement libre d’exercer. Pour sa part, le ministre allègue qu’un droit positif est invoqué, parce que la CAF cherche a` obtenir un droit positif a` des fonds pour son programme CLIC et, par extension, son activité d’expression. 85 Je conviens avec le ministre que le droit invoqué est un droit positif pour trois motifs. 236 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

86 Premièrement, seule l’activité d’expression par l’entremise du programme CLIC est en jeu du fait de la décision de couper le financement. Il n’y a aucun lien entre l’interruption du financement pour la formation relative au CLIC et le fait, pour la CAF, de continuer a` défendre les droits collectifs entourant le conflit israélo-palestinien. Le financement provenant de l’entente de contribution ne devait servir qu’aux dépenses liées au programme CLIC, et pour aucune autre fin. La CAF n’a et´´ e remboursée que pour les coûts admissibles réellement engagés pour fournir les services pendant la durée du contrat — les fonds n’étaient pas fournis pour que la CAF les utilise comme elle l’entendait. Il convient de noter que le contrat CLIC de la CAF n’a pas pris fin en raison de son discours; il n’a simplement pas et´´ e prolongé. En outre, l’autre entente de contribution de la CAF concernant le PEAI s’est poursuivie. De plus, le programme CLIC etait´ géré par la direction Services d’établissement de la CAF, laquelle est tout a` fait distincte de sa direction de défense des droits collectifs. Pour l’essentiel, les deux sont complètement in- dépendantes, exer¸cant même leurs activités a` partir de deux emplace- ments géographiques différents. Ces facteurs démontrent la séparation qui existe entre les activités de la CAF liées au CLIC et celles relatives a` la défense des droits collectifs. 87 Deuxièmement, le programme CLIC est une tribune créée par le gouvernement. Puisque, pour avoir accès au programme CLIC, il est nécessaire d’être habilité par le gouvernement, cela indique l’invocation d’un droit positif. 88 Troisièmement, l’arrêt Baier etablit´ clairement que le droit invoqué ne devient pas négatif simplement du fait que le demandeur a historique- ment eu accès a` la tribune d’expression avant que la législation ou la décision lui en enlève le droit. En l’espèce, l’accès qu’a eu la CAF au programme CLIC pendant 12 ans avant la décision du ministre ne trans- forme pas automatiquement le droit invoqué en un droit négatif. Dans l’arrêt Baier, la Cour suprême du Canada déclarait ceci: « Conclure autrement equivaudrait´ a` dire qu’une fois que le gouvernement a légiféré pour créer une tribune, il ne peut jamais la modifier ou la supprimer sans contrevenir a` l’al. 2b) et devoir justifier de tels changements au regard de l’article premier. » 89 Dans l’arrêt Baier, on a jugé que le demandeur doit etablir´ les facteurs suivants pour pouvoir revendiquer un droit positif au titre de l’alinéa 2b) de la Charte: Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn, J. 237

1. la demande doit reposer sur des libertés fondamentales garanties par la Charte plutôt que sur l’accès a` un régime légal précis; 2. le demandeur doit démontrer que l’exclusion du régime légal constitue une entrave substantielle a` l’exercice de l’activité protégée par l’al. 2b) ou que l’objet de l’exclusion etait´ de faire obstacle a` une telle activité; 3. l’Etat´ doit pouvoir etreˆ tenu responsable de toute incapacité d’exercer une liberté fondamentale. 90 Dans l’arrêt Baier, une loi avait et´´ e adoptée, laquelle empêchait les employés d’écoles de briguer un poste de conseiller de tout conseil scolaire, sauf s’ils avaient obtenu un congé et avaient démissionné de leur poste d’enseignant s’il etaient´ elus.´ L’Alberta Teachers’ Association al- léguait que cela portait atteinte a` la liberté d’expression des employés. Elle faisait valoir que le rôle de conseiller etait´ une tribune unique pour la défense des droits collectifs entourant les questions liées a` l’éducation et que, par conséquent, cela constituait une liberté fondamentale. 91 La Cour suprême du Canada a rejeté cette caractérisation en déclarant que « revendiquer un rôle tout a` fait particulier n’est pas la même chose que revendiquer une liberté fondamentale. La demande des appelants, telle qu’ils l’ont formulée, se fonde sur l’accès a` un régime légal précis, celui des conseils scolaires » (au paragraphe 44). De même, l’accès de la CAF au financement relatif au CLIC est une tribune particulière créée par le gouvernement, et non une liberté fondamentale. 92 Dans l’arrêt Baier, la Cour suprême déclarait egalement´ que, même si l’éligibilité a` un poste de conseiller etait´ une liberté fondamentale, la supprimer ne constituerait pas une ingérence importante dans la liberté d’expression, parce que, même sans le poste, les enseignants pouvaient toujours se livrer a` des activités de défense des droits collectifs entourant les questions relatives a` l’éducation. Il y a une analogie avec la situation de la CAF: même sans accès au programme CLIC, la CAF peut toujours défendre les droits collectifs entourant le conflit israélo-palestinien, et elle continue de le faire. L’interruption du financement relatif au CLIC n’a pas créé d’« incapacité » d’exercer des activités d’expression et n’a pas affecté de fa¸con importante les activités d’expression de la CAF. 93 En résumé, il n’existe pas de droit positif au financement, parce que le droit d’administrer le programme CLIC n’est pas fondé sur une liberté fondamentale. De même, les efforts déployés par la CAF pour la défense des droits collectifs ne sont pas affectés de manière importante, parce que la CAF a continué d’exprimer ses idées sur le conflit israélo-palestinien, 238 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

malgré qu’elle ne recevait pas de financement pour la formation relative au CLIC. 94 Puisque j’ai conclu qu’il n’y avait pas de manquement a` l’alinéa 2b) de la Charte, je n’ai pas besoin de procéder a` une analyse relative a` l’article premier.

4. La décision du ministre etait-elle´ raisonnable? 95 Il n’existe pas de précédent quant a` la norme applicable pour con- trôler une décision (ministérielle ou non) de rejeter une demande de financement aux termes du programme CLIC. Après avoir fait l’analyse enonc´´ ee dans l’arrêt Dunsmuir, je conclus que la norme de contrôle applicable est la raisonnabilité. Les facteurs a` examiner sont: (i) l’existence d’une clause privative, (ii) la possession, par le décideur, d’une expertise spéciale et (iii) la nature de la question a` trancher. 96 Premièrement, aucune clause privative n’est en jeu, et il n’y a donc pas de raison de faire montre, a` l’égard du ministre, d’une déférence accrue. 97 Deuxièmement, on peut faire valoir que le ministre ne possède aucune expertise particulière pertinente en ce qui a trait a` la question de savoir si la CAF devrait se voir ou non accorder du financement pour administrer le programme CLIC, et cela nécessite donc peu de déférence. Le ministre est toutefois un représentant elu´ qui rend des décisions dans le cadre de l’administration de la Loi, lesquelles impliquent des considér- ations de politiques plus générales, et, par conséquent, on devrait faire montre d’une déférence a` son egard,´ du fait du poste qu’il occupe. Ce facteur favorise la norme de contrôle de la raisonnabilité. 98 Troisièmement, la nature de la question a` trancher va aussi dans le sens de la raisonnabilité. En l’espèce, il s’agit d’une décision commerciale a` orientation prédéterminée qui a et´´ e rendue dans l’intention de donner effet aux objets généraux de la Loi. Il n’y a pas de question de droit essentielle liée a` l’importance du système juridique. Il faut donc faire montre de beaucoup de retenue. 99 Par conséquent, la norme applicable en l’espèce est la raisonnabilité. Le fait qu’il s’agit d’une décision générale fondée sur des politiques rendue par un représentant elu´ justifie un haut degré de retenue a` l’égard de sa décision. Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn, J. 239

100 La norme de contrôle de la raisonnabilité exige seulement que la déci- sion du ministre appartienne aux issues possibles acceptables pour eviter´ qu’elle soit annulée. 101 Pour apprécier si la décision appartient a` cette catégorie, il faut d’abord déterminer correctement ce qui doit faire l’objet de cette appréci- ation. Les parties ne caractérisent pas la décision du ministre de la même manière. La CAF soutient que la décision du ministre est que la CAF est antisémite et appuie les organisations terroristes, et que c’est cette déci- sion qui est déraisonnable. Quant au ministre, il soutient qu’il a décidé de ne pas distribuer des ressources limitées pour financer la CAF, parce qu’elle n’est pas un organisme fournisseur de services convenable, car elle semble etreˆ impliquée dans l’extrémisme, ce qui va a` l’encontre des valeurs canadiennes; il ajoute que cette décision etait´ raisonnable. 102 Dans la lettre du 18 mars 2009, on y déclarait que le ministre avait décidé de ne pas renouveler le financement de la CAF, parce que: [TRADUCTION] Certaines déclarations que vous et d’autres dirigeants de la CAF avez faites publiquement ont soulevé de graves préoccupations. Ces décla- rations comprenaient la fomentation de la haine et de l’antisémitisme ainsi que le soutien au Hamas et au Hezbollah, des organisations terroristes interdites. La nature désobligeante de ces déclarations publiques — en ce qu’elles semblent refléter le soutien evident´ accordé par la CAF a` des organisations terroristes et des positions qu’elle a prises qui sont probablement antisémites — soulève de sérieuses questions quant a` l’intégrité de votre organisme et a ebranl´´ e la confiance du gouvernement en la CAF en tant que partenaire convenable pour la prestation de services d’établissement aux immigrants. [Non souligné dans l’original.] 103 Sur la base du libellé exprès de la décision-lettre, je souscris a` la caractérisation que le ministre en a faite. La question qui doit etreˆ tranchée est de savoir s’il etait´ ou non raisonnable de continuer a` financer le programme CLIC de la CAF, parce qu’il s’agit d’un organisme qui semble etreˆ antisémite et soutenir des organisations terroristes. Je conclus qu’en l’espèce, la décision du ministre appartient aux issues acceptables. 104 La CAF a déposé de nombreux affidavits d’universitaires, de profes- seurs de droit, de groupe de défense des droits des juifs et de gens ayant collaboré etroitement´ avec la CAF, qui déclaraient n’avoir jamais et´´ e témoins d’antisémitisme, de fomentation de la haine ou de soutien au 240 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

terrorisme de la part de la CAF. Bien que cette preuve soit probante, elle doit etreˆ examinée a` la lumière des opinions et des el´´ ements de preuve contraires qui se trouvent au dossier concernant la question de savoir ce qui constitue de l’antisémitisme ainsi que la preuve sur la fa¸con dont les autres Canadiens ont per¸cu les actions de la CAF. La seule chose qui ressorte clairement du dossier, c’est qu’il n’y a pas de consensus. 105 La Cour n’est pas tenue de régler la question de ce que constitue l’antisémitisme, parce que le ministre n’a pas affirmé que la CAF etait´ antisémite, il a plutôt dit que les déclarations publiques qui avaient et´´ e faites [TRADUCTION] « sembl[aient] refléter le soutien evident´ ac- cordé par la CAF a` des organisations terroristes et des positions qu’elle a[vait] prises qui [étaient] probablement antisémites ». [Non souligné dans l’original.] Le ministre n’a pas a` prouver que la CAF est antisémite, mais seulement qu’elle puisse sembler etreˆ antisémite. La preuve au dossier est abondante pour démontrer que, bien que nombreux soient ceux qui ne considèrent pas les actions de la CAF comme etant´ antisémites, y compris des personnes d’origine juive, il y en a de nombreux autres qui sont d’avis contraire, dont un ancien président de la CAF. Dans ce contexte, il est particulièrement important de faire montre de retenue a` l’égard de la décision du ministre. 106 Quant aux six sujets spécifiques sur lesquels le ministre s’est appuyé, la CAF soutient que cela s’est produit sans son autorisation, que les personnes en cause n’étaient pas des représentantes officielles de la CAF a` ce moment-là, ou que la CAF n’a pas appuyé ou approuvé les actions et le contenu en question. Dans de nombreux cas, cette défense fait fi de la maxime suivante: « Dis-moi qui tu fréquentes, je te dirai qui tu es. » Simplement dit, la CAF ne peut se dissocier complètement du contenu de liens Web qu’elle inclut dans sa documentation, ou des commentaires de ses dirigeants, de la distribution qu’ils font de documents ou de leur prés- ence a` des réunions ou a` des conférences. 107 L’ensemble des déclarations et des actions que le ministre a invo- quées peut, selon moi, conduire raisonnablement quelqu’un a` se faire l’idée que la CAF semble soutenir des organisations que le Canada a dé- claré etreˆ des organisations terroristes et qui sont probablement an- tisémites. Hormis le fait que le ministre même soit de cet avis, le dossier est rempli d’articles de presse et de déclarations d’autres personnes qui vont dans le même sens, tout cela appuyant le fait qu’il n’était pas dér- aisonnable pour le ministre de tirer cette conclusion. Canadian Arab Federation v. Canada (MCI) Russel W. Zinn, J. 241

108 Pour ces motifs, la décision rentre dans la norme de la raisonnabilité, comme l’a décrite l’arrêt Dunsmuir, au paragraphe 47.

Les dépens 109 Le ministre a droit aux dépens. Si les parties ne peuvent s’entendre sur le quantum, elles doivent en aviser la Cour dans les trente (30) jours de la présente décision. Le ministre devra alors fournir ses observations ecrites´ sur les dépens, lesquelles ne dépasseront pas dix (10) pages, dans les dix (10) jours suivants, et la CAF devra fournir sa réponse ecrite´ dans les vingt (20) jours de la réception des observations du ministre.

Jugement LA COUR STATUE que: 1. la demande est rejetée; 2. les dépens sont accordés au ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l’Immigration. Application dismissed. 242 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

[Indexed as: Qin v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)] Qin Qin, Appellant and The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent Federal Court of Appeal Docket: A-97-13 2013 FCA 263 John M. Evans, Johanne Gauthier, D.G. Near JJ.A. Heard: October 17, 2013 Judgment: November 19, 2013 Immigration and citizenship –––– Admission — Immigrants — Miscellane- ous –––– Applicant was citizen of China — Officer rejected applicant’s application for permanent residence as member of Canadian Experience Class (CEC) — Officer found that applicant had not demonstrated that she met Cana- dian work experience requirement set out in s. 87.1 of Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations — Applicant’s application for judicial review was granted — Applicant appealed — Appeal dismissed — There was nothing in record to suggest that use of wage data as indicator of whether CEC applicant had requisite Canadian work experience had caused administrative problems — Of- ficer did not treat applicant’s low salary as disqualification in itself, because he also found that description of her duties in letter of reference was not consistent with Code. Cases considered by John M. Evans J.A.: A.T.A. v. Alberta (Information & Privacy Commissioner) (2011), 339 D.L.R. (4th) 428, 2011 CarswellAlta 2068, 2011 CarswellAlta 2069, 2011 SCC 61, (sub nom. Alberta Teachers’ Association v. Information & Privacy Commissioner (Alta.)) 424 N.R. 70, 52 Alta. L.R. (5th) 1, 28 Admin. L.R. (5th) 177, [2012] 2 W.W.R. 434, (sub nom. Alberta (Information & Privacy Commissioner) v. Alberta Teachers’ Association) [2011] 3 S.C.R. 654, (sub nom. Alberta Teachers’ Association v. Information and Privacy Commis- sioner) 519 A.R. 1, (sub nom. Alberta Teachers’ Association v. Information and Privacy Commissioner) 539 W.A.C. 1, [2011] S.C.J. No. 61 (S.C.C.) — referred to Agraira v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) (2013), 360 D.L.R. (4th) 411, 2013 CarswellNat 1983, 2013 CarswellNat 1984, 2013 SCC 36, 52 Admin. L.R. (5th) 183, 16 Imm. L.R. (4th) 173, 446 N.R. 65, [2013] S.C.J. No. 36 (S.C.C.) — considered Qin v. Canada (MCI) 243

C.U.P.E., Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp. (1979), 25 N.B.R. (2d) 237, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227, 51 A.P.R. 237, 26 N.R. 341, 79 C.L.L.C. 14,209, 97 D.L.R. (3d) 417, N.B.L.L.C. 24259, 1979 CarswellNB 17, 1979 Car- swellNB 17F, [1979] S.C.J. No. 45 (S.C.C.) — considered Covarrubias v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2006), 56 Imm. L.R. (3d) 178, 2006 CAF 365, 2006 CarswellNat 4727, 148 C.R.R. (2d) 45, [2007] 3 F.C.R. 169, 2006 FCA 365, 2006 CarswellNat 3653, 354 N.R. 367, [2006] F.C.J. No. 1682 (F.C.A.) — referred to Georgia Strait Alliance v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries & Oceans) (2012), 2012 CarswellNat 262, 2012 FCA 40, 33 Admin. L.R. (5th) 243, 2012 CAF 40, 2012 CarswellNat 2973, 427 N.R. 110, 65 C.E.L.R. (3d) 28, [2012] F.C.J. No. 157 (F.C.A.) — referred to Khan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2011), 2011 Car- swellNat 5153, 2011 FCA 339, 2011 CarswellNat 6381, 2011 CAF 339, 426 N.R. 12, 3 Imm. L.R. (4th) 1, 344 D.L.R. (4th) 739, [2011] F.C.J. No. 1729 (F.C.A.) — considered Martin v. Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) (2003), 2003 Car- swellNS 360, 2003 CarswellNS 361, 2003 SCC 54, (sub nom. Workers’ Compensation Board (N.S.) v. Martin) 217 N.S.R. (2d) 301, (sub nom. Workers’ Compensation Board (N.S.) v. Martin) 683 A.P.R. 301, 310 N.R. 22, (sub nom. Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin) [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504, 110 C.R.R. (2d) 233, (sub nom. Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin) 231 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 28 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, 4 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, REJB 2003-48214, [2003] S.C.J. No. 54 (S.C.C.) — followed New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir (2008), 372 N.R. 1, 69 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, 69 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 844 A.P.R. 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 2008 C.L.L.C. 220-020, D.T.E. 2008T-223, 329 N.B.R. (2d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 170 L.A.C. (4th) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 291 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 2008 CarswellNB 124, 2008 CarswellNB 125, 2008 SCC 9, 64 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 95 L.C.R. 65, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, [2008] A.C.S. No. 9 (S.C.C.) — followed Patel v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2011), 2011 FCA 187, 2011 CarswellNat 2031, 2011 CAF 187, 2011 CarswellNat 3251, 419 N.R. 320, 98 Imm. L.R. (3d) 175, [2013] 1 F.C.R. 340, [2011] F.C.J. No. 843, [2011] A.C.F. No. 843 (F.C.A.) — considered Qin v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2013), 2013 CF 147, 2013 CarswellNat 1443, 2013 FC 147, 2013 CarswellNat 306, [2013] F.C.J. No. 167 (F.C.) — considered Shpati v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety & Emergency Preparedness) (2011), 2011 CarswellNat 4198, 2011 CarswellNat 5487, 2011 CAF 286, 244 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

2011 FCA 286, 423 N.R. 309, 2 Imm. L.R. (4th) 6, 343 D.L.R. (4th) 128, [2011] F.C.J. No. 1454 (F.C.A.) — referred to Takeda Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health) (2013), 2013 CarswellNat 57, 108 C.P.R. (4th) 401, 440 N.R. 346, 2013 CAF 13, 2013 FCA 13, 2013 CarswellNat 2482 (F.C.A.) — referred to Statutes considered: Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 s. 34(2) — considered s. 74(d) — considered Regulations considered: Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 Generally — referred to s. 82(2)(c)(ii)(C) — considered s. 87.1 [en. SOR/2008-254] — considered s. 87.1(2)(a)(i) [en. SOR/2008-254] — considered s. 203(3)(d) — considered

APPEAL by applicant from judgment reported at Qin v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2013), [2013] F.C.J. No. 167, 2013 CF 147, 2013 CarswellNat 1443, 2013 FC 147, 2013 CarswellNat 306 (F.C.).

Mario D. Bellissimo, Erin C. Roth, for Appellant Lorne McClenaghan, Prathima Prasad, for Respondent

John M. Evans J.A.:

1 Foreign nationals who are in Canada on a temporary basis may apply for permanent residence as a member of the Canadian Experience Class (CEC). Applicants must satisfy a visa officer that, among other things, they have had at least 12 months work experience in Canada in the preceding 24 months. The program is limited to those who have worked in occupations requiring a relatively high level of skill. 2 The principal issue raised in this case concerns the evidence that a visa officer may consider in determining if a CEC applicant meets the Canadian work experience requirement. In particular, when deciding whether an applicant was employed to perform duties of the requisite level of skill, may the officer take into account the fact that the applicant’s wages are below those prevailing for the occupation in which the applicant was assessed? Qin v. Canada (MCI) John M. Evans J.A. 245

3 This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Court in which Jus- tice Gleason (Judge) allowed an application for judicial review by Qin Qin, a national of China, to set aside an officer’s rejection of her application for permanent residence as a member of the CEC. The officer found that Ms Qin had not demonstrated that she met the Canadian work experience requirement set out in section 87.1 of the Immigration and Refu- gee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 (Regulations) 4 The visa officer based his decision in part on the disparity between Ms Qin’s wages and the relatively higher minimum wage rates prevailing locally for legal secretaries and translators/interpreters, the occupational categories in which her application was assessed. In addition, the description of Ms Qin’s job provided by her employer did not match the duties of Legal Secretaries as described in the National Occupational Classification (NOC). 5 In a decision reported as Qin v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 147 (F.C.), the Judge allowed the application for judicial review on the ground that the visa officer had breached the duty of procedural fairness. He had failed to inform Ms Qin that he proposed to consult comparative wage data compiled by Human Resources and Skills Development Canada (HRSDC) as an indicator of whether her employment duties were consistent with those of legal secretaries, and to give her an opportunity to respond. In this appeal, the Minister of Citi- zenship and Immigration does not challenge the Judge’s finding of procedural unfairness. 6 The Judge remitted Ms Qin’s application for a permanent resident visa as a member of the CEC for redetermination by a different officer. She left it to that officer to decide if Ms Qin met the Canadian work experience requirement on the basis of the NOC codes for Translators, Terminologists and Interpreters (Translators/Interpreters) or Legal Secretaries. 7 The Judge also held that if the officer had observed the duty of procedural fairness it would have been open to him to take into account HRSDC comparator wage data as an indicator of whether the employment duties performed by Ms Qin were consistent with those in the relevant NOC codes. 246 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

8 The Judge certified the following two questions of general importance under paragraph 74(d) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (IRPA): Question 1: Is it permissible for a visa officer to consider comparator salary data when assessing the nature of the work experience of an applicant who wishes to qualify as a member of the Canadian Ex- perience Class, as described in section 87.1 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227? Question 2: What standard of review is applicable to a visa officer’s interpretation of theImmigration and Refugee Protection Regula- tions, SOR/2002-227 and to the officer’s assessment of an application under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227? 9 The parties agree that Ms Qin’s CEC application must be redetermined by another visa officer because of the breach of procedural fairness. However, it is clear from the Judge’s reasons that her Order implicitly permits the officer redetermining Ms Qin’s visa application to take comparator wage data into account. Hence, the questions of general importance certified by the Judge respecting the interpretation of section 87.1, and the standard of review applicable to the visa officer’s implicit interpretation of it, were properly certified under paragraph 74(d). 10 Strictly, however, the second part of the second certified question, namely, the standard of review to be applied to a visa officer’s assessment of a CEC application, does not arise for decision in this appeal. The officer’s refusal of Ms Qin’s application has been set aside on procedural grounds. The standard of review applicable to the assessment of the application will only arise after it has been redetermined. Nonetheless, because the other questions were properly certified, I propose to answer it.

Factual background 11 Ms Qin has been in Canada since 2002. After graduating from York University in 2009 with a Bachelor of Arts degree she obtained a three- year temporary resident permit that enabled her to take employment. In 2010 she started to work full-time for a small Toronto law firm, K D Associates, as an administrative assistant, and a translator/interpreter for the firm’s Chinese clients. 12 Subparagraph 87.1(2)(a)(i) of the Regulations provides that, in order to qualify for permanent residence as a member of the CEC, an applicant’s Canadian work experience must be in one or more of the occupa- Qin v. Canada (MCI) John M. Evans J.A. 247

tions of Skill Type O Management Occupations or Skill Level A or B in the NOC matrix. These occupations are relatively highly skilled and include Translators/Interpreters (NOC Code 5125) and Legal Secretaries (NOC Code 1242). The NOC sets out a range of tasks that comprise listed occupations, but does not include any wage information. 13 K D Associates provided a letter of reference, dated September 20, 2011, in support of Ms Qin’s application for permanent residence in Can- ada. The letter stated that she was employed by the firm as a legal secretary/translator, described her duties, and stated her hourly wage rate and annual salary. 14 In October 2011, more than a year after she had started working for K D Associates, Ms Qin applied for permanent resident status as a member of the CEC. She requested an assessment of her application on the basis that she had been employed full-time for more than 12 months as a Legal Secretary and Translator/Interpreter. 15 The officer was not satisfied that the reference letter’s statement of Ms Qin’s work duties adequately matched those contained in NOC Code 1242 (Legal Secretaries). His search of the HRSDC database of local average and minimum wage rates for legal secretaries, and translators/interpreters (NOC Code 5125) revealed that Ms Qin’s hourly wage and annual salary were below the minimum prevailing local wage rate and annual salary for these occupations. 16 A letter from Citizenship and Immigration Canada, dated March 12, 2012, advised Ms Qin that her application had been rejected. The reasons given for the decision were that she had not met the skilled work experience requirement because her salary was not consistent with NOC Codes 5125 or 1242, and the employment duties listed in the letter of reference were not consistent with NOC Code 1242.

Federal Court’s decision 17 I need only describe the two elements of the Judge’s decision that are in contention in this appeal. 18 The first is the standard of review applicable to the officer’s interpretation of the Regulations. The second is whether a visa officer may compare a CEC applicant’s wages with prevailing local wage rates for the occupational categories in which the applicant was assessed as an aid to determining if the applicant has satisfied the Canadian work experience requirement in section 87.1 of the Regulations. This issue has two parts. First, is comparator salary level factually relevant to whether applicants 248 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

have performed the employment duties of the NOC codes in which they are assessed? Second, if it is, does the visa officer have the legal authority to take it into account? 19 On the standard of review, the Judge noted that decisions of this Court (Khan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2011 FCA 339 (F.C.A.) (Khan) and Patel v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2011 FCA 187, [2013] 1 F.C.R. 340 (F.C.A.) (Patel)) had applied the correctness standard to visa officers’ interpretations of provisions in the Regulations relating to the work study program and educational requirements. 20 However, the Judge also stated (at para. 10) that the Supreme Court of Canada had interpreted New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.) (Dunsmuir) as deciding that reasonableness is the standard of review presumptively applicable to a tribunal’s interpretation of its home statute: see, in particular, A.T.A. v. Alberta (Information & Privacy Commissioner), 2011 SCC 61, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 654 (S.C.C.) at para. 39. 21 The Judge asked herself (at para. 16) whether Khan and Patel should still be regarded as having “satisfactorily” resolved the applicable standard of review issue in light of the Supreme Court’s post-Dunsmuir jurisprudence. Without deciding this question, she applied the correctness standard because Khan and Patel were directly on point: at para. 13. Moreover, she added, nothing turned on it because the officer’s interpretation of the legislation satisfied both standards. 22 On the substantive issue, the Judge stated that the significant disparity between Ms Qin’s wages and the prevailing local minimum wage for legal secretaries and translators/interpreters was relevant to determining the largely factual question of whether she was in fact performing the duties of these occupations as described in the applicable NOC codes. The Judge also held that the visa officer had the legal authority under the Regulations to take wages into account when deciding if a CEC applicant’s employment duties were within the applicable NOC code. Qin v. Canada (MCI) John M. Evans J.A. 249

Statutory framework 23 I set out below the material provisions of section 87.1 of the Regula- tions that were in force at the time relevant to this appeal. Canadian Experience Class Class 87.1 (1) For the purposes of subsection 12(2) of the Act, the Cana- dian experience class is prescribed as a class of persons who may become permanent residents on the basis of their experience in Can- ada and who intend to reside in a province other than the Province of Quebec. Member of the class (2) A foreign national is a member of the Canadian experience class if (a) they (i) have acquired in Canada within the 24 months before the day on which their application for permanent residence is made at least 12 months of full-time work experience, or the equivalent in part-time work experience, in one or more occupations that are listed in Skill Type 0 Management Occupations or Skill Level A or B of the Na- tional Occupational Classification matrix, and have acquired that work experience after having obtained ..... Catégorie de l’expérience canadienne Catégorie 87.1 (1) Pour l’application du paragraphe 12(2) de la Loi, la cat- egorie´ de l’expérience canadienne est une catégorie réglementaire de personnes qui peuvent devenir résidents permanents du fait de leur expérience au Canada et qui cherchent a` s’établir dans une province autre que le Québec. Qualité (2) Fait partie de la catégorie de l’expérience canadienne l’étranger qui satisfait aux exigences suivantes: a) l’étranger, selon le cas: (i) a accumulé au Canada au moins douze mois d’expérience de travail a` temps plein ou l’équivalent s’il travaille a` temps partiel dans au moins une des professions appartenant aux genre de compétence 0 Gestion ou niveaux de compétences A ou B de la matrice de la Clas- sification nationale des professions au cours des vingt-quatre mois 250 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

précédant la date de la présentation de sa demande de résidence permanente et, antérieurement a` cette expérience de travail, a obtenu au Canada, selon le cas [...]

Issues and analysis (i) Standard of review 24 As I have already noted, the standard of review of the visa officer’s assessment of Ms Qin’s application does not strictly arise in this appeal because his decision has been set aside for procedural unfairness. How- ever, since other questions have been properly certified and the issue is not in dispute between the parties, I can deal with it briefly. 25 A visa officer’s refusal of an application for permanent residence on the ground that an applicant’s employment was not consistent with an occupation in an NOC code of the required skill level is a question of mixed fact and law at the factual end of the spectrum. Accordingly, it is reviewable on the standard of reasonableness: Dunsmuir at para. 53. 26 Whether comparator wage data are factually relevant to determining if an applicant was employed in the NOC occupation in which she was assessed is a question of fact. Hence, it, too, is reviewable on the reasonableness standard: ibid. 27 The more contentious issue is whether the standard of correctness or reasonableness is applicable to a review of visa officers’ interpretations of the Regulations. The question of interpretation at issue is whether section 87.1 of the Regulations permits officers to consult HRSDC prevailing wage data as an aid to determining if a CEC applicant was performing employment duties that correspond to those of the NOC code in which she or he was assessed. 28 This Court has recently reaffirmed in obiter dicta that a visa officer’s interpretation of the enabling legislation is reviewable on the correctness standard: Takeda Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), 2013 FCA 13 (F.C.A.) at para. 116 (per Dawson J.A.). 29 After the Judge rendered her decision in the present proceeding, the Supreme Court of Canada held in Agraira v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36 (S.C.C.) (Agraira) that a Minister’s implied interpretation of the term “national interest” in IRPA, subsection 34(2) is reviewable on the reasonableness standard. Thus, the Court reasoned, when a Minister’s decision made under that Qin v. Canada (MCI) John M. Evans J.A. 251

provision is challenged on the basis of the legal relevance of the factors taken into account, a reviewing court may only set the decision aside if it can be inferred from those factors that the Minister had proceeded on the basis of an unreasonable interpretation of “national interest”. 30 Had it been available to her, Agraira might have strengthened the Judge’s doubts as to whether, in a post-Dunsmuir world, Khan and Patel should any longer be regarded as having satisfactorily decided that visa officers’ interpretations of the statutory provisions that they administer are reviewable for correctness. 31 For the reasons that I develop below, section 87.1 of the Regulations clearly authorizes a visa officer to take comparator wage information into account when assessing whether a CEC applicant’s employment duties match those described in the relevant NOC code so as to satisfy the Ca- nadian work experience requirement. Since the interpretation of section 87.1 implicit in the visa officer’s consideration of the wage information in his assessment of Ms Qin’s visa application is correct it cannot be unreasonable. 32 Indeed, unreasonableness as a possible standard of review of an administrative interpretation of legislation only arises when the statutory provision in question is ambiguous and “there is no one interpretation which can be said to be ‘right’”: C.U.P.E., Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp., [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227 (S.C.C.), at 237. 33 Hence, if a reviewing court concludes that one interpretation is “right”, after conducting a textual, contextual, and purposive interpreta- tive analysis of the legislation, and giving careful and respectful consideration to the tribunal’s reasons, correctness is the standard of review. In these circumstances, if a tribunal has interpreted the statute in some other way, the court may intervene to ensure administrative compliance with the legislature’s clearly expressed intention. The rule of law requires nothing less. 34 Although not necessary to determine the standard of review in this case because section 87.1 is not ambiguous, I would also note that deference is only due to administrative decision-makers on questions within their statutory power to decide. Adjudicative tribunals, such as labour relations boards, human rights tribunals, and professional disciplinary bodies, normally have express or implied statutory authority to decide any questions of law or fact necessary to dispose of a matter properly before them. 252 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

35 However, not all those entrusted with the exercise of statutory power necessarily have the delegated power to decide questions of law, including the interpretation of their enabling statute. Of course, from time to time all statutory delegates may have to form an opinion on whether the law permits them to take some particular administrative action, including enacting subordinate legislation. But this is not the same as a statutory power to decide definitively the meaning of a provision in an enabling statute, subject only to judicial review on the presumptive standard of reasonableness. 36 Whether the delegated statutory powers of any given public official or body include the power to decide question of law, including the interpretation of their enabling legislation, may be determined by reference to the factors identified in Martin v. Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board), 2003 SCC 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 (S.C.C.) at para. 48: and see Covarrubias v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2006 FCA 365, [2007] 3 F.C.R. 169 (F.C.A.) at paras. 47-56 (Covarrubias); Shpati v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety & Emergency Prepared- ness), 2011 FCA 286, [2012] 2 F.C.R. 133 (F.C.A.) at para. 27 (Shpati); Georgia Strait Alliance v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries & Oceans), 2012 FCA 40 (F.C.A.) at para. 99. 37 These factors include the terms of the delegate’s statutory mandate, the delegate’s relationship with other decision-makers in the statutory scheme, practicality, capacity, and procedure. On this basis, it must be inferred from the reasoning in Agraira that the Court was of the view that the Minister had the delegated power to interpret the term “national interest” in IRPA, subsection 34(2). 38 Because I have already decided for other reasons that correctness is the applicable standard of review in this case, it is not necessary for the disposition of this appeal to decide if post-Dunsmuir jurisprudence, including Agraira, requires this Court to revisit its decisions holding that immigration officials are not entitled to curial deference on issues of statutory interpretation: see, for example, Khan and Patel (visa officers); Shpati (enforcement officers), and Covarrubias (pre-removal risk assessment officers). Qin v. Canada (MCI) John M. Evans J.A. 253

(ii) May wage rate data be considered in the determination of a CEC application? (a) Factual relevance 39 As I have already indicated, whether an applicant is performing the employment tasks listed in an NOC code is largely a question of fact. Whether evidence is relevant to determining what duties the applicant was performing and, if it is, how much weight should be given to it, are also factual questions. Hence, reasonableness is the standard of review applicable to these aspects of a visa officer’s rejection of a CEC application. 40 I agree with the Judge that it was not clear from Ms Qin’s reference letter that her employment duties fell within the applicable NOC codes. Accordingly, it was reasonable for the visa officer to consult the extensive prevailing minimum and average wage data for these occupations compiled by HRSDC and available on its website. Wages generally increase with the complexity of a job. Wage rates may be particularly relevant in assessing a CEC application because the program is limited to those with higher skill levels. 41 It is not a statutory criterion that an applicant for permanent residence as a member of the CEC must be paid wages that are consistent with prevailing wage rates for the occupation in which the application was assessed. Hence, it will be open to Ms Qin in her representations to show why, in her particular situation, the officer should attach little probative value, if any, to her wages and to the HRSDC wage data when determining whether her employment duties satisfy the Canadian work experience requirement.

(b) The legal issue 42 Having found that it was reasonable for the visa officer to compare Ms Qin’s hourly wage rate and annual salary with the HRSDC data as an indicator of whether she was engaged in the NOC occupations in which she was assessed, I now consider if the Regulations preclude the officer from undertaking this comparison. I share the Judge’s view that they do not. 43 Express statutory authority is not required to enable administrative decision-makers to consider evidence that has probative value to determining a question entrusted to them. It is normally implicit in the grant 254 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

of legal authority to decide a question of fact that the decision-maker may take into account evidence relevant to making that decision. 44 The text of section 87.1 of the Regulations is silent on the evidence that visa officers may take into account when deciding a CEC application. Hence, considered alone, it does not rebut the presumption that they have the implied power to consider any evidence relevant to determining whether an applicant meets the skilled work experience requirement. 45 However, Ms Qin argues that to permit visa officers to take wage information into account when assessing a CEC application would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme. She points to provisions in the Reg- ulations governing the issuance of temporary work permits (TWP), and permanent resident visas to members of the federal skilled worker (FSW) class. 46 The provisions of the Regulations governing the FSW and TWP programs expressly direct visa officers to approve an offer of employment on the basis of an opinion of an HRSDC officer that, among other things, the wages offered to the applicant by a prospective employer are consistent with prevailing wage rates for the occupation in question: see Regu- lations, subparagraph 82(2)(c)(ii)(C) (federal skilled workers) and paragraph 203(3)(d) (temporary work permits). Ms Qin makes two arguments based on these provisions. 47 First, when Parliament intends comparator wage data to be taken into account in assessing an employment-based application to reside in Can- ada, it does so expressly. The absence of any such provision in section 87.1, or in the policy manuals, indicates that wages are not a criterion for assessing the work experience of an applicant for a permanent residence visa as a member of the CEC. 48 I disagree. Under the FSW and TWP programs an opinion is required on the impact on the labour market of granting a visa or work permit. Determining whether an applicant’s wages are consistent with those prevailing in the relevant occupation is one of the statutory components of a labour market opinion. In contrast, it is not a statutory condition to the grant of a visa under the CEC program that an applicant’s wages must be consistent with the prevailing local wage rates for the occupation in which the applicant is being assessed. Wages are simply one of the many considerations that may be relevant to determining whether a CEC applicant satisfies the prescribed work experience requirement. 49 In my view, the visa officer did not treat Ms Qin’s low salary as a disqualification in itself, because he also found that the description of her Qin v. Canada (MCI) John M. Evans J.A. 255

duties in the letter of reference was not consistent with NOC Code 1242: see also paragraph 25 of the affidavit of the visa officer at Appeal Book, p. 171. 50 On the other hand, if there is satisfactory evidence from an employer that a CEC applicant has the required Canadian work experience, she may be granted a visa even though her wages are below the prevailing wage rates. Indeed, when other evidence is available, the officer may be satisfied that an applicant meets the work experience requirement without having to consider comparator wage information at all. Much depends on the particular facts of an application. 51 I would not expect the Regulations to attempt to identify the different kinds of evidence that a visa officer may consider in determining if a CEC applicant’s work experience falls within a particular NOC code. However, the requirement in the CEC application process for an employer to provide an applicant’s wage information may be some indication that wages are relevant to a determination of whether an applicant has satisfied the Canadian work requirement. 52 Ms Qin’s second argument based on the FSW and TWP programs is that it would unduly complicate and confuse the administration of the CEC program if visa officers could take wages into account in assessing an application. 53 She noted that under the FSW and TWP programs HRSDC officers, not visa officers, give a labour market opinion based on, among other things, whether the individual’s wages are consistent with prevailing rates. This is because assessing labour market impact is within the expertise of HRSDC officers. Consequently, she argues, section 87.1 should not be interpreted as authorizing visa officers to make a similar determination with respect to CEC applications because they lack the necessary expertise. 54 I am not persuaded that permitting visa officers merely to take wage data into account when assessing a CEC applicant’s work experience would so disrupt the fair and effective administration of the program as to warrant reading into the Regulations a limit on the power of visa officers to take relevant evidence into account. 55 Considering comparator wage rates as one indication of whether a CEC applicant’s employment duties are consistent with those described in the relevant NOC code is not so complex a task that a visa officer could not perform it, especially with the benefit of applicants’ representations. Permitting a visa officer to take account of wage information for 256 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

this limited purpose is not the equivalent of authorizing a visa officer to prepare a labour market opinion such as that required in connection with FSW and TWP applications. 56 There is nothing in the record before us to suggest that the use of wage data as an indicator of whether a CEC applicant has the requisite Canadian work experience has caused administrative problems. In any event, visa officers do not work in a vacuum; advice from more exper- ienced colleagues may be available to them if it is required.

Conclusions 57 For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal and answer the certified questions as follows: Question 1: Is it permissible for a visa officer to consider comparator salary data when assessing the nature of the work experience of an applicant who wishes to qualify as a member of the Canadian Ex- perience Class, as described in section 87.1 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227? Answer: Yes Question 2: What standard of review is applicable to a visa officer’s interpretation of theImmigration and Refugee Protection Regula- tions, SOR/2002-227 and to the officer’s assessment of an application under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227? Answer: Correctness is the applicable standard in this case for reviewing the visa officer’s interpretation of section 87.1 of the Regu- lations, and reasonableness is the standard of review of a visa officer’s findings of fact and application of section 87.1 to the facts of a CEC application.

Johanne Gauthier J.A.:

I agree

D.G. Near J.A.:

I agree Appeal dismissed. Seeley v. Canadian National Railway 257

[Indexed as: Seeley v. Canadian National Railway] Canadian National Railway Company, Appellant and Denise Seeley and Canadian Human Rights Commission, Respondents and Federally Regulated Employers - Transportation and Communication, Intervener Ontario Human Rights Commission, Intervener Federal Court of Appeal Docket: A-90-13 2014 FCA 111 J.D. Denis Pelletier, Robert M. Mainville, A.F. Scott JJ.A. Heard: March 12, 2014 Judgment: May 2, 2014 Human rights –––– Practice and procedure — Judicial review — Standard of review –––– Employee asked to be relieved from work assignment because she could not arrange childcare — Employer extended time to report but did not make accommodation for employee and dismissed her — Employee’s complaint of discrimination based on family status was allowed by tribunal — Tribunal, inter alia, awarded damages for pain and suffering and for reckless conduct — Employer applied for judicial review — Application was dismissed — Em- ployer appealed — Appeal dismissed — Employer was not sensitive to employee’s situation, did not answer her requests, and did not consider family status matters that involved parental obligations as ground of discrimination that necessitated any form of accommodation whatsoever. Human rights –––– What constitutes discrimination — Family status — Employment –––– Employee asked to be relieved from work assignment because she could not arrange childcare — Employer extended time to report but did not make accommodation for employee and dismissed her — Employee’s complaint of discrimination based on family status was allowed by tribunal — Tribunal, inter alia, awarded damages for pain and suffering and for reckless conduct — Employer applied for judicial review — Application was dismissed — Employer appealed — Appeal dismissed — Employer was not sensitive to employee’s situation, did not answer her requests, and did not consider family status matters that involved parental obligations as ground of discrimination that necessitated any form of accommodation whatsoever. Human rights –––– Remedies — Damages — Punitive or exemplary damages –––– Employee asked to be relieved from work assignment because she could not arrange childcare — Employer extended time to report but did not 258 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th) make accommodation for employee and dismissed her — Employee’s complaint of discrimination based on family status was allowed by tribunal — Tribunal, inter alia, awarded damages for pain and suffering and for reckless conduct — Employer applied for judicial review — Application was dismissed — Em- ployer appealed — Appeal dismissed — Employer was not sensitive to employee’s situation, did not answer her requests, and did not consider family status matters that involved parental obligations as ground of discrimination that necessitated any form of accommodation whatsoever. Cases considered by Robert M. Mainville J.A.: British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. B.C.G.E.U. (1999), (sub nom. Public Service Employee Relations Commission (B.C.) v. British Columbia Government & Service Employees’ Union) 127 B.C.A.C. 161, (sub nom. Public Service Employee Relations Commission (B.C.) v. British Columbia Government & Service Employees’ Union) 207 W.A.C. 161, 35 C.H.R.R. D/257, 46 C.C.E.L. (2d) 206, (sub nom. British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU) [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3, (sub nom. British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. B.C.G.S.E.U.) 68 C.R.R. (2d) 1, 7 B.H.R.C. 437, (sub nom. Public Service Employee Relations Commission (B.C.) v. British Columbia Government & Service Employees’ Union) 244 N.R. 145, (sub nom. British Columbia Government & Service Employees’ Union v. Public Service Employee Relations Commission) 99 C.L.L.C. 230- 028, [1999] 10 W.W.R. 1, 66 B.C.L.R. (3d) 253, (sub nom. British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. B.C.G.S.E.U.) 176 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 1999 CarswellBC 1907, 1999 CarswellBC 1908, [1999] S.C.J. No. 46 (S.C.C.) — followed Brown v. Canada (Department of National Revenue - Customs & Excise) (1993), 1993 CarswellNat 2658, (sub nom. Brown v. Department of National Revenue) 93 C.L.L.C. 17,013, 19 C.H.R.R. D/39, [1993] C.H.R.D. No. 7 (Can. Human Rights Trib.) — referred to Campbell River & North Island Transition Society v. H.S.A.B.C. (2004), 2004 BCCA 260, 2004 CarswellBC 1012, (sub nom. H.S.A.B.C. v. Campbell River & North Island Transition Society) 127 L.A.C. (4th) 1, 28 B.C.L.R. (4th) 292, (sub nom. H.S.A.B.C. v. Campbell River & North Island Transition Society) 240 D.L.R. (4th) 479, (sub nom. Health Sciences Assn. of British Columbia v. Campbell River & North Island Transition Society) 50 C.H.R.R. D/140, 2004 C.L.L.C. 230-019, 196 B.C.A.C. 236, 322 W.A.C. 236, [2004] B.C.J. No. 922 (B.C. C.A.) — followed Chambly (Commission scolaire régionale) c. Bergevin (1994), 4 C.C.E.L. (2d) 165, 21 Admin. L.R. (2d) 169, (sub nom. Commission scolaire régionale de Chambly c. Syndicat de l’enseignement de Champlain) 169 N.R. 281, (sub nom. Syndicat de l’Enseignment de Champlain v. Commission Scolaire Régionale de Chambly) 94 C.L.L.C. 17,023, (sub nom. Commission scolaire Seeley v. Canadian National Railway 259

régionale de Chambly c. Syndicat de l’enseignement de Champlain) 62 Q.A.C. 241, (sub nom. Commission scolaire régionale de Chambly v. Ber- gevin) [1994] 2 S.C.R. 525, 115 D.L.R. (4th) 609, (sub nom. Régionale de Chambly, Commission scolaire c. Bergevin) 22 C.H.R.R. D/1, 1994 Car- swellQue 78, 1994 CarswellQue 114, EYB 1994-67796, [1997] S.C.J. No. 57 (S.C.C.) — referred to Hoyt v. Canadian National Railway (2006), 2006 CarswellNat 4258, 2006 CHRT 33, 2006 C.L.L.C. 230-035, 2006 CarswellNat 6612, 2006 TCDP 33, 57 C.H.R.R. D/437, [2006] C.H.R.D. No. 33 (Can. Human Rights Trib.) — considered Johnstone v. Canada (Attorney General) (2007), 2007 FC 36, 2007 CarswellNat 73, 2007 CF 36, 2007 CarswellNat 1588, 2007 C.L.L.C. 230-030, 306 F.T.R. 271 (Eng.), [2007] F.C.J. No. 43, [2007] A.C.F. No. 43 (F.C.) — considered Johnstone v. Canada (Border Services Agency) (2010), D.T.E. 2010T-750, 2010 C.L.L.C. 230-027, 2010 CarswellNat 3213, 2010 CHRT 20, [2010] R.J.D.T. 1402, [2010] C.H.R.D. No. 20 (Can. Human Rights Trib.) — considered Johnstone v. Canada (Border Services Agency) (2014), 2014 CarswellNat 1415, 2014 FCA 110 (F.C.A.) — considered Syndicat des employés de l’Hôpital général de Montréal c. Sexton (2007), 2007 CarswellQue 110, 2007 CarswellQue 111, 2007 SCC 4, (sub nom. Syndicat des Employés de l’Hôpital Général de Montréal v. Centre Universitaire de Santé McGill) 277 D.L.R. (4th) 577, (sub nom. CUSM c. Syndicat des Employés de L’HGM) [2007] 1 S.C.R. 161, (sub nom. Syndicat des employés de l’Hôpital général de Montréal v. Centre Universitaire de Santé McGill) 159 L.A.C. (4th) 1, (sub nom. McGill Univesity Health Centre v. Syndicat des employés de L’Hôpital général de Montréal) 59 C.H.R.R. D/259, (sub nom. McGill University Health Centre v. Syndicat des employés de l’Hôpital général de Montréal) 2007 C.L.L.C. 230-006, (sub nom. McGill University Health Centre (Montreal General Hospital) v. Syndicat des employés de l’Hôpital général de Montréal)) 356 N.R. 177, [2007] S.C.J. No. 4 (S.C.C.) — referred to Statutes considered: Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6 Generally — referred to s. 3(1) — considered s. 7 — considered s. 10 — considered s. 53(3) — considered

APPEAL by employer from decision reported at Seeley v. Canadian National Railway (2013), 2013 FC 117, 2013 CarswellNat 149, 2013 CF 117, 2013 Car- swellNat 1247, 50 Admin. L.R. (5th) 28, [2013] F.C.J. No. 97, 426 F.T.R. 258 260 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

(Eng.), 76 C.H.R.R. D/402 (F.C.), which dismissed application for judicial review.

Richard Charney, William Hlibchuk, Brian Gottheil for Appellant David Baker, Meryl Zisman Gary for Respondent, Denise Seeley Sheila Osborne-Brown, Daniel Poulin, Erin Collins for Respondent, Canadian Human Rights Commission Christina Hall, John Craig for Intervener, Federally Regulated Employers-Trans- portation and Communication Cathy Pike for Intervener, Ontario Human Rights Commission

Robert M. Mainville J.A.:

1 This is an appeal from a judgment reported as 2013 FC 117 (F.C.) of Mandamin J. of the Federal Court (Federal Court Judge) dismissing the judicial review application of the Canadian National Railway Company (CN) challenging a decision reported as 2010 CHRT 23 (Can. Human Rights Trib.) of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal (Tribunal). 2 The Tribunal found that CN had discriminated within the meaning of sections 7 and 10 of the Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H- 6 against the respondent Denise Seeley on the ground of family status by refusing to accommodate her childcare needs following her assignment from Jasper to Vancouver to protect a labour shortage. 3 For the reasons set out below, I would dismiss this appeal. 4 This appeal was heard immediately after an appeal involving similar legal issues between the Attorney General of Canada, representing the Canadian Border Services Agency, and Ms. Fiona Johnstone. The reasons for the judgment of this Court in Johnstone v. Canada (Border Services Agency), 2014 FCA 110 (F.C.A.) (“Johnstone”) are released concurrently with these reasons. For the purposes of clarity and brevity, extensive references to Johnstone will be made throughout these reasons.

Background and context 5 The full background is extensively set out in the Tribunal’s decision and need not be repeated. For the purposes of this appeal, the salient facts may be summarized as follows. 6 CN has more than 15,000 employees in Canada, of which over 4,000 are operating employees, also known as “running trade” employees, con- sisting of conductors and locomotive engineers. Running trade employees work either “road” or “yard”. Road work requires employees to get Seeley v. Canadian National Railway Robert M. Mainville J.A. 261

on a train at a terminal and take the train to another terminal. They then layover and come back to their home terminal. A yard employee typi- cally works in a rail yard, switching box cars and making up trains. The yard employees do not leave the terminal. A little over 3% of CN’S running trade employees are women. 7 Due to the nature of CN’s operations, running trade employees must be able to work where and when required. As a result, elaborate recall and mobility rules based largely on senority rights apply at CN. Of particular relevance for this appeal is section 148.11 of the applicable collective agreement, which provides that employees hired after June 29, 1990 can be forced to cover work at another terminal in the Western Region (i.e. from Vancouver to Thunder Bay) and are obligated to report for work at that terminal within 30 days unless they can submit satisfactory reasons justifying their failure to report. 8 Running trade employees who are laid off remain on a recall list in- definitely, and continue to accumulate seniority while laid off. Section 115 of the applicable collective agreement provides that employees who are laid off will be given preference for re-employment when staff is in- creased in their seniority district, and will be returned to work in order of seniority. The provision adds that if an employee is employed elsewhere at the time of recall, he may be allowed 30 days in which to report. If he fails to report for duty or to give satisfactory reasons for not reporting, he will forfeit all his seniority rights. 9 Ms. Seeley was hired by CN on July 2, 1991, and she qualified as a conductor in 1993. Her home terminal was Jasper, Alberta. Her husband is also employed by CN as a locomotive engineer with well over 30 years of service. Ms. Seeley worked from 1991 to 1997, when she was laid off. She however remained on the seniority list during lay-off and performed a few hours of work on emergency calls between 1997 and 2001. 10 Ms. Seeley and her husband had a first child in January 1999, and they then moved from Jasper to Brule, Alberta, a small community located approximately 98 kilometers from Jasper. Their second child was born in 2003. 11 In 2005, CN was experiencing a severe shortage of running trade employees at its Vancouver terminal. In February of 2005, CN decided to recall conductors from the Western Region to protect the shortage in Vancouver. For this purpose, 47 conductors were recalled on a seniority basis. Of these, 12 reported for work in Vancouver and are still employed 262 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

by CN, 30 were administratively terminated by CN in accordance with the terms of the collective agreement or chose to resign their position, and 5 were relieved from their obligation to report to Vancouver and remained in the employ of CN, including some who were accommodated due to attending to ill parents. 12 In the case of Ms. Seeley, she was recalled from lay off at the end of February, 2005 pursuant to section 115 of the collective agreement and assigned to cover the shortage in Vancouver pursuant to article 148.11 of that agreement. Various letters were then sent by Ms. Seeley to CN seeking an accommodation with respect to her childcare needs. She noted that it would be difficult to take her children with her to Vancouver, and that because of childcare responsibilities, it was not feasible to leave them with her husband whose own work obligations with CN would cause the same difficulties with childcare. She requested that her situation be considered on a compassionate basis and that she be allowed to wait out until Vancouver no longer required her services or there was work available at the Jasper terminal or at the adjacent terminal of Edson. She noted that CN running trade employees with medical conditions had been accommodated in the past, and she sought similar consideration with respect to her childcare situation. 13 CN authorized extensions of her recall date to Vancouver until June 30, 2005. Ms. Seeley continued to seek an accommodation that would address her childcare needs, but CN refused to deal with Ms. Seeley’s requests. On July 4, 2005, CN informed Ms. Seeley that her seniority rights had been forfeited and her employment terminated because she had failed to cover the shortage in Vancouver. 14 Ms. Seeley subsequently submitted a complaint pursuant to the Cana- dian Human Rights Act alleging that the CN had discriminated against her on the prohibited ground of family status. 15 The provisions of the Canadian Human Rights Act that are particularly pertinent to the complaint are subsection 3(1) and sections 7 and 10, which read as follows: 3. (1) For all purposes of this Act, the prohibited grounds of discrimination are race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, family status, disability and conviction for an offence for which a pardon has been granted or in respect of which a record suspension has been ordered. [Emphasis added] 7. It is a discriminatory practice, directly or indirectly, Seeley v. Canadian National Railway Robert M. Mainville J.A. 263

(a) to refuse to employ or continue to employ any individual, or (b) in the course of employment, to differentiate adversely in relation to an employee, on a prohibited ground of discrimination. 10. It is a discriminatory practice for an employer, employee organization or employer organization (a) to establish or pursue a policy or practice, or (b) to enter into an agreement affecting recruitment, referral, hir- ing, promotion, training, apprenticeship, transfer or any other matter relating to employment or prospective employment, that deprives or tends to deprive an individual or class of individuals of any employment opportunities on a prohibited ground of discrimination. 3. (1) Pour l’application de la présente loi, les motifs de distinction illicite sont ceux qui sont fondés sur la race, l’origine nationale ou ethnique, la couleur, la religion, l’âge, le sexe, l’orientation sexuelle, l’état matrimonial, la situation de famille, l’état de personne graciée ou la déficience. [Je souligne] 7. Constitue un acte discriminatoire, s’il est fondé sur un motif de distinction illicite, le fait, par des moyens directs ou indirects: a) de refuser d’employer ou de continuer d’employer un individu; b) de le défavoriser en cours d’emploi. 10. Constitue un acte discriminatoire, s’il est fondé sur un motif de distinction illicite et s’il est susceptible d’annihiler les chances d’emploi ou d’avancement d’un individu ou d’une catégorie d’individus, le fait, pour l’employeur, l’association patronale ou l’organisation syndicale: a) de fixer ou d’appliquer des lignes de conduite; b) de conclure des ententes touchant le recrutement, les mises en rapport, l’engagement, les promotions, la formation, l’apprentissage, les mutations ou tout autre aspect d’un emploi présent ou eventuel.´

The decision of the Tribunal 16 Relying on a previous decision of the Tribunal in Brown v. Canada (Department of National Revenue - Customs & Excise) [1993 Car- swellNat 2658 (Can. Human Rights Trib.)], 1993 CanLII 683, the Tribu- 264 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

nal found that the prohibited ground of discrimination of family status in the Canadian Human Rights Act includes the childcare obligations of a parent. 17 With respect to the test for finding a prima facie case of discrimination on this ground, the Tribunal rejected the approach proposed by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Campbell River & North Island Transition Society v. H.S.A.B.C., 2004 BCCA 260, 240 D.L.R. (4th) 479 (B.C. C.A.) (“Campbell River”). Under the Campbell River test, “a prima facie case of discrimination is made out when a change in a term or condition of employment imposed by an employer results in a serious interference with a substantial parental or other family duty or obligation of the employee”: Campbell River at para. 39. 18 The Tribunal instead followed the approach set out in its previous decisions of Hoyt v. Canadian National Railway, 2006 CHRT 33 (Can. Human Rights Trib.) (“Hoyt”) and of Johnstone v. Canada (Border Services Agency), 2010 CHRT 20 (Can. Human Rights Trib.), as well as in the reasons of Barnes J. of the Federal Court in Johnstone v. Canada (Attorney General), 2007 FC 36, 306 F.T.R. 271 (Eng.) (F.C.). Under that approach, in order to make out a prima facie case on the prohibited ground of family status, an individual should not have to tolerate some amount of discrimination to a certain unknown level before being afforded the protection of the Canadian Human Rights Act. 19 The Tribunal found that Ms. Seeley had made out a case of prima facie discrimination since she had demonstrated that she was the parent of two children, she could not rely on her husband for the childcare needs of these children as a result of his own work schedule for CN, that she was told to temporarily move to Vancouver “with no information with regard to how long she would have to stay there or about housing arrangements once she arrived there”, and that this temporary move “would disrupt her children’s care and that it would be impossible for her to make arrangements for appropriate child care”: Tribunal’s decision at para. 123. 20 The Tribunal further found that CN had not demonstrated that the accommodation sought by Ms. Seeley would cause it undue hardship under the third element of the three-step test set out in British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. B.C.G.E.U., [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) (“Meiorin”) at paras. 54 and 55. The Tribunal concluded from the evidence “that CN was not sensitive to the Complainant’s situation” and “did not answer her many requests for some form of accommodation Seeley v. Canadian National Railway Robert M. Mainville J.A. 265

and did not even meet or contact her to discuss her situation...”: Tribu- nal’s decision at para. 150. 21 The Tribunal further concluded that CN did not consider family status matters that involve parental obligations and responsibilities as a protected ground of discrimination that necessitated accommodation, and thus also found that CN had refused to seriously consider Ms. Seeley’s situation, thus failing to meet the procedural component of the duty to accommodate: Tribunal’s decision at paras. 151 to 165. 22 The Tribunal also rejected CN’s submission that accommodating Ms. Seeley would result in undue hardship since she would in effect be provided with a “super seniority” based on the simple fact of her status as a parent. The Tribunal found that CN did not produce evidence that it would have faced undue operational hardship by accommodating Ms. Seeley, that it was overwhelmed with requests for accommodation from individuals in a comparable situation to Ms. Seeley, or that accommodating her would cause undue hardship in terms of costs: Tribunal’s decision at paras. 116 to 173. 23 The Tribunal consequently concluded that CN had breached sections 7 and 10 of the Canadian Human Rights Act. It ordered CN (a) to work with the Canadian Human Rights Commission to ensure that such discriminatory practice and behaviour does not continue; (b) to reinstate Ms. Seeley as of March 2007 without loss of seniority, that being the date she would have returned to work at the Jasper terminal had she remained on the recall and seniority list, (c) to compensate Ms. Seeley for loss wages and benefits from March 1st, 2007, with a 30% reduction based on an assessment of Ms. Seeley’s ability to mitigate her damages, and (d) to pay Ms. Seeley $15,000 for pain and suffering. 24 The Tribunal also ordered CN to pay Ms. Seeley $20,000 for special compensation under subsection 53(3) of the Canadian Human Rights Act on the ground that CN’s conduct had been reckless. This award princi- pally resulted from the Tribunal’s finding that CN managers had ignored CN’s accommodation policy that identified family status as a ground of discrimination, and from its further finding that CN managers “didn’t make any efforts to try to understand the Complainant’s situations, ignored her letters, decided to treat her case as just a ‘child care issue’ and to cherry-pick which ground of discrimination should give way to accommodation and which should not”: Tribunal’s decision at para. 191. 266 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

The judgment of the Federal Court Judge 25 CN pursued the matter in the Federal Court through a judicial review application challenging the Tribunal’s decision on various grounds. The Federal Court judge dismissed the application. 26 The Judge applied the reasonableness standard of review to all of the issues raised before him, including the scope of the prohibited ground of discrimination on the basis of family status and the legal test for finding a prima facie case of discrimination on that ground. 27 The Judge rejected CN’s submission that the Tribunal had erred in adopting an overly broad interpretation of family status. He rather found that the Tribunal’s conclusion that family status included childcare obligations was reasonable since “[i]t is within the scope of the ordinary meaning of the words; it is in accord with the objects of the [Canadian Human Rights] Act which express Parliament’s intent; it is interpreted liberally giving the right enunciated full recognition and effect, and it is in keeping with previous decisions in related human rights and labour forums as well as relevant jurisprudence”: Federal Court Judge’s reasons at para. 70. 28 The Federal Court Judge also found that the test used by the Tribunal for finding a prima facie case of discrimination was reasonable, as well as the application of that test to the circumstances of Ms. Seeley. In so doing, he specifically discarded the “serious interference” test used in Campbell River. 29 Turning to CN’s submissions concerning its duty to accommodate, the Judge concluded that the Tribunal’s finding that CN had failed to meet the third part of the Meiorin test was reasonable. The Federal Court Judge noted that CN never responded to Ms. Seeley’s requests for accommodation, did not consider family status involving childcare obligations as requiring accommodation, and failed to meet the procedural component of the duty to accommodate: Federal Court Judge’s reasons at para. 106. 30 With respect to CN’s submissions on the issue of “super seniority” and the terms of the collective agreement, the Federal Court Judge found these to be valid questions, but that they were not engaged in this case since CN had never raised the question with the Union before terminating the employment of Ms. Seeley: Federal Court Judge’s reasons at paras. 108 and 109. Seeley v. Canadian National Railway Robert M. Mainville J.A. 267

31 Furthermore, the Federal Court Judge also found that the Tribunal had a sufficient basis to reasonably conclude that CN’s conduct in this case was reckless, and consequently he upheld the Tribunal’s award of special damages.

Issues raised in appeal 32 The issues raised in this appeal may be set out as follows: 1. What is the applicable standard of review? 2. Did the Tribunal commit a reviewable error in finding that family status includes childcare obligations and in identifying the legal test for finding a prima facie case of discrimination on the ground of family status? 3. Applying the proper meaning and scope to family status, and using the proper legal test, did the Tribunal commit a reviewable error in finding that a prima facie case of discrimination on the ground of family status had been made out in this case? 4. Did the Tribunal commit a reviewable error in finding that CN had not met the Meiorin test in this case? 5. Did the Tribunal commit a reviewable error in ordering special compensation under subsection 53(3) of the Cana- dian Human Rights Act? 33 The first two issues identified above have been extensively dealt with in the reasons for judgment released concurrently in Johnstone.

The standard of review 34 As noted in Johnstone, in an appeal from a judgment concerning a judicial review application, the role of this Court is to determine whether the application judge identified and applied the correct standard of review, and in the event he or she has not, to assess the decision under review in light of the correct standard. In effect, this means that an appellate court’s focus is on the administrative decision, in this case, the decision of the Tribunal. The application judge’s selection of the appropriate standard of review is itself a question of law subject to review on the standard of correctness. 35 There is no dispute that the findings of the Tribunal with respect to questions of fact and of mixed fact and law are to be reviewed on a standard of reasonableness. However, there is disagreement as to the stan- 268 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

dard of review that applies to findings of law made by the Tribunal with respect to (a) the meaning and scope of family status as a prohibited ground of discrimination and (b) the applicable legal test under which a finding of discrimination may be made under this prohibited ground. 36 For the reasons extensively set out in Johnstone, the presumption of reasonableness that applies to the decisions of the Tribunal is rebutted and a standard of correctness is to be applied with respect to these two legal issues. This results notably from the following: (a) the Supreme Court of Canada has consistently held that fundamental rights set out in human rights legislation are quasi-constitutional rights, and the principle that constitutional issues are subject to a correctness review extends as well to quasi-constitutional issues involving the fundamental human rights set out in the Canadian Human Rights Act; (b) a multiplicity of courts and tribunals are called upon to interpret and apply the rights set out in human rights legislation, including the Canadian Human Rights Act, and it would be inconsistent to review the legal questions at issue here on judicial review of a decision of the Tribunal on a deferential standard, but adopt a correctness standard on an appeal from a decision of a court of first instance on the same legal question; (c) since most provinces have adopted human rights legislation that prohibit discrimination on the basis of family status, for the sake of consistency between these statutes, the meaning and scope of family status and the legal test to find discrimination on that prohibited ground are issues of central importance to the legal system; (d) the Supreme Court of Canada has determined in the past that a correctness standard applies to the meaning and scope of family status under the Canadian Human Rights Act, and it should be left to the Supreme Court of Canada itself to determine if this approach has been implicitly over- ruled by its more recent decisions dealing with the standard of review. Seeley v. Canadian National Railway Robert M. Mainville J.A. 269

The meaning and scope of family status and the test for prima facie discrimination 37 Contrary to the appellant in Johnstone, in this appeal CN does not dispute that the scope of the prohibited ground of family status is wide enough to encompass parental obligations such as childcare obligations. 38 CN rather submits that the “issue raised by the instant appeal is when a parental obligation gives rise to a prima facie discrimination and requires accommodation”, and the “resolution of this issue requires an ap- preciation of the nature of parental obligations”: CN’s memorandum at para. 40. In CN’s view, “non-mandatory aspects of child-rearing do not fall within the scope of a parental obligation and are not protected by human rights law”: ibid. at para. 41. 39 CN further adds that there are a number of ways parents can meet both their professional obligations to their employer and their parental obligations, including care of the children by one of the spouses, by other family members, by daycare services, by nannies and by other appropriate options. As a result, CN submits that family status discrimination on the basis of childcare obligations does not occur unless no reasonable childcare option is available without accommodation in the workplace: CN’s memorandum at para. 48. 40 CN thus submits that the test to establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of family status involving childcare obligations requires the claimant to establish (1) that a parental obligation is at issue, as opposed to a preferred option for meeting that obligation; (2) that a causal connection exists between the parental obligation and any adverse employment consequences; (3) that the claimant has made all reasonable efforts to meet the parental obligation, but is unable to meet it without some form of accommodation in the workplace; and (4) that the facts of the case demonstrate arbitrariness or the perpetuation of prejudice or stereotyping: CN’s memorandum at para. 57. 41 As found by this Court in Johnstone, the prohibited ground of discrimination of family status encompasses the parental obligations whose non-fulfillment engages the parent’s legal responsibility to the child. The childcare obligations contemplated by the expression family status are thus those that have immutable or constructively immutable characteristics, such as those that form an integral component of the legal relationship between a parent and a child. As a result, the childcare obligations at issue are those which a parent cannot neglect without engaging his or her 270 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

legal liability. This approach avoids trivializing human rights by extending human rights protection to personal choices. 42 As further found in Johnstone, in order to make out a prima facie case where an alleged workplace discrimination on the prohibited ground of family status resulting from a childcare obligation is alleged, the individual advancing the claim must show (i) that a child is under his or her care and supervision; (ii) that the childcare obligation at issue engages the individual’s legal responsibility for that child, as opposed to a personal choice; (iii) that he or she has made reasonable efforts to meet that childcare obligation through reasonable alternative solutions, and that no such alternative solution is reasonably accessible; and (iv) that the impugned workplace rule interferes in a manner that is more than trivial or insubstantial with the fulfillment of the childcare obligation. 43 These factors are all further explained in Johnstone and need not be reviewed again here.

Application to the circumstances of Ms. Seeley 44 There is no fundamental dispute that Ms. Seeley meets the two first factors of the test for a prima facie case of discrimination. She was the mother of two young children at the time she was called to Vancouver, and these children were under her care and supervision and that of her husband. She and her husband had a legal responsibility to ensure that their children would be cared for and supervised while they were away at work. 45 The dispute in this case concerns the two last factors, namely whether Ms. Seeley made reasonable efforts to meet her childcare obligations through reasonable alternative solutions, and that no such alternative was reasonably accessible, and whether her recall to cover the shortage in Vancouver interfered in a manner that was more than trivial or insubstantial with the fulfillment of her childcare obligations. 46 CN submits that by moving to the hamlet of Brule, Alberta, Ms. See- ley placed herself in a situation where no childcare services could be ac- cessed so as to meet her obligations to her employer. This, in CN’s view, was a personal family choice. CN further submits that Ms. Seeley decided that she would not bring her children to Vancouver during her work assignment there. As a result, according to CN, Ms. Seeley “did not discern between childcare options, but rather sought to enforce her preferred option: an outright exemption from her Collective Agreement obligation to protect shortages”: CN’s memorandum au para. 60. Seeley v. Canadian National Railway Robert M. Mainville J.A. 271

47 CN further submits that “[a]s [Ms.] Seeley made no effort to explore childcare options in Vancouver or in Brule (or nearby Jasper or Hinton, Alberta), she failed to establish a causal connection between her failure to report to Vancouver (and consequent termination) and her parental obligations”: ibid. at para. 62. As a result, “[h]ad the Tribunal undertaken the proper analysis mandated by the case law, it would have recognized the complete lack of evidence of any effort by [Ms.] Seeley to meet her parental obligations in a way that would allow her professional obligations to be met”: ibid. at para. 63. 48 CN also submits that the evidence before the Tribunal was not capa- ble of supporting a finding of arbitrariness, prejudice or stereotyping since the only disadvantage suffered by Ms. Seeley was the termination of an exceptional benefit in the form of continued access to recall opportunities eight years after being laid off, when the condition of this benefit, accepting such opportunities when offered, was no longer satisfied: CN’s memorandum at paras. 69 to 72. 49 It adds that the Tribunal erred in placing considerable weight on the finding that CN did not believe that Ms. Seeley’s situation required accommodation and did not attempt to accommodate her. In CN’s view, this reasoning is problematic in that human rights law does not recognize a freestanding duty to accommodate before a prima facie case of discrimination has been established: CN’s memorandum at paras. 74 to 76. 50 The fundamental problem with CN’s submissions is that none of its managers provided any useful information to Ms. Seeley about her work assignment in Vancouver that would have allowed her to assess her childcare needs. In fact, CN did not respond in a substantive way to any of her numerous inquiries. Indeed, on February 25, 2005, a CN representative left a message with Ms. Seeley’s husband stating that she was being forced to cover a shortage in Vancouver and to report for duty in Vancouver within two weeks. This was the only information CN ever provided to Ms. Seeley: Tribunal’s decision at paras. 44-45, 60 to 62 and 123. 51 CN never provided Ms. Seeley information about the estimated dura- tion of her recall to Vancouver, about the location in Vancouver to which she would be assigned, about her shifts once assigned to Vancouver, about the housing accommodation that would be made available to her in Vancouver, or any other pertinent information that would have assisted her in reasonably assessing whether her required childcare needs could be fulfilled while responding to the recall. As a result, taking Ms. See- 272 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

ley’s children with her to Vancouver became an unrealistic option because she had no idea where, when or for how long she would be working in Vancouver. 52 In these circumstances, the Tribunal found that a prima facie case of discrimination had been made out, and the Federal Court Judge concluded that this finding was reasonable. In this regard, I agree with the assessment of the Federal Court Judge set out at paragraph 90 of his reasons: [90] I would agree that by any standard, Ms. Seeley has provided evidence of a prima facie case of discrimination based on family status. She is the primary caregiver for two children of tender age. Her husband works full time and is the family breadwinner. The choice of residence in Brule was not an issue previously and Ms. Seeley’s evidence indicates she considered whether childcare was available in nearby Hinton. CN never provided information necessary to explore whether childcare options were available or feasible in Vancouver. A realistic assessment of Ms. Seeley’s familial circumstances does disclose she would have significant difficulty in fulfilling her childcare responsibilities in responding to an indefinite recall assignment to cover the Vancouver shortage. 53 As for the fourth factor, it seems obvious that requesting Ms. Seeley to move from Alberta to British Columbia to meet a work shortage is a work related situation that interferes in a manner that is more than trivial or insubstantial with the fulfillment of Ms. Seeley’s childcare obligations. 54 In these circumstances, like the Federal Court Judge, I would not dis- turb the Tribunal’s finding that Ms. Seeley met her burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. This may well have been a different conclusion had CN actually provided Ms. Seeley with pertinent information about her new work arrangements in Vancouver, but it did not.

Duty to accommodate 55 Once a prima facie case of discrimination has been made out, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the impugned standard or action is a bona fide occupational requirement (BFOR). The Supreme Court of Canada provided the following test for this purpose at paras. 54 and 55 of Meiorin: [53] Having considered the various alternatives, I propose the following three-step test for determining whether a prima facie discrimina- Seeley v. Canadian National Railway Robert M. Mainville J.A. 273

tory standard is a BFOR. An employer may justify the impugned standard by establishing on the balance of probabilities: (1) that the employer adopted the standard for a purpose ration- ally connected to the performance of the job; (2) that the employer adopted the particular standard in an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary to the fulfilment of that legitimate work-related purpose; and (3) that the standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplish- ment of that legitimate work-related purpose. To show that the standard is reasonably necessary, it must be demonstrated that it is impossible to accommodate individual employees sharing the characteristics of the claimant without imposing undue hardship upon the employer. [55] This approach is premised on the need to develop standards that accommodate the potential contributions of all employees in so far as this can be done without undue hardship to the employer. Standards may adversely affect members of a particular group, to be sure. But as Wilson J. noted in Central Alberta Dairy Pool, supra, at p. 518, “[i]f a reasonable alternative exists to burdening members of a group with a given rule, that rule will not be [a BFOR]”. It follows that a rule or standard must accommodate individual differences to the point of undue hardship if it is to be found reasonably necessary. Un- less no further accommodation is possible without imposing undue hardship, the standard is not a BFOR in its existing form and the prima facie case of discrimination stands. 56 In this case, the Tribunal found that CN had met the first two parts of the Meiorin test. However, it also found that CN had not met the third part since it concluded that CN had failed to demonstrate that accommodating Ms. Seeley would cause undue hardship. 57 CN submitted to the Tribunal, and it reiterates in this appeal, three distinct arguments to support its argument with respect to having met its duty to accommodate. 58 First, in CN’s view, extending the date that Ms. Seeley was required to report to Vancouver by a few months to June 30, 2005 was a sufficient and reasonable accommodation in the circumstances. The Tribunal rejected this submission on the ground that this “was not in any way a meaningful response to the Complainant’s request and to the factual un- derpinnings of her situation which she had communicated to the employer through her correspondence”: Tribunal’s reasons at para. 145. I agree. 274 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

59 As the Tribunal found, at paras. 150 and following of its decision, CN was not sensitive to Ms. Seeley’s situation, did not answer her requests, and did not consider family status matters that involve parental obligations as a ground of discrimination that necessitated any form of accommodation whatsoever. 60 Second, CN adds that, in any event, the duty to accommodate does not extend to a complete exemption from Ms. Seeley’s obligation to report to work under the terms of the collective agreement. Though I recognize that the duty to accommodate usually results in an accommodation allowing the employee to actually participate in work related activities, each case must be considered in light of its particular circumstances. 61 CN had accommodated other running trade employees who had been recalled to Vancouver with Ms. Seeley. As an example, an employee identified as AB was “set up” at the Sioux Lookout terminal. By being “set up” at his home terminal, he was no longer required to cover the shortage in Vancouver: Tribunal’s decision at para. 49. Similarly, an employee identified as U was accommodated in various manners (extension of time to report, leave of absence, and “set up” at his home terminal) so as to attend to his father who was terminally ill: Tribunal’s decision at paras. 50 to 57 and 130. 62 It is abundantly clear from these examples that various forms of accommodation were provided by CN to other employees that were not offered to Ms. Seeley nor even contemplated in her case. In light of these circumstances, CN’s submissions on this point are rather hollow. 63 Third, CN submits that seniority rights under the collective agreement were ignored by the Tribunal, a submission that was identified as the “super seniority” argument by both the Tribunal and the Federal Court Judge. The Tribunal rejected this submission on the basis that CN had failed to submit evidence that an accommodation for Ms. Seeley would have caused any undue hardship for CN or its employees with more seniority: Tribunal’s decision at paras. 166 to 173. The Federal Court Judge added that CN never raised this question with the Union before dismissing Ms. Seeley, and it was therefore precluded to raise this issue after the fact: Federal Court Judge’s reasons at para. 109. 64 In this matter, I agree with both the Tribunal and the Federal Court Judge. I add that seniority and other collective labour agreement provisions do not normally constitute an impediment to an accommodation required under human rights legislation: Chambly (Commission scolaire Seeley v. Canadian National Railway Robert M. Mainville J.A. 275

régionale) c. Bergevin, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 525 (S.C.C.) at p. 551; Syndicat des employés de l’Hôpital général de Montréal c. Sexton, 2007 SCC 4, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 161 (S.C.C.) at paras. 11 to 28.

Special Compensation 65 In this appeal, CN is not challenging any of the remedies granted by the Tribunal except with respect to the amount of $20,000 for special compensation under subsection 53(3) of the Canadian Human Rights Act, which reads as follows: 53. (3) In addition to any order under subsection (2), the member or panel may order the person to pay such compensation not exceeding twenty thousand dollars to the victim as the member or panel may determine if the member or panel finds that the person is engaging or has engaged in the discriminatory practice wilfully or recklessly. 53. (3) Outre les pouvoirs que lui confère le paragraphe (2), le membre instructeur peut ordonner a` l’auteur d’un acte discriminatoire de payer a` la victime une indemnité maximale de 20 000 $, s’il en vient a` la conclusion que l’acte a et´´ e délibéré ou inconsidéré. 66 CN submits that the Tribunal’s finding of reckless conduct in this case was not supported by the evidence. CN argues that at the time it made its decisions concerning Ms. Seeley, Campbell River was the only appellate decision concerning the scope of the prohibited ground of discrimination of family status, and that the cases on which the Tribunal relied to support a broader interpretation of family status had not been rendered by the time Ms. Seeley was terminated on July 4, 2005. In CN’s view the “failure to abide by a jurisprudential current that did not yet exist is not representative of reckless behaviour”: CN’s memorandum at para. 117. 67 CN adds that the Tribunal’s conclusion of recklessness was based on its finding that CN had not applied its internal accommodation guidelines to Ms. Seeley. In CN’s view, it “is difficult to imagine why CN would have done so, when the state of the law at the relevant time provided no indication that [Ms.] Seeley’s circumstances might have amounted to prima facie discrimination”: CN’s memorandum at para. 118. 68 The Federal Court Judge rejected these submissions on the basis that CN “steadfastly ignored the basis for Ms. Seeley’s request for accommodation despite [that] available jurisprudence recognized childcare as within the scope of human rights based on family status.”: Federal Court Judge’s reasons at para. 113. I agree with the Federal Court Judge on this 276 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

matter, and add that the failure by CN to provide any significant information to Ms. Seeley concerning her assignment to Vancouver that could have assisted her in determining her childcare needs was, in any event, a form of reckless conduct.

Conclusion 69 I would therefore dismiss this appeal, with costs to be paid by CN in favour of Ms. Seeley. There should be no award of costs for or against the respondent Canadian Human Rights Commission or any of the interveners.

J.D. Denis Pelletier J.A.:

I agree

A.F. Scott J.A.:

I agree Appeal dismissed. Kinsel v. Canada (MCI) 277

[Indexed as: Kinsel v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)] Helen Jean Kinsel and Barbara Elizabeth Kinsel, Appellants and Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent Federal Court of Appeal Docket: A-35-13 2014 FCA 126 Eleanor R. Dawson, Johanne Trudel, D.G. Near JJ.A. Heard: December 10, 2013 Judgment: May 14, 2014* Immigration and citizenship –––– Constitutional issues — Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Citizenship –––– Officer of Citizenship and Immigration Canada refused applicants’ applications for Certificates of Citizenship under Citizenship Act — Applicants brought application for judicial review of decision — Application was dismissed — Applicants appealed — Appeal dismissed — Applicants lacked standing to bring Charter challenge because they were not primary targets of alleged violation of s. 15 of Charter and because they were not Canadian citizens or residents — It was not necessary to consider merits of Charter challenge.

APPEAL by applicants from decision reported at Kinsel v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2012), 2012 FC 1515, 2012 CarswellNat 5167, 2012 CF 1515, 2012 CarswellNat 5512, 15 Imm. L.R. (4th) 220, 52 Admin. L.R. (5th) 283, 423 F.T.R. 299 (Eng.), [2012] F.C.J. No. 1642, [2012] A.C.F. No. 1642 (F.C.), which dismissed application for judicial review.

William A. Kinsel for Appellants Banafsheh Sokhansanj, Phillipe Alma for Respondent

Eleanor R. Dawson J.A.: I. Introduction 1 In 2009, the Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-29 (Act) was amended to extend citizenship to individuals who had lost or were denied their

*A corrigendum issued by the court on May 29, 2014 has been incorporated herein. 278 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

citizenship for a variety of reasons. At issue in this appeal is the scope of the amendment. 2 This is an appeal from an order of the Federal Court dismissing the appellants’ application for judicial review of a decision by a delegate of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. The delegate refused to issue citizenship certificates to the appellants because they did not meet the statutory requirements for citizenship set out in the Act. 3 In the Federal Court, the appellants argued that the delegate had erroneously interpreted the Act. In the alternative, they argued that, if correct, the delegate’s interpretation of the Act violated section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 (Charter). 4 For reasons reported as 2012 FC 1515, 423 F.T.R. 299, the Federal Court dismissed the application for judicial review. For the reasons that follow, I would dismiss the appeal. The appellants have not established that the delegate erred in her interpretation of the Act and the appellants have failed to establish any violation of section 15 of the Charter.

II. The Facts 5 The facts are carefully set out in the decision of the Federal Court and are not in dispute. Simply put, the appellants’ paternal grandmother was a Canadian citizen who (under the then applicable citizenship legislation) ceased to be a Canadian when she became a naturalized citizen of the United States of America. The appellants’ father was born in the United States and at the time of his birth, neither of his parents held Canadian citizenship. The appellants were also born in the United States. At the time of their births, neither of their parents held Canadian citizenship. 6 On April 17, 2009, Bill C-37 came into force. Its effect was to amend the Act and restore citizenship to so-called “lost Canadians”. Under paragraphs 3(1)(f) and 3(7)(d) of the Act, Bill C-37 retroactively restored Canadian citizenship to persons, like the appellants’ paternal grandmother, who ceased to be a Canadian citizen as a result of acquiring another nationality. Under Bill C-37, such persons were deemed to be citizens of Canada from the time they lost their citizenship. 7 Additionally, under paragraphs 3(1)(g) and 3(7)(e) of the Act, citizenship was granted retroactively to persons born abroad to a Canadian. Thus, the appellants’ father was deemed to be a Canadian citizen from the time he was born. Kinsel v. Canada (MCI) Eleanor R. Dawson J.A. 279

8 The issue before this Court is whether Bill C-37 introduced a limit on derivative citizenship (that is citizenship derived from being born to a Canadian parent). It is the position of the Minister that, pursuant to paragraph 3(3)(a) of the Act, Canadian citizenship by descent extends only to the first generation of progeny born abroad. The appellants assert that there is no such limitation affecting their claims. They argue they are entitled to citizenship pursuant to paragraph 3(1)(b) of the Act which extends citizenship to persons born outside of Canada to a Canadian citizen. 9 In the alternative, the appellants argue that if the delegate properly interpreted the Act (as amended by Bill C-37), the legislation is unconsti- tutional on the ground that it violates section 15 of the Charter.

III. Applicable Legislation A. Citizenship Act 10 The relevant portion of the definition of “citizenship” under the Act is: 3. (1) Subject to this Act, a person is a citizen if (a) the person was born in Canada after February 14, 1977; (b) the person was born outside Canada after February 14, 1977 and at the time of his birth one of his parents, other than a parent who adopted him, was a citizen; [...] (f) before the coming into force of this paragraph, the person ceased to be a citizen for any reason other than the following reasons and did not subsequently become a citizen: (i) the person renounced his or her citizenship under any of the following provisions: [...] (ii) the person’s citizenship was revoked for false representation, fraud or concealment of material circumstances under any of the following provisions: [...] (iii) the person failed to make an application to retain his or her citizenship under section 8 as it read before the coming into force of this paragraph or did make such an application that subsequently was not approved; 280 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

(g) the person was born outside Canada before February 15, 1977 to a parent who was a citizen at the time of the birth and the person did not, before the coming into force of this paragraph, become a citizen; 3. (1) Sous réserve des autres dispositions de la présente loi, a qualité de citoyen toute personne: a) née au Canada après le 14 février 1977; b) née a` l’étranger après le 14 février 1977 d’un père ou d’une mère ayant qualité de citoyen au moment de la naissance; [...] f) qui, avant l’entrée en vigueur du présent alinéa, a cessé d’être citoyen pour un motif autre que les motifs ci-après et n’est pas subséquemment devenu citoyen: (i) elle a renoncé a` sa citoyenneté au titre de l’une des dispositions suivantes: [...] (ii) sa citoyenneté a et´´ e révoquée pour cause de fausse déclaration, fraude ou dissimulation de faits importants ou essentiels au titre de l’une des dispositions suivantes: [...] (iii) elle n’a pas présenté la demande visée a` l’article 8, dans ses versions antérieures a` l’entrée en vigueur du présent alinéa, pour conserver sa citoyenneté ou, si elle l’a fait, la demande a et´´ e rejetée; g) qui, née a` l’étranger avant le 15 février 1977 d’un père ou d’une mère ayant qualité de citoyen au moment de la naissance, n’est pas devenue citoyen avant l’entrée en vigueur du présent alinéa; 11 What the Minister characterizes to be the limit on derivative citizenship introduced by Bill C-37 is found in subsection 3(3). Only paragraph 3(3)(a) is relevant to this appeal: 3. (3) Subsection (1) does not apply to a person born outside Canada (a) if, at the time of his or her birth or adoption, only one of the person’s parents is a citizen and that parent is a citizen under paragraph (1)(b), (c.1), (e), (g) or (h), or both of the person’s parents are citizens under any of those paragraphs; or 3. (3) Le paragraphe (1) ne s’applique pas a` la personne née a` l’étranger dont, selon le cas: a) au moment de la naissance ou de l’adoption, seul le père ou la mère a qualité de citoyen, et ce, au titre de l’un des alinéas Kinsel v. Canada (MCI) Eleanor R. Dawson J.A. 281

(1)b), c.1), e), g) et h), ou les deux parents ont cette qualité au titre de l’un de ces alinéas; 12 Subsection 3(4) is characterized by its heading to be a transitional provision which provides an exception to subsection 3(3): 3. (4) Subsection (3) does not apply to a person who, on the coming into force of that subsection, is a citizen. 3. (4) Le paragraphe (3) ne s’applique pas a` la personne qui, a` la date d’entrée en vigueur de ce paragraphe, a qualité de citoyen. 13 It is paragraphs 3(7)(d) and (e) respectively that operated to confer citizenship on the appellants’ paternal grandmother retroactive to the time she lost her Canadian citizenship and on Mr. Kinsel, retroactive to the date of his birth: 3. (7) Despite any provision of this Act or any Act respecting natural- ization or citizenship that was in force in Canada at any time before the day on which this subsection comes into force [...] (d) a person referred to in paragraph (1)(f) — other than a person described in paragraph (c) — is deemed to be a citizen under paragraph (1)(f) from the time the person ceased to be a citizen; (e) a person referred to in paragraph (1)(g) or (h) is deemed to be a citizen from the time that he or she was born; 3. (7) Malgré les autres dispositions de la présente loi et l’ensemble des lois concernant la naturalisation ou la citoyenneté en vigueur au Canada avant l’entrée en vigueur du présent paragraphe: [...] d) la personne visée a` l’alinéa (1)f) autre que celle visée a` l’alinéa c) est réputée etreˆ citoyen au titre de l’alinéa (1)f) a` partir du moment où elle a cessé d’être citoyen; e) la personne visée aux alinéas (1)g) ou h) est réputée etreˆ citoyen a` partir du moment de sa naissance;

B. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 14 As stated above, if this Court finds paragraph 3(3)(a) precludes the appellants from claiming citizenship under paragraph 3(1)(b), they argue 282 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

in the alternative that this preclusion violates their equality rights under section 15 in a manner not saved by section 1 of the Charter: 1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. [...] 15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. 1. La Charte canadienne des droits et libertés garantit les droits et libertés qui y sont enonc´´ es. Ils ne peuvent etreˆ restreints que par une règle de droit, dans des limites qui soient raisonnables et dont la jus- tification puisse se démontrer dans le cadre d’une société libre et démocratique. [...] 15. (1) La loi ne fait acception de personne et s’applique egalement´ a` tous, et tous ont droit a` la même protection et au même bénéfice de la loi, indépendamment de toute discrimination, notamment des dis- criminations fondées sur la race, l’origine nationale ou ethnique, la couleur, la religion, le sexe, l’âge ou les déficiences mentales ou physiques.

IV. The Delegate’s Decision 15 The delegate refused the appellants’ applications for citizenship on the ground they did not meet the statutory requirements for citizenship under paragraph 3(1)(b) of the Act. In particular, the delegate found subsection 3(3) limits citizenship by descent to the first generation of progeny born abroad to Canadian citizens. Since the appellants were the second generation of Canadian-descendents born abroad, subsection 3(3) precluded them from claiming citizenship by descent.

V. The Federal Court’s Decision 16 After setting out the relevant facts, the Judge found the delegate’s decision should be reviewed on a reasonableness standard. In coming to this conclusion, the Judge relied on Federal Court decisions Rabin v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 1094, [2010] F.C.J. No. 1366 at paragraphs 16 and 17 and Jabour v. Canada Kinsel v. Canada (MCI) Eleanor R. Dawson J.A. 283

(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 98, [2013] 3 F.C.R. 640 at paragraphs 21 to 29 where reasonableness review was applied to a delegate’s determination on the same issue. The Judge also relied on the fact that determining who is a citizen falls directly within a delegate’s expertise and that, although important to Canadians, citizenship is not of central importance to the legal system as a whole. 17 The appellants argued that because their father was granted citizenship retroactive to the date of his birth, history was “rewritten” such that the appellants were born to a Canadian citizen and, therefore, met the requirements of paragraph 3(1)(b) of the Act. In turn, this meant, the appellants were already citizens when subsection 3(4) came into force and, as such, were insulated from the first generation cut-off. 18 The Judge analyzed the relevant provisions of the Act and found that, notwithstanding the appellants’ submissions, subsection 3(4) did not only apply to people born after April 17, 2009 when Bill C-37 came into force. There were two reasons for this conclusion. First, as set out in numerous legislative reports, the purpose of Bill C-37 was to preclude citizenship by descent after the first generation born abroad; the appellants’ interpretation would frustrate this purpose. Second, the appellants’ interpretation erroneously suggested their father’s retroactive citizenship under paragraph 3(7)(e) was conferred earlier than their loss of eligibility under paragraph 3(3)(a). In the Judge’s view, the following events all occurred simultaneously when Bill C-37 came into force: • Mr. Kinsel became a citizen from the date of his birth; • The appellants became entitled to citizenship; and • The appellants’ entitlement to citizenship was foreclosed by paragraph 3(3)(a). 19 The Judge then referred to various Parliamentary reports and Citizen- ship and Immigration documents to conclude that paragraph 3(3)(a) was intended to cut-off citizenship by descent after the first generation born abroad, regardless of whether or not an applicant was born before 2009. Further, because the appellants did not argue before the delegate that paragraph 3(3)(a) was inconsistent with the United Nations’ Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 30 August 1961, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 989, p. 175, the Judge ruled she would not consider it on judicial review. Given that the argument was not before her, in the Judge’s view it was reasonable for the delegate not to consider it. 284 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

20 Finally, the Judge found the appellants did not have standing under the Charter to challenge the alleged unconstitutionality of paragraph 3(3)(a) of the Act. The Judge reasoned that the appellants were relying on the alleged denial of their father’s right to pass his citizenship on by descent. Since their father was not a party to this application, the appellants did not have standing to rely on the alleged violations of his rights. Moreover, since the appellants were not physically present in Canada, as non-citizens they could not avail themselves of the Charter. 21 For these reasons, the Judge found the delegate’s decision was reasonable and the Charter challenge was not well-founded. Accordingly, the Judge dismissed the application for judicial review.

VI. The Issues 22 In my view, the issues to be determined on this appeal are: 1. What are the applicable standards of review? 2. Does paragraph 3(3)(a) of the Act, as amended by Bill C-37, preclude the appellants from receiving citizenship by descent? 3. If so, do subsections 3(3) and 3(4) of the Act infringe section 15 of the Charter? 4. If subsections 3(3) and 3(4) infringe section 15 of the Charter, is such infringement justified under section 1 of the Charter?

VII. What are the applicable standards of review? 23 On an appeal from an application for judicial review in the Federal Court, this Court’s role is to identify whether the Judge selected the correct standard of review and applied it correctly. In practice, this requires the reviewing court to step into the shoes of the lower court; the focus of this Court is, in effect, on the administrative decision (Merck Frosst Can- ada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), 2012 SCC 3, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 23 at paragraph 247; Agraira v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Prepared- ness), 2013 SCC 36, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 559 at paragraphs 45 and 46. 24 As set out above, the Judge found that the delegate’s interpretation of section 3 of the Act should be reviewed on the standard of reasonableness. In reaching this conclusion, the Judge did not have the benefit of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Agraira and McLean v. British Columbia (Securities Commission), 2013 SCC 67, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 895. Nor did she have the benefit of this Court’s decision in Kandola v. Can- ada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FCA 85, [2014] Kinsel v. Canada (MCI) Eleanor R. Dawson J.A. 285

F.C.J. No. 322. Indeed, Kandola was released after the hearing of this appeal. As a result, the parties were afforded the opportunity to make written submissions on the applicability of Kandola to this appeal. Those submissions have been received and considered. 25 As in this appeal, Kandola concerned an appeal from the Federal Court on an application for judicial review of a decision. The decision under review was the decision of a delegate of the Minister of Citizen- ship and Immigration not to issue a citizenship certificate. 26 In Kandola, this Court carefully considered the effect of Agraira upon prior jurisprudence. The Court concluded that as a result of Agraira, the determination of the applicable standard of review must begin from the premise that the reasonableness standard applies to the review of a citizenship officer’s interpretation of paragraph 3(1)(b) of the Act. I agree, for the reasons given by the Court in Kandola at paragraphs 30 to 42. For the same reasons, I conclude that the presumption of reasonableness review applies to the delegate’s interpretation of subsection 3(3) of the Act as well. 27 However, the analysis does not end there as it is necessary to consider whether the presumption of reasonableness review is rebutted. 28 In Kandola, the Court found this presumption could be quickly rebutted for a number of reasons, including the following: • The absence of a privative clause. • The nature of the question; namely, a pure question of statutory interpretation. • The absence of any discretionary element in the decision. • The absence of anything in the structure or scheme of the Act sug- gestive of the notion that deference should be accorded to the delegate on the question he or she had to decide. 29 These factors are also present in this case. 30 On the basis of Kandola, I am satisfied the presumption of reasonableness has been rebutted. The delegate’s interpretation of the Act should be reviewed on the standard of correctness. 31 In the event I am wrong in this conclusion and, as the Attorney Gen- eral submits, Kandola should be distinguished, I rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in McLean. 32 In McLean, the Supreme Court considered the standard of review to be applied to a securities commission’s interpretation of a limitation pe- 286 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

riod contained in its home statute. Justice Moldaver (writing for the majority) observed that where the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation lead to a single reasonable interpretation and the administrative decision- maker adopts a different interpretation, that interpretation will of neces- sity be unreasonable (McLean, paragraph 38). 33 For reasons developed below, I have conducted the required textual, contextual and purposive analysis of the relevant legislation. I am satisfied that there is only one reasonable interpretation of the legislation. 34 It follows that whether as a result of the rebuttal of the presumption of reasonableness, or as a result of the fact that there is only a single reasonable interpretation, this Court must interpret the relevant legislation and verify that the delegate’s interpretation is consistent with that interpretation.

VIII. Does paragraph 3(3)(a) of the Act, as amended by Bill C-37, preclude the appellants from receiving citizenship by descent? A. Applicable principles of statutory interpretation 35 Whether the delegate’s decision was correct depends on the interpretation of paragraph 3(3)(a) and subsection 3(4) of the Act. 36 The parties do not take issue with the applicable principles of statutory interpretation. 37 The Supreme Court has expressed the preferred approach to statutory interpretation in the following terms: Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament. See: Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27 at paragraph 21. See also: R. v. Ulybel Enterprises Ltd., 2001 SCC 56, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 867 at paragraph 29. 38 The Supreme Court restated this principle in Canada Trustco Mort- gage Co. v. Canada, 2005 SCC 54, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601 adding at paragraph 10: [...] The interpretation of a statutory provision must be made according to a textual, contextual and purposive analysis to find a meaning that is harmonious with the Act as a whole. When the words of a provision are precise and unequivocal, the ordinary meaning of the words play a dominant role in the interpretive process. On the other Kinsel v. Canada (MCI) Eleanor R. Dawson J.A. 287

hand, where the words can support more than one reasonable meaning, the ordinary meaning of the words plays a lesser role. The relative effects of ordinary meaning, context and purpose on the interpretive process may vary, but in all cases the court must seek to read the provisions of an Act as a harmonious whole. 39 Inherent in the preferred approach to statutory interpretation is the understanding that the grammatical and ordinary sense of a provision is not determinative of its meaning. A court must consider the total context of the provision at issue “no matter how plain the disposition may seem upon initial reading” (ATCO Gas and Pipelines Ltd. v. Alberta (Energy and Utilities Board), 2006 SCC 4, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 140 at paragraph 48). From the text and this wider context the interpreting court aims to ascer- tain legislative intent, “[t]he most significant element of this analysis” (R. v. Monney, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 652 at paragraph 26).

B. Application of the principles of statutory interpretation 40 I next turn to consider the required textual, contextual and purposive analysis needed to determine whether the delegate’s interpretation of the Act was correct.

(i) Textual analysis 41 Upon the coming into force of Bill C-37, Canadian citizenship was restored to the appellants’ paternal grandmother (pursuant to paragraph 3(1)(f) of the Act). The restoration was retroactive to the date she lost her citizenship (paragraph 3(7)(d)). The effect of this was to deem Mr. Kin- sel’s mother to be a Canadian citizen at the time of his birth. 42 As a result, upon the coming into force of Bill C-37, Canadian citizenship was also granted to Mr. Kinsel (paragraph 3(1)(g)). This grant was retroactive from the time Mr. Kinsel was born (paragraph 3(7)(e)). 43 Paragraph 3(1)(b) of the Act is a long-standing provision which con- fers citizenship by descent. A person is a citizen of Canada if that person was born outside of Canada after February 14, 1977, and at the time of his birth one of his parents was a Canadian citizen. The appellants rely upon this provision to argue that because their father is now deemed to be a Canadian citizen from the time of his birth, they are Canadian citizens. 288 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

44 In my respectful view, this ignores the effect of paragraph 3(3)(a) of the Act which came into force with the passing of Bill C-37. I repeat paragraph 3(3)(a) for ease of reference: 3. (3) Subsection (1) does not apply to a person born outside Canada (a) if, at the time of his or her birth or adoption, only one of the person’s parents is a citizen and that parent is a citizen under paragraph (1)(b), (c.1), (e), (g) or (h), or both of the person’s parents are citizens under any of those paragraphs; or 3. (3) Le paragraphe (1) ne s’applique pas a` la personne née a` l’étranger dont, selon le cas: a) au moment de la naissance ou de l’adoption, seul le père ou la mère a qualité de citoyen, et ce, au titre de l’un des alinéas (1)b), c.1), e), g) et h), ou les deux parents ont cette qualité au titre de l’un de ces alinéas; 45 In my view, the text of paragraph 3(3)(a) is unambiguous. Mr. Kinsel became a Canadian citizen by operation of paragraph 3(1)(g). At the time of their births, the appellants’ mother was not a Canadian citizen. Para- graph 3(3)(a) of the Act operates to limit the grant of citizenship by descent to the first generation born outside of Canada to a Canadian parent. This limitation applies to the appellants. 46 The appellants argue that subsection 3(4) of the Act removes them from the application of paragraph 3(3)(a). Again, for ease of reference, subsection 3(4) provides: 3. (4) Subsection (3) does not apply to a person who, on the coming into force of that subsection, is a citizen. 3. (4) Le paragraphe (3) ne s’applique pas a` la personne qui, a` la date d’entrée en vigueur de ce paragraphe, a qualité de citoyen. 47 I reject the appellants’ argument. In my view, for the reasons that follow, subsection 3(4) does not apply to the appellants. 48 I begin from the premise that prior to the coming into force of Bill C- 37 the appellants were not Canadian citizens. For that reason, subsection 3(4) does not apply to them. 49 It is significant that paragraph 3(3)(a) of the Act includes both paragraphs 3(1)(b) and 3(1)(g) as categories of parentage that are only able to bestow Canadian citizenship on the first generation of progeny born outside of Canada. 50 Unlike paragraph 3(1)(g), paragraph 3(1)(b) has been in effect for many years. Paragraph 3(1)(g), and subsections 3(4) and 3(7) came into Kinsel v. Canada (MCI) Eleanor R. Dawson J.A. 289

effect as part of Bill C-37. The result of this legislative scheme is that a child could not obtain Canadian citizenship by descent from a parent whose citizenship depended upon paragraph 3(1)(g) until after Canadian citizenship was granted to that parent. It follows that such a child’s claim to citizenship under paragraph 3(1)(b) could only arise after the coming into force of Bill C-37. Put another way, notwithstanding the retroactive grant of citizenship to their father, the appellants could not have been citizens before Bill C-37 came into effect. They, therefore, fall within paragraph 3(3)(a) of the Act. 51 Contrary to the appellants’ submissions, by enacting subsection 3(4) Parliament intended to protect the vested rights of individuals who were already citizens when Bill C-37 came into force. 52 It follows that I agree with the Judge’s interpretation of the temporal effect of Bill C-37, as described at paragraph 17 above. 53 In my view, the text of the relevant portions of section 3 considered above are precise and free of ambiguity. Therefore, their ordinary meaning should play a dominant role in the interpretive process. They support the delegate’s conclusion that subsection 3(3) of the Act, as amended by Bill C-37, limits citizenship by descent to the first generation of progeny born outside of Canada. 54 I next consider the relevant contextual factors.

(ii) Contextual analysis 55 The appellants rely upon two other provisions of the Act as providing relevant context for the proper interpretation of paragraph 3(3)(a) and subsection 3(4) of the Act: subsection 5(5) and section 6. 56 Subsection 5(5) states: (5) The Minister shall, on application, grant citizenship to a person who (a) is born outside Canada after the coming into force of this subsection; (b) has a birth parent who was a citizen at the time of the birth; (c) is less than 23 years of age; (d) has resided in Canada for at least three years during the four years immediately before the date of his or her application; (e) has always been stateless; and (f) has not been convicted of any of the following offences: [...] [Emphasis added.] 290 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

(5) Le ministre attribue, sur demande, la citoyenneté a` quiconque remplit les conditions suivantes: a) il est né a` l’étranger après l’entrée en vigueur du présent paragraphe; b) l’un de ses parents naturels avait qualité de citoyen au moment de sa naissance; c) il est ag´ˆ e de moins de vingt-trois ans; d) il a résidé au Canada pendant au moins trois ans au cours des quatre ans précédant la date de sa demande; e) il a toujours et´´ e apatride; f) il n’a jamais et´´ e déclaré coupable de l’une des infractions suivantes: [...] [Le souligné est de moi.] 57 The appellants argue that subsection 5(5) provides for the protection of stateless persons only if they are born after Bill C-37 came into effect on April 17, 2009. They assert that, properly interpreted, Bill C-37 did not require protection for stateless persons born on or before the coming into force of the Bill because the Bill granted citizenship to second generation Canadians born abroad. Thus, the delegate’s alleged misinterpre- tation of the Act is said to re-create the risk of statelessness because second-generation Canadians born abroad are denied citizenship. 58 This argument must fail. The appellants have not shown that subsection 5(5) fails to satisfy Canada’s obligations as a signatory to the Con- vention on the Reduction of Statelessness if it only applies to those children born after April 17, 2009. In particular, they have not shown why Canada was obliged as a signatory to provide such protection with retroactive effect. 59 The second provision relied upon by the appellants is section 6 of the Act: 6. A citizen, whether or not born in Canada, is entitled to all rights, powers and privileges and is subject to all obligations, duties and liabilities to which a person who is a citizen under paragraph 3(1)(a) is entitled or subject and has a like status to that of such person. [Emphasis added.] 6. Tout citoyen, qu’il soit né ou non au Canada, jouit des droits, pouvoirs et avantages conférés aux citoyens qui ont cette qualité aux termes de l’alinéa 3(1)a); il est assujetti aux mêmes devoirs, obligations et responsabilités, et son statut est le même. [Le souligné est de moi.] Kinsel v. Canada (MCI) Eleanor R. Dawson J.A. 291

60 The appellants say that the delegate’s interpretation violates this provision of the Act by denying their father the right, by virtue of his status as a Canadian citizen, to confer citizenship on the appellants. I agree this is a valid contextual factor to be weighed against the text and purpose of the legislation. 61 There is also a third relevant contextual factor: the clause-by-clause analysis which accompanied Bill C-37 (Appeal Book, Volume 2 at page 243). In respect of paragraph 3(3)(a) of the Bill, the clause-by-clause analysis explained that subsection 3(3) limits citizenship to the first generation born to a Canadian parent abroad. Persons born outside Canada do not acquire citizenship by descent if their parent was also born abroad. 62 In respect of subsection 3(4) of the Bill, the clause-by-clause analysis advised that the subsection clarified that, notwithstanding subsection 3(3), no one would lose their Canadian citizenship on the coming into force of the Bill, even if they were the second or subsequent generation born abroad. This applies to protect second or subsequent generations of Canadians who held Canadian citizenship prior to the coming into force of Bill C-37. 63 The clause-by-clause analysis is a relevant contextual factor that supports the interpretation reached under the textual analysis. 64 Further, prior to the enactment of Bill C-37, a child born outside of Canada to a Canadian citizen after February 14, 1977 was entitled to citizenship. However, such a child lost their citizenship on attaining the age of 28 unless the child: a. applied to retain his citizenship; and b. registered as a citizen and either resided in Canada for at least one year immediately preceding the date of his application, or established a substantial connection with Canada 65 Subsection 3(4) was intended to protect such second or subsequent generation Canadians born abroad who already had Canadian citizenship from losing it on the coming into force of Bill C-37. 66 In my view, interpreting paragraph 3(3)(a) of the Act to limit citizenship by descent to the first generation of progeny born abroad when a parent holds citizenship under paragraph 3(1)(g) is consistent with the preponderance of the contextual factors. 67 I next turn to the purposive analysis. 292 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

(iii) Purposive analysis 68 The genesis of Bill C-37 was a report prepared by the House of Com- mons Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration entitled “Re- claiming Citizenship for Canadians: A Report on the Loss of Canadian Citizenship”. 69 The report contained a number of recommendations. Recommenda- tion 4 urged that the Act be amended to provide that the following three classes of persons are Canadian citizens: • Anyone who was born in Canada at any time, retroactive to the date of their birth. The only exceptions contemplated were for those persons born in Canada to an accredited foreign diplomat, and those persons who later renounced their citizenship as an adult. • Anyone who was born abroad at any time to a Canadian mother or father, retroactive to the date of their birth, if they are the first generation born abroad. The only exception contemplated was for those persons who later renounced their citizenship as an adult. • Anyone who became a naturalized Canadian citizen at any time. The only exceptions contemplated were for those who renounced their citizenship as an adult, and those who obtained their citizenship by false representation, fraud, or knowingly concealing material circumstances. 70 To the extent Bill C-37 flowed from the Report of the Standing Com- mittee, this recommendation reflects that one purpose of Bill C-37 was to grant Canadian citizenship to those born in Canada who lost their citizenship (other than by renunciation) and to allow those formerly lost Cana- dian citizens to confer Canadian citizenship on their foreign born progeny, if the progeny was the first generation born abroad. The first generation born abroad were not to be able to bestow Canadian citizenship on their foreign born children. 71 A second, more relevant statement of legislative purpose is found in the Legislative Summary prepared by the Library of Parliament, Parlia- mentary Information and Research Service in respect of Bill C-37 (Ap- peal Book, Volume 1 at page 197). Under the heading “Description and Analysis”, the Summary noted: Bill C-37 amends the Citizenship Act in four main ways. It adds five new situations to the list defining who is a citizen. It provides for retroactive application of these new citizenship provisions. It pre- Kinsel v. Canada (MCI) Eleanor R. Dawson J.A. 293

cludes Canadians from passing down Canadian citizenship to their offspring born abroad after one generation. And it provides some relief for the stateless offspring of Canadians. Other provisions of Bill C-37 address various technical or housekeeping matters, including coordinating the coming into force of Bill C-37 with an Act adopted in June 2007 amending the Citizenship Act in relation to foreign adoptions. 72 Under the heading “Citizenship by Descent Limited to First Genera- tion”, the Summary stated that “Bill C-37 precludes citizens from passing citizenship down to their children born abroad after one generation.” 73 The delegate’s interpretation of the effect of Bill C-37 is consistent with these statements of purpose. 74 At the very least, there is nothing in the purpose to suggest Parliament intended to exempt second generation descendants like the appellants from the one generation rule when they only received Canadian citizenship on the coming into force of Bill C-37. 75 The appellants argue that the objects of Bill C-37 included the desire to solve the “lost Canadian” problem by restoring citizenship retroactively and to satisfy Canada’s international obligations as a signatory to the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. They argue their interpretation is consistent with these objects. 76 In support of the first object and the appellants’ argument that they are entitled to citizenship because subsequent to the time of their births, their father was granted Canadian citizenship retroactive to the time of his birth, they rely upon a passage of the Summary found in Appeal Book, Volume 1 at page 198 under the heading “Retroactive Application of Citizenship Provisions”. 77 In my view, the appellants take the passage out of context. It contains a general statement as to why lost citizens required retroactive grants of citizenship. The Summary later clarified in significant detail that there was a one generation limit to grants of citizenship by descent to children born abroad. 78 I have already dealt with the appellants’ argument based upon the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. 79 The appellants also point to documents generated by Citizenship and Immigration Canada, such as Operational Bulletin 102, that are said to contain passages which support their interpretation of the legislation. They submit that these passages should be taken as binding admissions against interest made by the Minister. 294 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

80 I reject this submission for the following reason. Assuming, without deciding, that there are passages in Citizenship and Immigration Canada documents that support the appellants’ position, it is well-established in the jurisprudence that such documents do not bind a court. 81 For these reasons, interpreting paragraph 3(3)(a) of the Act to limit citizenship by descent to the first generation born abroad to Canadian citizens is consistent with the purpose of the legislation.

(iv) Conclusion of statutory interpretation analysis 82 Having conducted the required textual, contextual and purposive analysis I am satisfied the delegate’s interpretation of the legislation was either correct or, alternatively, the only reasonable interpretation. In any event, because the delegate’s decision meets the higher standard of correctness, the standard of review applied does not affect the outcome of the appeal. 83 It is, therefore, necessary to consider the arguments advanced by the appellants pursuant to section 15 of the Charter.

IX. Do subsections 3(3) and 3(4) of the Act infringe section 15 of the Charter? 84 As described above, the Judge dismissed the Charter arguments on the basis that the appellants lacked standing to challenge the alleged unconstitutionality of the legislation. 85 Both in their written and oral submissions, the appellants and the respondent advanced arguments on the issues of standing, as well as the application of sections 15 and 1 of the Charter. For the following reasons, I prefer to deal with the merits of the appellants’ contention that the subsections 3(3) and 3(4) infringe section 15 of the Charter. 86 First, in my respectful view, the appellants’ argument concerning the territorial application of the Charter was not well developed. This is an important issue that required fuller submissions, tied to all of the relevant jurisprudence. 87 Second, it is a serious matter to invoke the Charter to challenge the validity of legislation enacted by Parliament. The important Canadian rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter should not be devalued by ill-considered challenges devoid of a proper evidentiary foundation. For the two reasons that follow, I conclude that this is such a challenge. Kinsel v. Canada (MCI) Eleanor R. Dawson J.A. 295

88 First, the appellants’ Charter argument is not clearly articulated. The submissions may be described as sketchy, contained in six paragraphs of a 91 paragraph memorandum of fact and law. 89 The analogous ground proffered by the appellants is dual citizenship. They argue that individual Canadians, such as their grandmother and father, historically found themselves discriminated against as being some- how suspect, less worthy members of society because they wanted or needed to be citizens of more than one country. 90 However, in Corbi`ere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203, 239 N.R.1, the Supreme Court discussed the criteria by which a ground of a distinction is identified as being analogous to an enumerated ground. In the Court’s view, section 15 of the Charter “targets the denial of equal treatment on grounds that are actually immutable, like race, or constructively immutable, like religion”. “Con- structively immutable” grounds are grounds that are “changeable only at unacceptable cost to personal identity” (paragraph 13). 91 The Supreme Court has consistently described analogous grounds in such fashion. See, for example, Quebec (Attorney General) v. A, 2013 SCC 5, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 61 at paragraph 335. 92 As the appellants’ representative conceded in oral argument, in the circumstances before the Court, dual citizenship is neither an immutable nor constructively immutable characteristic. The appellants are citizens of the United States who are fully able to apply for permanent resident status in Canada. Such status can lead to the grant of Canadian citizenship. 93 Of equal importance is my second concern. To date, the most authori- tative pronouncement as to what violates section 15 of the Charter is contained in Quebec (Attorney General) v. A. At paragraph 332 Justice Abella, writing for the majority on this point, observed that at the root of section 15 is awareness that certain groups have been historically discriminated against, and that perpetuation of this discrimination should be curtailed. State conduct that widens, not narrows, the gap between the historically disadvantaged and the rest of society based on an enumerated or analogous ground is discriminatory. 94 A flexible and contextual inquiry is needed to determine if a distinction has the effect of perpetrating arbitrary disadvantage because of membership in an enumerated or analogous group. Evidence is required to establish elements such as historic discrimination or disadvantage, and 296 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

that the impugned legislation perpetuates such discrimination or disadvantage. 95 The appellants adduced no evidence to support the alleged violation of their equality rights. While each appellant and their father filed affidavits in support of the appellants’ application, the affidavits are wholly bereft of evidence relevant to section 15. 96 The appellants’ affidavits are each half a page long and consist of four paragraphs which are confined to biographical information. The father’s affidavit is 12 paragraphs long, contains biographical information, information with respect to the procedural background of this case and attaches as an exhibit his legal opinion, as an American attorney, as to why the delegate’s decision is wrong in law. 97 No other evidence was filed on the appellants’ behalf. 98 In sum, there is no evidence before this Court to establish the elements of a section 15 claim. 99 For these reasons, I would dismiss the appellants’ challenge under section 15 of the Charter. As I have found no violation of the Charter, it is not necessary to consider section 1. 100 Before leaving this issue, I observe for completeness that because I chose not to deal with the issue of the appellants’ standing to bring a challenge under the Charter, these reasons should not be seen to confirm or reject the Judge’s analysis on the issue of standing.

X. Conclusion 101 For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal. 102 I see no reason to depart from the principle that costs follow the event. Therefore, I would award the costs of the appeal to the respondent.

Johanne Trudel J.A.:

I agree.

D.G. Near J.A.:

I agree. Appeal dismissed. Air Liaison inc. c. Conseil des Innus de Unamen Shipu 297

[Indexed as: Air Liaison inc. c. Conseil des Innus de Unamen Shipu] Air Liaison inc. (Demanderesse) c. Conseil des Innus de Unamen Shipu et Services Olamen inc. et Société Mukutan inc. (Défenderesses) et Max Aviation inc. et Voyages Inter-Nation & associés inc. et Société Mukutan inc. (Mises en cause) Cour supérieure du Québec Docket: C.S. Québec 200-17-019975-143 2014 QCCS 2299 La Rosa, J.C.S. Heard: 3 avril 2014 Judgment: 11 avril 2014 Droit administratif –––– Conditions préalables au contrôle judiciaire — Compétence du tribunal pour effectuer la révision — Cours supérieures des provinces — Principes généraux –––– Compagnie aérienne exploitait une entreprise de transport aérien dans une région où une réserve indienne etait´ si- tuée — Entente est survenue entre la réserve indienne, une entreprise de développement economique´ pour le compte de la réserve et une compagnie de gestion chargée de fournir des services de transport aérien a` la réserve (collectivement, les « défenderesses ») — En vertu de cette entente, le conseil de bande acceptait de traiter avec la compagnie de gestion pour tous les contrats de transport — Compagnie aérienne devait etreˆ payée par Santé Canada relativement a` tous les transferts médicaux — Puis, les défenderesses ont décidé de résilier l’entente — Compagnie aérienne a déposé une requête visant a` obtenir une injonction interlocutoire et permanente a` l’encontre de la résiliation de l’entente — Défenderesses ont déposé une requête en irrecevabilité contestant la compétence de la Cour supérieure — Requête en irrecevabilité rejetée—On s’entendait pour dire que le conseil de bande constituait un office fédéral au sens de la Loi sur les cours fédérales — Toutefois, l’injonction a` laquelle faisait réf- erence´ l’art. 18(1) de la Loi etait´ différente de celle a` laquelle le Code civil du Québec faisait référence — Injonction a` laquelle faisait référence la Loi constituait une fa¸con de mettre en œuvre le pouvoir de contrôle et de surveillance de la Cour fédérale au moyen du contrôle judiciaire — En l’espèce, la compagnie aér- ienne recherchait une injonction afin d’empêcher la résiliation d’une entente privée — Au fond, la question etait´ de nature contractuelle et ne portait pas sur la décision d’un office fédéral — Dans le meilleur des scénarios, la Cour supér- ieure et la Cour fédérale avaient une compétence concurrente — Par conséquent, la Cour supérieure avait compétence pour entendre le litige. 298 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

Juges et tribunaux –––– Compétence — Cours supérieures — Principes généraux –––– Compagnie aérienne exploitait une entreprise de transport aérien dans une région où une réserve indienne etait´ située — Entente est survenue entre la réserve indienne, une entreprise de développement economique´ pour le compte de la réserve et une compagnie de gestion chargée de fournir des services de transport aérien a` la réserve (collectivement, les « défenderesses ») — En vertu de cette entente, le conseil de bande acceptait de traiter avec la compagnie de gestion pour tous les contrats de transport — Compagnie aérienne devait etreˆ payée par Santé Canada relativement a` tous les transferts médicaux — Puis, les défenderesses ont décidé de résilier l’entente — Compagnie aérienne a dé- posé une requête visant a` obtenir une injonction interlocutoire et permanente a` l’encontre de la résiliation de l’entente — Défenderesses ont déposé une requête en irrecevabilité contestant la compétence de la Cour supérieure — Requête en irrecevabilité rejetée — On s’entendait pour dire que le conseil de bande constituait un office fédéral au sens de la Loi sur les cours fédérales — Toutefois, l’injonction a` laquelle faisait référence l’art. 18(1) de la Loi etait´ différente de celle a` laquelle le Code civil du Québec faisait référence — Injonction a` laquelle faisait référence la Loi constituait une fa¸con de mettre en œuvre le pouvoir de contrôle et de surveillance de la Cour fédérale au moyen du contrôle judiciaire — En l’espèce, la compagnie aérienne recherchait une injonction afin d’empêcher la résiliation d’une entente privée — Au fond, la question etait´ de nature contractuelle et ne portait pas sur la décision d’un office fédéral — Dans le meilleur des scénarios, la Cour supérieure et la Cour fédérale avaient une compétence concurrente — Par conséquent, la Cour supérieure avait compé- tence pour entendre le litige. Administrative law –––– Prerequisites to judicial review — Jurisdiction of court to review — Provincial superior courts — General principles –––– Air- line operated air transportation business in area where Indian reserve was located — Agreement was entered into between Indian reserve, economic development agent for reserve and management company in charge of providing air transportation services to reserve (collectively, “defendants”) — Under agreement, band council agreed to deal with management company for all transportation contracts — Airline was to be paid through Health Canada with respect to all medical transfers — Then, defendants decided to cancel agreement — Air- line brought motion seeking interim and permanent injunction against cancellation of agreement — Defendants brought motion for dismissal, challenging Su- perior Court’s jurisdiction — Motion for dismissal dismissed — It was agreed that band council constituted federal board, commission or other tribunal pursuant to Federal Courts Act — However, injunction referred to in s. 18(1) of Act was different from injunction referred to in Civil Code of Quebec — Injunction referred to in Act constitutes means to implement Federal Court’s power of control and supervision through judicial review — Here, airline was seeking injunction to prevent private agreement from being cancelled — As such, issue was Air Liaison inc. c. Conseil des Innus de Unamen Shipu 299

contractual in nature and had nothing to do with decision of federal board, commission or other tribunal — At best, Superior Court and Federal Court had concurrent jurisdiction — Therefore, Superior Court had jurisdiction to hear matter. Judges and courts –––– Jurisdiction — Superior courts — General principles –––– Airline operated air transportation business in area where Indian reserve was located — Agreement was entered into between Indian reserve, economic development agent for reserve and management company in charge of providing air transportation services to reserve (collectively, “defendants”) — Under agreement, band council agreed to deal with management company for all transportation contracts — Airline was to be paid through Health Canada with respect to all medical transfers — Then, defendants decided to cancel agreement — Airline brought motion seeking interim and permanent injunction against cancellation of agreement — Defendants brought motion for dismissal, challenging Superior Court’s jurisdiction — Motion for dismissal dismissed — It was agreed that band council constituted federal board, commission or other tribunal pursuant to Federal Courts Act — However, injunction referred to in s. 18(1) of Act was different from injunction referred to in Civil Code of Que- bec — Injunction referred to in Act constitutes means to implement Federal Court’s power of control and supervision through judicial review — Here, airline was seeking injunction to prevent private agreement from being cancelled — As such, issue was contractual in nature and had nothing to do with decision of federal board, commission or other tribunal — At best, Superior Court and Federal Court had concurrent jurisdiction — Therefore, Superior Court had jurisdiction to hear matter. Cases considered by La Rosa, J.C.S.: Anisman v. Canada (Border Services Agency) (2010), 2010 CarswellNat 948, 2010 CAF 52, 400 N.R. 137, 2010 CarswellNat 338, 2010 FCA 52 (F.C.A.) — referred to Balfour v. Norway House Cree Nation (2006), 47 Admin. L.R. (4th) 121, 2006 CF 213, [2006] 4 F.C.R. 404, 2006 FC 213, 2006 CarswellNat 357, 2006 CarswellNat 2248, 288 F.T.R. 182 (Eng.), [2006] F.C.J. No. 269 (F.C.) — considered Ballantyne v. Mathias Colomb Cree Nation (2011), 2011 FC 994, 2011 Car- swellNat 3219, 2011 CF 994, 2011 CarswellNat 4803, (sub nom. Ballantyne v. Bighetty) 395 F.T.R. 141 (Eng.) (F.C.) — referred to Canada (Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc. (2010), 410 N.R. 1, 56 C.E.L.R. (3d) 1, 327 D.L.R. (4th) 527, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 585, (sub nom. TeleZone Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)) 273 O.A.C. 1, (sub nom. TeleZone Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)) 108 O.R. (3d) 239, 2010 SCC 62, 2010 Cars- wellOnt 9657, 2010 CarswellOnt 9658, 96 C.L.R. (3d) 1, 13 Admin. L.R. (5th) 24, [2010] A.C.S. No. 62, [2010] S.C.J. No. 62 (S.C.C.) — followed 300 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Liberty Net (1998), 157 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 1998 CarswellNat 388, 224 N.R. 241, 31 C.H.R.R. D/433, 22 C.P.C. (4th) 1, 50 C.R.R. (2d) 189, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 626, 147 F.T.R. 305 (note), 1998 CarswellNat 387, 6 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, [1998] S.C.J. No. 31 (S.C.C.) — referred to Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band (1995), 1995 CarswellNat 264, 1995 CarswellNat 700, 26 Admin. L.R. (2d) 1, (sub nom. Matsqui Indian Band v. Canadian Pacific Ltd.) [1995] 2 C.N.L.R. 92, 122 D.L.R. (4th) 129, 85 F.T.R. 79 (note), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 3, 177 N.R. 325, [1995] S.C.J. No. 1 (S.C.C.) — considered Conseil des Mohawks de Kanesatake c. Kanesatake Health Center Inc. (2013), 2013 CarswellQue 13457, (sub nom. Mohawk Council of Kanesatake v. Kanesatake Health Center Inc.) [2014] 2 C.N.L.R. 227, 2013 CarswellQue 11011, EYB 2013-228703 (C.S. Que.) — considered Devil’s Gap Cottagers (1982) Ltd. v. Rat Portage Band No. 38B (2008), 2008 FC 812, 2008 CarswellNat 2117, 2008 CarswellNat 5024, 2008 CF 812, 83 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, [2009] 2 F.C.R. 267, 331 F.T.R. 87, [2008] F.C.J. No. 1018 (F.C.) — referred to Francis v. Mohawk Council of Kanesatake (2003), 2003 CFPI 115, 2003 Car- swellNat 2792, [2003] 3 C.N.L.R. 86, 2003 FCT 115, 227 F.T.R. 161, [2003] 4 F.C. 1133, 2003 CarswellNat 235, [2003] F.C.J. No. 156 (Fed. T.D.) — referred to Jenniss c. Jenniss (1999), 1999 CarswellQue 3343, [2000] 1 C.N.L.R. 134, REJB 1999-14859 (C.S. Que.) — considered Jock v. R. (1991), (sub nom. Jock v. Canada (Minister of Indian & Northern Affairs)) 41 F.T.R. 189, (sub nom. Jock v. Canada) [1991] 2 F.C. 355, (sub nom. Jock v. Canada (Minister of Indian & Northern Affairs)) [1992] 1 C.N.L.R. 103, 1991 CarswellNat 126, 1991 CarswellNat 126F, [1991] F.C.J. No. 204 (Fed. T.D.) — considered Lafond v. Muskeg Lake Cree Nation (2008), 2008 FC 480, 2008 CarswellNat 1051 (F.C.) — referred to Miida Electronics Inc. v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd. (1986), 1986 A.M.C. 2580, (sub nom. ITO - International Terminal Operators Ltd. v. Miida Electronics Inc.) [1986] 1 S.C.R. 752, 28 D.L.R. (4th) 641, 68 N.R. 241, 34 B.L.R. 251, 1986 CarswellNat 14, 1986 CarswellNat 736, [1986] S.C.J. No. 38 (S.C.C.) — followed Montana Band v. R. (1991), (sub nom. Montana Indian Band v. Canada) [1993] 2 C.N.L.R. 123, (sub nom. Montana Indian Band v. Canada) 44 F.T.R. 183, (sub nom. Montana Band v. Canada) [1991] 2 F.C. 273, 1991 CarswellNat 124, 1991 CarswellNat 124F (Fed. T.D.) — considered Peace Hills Trust Co. v. Moccasin (2005), 2005 FC 1364, 2005 CarswellNat 3111, 281 F.T.R. 201 (Eng.), 2005 CarswellNat 7487, 2005 CF 1364, [2005] F.C.J. No. 1646 (F.C.) — referred to Air Liaison inc. c. Conseil des Innus de Unamen Shipu 301

Sparvier v. Cowessess Indian Band No. 73 (1993), (sub nom. Sparvier v. Bande indienne Cowessess) 1993 CarswellNat 1319, 1993 CarswellNat 808, 13 Ad- min. L.R. (2d) 266, (sub nom. Sparvier v. Cowessess Indian Band) [1993] 3 F.C. 142, 63 F.T.R. 242, [1994] 1 C.N.L.R. 182, [1993] F.C.J. No. 446 (Fed. T.D.) — considered 861808 Ontario Inc. v. Canada Revenue Agency (2013), [2014] 2 C.T.C. 57, 118 O.R. (3d) 501, (sub nom. 861808 Ontario Inc. c. Canada (Agence du revenu)) 118 O.R. (3d) 504, [2013] G.S.T.C. 117, 2013 CarswellOnt 15473, 2013 ONCA 604 (Ont. C.A.) — considered 861808 Ontario Inc. v. Canada Revenue Agency (2014), 2014 CarswellOnt 1008 (S.C.C.) — referred to Statutes considered: Canada Transportation Act, S.C. 1996, c. 10 Generally — referred to s. 59 — considered s. 61 — considered Code civil du Québec, L.Q. 1991, c. 64 en général — referred to Constitution Act, 1867, (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5 s. 101 — considered Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7 Generally — referred to s. 2(1) “office fédéral” — considered s. 18 — considered s. 18(1) — considered s. 18(1)(a) — considered s. 18(1)(b) — considered s. 18(3) — considered s. 44 — considered Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5 Generally — referred to

REQUETEˆ déposée par un conseil de bande contestant la compétence de la Cour supérieure.

Me Eric´ Savard, Me Jean-Patrick Dallaire, pour la demanderesse Me Jean-Fran¸cois Bertrand, Me Jean Nobert, pour le Conseil des Innus de Unamen Shipu, Services Olamen inc. et Société Mukutan inc. Me Marie-Josée Prud’homme, pour Max Aviation inc. Me Jennifer Watters, pour Voyages Inter-Nation & assoc. inc. 302 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

La Rosa, J.C.S.:

1 La demanderesse, Air Liaison inc. (Air Liaison) a introduit une re- quête en injonction contre les défenderesses et les mises en cause. Elles contestent la compétence de la Cour supérieure. Elles soutiennent que la Cour fédérale aurait une compétence exclusive.

Le contexte 2 Air Liaison exploite une entreprise de transport aérien dans la province de Québec, notamment dans la région de la Basse-Côte-Nord, incluant Natashquan, La Romaine et St-Augustin. 3 La défenderesse, Conseil des Innus de Unamen Shipu (le Conseil), est un conseil de bande constitué en vertu de la Loi sur les indienset représente une réserve Innus du Québec située a` La Romaine. 4 La défenderesse, Société Mukutan inc. (Mukutan), est une personne morale œuvrant dans le développement economique´ de la communauté Unamen Shipu et dont le principal actionnaire est le Conseil. 5 Quant a` la défenderesse Services Olamen inc. (Olamen), il s’agit d’une personne morale constituée par le Conseil qui en est le seul actionnaire afin d’administrer les besoins de transport aérien, naval et terrestre du territoire de Unamen Shipu. 6 La mise en cause Max Aviation inc. est une personne morale qui œuvre aussi dans le domaine du transport aérien et a` ce titre, elle demeure une concurrente directe d’Air Liaison. 7 La mise en cause Voyages Inter-Nations & associés inc. (Voyages Inter-Nations) est une personne morale qui exploite une entreprise d’agence de voyages et de vente de billets d’avion. 8 Le 24 janvier 2013, le Conseil, Mukutan et Olamen signent une entente de partenariat (entente n° 1) avec SkyJet M.G. et Héli-Express inc., des sociétés apparentées a` Air Liaison, pour les besoins de transport aér- ien pour l’ensemble du territoire de la Basse-Côte-Nord, incluant Unamen Shipu. 9 Aux termes de cette entente, le Conseil s’engage a` transiger avec Olamen pour l’ensemble des contrats de transport. 10 Mentionnons qu’Olamen a et´´ e créée spécifiquement par le Conseil afin de s’assurer que la communauté puisse récupérer une portion des revenus des transports effectués sur son territoire. Air Liaison inc. c. Conseil des Innus de Unamen Shipu La Rosa, J.C.S. 303

11 Mukutan est intervenue au contrat afin de s’engager a` promouvoir, par ses interventions et ses initiatives, le développement du service de réservation et de transport aérien de fa¸con a` favoriser l’économie de la Basse-Côte-Nord. 12 L’entente n° 1 est probatoire. Sa durée est limitée a` 5 mois, avec pos- sibilité de renouvellement pour une période de 5 années supplémentaires si les parties se déclarent satisfaites de leur relation d’affaires après la période initiale. 13 Dans le cadre de l’exécution de ce contrat, Olamen, qui n’a aucune ressource ni expérience pour remplir ses obligations, requiert de SkyJet M.G. et de Héli-Express la prise en charge de tous les el´´ ements néces- saires afin d’assurer le transport aérien puisqu’elles possèdent l’expertise, les equipements´ et les installations nécessaires. 14 Dans les faits, avant l’expiration du terme initial de 5 mois, les parties qui se déclarent satisfaites de leur prestation respective signent le 11 avril 2013, a` Québec, une entente d’une durée de 5 ans (entente n° 2). 15 Aux fins d’exécuter cette deuxième entente, Olamen autorise la firme Lemieux Nolet, administratrice du programme de Santé Canada concernant les transferts pour des raisons médicales, a` payer directement Air Liaison. 16 Un peu moins d’un an plus tard, soit le 26 mars 2014, Air Liaison re¸coit du Conseil copie de trois résolutions qui auraient et´´ e adoptées par les défenderesses ayant comme objet la résiliation de l’entente n° 2. 17 Air Liaison conteste la position du Conseil. C’est dans ce cadre qu’elle introduit une requête en injonction provisoire, injonction interlocutoire et injonction permanente visant avant tout a` faire déclarer illégales et invalides la résiliation de contrat intervenue ainsi que l’exécution en nature des obligations contractées.

La position des défenderesses et des mises en cause sur le défaut de compétence allégué de la Cour supérieure 18 Les arguments invoqués par les défenderesses et mises en cause pour contester la compétence de la Cour supérieure se résument ainsi : a) Air Liaison ne respecte pas les licences délivrées par l’Office des transports du Canada, ce qui soulève l’application des articles 59 et 61 de la Loi sur les transports au Canada1;

1L.C. 1996, c. 10. 304 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

b) L’interprétation et l’application de la Loi sur les transports du Canada relèvent de la compétence exclusive de la Cour fédérale; c) Le Conseil est un « office fédéral » au sens de l’article 2 de la Loi sur les cours fédérales2.

La position d’Air Liaison sur le défaut de compétence allégué de la Cour supérieure 19 Air Liaison soutient que la Cour supérieure a compétence, car le cœur du litige est en lien avec une question d’interprétation de contrat qui doit etreˆ examinée a` la lumière du Code civil du Québec. Dans ce contexte, Air Liaison plaide qu’il ne s’agit nullement d’un domaine d’analyse ex- clusif a` la Cour fédérale.

Analyse 20 Pour répondre a` la question en litige, il convient, en premier lieu, de référer a` certaines dispositions de la Loi sur les cours fédérales3. 21 D’abord, l’article 18 de la Loi sur les cours fédéralesmentionne que : 18. (1) Sous réserve de l’article 28, la Cour fédérale a compétence exclusive, en première instance, pour : a) décerner une injonction, un bref de certiorari, de mandamus, de prohibition ou de quo warranto, ou pour rendre un jugement déclaratoire contre tout office fédéral; b) connaˆıtre de toute demande de réparation de la nature visée par l’alinéa a), et notamment de toute procédure engagée contre le procureur général du Canada afin d’obtenir répara- tion de la part d’un office fédéral. (2) Elle a compétence exclusive, en première instance, dans le cas des demandes suivantes visant un membre des Forces canadiennes en poste a` l’étranger : bref d’habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, de certiorari, de prohibition ou de mandamus. (3) Les recours prévus aux paragraphes (1) ou (2) sont exercés par présentation d’une demande de contrôle judiciaire. [Soulignement ajouté]

2L.R.C. (1985), c. F-7. 3Id. Air Liaison inc. c. Conseil des Innus de Unamen Shipu La Rosa, J.C.S. 305

22 Puis l’article 44 stipule que : Mandamus, injonction, exécution intégrale ou nomination d’un séquestre 44. Indépendamment de toute autre forme de réparation qu’elle peut accorder, la Cour d’appel fédérale ou la Cour fédérale peut, dans tous les cas où il lui paraˆıt juste ou opportun de le faire, décerner un mandamus, une injonction ou une ordonnance d’exécution intégrale, ou nommer un séquestre, soit sans condition, soit selon les modalités qu’elle juge equitables.´ 23 Il appert, a` la lecture de l’article 18, qu’est d’abord et avant tout visé un « office fédéral ». Or, qu’entend-on par ce vocable? 24 L’article 2 de la loi répond a` cette question. On y lit ce qui suit : office fédéral » Conseil, bureau, commission ou autre organisme, ou personne ou groupe de personnes, ayant, exer¸cant ou censé exercer une compétence ou des pouvoirs prévus par une loi fédérale ou par une ordonnance prise en vertu d’une prérogative royale, a` l’exclusion de la Cour canadienne de l’impôt et ses juges, d’un organisme con- stitué sous le régime d’une loi provinciale ou d’une personne ou d’un groupe de personnes nommées aux termes d’une loi provinciale ou de l’article 96 de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1867. 25 En l’espèce, il n’est pas contesté qu’un conseil de bande constitue généralement un « office fédéral » au sens de la loi4. 26 En fait, le concept d’« office fédéral » comprend toutes les autorités relevant de la Loi sur les indiensou de toute autre loi fédérale concernant les autochtones5.

4Jenniss c. Jenniss, J.E. 99-1676 (C.S. Que.) [1999 CarswellQue 3343 (C.S. Que.)], par. 23; Pierre GIROUX, Stéphane ROCHETTE et Nicholas JOBIDON, « Les recours en droit fédéral », dans Droit public et administratif, Collection de droit 2013-2014, Ecole´ du Barreau du Québec, vol. 7, Cowansville, Editions´ Yvon Blais, 2013, EYB2013CDD182, note de bas de page 1237 référant notamment aux affaires suivantes: Francis v. Mohawk Council of Kanesatake, [2003] 4 F.C. 1133 (Fed. T.D.) (1ere` inst.), par. 11; Balfour v. Norway House Cree Na- tion, [2006] 4 F.C.R. 404 (F.C.); Lafond v. Muskeg Lake Cree Nation, 2008 FC 480 (F.C.), par. 11. 5Patrice GARANT, Droit administratif, 6e ed.,´ Cowansville, Editions´ Yvon Blais, 2010, pp. 486-487, référant notamment aux affaires suivantes: Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.); Sparvier v. Cowessess Indian Band No. 73, [1993] 3 F.C. 142 (Fed. T.D.); Jock v. R., [1991] 2 F.C. 355 (Fed. T.D.); Montana Band v. R., [1991] 2 F.C. 273 (Fed. T.D.). 306 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

27 A` partir du moment où le conseil de bande est désigné comme etant´ un « office fédéral » et qu’il est par conséquent visé par la Loi sur les cours fédérales, il faut en deuxième lieu s’attarder au concept d’injonction employé a` l’article 18(1) de la loi. S’agit-il de l’injonction a` laquelle réfère le Code civil du Québec? Le Tribunal répond par la néga- tive pour les raisons qui suivent. 28 Tout d’abord, la Cour suprême, dans l’arrêt Canada (Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc.6, s’est exprimée sur le type de recours visés par l’article 18 de la Loi sur les cours fédérales : 52 Tous les recours enum´´ erés a` l’al. 18(1)a) sont des recours clas- siques du droit administratif, y compris les quatre brefs de préroga- tive — certiorari, prohibition, mandamus et quo warranto — et les demandes d’injonction et de jugement déclaratoire en droit administratif. L’article 18 ne prévoit pas l’octroi de dommages-intérêts. L’indemnisation n’est pas possible dans le cadre d’une procédure de contrôle judiciaire. [Soulignement ajouté] 29 Ainsi, l’article 18 de la Loi sur les cours fédérales vise l’injonction en tant que moyen de mise en œuvre du pouvoir de contrôle et de surveillance de la Cour fédérale a` l’égard des offices fédéraux au sens de l’article 2 de la même loi et non en tant que demande autonome. 30 D’ailleurs, le paragraphe 3 de l’article 18 de la Loi sur les cours fédérales prévoit que les demandes prévues au paragraphe 1 sont toutes exercées par présentation d’une demande de contrôle judiciaire. 31 Le raisonnement pourrait se terminer ici. Toutefois, le Tribunal pousse l’analyse sur la compétence proprement dite de la Cour fédérale. 32 Pour statuer sur cet el´´ ement, un test en trois etapes´ doit etreˆ effectué. Il a et´´ e développé par la Cour suprême du Canada dans l’arrêt Miida Electronics Inc. v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd.7 et contient les el´´ ements suivants : 1er Il doit y avoir attribution de compétence par une loi du Parle- ment fédéral; 2e Il doit exister un ensemble de règles de droit fédérales qui soit essentiel a` la solution du litige et constitue le fondement de l’attribution légale de compétence;

6[2010] 3 S.C.R. 585 (S.C.C.). 7[1986] 1 S.C.R. 752 (S.C.C.). Air Liaison inc. c. Conseil des Innus de Unamen Shipu La Rosa, J.C.S. 307

3e La loi invoquée dans l’affaire doit etreˆ « une loi du Canada » au sens où cette expression est employée a` l’article 101 de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1867. 33 En l’espèce, en ce qui a trait a` l’application du premier critère, le litige opposant les parties relève davantage du domaine contractuel, du droit privé, mettant en cause l’entente n° 2 intervenue entre elles, que du contrôle judiciaire de la légalité d’une décision d’un office fédéral8. 34 En d’autres mots, Air Liaison, par sa requête en injonction, requiert le maintien de la situation existante, c’est-à-dire l’exécution du contrat intervenu entre les parties jusqu’à ce qu’un arbitre soit saisi du litige comme le prévoit le contrat. En cela, il n’est pas question de contrôle judiciaire de la légalité d’une décision d’un office fédéral. 35 Ajoutons que l’article 44 de la Loi sur les cours fédérales confère egalement´ a` la Cour fédérale le pouvoir de prononcer une injonction dans la mesure toutefois où le dossier présenté devant elle relève de sa juridic- tion. Le Tribunal est d’avis que cette compétence, contrairement a` celle découlant de l’article 18, est concurrente a` celle de la Cour supérieure9. 36 Dans ce contexte, même si l’on devait conclure a` la compétence « générale » de la Cour fédérale a` la suite de l’analyse des critères etablis´ par la Cour suprême du Canada dans l’arrêt Miida Electronics Inc. v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd.10, la Cour supérieure du Québec ne serait pas pour autant dépouillée de sa compétence en matière d’injonction vu la compétence concurrente des deux cours sur cet el´´ ement. 37 Quant au deuxième critère qui repose sur l’existence de règles de droit fédéral prépondérantes, le Tribunal est d’avis qu’il n’est pas présent en l’espèce.

8Contrairement a` ce qui prévalait dans les affaires Jenniss c. Jenniss, J.E. 99- 1676 (C.S. Que.); Conseil des Mohawks de Kanesatake c. Kanesatake Health Center Inc., EYB 2013-228703 (C.S. Que.); 861808 Ontario Inc. v. Canada Revenue Agency, 2013 ONCA 604 (Ont. C.A.), requête pour autorisation de pourvoi a` la Cour suprême rejetée [2014 CarswellOnt 1008 (S.C.C.)] (C.S. Can., 2014-03-13), 35633. 9Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Liberty Net, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 626 (S.C.C.), par. 37 et suiv.; Danielle FERRON, Lawrence A. POITRAS, Ma- thieu PICHE-MESSIER,´ L’injonction et les ordonnances Anton Piller, Mareva et Norwich, LExisNexis, Montréal, 2008, p. 19. 10[1986] 1 S.C.R. 752 (S.C.C.). 308 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

38 Certes est ici impliqué un conseil de bande qui constitue générale- ment un office fédéral au sens de la Loi sur les cours fédérales et de la jurisprudence ainsi que l’application de certaines lois fédérales comme la Loi sur les transports du Canada. Toutefois, lorsqu’il a conclu l’entente n° 2 avec Air Liaison et qu’il a procédé a` sa résiliation de fa¸con unilatér- ale, le Conseil n’agissait pas en tant qu’« office fédéral » au sens de l’article 2 de la Loi sur les cours fédérales, mais plutôt comme un organisme soumis aux règles de droit civil des contrats et de la responsabilité contractuelle11. 39 En d’autres termes, il ne s’agit pas ici d’actes de nature publique re- posant sur une obligation prévue par la loi, mais plutôt sur une entente privée12. 40 Ajoutons que le fait que les défenderesses invoquent entre autres le non-respect par Air Liaison des licences délivrées par l’Office des transports du Canada et soulèvent l’application des articles 59 et 61 de la Loi sur les transports du Canada n’a aucune influence sur le fond du litige, lequel repose principalement sur le droit privé. Le fait d’invoquer l’application d’une loi fédérale dans un litige ne fait pas automatiquement echec´ a` la compétence de la Cour supérieure d’être saisie de l’affaire. 41 Puis, quant au troisième critère, cette condition ne pose pas problème en l’espèce. 42 En conclusion, si la Cour fédérale peut etreˆ compétente pour décerner l’injonction requise par Air Liaison, cette compétence n’est pas exclusive puisque ce qui est ultimement recherché n’est pas le contrôle judiciaire, voire la remise en question, d’une décision administrative ou de gouvernance finale d’un office fédéral, mais plutôt l’exécution en nature d’un contrat en force entre les parties13.

11Voir, par exemple: Anisman v. Canada (Border Services Agency), 2010 CAF 52 (F.C.A.), par. 13 a` 15. 12Voir, par exemple: Ballantyne v. Mathias Colomb Cree Nation, 2011 CF 994 (F.C.), par. 31-40; Devil’s Gap Cottagers (1982) Ltd. v. Rat Portage Band No. 38B, 2008 CF 812 (F.C.), par. 29-55; Peace Hills Trust Co. v. Moccasin, 2005 CF 1364 (F.C.), par. 62. 13Contrairement a` ce qui pr´evalait dans les affaires Jenniss c. Jenniss, J.E. 99- 1676 (C.S. Que.); Conseil des Mohawks de Kanesatake c. Kanesatake Health Center Inc., EYB 2013-228703 (C.S. Que.)); 861808 Ontario Inc. v. Canada Air Liaison inc. c. Conseil des Innus de Unamen Shipu La Rosa, J.C.S. 309

POUR CES MOTIFS, LE TRIBUNAL : 43 REJETTE le moyen d’irrecevabilité basé sur le défaut de compétence de la Cour supérieure présenté par les défenderesses et les mises en cause; 44 DECLARE´ que la Cour supérieure est compétente pour entendre la requête en injonction introduite par la demanderesse; 45 AVEC DEPENS.´ Requête rejetée.

Revenue Agency, 2013 ONCA 604 (Ont. C.A.), requête pour autorisation de pourvoi a` la Cour suprême rejetée (C.S. Can., 2014-03-13), 35633). 310 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

[Indexed as: Fitzgerald v. Nova Scotia (Public Prosecution Service)] Gordon Howard Fitzgerald, Appellant v. Her Majesty the Queen in right of Nova Scotia (Public Prosecution Service), Respondent Nova Scotia Supreme Court Docket: Halifax 421887 2014 NSSC 183 Gregory M. Warner J. Heard: March 27, 2014; April 11, 25, 2014 Judgment: May 15, 2014* Criminal law –––– Post-trial procedure — Evidence — Miscellaneous –––– Accused was convicted of rape in 1981 — Accused launched mercy applications seeking disclosure under provincial freedom of information legislation — Ac- cused had sought further disclosure of redacted and withheld documents in 2012, which was not accepted by provincial public prosecutions — Accused appealed to obtain new evidence to support application for ministerial review of miscarriage of justice pursuant to s. 696.1 of Criminal Code to get better disclosure — Public prosecutions office opposed appeal on grounds of privacy and that documents were privileged — Appeal allowed in part — Documents that constituted statements and records of witnesses and victim or documents originating with counsel for accused were ordered to be disclosed — Document that contained analytical notes and communications that related to prosecutorial advice were not ordered to be disclosed — Court treated matter as judicial review and noted that there was very little privacy interest at stake for documents that were over 30 years old — Court was not directed to any sensitive personal information, relevant to prosecution, which might now cause harm to victim, witness or to their reputation — There was no basis for finding that any third party witness would be unfairly exposed to financial or other harm — It was significant that accused sought disclosure of public prosecution file related to investigation and prosecution of himself to enable accused to seek fair determination of his rights pursuant to s. 696.1 — Public prosecutions was entitled to redact or withhold documents that were redacted that revealed thought processes of public prosecutions in conduct of trial and appeals including redacted marginal notes related to evidence and law, contained in transcripts, appeal factums,

*Corrigenda issued by the Court on June 6, 2014 have been incorporated herein. Fitzgerald v. Nova Scotia (Public Prosecution Service) 311

case law, submissions by counsel for accused and written advice given by public prosecutions to Director of Criminal Prosecutions respecting submissions made by counsel for accused in mercy applications. Privacy and freedom of information –––– Provincial privacy legislation — Miscellaneous –––– Accused was convicted of rape in 1981 — Accused launched mercy applications seeking disclosure under provincial freedom of information legislation — Accused had sought further disclosure of redacted and withheld documents in 2012, which was not accepted by provincial public prosecutions — Accused appealed to obtain new evidence to support application for ministerial review of miscarriage of justice pursuant to s. 696.1 of Criminal Code to get better disclosure — Public prosecutions office opposed appeal on grounds of privacy and that documents were privileged — Appeal allowed in part — Documents that constituted statements and records of witnesses and victim or documents originating with counsel for accused were ordered to be disclosed — Document that contained analytical notes and communications that related to prosecutorial advice were not ordered to be disclosed — Court treated matter as judicial review and noted that there was very little privacy interest at stake for documents that were over 30 years old — Court was not directed to any sensitive personal information, relevant to prosecution, which might now cause harm to victim, witness or to their reputation — There was no basis for finding that any third party witness would be unfairly exposed to financial or other harm — It was significant that accused sought disclosure of public prosecution file related to investigation and prosecution of himself to enable accused to seek fair determination of his rights pursuant to s. 696.1 — Public prosecutions was entitled to redact or withhold documents that were redacted that revealed thought processes of public prosecutions in conduct of trial and appeals including redacted marginal notes related to evidence and law, contained in transcripts, appeal factums, case law, submissions by counsel for accused and written advice given by public prosecutions to Director of Criminal Prosecutions respecting submissions made by counsel for accused in mercy applications. Cases considered by Gregory M. Warner J.: Canadian Assn. of Elizabeth Fry Societies v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety) (2010), 2010 FC 470, 2010 CarswellNat 1071, 2010 CarswellNat 1072, 7 Admin. L.R. (5th) 160, (sub nom. Canadian Assn. of Elizabeth Fry Societies v. Canada) [2011] 3 F.C.R. 309, 368 F.T.R. 211 (Eng.) (F.C.) — considered Coates v. Capital District Health Authority (2012), 2012 CarswellNS 47, 2012 NSCA 4, 987 A.P.R. 268, 312 N.S.R. (2d) 268, [2012] N.S.J. No. 24 (N.S. C.A.) — followed Criminal Lawyers’ Assn. v. Ontario (Ministry of Public Safety & Security) (2010), 319 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 255 C.C.C. (3d) 545, (sub nom. Ontario (Minister of Public Safety) v. Criminal Lawyers’ Association) 212 C.R.R. (2d) 300, (sub nom. Ontario (Public Safety & Security) v. Criminal Lawyers’ 312 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

Association) [2010] 1 S.C.R. 815, 76 C.R. (6th) 283, 1 Admin. L.R. (5th) 235, 402 N.R. 350, (sub nom. Criminal Lawyers’ Assn. (Ont.) v. Ontario (Ministry of Public Safety & Security)) 262 O.A.C. 258, 2010 SCC 23, 2010 CarswellOnt 3964, 2010 CarswellOnt 3965, 84 C.P.R. (4th) 81, [2010] A.C.S. No. 23, [2010] S.C.J. No. 23 (S.C.C.) — considered Cummings v. Nova Scotia (Public Prosecution Service) (2011), 298 N.S.R. (2d) 347, 945 A.P.R. 347, 2011 CarswellNS 50, 2011 NSSC 38 (N.S. S.C.) — considered Doctors Nova Scotia v. Nova Scotia (Department of Health) (2006), (sub nom. Doctors Nova Scotia v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Health)) 772 A.P.R. 362, (sub nom. Doctors Nova Scotia v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Health)) 243 N.S.R. (2d) 362, 44 Admin. L.R. (4th) 110, 2006 NSCA 59, 2006 Car- swellNS 195 (N.S. C.A.) — followed French v. Dalhousie University (2002), 2002 CarswellNS 255, 2002 NSSC 22, 206 N.S.R. (2d) 203, 645 A.P.R. 203, 20 C.P.R. (4th) 131, [2002] N.S.J. No. 139 (N.S. S.C. [In Chambers]) — followed Griffiths v. Nova Scotia (Department of Education) (2009), 2009 NSCA 48, 2009 CarswellNS 263, 882 A.P.R. 306, 277 N.S.R. (2d) 306 (N.S. C.A.) — followed House, Re (2000), 2000 CarswellNS 429, [2000] N.S.J. No. 473 (N.S. S.C. [In Chambers]) — followed Krieger v. Law Society (Alberta) (2002), 4 C.R. (6th) 255, 217 D.L.R. (4th) 513, 168 C.C.C. (3d) 97, [2003] 1 W.W.R. 193, 293 N.R. 201, 43 Admin. L.R. (3d) 167, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 372, 2002 SCC 65, 2002 CarswellAlta 1133, 2002 CarswellAlta 1134, 7 Alta. L.R. (4th) 1, [2002] S.C.J. No. 45, REJB 2002- 34458 (S.C.C.) — followed Lavigne v. Canada (Commissioner of Official Languages) (2002), 2002 SCC 53, 2002 CarswellNat 1357, 2002 CarswellNat 1358, 214 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 289 N.R. 282, 228 F.T.R. 319 (note), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 773, [2002] S.C.J. No. 55, REJB 2002-32125 (S.C.C.) — considered New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir (2008), 372 N.R. 1, 69 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, 69 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 844 A.P.R. 1, 2008 CSC 9, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 2008 C.L.L.C. 220-020, D.T.E. 2008T-223, 329 N.B.R. (2d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 170 L.A.C. (4th) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 291 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 2008 Car- swellNB 124, 2008 CarswellNB 125, 2008 SCC 9, 64 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 95 L.C.R. 65, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, [2008] A.C.S. No. 9 (S.C.C.) — followed R. v. Gill (2012), 2012 CarswellOnt 11352, 2012 ONCA 607, 36 M.V.R. (6th) 169, 265 C.R.R. (2d) 179, 295 O.A.C. 345, 96 C.R. (6th) 172, 112 O.R. (3d) 423, [2012] O.J. No. 4332 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Fitzgerald v. Nova Scotia (Public Prosecution Service) 313

R. v. Mills (1999), 180 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 1999 CarswellAlta 1055, 1999 Carswell- Alta 1056, 139 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 248 N.R. 101, 28 C.R. (5th) 207, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, 75 Alta. L.R. (3d) 1, 69 C.R.R. (2d) 1, [2000] 2 W.W.R. 180, 244 A.R. 201, 209 W.A.C. 201, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68 (S.C.C.) — considered R. v. Nixon (2011), 2011 SCC 34, 417 N.R. 274, 13 M.V.R. (6th) 1, 85 C.R. (6th) 1, 237 C.R.R. (2d) 333, 335 D.L.R. (4th) 565, 502 A.R. 18, 517 W.A.C. 18, 271 C.C.C. (3d) 36, 41 Alta. L.R. (5th) 221, [2011] 7 W.W.R. 429, 2011 CarswellAlta 988, 2011 CarswellAlta 989, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 566, [2011] S.C.J. No. 34 (S.C.C.) — referred to Victoria Police Department, Re (October 12, 1995), Doc. 58-1995, [1995] B.C.I.P.C.D. No. 31 (B.C. Information & Privacy Commr.) — considered Statutes considered: Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 s. 7 — considered s. 8 — considered Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34 s. 617 — referred to Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 Generally — referred to s. 278.1-278.91 [en. 1997, c. 30, s. 1] — referred to s. 690 — considered s. 696.1 [en. 2002, c. 13, s. 71] — considered s. 748 — considered s. 748(2) — considered s. 749 — referred to Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.S. 1993, c. 5 Generally — referred to s. 2 — considered s. 2(a) — considered s. 2(c) — considered s. 3(1)(i) “personal information” — considered s. 3(1)(i) “personal information” (i) — considered s. 3(1)(i) “personal information” (vi) — considered s. 3(1)(i) “personal information” (ix) — considered s. 5 — considered s. 14 — referred to s. 15 — considered s. 15(1) — considered s. 15(1)(f) — considered s. 15(2) — considered s. 16 — considered s. 20 — considered 314 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

s. 20(1) — considered s. 20(2) — considered s. 20(2)(c) — considered s. 20(2)(e)-20(2)(h) — referred to s. 20(2)(h) — considered s. 20(3) — considered s. 20(3)(b) — considered s. 20(4) — considered s. 32(3) — considered s. 39 — considered s. 39(1) — considered s. 40 — referred to s. 41 — considered s. 42(1) — considered s. 42(1)(b) — considered s. 42(3) — considered s. 45 — considered s. 45(1) — referred to s. 45(2) — considered Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21 Generally — referred to s. 41 — considered

APPEAL by accused from decision of provincial public prosecutions, refusing accused’s request for disclosure.

Gordon Howard Fitzgerald, for himself Agnes E. MacNeil, Debbie Brown, for Respondent

Gregory M. Warner J.: Part I Background 1 This is an appeal pursuant to s. 41 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act of Nova Scotia (“Act”). 2 Gordon H. Fitzgerald was charged with having sex without consent (rape) with a client in his law office on March 29, 1979. After a three- day preliminary in October 1979, in which 15 witnesses testified, and a five-day trial, commencing May 12, 1980, during which 12 crown witnesses and 15 defence witnesses testified, he was convicted. He was sen- tenced to five years imprisonment. He was released on parole after serv- ing 10 months on September 17, 1981. Fitzgerald v. Nova Scotia (Public Prosecution Service) Gregory M. Warner J. 315

3 His appeal to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal was dismissed on De- cember 14, 1980. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed on April 6, 1981. 4 On June 2, 1981, Welsford G. MacArthur, Q.C., filed an application pursuant to then s. 617 of the Criminal Code for “the mercy of the Crown” on the basis that the appellant’s conviction was a miscarriage of justice. 5 Mr. MacArthur filed several statutory declarations, documents and written submissions respecting the Appellant’s alibi evidence and the complainant’s credibility. The Federal Minister of Justice forwarded these materials to the Nova Scotia Department of Attorney General (Pub- lic Prosecution Service (“PPS”) and the Halifax Police Department on August 25, 1981, asking them to examine the materials and to respond to the application. The Department of the Attorney General responded. 6 On January 25, 1982, the Federal Minister of Justice declined to intervene or grant mercy. 7 On May 1982, Mr. MacArthur met with, and provided documents to, the Nova Scotia Deputy Attorney General for the purpose of having the complainant (victim) of the rape charged with perjury. On June 25, 1982, the Department of Attorney General determined that it would not do so. 8 About January 1983, Mr. MacArthur met with the new Federal Min- ister of Justice who agreed to review the mercy application for a second time. 9 In February 1983, the Nova Scotia Department of Attorney General received Mr. MacArthur’s new submissions to the Federal Minister of Justice. On July 12, 1983, the Federal Justice Minister again declined to intervene or grant mercy. 10 In 2009, the Appellant filed applications under the Act with PPS for disclosure of its two files in respect of the criminal prosecution and mercy application. He received some disclosure. 11 On April 13, 2012, he filed another request under the Act for more disclosure. On June 12, 2012, more disclosure was provided but some was withheld. Mr. Fitzgerald appealed the withholding of information pursuant to s. 32(3) of the Act to the Nova Scotia Supreme Court. That appeal was eventually withdrawn. Instead Mr. Fitzgerald filed a request for a review by the FOIPOP review officer, first on August 17, 2012, and again on November 15, 2012. 316 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

12 The FOIPOP review officer conducted a review. This included many communications between her, the PPS and the Appellant. On September 20, 2013, the review officer released a report prepared pursuant to s. 39(1) of the Act recommending that PPS disclose the documents that PPS had not disclosed. 13 In its October 23, 2013, response, PPS did not accept the review officer’s recommendation (s. 40 of the Act). 14 On November 22, 2013, Mr. Fitzgerald, by his Power of Attorney, his daughter L. Allison Jones, filed this appeal. 15 The stated purpose of the application and this appeal is to obtain new evidence to support an application for ministerial review of a miscarriage of justice pursuant to s. 696.1 of the Criminal Code, which section appears, with some different wording, to be the successor section to s. 617 of the Criminal Code, RSC 1970, C-34, and s. 690, RSC 1985, C-46. 16 During the hearing, an exchange between the PPS and the Court led Ms. Jones to state that Mr. Fitzgerald had at some point subsequent to 1982 been granted a pardon. No written record of the pardon, or when and how that pardon was granted, is in evidence before the Court. A pardon may be granted in accordance with s. 748(2) of the current Criminal Code (s. 683, RSC 1970 C-34, and s. 749, RSC 1985 C-46). 17 Also during the last day of the hearing, Ms. Jones produced a substantial volume of documents, which appeared to be a package prepared by Mr. MacArthur in respect of one or both of the “mercy of the Crown” applications made for Mr. Fitzgerald. The Court asked PPS, with the per- mission of Ms. Jones, to review the volume to determine whether the volume contained documents withheld by PPS. Upon its review, PPS ac- knowledged that the volume contained many documents for which exemption from disclosure had been claimed. 18 PPS filed with the Court, in a sealed package, 11 volumes of documents indexed as to whether the documents had been fully disclosed to the Appellant, partially disclosed (redacted), or withheld. The Court reviewed all of the documents. 19 In the open hearing, counsel for PPS submitted that the documents filed with the Court were all of the materials in the possession of PPS related to the criminal prosecution and the mercy of the Crown applications of the Appellant. The Court suggested to PPS that the Court’s review of the documents showed that the files did not contain any substan- Fitzgerald v. Nova Scotia (Public Prosecution Service) Gregory M. Warner J. 317

tive working notes of Crown Counsel at trial or on appeal, except a few marginal notes on copies of case law, and on the parties’ appeal briefs. 20 The files do not indicate which of the documents in the files were disclosed to Mr. Fitzgerald or his counsel as part of the criminal proceedings or the “mercy of the Crown” applications, and which of the documents had been provided by the Appellant or his counsel to PPS or to the Federal Department of Justice (and by the Federal Department to PPS). 21 The Court made the observation to PPS that it was clear from the Court’s review of the file that most, if not all, of the working notes of the Crown in respect of both files, which common sense dictates would have had to exist during the criminal proceedings and the “mercy of the Crown” applications, were not in the file. 22 Counsel for PPS was unable to advise the Court which of the approxi- mate 2,000 pages of documents in the package would have been disclosed to the Appellant during the criminal proceedings or the “mercy of the Crown” proceedings. A reading of the trial transcript, disclosed by PPS as part of the Case on Appeal redacted per s. 15(1)(f), reveals that the Appellant’s trial counsel unsuccessfully objected to evidence being received from only one witness on the basis that “no statement as to the purport of his testimony was given to the defence at any stage”. I infer that the statements of the other crown witnesses were disclosed to the Appellant, as the common law at that time required. 23 It was also clear that many of the documents, both redacted and withheld documents, were produced and provided to PPS directly and through the Federal Department of Justice, by the Appellant. 24 In this context, the Court asked the Appellant’s agent why the Appel- lant sought documents that either originated from the Appellant’s trial counsel or counsel on the mercy applications. Ms. Jones replied that circumstances caused the much of the Appellant’s various counsels’ files to be lost. 25 Part of the submissions by counsel for PPS was that the purpose for the request for disclosure was irrelevant and, alternatively, the Appellant had another means of obtaining the disclosure; that is, disclosure from the Federal Department of Justice as part of the application for ministerial review pursuant to s. 696.1 of the Criminal Code. It is not clear to the Court that s. 696.1 of the Criminal Code provides for full disclosure of PPS’s file. 318 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

26 The Court’s observation from its review of the redacted and/or withheld documents is that they would not likely assist the Appellant in establishing the grounds for a miscarriage of justice pursuant to s. 696.1 of the Criminal Code. They do not appear to support the submissions and allegations of a miscarriage of justice in the affidavits of Ms. Jones, Mr. Fitzgerald, and Mr. Clare, and the attached documents.

Part II This Proceeding 27 In support of the appeal, Ms. Jones filed an affidavit, to which is attached: a) correspondence with the PPS and the FOIPOP review office together with copies of communications amongst the Review Of- ficer, PPS and Appellant; b) an affidavit of Mr. Fitzgerald, c) an affidavit of Larry Clare (one of the police investigators involved in the original criminal prosecution), and, d) witness statements and correspondence intended to suggest that Mr. Fitzgerald was wrongfully convicted. 28 The Respondent PPS objected to the admissibility of some contents and attachments to Ms. Jones and Mr. Fitzgerald’s affidavits. On March 27, 2014, this Court received submissions and, in an oral decision, struck some of the contents and attachments to Ms. Jones and Mr. Fitzgerald’s affidavits. 29 PPS filed an affidavit of Denise C. Smith, Q.C., PPS’s Deputy Direc- tor, sworn February 28, 2014. It contained opinion evidence respecting: a) prosecutorial discretion and the law respecting the disclosure of the Crown’s file, b) the effect of the disclosure of sensitive personal information and third party information of victims and witnesses in certain types of criminal cases, c) the policy and practice of PPS respecting the protection of victims of crime, and d) her understanding of the purpose of s. 696.1 of the Criminal Code (wrongful conviction reviews) and s. 748 of the Criminal Code (mercy of the Crown applications). Fitzgerald v. Nova Scotia (Public Prosecution Service) Gregory M. Warner J. 319

This Court expressed reservations about the admissibility of most of the contents of the Smith affidavit as opinion evidence, but made no determination on its admissibility. 30 Neither party sought to cross-examine the affiants. 31 The hearing was organized into three parts: a) The first involved PPS’s motion to strike parts of the Appellant’s affidavits. b) The second involved submissions by the parties on the factual and legal issues, including: i) the nature of a FOIPOP appeal and authority of the appeal court; ii) the scope and purpose of the Act; iii) the interpretation and application of the exemption from disclosure of third party personal information (s. 20 of the Act); and iv) the interpretation and application of the exemption from disclosure of information that could reasonably be expected to reveal information related to or used in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion (s. 15(1)(f) of the Act). c) The third part was conducted in camera, pursuant to s. 42(1)(b) and 42(3) of the Act, with counsel for PPS present, for the purpose of examining the redacted and withheld records as well as receiving representations from PPS in a manner that would avoid disclosure of any record or part of any record that the Court eventually determined should not be disclosed.

Part III The Three Issues Issue #1 The nature of a FOIPOP appeal 32 PPS submits that this is not a judicial review. The review officer made no decisions, only recommendations. The issue of deference to the decision maker is not relevant. In any event, PPS argues, application of the law to this Act is a matter of special expertise of the Court. 33 It appears to the Court that the principles of judicial review may be relevant to this proceeding. This proceeding is an appeal. It is not the recommendations of the review officer that is the subject of the review, but rather the decision of the “head of the public body” (in this case PPS) 320 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

made pursuant to s. 40 of the Act in response to the review officer’s recommendations that is the subject matter of the appeal. 34 If this appeal is a judicial review, to the extent that the decision of the PPS involved a question of law, the standard of review would be correctness. To the extent that the decision involves the application of the law to a claim for exemption of a record, the standard of review would be more nuanced. 35 PPS submitted that no deference is due to the Review Officer’s recommendations. This submission suggests that the standard of review to the application of law to each claimed exemption would involve the standard of review of correctness. There is no reason for PPS’s submission to be different for judicial review of the decision of PPS than it submits is applicable to those of the Review Officer. 36 Context relevant to the standard of review analysis would include the fact that in s. 20 and s. 15 of the Act, the decisions to be made by the head of the public body require him or her, in the case of s. 20(2), to consider and weigh a non-exhaustive list of relevant circumstances. This would include determination whether the disclosure of certain information would be an unreasonable invasion of a third party’s personal privacy. In the case of prosecutorial discretion (s. 15(1)(f)), it would require determination whether the disclosure could reasonably be expected to reveal any information related to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 37 The question of whether this appeal constitutes a form of judicial review is addressed in some of the cases cited to the Court by PPS. 38 In Canadian Assn. of Elizabeth Fry Societies v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety), 2010 FC 470 (F.C.), at para 37, the Court quotes s. 41 of the Federal Privacy Act as providing that an individual may “... apply to the Court for a review of the matter” and at paras 43 to 45, the Court describes the standard of review in terms of judicial review, applying New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir, 2008 SCC 9 (S.C.C.). 39 In Lavigne v. Canada (Commissioner of Official Languages), 2002 SCC 53 (S.C.C.), again respecting the Federal Privacy Act, the Court described the application as one of judicial review. 40 In Criminal Lawyers’ Assn. v. Ontario (Ministry of Public Safety & Security), 2010 SCC 23 (S.C.C.), after dealing with constitutional questions related to Ontario’s FOIPOP legislation, the Court at paras 62 to 75 dealt with the decisions of the Minister and Commission as being as- Fitzgerald v. Nova Scotia (Public Prosecution Service) Gregory M. Warner J. 321

sessed, in respect of discretionary exemptions from disclosure, on the basis of whether their exercise of discretion was reasonable. 41 In House, Re, 2000 CarswellNS 429 (N.S. S.C. [In Chambers]), Jus- tice Moir did not address judicial review. He adopted his own four-step analysis for a claim by a government body for exemption from access based on an interpretation of s. 3(1)(i), s. 20(3) and s. 45(2) of the Act. 42 In Cummings v. Nova Scotia (Public Prosecution Service), 2011 NSSC 38 (N.S. S.C.), Justice Wright did not directly address judicial review. At paragraphs 10 to 17, he simply cites the provisions of the Act to identify the purpose of the Act (s. 2); the right to access unless expressly exempted (s. 5); the exemptions, including the one relevant in that case (s. 15(1)(f)); the powers of the courts (s. 14); the standard of review (s. 42(1)) and the burden of proof (s. 45(1)). 43 This Court notes with interest the observation of the review officer at page two of her September 20, 2013 report. It was her view that this Court did not have the same power as the review officer when it came to discretionary exemptions in circumstances where the Review Officer found that PPS exercised its discretion in a manner inconsistent with the Act. 44 If this appeal was under s. 41 of the Federal Privacy Act or Ontario’s Act, I would find that this appeal is a judicial review. The standard of review would be determined by application of the Dunsmuir principles, which include correctness with regards to matters of law, and, depending on the circumstances, correctness or reasonableness in the application of the law to the facts. In the case of discretionary decisions by a governing body, the standard of review would normally be reasonableness, as was held in the cases cited above. 45 However, s. 41 of the Act provides for an appeal and s. 42(1) provides that the Court may determine the matter de novo and, for that purpose, many examine any record in camera to “... determine on the merits whether the information within the record may be withheld pursuant to this Act.” 46 By reason of the express wording of s. 42(1), and PPS’s acknowledg- ment at the hearing of this appeal that the Court is free to determine the matter de novo, I adopt the position that this Court is in the same position as the PPS in interpreting the legislation and, in particular, the claims for exemption pursuant to s. 20 and s. 15(1)(f). 322 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

47 Section 5 of the Act expressly provides that a person has a right of access to any record in the custody or under the control of a public body upon complying with the Act. This section does not extend to information exempted from disclosure pursuant to the Act. 48 Section 45 of the Act reads as follows: Burden of proof 45 (1) At a review or appeal into a decision to refuse an applicant access to all or part of a record, the burden is on the head of a public body to prove that the applicant has no right of access to the record or part. (2) Where the record or part that the applicant is refused access to contains personal information about a third party, the burden is on the applicant to prove that disclosure of the information would not be an unreasonable invasion of the third party’s personal privacy. (3) At a review or appeal into a decision to give an applicant access to all or part of a record containing information that relates to a third party, (a) in the case of personal information, the burden is on the applicant to prove that disclosure of the information would not be an unreasonable invasion of the third party’s personal privacy; and (b) in any other case, the burden is on the third party to prove that the applicant has no right of access to the record or part. 49 The relevant portions of s. 20 (disclosure harmful to personal privacy) reads as follows: Personal information 20 (1) The head of a public body shall refuse to disclose personal information to an applicant if the disclosure would be an unreasonable invasion of a third party’s personal privacy. (2) In determining pursuant to subsection (1) or (3) whether a disclosure of personal information constitutes an unreasonable invasion of a third party’s personal privacy, the head of a public body shall consider all the relevant circumstances, including whether (a) the disclosure is desirable for the purpose of subjecting the activities of the Government of Nova Scotia or a public body to public scrutiny; (b) the disclosure is likely to promote public health and safety or to promote the protection of the environment; Fitzgerald v. Nova Scotia (Public Prosecution Service) Gregory M. Warner J. 323

(c) the personal information is relevant to a fair determination of the applicant’s rights; (d) the disclosure will assist in researching the claims, disputes or grievances of aboriginal people; (e) the third party will be exposed unfairly to financial or other harm; (f) the personal information has been supplied in confidence; (g) the personal information is likely to be inaccurate or unreliable; and (h) the disclosure may unfairly damage the reputation of any person referred to in the record requested by the applicant. (3) A disclosure of personal information is presumed to be an unreasonable invasion of a third party’s personal privacy if (a) the personal information relates to a medical, dental, psychi- atric, psychological or other health-care history, diagnosis, condition, treatment or evaluation; (b) the personal information was compiled and is identifiable as part of an investigation into a possible violation of law, except to the extent that disclosure is necessary to prosecute the violation or to continue the investigation; (c) the personal information relates to eligibility for income assistance or social-service benefits or to the determination of benefit levels; (d) the personal information relates to employment or educational history; (e) the personal information was obtained on a tax return or gathered for the purpose of collecting a tax; (f) the personal information describes the third party’s finances, income, assets, liabilities, net worth, bank balances, financial history or activities, or creditworthiness; (g) the personal information consists of personal recommendations or evaluations, character references or personnel evaluations; (h) the personal information indicates the third party’s racial or ethnic origin, sexual orientation or religious or political beliefs or associations; or (i) the personal information consists of the third party’s name together with the third party’s address or telephone number and is to be used for mailing lists or solicitations by telephone or other means. 324 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

(4) A disclosure of personal information is not an unreasonable invasion of a third party’s personal privacy if (a) the third party has, in writing, consented to or requested the disclosure; (b) there are compelling circumstances affecting anyone’s health or safety; (c) an enactment authorizes the disclosure; (d) the disclosure is for a research or statistical purpose and is in accordance with Section 29 or 30; (e) the information is about the third party’s position, functions or remuneration as an officer, employee or member of a public body or as a member of a minister’s staff; (f) the disclosure reveals financial and other similar details of a contract to supply goods or services to a public body; (g) the information is about expenses incurred by the third party while travelling at the expense of a public body; (h) the disclosure reveals details of a licence, permit or other similar discretionary benefit granted to the third party by a public body, not including personal information supplied in support of the request for the benefit; or (i) the disclosure reveals details of a discretionary benefit of a financial nature granted to the third party by a public body, not including personal information that is supplied in support of the request for the benefit or is referred to in clause (c) of subsection (3). 50 The relevant portions of the Act related to the claimed exemption respecting prosecutorial discretion read as follows: Law enforcement 15 (1) The head of a public body may refuse to disclose information to an applicant if the disclosure could reasonably be expected to (a) harm law enforcement; (b) prejudice the defence of Canada or of any foreign state allied to or associated with Canada or harm the detection, preven- tion or suppression of espionage, sabotage or terrorism; (c) harm the effectiveness of investigative techniques or proce- dures currently used, or likely to be used, in law enforcement; (d) reveal the identity of a confidential source of law enforcement information; Fitzgerald v. Nova Scotia (Public Prosecution Service) Gregory M. Warner J. 325

(e) endanger the life or physical safety of a law-enforcement officer or any other person; (f) reveal any information relating to or used in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion; (g) deprive a person of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication; (h) reveal a record that has been confiscated from a person by a peace officer in accordance with an enactment; (i) be detrimental to the proper custody, control or supervision of a person under lawful detention; (j) facilitate the commission of an offence contrary to an enactment; or (k) harm the security of any property or system, including a building, a vehicle, a computer system or a communications system. (2) The head of a public body may refuse to disclose information to an applicant if the information (a) is in a law-enforcement record and the disclosure would be an offence pursuant to an enactment; (b) is in a law-enforcement record and the disclosure could reasonably be expected to expose to civil liability the author of the record or a person who has been quoted or paraphrased in the record; or (c) is about the history, supervision or release of a person who is in custody or under supervision and the disclosure could reasonably be expected 51 The starting point of the analysis is recognition of the purposes of the Act, including: a) to ensure accountability of public bodies by giving the public (not relevant to this matrix) and individuals a right of access to personal information about themselves, subject to specified limited exceptions and independent review of access decisions (s. 2(a) of the Act); and, b) to protect the privacy of individuals with respect to personal information held by public bodies and to provide them with a right to access that information (s. 2(c) of the Act). 52 PPS submits that the reason that the right of access to personal information is set out twice is that the purpose of s. 2(a), which ensures accountability for information the Government collects (transparency), is a 326 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

public policy, while the purpose of s. 2(c), to ensure respect for a person’s privacy with respect to the collection of personal information, is not a public policy but a personal entitlement. 53 The Court notes that the reference in s. 2 to the exceptions to access to personal information about an individual is in s. 2(a). 54 In this case, PPS redacted 57 documents: 17 in the criminal file and 40 in the mercy file. Seventeen of the redacted documents were in the Appellant’s package of materials related to his mercy application (com- pared by PPS counsel to their list on April 25th), thus leaving 40 remaining redacted documents that are subject to this appeal. 55 Of the remaining 40 redacted documents, 20 are redacted on the basis of an exception under s. 20(3)(b); 12 were reacted on the basis of an exception under s. 15(1)(f); 1 on the basis of both subsections and the remaining 7 on the basis that they were out of scope of the Act (1 document), or on the basis of s. 20(3)(b) and 20(2)(h) (5 documents), or a combination of s. 20(3)(b) and s. 16 (1 document). 56 PPS withheld 41 documents, 17 in the criminal file and 24 in the mercy file. Ten of the withheld documents were in the Appellant’s mercy package, thus leaving 31 withheld documents that are subject to this appeal. 57 Of the remaining withheld documents, the claimed exception was s. 20(3)(b) for 4 documents, s. 15(1)(f) for 8 documents, and both subsections for the remaining 19 documents. 58 In summary, 49 of the claimed exemptions involve s. 20(3)(b) and 39 involve s. 15(1)(f).

Issue #2 Would it be an unreasonable invasion of third party’s personal privacy to release their personal information which was redacted or withheld pursuant to s. 20? 59 The focus of the analysis is ensuring that the individual can obtain access to their personal information held by a public body and, where that document involves personal information of a third party, the disclosure would not be an unreasonable invasion of the third party’s personal privacy. 60 The section 2(a) right of access to information held by a public body about an individual may come in conflict with the s. 2(c) right to protection of a third party’s privacy in their personal information. It is in that Fitzgerald v. Nova Scotia (Public Prosecution Service) Gregory M. Warner J. 327

circumstance that the public body, and in this case the Court, must recon- cile the dual purposes of the Act. 61 PPS has the burden to prove that the Applicant has no right of access to a record (s. 45(1)) but where the record contains personal information about a third party, the Appellant must prove that the disclosure would not be an unreasonable invasion of the third party’s personal privacy. 62 Section 20 is all about what constitutes an unreasonable invasion of a third party’s personal privacy. 63 Section 20(2) sets out a non-exhaustive list of eight relevant circumstances to be considered when balancing the two rights. The Appellant focussed on s. 20(2)(c): “The personal information is relevant to a fair determination of the applicant’s rights”. 64 PPS focussed on ss. 20(2)(e) to (h) inclusive: unfairly exposure of the third party to financial or other harm; the personal information was supplied in confidence; the personal information is likely to be inaccurate or unreliable; and the disclosure may unfairly damage the reputation of a person referred to in the record. 65 Section 20(3) lists nine types of personal information, the disclosure of which is “presumed to be” an unreasonable invasion of a third party’s personal privacy. 66 Section 20(4) lists nine circumstances where the disclosure of a person’s personal information is “not” an unreasonable invasion of a third party’s personal privacy. Seven of the nine circumstances are not relevant to the matrix of this case. The two that may be relevant provide that disclosure is not an unreasonable invasion where the third party has in writing consented to disclosure, or where an enactment authorizes the disclosure. 67 With respect to the consent provision, the documents for which disclosure is sought are over 30 years old. Counsel for PPS submits that it attempted to contact the third parties, in respect of whom documents have been redacted or withheld. PPS acknowledges that it was unable to locate most of the third parties and has no information even about whether they are alive. No evidence was tendered to the Court, in camera or otherwise, of the nature of steps undertaken to contact, or attempt to contact, the parties whose names are redacted, or which were located. PPS did provide one letter from a third party, objecting to the disclosure of his personal information. That third party was a witness in the trial of the Appellant. 328 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

68 An analytical framework for deciding a s. 20 exception is set out in Justice Moir’s decision in House and involves four questions: i. Is the requested information “personal information” within s. 3(1)(i)? If not, that is the end of the analysis. ii. Are any of the conditions of s. 20(4) satisfied? If so, that is the end of the analysis. iii. Is the personal information presumed to be an unreasonable invasion of personal privacy pursuant to s. 20(3)? iv. In light of any s. 20(3) presumption, and in light of any burden upon the appellant established by s. 45(2), does the balancing of all relevant circumstances, including those listed in s. 20(2), lead to the conclusion that disclosure would result in an unreasonable invasion of privacy? 69 The first question depends upon the meaning of “personal information”. It is defined in s. 3(1)(i) as follows: “personal information” means recorded information about an identifiable individual, including (i) the individual’s name, address or telephone number, (ii) the individual’s race, national or ethnic origin, colour, or religious or political beliefs or associations, (iii) the individual’s age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status or family status, (iv) an identifying number, symbol or other particular assigned to the individual, (v) the individual’s fingerprints, blood type or inheritable characteristics, (vi) information about the individual’s health-care history, including a physical or mental disability, (vii) information about the individual’s educational, financial, criminal or employment history, (viii) anyone else’s opinions about the individual, and (ix) the individual’s personal views or opinions, except if they are about someone else; 70 PPS submits that a party’s name and address [s. 3(1)(i)(i)] is personal information and the Appellant has no right of access unless he satisfies the Court that the Act authorizes disclosure. Fitzgerald v. Nova Scotia (Public Prosecution Service) Gregory M. Warner J. 329

71 In addition, PPS argues that information about the victim’s health- care history [s. 3(1)(i)(vi)], and a third party’s personal views and opinions [s. 3(1)(i)(ix)] fall within the realm of personal information. 72 For the most part, PPS’s claims for exemption under s. 20(3)(b) relate to redaction of the name of the third party, or the withholding of the documents of a third party, on the basis that the document contains the name of the third party and their observations (facts) about the Appellant. 73 The Court has a problem with this submission. The documents redacted and withheld based on s. 20(3)(b) are not about the third party but about the Appellant and his involvement in the crime for which he was convicted, based upon their evidence. They are not opinion about an individual, they are statements of fact about the Appellant. To the extent that they may be the third party’s personal views or opinions as defined in s. 3(1)(i)(ix), they are not personal information because they are about the Appellant, and therefore not personal information. 74 For the most part, the only third party personal information is the name of the victim and other trial witnesses. One exception is the note of the doctor, upon whom the victim attended shortly after the sexual as- sault, which note contains some of the evidence given by the examining doctor at the trial. That note is not the type of record that would have been or is now protected from disclosure under ss. 278.1 to 278.91 of the Criminal Code, as discussed in R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 (S.C.C.). 75 Of the documents redacted solely on the basis that they contain the name of a witness or the victim and their “opinion” (factual evidence) about the Appellant, the only portion of the document that may be subject to redaction, pursuant to s. 20(3)(b) on the House analysis, could be the name of the witness or the victim. 76 The second House question asked whether any of the conditions of s. 20(4) are satisfied. The redactions or withholding of documents were in respect of third parties whose written consent to disclosure was not received. 77 PPS submits that no enactment authorizes the release of the redacted or withheld information. It relies upon the affidavit of Ms. Smith outlining the changes in the Criminal Code to protect witnesses and victims of crime from having their information unnecessarily released. 78 The submission is based upon the changes in the Criminal Code, considered in detail in Mills where the court recognized the balancing of the 330 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

rights of privacy of victims and witnesses with the accused’s right to a full answer and defence, protected by s. 7 of the Charter. 79 While the Court agrees with the PPS that there are limits recognized in the Criminal Code and by the courts with respect to what information of a victim or witness is disclosable to an accused person, none of the information redacted or withheld by PPS in this case would qualify as the type of Crown information protected from disclosure by reason of its interference with the reasonable right to privacy protected by s. 8 of the Charter. 80 PPS submits that the matter before this Court is not in relation to an active prosecution or appeal, both of which were concluded almost 35 years ago. PPS submits that, even in an active prosecution, the Appellant does not unlimited access to information, pursuant to the Criminal Code and s. 7 of the Charter. 81 While acknowledging that the redacted or withheld documents relate to the victim and witnesses who participated in the trial, PPS submits that it is in the interest of justice that victims and witnesses be afforded the comfort of knowing that their involvement in the judicial system will come to an end. Otherwise such persons may be unwilling to participate in the process in future. This latter submission is relevant to the fourth House question. 82 PPS’s submission is complicated by the fact that there is no record in the materials filed with the Court as to what was disclosed by the Crown to the Appellant during the earlier criminal proceedings. However, there are the transcripts of the preliminary hearing and trial before the Court, which set out the information about which the witnesses and victim testified. Their evidence was the same as the information in the redacted and withheld documents. I infer from the Appellant’s trial counsel’s objection to evidence being received from one Crown witness for non-disclosure of his evidence before trial, that the statements of the other witnesses were disclosed. 83 Also relevant is the fact that many of the redacted or withheld documents appear to be sworn witness statements obtained, and submissions made, by the Appellant and provided to PPS either directly by the Appel- lant’s then-counsel in an effort to get PPS to charge the victim with perjury or indirectly in respect of the mercy applications. 84 This Court has difficulty with PPS’s submission that an enactment does not authorize disclosure of the evidence tendered at a criminal trial against the Appellant or submitted by PPS in response to the Appellant’s Fitzgerald v. Nova Scotia (Public Prosecution Service) Gregory M. Warner J. 331

mercy applications made pursuant to the Criminal Code. While the entitlement to disclosure of the Crown’s case before the Charter was based on the common law, that common law became a right recognized and protected by the Charter. 85 While the Crown’s proceeding against the Appellant may have ended more than 30 years ago, the Appellant’s intention to obtain through his FOIPOP application “new matters of significance” that were not “previously considered” to found an application pursuant to s. 696.1 of the Criminal Code, is a statutory right. 86 Between the first and second hearing dates, PPS provided the Court with case law which refers to this issue: Victoria Police Department, Re [(October 12, 1995), Doc. 58-1995 (B.C. Information & Privacy Commr.)], 1995 CanLII (Order F58-1995). The applicant was described as a dangerous person, a convicted murderer, still in prison, seeking disclosure of the police file relating to his conviction. 87 The Commissioner, citing several sections of the BC FOIPOP legislation, upheld the redaction and withholding of the requested material pursuant to four sections exempting material from disclosure, including that disclosure could reasonably be expected to threaten a person’s safety and interfere with public safety. His “discussion” that a request for disclosure based on an intent to file a s. 696.1 of the Criminal Code application respecting a completed prosecution did not constitute an entitlement to use the FOIPOP Act to access these records, was short and without reference to any authority. 88 With respect, I do not agree with that conclusion. 89 The third House question is whether any of the personal information is presumed to be an unreasonable invasion of privacy pursuant to s. 20(3). 90 PPS submits that the personal information of the third parties, as above identified, is presumed to be an unreasonable invasion of a person’s privacy on the basis that it is personal information that “was compiled and is identifiable as part of an investigation into a possible violation of law, except to the extent that disclosure is necessary to prosecution the violation or to continue the investigation”. 91 Said differently, PPS submits that the information was gathered by the police as part of the investigation and prosecution of the Appellant and that its disclosure ceased to be necessary when the prosecution and investigation ended. 332 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

92 Based on this Court’s review of the documents redacted or withheld on the basis of s. 20(3)(b), only one withheld document contains a statement by a third party which appears never to have been acted upon by the PPS in the criminal proceeding nor disclosed to the Appellant. That document identifies a person who did not testify. The document’s purpose appears to be relevant to the question of whether the Crown should continue the prosecution — one of the core elements of prosecutorial discretion discussed in the third issue. 93 For all other documents, for which exception is claimed on the basis on an unreasonable invasion of personal privacy of a third party, the third parties testified at trial. There is no basis to find (nor was it submitted) that the disclosure of their statements would not have been necessary under the common law, later codified in the Charter, as part of the prosecution of the Appellant. 94 Said differently, with the exception of one document, which did not form part of the evidence of trial, and which appears relevant to the PPS’s decision to continue the prosecution, the statements were required by law, now codified, to be disclosed in the criminal proceeding. 95 In the event that I am in error in finding that all but one document in the PPS file, for which exemption is claimed based on s. 20 of the Act, is either not personal information (except for the name of the third party), or, in the case of witnesses who have not been found and not given written consent to disclosure, is required by the Charter to disclosed to the Appellant, then I agree with PPS that the purpose for which they were compiled was in respect a violation of the law and disclosure is not now necessary for prosecution or continued investigation. The remaining personal information (that is, the name of the witnesses and victim) is presumed to be an unreasonable invasion of that third party’s personal privacy. 96 The fourth House question requires that I consider the relevant factors in s. 20(2) in determining whether the disclosure of personal information, presumed to be an unreasonable invasion of personal privacy, does constitute an unreasonable invasion of a third party’s personal privacy. The burden is on the Appellant. 97 The presumption of an unreasonable invasion of personal privacy in s. 20(3) does not constitute the end of the analysis. Clearly s. 20(2) requires that, where a presumptive finding is made, pursuant to s. 20(3), the issue of whether the disclosure of personal information constitutes an Fitzgerald v. Nova Scotia (Public Prosecution Service) Gregory M. Warner J. 333

unreasonable invasion of a third party’s personal privacy, must still be considered based upon all the relevant circumstances. 98 In this case, in respect of all but one of the documents for which exemption is claimed by reason of s. 20 of the Act, the Court is satisfied the personal information of the third parties consists of the name of the witnesses and the victim who provided information about the Appellant relevant to the criminal prosecution. The statements and evidence could not have been given with an expectation of confidentiality. Their evidence was the subject matter of a public process. Many of the statements of witnesses and documents were provided to PPS by the Appellant’s various counsels. 99 There is no basis for finding that the personal information is inaccurate or unreliable. There is no basis for finding that the reputation of any third party would be damaged at this point. The Court was not directed to any sensitive personal information, relevant to the prosecution, which might now cause harm to the victim, or a witness, or to their reputation. There is no basis for finding that any third party witness would be unfairly exposed to financial or other harm. 100 Because counsel for the Appellant claimed at the time he appealed his conviction, and in the mercy applications, that the victim committed perjury, he could conceivably have commenced civil proceedings against her, but the limitation periods for any such proceeding have long expired. There is no basis for finding that she would now be exposed unfairly to financial or other harm. 101 The Appellant seeks disclosure for the purpose of obtaining new material of significance that might justify an application pursuant to s. 696.1 of the Criminal Code. Part of his claim that new information exists is found in the affidavit of Officer Larry Clare to the effect that the Crown had concerns about the credibility of the complainant, who therefore swore the Information herself, even though the Crown appears to have conducted the prosecution from the beginning. It is a relevant consideration of some significance that the Appellant seeks disclosure of the PPS file related to the investigation and prosecution of him, and the response to his initial application for mercy of the Crown, to enable him to seek a fair determination of his rights pursuant to s. 696.1 of the Criminal Code. 102 It is also a valid consideration that the disclosure of the victim’s name may cause her name to be reintroduced to the public more than 35 years after the trial. 334 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

103 The witnesses’ evidence and statements was not such that disclosure at this time would cause any of them distress, harm or loss of reputation. Furthermore, most of them could not be found when PPS attempted to notify them of the Appellant’s application. 104 Disclosure of all the documents redacted or withheld on the basis of s. 20 of the Act, with the exception of document number 6 in the mercy file, would not constitute an unreasonable invasion of any third party’s personal privacy. 105 In my view, this conclusion is consistent with the analysis of s. 20 exemption claims in French v. Dalhousie University, 2002 NSSC 22 (N.S. S.C. [In Chambers]); Doctors Nova Scotia v. Nova Scotia (Department of Health), 2006 NSCA 59 (N.S. C.A.); Griffiths v. Nova Scotia (Department of Education), 2009 NSCA 48 (N.S. C.A.), and Coates v. Capital District Health Authority, 2012 NSCA 4 (N.S. C.A.).

Issue #4 Could the disclosure of information redacted or withheld be reasonably expected to reveal any information related to or used in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion? 106 PPS tendered the Affidavit of Denise Smith. Paragraphs 7 to 18 describe her understanding of prosecutorial discretion under three headings: prosecutorial discretion, the Crown’s file, and disclosure of the Crown’s file. It contains the substance of counsel’s submissions to the Court during the three days of hearing. 107 It essentially opines that everything in the Crown’s file can be reasonably expected to reveal information related to or used in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and should therefore be exempt from disclosure pursuant s. 15(1)(f) of the Act. Counsel for PPS reiterated in her oral submissions that this is PPS’s position. 108 Ms. Smith’s affidavit reads in part: 7. A Crown uses his or her discretion in making any and all decisions while conducting a criminal prosecution. A Crown’s discretion is therefore exercised during all stages of a criminal case. ... 9. ... A Crown’s discretion is a decision to be made which has an impact on the accused. It is also exercised with respect to many aspects of the conduct of the prosecution, including, but not limited to: a. Whether the correct charge was laid, or whether additional charges ought to be brought; Fitzgerald v. Nova Scotia (Public Prosecution Service) Gregory M. Warner J. 335

b. Whether to proceed by way of summary or indictable offence; c. What penalty or sentence to seek; d. Whether a publication ban should be sought; e. Whether release should be opposed or terms of release sought; and f. A variety of decisions regarding a preliminary hearing or trial strategy.(Court’s emphasis) ... 13. The file received from the police is used in the exercise of the Crown’s discretion. In addition, as the Crown Attorney adds to the file, including research materials, and their own notes and memos, those materials also become part of the documentation used by the Crown Attorney in the exercise of their discretion. ... 15. The exercise of Crown discretion is not always evident from the file materials, through a given note or sequence of notes, but rather the Crown’s discretion may be revealed through the course of action taken. Notations which might appear to be innocuous might in fact have a significant bearing on the Crown’s discretion or, in fact, re- present the exercise of the Crown’s discretion. 16. The materials contained in a Crown’s file go to the heart of prosecutorial discretion. (Court’s emphasis) The Crown’s file 17. Detailed Crown notes are an essential part of the Crown file and key to any prosecution. Crown notes are made throughout the prosecution, and can relate to the exercise of the Crown’s discretion regarding many different aspects of the case. The notes are important as the same Crown who is involved in the earlier stages of the prosecution may not necessarily be the Crown who takes the case to trial, or on appeal. 18. If Crown Attorneys had the knowledge that their notes could be disclosed it could result in them making fewer notes. This may lead to poor communication between Crown Attorneys where the file is transferred from one to another, resulting in poor representation by the Crown in protecting the public interest in prosecuting the crime. 19. Disclosure of a Crown Attorney’s notes may lead to misinterpre- tation if taken out of context. 336 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

109 As indicated earlier in this decision, there were extremely few working notes of Crown counsel in these files. Crown counsel, at trial and on appeal, could not have conducted the prosecution and appeals without far more notes than are in the file disclosed to the Court. 110 Most of the notes for which the Crown sought exemption from disclosure were marginal notes on appellate factums and case law related to the appeal of the conviction. 111 Prosecutorial discretion is not defined in the Act. PPS refers the Court to paras 20 and 21 in Cummings, a decision based on a FOIPOP application for the Crown’s file by an accused in respect of two charges: one in which she was found not criminally responsible and a second which was withdrawn and therefore dismissed. Justice Wright accepted the definition in the BC FOIPOP legislation. In his view, this definition was consistent with the comments at paras 46 and 47 in Krieger v. Law Society (Alberta), 2002 SCC 65 (S.C.C.). 112 Krieger was not a decision respecting FOIPOP legislation. It dealt with a Crown prosecutor’s challenge to the jurisdiction of the Provincial Bar Society to review his conduct in a case. In Krieger, the complaint involved the Crown’s failure to disclose relevant exculpatory evidence to an accused. 113 The Supreme Court confirmed the Law Society’s jurisdiction to review the prosecutor’s conduct. The Court held that conduct involving the exercise of prosecutorial discretion would not be reviewable, except in cases of flagrant impropriety. It articulated what did and did not constitute the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The Court held that the prosecutor’s conduct in Krieger did not constitute the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 114 Paragraphs 42 to 47 of Krieger describes what the exercise of prosecutorial discretion does and does not encompass as: D. Prosecutorial Discretion 42 In making independent decisions on prosecutions, the Attorney General and his agents exercise what is known as prosecutorial discretion. This discretion is generally exercised directly by agents, the Crown attorneys, as it is uncommon for a single prosecution to attract the Attorney General’s personal attention. 43 “Prosecutorial discretion” is a term of art. It does not simply refer to any discretionary decision made by a Crown prosecutor. Prosecutorial discretion refers to the use of those powers that constitute the core of the Attorney General’s office and which are protected Fitzgerald v. Nova Scotia (Public Prosecution Service) Gregory M. Warner J. 337

from the influence of improper political and other vitiating factors by the principle of independence. 44 L’Heureux-Dub´e J., in quoting David Vanek’s work, “Prosecutorial Discretion” (1987-88), 30 Crim. L.Q. 219, at p. 219, said that “[p]rosecutorial discretion refers to the discretion exercised by the Attorney-General in matters within his authority in relation to the prosecution of criminal offences” (Power, supra, at p. 622). 45 As discussed above, these powers emanate from the office holder’s role as legal advisor of and officer to the Crown. In our theory of government, it is the sovereign who holds the power to prosecute his or her subjects. A decision of the Attorney General, or of his or her agents, within the authority delegated to him or her by the sovereign is not subject to interference by other arms of government. An exercise of prosecutorial discretion will, therefore, be treated with deference by the courts and by other members of the executive, as well as statutory bodies like provincial law societies. 46 Without being exhaustive, we believe the core elements of prosecutorial discretion encompass the following: (a) the discretion whether to bring the prosecution of a charge laid by police; (b) the discretion to enter a stay of proceedings in either a private or public prosecution, as codified in the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 579 and 579.1; (c) the discretion to accept a guilty plea to a lesser charge; (d) the discretion to withdraw from criminal proceedings al- together: R. v. Osborne (1975), 25 C.C.C. (2d) 405 (N.B.C.A.); and (e) the discretion to take control of a private prosecution: R. v. Osi- owy (1989), 50 C.C.C. (3d) 189 (Sask. C.A.). While there are other discretionary decisions, these are the core of the delegated sovereign authority peculiar to the office of the Attorney General. 47 Significantly, what is common to the various elements of prosecutorial discretion is that they involve the ultimate decisions as to whether a prosecution should be brought, continued or ceased, and what the prosecution ought to be for. Put differently, prosecutorial discretion refers to decisions regarding the nature and extent of the prosecution and the Attorney General’s participation in it. Decisions that do not go to the nature and extent of the prosecution, i.e., the decisions that govern a Crown prosecutor’s tactics or conduct before the court, do not fall within the scope of prosecutorial discretion. Rather, such decisions are governed by the inherent jurisdiction of the court to control its own processes once the Attorney General has elected to enter into that forum. 115 From Krieger, it is clear that prosecutorial discretion does not include every Crown action in the conduct of a criminal prosecution. 338 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

116 The Crown’s submission that virtually all, if not all, of the criminal prosecution file relates to or is used in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is not the law as described in Krieger. The fact that the entire contents of the prosecution file may influence whether the Crown pro- ceeds with a charge or what charges, or whether it stays a charge, or discontinues a prosecution, or determines what position to take with respect to sentence, does not protect from disclosure under s.15(1)(f) the steps taken in the investigation of the offence, the preparation for trial, the conduct of the trial, the preparation for appeal and the conduct of the appeal. 117 Other recent decisions, not related to FOIPOP disclosure, that provide useful guidance with respect to what constitutes the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and distinguishes it from other actions related to Crown prosecutor’s tactics and conduct before the Court are R. v. Gill, 2012 ONCA 607 (Ont. C.A.), and R. v. Nixon, 2011 SCC 34 (S.C.C.). 118 Related to PPS’s claimed exemption from disclosure pursuant to s. 15(1)(f) is the relationship between the Act and the common law principles of litigation privilege and solicitor-client privilege. While not articulated by PPS as a reason to refuse disclosure in its written or oral argument, paras 17 to 21 of the Smith affidavit do contain practices and reflect concerns that relate to the principle of litigation privilege, referred to as “work product privilege” in the criminal context, and solicitor-client privilege. They were the subject matter of the decision of the Su- preme Court in Criminal Lawyers’ Assn. v. Ontario (Ministry of Public Safety & Security), 2010 SCC 23 (S.C.C.), decided under Ontario’s FOI- POP legislation. 119 In determining which of the documents in this case should be exempt from disclosure by reason of s. 15 and s. 16 (solicitor-client privilege) of the Act, I have taken into consideration the analysis contained in the text by Robert Hubbard, Susan Magotiaux and Suzanne M. Duncan, The Law of Privilege in Canada, volume 2 (Toronto: Canada Law Book, looseleaf to July 2013) ch. 12 and, in particular, section 12.270. The Appellant is not entitled by means of this Act to receive disclosure than he would be entitled to receive under the Charter or criminal law. 120 Some documents, redacted and withheld pursuant to s. 15(1)(f), could reasonably be expected to reveal information relating to or used in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 121 Other documents were redacted that reveal the thought processes of PPS in the conduct of the trial and appeals, in particular, the redacted Fitzgerald v. Nova Scotia (Public Prosecution Service) Gregory M. Warner J. 339

marginal notes related to the evidence and the law, contained in transcripts, appeal factums, case law, submissions by counsel for the Appel- lant, and the written advice given by PPS to the Director of Criminal Prosecutions respecting the submissions made by counsel for the Appel- lant in the mercy applications. PPS is entitled to react or withhold those on the basis of solicitor-client and work product privilege. 122 Other documents redacted or withheld pursuant to s. 15(1)(f) were documents prepared for and provided to PPS by the Appellant’s counsel, or were documents that reflected steps taken by PPS in the conduct of the proceeding and do not reflect the thought processes of PPS during the proceedings. PPS’s claim for exemption from disclosing those documents is denied.

Part IV Conclusion 123 A few documents were not disclosed because they were matters of public record and thus outside the scope of the Act pursuant to s. 4(2)(b). This decision makes no order for disclosure of public documents or the documents already in the possession of the Appellant. 124 Appendix A to this decision sets out which documents this Court directs PPS to disclose to the Appellant, and which documents it directs PPS not to disclose. The Appendix is based upon the index of all documents in each of the two files, the criminal prosecution file and mercy file, and called by PPS “FOIPOP Request INDEX SEALED (All Documents)”. 125 Absent agreement between the parties, the Court will hear the parties on costs by written submission at their request. Appeal allowed in part.

Appendix A

Of the 111 documents in the criminal file and 91 documents in the mercy file, 104 were released by the Crown; 57 were redacted and 41 were withheld. During the hearing, it became apparent that the Appellant had 17 of the redacted documents and 10 of the withheld documents. This Appendix itemizes which of the remaining 40 redacted documents and 31 withheld documents that are ordered to be disclosed and ordered not to be disclosed. 340 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

Redacted Documents Documents redacted by reason of s. 20 and directed to be disclosed without redaction: Criminal Tabs 5 and 12. File: Mercy File: Tabs 2, 3, 12, 29, 30, 31, 32, 37, 38, 52, 53, 56, 59, 62, 69, 73, 75, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89 and 91. Documents redacted on the basis of s. 15(1)(f) that are ordered to be disclosed without redaction: Criminal File: Tab 57. Mercy File: Tab 7. Documents redacted by the Crown on the basis of s. 15(1)(f), and privileged notes containing the thought processes of the Crown that are ordered not be unredacted: Criminal Tabs 11, 24, 28, 32, 46, 47, 63, 64, 76, 108 (out of File: scope) and 110.

Withheld Documents Of the 31 remaining withheld documents, those that constitute statements and records of the witnesses and the victim, or documents originating with counsel for the Appellant, are ordered to be disclosed. Those that contain analytical notes, and communications that relate to prosecutorial advice are not ordered to be disclosed. Withheld documents ordered to be disclosed: Criminal Tabs 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 50, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, File: 105 and 107. Mercy File: Tabs 5, 19, 34, 40, 46 and 77. Withheld documents ordered not to be disclosed: Criminal Tabs 14 (out of scope), 15 and 106. File: Mercy File: Tabs 6, 43, 44, 45, 51, 58, 76 and 78. Brampton (City) v. Singh 341

[Indexed as: Brampton (City) v. Singh] The Corporation of the City of Brampton, Applicant and Anrik Singh, Respondent Ontario Superior Court of Justice Docket: 184/14 2014 ONSC 2626 Durno J. Heard: April 17, 2014 Judgment: April 28, 2014 Criminal law –––– Extraordinary remedies — Certiorari — Grounds for review — Exceeding jurisdiction — Conduct of proceedings –––– City applied for order of certiorari setting aside order of justice of peace which dismissed charge against accused for failing to stop at red light, and order of mandamus reinstating proceedings — Accused’s trial could not be completed because of lack of court time — Justice of peace refused to grant adjournment and indicated he would arraign accused but would not start trial that he could not finish — Justice of peace dismissed charge due to lack of court time — City argued that justice of peace erred in refusing motion for adjournment and exceeded his jurisdiction in dismissing case without hearing evidence — Application allowed — Acquittal was quashed and new trial ordered — Section 46(1) of Highway Traf- fic Act provided that if accused pleaded not guilty, justice of peace was required to hold trial — Trial should have started by asking prosecutor to call its first witness, not by immediately dismissing charge — Neither party was permitted to exercise its right to examine witnesses — Substantial wrong and miscarriage of justice occurred — Justice of peace proceeded without jurisdiction to dismiss charge that was validly before court — Dismissing charge because of personal preference to avoid being seized with case was dangerous precedent to set — Justice of peace erred in refusing prosecutor’s adjournment application and compounded that error by failing to give reasons — Subject to one possible explana- tion, public, parties, and appellate court would have been left to speculate why adjournment application was refused — Automatically dismissing adjournment application on first trial date 80 days after being charged when case would not have been reached was not determining adjournment application judiciously. Cases considered by Durno J.: Barrette v. R. (1976), [1977] 2 S.C.R. 121, 1976 CarswellQue 6, 1976 Carswell- Que 38, 33 C.R.N.S. 377, 29 C.C.C. (2d) 189, (sub nom. R. v. Barrette) 10 N.R. 321, (sub nom. R. v. Barrette) 68 D.L.R. (3d) 260 (S.C.C.) — referred to 342 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

R. v. Darville (1956), 25 C.R. 1, 1956 CarswellOnt 28, [1956] S.C.R. vii, 116 C.C.C. 113, [1956] S.C.J. No. 82 (S.C.C.) — followed R. v. Sheppard (2002), 50 C.R. (5th) 68, 211 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 50, 633 A.P.R. 50, 210 D.L.R. (4th) 608, 284 N.R. 342, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, 2002 SCC 26, 2002 CarswellNfld 74, 2002 CarswellNfld 75, 162 C.C.C. (3d) 298, [2002] S.C.J. No. 30, REJB 2002-29516 (S.C.C.) — referred to Statutes considered: Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 s. 11(b) — considered Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 Generally — referred to Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33 s. 46 — considered s. 46(1) — considered s. 46(3) — considered s. 49(1) — considered s. 140(1) — considered s. 141(1) — considered s. 141(3) — considered s. 141(4) — considered

APPLICATION by city for order of certiorari setting aside order of justice of peace which dismissed charge against accused for failing to stop at red light.

Danielle Bastarache, for Applicant No one for Respondent

Durno J.:

1 The respondent was charged under s. 114(15) of the Highway Traffic Act with failing to stop for an amber light. His trial was scheduled to be heard 80 days after he was charged. At 2:45 p.m. it was evident that his trial would not be completed that date as there was another docket at 3:00 p.m. The justice of the peace asked the respondent if he had any objection to coming back on another date. He said, “Yes, because I took off today.” 2 The justice of the peace noted it was the first trial date and it was through no fault of the respondent that the case would not be reached. The prosecutor said she was ready to proceed but it was because of the Brampton (City) v. Singh Durno J. 343

court’s time that made the case unreachable. It would be an administrative adjournment and the prosecution would “wear it on the 11(b).” 3 When His Worship said, “Court’s not going to adjourn it,” the prosecutor said she was ready to proceed. The justice of the peace said he was happy to arraign the respondent but he was not going to start a trial that he could not finish as he did not normally sit in Brampton. The prosecutor said that while there had been an effort to resolve the case, a resolution had not been worked out, she was not prepared to withdraw the charge and asked for another date. 4 The justice of the peace asked that the respondent be arraigned. He pled not guilty and His Worship immediately said, “Due to lack of court time, court is going to dismiss the charge, sir.” 5 The Corporation of the City of Brampton (Brampton) applies for judicial review seeking relief in the nature of certiorari setting aside the order of the justice of the peace and mandamus reinstating the proceedings, contending the justice of the peace: (a) erred in law in refusing the motion for an adjournment, (b) exceeded his jurisdiction in dismissing the case without hearing evidence, and (c) that the jurisdictional error constitutes a substantial wrong requiring relief in the nature of certiorari and mandamus. 6 The respondent did not attend the first appearance on this application. The applicant was directed to serve the material on the respondent for the hearing on April 17, 2014. I am persuaded that was done. He was to advise if he was going to attend, Ms. Bastarache has heard nothing and he has not attended. 7 On April 17, 2014, I indicated that the application would be allowed for reasons to be released on a later date. These are those reasons.

The Legislation 8 The relevant portions of the Provincial Offences Act are: 7 Section 46: (1) If the defendant pleads not guilty, the court shall hold the trial. (2) The defendant is entitled to make full answer and defence. (3) The prosecutor or defendant, as the case may be, may examine and cross-examine witnesses. 344 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

(4) The court may receive and act upon any facts agreed upon by the defendant and prosecutor without proof or evidence...... Section 49: (1) The court may, from time to time, adjourn a trial or hearing but, where the defendant is in custody, an adjournment shall not be for a period longer than eight days without the consent of the defendant...... Section 140: (1) On application, the Superior Court of Justice may by order grant any relief in respect of matters arising under this Act that the applicant would be entitled to in an application for an order in the nature of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari. Section 141: (1) A notice under section 140 in respect of an application for relief in the nature of certiorari shall be given at least seven days and not more than ten days before the date fixed for the hearing of the application and the notice shall be served within thirty days after the occurrence of the act sought to be quashed...... (3) No application shall be made to quash a conviction, order or ruling from which an appeal is provided by this Act, whether subject to leave or otherwise. (4) On an application for relief in the nature of certiorari, the Su- perior Court of Justice shall not grant relief unless the court finds that a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred, and the court may amend or validate any decision already made, with effect from such time and on such terms as the court considers proper.

Analysis 9 I am persuaded the justice of the peace exceeded his jurisdiction, that the acquittal should be quashed and the case remitted to the Provincial Offences Court for the following reasons. First, the justice of the peace committed a jurisdictional error by dismissing the charge after a not guilty plea without having a trial. Section 46(1) provides that if the defendant pleads not guilty as the respondent did, the court shall hold a trial. Section 46(3) permits the prosecutor and defendant to examine the Brampton (City) v. Singh Durno J. 345

cross-examine witnesses at the trial. His Worship did not hold a trial or even ask if the prosecutor had evidence to call. He immediately dismissed the charge. That is not a trial. Neither the applicant nor the respondent were permitted to exercise their right to examine witnesses. When a plea of not guilty was entered the justice of the peace was required to conduct a trial. That trial would start by asking the prosecutor to call her first witness, not by immediately dismissing the charge. 10 In the circumstances, what occurred was a substantial wrong and a miscarriage of justice. The justice of the peace proceeded without jurisdiction to dismiss a charge that was validly before the court. Because of his personal preference to avoid being seized with a case, a charge was dismissed. It would be a dangerous precedent to have charges dismissed on that basis, a precedent that should be put to rest at the earliest possible date. Brampton appropriately pursued this application to remove an ill- conceived practice. 11 While the first ground provides a sufficient basis upon which to grant the relief sought, the adjournment application merits brief reference although that issue might have more appropriately been dealt with by means of appeals. The justice of the peace erred in refusing the prosecutor’s adjournment application and compounded that error by failing to give reasons. While the authority to grant an adjournment is discretionary, it must be exercised judiciously. Judicial discretion, however, is subject to review. Barrette v. R. (1976), 29 C.C.C. (2d) 189 (S.C.C.) 12 Reasons are required so the public knows why a decision was made, the parties understand the decision and it permits appellate review. R. v. Sheppard, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869 (S.C.C.). Here, no reasons were given, just a refusal to grant the adjournment. Subject to one possible explana- tion, the public, the parties and the appellate court would be left to speculate why this adjournment application was refused. It is possible that the respondent taking a day off work had some impact on the decision. If that were so, an adjournment application should not be refused based solely on the defendant being prejudiced because he took a day off work in the absence of a s. 11(b) Charter application. 13 If that was the motivation for the refusal, it cannot be ignored that only 80 days had elapsed since the date the respondent was charged and there was no indication when the next court date would be. Otherwise, whether to grant an adjournment should involve applying the principles in R. v. Darville (1956), 116 C.C.C. 113 (S.C.C.) where the adjournment is as a result of the failure of a witness to attend or applying those princi- 346 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORTS 73 Admin. L.R. (5th)

ples with appropriate modifications to other reasons for the adjournment. Automatically dismissing an adjournment application on a first trial date 80 days after being charged when the case will not be reached is not determining the adjournment application judiciously.

Conclusion 14 The application is granted, the dismissal of the charge is set aside and a new trial ordered so that the applicant can deal with the charge in accordance with their stated intentions.1 Application granted.

1At the outset of the hearing, Ms. Bastarache indicated that the respondent had been advised that should the application be granted, the Corporation would not proceed with a new trial.