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A Brief History of Nuclear Criticality Accidents in Russia -1953-1997

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A Brief History of Nuclear Criticality Accidents in Russia -1953-1997 ,- . .. .... ,,. ., P~~L-12199 PacificNorthwest National Laborator Operated by Battelle for the U.S. Depatiment of Energy A Brief History of Nuclear Criticality Accidents in Russia -1953-1997 “. G.J. Vargo .. April 1999 Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy FUXXW$’””:-t ...... .. ,’,.. under Contract DE-AC06-76 IWO 1830 I;AY 25 1%39 CH3TI Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Richland, Washington . ,. .. .. .-._L ‘. -- . —_-–– . .- .“ ,,, ....... This reportwas prepared as an accountof worksponsoredby ~ agencyof tie UnitedStatesGovernment.NeithertheUnitedSat& Governmentnoranyagency thereof,nor BattelleMemorial Institute,nor any of their employees,makesany warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, . .. produc~ or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference hereinto any specificcommercialproducq process,or serviceby tradename,trademarlqmanufacturer,or otherwisedoesnot necesW-ilyconstituteor imply its endorsementrecommendation,or favoringby the United..States Government or ~y agency thereof, or Battelle Memorial Ins@& Theviewsand opinionsof authorsexpressedhereindo not necessarily state or reflectthose of the United StatesGovernmentor anyagencythereof. PACIFICNORTHWEST NATIONAL LABORATORY operatedby BATTELLE- for the ‘ ,.. “UNmD STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY un&r ContractDE-AC06-,76RL01830 Printed in the United States of America Avaiiabie to DOE and DOE con~ctors from the Office of SMentific and Technical Information, P.O. Box 62 Oak Ridge, TN 37S31; prices available from (615) 576-S401. Available to the public from the National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, 52S5 Port Royal Rd. Springfield, VA 22161 ,. *- ..:- . e This document was printed on’recyciedpaper. (9/97) . .. ., . DISCLAIMER Portions of this document may be illegible in electronic image products. Images are produced from the best available original document. A Brief History of Nuclear Criticality Accidents in Russia -1953-1997 G.J. Vargo April 1999 Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy under Contract DE-AC06-76 RLO 1830 Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Richland, Washington 99352 Summary . This report describes 14 nuclear criticality accidents that occurred in Russia between 1953 and 1997. These accidents are significant because of the loss of control of special nuclear material and the resultant radiation doses to personnel, potential damage to equipment, and release of . radioactive material to the workplace and the environment. A qualitative analysis of the causes and contributing factors to these accidents is presented along with a description of the radiation health effects to workers. The primary cause of most of these accidents was inadequate design that allowed the use of process equipment that did not preclude nuclear criticality on the basis of geometry. Personnel errors and violations of procedures were major contributing factors to these accidents. ... 111 , # iv Acknowledgments The author would like to acknowledge the support of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation, directed by Dr. Terry Lash. They have been critical in providing programmatic guidance and funding, and in establishing the government-to-government links that made it possible. The DOE Office of International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation manages a comprehensive collaborative effort to improve nuclear safety at Soviet-designed nuclear power plants in nine partnering countries. Collaborative work with the Federal Nuclear and Radiation Safety Authority of Russia (Gosatomnadzor) is part of this broader program, and strengthens the nuclear safety regulatory infi-astructure in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union by exchanging information on international experience and standards. Similar nuclear safety regulatory infrastructure exchanges, formerly sponsored by DOE and currently sponsored by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, are underway in other countries of the former Soviet Union. vi Contents . Summary . ..iii Acknowledgments . : . ..v Introduction . ...1 CriticalityAccidents . ..3 1. March 15,1953-- MayakEnterprise, theUrals Shielded Cell with Plutonium Product Receiving Tanks (1953-1) . ...3 2. Apri121, 1957--Mayak Enterprise,theUrals Shielded Cell for the Purification of Uranium Solutions (1957-1) . ...4 3. January2,1958-- MayakEnterprise, theUrals Critical Parameter Test Facility for Highly-Enriched Uranium Solutions (1958-1)4 4. December5,1960 -- MayakEnterprise, theUrals Shielded Cell for Purification of Plutonium Solutions (1960-1) . ...5 5. August 14,1961 --Siberian Chemical Combine Facility for Condensing andEvaporating UraniumHexafluoride(1961-1) . ...6 6. September7,1962 -- MayakEnterprise, theUrals Plutonium Scrap RecoveryFacility (1962-1) . ...6 7. January30,1963 --Siberian Chemical Combine Highly EnrichedUranium ScrapRecovery Facility(1963-1) . ...7 8. December 13,1 963 --Siberian Chemical Combine Highly-Enriched Uranium Extraction Facility (1963-2) . 8 . 9. November 13, 1965 -- Electrostal Fuel Fabrication Plant Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facility (1965-1) . ...8 vii 10. December 16, 1965 -- Mayak Enterprise, the Urals Highly-Enriched Uranium Scrap Recovery Facility (1965-1) . ...9 11. December 10, 1968 -- Mayak Enterprise, the Urals , Plutonium Extraction Facility (1968-1 )...... ...10 12. December 13, 1978 -- Siberian Chemical Combine Box for Temporary Storage of Plutonium Metal Ingots (1978-1) . ...10 13. May 15, 1997 – Novosibirsk Fuel Pellets Fabrication Plant Slab Tanks for the Storage of Uranium Scrap Solution (1997-1) . ...11 14. June 17, 1997 -- Arzamas-16 Misoperation of Critical Assembly (1997-2) . .“. ..12 Observations and Conclusions . ...15 Tables 1 Summary of Russian Criticality Accidents . ...17 ... Vlll Introduction In August 1997, the U.S. Department of Energy sponsored a training course on nuclear criticality safety for staff from the Federal Nuclear and Radiation Safety Authority of Russia (Gosatornnadzor) as part of its program to strengthen the nuclear safety regulatory infrastructure in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. When the course was planned in late 1996, no one had any idea that the following year would bring two nuclear criticality accidents in Russia – the first such accidents in either the United States or Russia in nearly two decades. When news of these events reached the U.S. organizers of the course, the Russian hosts were requested to provide some background on the history of nuclear criticality accidents in Russia. Our Russian hosts accommodated this request by arranging a presentation by Professor V.V. Frolov of the Nuclear Safety Division of the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering at Obninsk during the August 1997 nuclear criticality safety course. His presentation was supplemented by lively discussion and information given by various course participants including representatives of Gosatomnadzor and Minatom. This report is based on notes taken during his presentation and subsequent discussions during the August 1997 course. Because of the open, often rapid exchange between participants, it is impossible to provide complete attribution of all details. This report describes 14 criticality accidents that occurred at Russian non-reactor nuclear facilities between 1953 and 1997. Only one accident took place at a civilian nuclear fhel fabrication facility (Electrostal); the remainder occurred at highly-enriched uranium and plutonium processing facilities. Reactivity accidents in reactors (e.g., Chernobyl, Chazma Bay) are not included. The predominant causes of the accidents were inadequate implementation of geometry control and breakdown in administrative practices (i.e., personnel errors). Eleven of the accidents occurred in water-moderated systems. Two accidents took place in systems that are considered by the Russians to be low-enriched uranium systems. External measures such as the addition of neutron absorber solutions were needed to terminate four of the events. The most recent accident, involving a criticality at the Arzarnas-16 (Sarov) facility in June 1997 I is also described based on a combination of news accounts and expert opinion by non-Russian I specialists. This accident bears a circumstantial resemblance to the early Los Akunos criticality I accidents -- manual manipulation and misoperation of critical assembly components. The I reluctance of our Russian hosts to discuss details of this event openly supports the belief that the accident may have involved actual nuclear weapon components. The radiation levels and doses have been left in the originally reported radiological units. It is important to note that the radiological quantities of dose equivalent, the sievert, and its predecessor, the rem, are not physical quantities, per se. Rather, they are the product of the absorbed dose (in grays or rads) multiplied by a quality factor to account for the type of radiation to which an individual is exposed. These quality factors also take into account the fact that dose equivalent limits are based on extrapolations from higher absorbed doses at which deleterious effects in man can be directly assessed. In its 1976 recommendations for radiation protection, the Internaticmal Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) specifically cautions that “dose equivalent should not be used to assess the likely early consequences
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