Eastern Congo: the ADF-Nalu’s Lost Rebellion Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°93, 19 December 2012 Page 1 Policy Briefing Africa Briefing N°93 Nairobi/Brussels, 19 December 2012 Eastern Congo: The ADF-NALU’s Lost Rebellion I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY organisations in the region and the group’s allegiance to Islamism seems rather superficial. The Allied Democratic Forces-National Army for the The fight against armed groups in eastern Congo continues Liberation of Uganda (Forces démocratiques alliées-Armée to be viewed through a military lens, but it would be wise nationale de libération de l’Ouganda, ADF-NALU) is one to avoid another ineffective military operation. The Inter- of the oldest but least known armed groups in the east of national Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the only one the UN, the DRC and Uganda should therefore adopt a dif- in the area to be considered an Islamist terrorist organisa- ferent approach that seeks to: tion. Although it does not represent the same destabilising threat as the 23 March Movement (M23), it has managed to Formulate an intelligence-based strategy to neutralise stand its ground against the Congolese army since 2010. the ADF-NALU’s cross-border economic and logis- Created in the DRC in 1995 and located in the mountain- tical networks. The officers of the Joint Verification ous DRC-Uganda border area, this Congolese-Ugandan Mechanism deployed by the ICGLR in 2012 should armed group has shown remarkable resilience attributable work with the UN group of experts to produce a de- to its geostrategic position, its successful integration into tailed study of these networks and use it to define an the cross-border economy and corruption in the security appropriate strategy for undermining the armed group’s forces. Therefore, before considering any further military economic and logistical base. action against the ADF-NALU, it would be wise to separate Include the leaders of ADF-NALU’s support networks, fiction from fact and instead pursue a course of weakening inside and outside the DRC, on the list of individuals its socio-economic base while at the same time offering a subject to UN sanctions for their support of armed demobilisation and reintegration program to its combatants. groups. Congolese and Ugandan military personnel colluding with these networks should be dealt with Formed of an alliance of several armed groups supported appropriately by the authorities of their country. by external actors (Mobutu Sese Seko’s Zaire and Hassan al-Turabi’s Sudan), the ADF-NALU initially fought the Rotate on a regular basis Congolese and Ugandan of- Ugandan government of Yoweri Museveni. However, ficers deployed in this region. despite its Ugandan origins, it never managed to gain a foot- hold in its own country and instead settled in eastern Congo, Introduce a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegra- particularly in the remote mountainous border areas. There tion (DDR) program for Congolese and Ugandan com- it became integrated into local communities, participated batants who after investigation are found not to be re- in cross-border trade and forged relationships with various sponsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. armed groups in eastern Congo as well as with both Con- MONUSCO should appeal to donors to fund the pro- golese and Ugandan civilian and military authorities. Given gram for Congolese ADF-NALU combatants. their location in this “grey zone”, the ADF-NALU’s lost Authorise villagers in the Erengeti and Oïcha areas to combatants have been able to survive despite not winning resume work on their farms, which was suspended by a battle in over fifteen years and having been defeated sev- the military authorities. eral times, but never neutralised. Due to the ADF-NALU’s leader, Jamil Mukulu, a Chris- tian convert to Islam, the group has transformed from a purely Congolese-Ugandan problem into one with regional dimensions, as a component of the trend of radical Islam- ism in East Africa. However, little is known about such purported links between ADF-NALU and radical Islamist Eastern Congo: the ADF-Nalu’s Lost Rebellion Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°93, 19 December 2012 Page 2 II. AN ARMED GROUP ALMOST 1. The National Army for LIKE ANY OTHER the Liberation of Uganda The ADF-NALU’s historical roots can be found in the The ADF-NALU was created in 1995 as a product of in- first Rwenzururu independence movement, formed in the ternal Ugandan struggles and regional geopolitics.1 It ethnic crucible of the Bakonzo community, a minority united two armed movements opposed to Yoweri Muse- tribe in western Uganda.6 The historical precedent of the veni’s government.2 Driven back by the Ugandan army, Rwenzururu armed movement, one of the secessionist they found refuge in their welcoming Congolese neigh- movements that emerged when Uganda became independ- bour, where they merged and formed a hybrid rebellion ent, facilitated NALU’s creation and development.7 From that, having been unable to gain a foothold in Uganda, set 1967 the Rwenzururu movement conducted a low-intensity down roots in the DRC. Contained by the Ugandan army guerrilla war in an attempt to gain the Ugandan govern- but ensconced in a remote mountainous border area,3 the ment’s recognition of the Kingdom of Rwenzururu. The ADF-NALU found a way of surviving in Eastern Congo’s struggle officially ended on 15 August 1982, when Charles “grey zone”.4 In the context of the collapse of the DRC Wesley Irema-Ngoma, the Bakonzo’s Omusinga,8 joined state, it was able to blend in with the many armed groups Milton Obote’s government, which granted autonomy to that characterise the region’s rebellious, convulsive and the Kingdom of Rwenzururu rather than independence.9 violent geopolitics and it has remained there until today. A. BIRTH OF A FOREIGN-BACKED, FAILED Mwaka Bwenge, “Les milices Mayi-mayi à l’Est de la Répu- blique Démocratique du Congo: Dynamique d’une gouverne- REBELLION mentalité en situation de crise”, Revue africaine de sociologie, no. 7 (2003), pp. 73-94; Arye Oded, “Islam et politique en In September 1995, Yusuf Kabanda, one of the leaders Afrique de l’Est (Kenya, Ouganda et Tanzanie)”, Outre-Terre, of the Islamic opposition to the Ugandan army, sealed an no. 11 (2005), pp. 189-194; Lindsay Scorgie, “Peripheral Pa- alliance with Commander Ali Ngaimoko of the National riah or Regional Rebel? The Allied Democratic Forces in the Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), in Beni, in Uganda / Congo Borderland”, University of Cambridge, March the Congolese province of North Kivu. They founded the 2011. Allied Democratic Forces-National Army for the Libera- 6 With their Nande cousins, who live on the other side of the tion of Uganda (ADF-NALU). Agreed outside of Uganda DRC border, the Bakonzo form the Bayira cross-border ethnic with the help of the Sudanese and Congolese secret ser- group. The Bakonzo and the Nande maintain close relations vices, this alliance brought together two movements de- (they recognise the same traditional authorities, they hold an annual meeting of leaders of the two groups, etc.) and have taken feated by the Ugandan army. With no previous ideological advantage of their cross-border position to build a trading net- or operational links, these two movements were never- work. The Bakonzo have opposed the central government in theless united in their opposition to the Ugandan govern- Kampala since the colonial period. In 1950, following the British ment, their presence on Congolese soil and their links administration’s refusal to create a Bakonzo district, the Rwen- with Kampala’s enemies: the Sudanese al-Turabi and the zururu armed movement appeared. Opposed to the new post- Congolese Mobutu.5 independence government, the Bakonzo then created the King- dom of Rwenzururu on 30 June 1962. It unilaterally proclaimed independence on 15 August 1962 and Isaya Mukiriana became king. The Ugandan army violently repressed this first insurrec- tion. In 1964, Kampala retook control of this part of the country 1 See Crisis Group Africa Report N°14, Uganda and Rwanda: while the Rwenzururu combatants fled into the Rwenzori Moun- Friends or Enemies?, 4 May 2000. For more details, see Crisis tains, on the border with the DRC, a remote area where the Group Africa Reports N°165, Congo: No Stability in Kivu De- movement established an independent kingdom. In September spite Rapprochement with Rwanda, 16 November 2010; N°182, 1967, the army destroyed the camp where the king of Rwen- The Lord’s Resistance Army: End Game?, 17 November 2011; zururu was living and dispersed the population. Cecilia Pennac- and N°188, Black Gold in the Congo: Threat to Stability or De- ini, Herman Wittenberg, Rwenzori, Histories and Culture of an velopment Opportunity?, 11 July 2012. African Mountain (Kampala, 2008). For more details on the 2 See Crisis Group Africa Report N°187, Uganda: No Resolu- Rwenzururu movement, see Mahamood Mamdani, Citizen and tion to Growing Tensions, 5 April 2012. Subject. Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism 3 See map in Appendix A. (Princeton, 1996). 4 Grey zones are geographical areas characterised by continu- 7 See Appendix D for a chronology of armed movements in the ous insecurity and a lack of state control. For more details, see region. Phillipe Moreau Defarges, “La gestion de zones grises”, Ram- 8 Omusinga is the title of the king of Uganda’s Bakonzo and sès 2003, pp. 59-70 and Gaïdz Minassian, Zones grises, quand DRC’s Nande. les Etats perdent le contrôle (Paris, 2011). 9 On 15 August 1982, Charles Wesley Irema-Ngoma joined 5 Gérard Prunier, “L’Ouganda et les guerres congolaises”, Poli- Milton Obote’s government as chief elder of the Kasese district.