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Democratic Progressive Party Mínjìndǎng ​民进党 ◀ Defense Industry Comprehensive index starts in volume 5, page 2667. Democratic Progressive Party Mínjìndǎng ​民进党 The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of 4 ​Taiwan’s history has mainly been the record of Taiwan was established on 28 September 1986, Taiwanese seeking self-​­determination and self- when martial law was lifted in Taiwan, allow- r u l e . ing the formation of political parties. 5 ​Taiwan needs a complete change of govern- ment. 6 ​Taiwan’s independence movement is in ac- cordance with the prevailing tendencies in the he origins of the Democratic Progressive Party world. (DPP) can be traced to two main groups: po- litical prisoners jailed in Taiwan by the Kuom- Taiwan’s leader at that time, Chiang Kai-​­shek, had, intang (Nationalist Party in Taiwan) government, and of course, always maintained that Taiwan is a province exiled dissidents living in Japan and the United States of China. who were members of Taiwan independence move- In January 1970 Taiwanese dissidents in Japan, Europe, ments. Together the two groups were referred to as Dang and the United States formed the Taiwan Independence wai (Outside the [Kuomintang] Party) before they es- Alliance. The founding members included Tsai Tung- tablished the DPP. jung, Chang T s a n - hung, Wang Y u - te, and Huang Y u - j e n . The DPP’s ideology was formulated by the intellec- Growing impatient with Chiang’s authoritarian, one-party​­ tual dissident Peng Ming-​­min, who drafted a number of rule in Taiwan, they practiced terrorism in an attempt to manifestos. Peng in 1961 became the young chairman of overthrow Chiang in the 1970s. One example was the as- the Department of Political Science at National Taiwan sassination attempt on Chiang Kai-​­shek’s son, Chiang University. In 1964 Peng was arrested for trying to circu- Ching-kuo,​­ the powerful vice premier, by alliance member late a manifesto calling for the overthrow of Chiang Kai- Huang Wen-hsiung,​­ when Chiang Ching-kuo​­ was visiting shek’s exiled government in Taiwan. The main points of New York City on 24 April 1970. Other examples include his manifesto can be summarized as follows: the attempted murder of Kuomintang representative Teng Yung-​­kong in Paris on 29 March 1973; sabotage of a power 1 ​Historical relations between Taiwan and plant in Taiwan, causing minor damage, in January 1976; the People’s Republic of China should be mini- and the attempted assassination of the Kuomintang gov- mized. ernor of Taiwan, Hsieh Tung-min,​­ in October 1976. 2 ​Taiwan is more “modern” than old China. After the so-called​­ Kaohsiung Incident (a demonstra- 3 ​Taiwan’s experience with Japan is more benefi- tion by dissidents to commemorate Human Rights Day, cial than its experience with China. 10 December 1979, which led to violence and the alleged T598 © 2009 by Berkshire Publishing Group LLC Democratic Progressive Party n Mínjìndǎng n 民进党 599 It is easy to dodge a spear that comes in front of you but hard to avoid an arrow shot from behind. 明枪易躲，暗箭难防 Míng qiāng yì duǒ, àn jiàn nán fang injury of 183 police officers), dissident activists in the Magazine in the 1970s to advocate democracy and Tai- United States launched massive attacks against Kuom- wan’s independence as well as to criticize the Kuomintang intang offices in the United States. These attacks included for its authoritarian rule. Second major is the New Tide ransacking Kuomintang government offices in Los An- Faction, founded by Chou I-​­jen. Chou helped organize geles (14 December 1979), Seattle (15 December 1979), many demonstrations and protests, including large farm- and Washington, D.C. (19 December 1979), as well as the ers’ protests on 20 May 1988. The New Tide Faction is con- headquarters of the Kuomintang newspaper Shi Jie Ri Bao sidered one of the more radical groups within the DPP; (World Journal) in New York City (22 December 1979). many of its members advocated using the concept of the Other violent incidents were reported in San Francisco, Philippines’ “People’s Power” to overthrow the Kuomint- Chicago, and other major cities with Kuomintang offices. ang government. In addition to these two largest factions, Finally, Li Chiang-​­lin, the brother-​­in-law of Kaohsiung numerous small interest groups are centered around vari- city mayor Wang Yu-​­yun, was murdered in Los Angeles ous DPP personalities. on 28 July 1980. No clear evidence links the DPP directly However, the Formosa Group members seem to have to any of these terrorist activities. However, many partici- had the most influence within the DPP in terms of political pants were welcomed back to Taiwan during President positions. After Chen Shui-bian​­ was elected president, one Chen Shui-​­bian’s administration (2000– 2008). prominent former Formosa Group member, Yao Chia-wen,​­ became head of the Examination Yuan, one of the five co- equal branches of Taiwan’s government. He had also been Major Factions elected to Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan in 1992. Another mem- ber, Chang Chun-​­hung, was the DPP’s secretary-​­general The DPP is a complex organization with a variety of mem- and a member of Taiwan’s Legislature (2000– 2005). He bers and factions. Some are well known, the first being had been the editor of two prominent magazines, The Intel- the Formosa Group, which began publishing Formosa lectual and Taiwan Political Review, during the 1970s. © 2009 by Berkshire Publishing Group LLC 600 Berkshire Encyclopedia of China 宝 库 山 中 华 全 书 Another important member, Huang Hsin-chieh,​­ was, “Republic of Taiwan” (as opposed to Republic of China in fact, at one time during the 1960s a member of the Kuo- on Taiwan). The DPP has tried to unite its factions around mintang. (He left the Kuomintang in 1964 to support the a distinctively Taiwanese identity, using as bait the ulti- independent candidate Kao Yu-​­shu for mayor of Taipei.) mate goal of an independent Taiwan nation in its efforts Huang became chairman of the DPP for three terms from to consolidate intraparty debates and disagreements on 1988 to 1991. He had been arrested after the Kaohsiung other political issues. Incident and was sentenced to more than seven years in However, fierce infighting has been a mainstay of the jail. In the summer of 1997 Huang accepted Kuomintang DPP since its founding. For example, during the Third president Lee Teng-hui’s​­ appointment as vice chairman of Plenary Conference of the DPP in October 1988 com- the National Unification Council, ironic for a man who in petition by the Formosa and New Tide factions for the his earlier years had supported Taiwanese independence. position of party chairmanship led to outright violence, Some DPP members called without success for Huang to including not only quarrels and personal attacks on mem- be expelled from the DPP. He died in 1999 and thus did bers’ character but also physical attacks. Although the not live to see the DPP win the presidency of Taiwan. Formosa Group won the chairmanship, the bitter infight- Former Formosa Group member Hsu Hsin-liang,​­ also ing almost split the DPP. Other serious intraparty squab- a former Kuomintang member, served as the DPP’s chair- bling has continued to the present. man from 1996 to 1997. After the Chung Li Incident—​­a The DPP also suffered credibility problems from the protest that Hsu was involved in and that led to violence outside. Vote-​­buying, gift-​­giving, and lavish “free” ban- in the city of Chung Li in 1977—​­Hsu fled to the United quets and all-​­expenses-paid trips for politicians were States, where he established a DPP branch in San Fran- widespread during the period of Kuomintang rule in cisco. He returned to Taiwan in 1988. However, he re- Taiwan (1949– 2000). Although the DPP promised voter signed from the DPP in 1999 in order to run for president reform, the DPP, in fact, found itself accused of using as an independent. Later he became especially critical of many of the same tactics, known as “black gold politics” Chen Shui-bian’s​­ policies toward China and led a popular in Taiwan. sit-​­down demonstration in front of the Taiwan presiden- As a result, although at one point the DPP had of- tial office in 2007. fered itself as a “fresh” alternative to the corruption of Lin Yi-​­hsiung, yet another former Formosa Group the Kuomintang, the DPP ultimately suffered a loss of member, became the eighth chairman of the DPP in 1998. voter confidence. In the 2000 election, when Chen Shui- He began his political career in the provincial assembly bian was elected to the presidency, he won a mere 39.3 per- of Taiwan in 1977 and previously served time in jail for cent of the votes cast—​­and mostly from traditional DPP his role in the Kaohsiung Incident. He went into exile strongholds in southern and central Taiwan (Kaohsiung in Japan and also lived in both the United Kingdom and County, Kaohsiung City, Tainan City, Tainan County, the United States before returning to Taiwan in 1989. He Pingtung County, Chiayi City, Chiayi County, Yunlin ran Chen Shui-​­bian’s successful presidential campaign County, and Changhua County). In fact, the DPP could in 2000. However, in 2006 he left the DPP and criticized not have won the presidency if the Kuomintang, in a case Chen publicly for causing worsening ethnic relations of its own infighting, had not split into two parties just within Taiwan. before the election: the Kuomintang (with its candidate, former vice president Lien Chan, receiving 23.1 percent of the vote) and the Independent Party (former Taiwan Nationalistic Platform governor James Soong receiving 36.8 percent).
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