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ACADEMIC PEACE ORCHESTRA MIDDLE EAST POLICY BRIEF FOR THE MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE ON A WMD/DVS FREE ZONE NO. 46 • AUGUST 2015 First Steps towards a Regional Security Architecture Unilateral and Multilateral Opportunities for Israel Akiva Eldar, Aviv Melamud, and Christian Weidlich Since October 2013, Israel has actively en- there are opportunities for regional states to Abstract gaged in multilateral consultations in Glion prove their commitment to a WMD/DVs Free and Geneva, underlined by frequently send- Zone and to revive the regional peace process. The fact that the 2015 NPT Review Conference ing a high-ranking envoy, with the perspec- has failed to agree on a consensus document tive of attending the Helsinki Conference The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is certainly disappointing. The convening of fi ve on the establishment of a zone free of weap- (JCPA) reached between Iran and the E3+3 rounds of multilateral consultations between ons of mass destruction (WMD) and their on July 14, 2015, provides an important win- Israel and the Arab states since 2013 can surely 1 delivery vehicles (DVs) in the Middle East. dow of opportunity in this respect. If prop- be considered an achievement, but negotiations It also participated as an observer state in erly implemented and verifi ed, the agreement in New York were again characterized by tradi- the 2015 Review Conference of the Nuclear signifi cantly mitigates the nuclear threat from tional positions that prevented any substantial Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for the fi rst Iran. While U.S. President Barack Obama as progress towards establishing a WMD/DVs Free time in 20 years. The Israeli delegation also well as Western decision-makers and nonpro- Zone in the Middle East. provided a comprehensive background paper liferation experts asserted that the accord will Against this backdrop, returning to a ‘business- reiterating Israel’s willingness to participate in cut off every pathway for Iran to obtain nu- as-usual policy’ with regard to nonproliferation the Helsinki Conference, in principle, should clear weapons, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin and disarmament is therefore hardly possible. its concerns regarding the formalities and Netanyahu denounced the JCPA as a “historic Once the dust has settled, regional actors would 2 the agenda be adequately addressed. This mistake” that will exacerbate regional ten- be well advised to make use of the multi-faceted 5 demonstrates commitment and is no small sions. In the long-term, the agreement could, opportunities, presented in this POLICY BRIEF , to achievement, especially given the initial rejec- however, result in a more suitable environ- prove their continuing commitment to disarma- 3 tion of such a gathering by Israeli offi cials. ment aimed at the future establishment of a ment and to revive the regional peace process regional security architecture that is based on as crucial steps towards the future establishment The 2015 NPT Review Conference could not a multi-faceted understanding of ‘security’, of a regional security architecture that is based agree on a fi nal document, mainly because including its military, political, economic, and on a comprehensive understanding of ‘security’. of unbridgeable positions with regard to the ecological aspects. While such a two-track gradual approach requires WMD/DVs Free Zone in the Middle East. many compromises by all relevant actors, Israeli While this is certainly disappointing, it once The Interconnectedness of diplomacy in the future may well make use of the again became very clear that the traditional Peace and Disarmament: rather pragmatic approach of its more moderate juxtapositions between Israel and the Arab Outlining a Two-track Gradual neighbors, who have shown less ideological and states still persist – despite the fi ve rounds Approach towards a Regional more compromise-oriented stances on various of multilateral consultations and the tire- Security Architecture issues. Nevertheless, at the end of the day Israel less efforts of Ambassador Jaakko Laajava has to be willing to commit, in principle, to far- of Finland, the Facilitator of the Helsinki Since it is generally agreed that the precon- reaching concessions in a security-compatible Conference. Israel generally supports the con- ditions for implementing a comprehensive way. This would send an important message to cept of a regional approach to WMD disar- regional security architecture do not exist at the public of all Middle Eastern states that Israel mament. It has always framed it as a sequen- present, initial steps regarding arms control is a true partner for peace, disarmament, democ- tial step in the context of a comprehensive and disarmament, as well as an improvement racy, and economic prosperity. n peace (“Peace First, Disarmament Second”) of the general political situation, can and and has repeatedly stated that the Arab posi- should already be implemented. Thinking and This POLICY BRIEF builds on two ACADEMIC PEACE tion of establishing such a zone prior to a peace theorizing on these avenues can begin, even ORCHESTRA MIDDLE EAST workshops held in Nicosia 4 settlement is utterly unacceptable. While the (and perhaps particularly) during political stale- on June 12-14, 2014, and in Berlin on March 11-12, challenges to arms control and disarmament mate and lack of progress on the offi cial level. 2015, with participants from Belgium, Germany, seem insurmountable in this context, this All regional states can work – both unilater- Hungary, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Palestine, Russia, POLICY BRIEF will show that – once the dust ally and multilaterally – to advance the goal Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Switzerland, United Arab of the NPT Review Conference has settled – of establishing a WMD/DVs Free Zone, and Emirates, United States, and Yemen. ACADEMIC PEACE ORCHESTRA MIDDLE EAST – POLICY BRIEF NO. 46 • AUGUST 2015 A Sign of Commitment from Israel: Box No. 1: A Gradual, Mutually Reinforcing Approach towards a Regional Security Ratifi cation of the CTBT and CWC Architecture Israel signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, and has been an active and contributing member of the regime Regional Security Architecture since. Its ratifi cation of the CTBT would (military, political, economic, ecological security) give it a substantial legitimacy boost and show its commitment to the nonproliferation regime in particular and to a regional process in general. The same can be stated regard- PEACE DISARMAMENT ing Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) ratifi cation: Israel signed the CWC as early as 1993, but has yet to ratify it. The ratifi cation of this central disarmament treaty would go First steps a long way in terms of proving the country’s (unilateral/multilateral) seriousness regarding a regional arms control process. This is especially relevant against the there are many avenues which can already be Nevertheless, each country – Israel being no backdrop of the Syrian accession to the CWC actively pursued, even in this current atmos- exception – could and should consider its in 2013 and the destruction of its chemical phere of prolonged stalemate. Israel is often options for unilateral action to advance the weapons arsenal. In Israel, however, there are targeted for its insuffi cient participation in establishment of a WMD/DVs Free Zone concerns that Syria may have retained caches both the disarmament and political processes. or more generally to advance any process of combat-ready chemical weapons.8 Taking a more active role – either unilaterally of regional arms control and disarmament or by engaging in a multilateral endeavor – undertaken in earnest. While it is true that It is important to mention that Israel has sub- could help it counter this criticism and prove unilateral steps, if they remain unanswered, stantial concerns regarding the verifi cation its commitment to both arms control and may prevent further serious bi- and multi- regimes of both the CTBT and CWC and the peace in the region. Israel’s engagement as lateral engagement, it is even more true that potential for their abuse, as well as other an active participant, or initiator of measures compromise-oriented solutions will not be technical issues. Notwithstanding these, it is that can signal this commitment, will not only found without one side taking courageous clear that its adherence to these central global increase its infl uence over their formation and fi rst steps. In the following, several measures, mechanisms would substantially support its offer it real ownership, but could also mean- in terms of hypothetical fi rst steps, are pre- position on arms control, and there have been ingfully promote the regional processes of sented which can serve to enhance confi dence some positive signs in these avenues.9 For disarmament and peace. in the region and can be pursued by Israel the CWC, offi cial policy is still set despite a unilaterally or in cooperation with its regional positive statement from then-President Peres The interconnectedness between the establish- neighbors. The fi rst cluster concentrates on that Israel “will consider joining chemical ment of a regional security architecture and the improving the conditions for arms control weapons ban treaty.”10 However, the benefi ts achievement of regional peace should be clearly and disarmament; the second focuses on fur- of beginning a zonal process by addressing recognized. Peace (in the Israeli-Palestinian as thering the efforts towards regional peace by issues related to chemical capabilities (per- well
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