Saudi- Dialogue: What Lies Ahead?

Sarah Yizraeli

Over the last year there have been reports in the Israeli media about top level meetings between Saudi and Israeli leaders that took place in 2006. At the same time, the media also reported the efforts of Prime Minister Olmert and , then the deputy prime minister, to meet with King Abdullah of . The Saudis denied the reports about the high level meetings, and rejected attempts by the prime minister and his deputy to meet with King Abdullah. Against this backdrop, the following essay attempts to shed light on the chanc- es for Saudi-Israeli dialogue, given the internal constraints that limit the Saudi government’s freedom of movement.

The 2006 Meetings and their previous instances where the Saudis ignored Objectives the reports, this time they hastened to deny Last September there were reports in the Is- the reports. Prince Sultan, Bandar’s father, raeli media about meetings between senior was the most prominent voice, saying that Saudi and Israeli figures. The reports inti- it was absurd to think that any Saudi would mated that the meetings were of a political meet with an Israeli, and even more absurd nature, as opposed to meetings relating to to consider a meeting with Saudi leaders. exchange of intelligence information or busi- Notwithstanding the Saudi denials, ness dealings that take place from time to which were designed primarily for inter- time directly and indirectly with Saudi fig- nal purposes, it seems that during 2006 and ures. The reports included items about Prime up to early 2007, there were in fact several Minister Olmert holdings secret meetings meetings between Prince Bandar and Israeli with a senior Saudi figure in , hinting/ officials. On the other hand and contrary to assuming that the figure was King Abdullah the reports, there was no meeting between himself. There were also reports that there Prime Minister Olmert and Saudi king had been several meetings between Israelis Abdullah. The presumption of such a meet- and Saudis attended by Prince Bandar. Ban- ing indicated more about Israeli aspirations dar, son of Defense Minister Prince Sultan, than about Israeli understanding of domestic served as Saudi ambassador to the United Saudi political dynamics, which would sanc- States for over twenty years, and since Oc- tion such a meeting only if it yielded signifi- Sara Yizraeli, scholar tober 2005 has served as general secretary of cant results for Saudi Arabia. In early 2007, of modern Saudi the Saudi National Security Council. Unlike an opposition Saudi periodical published in Arabian history

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 71 The Abdullah London claimed there had been further con- was lost. Given the circumstances and due to initiative talked tacts in Washington, between Prince Turki al- their reluctance to extend the dialogue with Faisal, the Saudi ambassador to the US who Israel beyond the Palestinian issue, it is easy explicitly about resigned in December 2006, and head of the to understand why the talks with Israel were ending the Israeli Mossad, Meir Dagan. The latter con- suspended. On a side note: since took conflict, about tacts have not been confirmed and it is possi- control of the and the subsequent peace treaties ble that this report is connected to the power establishment of a new Palestinian govern- with Israel, struggle in the Saudi court between the Su- ment in the West Bank, the Saudis have yet dairi line, of which Bandar is a member, and adhered to the need for Palestinian unity, and about the faction of King Abdullah, of which Prince and have continued to call for repair of the normalizing Turki is a member. divisions in the Palestinian camp. relations with The main topic raised by the Saudis in Israel as part of the political talks with Prince Bandar was The Saudi Position on Israel a total peace apparently the Palestinian issue. The Sau- Saudi Arabia has come a long way in its dis tried to decipher the Israeli position on stance on Israel. Between the mid-1950s and agreement. King Abdullah’s peace plan, with a view to the late 1970s Saudi Arabia adhered to the advancing a solution to the Palestinian is- line that Israel had no right to exist as a re- sue. Abdullah’s peace plan was publicized in gional state. A change in its position began 2002 and was accepted, with amendments, after the assassination of King Faisal in 1975. at a summit meeting in that year, Following the peace initiative launched by and reaffirmed at the summit in 2007. Egyptian president Sadat in 1977, was Other areas of discussion that feature highly no longer the driving force of the Arab-Israeli on the Saudi agenda, such as the situation and Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The vacuum in Iraq or the Iranian nuclear program, were that emerged in the Arab world was seized not prominent at these meetings. The Saudis temporarily at the Baghdad summit of 1978 do not regard Israel as a relevant partner for by extremist elements in the Arab world, these issues. specifically, Iraq and . The round of talks between Prince Bandar Due to its economic and political ties with and Israeli officials during 2006 was termi- Western states, Saudi Arabia could not allow nated in 2007. The main reason seems to be itself to be led by extremist factions. In 1981, internal Palestinian developments (although Saudi crown prince Fahd (who was crowned there were also reports in the foreign press king in 1982) proposed a surprising initia- that Bandar’s position in the royal family has tive for solving the Arab-Israeli conflict. In declined). In the agreement of Febru- what became known as the Fahd initiative, ary 2007, the Saudi government tried to rec- the Saudis abandoned their policy that had oncile loyalists with Hamas support- negated the existence of Israel and made it ers, in order to present a unified Palestinian clear that the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict position. This attempt failed, and the draw- was the Palestinian problem. Out of eight ing card of Palestinian unity and a cohesive principles noted by the Fahd initiative, six Palestinian government, which the Saudis addressed the Palestinian issue; only two of would have liked to show Israel ahead of the clauses referred to withdrawal from the generating Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, Golan Heights. The Fahd initiative declared

72 that in return for Israeli willingness to with- tion 194, in other words, that all the clauses draw to the 1967 borders and the creation of of the resolution were binding). With regard an independent Palestinian state with [Arab] to the issue of what Israel receives in return, Jerusalem as its capital, all the states of the here too the Abdullah initiative reflected re- region would be able to live in peace. cent developments in the Arab-Israeli arena. Twenty years later, in 2002, Crown Prince While the Fahd initiative aspired to the re- Abdullah (who became king in 2005) pro- gion’s states being able to live in peace, the posed a new initiative. The Abdullah initia- Abdullah initiative talked explicitly about tive essentially did not extend beyond the ending the conflict, peace treaties with Israel, principles of the Fahd initiative, although and normalizing relations with Israel as part its wording broke new ground in certain of a total peace agreement. instances. The Abdullah initiative reflected Both the Fahd and Abdullah initiatives the developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict were originally publicized by crown princes of the previous twenty years (especially the in interviews with senior American journalists Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement, the peace (Katharine Graham, owner of the Washington treaty between Israel and Jordan, the Oslo Post, and of the New York principles, and the several subsequent agree- Times). These were not incidental interviews; ments that were signed with the ). rather, they were well planned statements The demand of the Fahd initiative that Israel given before each royal figure became king. withdraw to the 1967 borders remained, as The intention was to improve Saudi Arabia’s did the demand for the establishment of an image in the Western world (the Fahd initia- independent Palestinian state, with [Arab] tive emerged after Saudi Arabia rejected the

Jerusalem as its capital. There was a semantic Sadat initiative, in response to pressure exert- King Abdullah of Saudi softening on the matter of the Palestinian ref- ed on Saudi Arabia by radical Arab elements Arabia ugees, whereby the principle of the Fahd ini- who took control of the Arab world at the tiative that guaranteed the right of return for Baghdad Summit in 1978; the Abdullah ini- Palestinians who wished to return and finan- tiative was publicized a few months after the cial compensation for those who preferred 9/11 terrorist attacks) but also, and perhaps it was replaced in the Abdullah initiative by mainly, to hint at the policy that should be ex- the moderate wording of “a just solution” pected from the person who would inherit the to the problem of Palestinian refugees, to be throne, without obligating the king to adopt it agreed on “in accordance with” UN Security as official policy. This approach, though alien Council resolution 194, namely: the solution to the Western world, is designed to bypass to the problems of the refugees must be ac- expected internal objection. Policy initiatives ceptable to Israel, and Israel is not bound of a crown prince in Saudi Arabia do not ne- to comply with all the clauses of resolution cessitate preliminary discussion with internal 194 – hence the moderation. (In the 2002 Da- influential political forces, and certainly not if mascus Summit resolution, which approved the initiatives are offered as part of interviews the Abdullah initiative, the wording on the to the media. This is not the case with policy solution to the Palestinian refugee problem initiatives of a king, which require a consen- was hardened when it stipulated that the sus among powerful groupings or factors in solution be “in conformity with” UN resolu- the administration.

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 73 Based on the principles of the Fahd and another sense, an attempt to bypass internal Abdullah initiatives, the Saudis made sev- constraints on such dialogue. eral attempts over the years to advance a solution to the Palestinian problem. This Internal Constraints on Dialogue activity was evident in diplomatic discus- with Israel sions that the Saudis conducted with their Despite the progress in the basic Saudi posi- counterparts in the and West tion, the Saudis refused to hold direct talks European countries who were anxious to with Israel and played down any other in- The talks find a solution to the Palestinian problem. volvement in advancing the Palestinian is- between Prince This also took place through more direct in- sue. In the 1980s commentators tended to volvement – such as with the involvement associate this approach with Saudi concern Bandar and of Prince Bandar when he was ambassador over Palestinian terror elements that op- the Israelis to the US – for example, in US efforts to con- posed a settlement with Israel. In line with in 2006 were vene the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, this viewpoint, the commentators also thus in one or the prince’s failed effort to persuade PLO tended to explain the financial aid that the sense a direct chairman Arafat to accept Prime Minister Saudis gave to Palestinian elements as “buy- Barak’s proposal at the Camp David Con- ing security” to ensure the stability of the continuation of ference in 2000. Indeed, to this day Bandar regime. Saudi concern over Palestinian ter- the traditional refers to Arafat’s refusal to accept Barak’s ror was partially relevant to those years, but fundamental proposal as a “crime.” lost much of its significance after the Madrid Saudi stance At no stage did the Saudis see themselves Peace Conference in 1991 and the Washing- that views the as mediators between the Syrians and the Is- ton peace talks that followed, and later af- raelis, but they did see themselves as media- ter the and direct peace talks Palestinian tors between the Palestinians and the US (in between the Palestinians and Israelis in the problem as the the late 1970s, when they worked to achieve second half of the 1990s. With the start of di- nucleus of the recognition of the PLO by the Washington rect talks between the Palestinians and the Arab-Israeli administration), and over the last year, as Israelis, the Saudis agreed to the US request mediators between the Palestinians and Is- and dispatched official representatives to the conflict and in rael. Their willingness, even if reluctant, to multilateral talks. Saudi princes, including another sense, act as mediators in contacts between the Pal- Bandar, also displayed a willingness to meet an attempt to estinians and Israel constitutes progress in with unofficial Israeli figures, as a show of bypass internal Saudi diplomacy and the approach towards good will and a means of building trust. constraints on Israel. This willingness should be promoted Naturally, these meetings were not covered sensitively and with an understanding of in- by the media. such dialogue. ternal constraints that impact on Saudi activ- Current Saudi concern that direct con- ity and still prevent Saudi Arabia from agree- tacts with Israelis might be leaked to the ing to an open dialogue with Israel. The talks press does not necessarily refer to the Pales- between Prince Bandar and the Israelis in tinian or inter-Arab arena, but internal Saudi 2006 were thus in one sense a direct continu- politics. This concern is influenced and mo- ation of the traditional fundamental Saudi tivated by three factors that characterize the stance that views the Palestinian problem as internal code of the Saudi government and the nucleus of the Arab-Israeli conflict and in social structure:

74 1. The importance of the religious establish- or other business people) to government em- ment and the entrenched negative Wahhabi ap- ployees, university lecturers, professionals proach towards Jews. The Saudi royal family who share the conservative approach, and sees the religious Wahhabi establishment members of the lower economic class. These as its strategic partner in government and groups adhere to the traditional standpoint a fundamental part of the ruling coalition. of the Saudi society and view any challenge Thus the royal family is forced to consider to this approach as a threat. the positions of this establishment, includ- Therefore, the conservative groups are ing its approach towards Israel and the Jews. more exposed to and more influenced by There are a considerable number of mem- the negative messages in the Qur’an against bers of the religious Wahhabi establishment Jews than other elements in Saudi society. who still consider contact with official Israeli These messages, which are promulgated elements as heresy at worst, but at the very by religious establishment activists, present least as undesirable policy. This opposition Jews and Israelis as elements that “defile” is augmented by opposition from radical re- Islamic society. Over the years the Saudis ligious groups (some of which support the prevented Jews with European and America messages of Bin Laden and the al-Qaeda or- passports from entering the country, claim- ganization) that do not belong to the official ing they represented a threat to the “purity” religious establishment and tend to adopt of Saudi Islamic society and the “purity” of the strict interpretations of the Qur’an and Saudi soil. The American Aramco oil compa- the Hadith with regard to the Jews. Over the ny, which stationed thousands of American years, these strict interpretations have radi- and European employees in Saudi Arabia, calized the approaches among the religious collaborated with this approach of the Sau- Wahhabi establishment, whether based on di government and did not employ Jews in conviction or as a defense against accusa- Saudi Arabia. This general attitude bolstered tions of radical religious groups that doubt- the traditional negative Saudi approach to- ed its religious sincerity and attacked it for wards Jews and Israel. what was presented as succumbing to the The taboo on Jews began to weaken when royal family. the Saudis were forced to meet US secretary 2. A conservative approach among large of state Henry Kissinger in the 1970s. How- sectors of society. In addition to the religious ever, the taboo on recognition of Israel con- groups, some of which are partners in the tinued, theoretically until the Fahd initiative, ruling coalition while others are in opposi- which for the first time implied Saudi recog- tion to the government, there is a wide range nition of the State of Israel, and in practice of groups with a conservative approach. up to the Madrid Peace Conference and the These groups are conceptually close to the Oslo accords. After the Oslo accords Saudi religious establishment or are influenced by princes as well as representatives of various it. They are present in all walks of society, Saudi groups – businesspeople, journalists, from prominent business people (such as the students, and others – displayed a willing- al-Rajahi family that started out as a family of ness to meet with Israelis and some even vis- money changers and today owns an Islamic ited Israel privately to get a closer look at the bank that has branches across the kingdom, business opportunities there.

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 75 3. Power struggles in the royal family. The eralization in various walks of life. The royal royal family, which enjoys a monopoly on family, which is united in its drive to main- the government and strives to maintain this tain its hold on government, will have to re- hold for the future, is reluctant to take any spond to these demands for change. It will step that may generate opposition from the be compelled to reexamine its approach to religious establishment and conservative its strategic partners in the ruling coalition, elements in society. This is the main reason or alternately, to reach a sort of compromise why over the years its policy was of a con- with the religious establishment in order to servative nature. Moreover, various factions contend with internal demands for change. among the princes, aiming to advance one of Since the terror attacks of September 2001 their members to a key position in the royal and especially since terror attacks began in- family, maintain open channels of commu- side Saudi Arabia in May 2004, the religious nication with all sectors of the population, establishment has been subjected to persis- especially the religious establishment. As a tent political and public criticism. A promi- result, various princes – including those in nent attack on the religious establishment leading positions – have desisted from direct was apparently initiated by elements within and open contact with Israeli officials. Even the royal family and conducted through the Prince Bandar, who was involved in prelimi- media, which is owned by various princes. nary contacts toward the Madrid Peace Con- This attack has three main focal points: the ference as well as the contacts ahead of and education system, women’s rights, and the during the , kept a religion police. In these three areas, the reli- low profile during these talks. It is therefore gious establishment, at least in the last three not surprising that his father, Crown Prince decades, has blocked any move toward liber- Sultan, who is also the minister of defense, alization and modernization. Thus the pub- denied the existence of meetings with official lic education system has been governed by Israeli elements in 2006, partly to offset po- the religious establishment since the 1970s, tential damage to Bandar’s prospects of ad- which prevented the system from training vancing in the government hierarchy. the younger generation to contend with modern life. It expanded areas of religious The Chances of Open Dialogue study and prevented the expansion of gener- with Israel al studies. The education system, still led by The Saudi system of government is based on the religious establishment, is now branded a monopoly of the royal family in the gov- as responsible for encouraging xenophobia ernment system and a strategic coalition and for nurturing a hothouse for breeding with the religious establishment. This system terrorists. With regard to women’s rights, has proven its efficiency in ensuring survival the religious establishment is presented as of the royal family’s power over the last hun- spearheading the segregation of women in dred years, but at the cost of a conservative society and over the years intensifying limi- domestic policy and a hesitant foreign policy. tations on women’s freedom of action, which In recent years, the winds of change have be- constrict large sections of the population, gun to blow in Saudi society, and with them prevent their integration in the workforce, are increasing calls from within for more lib- and contribute to the increase in the foreign

76 workforce in Saudi Arabia. The third focus Israel, particularly open relations, in return of criticism, the religion police – which acts for concessions forced on the religious estab- as the operational arm of the religious estab- lishment relating to domestic areas. lishment’s guidelines – oversees traditional and religious behavioral norms and adopts Conclusion a hard line against any manifestation of lib- Despite an increase in Saudi willingness to eralization, either in the education system or adopt an active role in finding a solution to among women. In recent years, the religion the Arab-Israeli conflict, the kingdom still police has withstood challenges designed to adheres to the viewpoint that the Palestinian There will reduce its freedom of activity and influence problem – whose solution is the creation of likely not be in society. an independent Palestinian state, with Arab an increase in These attacks on the religious establish- Jerusalem as its capital – is the core of the ment may shorten the octopus’ tentacles but Arab-Israeli conflict. The considerable up- cooperation will not obliterate it. It is questionable how turn in the Saudi economy following the rise between Saudi many in the royal family support an end to in oil prices in recent years and the decrease Arabia and the ruling coalition with the religious estab- in the power of radical elements in the Arab Israel in areas lishment. On the other hand, however, many world (Iraq, Syria) have not spurred Saudi of strategic in the royal family believe that the expan- Arabia to take on an independent and open sion of the religious establishment since the role in solving the Palestinian problem, and importance, early 1970s and its increased influence have it continues to search for inter-Arab support such as Iranian damaged the kingdom. The latter are look- for King Abdullah’s peace initiative, even ambitions ing to reduce the influence of the religious if only from moderate states. Moreover, the to obtain establishment, both in domestic policy and rise in oil prices has hardened King Abdul- a nuclear foreign policy. It is still unclear if this attack lah’s bargaining stance further. He will likely on the religious establishment will result in a condition his personal participation in Presi- capability or diminishing of the religious establishment’s dent Bush’s proposed peace conference on the situation in power or a compromise agreement with it. tangible outcomes regarding Palestinian Iraq. However, Under such a compromise the religious es- issues. However, he may allow lower level sporadic and tablishment may be persuaded to relinquish participation in the conference (perhaps its monopolistic hold on certain areas in re- Prince Bandar) in order to avert a confronta- covert dialogue turn for preserving its influence in others. tion with the United States. with Israel will It is not inconceivable that such a compro- Saudi Arabia’s specific regime structure – continue on mise agreement, if attained, would force more precisely, the strategic ruling coalition the Palestinian the religious establishment to relinquish, between the royal family and the religious issue. even partially, its staunch objection to open establishment – determines its shirking of a and official contacts with Israel. This would leadership role vis-à-vis the Palestinian issue be in return for what it views as even more and the Arab-Israeli conflict. As long as this important fundamental tenets – maintain- ruling coalition exists in its current format, ing the religious and traditional values of and as long as the religious establishment Saudi society. By the same token, however, maintains its policy of exclusion towards it is possible that a compromise agreement non-Islamic elements and its anti-Jewish and would include reservations about ties with anti-Israeli messages, it is highly likely that

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 77 the hesitant Saudi policy towards Israel will Extending political cooperation with Is- be maintained, including concern over open rael will become possible only if there is a dialogue and extending areas of cooperation change in the Saudi ruling coalition, which with it. This means there will not be an in- lessens the influence of the religious estab- crease in cooperation between Saudi Arabia lishment on the government and society, and and Israel in areas of strategic importance, increases the influence of domestic forces such as Iranian ambitions to obtain a nuclear looking to promote internal liberalization capability or the situation in Iraq. However, and greater openness towards non-Islamic sporadic and covert dialogue with Israel will elements and states. continue on the Palestinian issue.

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