LONG -WAVE ECONOMICS and the CHANGING FORTUNES of the POLITICAL and SOCIAL MOVEMENTS of the LEFT and RIGHT By DUNCAN FRASER Ph.D. Thesis London School of Economics University of London UMI Number: U166505 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U166505 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Zoos ABSTRACT A number of writers working in the fields of history and industrial relations have claimed a correlation between long-wave economics and the changing fortunes of political and social movements of the left and right. They have suggested both particular patterns of development and causations but often on the basis of piecemeal evidence, lacking a comprehensive theoretical and empirical basis. This thesis tests the validity of such a correlation through a comparative historical analysis of the domestic political histories of Britain, France, Germany and the USA over the four long-waves that have occurred in modem times; those of 1803-1848, 1848-1896, 1896-1948 and 1948-1998. It finds, that since industrialization, there has been a distinct and repeating pattern of political and social development that can be correlated with long­ wave economics. Common ground is found with existing theoretical patterns, though also notable areas of difference, and this thesis provides a more comprehensive pattern of development. The thesis proceeds to explore possible causations for the pattern found. It does so by using existing political science theories explaining political change; those concerning voting behaviour, class struggle and party competition. It finds that aspects of these theories can be used to explain the pattern of development found. Above all, populations experiencing the different economic phases of the long-wave undergo significant motivational changes that are reflected in the shifting fortunes of the left and right. The thesis concludes by analyzing these findings and highlighting advances made on existing accounts. It also discusses those events within modem history that could be regarded as anomalous, with the intention of further understanding this process. Finally, it discusses the implications of the findings of this thesis for long-wave and political science theory. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank all those in the Government Department at the LSE who have helped to make this thesis possible. In particular I would like to acknowledge the contributions made by my supervisor, Dr. Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey and by my advisors, Dr. Solomon Karmel and Mr. John Barnes. Most of all I would like to acknowledge the important role of my wife Amanda, without whose help and support this thesis would not have been possible. As such, this thesis is dedicated to her, and our two sons, Ewan and Gavin. GLOSSARY CONTENTS Abstract p.ii Acknowledgements iii Glossary iv List of Figures vi Chapter One. Long-Wave Economics and the Left and Right p. 1 1.1 The Last Fifty Years 1 1.2 Introduction to Long-Wave Economics 4 1.3 Long-Wave Research and the Left and Right 7 1.4 Research Design 21 Chapter 2. Political History and Long-Wave Economics 30 2.1 First Long-Wave 1803-1848 30 2.2 Second Long-Wave 1848-1896 39 2.3 Third Long-Wave 1896-1948 48 2.4 Fourth Long-Wave 1948-1998 63 2.5 The Correlation between Long-Wave Economics and the Left and Right 78 Chapter 3 Ideas and Voting Behaviour 100 3.1 Partisan Alignment 101 3.2 Issue Voting 105 3.3 Economic Performance Voting 113 3.4 Realignment 124 Chapter 4 Class Struggle and Long-Wave Economics 136 4.1 Long-Wave Upswings 137 4.2 Long-Wave Downswings - ‘the Crisis Period’. 149 4.3 Long-Wave Downswings - ‘the Recovery Period’. 157 Chapter 5 Party Competition and the Distribution of Power. 166 5.1 Trends in Party Competition Theory 166 5.2 Long-Waves and Party Competition 170 Chapter 6 Conclusions and Analysis 184 6.1 Period of Consensus 187 6.2 Period of Progressive Change 190 6.3The Peak in Left-wing Radicalism 192 6.4The Period of Political Turmoil 195 6.5The Rise of the Right and conservatism 198 6.6The Left Recovery and the Emergence of a New Consensus 203 IV Chapter 7 Discussion 213 7.1 Historical Review 213 7.2 Causations for Deviations from the Theoretical Trajectory 233 7.3 Implications for Long-Wave Theory 236 7.4 Implications for Political Science Theory 241 Appendix A Defining ‘Right’ and ‘Left’ 247 A.l A Brief History of the Left-Right Dichotomy 247 A.2 The Left-Right Dichotomy 251 A.3 Ideology and the Distribution of Power 257 A.4 Definition of the Left-Right Dichotomy 261 Appendix B Dating Long-Wave Periods 269 B.l First Long-Wave 270 B.2 Second Long-Wave 277 B.3 Third Long-Wave 280 B.4 Fourth Long-Wave 285 Bibliography 300 V LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Averages of the dates used by long-wave researchers. p.6 Figure 2. Hobsbawm’s historical periods and typical long-wave periodicity’s. 13 Figure 3. The Political Long-Wave 82 Figure 4. Trends in voting behaviour across the fourth long-wave. 101 Figure 5a. Consensus Politics and Preference-accommodating 171 5b. Progressive Politics. Figure 6a. Adversary Politics. 178 6b. Conservative Politics. Table 1 Unemployment Rates (%) 1855-1998 288 Table 2. Economic Growth Rates (%) 1840-1998 288 vi CHAPTER ONE LONG-WAVE ECONOMICS AND THE LEFT AND RIGHT 1.1 The Last Fifty Years Within liberal democracies, the political changes of the last fifty years appear to have turned full circle. The post-war era began with a period of political consensus, the proclamation of the ‘end of ideology’, and the construction and establishment of a ‘middle way’ between collectivist and class-struggle Socialism and Communism on the left, and laissez-faire Conservatism and Fascism on the right. The mid-1990s have now seen what appears to be the emergence of a new political consensus, that also seeks a ‘third way’, though this time between redistributive social democracy and the neo­ liberalism of the New Right, and once again predictions that the old left-right dichotomy is no longer applicable to the politics of liberal democracies. The period immediately after WW2 saw gradual, but progressive social change based upon the mixed economy and redistributive social democracy that came to represent the ‘middle way’. Much of this was carried out by the parties of the centre-left, often in government in the late 1940s and establishing the basis of a society charaterised by the welfare state, full employment and Keynesian demand management. By the 1950s though, it was mostly parties of the right that had occupied government, and this decade was renowned for its political conservatism, and little in the way of political change occurred. It was this phenomenon that gave rise to many political scientists proclaiming that a political consensus had arisen. This consensus politics was perceived as variously occurring at intellectual, electoral, elite and party levels. Differences between left and right parties were believed to be minimal as both competed for the centre ground of the political spectrum. Ironically, such a tendency often resulted in the squeezing out of centre parties at a time when centre- politics, consensus and conformity were seen as being in the political ascendant. The differences between the major parties were considered so minimal, that Bell declared the l ‘End of Ideology’, whilst Lipset maintained that the ideological differences of the early 20th Century had been replaced by ‘conservative socialism’.1 Others such as Schlesinger, Aron and Shils sought or described a ‘third way’ based upon pragmatism and moderation - a new radicalism of the centre. The left-right dichotomy was, according to these theories, a feature of the past. However, this belief was challenged when the consensus was attacked by the intellectuals of the New Left in the early 1960s. In fact the rise of the New Left presaged a general leftward drift in the political spectrum throughout the following decade. Through to the mid-1970s most liberal democracies saw a gradual increase in the percentage vote of the left, with these electoral gains often resulting in left-wing governments. The electoral success of the left markedly improved on their performance in the 1950s.3 The rise of the New Left, and the improved electoral position of the left in general, was accompanied by a period of political unrest. The late 1960s and early 1970s were characterized by militant student and youth revolts, civil rights movements and opposition to the Vietnam War. This period also saw the rise of ‘post-materialist’ left politics; the appearance of radical political movements devoted to the equality of women, gays and ethnic minorities, and protection of the environment. It also saw increased support for left-wing nationalist movements in the developing world as part of a wider support for internationalism.4 Finally this period was accompanied by a concerted period of trade-union militancy and a proliferation of radical left movements advocating socialism and revolution. The late 1960s and early 1970s saw a wave of strike activity, almost entirely organized by rank-and-file movements and which included factory occupations.