14 January 2021

Military History Group

U3A Dorking

Newsletter Number 6

Meetings via Zoom during Pandemic

From Group Leader Barrie Friend

Parish Notes

Fellow enthusiasts

Greetings and good hopes for a speedy permanent change in direction of those wretched Covid graphs as we remain sensibly isolated and the vaccine’s effect starts to show. Our monthly talks will continue on Zoom for a little while longer yet and we will be introducing more guest speakers.

Our January Zoom talk was well attended by over forty members and guests. You gave our first guest speaker, Mike Smith, a warm welcome and positive comments on his talk on The Battle of Gallipoli 1915/16.

One of the guests invited to hear the talk was Mike Fox, U3A’s Military History Advisor, and member of the U3A Banstead group.

1 He has sent a link to his talk on Arnhem which includes errors in the film A Bridge too Far: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vTUC79o4Kmc We look forward to his support in the coming months.

Another guest invited was our speaker’s cousin, Valerie Steele, who lives in New Zealand showing the reach of Zoom as a powerful communication tool. Maybe Dorking U3A can claim to be the first British U3A group which has a New Zealand ‘Chapter’? New Zealand has some 84 U3A groups across both North and South Islands and viewing their website www.u3a.nz makes for extremely interesting reading.

In The Great War the troops from New Zealand were described as ‘coming from the furthest ends of the earth’ to fight for king and country and further support came from Britain’s other colonies and dominions. Without the help of these countries the British Expeditionary Forces at Gallipoli and the Western Front would have suffered severe setbacks. The statistics are eye opening.

12% British population, some 5.7 million, served in the war. The colonies and dominions supplied a further 3 million, increasing the British figure by nearly 50% .

8.5% of the Australian population and 12% of the New Zealand population served. 18,000 New Zealand troops were killed, 60,000 Australians. Their memorials and headstones remain sad reminders on the Western Front and Gallipoli.

The story of the Australians and New Zealanders were included in Mike Smith’s talk on Gallipoli, the first battle for the ANZACs. This talk is now available Dorking U3A YouTube.

Our next Zoom talk is on Tuesday 2nd February at 1030 am.

Was the Royal Navy ‘Invincible’ in 1914?

Find out the truth behind this headline in George Blundell- Pound’s talk.

Our Royal Navy ‘ruled the waves’ but lost its first battle against the Imperial German Navy in November 1914 at Coronel, off the Chilean coast. Five weeks later the tables were turned at the Battle of The Falklands.

It’s all in George’s talk! MH Zoom Meeting Time: Feb 2, 2021 10:30 AM

Join Zoom Meeting https://zoom.us/j/94980775518?pwd=Vnk3Ukt0TGJlT1JSYVAyaFpIZ1UyQT09

Meeting ID: 949 8077 5518 Passcode: 247543

2

Programme for 2021

February 2 Was the Royal Navy ‘Invincible’ in 1914? George Blundell- Pound’s March 3 Jim Barnes April 6 May 4 June 8 July 6 August 3 September 7

Zoom Presentations https://www.danhillmilitaryhistorian.com/archive

DARDANELLES / GALLIPOLI

February 1915 to January 1916

Michael Smith – January Zoom presentation to MHG

YouTube link to Mike's talk: https://youtu.be/ExmfxReZ9gI

Recurring and enduring perceptions of this campaign in the Great War include: • It was an unmitigated disaster for the Allies • It was the sole idea & responsibility of Winston Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty • The greatest contribution was by the ANZACs (Australia & New Zealand Army Corps), who were under incompetent British field officers • Mustafa Kemal’s (later Ataturk) leadership was largely responsible for the Ottoman Victory • The only successful aspect from the Allies side was the evacuation

Mike Smith’s presentation sought to review and re consider the above, as well as the chronology of the campaign. Germany’s strategy for the Great war (mainly the Schlieffen Plan) was to NOT be fighting on two fronts. To this end it would firstly, quickly knock out France

3 in the West, then using its railway network move its army to the East to fight the real threat: Russia, which would take much longer to fully mobilise than the French.

There is some argument that when the Germans failed to capture Paris (the miracle of the Marne, etc) in 1914, it would then inevitably eventually lose the war, as it was then destined to fight on two fronts

Britain’s role in this early part of the war was to dominate the seas and blockade Germany with its huge Navy; contributing only a small army force (The BEF) to help Belgium & France.

The Ottomans were seen as a collapsing empire, “The Sick Man of Europe “(by 1914 they had lost almost all of their European possessions) and perceived as a soft touch for circling predatory powers (Russia, France, Britain. Germany and its Central Powers allies naturally wanted the Ottomans as allies. As early as 3 November 1914 Churchill ordered a Naval attack on the Dardanelles (2 British Battle cruisers & 2 French Battleships). The 20-minute bombardment was to test the Ottoman defences and of course alerted the defenders to strengthen their defences and lay more sea minefields.

The Ottomans declared war on the Allies on 11 Nov 1914 and the defences of the Dardanelles/ Gallipoli were under the direction of senior officers from Germany (General Otto Liman von Sanders). With the strategic situation in Europe in stalemate in winter 1914/1915 a new front using part of Britain’s huge Navy (which had been engaged in relatively small battles, while waiting for German Navy to try to break out of port into the North Sea) to mount a Naval attack through the Dardanelles to capture Constantinople ( Istanbul ) thereby allowing supplies through the Black Sea to help keep struggling Russia in the War seemed like a god plan….to some .

4 The Navy, however, was not over enthusiastic and part grudgingly allocated a rather second division pre dreadnought fleet, in addition to the modern battleship HMS Queen Elizabeth, Battlecruiser HMS Inflexible and the world’s first seaplane carrier: HMS Ark Royal.

The fleet set sail with contingents from Britain, France, Russia & Australia.

Long range bombardment of the Ottoman forts guarding the Dardanelles started on 19 February 1915 and the attempt to sail through the narrow would be made on 18 March 1915. The Dardanelles are 38 miles long and 1500 metres wide at narrowest point, heavily defended by gun emplacements and multiple ranks of sea minefields. The fleet losses were the highest since Trafalgar and the decision was made to withdraw. The failure was attributed to gross underestimation of Ottoman/ German defences, outdated fleet, failure to realise extent of minefields (despite use of Scout planes), accurate fire from stable land-based howitzers and lack of aggressive follow through.

The invasion plan was revised and it was decided to deploy a Combined Operations assault by the Navy, the Army and a few aircraft. The army’s role would be to knock out the forts allowing the Navy to sail through the Dardanelles, capture Istanbul and so on, as before (note Army to enable Navy: not to invade Gallipoli, as such)

The contingent contained only one regular division: the 29th under Lt Gen Aylmer Hunter-Weston, who Douglas Haig had described as “ rank amateur” ) and a three Gurkha battalions, all the rest of the Army , including the ANZACS ( who were ALL volunteers) were basically recently recruited “ Citizens soldiers”, who had never been in battle & were scarcely trained.

The Navy was to land the Army at several beaches: the French on the Asian side, the main force on five beaches at Helles Point in the South of Gallipoli and the Anzacs further north on the European side. There was also a feint towards Bulair from Skyros (where the Germans had initially expected the amphibious assault was to take place)

5

There was not the slightest element of secrecy or surprise

The targets for the first day were capture of the town of Krithia and the heights of Achi Baba by the main force and the heights of Gaba Tepe by the ANZACs. A brief summary of the Cape Helles beaches:

“S” beach:2/: Largest beach; smallest force; almost no opposition: a complete success

“V” beach: the main landing force (1/Royal Munster Fusiliers; 1/ Royal Dublin Fusiliers & 2/ Hampshires) from converted collier SS River Clyde. Very heavily opposed, small beach surrounded by high cliffs. Very heavy British casualties (1,200).

6

“W” beach (aka “the Lancashire landing”). Men of the 1/ Lancs Fusiliers were awarded the famous Six VCs before breakfast. Very well defended, but British had firm hold after 533 casualties

“X” beach 2/ : almost no opposition

“Y” beach 1/ Kings Own Scottish Borderers: landed unopposed; a British officer strolled into Krithia & bought some fruit.

“Z” Beach (aka Ari Burnu/ Gaba Tepe / later called ANZAC Cove) Troops landed north of intended landing area (various reasons cited) but this, at least, meant that landings were only lightly opposed and almost all of the 16,00 were able to make their way inland: to then face fierce, mainly trench based, opposition.

7

Again, the plan was to take & hold the high ground, but again this largely failed due to underestimating Ottoman opposition & numbers who were fighting from the high ground and on their homeland soil.

In the south the French, who had made only 7 km progress on the Asian side crossed back over the strait and joined the British in three major assaults to attempt capture Krithia, and Achi Baba (28 April; 6-8 May and 4 June): remember this had been planned to be done on first day: April 25th

In addition to the above listed causes of failure could be added: inadequate artillery and disease accounting for 50% of casualties.

The fighting conditions were horrific for both sides and included: heat; dysentery, always covered by flies; mosquitoes, malaria, insanitary trench warfare (often only 20 -25 yards apart), and the scarcely imaginable black corpse flies

British and ANZACS were always in range of Ottoman snipers, so even, for example, when in R & R in the sea. The entire Gallipoli peninsula is only the size of

Following a review of the failure of all of the assaults, it was decided to mount a rescue operation at Suvla Bay (6 -15 August).

If possible, and bearing in mind all the lessons learned before, these landings were even worse planned & effected than the initial 25 April landings. The commander Lt General Sir Frederick Stopford disobeyed the overall Commander’s (still inexplicably: Gen Hamilton) specific instructions to land and immediately take the high ground

8

He, for example, decided to construct a Divisional HQ on the beach and cited amongst reasons for inaction “The Ottomans were inclined to be aggressive “

The opportunities offered by very light initial opposition were lost, allowing the Ottomans time to gather troops on the British targeted high grounds. The plan to link up the three Allied enclaves: Helles, ANZAC and now SUVLA, failed.

Hamilton was sacked on 15 Oct and replaced by Gen Charles Munro. He reported to Kitchener that he considered there was…” no realistic chance of breaking out of the three enclaves or breaking through the Dardanelles”. Kitchener visited on 14 November 1915 ….and agreed. The order was given to evacuate. There is a general view that the evacuation was brilliantly planned and effected with no loss of men; the last ANZAC and SUVLA evacuations carried out on 18/19 December (Clement Atlee, future Prime Minister was second last to go). The Helles final withdrawals were 8/9 Jan 1916

My own opinion is that seems almost impossible, with such close positions, that that Ottomans had no idea of the planned evacuation and perhaps with the consideration of their own very high casualties and the possibility of inheriting some supplies, decide to let the Allies go unimpeded!!

Campaign Casualties

9 Total served Total Casualties Killed % of casualties who were killed OTTOMANS 251,309 86,692 34 Incl : some Germans

Other Sources: 470,000 350,000

ALLIES % of Allied Killed Britain & rest of Empire 420,000 171,335 119,696 70 76.3

France 80,000 47,000 27,000 57 17.2

Australia 50,000 26,094 7,594 29 4.8 New Zealand 13,000 7,571 2,431 32 1.6 ANZAC total 33,665 10,025 30 6.4

TOTAL ALLIES 559,000 252,000 156,721 62 100.0 Sources: In black type: Major & Mrs Holt’s Battlefield Guide : Gallipoli In red type : Other

These disprove the general perception of the ANZACS being the biggest contributors and taking most deaths & casualties. Facts are stubborn things!

Also please note it is quite possible that Ottoman casualties exceeded (possibly greatly) those of the Allies

Ataturk (Mustafa Kemal) was a field commander (Lt. Col.) at Gallipoli; overall commander Von Sanders. It seems the post war P.R. rather exaggerated his role: e.g., miraculously appearing at key moments in key battles, taking command, inspiring the troops etc. Whatever, he was undoubtedly brave, able & charismatic and play the central role in creation of modern

10 Turkey from the stalemate of the Treaty of Sevres (Versailles was just for Germany) and the later Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.

Greece had unwisely invaded Turkey from its enclave in Smyrna (now Izmir) in 1919. Kemal had led the Turkish army to expel Greeks from Turkey and helped spin the myth that Turkey should virtually be treated as actually a victim of the Ottoman Empire /Great War

Churchill resigned as First Lord of the Admiralty and saw service on Western Front with 6 Royal Scots Fusiliers. A Government enquiry exonerated him from blame over Gallipoli, but for many (probably including himself) his reputation never fully recovered

Footnotes on ANZACs:

Truly a very significant contribution by an all-volunteer force. Estimated that about half had been born in They were under their own field officers (albeit under British High Command) Max Hastings says, “the New Zealanders who, in both World Wars, were perhaps the finest of all Allied fighters.” Gallipoli undoubtedly the key event in creating unique national identities of Australia & New Zealand, as distinct from being part of

Book recommendations

** Out of print for many years, “A Military Atlas of the First World War” by Arthur Banks is now back in print, by Pen & Sword (mine was £16.99). Great on Gallipoli and all other campaigns & don’t worry, although it says Atlas: it measures 9 1/2 inches by 71/2 inches. Great maps, drawings & commentaries ** Major & Mrs Holt’s Battlefield Guide: Gallipoli” Leo Cooper & Sword Guide ** Specialist books on Gallipoli battles by Stephen Chambers: e.g., ANZAC the landing: Pen & Sword

Odds & Misc. War Poet: Rupert Brooke died on the feint crossing from Skyros to Bulair, author of “The Soldier” “If I should die, think only this of me: That there’s some corner of a foreign field That is forever England………”

Mass hysteria There is a recorded episode when one morning the British soldiers were all running about and shouting etc: there had been snow and it was the first time they were not immediately covered with flies on emerging from tents, trenches, dugouts etc

11

The Battles of Isandlwana and Rorke’s Drift

Part 2 Rork’s Drift

Arriving at the Rorke’s Drift Ferry on the morning of 22nd January without any specific orders, Lt John Chard, rode to Isandlwana to seek orders from his superiors. At Isandlwana he had just time to note the Zulus massing on the skyline, before being sent back to take charge of the ferry crossing at Rourke's Drift. After a light lunch at the ferry crossing, he went to rest in his tent and write a letter, but he was interrupted by the sudden arrival of Lt. Adendorf of the1/3rd NNC, who informed him of the defeat at Isandlwana and that an impi was advancing towards Rourke’s Drift. This 4000 strong impi led by Cetswayo's younger brother Dabulamanzi was part of the Reserve, which had not been involved in the victorious charge at Isandlwana. As they had missed out on the battle, the warriors shouted, “Oh let us go and have a fight at Kwa Jimi” and crossed the river into Natal. This went against Cetswayo's orders that his warriors should not cross into Natal and should never attack the redcoats in entrenched or fortified positions.

Around 3pm a messenger arrived with a note from Lt. Bromhead requesting Chard to return to the Rourke’s Drift Mission Depot without delay. Lt. Bromhead with B Company from the 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment of Foot were tasked with providing for the defence as well as some of the labour for the ferry working party. Lt Bromhead was a popular, but unexceptional officer, who was partially deaf. Chard arrived at the Rourke’s Drift forward supply depot to find Acting Assistant Commissary James Dalton directing the striking of the tents and the barricading and loop holing of the mission's two stone buildings in use as a storehouse and hospital.

Dalton and Bromhead had decided to use the 200 lb mealie bags and 100 lb biscuit boxes from the store to build ramparts. Bromhead showed Chard a message sent by staff officer Capt. Gardner, confirming that the camp at Isandlwana had fallen, that the mission was in grave danger and should be fortified and held at all costs. Chard agreed that the garrison should continue with loop holing the buildings and using the mealie bags to build a rampart around the perimeter under the direction of Dalton, who had a certificate in field works. The mission, formerly the farm and trading store of Jim Rorke, had been requisitioned from the current owner Swedish missionary Otto Witt. His thatch-roofed chapel had been converted into the storehouse and his thatched eleven-room house into a hospital. The buildings stood on a three- foot-high terrace, but they did not provide an inherently strong defensive position, as there was good cover for attackers including trees, walls and outbuildings and long grass much of it only a few yards from the perimeter. Bromhead distributed the standard 70 rounds per man, which left a reserve of 34 ammunition boxes (600 rounds each) containing a total of 20,400 rounds.

12 Chard met with Major Spalding, the officer in charge of the depot, who was preparing to return to the main depot at Helpmarkaar to get reinforcements. Before leaving having checked on the relative seniority of Chard and Bromhead on the Army List, he put Chard in command. His parting words were “You will be in charge, although of course, nothing will happen and I shall be back again this evening early”. Chard the newly appointed commander had struggled to pass out from the Woolwich Royal Military Academy and according to his superior's scathing report was “A most useless officer, fit for nothing and stupid looking”. He had served previously in Malta and and had no battle experience. Such criticisms of both officers as mediocre was no doubt due in part to jealousy of their fellow officers over their fame. Neither officer was a highflyer, but both were modest and experienced professionals.

At this point there were approximately 300 troops at Rourke’s Drift comprising the 100 or so strong B Company, 100 African auxiliaries of the NNC (only 10 armed with guns) and their white officers and NCOs and 80 Sikali and Basuto cavalrymen under Lt. Henderson, who had escaped from Isandlwana. Henderson was asked to post his cavalrymen as mounted scouts and seek to delay the arrival of the Zulus by mounting a fighting withdrawal. Henderson's troopers engaged the Zulus, but as the Zulus closed in on them, the cavalrymen wavered and rode off for Helpmarkaar. Chard and Bromhead initially decided in view of the reduced garrison to abandon the depot and withdraw to Helpmarkaar, but they were dissuaded by Dalton from doing so. He argued that if they withdrew along the road, they would have no chance of survival out in the open against the mass of fleet footed Zulus. While if they stayed put, given the Zulu's dislike of attacking fortified encampments, they had a better chance.

Chard put Sgt Windridge in charge of guarding the casks of rum (a few months later reduced to ranks for drunkenness). He then ordered the linking of the stone hospital and the storehouse with a wall of mealie bags. With the Zulus closing in on the depot, the NNC soldiers with their white officers leapt over the barricades and bolted. They were fired upon by some of the 2/24th furious at this desertion and a white NNC corporal was shot dead. The Regimental Chaplain the Rev Smith also decided to leave, but on finding his horse missing, he filled his haversack with cartridges ready to keep the men on the ramparts supplied with ammunition. The garrison was now reduced to 100 fit fighting men and 35 sick and wounded inmates of the hospital. They were about to be attacked by 4000 warriors. The garrison had to defend a 300-yard perimeter, which meant a defender every two yards at best. Chard realised that so long a perimeter was vulnerable, so he had a new wall constructed to bisect the perimeter. This created a three-sided compound in front of the storehouse, which would serve as the garrison's keep an area to which they could fall back. Without this wall Chard's “retrenchment barricade”, the mission might well have fallen. The hospital walls were loop holed and six privates were ordered to help the walking wounded to defend it.

Around 4.30 pm 600 Zulu black shielded warriors from the junior iNltiyengwe ambutho came around the back of the rocky Shiyane/Oscarberg hill to charge the rampart. Sgt Gallagher shouted, “Here they come, as thick as grass and as black as thunder”. Chard called in the skirmishers led by the senior NCO Colour Sergeant “the kid” 22-year-old Frank Bourne, a future Colonel. Unlike Isandlwana which began with volley firing, the order was given for

13 independent firing throughout the battle at Rourke’s Drift. The Martini Henry rifle proved itself as a formidable weapon in the hands of the well-drilled B Company. Young Private. Dunbar shot eight Zulus including a senior induna on horseback with just nine shots. The Martini Henry was an excellent weapon for close quarter fighting, as the rifle itself being capable of firing one round every eight seconds. It was 4 feet long and the “lunger bayonet” added another 22 ins. This meant that it gave the soldiers an advantage over the Zulus with their Iklwa stabbing spears, which were shorter in length. Private Hitch recalled that, “Had the Zulus taken the bayonet as freely as they took the bullets, we could not have stood more than five minutes, but they seemed to have a great dread of the bayonet”. xxx

If the hundreds of Zulus on the Shiyane Hill had been better marksmen, it could have caused disaster. Also, if the Zulus had mounted a mass assault attacking all sides of the thinly manned perimeter wall simultaneously might well have overwhelmed the small garrison. However, Dabulamanzi during the remaining hour or so of daylight did not properly coordinate the assault, but left his warriors led by junior indunas to launch a series of piecemeal attacks against the hospital and the North Wall, which were all repulsed. However Zulu short-range fire from the stone wall and the edge of the terrace in front of the hospital made it dangerous to lean over the barricade to fire, where the garrison were beginning to lose control of the perimeter barricade. In consequence Chard had a dog leg barricade erected across the gap between the north wall and the near corner of the hospital. The defenders were ordered to fall back from the hospital veranda and hospital compound to shelter behind this barricade, from which they could still provide covering fire for the front of the hospital. The Zulus started to break down the mealie bag perimeter barricade to the hospital compound in order to create gaps in the defences. Amidst the fighting Padre Smith moved along the firing line distributing ammunition and admonishing the men for swearing when their rifles jammed. The Zulus then turned their attention to attacking the storehouse, where the terrace was at its lowest. Their sudden rush almost succeeded in breaking through, but reinforcements led by Bromhead arrived just in time to repulse them. It had been a close thing, so Chard ordered a withdrawal to the entrenched barricade. This meant that they could no longer support those defending the hospital with covering fire for the front of the hospital, so the hospital could now be assaulted with relative impunity.

The Zulus succeeded in setting fire to the hospital's thatched roof putting at risk the lives of the 35 patients and the six soldiers manning the loopholes. As Pte Harry Hook, a lay reader recalled the defenders were, “like rats in a hole” and were running out of ammunition. It was time to get out. Originally when the soldiers were loop holing the hospital walls, Chard had ordered mouse holing through the walls to provide a low level connecting corridor through the 11 rooms, but there had been no time to carry the order out, so the patients and defenders were trapped with no way out. A group of Privates Hook, Coles, the two Williams, Waters and Gunners Howard and Evans organised the evacuation by digging holes in the sidewalls, while simultaneously with bullet and bayonet keeping the Zulus, who had smashed their way into the building at bay. Thanks to their heroism 23 out of the total of 30 patients were evacuated to safety. Pte Waters, the hospital orderly had been shot in the shoulder fighting on the perimeter barricade and had sought out his colleague the hospital cook Harry Hook to bandage him and

14 thereafter he joined in the defence of the hospital. He and Private Beckett decided to make a dash for it through the front, but Beckett bumped into a Zulu and was stabbed, so Waters had to double back and hide in the cloak closet of the hospital. After dark he crept out wearing Witt's black cloak and hid in the long grass until morning.

After the loss of the hospital Chard abandoned that end of the compound, which meant the defenders had a reduced perimeter to defend and were protected from the snipers on the Shigane Hill. However, they were now more closely packed together, which made them an easier target for Zulus firing at close range. The Zulus were able to take cover within a few feet of the defences, which gave the defenders the time for only one aimed shot when they rushed forward. NNC Corporal Schiess vaulted the wall to deal with some troublesome close-range snipers; he shot one and bayoneted two before jumping back over the wall.

Private Hitch frightened off a Zulu about to attack Bromhead from behind. Shortly afterwards Private Hitch was wounded in the shoulder by an assegai and was about to be finished off when Bromhead shot his Zulu assailant with his revolver. Bromhead then gave the wounded Hitch, who could no longer use his rifle, his own revolver saying, “Mate I am sorry to see you down”. The defence of the Mission was greatly assisted during the night by the flames of the burning hospital, which illuminated the attacking Zulus and prevented the garrison being surprised. The Zulus succeeded in driving the soldiers out of the stone cattle Kraal, so with the outer defences collapsing, Chard ordered Assistant Commissary Dunne to build a 8 foot high redoubt out of two piles of mealie bags, which would provide a secure firing platform for a dozen riflemen and shelter for the wounded. The redoubt enabled the 12 riflemen to fire over the heads of their colleagues and bring more fire to bear on any threatened sector. The Zulus tried to ignite the straw thatched roof of the storehouse by throwing assegais wrapped in burning grass, but the roof failed to ignite. Gradually the intensity of the attacks lessened as having failed to capture or burn the storehouse, the Zulus became disheartened due to mounting casualties and their dislike of night fighting.

The Zulu commanders had had only a limited opportunity to exploit their numerical superiority. The Zulus had missed their best chance of taking the mission when the defenders had been more thinly spread out around the whole perimeter. A strong two-pronged attack hitting both sides of the perimeter simultaneously early on might well have succeeded, but once the

15 defenders had withdrawn from the hospital compound into the reduced perimeter, successful attacks became much more difficult. Fortunately, they allowed this short-lived opportunity to pass in the first hour, because they thought seizing Kwa Jims would be easy and left the attacking to their junior indunas. Chard was thus able to concentrate his force into a well- entrenched company square. The last bastion seemed impregnable and the direct attacks petered out at 9.30 pm. Meanwhile Major Spalding on his ride to Helpmakaar had met up with Major Upcher at the head of two companies of 1/24th, which he had led back towards Rourke’s Drift. Riding ahead of the infantry he met up with fugitives, who reported that the burning depot had been captured, so Spalding ordered the two companies back to Helpmarkaar. Both the Zulus and the defenders spotted these reinforcements. Bromhead refilled the men’s ammunition pouches with 70 rounds. They had fired on average 210 rounds or 42 per hour per man. B Company had heeded their officers' warnings not to waste ammunition and had exercised excellent fire control as the Martini Henry rifle could fire one round every eight seconds. The Zulu attacks tailed off and by 4.30am firing had ceased. The Zulus withdrew behind the Oscarberg. The British defenders were down to their last box and a half of ammunition. Shortly afterwards Chelmsford's column came into sight passing within a few hundred yards of the retreating Zulus. Lt. Bannister of 2/24th recorded that “Old Granny was as cheery as ever and not a scratch about him”.

The British defenders suffered 17 dead and 10 wounded. The British counted 351 Zulu dead and slaughtered 500 wounded Zulus. On re-joining the main Impi Dabulamanzi's warriors were ridiculed by the rest of the army for their failure. A Zulu warrior attributed their failure to, “The soldiers were behind a breastwork and they were in a corner”.

Cetswayo was concerned by the Zulus' heavy losses in the two battles and disappointed at having no officer prisoners to use as hostages. Lord Chelmsford had to abandon the invasion and wait for London to send reinforcements. The defeat of an Imperial Force by natives caused a profound shock in Victorian Britain, just as the defeat of General Custer and the 7th Cavalry at the Little Bighorn by the Plains Indians had shaken American society just three years earlier. Both defeats can be explained in terms of a catastrophic failure by Custer and Chelmsford to gather intelligence about the numerical strength of the opposing force before rushing headlong into combat, their decisions to divide rather than concentrate their forces in the face of the enemy and to leave behind their reserves of ammunition in the interests of speed. They both shared a contempt for their native foes, a belief in the absolute superiority of the white man and his rifle over the native however numerous. They also had a preference for cronies rather than well trained staff and intelligence officers, which led to a breakdown in battlefield communications. The myth of the god given superiority of the British and American military, which led to their underestimating their opponents was tested to destruction at Isandlwana and the Little Bighorn, although it resurfaced again in more recent conflicts. Lord Chelmsford finally triumphed over the Zulus at the Battle of Ulindi, where his four men deep infantry square comprising 4,166 white soldiers and 980 Black African auxiliaries supported by 12 field guns and two Gatling guns successfully repulsed the assaults by a 20,000 strong impi, which left 1,500 warriors dead. The odds had reduced to four to one.

16 Disraeli's eulogy of the Zulus, “Who are these Zulus, who are these remarkable people, who defeat our generals, convert our bishops and who on this day have put an end to a great dynasty”. The Commander in Chief's Commission of Inquiry concluded that the primary cause of the defeat was due to Lord Chelmsford's underestimating the fighting power of the Zulus. While Chelmsford was never given another active field command, he was in the best Horseguards/Whitehall tradition rewarded with the Colonelcy of the Life Guards and appointed Constable of the Tower of London. Frere, however, was recalled and took early retirement.

B' Company Survivors of Rorke's Drift Awarded the

Lieutenant John Rouse Merriott Chard, 5th Field Coy, Royal Engineers

17

Lieutenant ; B Coy, 2nd/24th Foot Died in India aged 45

• Corporal William Wilson Allen; B Coy, 2nd/24th Foot • Private ; B Coy, 2nd/24th Foot • Private Alfred Henry Hook; B Coy, 2nd/24th Foot • Private Robert Jones; B Coy, 2nd/24th Foot • Private William Jones; B Coy, 2nd/24th Foot • Private John Williams; B Coy, 2nd/24th Foot • Surgeon James ; Army Medical Department • Acting Assistant Commissary James Langley Dalton; Commissariat and Transport Department • Corporal Christian Ferdinand Schiess; 2nd/3rd

In 1879 there was no provision for the posthumous granting of the Victoria Cross, and so it could not be awarded to anyone who had died in performing an act of bravery. In light of this, an unofficial "twelfth VC" may be added to those listed: Private Joseph Williams, B Coy, 2nd/24th Foot, who was killed during the fight in the hospital and for whom it was mentioned in despatches that "had he lived he would have been recommended for the Victoria Cross".

Awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal

Sgt Frank Bourne, DCM, in 1905

18 • Gunner John Cantwell; N Batt, 5th Brig Royal Horse Artillery (demoted from bombardier wheeler the day before the battle) • Private John William Roy; 1st/24th Foot • Colour Sergeant Frank Edward Bourne; B Coy, 2nd/24th Foot • Second Corporal Francis Attwood; Army Service Corps

On 15 January 1880, a submission for a DCM was also made for Private Michael McMahon (Army Hospital Corps). The submission was cancelled on 29 January 1880 for absence without leave and theft.

Book review

The Long Range Desert Group in Action 1940–1943 Rare Photographs from Wartime Archives

By Brendan O'Carroll Imprint: Pen & Sword Military Series: Images of War

19 Pages: 224 Illustrations: 250 integrated black and white illustrations ISBN: 9781526777416 Published: 15th October 202

Brendan O'Carroll Brendan O’Carroll lives in Auckland, New Zealand and recently retired from the New Zealand Customs Service. With a long time interest in military history, the Long Range Desert Group has become his speciality. He has interviewed over 30 veterans while writing The Kiwi Scorpions: The Story of the New Zealanders in the LRDG (2000), Bearded Brigands (2002) and Barce Raid: The LRDG’s Most Daring Exploit in World War Two (2005). This book follows The LRDG in the Aegean (2020) under the Pen and Sword Military imprint. He has numerous other published works and articles to his credit. In 2006 his work was recognised by awards from the New Zealand Military Historical Society.

Synopsis The Long Range Desert Group has a strong claim to be the first Special Forces unit in the British Army. This superb, illustrated history follows the LRDG from its July 1940 formation as the Long Range Patrol in North Africa, tasked with intelligence gathering, mapping and reconnaissance deep behind enemy lines. Manned initially by New Zealanders, in 1940 the unit became the LRDG with members drawn from British Guards and Yeomanry regiments and Rhodesians.

So successful were the LRDG patrols, that when the Special Air Service were formed, they often relied on their navigational and tactical skills to achieve their missions.

After victory in North Africa the LRDG re-located to Lebanon before being sent on the ill- fated mission to the Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean. Serving independently, when the Germans overwhelmed and captured the British garrisons, many LRDG personnel escaped using their well-honed skills. Many images in this, the first pictorial history of the LRDG, were taken unofficially by serving members. The result is a superb record of the LRDG’s achievements, the personalities, their weapons and vehicles which will delight laymen and specialists alike.

Review Firstly, there is a need to be up front and let the reader know that the reviewer is a bit of an LRDG enthusiast and has been for many, many years. The owner of a significant number of books on the LRDG and so is well aware of the work and interest of Brendan O’Carroll. Of all researchers and aficionados Brendan is THE go-to man for the NZ patrols and probably knows as much if not more than those who research the Rhodesian and UK patrols. That is why this

20 book is so important. Not only does it contain some 300 photographs, the interwoven script and captions on individual photos can be taken as thoroughly accurate. Many of the photographs are new to publication having come from Patrol members or their families and collected over many years. The quality is sometimes a little fuzzy, a bit below normal publication crispness, but given the circumstances of when they were taken, developed, stored and handed down they are all remarkable. The official LRDG promo photos have in the main been avoided, there are some, but the enthusiast will know where to look if there is a particular photo being sought. The men were not permitted to have cameras and take photos. Many forgot to read that page of Orders! Thank goodness they did as this is a remarkable record of desert patrolling, living and warfare. Enough photographs of kit and vehicles to satisfy the most ardent enthusiast. This is a book that will more than satisfy the enthusiast and will be of great interest to the general reader of special forces operating mainly as desert intelligence and reconnaissance patrols but not without enemy action from the air and on the ground. There are a number of rare photos of the Group operating in the Dodecanese in the Aegean in 1943 when the desert war was over and a new role being sought for these brave resourceful troopers. Put it on your Christmas list!

The SAS in Occupied France 1 SAS Operations, June to October 1944

By Gavin Mortimer Imprint: Pen & Sword Military Pages: 216

21 Illustrations: 120 b/w & colour illustrations ISBN: 9781526769626 Published: 9th November 2020

Gavin Mortimer Gavin Mortimer is a writer, historian and television consultant whose ground-breaking book Stirling's Men remains the definitive history of the wartime SAS. Drawing on interviews with more than sixty veterans, most of whom had never spoken publicly, the book was the first comprehensive account of the SAS brigade. He has also written histories of the SBS, Merrill's Marauders and LRDG, again drawing heavily on veteran interviews. Gavin was the historical consultant on the 2017 BBC documentary about the wartime SAS and he has guided several serving members of the SAS around the sites in France where their predecessors operated in the summer of 1944. Synopsis In the world of military history there is no brand as potent as that of the SAS. They burst into global prominence in 1980 with their spectacular storming of the Iranian Embassy, and there have been hundreds of books, films, documentaries and even reality TV shows about them. But what there hasn't been is a guide to the scenes of some of their most famous Second World War operations. That is why Gavin Mortimer’s vivid two-volume account of their daring missions in German-occupied France in 1944 is such compelling reading.

SAS actions in France delayed German reinforcements reaching the battlefront in Normandy, later sewing confusion among the Germans as they withdrew. The SAS trained the French Maquis and helped to turn them from an undisciplined rabble into an effective fighting force. Their exploits inflicted heavy casualties on the Germans, and they left a trail of destruction and disorder in their wake.

This first volume focuses on 1 SAS and describes in graphic detail operations Titanic, Houndsworth, Bulbasket, Gain, Haggard and Kipling, all of which were carried out in northern and central France. Using previously unpublished interviews with SAS veterans and members of the Maquis as well as rare photographs, Gavin Mortimer blends the past and present, so that readers can walk in the footsteps of SAS heroes and see where they lived, fought and died.

Review

Gavin Mortimer knows his subject well and that is obviously so from this unusual book, part history, part photographic and a significant battlefield tour guide to the areas where the SAS fought and died in France during 1944. The book concentrates on six of the main SAS operations in France at this time in some detail. Mortimer establishes the personalities involved, the courage and difficulties encountered by soldiers, French Resistance and the Maquis as close quarter, brutal fighting as the end of the war in France played out. The Germans saw the SAS

22 as terrorists and treated them harshly if captured. The Commando Order from Hitler left no opportunity for quarter.

Each of the operations has a chapter analysing preparation, deployment to the area of operation and activity on the ground. The author has visited the locations and has written about what is still to be seen and more sombrely where the men were killed or many murdered after capture. It is a sobering to realise the risks that were run knowing that the consequences of a wound or capture was most likely torture and death. But still they volunteered for special duties. Hopefully there was significant military gain from the sacrifices made.

The chapters have not just photos of the men on deployment but also modern colour photos of the ground where the action took place and of graves and memorials of which there are too many! There are clear maps and details of how to visit key points complete with GPS coordinates.

Mortimer says his book is intended for the committed battlefield tourist and because of the remoteness of many of the areas to be visited, knowledge of the French language would be a good idea. Few locals speak English and tourists are rarely seen but are made welcome. There is also a warning about entering the dense forests as French hunters have a well-deserved reputation for being trigger happy. Steer clear when “Attention. Chasse en cours” is advised!

This is an excellent book, not just for the tourist on the ground. It is a satisfying structure to read about the operation and learn what survives and what remains to be seen even if done by the armchair adventurer. Highly recommended and looking forward to the second volume in the series.

23