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U.S. WAR AGAINST TERRORISM AND ITS IMPACT ON PAK-U.S. RELATIONS (2001-2008)
LUBNA SUNAWAR
Registration No: NDU-PCS-PH.D/S-09/006
A PHD DISSERTATION SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES (PCS) NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY ISLAMABAD (NDU) PAKISTAN 2016
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PhD SCHOLAR’S DECLARATION
I hereby declare that the thesis submitted by me titled “U.S. War against Terrorism and its
Impact on Pak-U.S. Relations (2001-2008)” is based on my own original research work and has
not been submitted to any other institution for any other degree.
Date: Lubna Sunawar PhD Scholar Peace and Conflict Studies (PCS) National Defence University, Islamabad
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SUPERVISOR’S DECLARATION
This is to certify that PhD dissertation submitted by LUBNA SUNAWAR to the Department of
Peace & Conflict Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad, Registration No: NDU-
PCS-PhD/S-09/006 titled, “U.S. War against Terrorism and its impact on Pak-U.S. Relations
(2001-2008) is supervised by me for fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of PhD in
Peace & Conflict Studies (PCS).
Date: Dr. Noman Sattar Area Study Centre Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The endless thanks goes to Allah Almighty for all the blessings He has showered onto me, which has enabled me to complete this research work. I have been blessed by Almighty with some extraordinary people who have spun a web of support around me. Words can never be enough in expressing how grateful I am to those incredible people in my life who made this dissertation possible. First and foremost, I want to thank my Mummy and Daddy for their all time support, love, and guidance. Thank you for letting me find my own way. Thank you for acknowledging for how hard I have worked, but also know that I would not be here without you. Thank you for always holding my hand through the things that make me nervous. This PhD dissertation would not have been possible without the wholehearted support of my lovely parents whose kind encouragement have been a motivating factor and a source of strength for me from every perspective. I really appreciate and acknowledge your patience and your valuable contribution in accomplishing this arduous task. You’re the best parents in the world and I owe my success to you. You have truly been the best support system I could have ever asked for. Each thing you do for me is a stair I climb to reach the platform where I now stand. I would like to thank my sisters and brothers, Nabeela, Aneeqa, Bilal, and Talal for all their love and unending encouragement in making this PhD dissertation better than it started out; and a big thank you goes to my online families at Washington College, Chestertown, Maryland and American Graduate School, Paris. I’m indebted to my research supervisor Dr. Noman Sattar for going through the drafts and keeping me on the track. He has been so generous in dealing with my queries and each meeting with him added invaluable aspects to the implementation and broadened my perspective. I gratefully acknowledge the French Government initiative- a PhD Split Fellowship which I obtained in 2013 for Paris. I was funded by the French Government and this generous funding made my PhD. research work invaluable in many ways. It was more than I had ever hoped for in my research life. I consider it a great honor to have been part of School of Politics and International Relations at American Graduate School (AGS) in Paris as a visiting research scholar. During my stay at the host institution, Dr. Tatiana Coutto supervised my research work. I would like to pay my heartfelt thanks for her untiring support and guidance throughout my research journey and for turning the most unlikely dreams into realities. Above all, she provided me with unflinching encouragement and support in various ways whilst allowing me the room to work in my own way. Her drive for scientific excellence has pushed me to aspire for the same. She was the best choice I could have made for an advisor. Sometime we are just (or incredibly) lucky!!! One simply could not wish for a better or friendlier supervisor. I am indebted to her more than she knows. We are working together on peer reviewed articles and I would love to work with her on many such projects in future too. My time at American Graduate School, Paris was made enjoyable in large part due to the many friends and groups that became a part of my life and family; Ma’am Muriel (Registrar) at American Graduate School is one of them. I cannot forget her very friendly nature and administrative support she rendered throughout my research stay at AGS, Paris.
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I will be failing in my duty if I don’t acknowledge some of key diplomats, experts and research scholars I met in Paris. I shared my research experiences and got their valuable perspectives on my research subject by conducting formal talks/interviews. I’m greatly indebted to: Ghalib Iqbal (Pakistani Ambassador in Paris), Muhaamd Ijaz (Minster Chief de Mission Adjoin, Embassy of Pakistan, Paris), Air Commodore Syed Nasir Raza Hamdani (Defense and Air Attache, Embassy of Pakistan), Mr. Camile Grand (Director of Foundation pour la Recherché Strategique Paris), Dr. Mariam Abou Zahab (an expert on politics and social issues related to Pakistan and Afghanistan), Mr. Gerald Stang (Senior Canadian Research Fellow at European Union Institute, Paris) serving and retired Pakistan Army officers for their valuable time, for their forthright narratives, and their hospitality. I would also like to mention my deep gratitude towards Prof. Ishtiaq Chaudhry Head of Department, Peace & Conflict Studies, National Defence University for all his kind support provided to me while I was a student in the department. I’m grateful to Mr. Tauqeer (Controller of Examination Branch, NDU) and Tasleem Kiani (Assistant Controller of Examination, NDU) for their co-operation throughout this research work. Lastly, I would like to extend special thanks to the unknown reviewers of my thesis for accepting to read and review this thesis.
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Dedicated with Extreme Affection and Gratitude To the Loving Memory of My Beloved Brother and My Best Friend
CAPT (SHAHEED) MUHAMMAD BILAL SUNAWAR (TBt)
HERO OF OPERATION RAH-E-NIJAT 2009
"Think not of those who are slain in Allah's way as dead. Nay, they live, finding their sustenance in the presence of their Lord. They rejoice in the Bounty provided by Allah: And with regard to those left behind, who have not yet joined them (in their bliss), the (Martyrs) glory in the fact that on them is no fear, nor have they (cause to) grieve. They glory in the Grace and Bounty from Allah, and in the fact that Allah suffereth not the reward of the faithful to be lost (in the least). (The Noble Quran, 3:169-171)" A brave valiant officer of Pakistan Army, a fourth generation officer of the family, Capt (Shaheed) Bilal was a part of “Operation Rah-e-Nijaat,” who fought vigorously with the Taliban while performing his duties. He engaged the Taliban in a fierce battle at Pash Ziarat (South Waziristan).He kept his cool, encircled the militants and boldly charged towards them with his troops while commanding his Platoon. The terrorists were completely taken aback by the bold counter-attack from Capt (Shaheed) Bilal and his troops. He embraced Shahadat on 20th November, 2009 while fighting vigorously with terrorists. His professionalism under pressure and ability to remain calm in what was a chaotic situation is testament to his character. The troops narrate Capt (Shaheed) Bilal’s performance as “Selfless, brave and courageous,….”Words like these do not come close to what Capt Bilal demonstrated that day.” My brother is my best friend, my inspiration, my strength, a guiding star, and above all, an Angel who has always shown me the way in the darkness around. He still gives me the strength to go on when I feel I cannot. He gives me encouragement , word of advice though it may be in his own little way- in a dream, in a song I hear, through the perfect sunset, and blowing wind, my beloved brother is always with me. He has always given me so much in life and I do not believe just saying “thank you” is enough when it comes to paying a tribute to you. I always looked up to you for guidance, protection and advice. You never failed me and was always by my side in everything I did. You were always there to offer me a word of encouragement when I needed it. You are always there to build me up when I felt down and give me the push I needed to accomplish something. We miss you Bilal each and every day. There is not a minute that goes without you when you are not in our thoughts. In everything that I do, you always stand by my side! You will be remembered as a gentleman, as a good leader who has set a precedent of extreme valor and bravery for your followers, as a most loving and caring son and, the best brother in the world. The whole Pakistani nation is indebted to you for what you have done for this motherland. MY VALIANT SOLDIER, MY HERO, I’M EXTREMELY PROUD OF YOU May Allah Almighty bless you with eternal Peace and Happiness in Jannat ul Firdos. Ameen sum Ameen
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Contents
1. Introduction…………………………. …………………………………...1 1.1. The Statement of the Problem…………………………………………………………...4 1.2. Theoretical Framework………………………………………………………………….5 1.3. Hypothesis………………………………………………………………………………11 1.4. Research Questions……………………………………………………………………..11 1.5. Research Methodology…………………………………………………………………11 1.6. Literature Review……………………………………………………………………….12 1.7. Structure of the Dissertation…………………………………………………………….22
2. Pakistan-U.S. Relations- An Historical Perspective…………………...25 2.1.The Cold War Era……………………………………………………………………….25 2.2. Socio-Economic Impacts of the Afghanistan War on Pakistan...... 51
3. Changing Strategic Environment of the Region - The Taliban Factor..54 3.1. The Post Cold War Era……………………………………………………………….....58 4. Terrorism and Terrorist Threats before 9/11……………………………79 4.1. Terror Threats and Responses…………………………………………………………...81 4.2. 1993 World Trade Center (WTC) Attacks……………………………………………...84 4.3. Unsuccessful Diplomacy before 9/11…………………………………………………...85 4.4. U.S. National Security Strategy for Al-Qaeda before 9/11……………………………..87 4.5. Al-Qaeda’s Terrorist Activities before 9/11…………………………………………….88 4.6. Attacks in Kenya and Tanzania…………………………………………………………90 4.7. The Attack on the USS Cole…………………………………………………………….92
5 September 11 and its Aftermath………………………………………….94 5.1 Growth of Talibanization……………………………………………………………….116
6 Pakistan- Frontline State in the War against Terrorism…………...... 135 6.1. U.S. War on Terror: Impact and Apprehensions for Pakistan…………………………..141 6.2. Legal Position: Are Drone Strikes justified?...... 159 6.3. Postscript……………………………………………………………………………….. 166 6.3.1. Af-Pak Strategy………………………………………………………………………..166 6.3.2. Kerry-Lugar Bill (KLB)……………………………………………………………….168 6.3.3. The Raymond Davis Case……………………………………………………………..170 6.3.4. The Death of Osama bin Laden……………………………………………………….171 6.3.5. Salala Border Incident………………………………………………………………...173 6.3.6. Operation Zarb-e-Azb…………………………………………………………………174 6.3.7. 2014 U.S. Drawdown: Muddling through situation for Pakistan………………...... 175 . Conclusions and Recommendations………………………………………….. 179
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Findings ………………………………………………………………………192
Appendices
Appendix-I Text of the Speech of President General Pervez Musharraf on (September 19, 2001)
Appendix-II George W. Bush: 9/11 Address to the Nation
Appendix-III Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act 2009
Appendix-IV Text of Obama’s Speech on Osama’s bin Laden’s death
Appendix-V A New Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan
Appendix-VI Questionnaire
Bibliography………………………………………………………………….194
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Abstract
Pakistan has been facing security threats since its independence, and looking for security assurances from external sources. Its alignment policy with the U.S. has been primarily based on its heightened sense of insecurity at different times. This sense of insecurity and the U.S. need for allies brought the two countries together during the Cold War. Military collaboration has been an important component of this alliance. Since then, the U.S.-Pakistan security relationship has been a roller coaster ride with periodic highs and lows at both ends. This relationship has been based on periods of friendship as well as mutual distrust. Pakistan and the U.S. developed new security strategies in the region to face the growing threat from Afghanistan in the 1980s and after 2001.
American economic aid and the arms sales packages were meant to meet Pakistan’s security needs during the Cold War and the Afghanistan Jihad. This was also meant to promote
U.S. interests in the region. The U.S. has enforced a reactive policy towards Pakistan by relating aid to other requirements, such as nuclear nonproliferation, strengthening of democratic institutions and to fight terrorism.
After September 11, 2001, Pakistan and the U.S. once again formed a security partnership. Pakistan by virtue of its geopolitical environment became a natural and frontline ally in the U.S led global War on Terror. However, Pakistan’s role in this war is a complex phenomenon in terms of its implications. Though, Pakistan was an isolated country prior to 9/11 due to nuclear sanctions, military takeover by General Musharraf, and close ties with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Pakistan once again became a U.S. ally to fight terrorism. This new relationship brought new opportunities and challenges for the two allies. While the War on
Terrorism has made Pakistan to pay a heavy price, it has managed to build a sustainable
10 relationship with the U.S. However, the future remains uncertain pertaining to the conclusions of the War on Terror, and future developments in Afghanistan.
This dissertation analyzes the deciding factors in the Pakistan-U.S. relationship in the post 9/11 era. While the main focus remains on the complex dynamics of the relations, and
Pakistan’s role in the War on Terror is highlighted.
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Abbreviations & Acronyms
ASSP Anjuman Sipha-e-Sahaba Pakistan
CARs Central Asian Republics
C3I Command, Control and Communication Intelligence
CENTO Central Treaty Organization
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
COAS Chief of Army Staff
CSF Coalition Support Fund
FATA Federal Administered Tribal Areas
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
GWOT Global War on Terrorism
IMF International Monetary Fund
INS Immigration and Naturalization Service
ILOAC International Law of Armed Conflict
ISI Inter Services Intelligence
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISAF International Assistance Security Force
JSOC Joint Special Operation Command
KLB Kerry Lugar Bill
LOAC Law of Armed Conflict
LOC Line of Control
MCA Military Commission Act
MEDO Middle East Defense Organization
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MI Military intelligence
MSR Main Supply Route
MTCR Missile Technological Control Regime
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NPT Nuclear Proliferation Treaty
NWFP North West Frontier Province
OEF Operation Enduring Freedom
PML Pakistan Muslim League
PPP Pakistan People Party
PDPA People Democratic Party of Afghanistan
POWs Prisoners of War
RAW Research and Analysis Wing
RCD Regional Co-Operation for Development
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAARC South Asian Association of Regional Co-operation
SCO Shanghai Co-operation Organization
SEATO South East Asian Treaty Organization
TTP Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
UAE United Arab Emirates
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UNMA United Nation Mission in Afghanistan
UNSC United Nation Security Council
USCENTCOM United States Central Command
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
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WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTC World Trade Center
List of Maps
Pakistan and it’s Immediate Neighbors…………………………………………………..28 District Map of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa………………………………………..57 The Build-up of Kargil Conflict 1999……………………………………………………72 Map of Pakistan…………………………………………………………………………140
List of Tables
Pakistani Military Casualties 2001-2011……………………………………………………….118
List of Figures
U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan……………………………………………………………..….162
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Chapter -1
Introduction
Since its independence in 1947, Pakistan has been moving from one crisis to another and even after sixty nine years of existence, Pakistan is facing numerous problems and challenges. The history of U.S.-Pakistan relations can be categorically divided into three different periods. Each one of these periods contribute toward intense engagement with the U.S., subsequently followed by a period of severance, even moving towards periods of sanctions and disengagements. In total, U.S.-Pakistan relationship witnesses three major military engagements.
The first two engagements took place during the peak of the Cold War era (1950s and
1960s) and then came the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1980s) when Pakistan fought a proxy war in Afghanistan with Mujahedin to defeat the Red Army in the region. This war lasted for a decade and finally concluded with the signing of the Geneva Accords. The third military engagement started in the wake of September 11, 2001, which is directly related to the War on
Terrorism.
Cold War Engagement: When Pakistan emerged on the map of the world in 1947, the Cold
War had just started. That was the period when the U.S. was direly looking for allies in South
Asia to fight against Communism. Economic and military imbalances against India in the east and unfriendly and hostile Afghanistan in the north-west made Pakistan deeply conscious of its security and survival and it was looking for ways to redress it. Tensions with India in the form of incessant confrontational attitude, and Kashmir issue brought Pakistan closer to the U.S to form an alliance. On the north-west front, Afghanistan had cordial relations with the Indian Congress who had never accepted the existence of Pakistan whole-heartedly. Moreover, Durand Line has
15 been a bilateral issue between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Kabul had not accepted Durand Line as an international border and was the first Muslim country which opposed the entry of Pakistan in the United Nations. These heightened security concerns from the neighboring countries and need for economic development compelled Pakistan to look towards the U.S. for support. Pakistan’s geo-strategic location proved to be a value added factor in the region and the U.S. offered
Pakistan military assistance. Pakistan signed South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in
1954, Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1955 and Pakistan-U.S Co-operation Agreement in 1959, thus making Pakistan the most allied ally in South Asia in the 1950s.
Fight against Communism: In the decade of 1980s, the resistance against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan offered a new opportunity to bring the two countries together to minimize differences on the pretext of containing Communism. During this period, which lasted till 1990, Pakistan acted as a frontline state to promote U.S. interests in containing Communism.
Pakistan became a recipient of economic and military aid packages amounting to $1.625 billion spread over economic assistance and $1.5 billion in military assistance1 for six years for its role in the Afghan Jihad. 2
But with the departure of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and dismemberment of the
Soviet Union, Pakistan lost its importance for the U.S. as a frontline state. Pakistan was left alone to deal with the outcome of the war-torn and politically unstable Afghanistan.
Post-Cold War Era can be termed as the era of disengagement and sanctions in the history of Pak-U.S. relations. The U.S. imposed Pressler Amendment which was introduced in 1985 but was finally implemented in the 1990s on the pretext of Pakistan’s nuclear program. Moreover, many other major issues contributed to strain Pak-U.S. relations including Indian propagation of
1S.M.Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 451. 2 Raziullah Azmi, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1994, p.29.
16 labeling Pakistan as a terrorist state because of its alleged support to the Kashmiri Mujahedin.
Pakistan recognized the Taliban when they were in power in Afghanistan from the mid-1990s until 2001. Throughout this period, Pak-U.S. relations were at the lowest ebb. Kargil crisis, nuclear explosions of 1998 and finally bloodless military takeover by General Musharraf in 1999 brought democracy sanctions against Pakistan. During this period, Pakistan’s status of most favored allied ally changed ultimately to most sanctioned ally by number of legislations made against Pakistan from time to time.
Post 9/11 Relationship: After the shocking incidents of 9/11, Pakistan once again became a frontline state in the U.S led war in Afghanistan. Thus the 9/11 incident provided a chance for both countries to work under close military collaboration. Though Pakistan joined this war reluctantly but has been the most active frontline state to contain Al-Qaeda and the Taliban forces posing a continuing security threat for Pakistan. Pakistan has got involved in this War against Terrorism to such an extent that its own internal security is badly endangered.
Pakistan’s co-operation with the U.S. included: granting logistics base facilities, sharing military and human intelligence, and capturing and handing of Al-Qaeda suspects, sealing off
Pakistan’s western border and making its two naval bases, three air force bases, and its airspace available to the U.S. military action in Afghanistan.3
The 9/11 attacks on the U.S. mainland created a difficult diplomatic ground for Pakistan to negotiate with the U.S as it had been supporting the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Basically,
Pakistan was left with only two options to go with: to stay as a supporter of the Taliban without giving in to any international pressure; or to simply join the American-led international forces
3 The 9/11 Commission Report, London: Norton Company, 2003, p. 331.
17 against terrorism (the War against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban) in Afghanistan without any immediate delay.
However, without any doubt that was a difficult decision which President Musharraf had to make in the better interest of the country under immense pressure which he had been facing domestically and internationally on how to move forward vis-à-vis U.S. demands and expectations in the coming days. President Musharraf admitted that he had taken the hard decision of offering “open-handed support” to the U.S. under immense pressure, and dire consequences and repercussions. He further added, in case of refusal to the U.S. demands, a possibility of direct military action by a coalition of the U.S., India, and Israel against Pakistan was inevitable.4
Pakistan has been going through a difficult phase as a frontline state against the War on
Terrorism. Today, Pakistan is involved in the U.S. led war to such an extent that its’ own security and survival is endangered and has now become a victim of terrorism.
1.1 The Statement of the Problem
Pakistan and the U.S. have become allies when the situation in the region threatened the U.S. interests as during the Cold War and following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The post 9/11 shift in world politics brought Pakistan and the U.S. closer to face the post 9/11 challenges to the
U.S. security.
Pakistan joined the U.S. led War on Terrorism as a coalition partner. As in the past, the two allies developed a closer partnership in military, economic and political fields. This had deep implications for bilateral relations that has seen many ups and downs in its history. Pakistan offered the U.S. its support in America’s war in Afghanistan, Pakistan also received economic
4 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism Allah, the Army & America’s War on Terror, New York: East Gate, 2005, p. 221.
18 and military assistance in this region. Despite this close collaboration, the relationship could not be smooth in the long run. The U.S. policy of drone attacks in Pakistan’s Tribal areas, differences over fighting terrorism and drawdown in Afghanistan led to differences between two countries. While the two administrations try to overcome these differences, many issues remained unresolved and leading to anti-Americanism and periodic strains.
A post 9/11 world offered challenges and opportunities for Pakistan and the U.S. and brought serious implications for bilateral relations as well. This also had a bearing on both countries relations with the regional countries (India and Afghanistan). The War on Terror thus can be analyzed from the perspective of how a superpower manages an alliance relationship.
This will be addressed from Pakistan’s perspective in the light of Balance of Threat Theory proposed by Stephen M. Walt and Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s model of Complex
Interdependence.
1.2 Theoretical Framework
First is the Realists’ insight that there are no permanent friends or foes in international politics, only permanent (national) interests. Every nation state in the international system pursues and promotes its national interests. In the international system, some nation states are more powerful than others. The powerful nation states have the capability to persuade weaker states to react in certain predictable ways. They have the capability in terms of military and economic means to exert influence on the weaker nations to promote their interests accordingly.
Kenneth Waltz believes that every nation state wants survival in the international political system. The means for protecting and promoting one’s interest is power. According to Waltz,
“all states function in a similar manner in the international system; however, they are
19 differentiated from one another in terms of power capability (i.e. power differentiation). Kenneth
Waltz makes a clear distinction between “strong” and ‘weak” states. Strong states or great powers are in fact “power makers; they have the capability to change the behavior of other states.
Whereas, weak states are actually ‘power takers,’ having no choice but to follow the great powers. Under anarchy, power differentiation ensures that all states must follow self-help or decline and perish.”5
The Balance of Power theory is considered one of the basic mainstays of (neo) realist theory of International Relations. This theory basically claims that states usually come together and balance against the aggressive rising power for their security. In the international system, which is an anarchical system and all states rely on self-help, in this way they can balance against the rising state(s) having aggressive intentions. This balance of power theory has been a norm of Realist theorists from Hans Morgenthau to Kenneth Waltz and more recently, John
Mearsheimer. All emphasize that weaker nation balances the threat in the form of alliances against stronger nations. Stephen Walt, however, has taken a different perspective. He says that intentions cannot be ignored and threats are equally important and they really do matter as much as raw power. Threats are related to power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions of the enemy. Walt believes that threats have the ability to explain balancing behavior better than power.
Neighboring states that are in close proximity are more dangerous than those that are far away. States which do have large offensive capabilities and aggressive intentions have the ability to threaten the sovereignty of other states with great ease; thus posing a serious danger to those states which are economically and militarily weaker and smaller. Lastly, states with offensive
5 John M. Hobson, The State and International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.22.
20 capabilities are tend to be more threatening and can create volatile situation then those states who seek to preserve only the status quo. If balancing behavior is the norm in the international system, then increase in any of these given factors like power, proximity, offensive capabilities, or aggressive intentions usually encourage other states to ally against the most threatening power.6
Thus Walt studies three types of state behavior: Balancing is a kind of alignment against the threatening power (rather than the most
powerful one) to deter or contain the threat effectively.
Bandwagoning is an alignment with a dominant power, either to appease it or in the hope
of profiting from its victory in order to secure the interest of the state which is
comparatively weaker enough to defend itself.
Détente can be defined as the voluntary development of peaceful relations to reduce
tensions between nation states.
In historical perspective, Pakistan and the U.S. share have an unbalanced relationship primarily based on mistrust, different perceptions and interests. Complex Interdependence and national security are two different components which make this relationship difficult. But neither
Complex Interdependence nor national security gives a clear framework for many inter-related problems of extensive engagement between states. International conflicts do not disappear when interdependence prevails in a relationship but rather conflicts in place will take new forms and
6 Stephen Walt, “Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia,” International Organization, Cambridge MIT Press, Vol. 42, No. 2, 1988, pp. 275-316.
21 may have the possibility to escalate. The traditional approaches fail to explain the
Interdependence conflict and this failure may lead to wrong analysis and bad policies.7
International politics can be defined as a struggle for power where all nation-states act like a coherent unit to compete with each other. For political Realists, using or threatening force is the most effective means to influence the behavior of other states. Violence which erupts between states may take the form of war. The most important factor which dominates the international system is the urge of a nation state to acquire strong defence by all means. The “high politics” of important issues like military security dominates the “low politics” of economic and other social affairs that with the passage of time become secondary issues of less importance to tackle.8
These real assumptions define an ideal type of world politics where every nation state has a right to defend its territory and interests from real or perceived threats from the aggressive state. In international politics, there are no permanent friends and foes and the interests of the stronger nation prevail. Transnational actors either do not exist or are politically unimportant.
The only possible means of survival for states in international politics is to exercise force or the threat of force. There is a clear hierarchy of issues for states in international politics which makes it more difficult and challenging for nation states to determine fix rules pertaining to Complex
Interdependence and national security.9
In the post-Cold War era, the world has become more interdependent in economics, communications and human aspirations. The main vital actors of this era are ‘non-territorial’ actors such as multinational corporations, international organizations and trans-national social
7 Robert J. Art & Robert Jervis, International Politics: Enduring Concepts & Contemporary Issues, New York: Harper Collins College Publisher,1996, p.239. 8 Art & Jervis 239-241 9 Ibid.
22 movements which have the capability to exert great influence worldwide and have played an effective role in bringing nation-states closer.10
Keohane and Nye are two influential theorists who have discussed interdependence in the context of economics, communications, and human aspirations. Keohane and Nye intended to come up with a coherent theoretical framework that could easily explicate the process of continuity and change in order to exhibit the authenticity of Complex Interdependence in modern-day world politics. Keohane and Nye basically explained Complex Interdependence on the basis of three following characteristics:11
1. The main actors are states in the international system and they are closely interrelated
together via means of communication, interdependent economic structure,
multinational companies, non-intergovernmental organizations, and through process
of globalization.
2. The agenda of interstate relationships is mainly consisted of multiple issues that are
not arranged in order to form a regular pattern. In fact, there are numerous issues with
no hierarchical structure; and in this context, military security does not always
dominate the agenda.
3. The use of power in a form of military force becomes less significant when Complex
Interdependence prevails between the nation states.12
Keohane and Nye do not claim that military power is insignificant. They say that military actions are always costly and deadly which could be avoided for a number of reasons. Keohane and Nye emphasize the importance of transnational actors in the world politics that seek their own
10 Ibid 11Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power & Interdependence, Boston: Little Brown & Company, 1977, pp. 24- 26. 12 Hüseyin IŞIKSAL, “To What Extent Complex Interdependence Theorists Challenge to Structural Realist School of International Relations?,” Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, 2004, pp. 139-142
23 objectives rather than a state based desire. As a result, international organizations can play a vital role on setting the security agendas of the weaker states because of the domestic influence these organizations exert on the internal politics of that very state.13
In the post-Cold War era, Keohane argued that military security still plays a dominant role in certain parts of the world where Complex Interdependence does not play influence role. On the other hand, Complex Interdependence is a vital characteristic of democratic countries.
Eventually, the post-Cold War era can be described as a period which has witnessed the expansion of international institutions and co-operation with gradual decline in military security
14 in the World Politics.
Thus, accordingly, Complex Interdependence is a potent force which offers co-operation between international regimes and institutions in order to prevent anarchical forces in the international system. In addition to this, Keohane and Nye suggest that powerful institutions with powerful norms could play a role that is similar to the powerful states both domestically and internationally. This assumption is likely because Non-Governmental Organization’s (NGO’s) and other networks are particularly strong enough to exert influence on states without regard to boundaries. They use domestic public pressure to persuade political leaders to focus on their preferred agendas.15
Therefore, it would not be wrong to argue that Complex Interdependence has widened the boundaries of the security concerns of the states much beyond the use of military security
13Ibid. 14 Keohane and Nye, “Power and Interdependence in the information age,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No.5, (Autumn, 1998) 81-94 15 IŞIKSAL, “To What Extent Complex Interdependence Theorists Challenge to Structural Realist School of International Relations?,” pp. 139-142.
24 concerns including nongovernmental organizations, multinational companies, ethnic groups and minorities.
Pakistan for the sake of its security, preservation of national interests and survival took a
U-turn and joined U.S. led coalition against terrorism. This was meant to secure its national interests and balance the threat emanating from the U.S in the post 9/11 scenario.
1.3 Hypothesis i. War on Terror put Pakistan’s security under severe strain and may not be able to
sustain Pak-U.S. relationship in the long run.
ii. Implications of the War on Terror have adversely affected Pak-U.S. relations and
undermined Pakistan’s security as well.
1.4 Research Questions
i. What were the external and internal security challenges related to terrorism for
Pakistan?
ii. What was the nature of the threat and what sort of implications has terrorism brought
for Pakistan?
iii. Has the nature of threat and Pakistan’s role and involvement in the War against
Terrorism changed over time?
iv. In what way does the current U.S.-Pakistan alliance differ from the earlier periods?
v. Is Pakistan a beneficiary in the War on Terror and what are Pakistan’s gains and
losses?
1.5 Research Methodology
This research is analytical based on qualitative approach to the research problem. Primary, secondary, electronic, print media sources are used to gather data for research work, while
25 putting major emphasis on primary sources. This would be primarily based on observations and telephonic talks/e-mails/Skype contacts; formal and informal interviews with diplomats and scholars in France. It also includes interviews and on ground observations of Pakistani military officers who have already served or are serving in the battle zone as a source for my research work. I was a visiting research fellow at American Graduate School (AGS), Paris from April 1 to
September 30, 2013 under the Split PhD Program, an initiative of the French Embassy,
Islamabad. I worked under the guidance of Dr. Tatiana Coutto at AGS. This fellowship provided me a wonderful opportunity to interact with diplomats, intellectuals, foreign research scholars in order to collect primary data for my dissertation. Interviews with diplomats at Pakistan Embassy,
Paris, provided useful input.
1.6 Literature Review
The selected topic covers a period of eight years (2001-2008) of Pak-U.S. relations with particular focus on post-9/11 era and its implications for Pakistan-U.S. relations. In order to comprehend the present dynamics of Pak-U.S. relationship in the wake of 9/11, it is important to understand the relationship during the Cold War, post-Cold War and post-9/11 era in the light of relevant literature.
M.S. Venkataramani in The American Role in Pakistan deals with Pakistan – U.S.
Relations from 1947 – 1958. The author has given a very interesting account of Pakistan-U.S. relations by arguing that the U.S. has always supported military regimes in Pakistan in order to promote its own self-vested agenda in the region for which it has used Pakistan as a weight-pan.
This has never been liked by the people of Pakistan. He has primarily discussed the role of
President Ayub in promoting U.S. interests during his military tenure, i.e. 1958-1969.
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Another useful publication is the book by Robert J McMohan, titled Cold War on the
Periphery, which gives an excellent account of Pak-U.S. relations during the initial years of the
Cold War till the War with India in 1965.
G.W Choudhry’s Last Days of United Pakistan, and Rao Farman Ali’s How Pakistan Got
Divided, both publications give a very informative and balanced perspective on the 1971 dismemberment of Pakistan and discuss the factors in detail responsible for Pakistan’s break-up from its Eastern wing.
In the U.S. – Pakistan Forum: Relations with the Major Power, edited by Leo E. Rose and Noor A. Hussain, Stephen Cohen has identified few salient features of the Pakistan – U.S. relationship during the Cold War era. In author’s opinion, U.S. – Pakistan security relations are important for both nations. During the Cold War period, the Soviet Union had been the biggest threat to contain. For Pakistan, on the other hand, India has been the vital security threat and this factor overshadowed Pakistan’s relations with both the superpowers of the Cold War. He terms the relations as unbalanced because in his opinion, the relationship has been, and may remain, more important to Pakistan than to the U.S. itself. The U.S. has no permanent stake in the region while Pakistan is a stake holder.
America – Pakistan Relations, Vol – I & II, edited by K. Arif, is a good collection of official documents, speeches and other extracts related to Pak- U.S. Relations during 1947-1974.
These volumes provide an authentic resource base for research work, whereas thoughts and opinions of different writers can be well compared with official extracts provided by the author to arrive at meaningful conclusions.
Eagle Over Pakistan by Zubair Ahmed Firdousi is an overview of Pakistan-U.S. relationship from independence in 1947 to the fall of Bhutto in 1977. The book gives a powerful
27 account of dangers and pitfalls of a weaker nation like Pakistan with the superpower of the Cold
War, that is, the U.S.; and the obstacles which both nations faced due to divergence of their interests and perceptions.
There is a wealth of literature available on the Pak – U.S. security relations during the
Afghan Civil War period. Two important publications by Shirin R. Tahir Kheli are significant in this regard. These include: India, Pakistan and the U.S. breaking with the Past and the U.S. and
Pakistan – The Evolution of an Influence Relationship. The author has captured all the important dynamics of relationship quite well. During the 1980s, Pakistan as a frontline state enjoyed the influence and the benefits of being a partner of the U.S. in order to prevent Communism from spreading in the region. Moreover, it discusses Pak – U.S. relations vis-a-vis India, including future prospects, which have been covered in detail.
Robert G. Wirsings book Pakistan’s Security under Zia 1977 – 1988 gives a balanced view of the various features and dynamics of security partnership during the critical period of
Afghan War.
Niloufer Mahdi in her book Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1971 – 1981: The Search for
Security, has described the nature of alliance of Pakistan with the U.S. The book gives a thorough analysis of Pakistan’s foreign policy compulsions from 1971 till 1981.
In Pakistan – U.S. Relations: The Recent Past, edited by Raziullah Azmi and Dr Maleeha
Lodhi analyzed the regional and global imperatives of the Pak – U.S. relationship with the collapse of the Soviet Union after the Cold War. In the post Cold War period, Pakistan’s nuclear program and the changing realities at regional and global levels made things really uncertain and difficult for Pakistan. Its relations with Afghanistan in the early 1990s remained largely
28 unsettled. In the author’s opinion, Pakistan had to redefine its foreign policy due to rapprochement between India and China on one hand, and India and the U.S. on the other hand.
Disenchanted Allies – USA & Pakistan 1947-2001, by Dennis Kux provides deep insight into the Pakistani and U.S. decision making process. This book presents the historic Pak-U.S. relationship in an objective and very concise manner with highs and lows. Author’s conclusions regarding the nature of relationship between both countries are quite interesting and thought provoking which covers many critical phases during the Cold War and post-Cold War period.
This book, however, does not gives a clear picture of some important developments that occurred in the wake of 9/11 attacks. However, the author has given the Pakistani perspective on the range of bilateral issues which are of primary importance though covered in some detail, but need to be analyzed further by utilizing primary and secondary sources.
Other books which provide a useful and deep insight into the dynamics of the Pak-U.S. relationship are Abdul Sattar’s Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947 – 2009, A Concise History and
S.M. Burke’s Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, An Historical Analysis. Both publications have covered a wide range of aspects based on their convergence and divergence of interests between Pakistan and the U.S. since the early days of Pakistan’s inception.
Ghost War: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet
Invasion to September 10, 2001 by Steve Coll highlights some of the difficulties after 9/11 due to
Pakistan’s continued support to the Taliban. In the author’s view, one of the greatest mistakes on
Pakistan’s part was its continuous meddling in Afghanistan’s political system after the Soviet
Union’s withdrawal from the region. At that time Islamabad considered it vital for its own national interest. As Pakistan took U-turn in the wake of 9/11 which further exacerbated the situation and gave Al-Qaeda and the Taliban opportunity to destabilize Pakistan.
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America’s Secret War - Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle between the U.S. and its
Enemies by George Friedman, discusses Pakistan problems with the U.S. and major developments in the wake of September 11. Lack of trust on Pakistan’s ability to contain terrorism and the U.S.’ criticism of Pakistan’s army and its intelligence agencies for playing double game pertaining to its role in dealing with terrorists discussed in detail. The author has also highlighted the drone attacks and especially the U.S determination to prevent nuclear weapons falling into Al-Qaeda’s hands.
The War on Terror and the Laws of War: A Military Perspective presents the work of six
American legal scholars who are considered an authority in their respective fields: Michael
Lewis, Eric Jensen, Geoffrey Corn, Victor Hansen, Richard Jackson and James Schoettler. This book deals with the laws which are directly pertinent to the War on Terror including: targeting of persons and property by using tactic of harassment, incarceration of combatants, interrogation and treatment of prisoners, rules and norms regarding trial and punishment for battlefield misconduct, command and responsibility, etc. Each chapter in the book actually addresses a specific operational issue in a very comprehensive manner arising in the framework of the
Global War on Terror (GWOT); and demonstrates how a balance can be maintained between authority and obligation under the laws of war. The book is based on the argument that the U.S. has a traditional characteristic and has had a history of engagements in armed conflicts around the globe. It would not be naïve to think that the U.S. has invoked and will continue to invoke the
Law of War against terrorist threats.
The Hunt for Khalid Sheikh Muhammad is an interesting account by Terry McDermott and Josh Meyer who have given a comprehensive explanation of the search and capture of the main executor of 9/11, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. This gives the readers an informative
30 description about the War on Terrorism at its best and worst. This is the story of determined agents who meticulously carried out intelligence activities as they followed one of the world’s most dangerous terrorists across the globe.
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reacted in a different manner to 9/11 incident. The authors explain “The FBI, looking at the smoldering carcass in New York . . . instinctively asked, what happened and how? The CIA was comparatively far better at looking past catastrophe that had occurred and asked the defining question in that context…..What’s next?” This clearly shows the difference in tackling the same problem but with different perspectives.
Seth Jones’s Hunting in the Shadows offers a detailing account on the War on Terror.
Seth Jones, who is a former senior adviser at the U.S. Special Operations Command has covered every important event in such a way that it seems he has not left anything out. He has provided terrorists profile in detail who have been involved in executing deadliest attacks since 9/11. The author has narrated all the important terrorist acts by giving broader analysis in order to give a clear picture to the readers. As Jones takes it, the history and brutal activities of Al-Qaeda’s war against the Western world can be best identified as a series of “waves.” The first wave started with the embassy bombings in East Africa in 1998, which hit the U.S. mainland in September
2001. This wave eventually ended with the U.S. led War against Terrorism and launching of
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) against Al-Qaeda’s leadership and Taliban in Afghanistan and hit Pakistan with drone strikes. The second wave had begun in 2003 with the invasion of Iraq by the U.S. and British led forces. The third wave gained momentum between 2009 and 2011 with the rise of the radical leader Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen and this third wave was concluded with the killing of Osama bin Laden and several other Al-Qaeda leaders in 2011.
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Studying expansion of terrorism around the globe in a greater detail, and the counter waves that deterred them gives a clear explanation to a layman about what works and what does not when it comes to fighting terrorism. In the wake of 9/11, since the U.S. declaration of War against Terrorism, the world has witnessed as there is no visible enemy to fight with. Terrorism is an ideology and not a physical subject to tackle with force. If the U.S. attempts to defeat Al -
Qaeda and the Taliban forces by deploying large numbers of conventional soldiers to foreign countries, they are only exporting backlash of radicalization and anti-Americanism.
Top Secret America by Dana Priest and William Arkin outlines how defence contracting firms had made billions from the War on Terror with the erosion of civil rights in America and the Pentagon’s heavy reliance on contractors. It features extensive research and investigation into the murky world of intelligence collection, sharing and use, and detailing how multiple agencies manipulating post-9/11. Within a span of ten years, many started producing the same intelligence data – piles and piles of it that complicated the process instead of helping intelligence agencies.
The core argument presented in Top Secret America is whether the surveillance, the intense working of intelligence agencies, the maintenance of secrecy, that have been used as trademarks since the War against Terrorism has started have benefitted the U.S. or have helped make it safer.
Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror by Richard A. Clarke is a thought provoking memoir. After just a week of publication of Against All Enemies, Clarke before the
9/11 Commission pointed out some of the sensitive issues which later generated controversy over how the Bush administration handled the threat of terrorism and the situation developed in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks. Richard Clarke, a National Security Expert, who has a deep insight into Washington affairs had advised and informed Presidents Reagan, George H.W. Bush,
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Clinton, and George W. Bush on terrorism as a security threat to the U.S. He criticized President
Bush and his advisors most in a very forceful manner. Clarke firmly believed that Bush administration failed to address terrorism which did not take Al-Qaeda seriously as a potent threat to the U.S. national security. Clarke has given a wide-ranging account in the light of rising intelligence of the danger posed by Al-Qaeda. He had been requesting in early days of Bush administration to make terrorism a priority to fight with but his repeated requests were met with lack of concern and interest. After the 9/11 attacks, President Bush and key figures such as
Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Dick Cheney turned their attention immediately to Iraq which had nothing to do with the planning and execution of 9/11 attacks.
Just War against Terror impressively shows Elshtain's ability to address the U.S. military action along with coalition partners against rogue states such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Other writers have given their perspective of the U.S. military engagements in both secular and religious journals as clear violation of the U.N.’ Charter and principles of International Law. In
"Taking Terrorists at Their Word," Elshtain mentions a September 18, 2001 Resolution passed by then Congress gave President Bush exclusive right for the use of force under the Constitution to take strict action to deter and prevent any further acts of International terrorism against the
U.S. mainland. She tries to justify the Resolution by stating that sovereign states of the world such as the U.S., have every right to defend themselves and are acting under the rule of law. The
U.S. has sufficient legal authority to pass such laws which are vital for defence requirements such as the September 18, 2001 Resolution and the Patriot Act. Just War Against Terror is an important contribution to the ongoing discourse pertaining to the justification of U.S. led military action against rogue states such as Iraq and Afghanistan. After years of political debate, followed by the U.S. military action, both sides are trying to justify their positions.
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In the Line of Fire, which is a memoir written by President of Pakistan, General Pervez
Musharraf. This book has generated numerous controversies not only in Pakistan but across the globe, but at the same time, this book is interesting and worth reading from every perspective.
President Pervez Musharraf detailed the U.S.’ threat to bomb Pakistan in the wake of 9/11, 2001, and the serious repercussions due to which Pakistan had become the U.S ally against War on
Terrorism. The most interesting part of the book relates to 9/11 incident and Pakistan’s position as a frontline ally, and the steps which Pakistan has taken in order to eradicate terrorism and
President Musharraf’s role in aligning Pakistan with the U.S. in the War against Terrorism.
The Age of Sacred Terror - Radical Islam’s War Against America by Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon provides a detailing, informative, and interesting perspective on the efforts of the Bush administration to obtain Pakistan’s unconditional support in the wake of 9/11 against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. This book is important from the perspective as this outlines the hard choices which Pakistan had to make because of continuous U.S. pressure.
The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan by Bing West provides a balanced and realistic way out of Afghanistan. Based on his own proficiency as both a combat- hardened Marine officer and a former Assistant Secretary of Defence, Bing West has written a very interesting, informative and compelling narrative which is quite rich with vivid characters and rough warfare. The author narrates the consequences and the mix of strategic theory and tactical reality. His conclusion is too good to provoke intense debate. He suggests: remove most of the troops from Afghanistan without any further delay; stop spending billions of dollars on the dream and hope of a modern but utopian democracy; and insist that Afghans fight their own battles instead of looking towards foreign troops to provide them shelter. Bing West’s book is an
34 account about brave men and cunning enemies that examines realistic choices to achieve win- win situation.
In Pakistan: Terrorism Ground Zero, Rohan Gunaratna and Khurum Iqbal discuss the facts that make Pakistan the headline of world media in recent years. Both authors claim many fail to understand the gravity and complexity of the threat that emerges from within and concurrently impacts regional and international security. For this reason, it has not only become imperative to address the growing threat of terrorism, basic root causes of militancy in Pakistan; but also there is a need to plan a long-term strategy to counter the menace of terrorism. Against this backdrop, this book offers an interesting but compelling case of how Pakistan has become an epicenter of Global War on Terrorism over the years. Ultimately, the authors have presented the intensity of the threat which is a dominant factor in winning a crucial battle against the global
War on Terror. The authors introduce the readers to the backdrop of the problem currently faced by Pakistan. For instance, the mishandling of the Cold War by the international community and the policies carried by Islamabad against insurgents were strategic blunder in the region. This could be dangerous for Pakistan in the long run. Starting with an explanation of Tribal areas of
Pakistan as the epicenter of global terrorism, Gunaratna and Iqbal show clearly how Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) emerged as a new headquarters and safe zones for Al-Qaeda and the Taliban forces. The book then shifts the focus on mapping out numerous insurgent groups that work actively under the umbrella of the Pakistani Taliban. The authors have given a detailing generic profile of the sub-groups and their membership, leadership and organizational structure, methods of finance, operational capabilities, and terrorists’ links with other local and international groups all across the globe. The authors depict the complexity of the Pakistani
Taliban, which according to the authors is not a monolithic entity. The authors give much credit
35 to Pakistan’s unparalleled effort in fighting the global War on Terrorism alongside the U.S., despite numerous accusations made against the country as a perpetrator of militancy and terrorism in the region. As Islamabad became the frontline fighter and thus the frontline target of terrorist groups, the Pakistani nation is now paying the price of countering this menace. The writers encourage the readers to realize the severity and the complication of the anomaly that haunts the country and call for the need to strengthen international co-operation as a way forward in fighting this rigorous battle against Pakistan’s most fatal cancer.
1.7 Structure of the Dissertation
The study has been divided into five parts:
Chapter-1 Introduction begins by giving very brief preface about the Cold War period, post-Cold War period and the post 9/11 period. This chapter includes: statement of problem, theoretical framework, hypothesis, research questions, research methodology, and the Literature review.
Chapter-2 U.S.-Pakistan Relations – An Historical Perspective examines the history of U.S.-Pak relations to gain insights on the previous ups and downs and highs and lows in the relationship and draws attention to the origin of alliances between the two partners.
Pakistan acted as a frontline state during the Cold War period and provided active support to the
U.S. to fight the Cold War against Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the region. It gives framework that analyzes consequences of USSR intervention in Afghanistan. When USSR withdrew its troops from Afghanistan, the U.S. also withdrew its support from Pakistan and imposed economic and military sanctions on it. During this period, Pakistan was in a dire need of financial support by the U.S. to help rebuild Afghanistan’s infrastructure and its institutions, and
36 above all, establishment of a favorable government in Kabul. In absence of the U.S. support,
Pakistan's economy was not that strong enough which could have afforded the rebuilding of
Afghanistan on its own. Ultimately, Pakistan also withdrew its support from Afghanistan which led to civil war among the various factions of the Mujahedin who were seeking control of Kabul through power. Pakistan, which was already supporting and hosting millions of the Afghan refugees on its soil was further flooded with fresh wave of refugees due to civil war in
Afghanistan in the early 1990s. This influx of the refugees severely weakened Pakistan's economy.
Chapter-3 Changing Strategic Environment of the Region- The Taliban
Factor gives a detailed picture of the 1990s when the Taliban had emerged as a dominant source of power in Afghanistan. Pakistan was one of the three countries which wasted no time in extending diplomatic official recognition to the Taliban regime. By giving them diplomatic recognition, Pakistan invited wrath of the U.S. in particular and the international community in general. The Taliban paradox has badly impacted Pakistan-U.S. relations coupled with other issues like: Kashmir struggle and Pakistan’s support for Jihadis, Pakistan’s noncompliance for signing Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT), imposition of sanctions, weak political and economic structure, lack of democracy, Kargil conflict, and military takeover have been some of the highlights of the 1990s.
Chapter-4 Terrorism and Terrorist Threat before 9/11 deals with the seismic changes during the 1990s up to 9/11. This chapter highlights the growth of Al-Qaeda and the
Taliban forces in Afghanistan and its radical and subsequent effect on Pakistani society. This chapter also analyses Pakistan’s security consideration in the region that led to the support of the
Taliban regime which eventually resulted in security predicament for Pakistan.
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Chapter-5 September 11, 2001 deals with the incident on the U.S. mainland of which brought serious external and internal repercussions for Pakistan being a neighboring country of
Afghanistan in the long run. Pakistan’s decision to change its Afghan policy and President
Musharraf’s decisive decision to align Pakistan with the U.S. led coalition in the aftermath of
9/11 is analyzed and discussed here.
Chapter-6 Pakistan- Frontline State in the War against Terrorism deals with the role of Pakistan as a “frontline ally” in on-going and unending War against Terrorism and its implications for Pakistan in years to come. Once again, after the Cold War due to its important geo-strategic location, Pakistan acquires huge importance for the U.S. as a neighboring country of Afghanistan. Due to this geographical proximity, Pakistan has become highly vulnerable to any volatility or militancy that has been occurring in Afghanistan for years due to foreign invasions or domestic political strife. Pakistan has paid immensely for its commitment towards fighting against terrorism, both domestically and internationally. In the War against Terrorism,
Pakistan has become not only the front line fighter to contain terrorism, but also has become the frontline target of aggression and there are serious security threats for military forces and civilians alike.
Conclusions & Policy Recommendations The last section of the dissertation will critically examine the concerns of Pakistan vis-à-vis the U.S. and their past and contemporary relationship. The dissertation will conclude with findings, some reflections on the policy implications and recommends ways to enhance the relationship and improve co-operation between both countries in their joint venture of fighting against terrorism.
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Chapter -2
Pakistan-U.S. Relations- An Historical Perspective
2.1 The Cold War Era
A leading theorist of International Politics, Hans J. Morgenthau, while referring to the most essential determinant of a country’s foreign policy writes: “There is always one star to guide, one set of thoughts, and one law for action to execute in a nation’s dealing with other nations of the world, and that is, the national interest.”16
This above quote of Morgenthau is equally applicable to Pakistan’s foreign policy, i.e.
“National interest” which means “what is best for a national society in general” or “what is best for a nation in foreign affairs in particular.”17 The concept of national interest and power considerations are determined by various factors such as the geopolitical setting of a nation state, historical legacies and traditions. It also includes other domestic factors including Pakistan’s search for identity, conflicts between the two wings of Pakistan, i.e. East and West after partition of the Subcontinent. The foreign policy of Pakistan can also be determined by military
16Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defence of National Interest, New York: Random House, 1951, p.242. 17 James N. Rosenau,“National Interest,” in David Sills (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, New York: Mac-. Millard Free Press,1968, p. 34.
39 establishment, the socio-economic and political conditions, and the breaking away of East
Pakistan in 1971. The aspirations, images as well as thinking and enthusiasm of the decision makers to formulate policies in the best interest of the country, and the external environment constitute the basic foundations of Pakistan’s foreign policy.18
The initial phase of Pakistan’s creation was full of hardships. The most severe of all were the issues related to security, including a massive migration of refugees from India, weak economic structure which Pakistan inherited from the British Raj in the Sub-continent, lack of managerial skills and most important of all, threats from its eastern neighbor, India. In order to deal with these internal problems successfully, Pakistan was in a dire need of external support, which was required both in terms of economic and military assistance. First, Pakistan explored the prospect of getting any relief from the British Commonwealth but due to its poor economic condition after the Second World War, and because of its clear inclination towards India, Pakistan did not receive any positive response.19 After World War II, the U.S. emerged as a superpower with global responsibilities. The U.S. was constantly seeking new allies around the world because of its competition with the Soviet Union. In a letter to then President Harry Truman, Secretary of
State George Marshall called for the President’s attention to the potential value of Pakistan as an important Muslim country in the world and a country with a strategic position in South Asia.20
Pakistan’s former Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar narrates the initial period of Pakistan-
U.S. relationship as:
The U.S. was the only promising source of assistance for a country like Pakistan. Emerging from the Second World War with its strong economy intact, it was the wealthiest nation in the world
18 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 1947-2005, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 125-129. 19 Mussarrat Sohail, Partition & Anglo Pakistan Relations, 1947-1951, Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd, 1991, pp. 37- 55. 20 “Memorandum of Secretary of State George C. Marshall to President Harry S. Truman, 17 July 1947 (Extracts),” Arif, ed., in U.S.-Pak Relations, Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1984, p. 3.
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with huge resources, accounting for over 40 per cent of global production. Also, its democratic system was quite congenial. It was, however, preoccupied by two factors (i) Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe and (ii) the need to stabilize Western Europe through economic and military assistance. At time, US interest in South Asia was rather minimal. However, Pakistan’s geo- strategic location next to the Middle East, with its petroleum and other natural resources reserves, provided strategic link and opportunity to benefit to Pakistan’s search for cooperation.21
The foreign policy of a country cannot be static, but adapts to change according to the internal and external factors. As remarked by Lord Palmerston, there can be no eternal friends or eternal enemies in the international politics. The only constant factor which creates difference is national interest of a nation state which is supreme.22 Pakistan is located at the crossroads of various civilizations and is located in such a region where it can play an important role and can exert its influence effectively in economic and political developments involving the regional and extra- regional powers.
The emergence of Central Asian Republics (CARs) with huge economic potential at the end of the Cold War and collapse of USSR, China as an emerging superpower, Pakistan’s closeness to Gulf due to its Gawadar seaport and above all, South Asia being a nuclear flash point make Pakistan an important country not only in the region but also in the eyes of international players.
21 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, p. 37. 22 Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters, New York: Oxford University Press, 1967, p.114.
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42
Pakistan and its Immediate Neighbors
Pakistan’s relationships with its neighbors have had significant and lasting effects on Pakistan’s foreign policy. Pakistan suffered from instability soon after independence vis-à-vis India.
Because of border disputes, particularly due to Durand Line and ethnic rivalries, Afghanistan remained another security threat to Pakistan. Pakistan’s proximity to the Soviet Union, the superpower of the Cold War period, augmented Pakistan’s potential to be drawn into the Cold
War as would happen in 1979 when the U.S. used Pakistan to achieve its own strategic objectives in the region. Its position on the crossroad between the Middle Eastern region and
South Asia gave it a huge potential as a geostrategic asset to the U.S.
Pakistan-U.S. relations in the past have been cooperative and conflictual at the same time.
With the beginning of the Cold War and the U.S.’ active participation in the world affairs after the World War II, Pakistan assumed considerable importance for the U.S. Since 1947, “the policy of Containment was deliberately designed to check the expansion of Communism throughout the world,” and became the principal objective of the U.S. foreign policy.23 As an end result of which, “for a decade and a half after the World War II, the U.S. identified and started relying heavily for its security with alliances.”24And as the Cold War extended to Asia, the U.S. had two broad objectives: first, the U.S. needed an ally so as to bridge the gap in its security system versus the Communist system around the world, and second, to strengthen its alliance system in the Middle East as well as South East Asia. SEATO was formed in 1954, under this
Treaty, the U.S. agreed to give armed equipment and offered training courses to Pakistan’s armed forces. Pakistan was desperately looking for military assistance to strengthen its defence
23 Willaim G. Carleton, The Revolution in American Foreign Policy, New York: Random House, 1967, p. 163. 24 Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy: Three Essays, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969, p.69.
43 capabilities against mighty India. President Harry Truman’s Administration gave priority to the defence of Western Europe which had become his Administration’s prime concern.
Pakistan needed diplomatic, military and economic assistance because of its poor socio- economic and defence conditions. Despite Pakistan’s non-alignment policy stance, it was very obvious from the Prime Minister of Pakistan Liaquat Ali Khan’s visit to the U.S. that Pakistan was inclined towards the West in order to get required diplomatic, economic and military assistance.
When Pakistan emerged in 1947 after the partition of the Subcontinent, the Soviets tried to bring Pakistan into their fold because they wanted to have uninterrupted access to warm waters.25 Pakistan preferred to join the western bloc led by the U.S. which claimed itself a great promoter of human rights and democratic values, and at that time was fighting against
Communism. The American Administration was against Communism because of its anti- religious, undemocratic views and its’ restrictions on human liberties. Pakistan found the U.S. closer to its ideological values than the Communist Soviet Union. Pakistan thus became
“America’s most trusted allied ally” in the decade of 1950s when the Cold War just started to contain Soviet expansion across the world.26
The U.S. interest in Pakistan also arose out of its strategic location which is quite significant regionally and it has been of importance to western powers as well. Pakistan could serve as an ideal base for the U.S. from where it could keep a check on both the Communist
25 Op.cit. 26 Robert Wirsing, “Precarious Partnership: Pakistan’s Response to U.S. Security Policies,” Asian Affairs, Summer, 2003, p.70.
44 powers of the Cold War period, i.e. China and the USSR and also safeguard its oil interests in the
Persian Gulf.27
Apart from the ideological, military and economic considerations, Pakistan has always been a nation state where geopolitical factors have had a major influence on Pakistan’s foreign policy. Pakistan had a very unique geography up till 1971 in the sense that it was comprised of two wings, East and West, and both these wings were separated by one thousand miles of Indian territory in between. The relations between India and Pakistan were never cordial since the inception of Pakistan, so this rift in bilateral relations of the two states was of serious concern from the security perspective of Pakistan. This security concern from the east led Pakistan to spend more on defence than any other sector as compared to other developing countries.
Geographically, East Pakistan was surrounded by India from three sides and Pakistan as a whole was surrounded by three big neighbors, namely, the Soviet Union, China, and India. There is no other country in the world which has a geographical location akin to Pakistan, thus making it vulnerable before external powers to extend their influence. As former President Ayub Khan stated: “I know of no other small country which has the somewhat dubious distinction of having three such mighty neighbors.”28
Despite entering into two major alliances with the U.S., Pakistan's interests and objectives did not coincide with the U.S. from the very beginning. Whereas the U.S. needed a stable and strong partner in South Asia for the defence against Communist threat, Pakistan's most important objective was to reinforce its defence capability against India. The U.S. also never wanted to gain the displeasure of much larger and important country in the region, India.
27 H.C. Arya, A Study of Some Aspects of the Relations of the U.S. with Pakistan, PhD Dissertation, Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi, 1966, p. 2 28 Khan, Friends Not Masters, p.114.
45
By the 1960s, Pakistan realized that it had lost more than it had gained from the military alliance with the U.S. Therefore, it started moving towards the strategy of partial alliance with the U.S. on the one hand, and started cultivating relationship with China on the other hand. This move became more obvious with the coming of John F. Kennedy to power. The U.S. policy too underwent a significant change with the change of Administration. President Kennedy, soon after assuming office, adopted a friendly attitude towards Pakistan’s arch enemy, India29 which went against the interest of Pakistan in the region.
Pakistan was seen by the American government as one of the countries that could promote well the U.S. interests in the region in general and in the Middle East in particular, so it deserved both types of aid, i.e. military and economic. According to the U.S. Administration, the major objective of the U.S. assistance was to facilitate Pakistan in maintaining its autonomy and strengthen its national unity, develop its institutions and sustain its major developmental effort.30
Thus, this aid factor in one way or the other opened the door to so called guidance and open interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs. It has been observed, during times of arms sales, interactions between Pakistan and the U.S. were warm and friendly; but during arms embargos and restrictions, the relationship was precarious to a great extent.
Pakistan, no doubt, gained a lot from this alliance with the U.S., but had to pay heavily for it. Due to this alliance, it began to be looked upon as an envoy of imperialist powers among the Muslim world that had the ability to promote their self-vested interests.31 Its relations with the Muslim countries particularly Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan became tense because of its alliance with the western camp. It also antagonized the two communist giants, i.e. USSR and
29 Documents on American Foreign Relations: 1960 , New York, 1961, pp.97-101. 30 Proposed Mutual Defence and Development Programmes F.Y. 1966, US Agency for International Development and Ministry of Economic Affairs. 31 Selig Harrison, “India, Pakistan & U.S: Case History of a Mistake,” New Republic, 141, August 1959, pp.50-81.
46
China. This alignment did not even get much public support within Pakistan. Subsequent governments faced severe pressure to withdraw Pakistan from the U.S. sponsored military pacts.
People feared that it would endanger the freedom and sovereignty of Pakistan in the years to come, it also led to a stalemate on the Kashmir issue.32
President Ayub Khan, when assumed office, started thinking of strengthening military coalition with the U.S. But in fact, Pakistan was ever prepared to do anything to qualify for the supply of arms from any global source which was to be used against India to contain its aggression.33Other forces which seemed very keen to draw Pakistan towards the West were the elite class in
Pakistan. They were heavily influenced by the Western democratic system and drawn mainly from the feudal and military classes trained in the West.34
The heightened security concerns at the borders from the east and west, and necessity for getting economic assistance for development required Pakistan to reach out to the U.S. During the Cold War period, the U.S. reinforced Pakistan’s defence capabilities to a great extent and potential for economic development as well. But in doing so, the U.S. also helped in promoting despotic and radical elements within the country; the U.S. backing of the Pakistan armed forces raised the military’s national profile. On and off, the Pakistan military came to lead the country’s politics through a coalition of pro-Western elite, including Islamists who asserted and gained firm ground during the Cold War. At this time, the U.S. did not show any apprehension for
Pakistan’s religious and extremist elements. In fact, it suited the U.S.’ interests in the region, as religion itself became a powerful weapon which could be easily used for both purposes, to
32 Surendra Chopra, “U.S. Intervention in the Indo-Pakistan Dialogue 1953-1955,” Kurukshetra University Research Journal, Vol. 4, Part 1-2, 1970, pp. 165-176. 33 Khalid Bin Sayeed, Preliminary Analysis of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy in Verma & K.P. Misra, (ed.), Foreign Policies in South Asia, Bombay, 1969, p. 73 and p.102. 34 Shaheen Irshad, Rejection Alliances: A Case Study of US-Pak Relations 1947-1967, Lahore: Ferozsons,1972, p.28.
47 counter internal stability within a country and on the external front, it was used as a defence shield against Communism.35
Pakistan’s alignment with the West, ill considered foreign policy and economic decisions cost Pakistan dearly in the long run as it had troublesome relations with the Soviet Union. In order to neutralize Pakistan, the Soviet Union joined hands with India. It openly supported India for all disputed issues between India and Pakistan; particularly India got their strong backing on
Kashmir issue in the United Nations. The Soviets made sure to veto all resolutions on Kashmir in favor of India and which they did to please India. This is one of the reasons the Kashmir dispute remains unresolved till this day. Pakistan’s alignment with the West created an almost unending enmity with both India and the Soviet Union.
India has always been a source of trouble for Pakistan since its inception. Pakistan was refused its due share of assets of undivided India which were already allocated by the British at the time of Partition. India deliberately stopped or severely restricted the flow of river waters to the territory of Pakistan which emanated from Indian held Kashmir and this move badly affected agriculture sector in Pakistan.36 Apart from these problems, Pakistan and India, two arch rivals, fought three major wars, in 1948, 1965, and 1971 and one limited war, Kargil War, in 1999. In sum, the Indian factor caused the greatest strain to the Pakistan-U.S. relationship.
The most important seal of Pakistan-U.S. relations was the 1959 Agreement of Co- operation between Pakistan and the U.S. This coming together drew Pakistan and the U.S. closer, but a lack of clarity on whether the agreement applied to aggression from India which later became the main reason of Pakistani disenchantment with America. Under the Agreement of Co-
35 Touqir Hussain, “The U.S-Pakistan Engagement: The War on Terrorism and Beyond,” U.S. Institute of Peace (Autumn 2005), p. 2. 36 Pak-India Relations, Handbook of National and International Affairs, Pakistan Military Academy Kakul, 2003, p.42
48 operation¸ the U.S. was required, under specific conditions, to help Pakistan if it becomes the victim of belligerence from any country in general and regional country in particular. 37 On the other hand, India did not show any interest to contain Communism because of its so called non- alignment policy and its growing friendly relations with the Soviet Union.
In return for this support offered to Pakistan via defence alliances by the U.S., Pakistan agreed to provide bases at Badaber near Peshawar for the U-2 spy planes. The U-2 incident took place in
1960 when a spy plane took off from the American Air Force installation in Peshawar and was shot down over the Soviet Union. Pakistan faced immense pressure from the USSR, including the threat of dire consequences and complete annihilation.38
In 1962, Sino-Indian war broke out and the U.S. started pouring military and economic aid to India. American arms to India came as a shock to Pakistanis who felt betrayed by the U.S. being an ally of Pakistan. As a result, Pakistan began to question its relationship with the U.S.
Despite Pakistan's protest, the Kennedy Administration continued its military support to India even after the war. Consequently, Pakistan sided itself with China and here started a new period of growing relationship focused more on strengthening bilateral relations and areas of common interests between the two countries.
In sum, over the period 1954-1962, U.S. financial assistance to Pakistan amounted to
$3.5 billion, which did not include $1.372 billion which was a reserved amount for defence purpose and purchase of other military equipment,39 whereas India obtained $4 billion as monetary aid during 1959-1963.40
37 “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy,” cited by Shahid Amin Dawn, 31 January, 1957. 38 Bashir Ahmed, Tahir & Shabbir, “Pak-U.S. Relations, A Chronology-1947 -1985,” Pakistan Journal of American Studies, Area Study Centre, Quaid-i- Azam University, Islamabad, p.111. 39 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2009, p.59. 40 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, United States: Oxford University Press,1969, p.49.
49
There was a lot of resentment against these defence pacts, i.e. SEATO and CENTO sponsored by the U.S. which Pakistan signed in the mid-1950s. The basic purpose of signing these defence pacts was to get military assistance in case of Indian aggression. But these defence pacts came into limelight after the war of 1965, as no significant help was provided to Pakistan by the U.S. during the war despite alliances with the U.S. The then Government of Pakistan faced severe criticism from Pakistani public regarding signing of these Mutual Defence
Assistance Agreements. Pakistan was committed to fight against Communism, but on the other hand, members of these defence pacts were not obliged to defend Pakistan in case of foreign aggression against its territory which was quite unfair and went against building a workable and longstanding relationship with the U.S.41
The U.S. never liked Pakistan’s growing relations with China and the former USSR; it always showed concern and resentment to this process. Pakistan tried to balance its relationship with China and its Western ally but in spite of all these efforts, in 1962, the U.S. - Pakistan relations were under great strain. This was the time period when a phase of deterioration in Pak-
U.S. relations began with massive U.S. defence aid to the Indians. The basic objective was to strengthen them against China as India faced a humiliating defeat by the Chinese in Sino-Indian
War of 1962.42 The Government of Pakistan opposed this decision, many letters were written by
President Ayub of Pakistan to the Kennedy Administration but all these protests on official level went unnoticed by the Kennedy Administration.43
Pakistan believed that the only guarantee that could deter India from committing aggression against Pakistan was the pressure of the mightier and stronger China which would
41 Safdar Mehmood, Pakistan Political Roots and Development 1947-1999, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 200 42 Ibid., p. 199 43 Op.cit.
50 never let India to take Pakistan as an easy prey.44 Pakistan concluded a boundary agreement and an Aviation accord with China on August 29, 1963. The Kennedy Administration responded by suspending a $4.3 million loan for Pakistan which was meant to build a new airport at Dacca, from where Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) planned to fly to Beijing.45
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and later President of Pakistan, criticized this drastic change in the U.S. Administration’s attitude towards Pakistan as
“unjustified policy of appeasing India in the region.” He stated, he saw no good reason why
Pakistan and China although ideologically apart could not draw closer to each other when the
U.S. and the USSR who were bitterly opposed to each other had forced themselves to ignore their differences and develop some sort of understanding and reconciliation pertaining to their outstanding problems.46
The most pleasant and surprising move in the aftermath of 1965 war with India was the drastic and visible change in the Soviet attitude towards Pakistan. The President of the Soviet
Union would act as a mediator at Tashkent on January 4, 1966. A final declaration was signed by the President of Pakistan, General Ayub Khan, and from Indian side, Indian Prime Minister, Mr.
Lal Bahadur Shastri signed the Ceasefire Agreement which is known as Tashkent Declaration.
President Ayub under severe pressure by the Soviet Union and India had lost on the negotiation table whatever Pakistan had gained in the war.47
It is worth mentioning that Pakistan became a target of the U.S. sanctions throughout the
1965 War with India. The Johnson Administration immediately put sanctions on Pakistan and stopped supplying all kind of military and economic aid, including the supply of spare parts to
44 Dawn, 25 August 1963. 45 Ahmed, Tahir & Shabbir, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations: A Chronology-1947 – 1985.” p. 131 46 Ahmed, Tahir & Shabbir, Pak-U.S. Relations, Area Study Centre: Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, p. 131. 47 Mehmood, Pakistan Political Roots and Development 1947-1999, p. 213.
51 the Armed Forces. Pakistan considered this grossly unequal treatment because the U.S. was
Pakistan’s main and most significant supplier of war material while India had access to military equipment from other countries. On the other side, USSR tried to strengthen India and kept pumping military hardware and economic aid to ensure Indian supremacy over Pakistan.48
On April 12, 1967, the U.S. Department of State announced that the U.S. had no intention to recommence defence assistance to Pakistan and India. This aid had been suspended by the U.S. for both countries as a result of September War of 1965. Pakistan felt highly betrayed being an ally and signatory of SEATO and CENTO pacts and was now highly worried about its security.
On April 17, 1967, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan issued a statement which read, in part, as follows:
The current American decision to stop arms supply is loaded with serious repercussions on Pakistan’s security and, therefore, has caused a great concern for the U.S as well. It is a well acknowledged fact that most of the military equipment which Pakistan gets is of American origin. While, on other hand, India is getting defense equipments from diverse sources as well as focusing on increasing its own production is not hidden fact indeed. It is very much apparent that the American decision to suspend military supplies to Pakistan has encouraged India to become more inflexible in her attitude towards Pakistan.49
Pakistan got dissatisfied and eventually lost its immediate interest in SEATO and CENTO. But
President Ayub showed disagreement as he was wishing for the stability of close ties with the
U.S. and disproved the public reaction. In his speech to the Pakistani people, he said that “such an emotional reaction is not inconsistent with our dignity as a nation.” 50
Pakistan faced a major internal crisis in its eastern wing in 1970-1971, a reaction to the policies of the central government, under control of the military regime. The U.S. did not want to
48 Ibid., p. 207. 49 Statement of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, April 17, 1967, Dawn, April 18, 1967. 50 President Ayub’s speech to the Pakistani Nation, May 1, 1967, The Pakistan Times, April 15, 1967.
52 be involved in the ongoing internal conflict of Pakistan which needed to be settled accordingly.
But in fact, the U.S. was concerned over the elections which were held in Pakistan in 1970. The
U.S. did not want Mujib ur Rehman, the leader of Awami League to emerge as the dominant political force in Pakistan. The Awami League had promised in its election manifesto that it would withdraw Pakistan from the U.S. defence pacts, SEATO and CENTO which would ultimately reduce American influence in Pakistan. To make the situation worse for Pakistan,
India and the USSR came closer to each other and signed Indian-Soviet Union Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation in 1971.51
Although the U.S never approved close Pak-China relations and had resented Pakistan’s growing friendly relations with China. On the other hand, it had also requested Pakistan to bridge the gap between Communist China and the U.S and asked it to arrange a meeting between
President Nixon and Chairman Mao. The Chinese relationship was extremely important for the
U.S. as it was trying to fix its growing differences regarding its Vietnam policy.52
Throughout the 1971 crisis, Congress had been hostile and showed indifferent attitude towards Pakistan. The U.S. banned the supply of military spare parts to Pakistan in May 1971.53
India continued to get highly sophisticated weapons due to the 1971 Treaty which it signed with the USSR. While Pakistan was a signatory of the defence pacts, it did not receive any military equipment from the U.S during the crisis.
Pakistan eventually withdrew from SEATO in November 1972 and CENTO from 1979.54
After losing East Pakistan, there was an obvious change in the U.S. foreign policy towards South
Asia. It started tilting towards India acknowledging it as a major power. Therefore, it was
51 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, p. 217 52 Ibid., p. 216 53 Ibid. 54 Op.cit.
53 presumed in the Indian circle, that the U.S. was not keen to consider Pakistan and India on equal footing as far as military strength was considered.55
In the wake of Indian nuclear tests in 1974, Pakistan Government was compelled to consider ways to meet this new threat in the region. Pakistan’s nuclear quest would develop into a major stumbling block in the continuity of smooth and stable relations with the U.S. in the coming years.56
Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, visited the U.S. in February 1975 in an effort to convince the U.S. Administration to recommence military aid to Pakistan. The Indian nuclear explosions of 1974 and Pakistan’s legitimate sense of insecurity must have been the reason which convinced the U.S. to re-evaluate its 1965 arms prohibition against Pakistan. After
Bhutto’s visit, the U.S. finally waived off the arms embargo which it imposed on Pakistan and
India. The U.S. arms embargo was lifted on the basis that Pakistan has been a “U.S. ally in the region and is feeling insecure after its dismemberment in 1971.” This was further argued that the
U.S. aid would facilitate and “prevent Pakistan from going nuclear.”57
The Pakistan-U.S. relationship started deteriorating once again in 1976 when the Ford
Administration applied unprecedented pressure on Pakistan to abandon its deal for the purchase of a nuclear reprocessing plant which it was eager to buy from France. In 1977, the U.S. implemented the Symington Amendment against Pakistan, which allowed Congress to halt economic and military assistance to any country that tried to acquire nuclear weapons technology.58 The U.S. also tried to persuade France from providing the nuclear plant to Pakistan but Pakistan retaliated by moving closer to the Soviet Union. Thus the period indicated the
55 D.C. Jha. “U.S. Policy Towards India,” Journal of Political Science 37, Jan-March, 1976, pp. 67-71. 56 Interview with ex-Army Officer, 17 June 2012. 57 National Herald, 12 March, 1975. 58 Steve Weissman & Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East, New York: Times Books, 1981, p. 168.
54 erosion in Pakistan’s ties with the U.S. because of its closeness with India. When Pakistan did not concede, the U.S. started pressurizing France to cancel this nuclear deal which it did under immense pressure from the U.S. in 1978.59
Tensions over Pakistan’s nuclear program had become evident with the passage of time. In a meeting with Prime Minister Bhutto, Secretary of State Kissinger stated that Pakistan should not
“insult the intelligence” of the U.S. by claiming the reprocessing plant was for peaceful, energy- related purposes.60 Bhutto later stated that Kissinger threatened him by saying he must end nuclear development or the U.S. “would make a horrible example of him.” 61 Bhutto responded to this threatening statement by stating that no country had in any capacity the right to tell Pakistan what it could or could not do.62 This meeting highlighted the rapidly deteriorating relationship between Pakistan and the U.S.
During 1977-81, Pakistan had become a low priority and less important country for the
U.S. because the U.S. was more interested in strengthening relations with India in South Asia.
The democratic government of Bhutto was overthrown in 1977, and General Zia took over as
Military Administrator.63
Such American attitude confirmed the old but factual dictum that friendship between countries is not permanent but relies heavily on their own national and global interests. In 1979, the Carter Administration immediately stopped all economic, technical and defence aid to
59 A.Q. Khan. Chairman, Khan Research Laboratories, “The Journey to our Tests.” The News, Islamabad, Special Issue, 28 May, 1999. 60 Weissman and Krosney, The Islamic Bomb, p. 163. 61 Ibid., p. 63 62 Rashimi Jain, U.S.-Pak Relations,1947-1983, Radiant Publishers: New Delhi, 1983, p. 61. 63 The Economist, 27 March-April 1982.
55
Pakistan on the pretext that it was secretly building an ‘Islamic bomb,’ which was based on propaganda created by India.64
Change in U.S.-Pak relations came after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which ultimately gave rise to an increase in Soviet sphere of influence which endangered the strategic interests of the U.S. in the region. Pakistan immediately got importance as a frontline state to contain the Soviet Union’s expansion of Communism. As a consequence of this development in the region, President Carter lifted the ban on aid to Pakistan which he had imposed earlier.
Pakistan could regain its influence on the pretext that he had decided to lift the ban so that
Pakistan could protect itself against the expansion of Communism. He further justified and propagated this change in his policy towards Pakistan by saying “Pakistan was a frontline state and would be USSR’s next target.”65 In keeping with this policy, President Carter, in January
1980, approved a package of $400 million worth of economic and defence aid to Pakistan.66
President Zia rejected this aid as peanuts as he regarded this aid package too small for the purpose for which it was being provided to face immense threat from Afghanistan backed by the
Soviet Union. President Zia demanded $2 billion to rebuild the Pakistan armed forces.67 Pakistan thus was in a position after the Soviet invasion to determine its own terms and conditions to the
U.S.
The Americans were now looking for a strong foothold in this region in order to promote their strategic interests and to execute their influence in the region that was not possible without the support and co-operation of Pakistan. Even during the election campaign of 1980, President
Ronald Reagan had openly claimed for establishing military bases in Pakistan. After getting
64 The Washington Post, 3 December 1981. 65 “U.S. Aid Package,” Dawn Overseas Weekly 5(19-25 January 1980), p. 5 66 The Tribune, 22 January, 1980. 67 “The Pakistan Puzzle,” The Tribune , 27 March, 1980.
56 bitter lessons from 1965 and 1971 wars, Pakistan was quite determined this time not to provide any such facility to the U.S. at the cost of its own national interests.68
The military regime of General Zia had expressed its apprehension pertaining to increase of Soviet activity in Kabul at the end of 1979 shortly before the Red Army’s invasion and had called for prompt U.S. action. Pakistan's Foreign Affairs Advisor, Agha Shahi, in one of the briefings to the American officials clearly highlighted the plight of Pakistan due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The historical significance of Afghanistan as a buffer zone disappeared with the invasion and eventually Pakistan found itself economically and military weak. It was ill- prepared and ill-equipped in the wake of sanctions which the Carter Administration imposed to meet the military threat from the north-west. The Pakistani advisor clearly explained to the
Americans that the time to do something against Soviets advancement in Afghanistan was now. 69
But this word of warning was not taken in a serious manner by the U.S. Administration at the time until the presence of Soviet tanks and soldiers in Afghanistan became a harsh reality which posed a serious threat for Pakistan.
Pakistan and Afghanistan share a common border of approximately 1500 miles which runs along the Durand Line in the north and northwest of Pakistan. Despite their common religion and shared cultural values, relations between the two countries have always remained tense.70
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 proved to be a decisive event which brought Pakistan and the U.S. closer to each other. Pakistan was then under direct military rule of General Zia. The Soviet action shook the world. Prior to the Soviet invasion, the U.S. and
68 The Washington Post, 3 December 1981. 69 Agha Shahi, Dawn, October 30, 1979. 70 Lubna Sunawar, “Stopping Illegal X-Border Movement: A Must for Peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” HILAL, The Pakistan Armed Forces Magazine. April, 2014. pp. 103-105.
57 other Western democracies were critical of the military regime in Pakistan. However, the situation changed in favor of Pakistan. The U.S. found General Zia in Pakistan as a potential military leader who could defeat the Soviet Union in Afghanistan by confining Communism to its borders. For this reason, President Zia was whole heartedly accepted by both the U.S. and the
Western world.71
“Strength, and not a little strength at that, is needed to defend socialist gains.”72
Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan became a decisive event of the Cold War between two mighty rivals of the time, the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The regional significance of Pakistan to both superpowers had increased dramatically due to the presence of Red Army in neighboring
Afghanistan. This was the result of several factors: Firstly, Pakistan’s unique geographical location made it extremely important in the region and secondly, Iran’s Islamic Revolution of
1979 made the situation critical for the U.S. Pakistan’s historical ties with Afghanistan and Iran enhanced its importance manifold where Pakistan could play a vital role. Thirdly, Pakistan had a prominent place in the Muslim world, especially its close ties with oil producing countries of the
Gulf region. Finally, Pakistan’s efforts to obtain a nuclear technology made it the first Muslim country in the region which acquired nuclear capability. This created much difference not only for the opponents but that became a matter of grave concern for the super powers as well.
The Soviet invasion brought Pakistan closer to the U.S. to support the Afghan Jihad.73
The U.S. chose Afghan religious leaders as its allies and extended full support who used to
71 Sundra Kaushik, Politics of Islamization in Pakistan, New Delhi: South Asia Publishers,1993, pp.165-167. 72Leonid Brezhnev, “For Greater Unity Among Communists, Speech,” Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1969, p.15.
73 Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trial of Political Islam, London: Tauris Publishers, 2005, p.143.
58 receive training from Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence Agency (ISI) with the close collaboration of CIA through military assistance.74
President Zia-ul-Huq and other high-ranking army officials in Pakistan perceived the crisis in Afghanistan as a golden opportunity to advance the army’s own capabilities. A. Z. Hilali says: “Zia and his colleagues took the decision to get involved in Afghanistan because they saw it as militarily and economically profitable.”75The modernization of Pakistan’s outdated weapons and defence systems would also serve as a deterrent to India; that factor too was of extreme significance. Another reason Pakistan wanted to aid the Afghan rebels was Pakistan’s desire for strategic depth which has been Pakistan’s top most priority against India.76General Zia perceived that if the Soviet Union could be defeated in Afghanistan by using Mujahedin, and if a government friendly to Pakistan could be installed in Afghanistan; Pakistan would definitely gain influence in the region not only by solving decades-old border dispute of Durand Line with
Afghanistan but also by limiting chances of a pro-Indian neighbor.77
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan dramatically enhanced the U.S. economic and military assistance to Pakistan in order to fight a war against the Red Army’s occupation. Large amounts of cash and equipment were provided to the Mujahedin. They successfully engaged the
Red Army in Afghanistan through possible assistance which was given by Pakistan’s military and its secret agencies, particularly the ISI. While this “aid” was primarily meant for the Afghan
Mujahedin, but there is sufficient evidence that funds allocated by the U.S. were misused on a massive scale. Apart from this, Pakistan also received money for dual purposes: for the
74 Samina Ahmed, “The U.S. & Terrorism in Southwest Asia: September 11 and Beyond,” International Security, Winter 2001-2, p.80. 75 A.Z. Hilali. U.S.-Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005, p. 11 76 Marvin G. Weinbaum. “Pakistan & Afghanistan: The Strategic Relationship,” Asian Survey 31, June, 1991, p.498. 77 Ibid.
59 rehabilitation of Afghan refugees who left their homes; and for the construction of infrastructure in war torn Afghanistan.78
Despite this aid flows, Pakistan remained suspicious of America’s intentions in the region. It was largely assumed that the basic objective of the U.S. for pumping billions of dollars to Pakistan’s was to contain the Soviet influence rather than helping and securing Pakistani interests. The other factors which contributed anti-Americanism were the spread of Islamization and radicalization of Pakistani society under President General Zia ul-Haq, and the gradual expansion of militant Islam after the 1979 Revolution in Iran.
The U.S. disapproved the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and greatly disconcerted by the developments under the cover of Islamic Revolution in Pakistan’s neighboring Iran. The U.S. was committed to provide every possible support to Pakistan. On January 7, 1980, President
Carter made the following statement:
We have already assured President Zia, who is the leader of Pakistan, directly after the invasion, and since then through emissaries that we are willing to join other nations in giving necessary protection to Pakistan and meet their legitimate defensive military needs whenever required by the government of Pakistan.79
Before 1979, the U.S. had strong reservations on Pakistan’s nuclear program, unstable democratic system, India- Pakistan relations, narcotics, etc but Pakistan -U.S. alliance became vital for the U.S. to defeat the Red Army in Afghanistan. In the post-Soviet invasion scenario, the U.S. became less interested in the issues. Interestingly, President Reagan when assumed office was not anxious about the after effects of radical Islamists in the region in the long run.
78 Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008.
79 President Carter’s Interview. Jan 7, 1980, Dawn, January 9, 1980.
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They were seen and known as the best combatants in Afghanistan which the U.S. perceived as a threat to the USSR but not to the U.S.80
The Afghan War caused great instability in the entire region and it caused a devastating effect on Pakistan in particular. The Soviet Union also conveyed a number of direct and bluntly- worded warnings to Pakistan from time to time during this period. The Soviet Union held
Pakistan responsible for the continuous trouble in Afghanistan. Radio Moscow carried anti-
Pakistan propaganda. Pakistan throughout this period strictly maintained a policy of restraint in response to Soviet threats and its repeated air violations into Pakistani territory by the Soviet Air
Force.81
The influence of the ISI in the domestic and foreign policy of Pakistan increased during the Afghan War. It played a dominating and vital role in formulating policies and strategies during the War. The CIA and ISI co-operated with each other in the biggest covert operation at the time in Afghanistan.82 ISI was directly involved in recruiting the Mujahedin across the border and funneling the funds for the War. As a result of ISI’s close collaboration with Mujahedin, direct contacts were established with the militants and religious forces at both national and foreign level. Once the War was over and the Soviet Union withdrew its forces from
Afghanistan, both ISI and militant groups within Pakistan and Afghanistan continued their collaboration.
The Afghanistan crisis was also taken up by the UN General Assembly in the 1980s which passed resolutions with an overwhelming majority. It repeatedly called for a diplomatic solution of the Afghanistan crisis, including the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and return of the
80 Lawrence Ziring, “South Asian Tangles and Triangles,” In Lawrence Ziring, ed., The Subcontinent in World Politics: India, Its Neighbors and the Great Powers, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982, p.24 81 The Muslim, 21st February 1983. 82 Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 2007, pp. 13-15
61
Afghan refugees to their homes from Pakistan and Iran. In the beginning, the Soviet attitude was quite threatening and belligerent towards Pakistan because of its support to Mujahedin with active involvement of CIA. This can be illustrated from an instance when Agha Shahi met Soviet
Foreign Minister Gromyko at the United Nations in September 1980; Gromyko greeted his
Pakistani counterpart, saying you seem to fight a war with us.83
The Reagan Administration was more flexible than President Carter’s in granting military and economic loans to Pakistan. It offered 3.2. billion dollars for economic assistance, apart from that, the U.S. also agreed to sell 40 high performance F-16 aircrafts to Pakistan. During the years of Soviet presence in Afghanistan, both countries maintained high level of civil and military interaction. The U.S. and Pakistan were agreed on one point agenda and that was a peaceful settlement of the Afghanistan problem.84
The aid to the Mujahedin during President Carter’s time trickled into Pakistan with a snail’s pace turned into a flood under President Ronald Reagan. The military sales and diplomatic relationship between Pakistan and the U.S. improved dramatically in later years.
During President Reagan’s term in office, the U.S.-Pak relations were going back to the relationship of the fifties when arms merchants were roaming the continents in search of new customers. It seemed Carter’s emphasis on human rights did not get any significant place in U.S. foreign policy agenda. President Reagan while adopting a policy of deterrence, decided to fulfill the demands of Pakistan for aid. There were clear indications from the White House that
Pakistan would get highly refined defence equipment from the U.S. as this aid would prevent the
Soviet Union from further exerting its influence and this would also refrain it from fulfilling its expansionist ambitions. President Reagan went to the extent of exempting Pakistan from the
83 The Muslim, 15 September 1981. 84 Ziring. “South Asian Tangles and Triangles,” p. 24.
62
Symington Amendment on the pretext that politically strong, economically stable and independent Pakistan with democratic institutions was in the interest of the U.S. It seemed that the U.S. was no more interested in persuading Pakistan to roll back its nuclear program as it had been doing earlier.
During 1985-86, Pakistan and the U.S. remained in close contact with each other pertaining to regional security environment in the backdrop of the ongoing Jihad in Afghanistan.
The U.S. appreciated Pakistan’s close collaboration with CIA and steadfastness against the
Soviet threats. Pakistan received F-16 aircrafts from the U.S., twenty-five in 1985 and fifteen in
1986. The Congress and the CIA provided the Mujahedin with 250 launchers and 1,000 missiles
(costing approximately $200,000 each). The Mujahedin’s first success occurred in September
1986, when they used Stingers to take down three Soviet gunships near the Jalalabad airfield.85
Until the Soviet withdrawal, the Stingers wreaked devastating havoc on Soviet forces at the hands of the Mujahedin.
Using Stingers, other advanced weapons and defence systems which was being provided by the U.S. required proper training. The CIA sent several agents to assist the Mujahedin. During the 1980s, over a million Mujahedin were trained in joint ISI and CIA established camps in
Pakistan.86 The U.S. and Pakistan co-operated closely throughout the crisis of the Afghan War.
In the early 1980s, Bill Casey, then Director of the CIA, and General Akhtar Abdul Rehman
Khan, Director General of the ISI, established a close relationship and they both kept in direct communication. Money from the CIA went either to arms purchases from countries such as
China, Egypt, Israel, Britain, and America, or directly to ISI offices in Islamabad, Rawalpindi, and Quetta. The weapons were then distributed to one of the seven groups of Mujahedin fighting
85 Hilali. U.S.-Pakistan Relationship. p.169. 86 Ibid., p. 121
63 the Soviet troops.87 The heavy influx of arms and aid to Pakistan from the U.S. during the 1980s, led Pakistan to become a safe haven not only for the Mujahedin but facilitated other terrorist groups, where they could train, resupply, and regroup themselves before continuing the fight in
Afghanistan. In one of his articles, Charles Cogan describes the Pakistan border during this period as a “psychological Yalu River.” 88
When Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in 1985, diplomatic relations between the U.S. and
Soviet Union started improving. Gorbachev openly admitted that Afghanistan was a bleeding wound for the Soviet Union. As a result, the Soviet government showed its willingness to disengage from Afghanistan and to work towards peaceful settlement of Afghan issue. Pakistan took a sigh of relief with this drastic change in Soviet policy pertaining to Afghanistan.
After President General Zia’s mysterious death in a plane crash in 1988, Benazir Bhutto came to power. She had been critical of President Zia’s policy regarding the Afghan crisis during these years. She was not happy the way President Zia made diplomatic gains during these years from the U.S. economic and military assistance for Pakistan. When she came to power, she once again faced an immense pressure from the U.S. regarding Pakistan’s nuclear program. She tried her best to remove misunderstandings about the nuclear program which were mainly created by the Indian lobby.
During her visit to the U.S. in 1989, she successfully conveyed her government’s message to the U.S. Administration that Pakistan neither had a bomb nor it had any intentions to manufacture one. But apart from that, she also asserted that Pakistan being a sovereign nation had every right to pursue its nuclear program for defence purposes. The U.S. showed interest in
87 Mohammed Yousaf & Mark Adkin, Afghanistan: The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2002, p. 82. 88 Charles G. Cogan. “Partners in Time: The CIA and Afghanistan since 1979,” World Policy Journal, New York, Summer 1993, p. 79.
64 maintaining cordial relations with Pakistan and offered to sell thirty eight F-16s to Pakistan. On the other hand, the U.S. remained doubtful about Pakistan’s nuclear program which it considered as a threat to the region’s stability.89
The Soviet interference in Afghanistan was an expensive and pointless venture and ultimately Soviet Union failed to achieve its objectives. The Soviet Union had been condemned all over the world, earned hatred and hostility of various factions within Afghanistan who were deadly against any foreign intrusion on their territory and had been unable to establish a firm control on the Afghan territory.
The final accomplishment of the U.S. and Pakistan at the end of the 1980s was the withdrawal of the Soviet Union as outlined in the Geneva Accords. The Geneva Accords, signed in 1988 called for a return to normalized relations and “good-neighborliness” between
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The U.S. emerged as the watchdog and enforcer of the Soviet timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan. But the situation in Afghanistan was unresolved for the Afghans, and as the U.S. decreased aid to the Mujahedin who were now fighting amongst themselves to gain power, disagreements arose amongst various warring factions over the best way to deal with the political turmoil in Kabul.
2.2 Socio-Economic Impacts of the Afghanistan War on Pakistan
After the Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan remained largely lawless society and under the direct control of militant factions of former Mujahedin. Pakistan faced an unresolved situation in
Afghanistan, which caused many more Afghans to migrate to Pakistani border areas. The crumbling of the Soviet Union and arrival of Afghan refugees created more problems for
89 Burke & Ziring, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, 2nd edition, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 463-70.
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Pakistan in many ways, such as social, political, and economic.90 In the long run, refugees not only created just socio-economic rift and discrepancy in the Tribal areas but also added to security problems, thus posing a direct threat to Pakistan’s security environment. Lethal weapons were easily available in Pakistani society and this started when the U.S sent huge supply of arms consisted of AK47 rifles and other military equipment for Afghan Mujahedin during the Soviet invasion.
Weapons which Pakistan supplied to the Afghan Mujahedin groups to fight the Red Army were again smuggled back to Pakistan’s Tribal areas and were directly sold by the Mujahedin in the weapons market especially built for this purpose. These weapons were easily available in markets of smuggled goods across the border where these weapons could be easily purchased at very low prices by local citizens. For example, Darra market, Peshawar, which is considered to be the world’s largest illegal arms market, consisted of just about 2600 arms shops with 3000 trained experts produced sophisticated weapons of all kinds on massive scale thus creating a serious security concern for Pakistan.91It is true that the present wave of terrorism is a direct outcome of this period which has radicalized Pakistan and further augmented militancy and uprising in FATA and Baluchistan. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan impacted Pakistan adversely, including: the rise of ethnic and sectarian violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and
Balochistan, organized crime activities, weaponization and militarization of Pakistani society.
According to an estimate, about 90% of the world’s poppy farming is carried out in
Afghanistan. Out of this, 90% poppy, Afghanistan is capable to produce 70% of high grade heroin. In order to create profits for provisions from war against USSR, political anarchy, and
90 Imrana Begum, The Impact of Afghan-Soviet War on Pakistan,” Master Thesis, Area Study Centre: Karachi University, 2010, pp. 115-116.
91Begum, The Impact of Afghan-Soviet War on Pakistan, pp. 193-195
66 ongoing civil war within the country; the Afghan warring factions chose to restrict themselves to this business of poppy farming and drug trafficking. Afghanistan had become a safe drug haven for smugglers and drug merchants of the world which got the opportunity to smuggle their products to all parts of the world with a great ease from this “golden crescent.” This business eventually extended with the passage of time and resulted in the expansion of arms and drug mafia in the adjoining Tribal areas of Pakistan. As time went by, heroin became easily accessible everywhere in Pakistan making it a serious issue in Pakistani society. During the early 1980s, drug were unknown in Pakistan and there were no cases reported as such but soon their number rose to 45,0000, including five thousand heroin patients in 1986 which was highly alarming for the government.92
Throughout the Cold War period, the U.S. followed a policy of friendship towards both
Pakistan and India. But the policy had suffered from some constraints in one way or the other, primarily due to Pakistan-India hostility. The U.S. Pakistan alliance of the 1950s strained U.S.-
India relations to some extent. Throughout this period, India had been getting economic and military assistance from the U.S. on one or the other pretext despite India’s non-aligned policy.
U.S. tried to build India as a barricade against China in the region which had defeated India in the Sino-Indian war of October 1962. Pak-U.S. relations, on the other hand, were mostly characterized by unfulfilled promises, lack of trust and mutual frustration mainly on Pakistan’s side. Ironically, the U.S. efforts to improve relations with one country automatically strained its relations with the other.93
92 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “The Afghan Refugees & Pakistan’s Internal Security Problems,” Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, 1994, p.18.
93U.S. Policy Towards South Asia, Handbook of National and International Affairs. Pakistan Military Academy Kakul, 2003, pp.115-124.
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The end of the Cold War saw a democratic setup in Pakistan. Both countries tried to normalize relations, but Pakistan suffered aid cuts from Washington. The U.S. was no more interested in this region after Soviet Union’s departure from the region and they left Pakistan on its own to settle the mess. Pakistan, after Geneva Accords of 1988 lost a special frontline status which it had been enjoying during the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Thus, the close U.S. alliance of 1980s with Pakistan quickly declined; it seemed as the Soviets were the only reason which brought both the U.S. and Pakistan closer to each other in the first place.
Chapter – 3
Changing Strategic Environment of the Region: The Taliban Factor
After the end of the Cold War, the drastic transformation of Pakistan’s domestic politics had indicated the signs of controlled democracy in the country. However, this change did not fundamentally alter Pakistan’s policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan. The post civilian leadership under
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto consequently tended to follow the general parameters on
Afghanistan which were already laid down by the military without any significant change. The army retained the fundamental influence on the formulation of important domestic and foreign policy agendas.94
Afghanistan is comprised of ethnic factions; a country representing a coalition of Islamist groups within Afghanistan was granted the United Nation’s seat and recognized by much of the international community in 1992. However, Afghanistan did not meet the necessary key criteria for sovereignty in order to maintain existing frontiers, means to exercise its influence over its
94 Rauf Klasra, Shujaat says “(Gen) Baig offered him massive funds.” The News, 23 April, 2003.
68 populace and territories, and the ability to regulate the management of its domestic economy.
Above mentioned are essential traits for a state in order to become eligible to get status in the international community.95 States which do not exhibit these characteristics are termed as
‘quasi’, ‘pseudo,’ ‘disrupted’ or even ‘failed’ states.96 In this respect, Robert H. Jackson’s use of the term ‘quasi state’ to explain the state behavior which lacks the recognition of the global system by not fulfilling the criteria of International Law was applicable to the Afghanistan’s case from any perspective.97
The UN’s Special Reporter for Afghanistan, Felix Ermacora, noted in his 1993 Report to the UN
Commission on Human Rights:
Whilst the Foreign office of Afghanistan may appear to demonstrate the features of a central government when viewed from abroad, this is misleading because there is still no effective government which truly represents all the country’s political forces and segments of the population. An armed struggle is still going on between government forces and militant groups headed by political leaders and field commanders, and even struggle along ethnic and religious lines.98
The Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 gave rise to a call for Jihad, which brought foreign fighters, flood of refugees, and massive influx of foreign supplied weapons to Pakistan and this further aggravated the situation. Following the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan, many
Mujahedin who fought at the forefront in against the Soviet forces largely remained unsettled.
They began working independently outside the influence of clan elders who hired them earlier.
They acted as warlords and worked for criminal organized groups not only in Afghanistan but in
Pakistan as well.
95 Christopher Clapham, ‘Degrees of Statehood.’ Review of International Studies, Vol. 24, 1998, pp.143-157. 96 Amin Saikal, “Dimensions of State disruption & International Responses,” 3rd World Quarterly, 21, No.1, 2000, pp.39-49. 97 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi States: Sovereignty, International Relations & the 3rd World, London: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.22. 98 Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan by Mr. F. Ermacora, in accordance with the Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1992/68, Geneva, 18 February 1993.
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Pakistan remained the most influential external power in Afghanistan due to its prior assistance for anti-Soviet Afghan Islamic groups in the 1980s. Most of the Afghan refugees who came to Pakistan during this period of warfare were ethnic Pashtuns.99 Pashtuns are the single dominating ethnic group in Afghanistan, bordering Pakistan FATA region.
The region of FATA is comprised of 450 Km long section situated along Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan. This area is mostly inhabited by Pashtun majority and further subdivided into dozens major ethnic groups and hundreds of clan and sub-tribes.100 The FATA is a semi-autonomous area of Pakistan, dating back to British colonial rule of the Sub-continent.
The tribes live there have a rich history and are known for managing their resources, affairs, and internal disputes without allowing any sort of external interference in their matters.101 By the end of the Soviet invasion in the 1989, Pakistan was hosting approximately 3.5 million Afghan refugees on its soil. These refugees had built strong networks with their Pakistani Pashtun cousins and participated in almost every kind of economic activities particularly ranging from involvement in the transport business of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Baluchistan to illicit drug trafficking.102Afghans, residing in Pakistan had assimilated themselves into Pakistani traditions and thousands of them received their education in Urdu language.
99 Fiona Terry, Condemned to Repeat: The Paradox of Humanitarian Action, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2002. 100 Sunawar, “Stopping Illegal X-Border Movement: A Must for Peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” pp. 103-105 101 Kirk H. Nilsson, Dealing with Terrorist Sanctuary in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, US Army War College, 2009, p. 2 102 Hilali, “The Costs & Benefits of the Afghan War for Pakistan,” Contemporary South Asia, Vol.11, No.3, 2002, pp.291-320.
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District Map of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
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In the recent years, the semi-autonomous region of FATA has become a breeding ground of terrorism. The U.S. intervention in this region has only resulted in the rise of anti-Americanism.
FATA is also considered to be the home of many Al-Qaeda fugitives and the Taliban forces. The presence of a large number of “foreigners” from the Middle East, Central Asia, Muslim areas of the Far East and even Europe to some extent go unnoticed by the government of Pakistan in the past. This carefree attitude by the government of Pakistan encouraged the militants to use this area as a safe zone to conduct terrorist activities.
3.1 The Post-Cold War Era
The end of the Cold War opened new opportunities for the U.S. to restructure its relations with
South Asian countries. The U.S. foreign policy and security perspectives changed towards South
Asia in the post-Cold War era. The significance of the region declined for the US policy makers after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Pak-U.S. relations witnessed a downturn on major issues including: cross border infiltration in India by Pakistani militant organizations, terrorism, drug trafficking, and nuclear proliferation were some of the highlights of the 1990s.
In the post-Cold War period, when the U.S. was left as the only global power, it changed its policies and priorities too. The main focus would be on how to tackle the challenges of the new unipolar world. During the Cold War period, the U.S. policy was based mainly on the notion of power, influence, security issues and its strategic interests around the globe. In the South
Asian region, Pakistan was the only state which promoted the U.S. strategic interests during the
Cold War period and had been the most allied ally of the U.S. in the region. India, the conventional ally of Moscow and arch rival of Pakistan, apparently welcomed Washington’s
73 changed policy towards Pakistan and had become the focus of the U.S. as the dominant power in
South Asia which has always been its desire.103
In the given situation, Pakistan not only lost the status of a frontline state but also attained the reputation as an unfavorable nation and was alleged to have a tendency of harming U.S.’ regional interests in South Asia. It has often been said about Pak-U.S. relationship, that this alliance between both countries is largely issue based; and whenever the “issue” lost its significance for one of the countries, led to the loss of strategic interest and mutual co- operation.104
As Dennis Kux has observed, during the Cold War, the fight for a common objective, that is, against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan could no longer cement U.S-Pak relations. In the absence of a “mutual significant national interests,” tensions between the two unequal partners were becoming more obvious.105
When the U.S. imposed sanctions against Pakistan’s nuclear program in 1990 under the
Pressler Amendment, the U.S. Department of Defence and military agencies still wanted to work in close collaboration with Pakistani armed forces. This was because they considered and perceived Pakistan as a vital state that could play an important role in the Gulf region due to its cordial relations with the Muslim countries for ongoing U.S. military operations there. As a consequence of this difference in policy, the U.S. was engaged in a series of selective sales of military spare parts and equipment to Pakistan.106
In October 1990, the Bush Administration notified Congress and expressed lack of trust to verify that Pakistan was not developing nuclear weapons. Congress took immediate action and
103 Stephen Philip Cohen, “American Interest & the India – Pakistan Conflict,” (ed) Asian Security, New Delhi: Lances International, 1991, pp. 132-155. 104 Farzana Sheikh, “Pakistan U.S. Relations.” Pakistan Horizon, 54 (January 2001), pp. 18-33 105 Dennis Kux, The U.S. & Pakistan, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001, p. 320. 106 The Washington Post, March 3, 1992.
74 suspended all economic and defence grant for Pakistan under the provision of Pressler
Amendment. The Bush Administration did not prevent Congress from doing so, that clearly reflects that the Administration wanted Congress to exactly react that way. But apart from these sanctions, the U.S. continued commercial military sales to Pakistan. Though, the only purpose was to continue the long standing relations with Pakistan. The Bush Administration made it clear that this commercial sale would only include spare parts which the U.S. had already sold and not for the purchase of new weapons.107
After imposing military and economic sanctions under the Pressler Amendment, the U.S. started pressurizing Pakistan to conduct inspections of its nuclear facilities, but this demand was turned down by Islamabad. The U.S. insisted that Pakistan should sign Nuclear Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) unconditionally and Pakistan claimed that it had already maintained a clear stance on the NPT.108
One of the main goals and priority agenda of the senior Bush Administration was to prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in South Asia and to persuade
Pakistan to sign NPT, and for this it had been blaming Pakistan for some time. But due to strategic conditions, President Bush chose to ignore Pakistan’s nuclear program. His priority goal became to contain Soviet influence in Afghanistan for which he needed Pakistan’s close co- operation. When the Soviet troops finally left Afghanistan, the country slipped into a bloody civil war and this time the U.S. was not interested to intervene; thus it left Pakistan on its own to manage the crisis in its backyard.
The basic objective of Afghan struggle against Soviet occupation was mainly based on the fundamental theme of Islamic Jihad. The slow rise of militancy in Afghan society also
107 C. Uday Bhaskar, “The May 1990 Nuclear Crisis: An Indian Perspective.” Strategic Digest, 5 (May 1998), p.730. 108 Nazim Kamal, “Nuclear and Missile Proliferation Issues: Some Approaches to Stability in South Asia,” Contemporary South-East Asia, 4 (March 1992), pp. 378-379
75 entered into Pakistan which was an expected outcome of the prevailing turmoil. During subsequent years, the civil war in Afghanistan and movement of freedom in different Eastern
European countries which later emerged as Central Asian Republics (CARs) gave rise to the tendency of militancy and fundamentalism in this region at a wider scale.109
In addition, hundreds of Pakistani retired and serving officers and non commissioned personnel were attached to the so-called religious Taliban ‘movement’ during the 1990s. The
Saudi government and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) both were the main financiers to support the Taliban regime, including logistics, medical support, military training, warfare planning and most of all intelligence. Pakistani servicemen also stood side by side, dressed in Afghan clothing and remained impossible to differentiate them from the Taliban during the conduct of strategic and other course of actions.110
Containing Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan and the Gulf region had become the most vital objective for the U.S. administration during the 1990s. The U.S. refused to accept the Taliban on an official level and they exerted pressure on the Taliban government not to violate human rights in Afghanistan. But the major irritant between both the
U.S. and Afghanistan throughout this period remained Afghanistan’s involvement in drug trafficking; and the use of the Afghan territory by the groups and individuals who were involved in terrorist activities and were seen as a source of threat to American interests.111 Though the
Taliban leaders denied accusations by the U.S. pertaining to their connection with drug trafficking and terrorist activities, but on the other hand, they admitted that Osama bin Laden
109 Graham Fuller, “Islamic Fundamentalism in Afghanistan its Character & Prospect.” http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2008/pdf 110 Interview with ex Army Officer, 27 November 2012 111 Interview with ex Army Officer, 07 January 2013
76 was based in Afghanistan. They demanded proof from the U.S. of Osama’s involvement in terrorist activities before he could be expelled from Afghanistan. 112
In February 1990, tension between India and Pakistan started developing again on the Kashmir issue:
Indian forces in Kashmir have engaged in immense human rights violations including extra-judicial executions, rape, torture and intentional attacks on health care workers…..such killings are approved out as a matter of policy. More than any other occurrence, these premeditated killings disclose the extent of the human rights crisis in Kashmir.113
India accused Pakistan of instigating cross border terrorism that was denied by Pakistan. Both the countries were dragged to the edge of war. The U.S. believed that the two states had nuclear weapons and any possibility of conventional war or political crisis between them would eventually lead to nuclear warfare in South Asia. The Deputy Director of the CIA Richard Kerr later expressed concern over ongoing tensions between the two neighbors and revealed that the explosive situation in South Asia was more precarious than the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the U.S. prevented a nuclear war between the two states of South Asia.114
Pak-U.S. relations remained strained in the 1990s due to continuous Indian efforts at the international level to label Pakistan as a ‘terrorist state,’ by propagating that Pakistan was sponsoring terrorism in Indian held Kashmir. With the passage of time, the Clinton
Administration realized that India was the major source of disturbance and was not interested in solving the Kashmir dispute which was a mutual and outstanding problem between India and
Pakistan. For instance, Assistant Secretary Robin Raphael repeatedly gave statements that India was showing unfriendly gestures towards Pakistan. On October 28, 1993, she said that Kashmir
112 Interview with ex Army Officer, 02 February 2013 113 Asia Watch on Human Rights, Boston, 1993. 114 Bhaskar, “The May 1990 Nuclear Crisis: An Indian Perspective.” p. 730.
77 was a disputed territory according to the United Nations resolutions and denied India’s legitimacy and rule over Kashmir.115
After the Soviet forces withdrawal from the region, the U.S. no longer needed the
Mujahedin, so they were designated as terrorists and Pakistan was repeatedly accused by the
U.S. of letting them use its territory. Pakistan took some steps in 1993-94 under immense pressure exerted by the U.S. in this regard. In return for this favor, the U.S. withdrew Pakistan from the list of the countries that were encouraging and promoting terrorists.116
The most perilous development was the rising support for the Islamic movement in neighboring Afghanistan and its perpetrators from within the army, which had the repute of formulating major foreign policy decisions. There was a mounting fear of clear split along ideological lines in Pakistan Army ranks which further increased the possibility of the military’s conflict with the Islamists. These elements had developed strong foothold and network within the establishment which was somewhat disturbing and regarded as an effort to malign Pakistan
Army’s image all across the globe. But in one way or the other, senior retired army officers joined by hundreds of serving officers and soldiers attended the ideological training sessions.117General (Retd) Hameed Gul, former head of the ISI, who was intensely engaged in clandestine operations in Afghanistan against the Soviet forces in 1980s, says: “Officers in
Pakistan Army undoubtedly had always remained religious, but an increasing number of officers had turned Islamist by then.”118
Pakistan’s military establishment provided its full backing to the Taliban to attain the goal of strategic depth in Afghanistan thus restricting the influence of other regional actors in
115 South China Morning Post, March 4, 1994. 116 Afghanistan Militias, Global Security. Org. available from http://www.globalsecurity.org./militaryworld/afghanistan/militia-fac.htm. 117 Naseem Ahmed, “General Musharraf’s Taliban Policy,” The Dialogue, Vol. V No. 2, pp.98-99 118 Hussain, “Jihad Begins at Home,” News-line, February, 2001, p.23
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Afghanistan including Iran and India and the forces of the Northern Alliance which have never been on friendly terms with Pakistan. The concept of ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan was presented by then Army Chief General Aslam Beg who “had given the ISI mandate and the task of running it.”119
Pakistan throughout this period tried to develop good relations with its neighboring countries, particularly with Iran, Russia and Afghanistan. Pakistan contributed a lot in its effort to bring peace in war torn Afghanistan and held discussions with Mujahedin groups several times. Pakistan tried to patch up differences between different Afghan warring groups and in this regard, Islamabad accord was signed in 1993.120
Pakistan was instrumental in the conclusion of the Islamabad Accord signed on 7 March
1993. This Accord sought to resolve the differences between Rabbani and Hikmatyar.121 The then Pakistani Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, played a decisive role in this reconciliatory course of action; with the moral and financial support of Islamabad’s most important Arab ally, Saudi
Arabia. The Islamabad Accord had the blessing and support of Iran as well.122
When Benazir Bhutto’s government came into power in 1993, she had very limited authority to formulate an independent foreign policy course without the consent of the military.
Pakistan military has been the major driving force which takes all major decisions pertaining to foreign policy of Pakistan. Many observers have also emphasized the role of Benazir Bhutto’s
119 Quoted in International Crisis Group’s Report on Pakistan: The Dangers of Conventional Wisdom, International Crisis Group Asia Briefing Paper , Brussels, March 12, 2002, pp.2-4 120 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005: A Concise History, p. 198 121 Gerald Bourke, “Pakistan Brokers Afghan Peace Deal.”The Guardian, 4 March 1993. 122 Kamal Matinuddin, The Taliban Phenomenon, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 306
79 government and most importantly, Interior Minister, Naseerullah Baber, who had been instrumental in organizing and supporting the Taliban.123
In the post-Cold War era, Pak-U.S. relations remained fraught due to certain other issues like human rights violation, drug trafficking, missile development, nuclear explosions and alleged support to remnants of Mujahedin in Afghanistan were still stumbling blocks between the two countries, preventing turn to normalcy. It was during the era of President Clinton that Pak-U.S. relations showed some sign of improvement, because of the Brown Amendment of October
1994.
When President Clinton assumed office, it promised to remove sanctions imposed on
Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment which he himself regarded unfair and unjust. He also admitted this fact that U.S. had not been fair to Pakistan regarding military sales and assured
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to request Congress to reconsider the Pressler Amendment. The relations between Pakistan and the U.S. improved as both the states realized that Kashmir was a focal point of disturbance between Pakistan and India and undoubtedly it is a disputed territory which could escalate to nuclear war between two neighbors at any point. Apart from that, both nations showed willingness to the importance of resolving Kashmir issue at the earliest; and showed eagerness and interest to enhance co-operation in defence sector as well. The F-16 dispute constituted as a major irritant in Pakistan-U.S. relationship. It is worth mentioning that the Clinton Administration actively sought an agreeable solution to the problem, which dispelled the traditional perception in Pakistan that Democrats were “anti- Pakistan and pro-India.”124
In 1994, Senator Hank Brown sponsored an Amendment primarily designed to neutralize the impact of specific Pressler sanctions on Pakistan. Brown initially recommended easing of
123 Ahmed Rashid,“Pakistan & the Taliban.” in Maley, ed., Fundamentalism Reborn, New York: New York University Press, 1998, pp.74-90 124 Hilali, U.S.-Pakistan Relationship, Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005, p. 235.
80 sanctions by lifting the ban on economic assistance and releasing all military equipment frozen by the U.S., including the supply of F-16s. But he had to drop the F-16s from the package in the face of rigid opposition by pro Indian lobby.125 The Brown Amendment also provided a way out of the F-16 stalemate by allowing the sale of these aircrafts to a third country and reimbursement of already paid money to Pakistan. The country selected by the Clinton Administration was
Indonesia. 126
In 1995, Brown Amendment was passed by the House of Representatives which enabled the Clinton Administration to release the military equipment and weapons to Pakistan for which it had already paid much before the implementation of the Pressler Amendment in the 1990s.
The Brown Amendment was welcomed by Pakistan. It was, however, a symbolic victory for
Pak-U.S. security relations; as for the very first time since the imposition of Pressler
Amendment, the U.S. lawmakers agreed to ease sanctions against Pakistan that were widely seen as discriminatory.
In 1995-1996, a new force comprising of the students of religious schools (Madrassas) calling themselves the Taliban emerged on the scene of Afghanistan. They denounced all the warring Mujahedin factions who were engaged with fighting with each other and waged a war against all. Soon, the Taliban gradually swept entire Afghanistan and conquered major cities where they developed their strong foothold and entered Kabul in 1996. They established their own government based on strict Islamic ideology that had nothing to do with the original teachings and message of the Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W.W)
Pakistan’s good relations with the Taliban’s government sufficed to motivate Pakistan’s rivals in the Afghan game, namely Iran, India and Russia to arrive at informal strategic
125 Rasul Bakhsh Rais,“Indo-US Relations.” Pakistan Journal of American Studies, 14 (Spring & Fall 1997), p.19. 126 Washington Post, 12 April, 1995
81 understanding against Pakistan. These countries bolstered the forces that were against the
Taliban, that is, Northern Alliance led by then Commander Ahmed Shah Masoud. Between 1996 and 2000, Afghanistan became an epicenter of a complex regional rivalry played out by the leading powers of Southwest Asia for exerting influence in Central and Southwestern Asia. In this context, Pakistan remained the foremost regional power with the greatest ability to exert influence in Afghanistan; as a result of the remarkable success of its proxy, the Taliban, in checking the forces of the Rabbani-Masoud coalition.
When the Taliban movement surfaced in Afghanistan, Islamabad co-opted their strides, without any formal reluctance and gave recognition to the Taliban government in May 1997 despite facing severe criticism and pressure on its official recognition from the international community.127A source of friction between Pak-U.S. relations was Pakistan’s support for the
Taliban, who by now controlled most of Afghanistan. The Taliban gained the wrath of the U.S. by their harsh treatment of women, abuse of human rights and their willingness to provide a safe asylum for Islamic militants and terrorists.128 Pakistan's attempt to establish a pro-Pakistan
Mujahedin government in Kabul did not yield any fruitful result as it feared that political vacuum would give New Delhi an opportunity to play against Pakistan from Kabul.
Having established peace and showing a positive posture towards Pakistan, the Taliban quickly gained the good will of Pakistan. Though the U.S. did not like Pakistan’s close interaction with the Taliban regime but the U.S. by that time was involved in the Afghan problem. This time, it viewed the spread of militant Islam as a threat to its own interests which it
127 U.S. Policy Towards South Asia, Handbook of National and International Affairs, Pakistan Military Academy Kakul, 2003, p.37 128 Mehtab Ali Shah,“Pak-US Relationship in the Post Cold War,” Pakistan Journal of American Studies, 17 (Spring & Fall 1999), pp.9-20.
82 ignored completely during its unconditional support to Mujahedin throughout the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
Though the pressure started mounting on Pakistan by the U.S. pertaining to the Taliban government and it had become an isolated state at the global level. Pakistan did not stop its support for the Taliban and advocated that Afghanistan should be given a seat in the United
Nations, but the international community did not pay any attention to this request. Pakistan’s relations with Iran also suffered due to its support for the Taliban government.
The Clinton Administration tried to curtail the production of WMDs in South Asia. In
December 1995, the U.S. came to know that India was all set for a nuclear test. The U.S. officials privately warned India not to conduct nuclear tests and it also threatened India of dire consequences under economic sanctions, although that information was not authentic and it did not turn into a reality. However, the U.S. Administration remained doubtful of Janata Party’s intentions that had been advocating for turning India into a nuclear country in South Asia.129
In 1996, the U.S. not only tried to bring various Afghan factions on negotiation table but also wanted to strike a deal with the Taliban in Afghanistan and was interested in building a proposed gas pipeline from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan to Pakistan by two major oil companies: American oil giant Unocal and Bridas of Argentina.
On 19 April, 1996, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of South Asia Robin Raphel while visiting Kabul, Afghanistan said:
We do not see ourselves inserting in the middle of Afghan affairs, but we consider ourselves as a friend of Afghanistan which is why I am here to urge the Afghans themselves to get together and talk. We are also concerned that economic opportunities here will be missed, if political stability cannot be restored.130
129 David Chou, U.S. Policy Toward India & Pakistan in the Post-Cold War, Taipai: Sheng Book Co.Ltd., 2003. 130 Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil & the New Great Game in Central Asia, Publisher: I.B. Tauris, 2000, p. 45
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It is also believed in Pakistan that the Taliban were being punished by the U.S. and international community because of their disagreement with the U.S. oil corporations that premeditated to pipe out Central Asian oil and gas.131 No serious economic foreign investment was possible in
Afghanistan as there was no end to the ongoing political turmoil between warring factions. The government in Kabul was not in a position to ensure minimum stability and protection to the investors.132
In 1998, the U.S. launched a cruise missile attack on Osama’s bin Laden’s base camp in
Afghanistan close to Pakistan’s border. Osama remained at large but some of his companions were killed or seriously injured in that cruise missile attack. The Taliban government protested on these missile attacks and warned the U.S. of serious consequences. The U.S. government also complained that ISI was supporting the Taliban and their military operations, but no concrete facts were provided by the U.S. to Pakistan in this regard.133
Not only to the surprise of the U.S. but to the whole world, India tested its nuclear weapons on 11 May 1998 using China as a threat to its security in the region. The U.S. strongly condemned the nuclear tests and enacted related sanctions for this act. The Clinton
Administration termed these tests as a terrible mistake.134 The U.S. tried its best to engage
Pakistan to desist from exploding nuclear devices which it was expecting from Pakistan in the wake of Indian nuclear detonations. But the Pakistan government did not yield to any pressure in this regard and exploded nuclear devices on May 28 and 30 1998 which was severely criticized
131 Umbreen Javed, “War on Terror: Pakistan’s Apprehensions,” African Journal of Political Science & IR. 5(3), p. 125
132 Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil & the New Great Game in Central Asia, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), p. 126 133 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005, pp. 197-206 134 Benet, May 14, 1998
84 by the U.S. It was assumed that Pakistan was a threat to the U.S.’ non proliferation goals in
South Asia while ignoring the Indian nuclear capability.
It is pertinent to mention that if India had not exploded nuclear devices, Pakistan would not have gone for 6 nuclear explosions of its own. In fact, India changed the fragile balance of power in the region and provoked Pakistan to follow suit.135 Indian leaders openly hurled threats at
Pakistan to attack Azad Kashmir. It was a grave situation for Pakistan’s security but Pakistan responded in kind.
In May 1998, the U.S. Congress approved another set of sanctions against Pakistan after a series of nuclear tests. There were three sets of sanctions that the U.S. had imposed on Pakistan in the wake of nuclear tests: these were Pressler Amendment (related to possession of nuclear weapons), Symington and Glenn Sanctions (related to military takeover) and sanctions imposed after the nuclear explosions conducted by Pakistan in May 1998.136
The U.S. insisted on both countries to sign the NPT immediately. Pakistan showed its keenness to sign the NPT and give up its nuclear weapons provided that India did the same. On the other hand, India criticized NPT as a discriminatory treaty and in return set a condition for
Washington and said it would agree to sign it and to give up its nuclear weapons on the condition that the five nuclear powers in the world destroy their own nuclear devices first. Washington rejected this condition without any hesitation.137
The U.S. sanctions on Pakistan and India neither changed anything regarding the nuclear capability nor their attitude towards nuclear policy for their respective countries. The Clinton administration eventually on July 15, 1998, asked Congress to pass the Pakistan-India Relief Act which is commonly known as Brownback Amendment that relaxed sanctions on both nuclear
135 Op.cit. 136 Sartaj Aziz, “Pakistan More Secure than Ever Before,”Pakistan Times, 1 January 1999, p.1 137 Op.cit.
85 states of South Asia. On October 1, 1999, Congress passed the Second Brownback Amendment which allowed Pakistan to receive aid which was earlier suspended under the Pressler
Amendment- the primary reason of deterioration of Pakistan-U.S. relations during the 1990s.138
Towards the end of 1998, some of the Kashmiri freedom fighters crossed the Line of
Control (LOC) and occupied some of the inaccessible and snow bound mountain peaks in Kargil and Daras sectors. These mountains which up-till now were unoccupied by either side eventually engaged Indian forces in guerilla warfare thus elevating tensions between Pakistan, India, and the U.S.139 These freedom fighters, in addition, blocked the Main Supply Route (MSR) of India to Siachin and posed a very serious threat to Indian military in the area. India plunged its entire resources to eject the freedom fighters from those mountains leading to a limited war between the two traditional rivals.
138 International Herald Tribune, October 15, 1999, p.5 139 Hilali, US-Pakistan Relationship, p. 243.
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The Build-up of Kargil Conflict 1999
Parallel to that, India initiated a propaganda campaign against Pakistan for its alleged support to intruders who had captured the mountains. The U.S. mediation controlled the situation between
Pakistan and India; freedom fighters withdrew and India was safely pulled out of the quagmire.
Both countries remained on high alert during the Kargil episode and the Clinton Administration
87 had taken Kargil crisis as a flash point between Pakistan and India which could be turned into a full-fledged nuclear escalation any time.
Again, the American role was very significant in resolving the conflict between two arch rivals of South Asia through mediation. Although, the U.S. had historically advocated bilateral negotiations between Pakistan and India and had been successful to resolve their bilateral issues; but the U.S. has always followed a path of “crisis management” in regard to the frequent crises which have erupted between Pakistan and India.140
The Nawaz Sharif government had faced severe criticism from the Clinton
Administration on issues associated with Osama Bin Laden and Pakistan’s alleged support to the
Taliban regime; and the presence of many terrorist camps in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.141
Pakistan had been going through a variety of sanctions imposed by the U.S. on various pretexts throughout the 1990s. The most recent series of sanctions were imposed in the first week of September that year when Pakistan was blamed of getting Chinese assistance for the development of missiles production and held responsible for defying the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR). With the imposition of this last set of sanctions, Pakistan had become the most sanctioned nation in the year 2001.142 It has been observed that Pakistan’s political and economic stability in the region is of vital importance to the international community in general and to the U.S. in particular.
By the end of the 1990s, the policy-makers of Pakistan were highly alarmed and concerned regarding the Taliban’s ignoring attitude despite severe protest from the Nawaz Sharif
140 Margaret M. Huffman, The United States and Pakistan during Crisis: From the Russian intervention in Afghanistan to 9/11.” Master Thesis, Faculty of the Department of History, East Carolina University, 2012, pp. 62- 63 141 The Nation, Oct 12, 1999. 142 Syed Farooq Hasnat, “Pakistan - U.S. Relations on Slippery Grounds,” Pakistan Vision, Vol. 12 No. 1, 2011, pp. 23-61.
88 government against the use of Afghan territory by some terrorists groups who were actively involved in criminal actions within Pakistan. However, contrary to this, Pakistani establishment was still of the opinion that the Taliban were the most dependable proxy of Pakistan in
Afghanistan to attain ‘strategic depth’ against India. Consequently, the civilian government’s complaints were continuously ignored and Pakistan army continued military and technical support to the Taliban which they deemed important.143 Pakistan’s policy was criticized by Iran,
India, Russia and Central Asian states.
The government of Nawaz Sharif was toppled in a military coup carried out by General
Pervez Musharraf in 1999, but there was no vital alteration regarding Pakistan’s policy for the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the new military government which was led by then General
Musharraf followed the same policy. On the other hand, in Pakistan, finally “Democracy
Sanctions” were enacted at the end of the 1990s. The U.S. immediately brought into play Section
508 of the Foreign Assistance Act which immediately brought an end to the U.S. economic and defense grant to Pakistan.144
Prior to 9/11, the U.S. regarded Pakistan a failing state because it remained unable to cope up with many external and internal problems, for instance, on the external front, its alleged support to undemocratic Taliban government in Afghanistan was severely criticized; and at home front, Nawaz government was unable to tackle many domestic problems including economic, social and political problems. In sum, the main problem remained terrorism which spread its tentacles and penetrated deep into Pakistani society. To make matters worse for Pakistan, India was continuously blaming Pakistan for the growing infiltration of militants into Indian held
143 Rizwan Hussain, Pakistan & the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan, London: Ashgate Publishing Limited., 2005, p. 220. 144 Hasnat, “Pak - U.S. Relations on Slippery Grounds,” pp. 23-61.
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Kashmir, who were taken as terrorists by the Indian government. India took this as a great opportunity to create propaganda and malign the image of Pakistan internationally. Weak democratic institutions gave way to military takeover and nuclear tests of 1998 were some of the serious sources of friction between Pakistan-U.S. relations which further aggravated the situation for Pakistan. So by the late 1990s, Pakistan was internationally an isolated state which was facing numerous domestic problems on the one hand and external condemnation pertaining to the Taliban regime on the other.145
Though President General Musharraf after assuming power promised wide-ranging internal domestic reforms but announced that he had no intention to change the foreign policy course of action set by the predecessor government. This highlighted Pakistan’s desire of continuation of its same foreign policy agenda with regard to Kashmir and Afghanistan which previously had been approved by the Pakistan Army.146 Therefore, the new military regime in
Pakistan was of the view that it should continue its support to the Taliban leadership in
Afghanistan.
Ahmed Shah Masoud humiliated Pakistan further by informing that he had captured hundreds of Pakistani hostages, including 17 officers of the Pakistan Army. This statement was straightaway dismissed by Pakistan ‘as the captives were all retired officers from service and could have gone to Afghanistan on their own and for this, Pakistan Army had nothing to do with this affair.’147
The Taliban government was further isolated on the international front when on 7
December 2000, Russia and the U.S. moved a Resolution in the UN Security Council urging the
145 Umbreen Javed, “War on Terror: Pakistan’s Apprehensions,” African Journal of Political Science & International Relations, Vol. 5 (March 2011), pp. 125-131 146 Khalid Ahmed, Pakistan- the State in Crisis, Lahore: Vanguard Books Ptv. 2002, p. 35. 147 Ibid., p. 37
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UN to take strict actions for intensification of sanctions against the Taliban in Afghanistan including military sanctions and other related but effective measures. The resolution further recommended the Taliban to close all the terrorist camps within thirty days on its land and to allow, “Strict monitoring of such shutting down by the UN officials.”148
The process of Talibanisation posed a serious threat to Pakistan’s security. Moreover, the influence and control which the Taliban exhibited in Afghanistan was a source of stimulation for many militant groups who found a safe asylum within the country and created political instability for Pakistan. These groups with a typical mind set were all set to make Pakistan as a theocratic state where they could establish a Taliban-style regime with great ease which they earlier implemented in Afghanistan. With the passage of time, these groups had become strong enough to exert considerable pressure on the government to surrender before their demands. For example, Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) rejected the UN restrictions on Afghanistan and severely criticized this resolution as discriminatory and insisted the Islamic countries including Pakistan, not to accept these sanctions thus boosting the morale of militants all time high.149
Meanwhile, at the international level, Pakistan stood all alone facing many allegations including the support of Kashmiri insurgency and its pro-Taliban stance. President Musharraf safeguarded his pro-Taliban policy by claiming it as a need of hour in both Pakistan’s national and security related interests which highlighted Pakistan’s strategy in the region. Pakistan in one way or the other could not simply afford a security threat from Afghanistan’s side, in addition to the one in the East (India) on its borders.150
148Dawn, December 8, 2000 149 Ahmed, “General Musharraf’s Taliban Policy,” pp.98-99 150 www.state/gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/.html.
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The U.S. President Bill Clinton in March, 2000 had planned to visit South Asia, but no clear prior information and details were given to Pakistan’s government till end, whether he would stop over in Pakistan. Finally, Clinton did visit Pakistan on March 25, 2000, but only for a very short duration of five hours after paying a visit to India where he stayed much longer. President
Clinton conveyed a blunt message to President General Musharraf, though conveyed in a pleasant, frank and appeasing manner.151 He clearly set and emphasized certain landmarks for having more meaningful relationship with Pakistan. These landmarks were: revival of democracy, resolution of the nuclear issue, and peaceful co-existence with India. Pakistan’s expectation of the visit by the U.S. President was to have a fair and equitable response for the resolution of Kashmir issue and economic assistance which were not fulfilled and undoubtedly remained a great disappointment for Pakistan.152
During meeting with President Clinton, President General Musharraf tried to justify military takeover. During the meeting, President Musharraf showed strong reservation for convincing the Taliban to adopt policies according to the International Law.153 In fact, General
Musharraf emphasized the need of international community’s involvement in Afghani crisis in order to help Pakistan in resolving the crisis by employing diplomatic way. According to
President General Musharraf, the Taliban had controlled 95% of Afghanistan’s territory and it was not that easy for the U.S. or other regional powers to wipe them off that easily.154
Indeed the 1990 was the decade of Pakistan’s isolation. By that time, the U.S. lost the influence to contain Pakistan’s behavior due to its sanction strategy time and again on one or the other pretext. The incentive for change in Pakistan came from within. President General
151 Dennis Kux, The U.S. & Pakistan 1947-2000, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 357 152 U.S. Policy Towards South Asia, Handbook of National and International Affairs, Pakistan Military Academy Kakul, 2003, pp.115-124 153 Ibid. 154 W. Winchell, International Journal of Intelligence & Counter Intelligence, Vol. 16, 2003, p. 379
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Musharraf soon after assuming power realized that Pakistan was in a much poorer condition economically than it had been during previous military takeovers. At the end of the 1990s,
Pakistan lost its international standing within the community of world nations and most importantly, it needed internal stability. The country’s base was being badly jolted and undermined by the rise of religious extremism which distorted the main social fabric of Pakistani society and numerous problems emerged from ethnic conflicts and poor governance in the center and at provincial levels. This placed not only the country’s future at risk but raised a question mark on the role of Pakistan’s Army. In such a fragile national environment accompanied by challenges and foreseen threats primarily from fundamentalism, it was not that easy for the establishment under President General Musharraf to pursue an independent forward policy, especially toward Kashmir and Afghanistan.155
In sum, the 1990’s was a defining decade for Pakistan’s foreign policy when it comes to war against terror, Pakistan’s support of the Taliban regime was a central factor in the next two decades of this war. Secondly, that the 1990’s was a good decade to demonstrate the dictum of
‘no permanent friends, but only enduring national interests’ in that the United States in the post- cold war era moved away from Pakistan and the nuclear issue/proliferation became its main concern.
155 Hussain, “U.S. Pakistan Engagement,” Special Report, U.S. Institute of Peace, August 2005. pp. 4-7
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Chapter-4
Terrorism and Terrorist Threats before 9/11
In the 1980s, some countries were labeled as terrorism sponsoring states, including Libya, Iran and Iraq. As these countries were thought to prepare terrorists on their soil and were also accused of providing them safe havens, arms and guerrilla training all across the globe. Throughout the
1990s, the U.S. became highly concerned regarding terrorist activities carried out against the
U.S. citizens.
The obsession of defeating the Soviets in Afghanistan at any cost had made the U.S. blind to the dangers of stocking Islamic fundamentalism in the region without considering its long lasting repercussions for the region in general and for the U.S. in particular. The arming and raising of the militants, and being tolerant to the expansion of the narcotics trade to a greater extent created alarming situation in subsequent years. The primary objective was to defeat the
Soviet Union in Afghanistan so these above mentioned important issues were ignored by the
U.S. because they were supporting the U.S. objectives in the region.
After the first Gulf War, Al-Qaeda primarily focused on combating the growing U.S. influence in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia wanted the U.S. to withdraw its troops in the name of providing security to the Middle East. Al-Qaeda showed strong resistance against the presence of the U.S. troops on Saudi land which it considered the most sacred place. Al-Qaeda severely criticized Saudi rulers’ policies and bin Laden termed them fake Muslims as they were unable to protect their land from foreign troops. The ultimate goal of this campaign led by Al-Qaeda was to remove the Saudi royal family from power and put in place an Islamic regime of Al-Qaeda
94 style on the Arabian Peninsula. The Saudi government retaliated as a result of bin Laden’s anti- state activities and expelled him in 1992 and eventually revoked his citizenship in 1994.156
Al-Qaeda emerged as a well-known transnational network. In addition to following its campaign against the western world, it largely included numerous militant fundamental groups that shared some of its ideological beliefs to support in executing violent and aggressive campaign against the U.S. Osama bin Laden became the main person in charge and patron of the
Taliban.
In Afghanistan, one of these militant groups was Al-Qaeda which was well organized and established group. They developed good relations with the ruling Taliban government and received a special status in Afghanistan. This group was headed by Osama bin Laden who earned a good repute for fighting against the Soviets with the active role of CIA in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation. The U.S. supported Osama while fighting against the Soviets and soon he became a legendary figure in Afghanistan due to his participation in the so-called Afghan Jihad against the Red Army and became an honored guest of the Taliban government. Guests in this region are held in very high esteem position and would always be protected at the peril of the lives of their hosts.
Osama was provided with all kinds of assistance by the Taliban government for his mission as a revolutionary. Osama wanted to build an Islamic force to fight on behalf of the
Palestinians by motivating young people to join him against the western world and against those who were helping Israel to occupy more Arab lands and to develop its hegemony in the region.
Osama had started his militant operations from Saudi Arabia during the conflict in Afghanistan in the 1980s with active collaboration of Pakistan ISI and American CIA. Afghanistan under the
156 Interview with ex-Pak Army officer, 22 February, 2013.
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Taliban regime was considered the largest producer of heroin in the world. During 1998-99,
Osama was in control and owner of 64,000 hectares of land for opium cultivation.157 This can be guessed from the financial capability and strength of the promoters of terrorism. Bin Laden was the main architect of the September 11 terror attacks- the most significant and lethal terror operation in the history of modern terror till date.158 Its repercussions and lessons will likely be studied in the years to come and will serve as a wide field of study for researchers both in the operational areas and in the academic research areas of various disciplines. This unprecedented attack on mankind and its grave implications raise a new set of security concerns affecting all civilized nations.
4.1 Terror Threats and Responses
Terrorism is a methodical use of terror to achieve political aims and including the kidnapping of government officials, identified individuals, innocent civilians, killing of political leaders, bombing of embassies, and hijacking of aircrafts. Modern terrorism has introduced a new variety of warfare in terms of technology, victimization, threats and responses. Thus an organization with terror agenda will always prefer to use the techniques of general terror against the population because of its grave consequences in order to achieve its objectives. If terrorism is continued without any checks and limits beyond a certain point, it may spring back and may drive the people towards the fold of revolutionaries.159
Terrorism can be defined as deliberate attempt to use force and inflict harm on innocent citizens and the basic purpose remains to generate fear thus creating unrest, political anarchy and
157 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Military Operations Outside Afghanistan to Fight Terrorism, Press Release (2001). 158 Osama Bin Laden www.adl.org/terrorism_america/bin_l.asp
159 Washington Post, Online, September 19, 2001
96 chaos to achieve political objectives.160 Akin to all forms of wars, it buys strength from
Clausewitz's phrase that war is a continuation of politics by other means.161 International terrorism is not a new phenomenon but a political strategy which has been used in the past by non-state actors, for instance, Al-Qaeda, Hamas, Boko Haram, ISIS, and Hezbollah against the states (e.g., guerilla warfare, the annihilation and bombing of cities, etc to pressurize governments).162
As a whole, terrorism is generally known in the world community as illegitimate and morally wrong act against humanity. It is an attack on the social and moral fabric of civilization to inflict damage to a greater extent without any discrimination. The prevalent recognition of the criminality and fear of terror inflicted within and across national boundaries. This poses a greater security threat for governments and nongovernmental organizations alike which in turn calls them to formulate strategies and effective policies to combat it. According to the principles of jus in bello, in particular, the law clearly makes distinction and is designed in such a way which provides noncombatant immunity. The intentional killing of innocent civilians is prohibited and this as a military and political strategy is never justifiable and acceptable on moral grounds. The deliberate killing of innocents for achieving political objectives is the very definition of terrorism.
In most cases, terrorists seek to bring down or destabilize an existing political regime in order to create political unrest in the country. But on the other hand, totalitarian governments use the technique of terror to exert strong influence by creating power vacuum and try to exercise the projection of force. Terrorism has been a practice which is used throughout history of human life
160 Dale T. Snauwaert, “The Bush Doctrine and Just War Theory,” The Online Journal of Peace & Conflict Resolution, 6 No. 1(2004): 128
161 Ibid. 162 Ibid.
97 and in almost every part of the world in order to achieve specific objectives in one way or the other. Roman emperors resorted to terrorism to sustain their governments; the Spanish used it as an effective method to root out religious controversies which developed with the passage of time.
The French Revolution went through a period which is called the Reign of Terror; and the Ku
Klux Klan is another example in the post-Civil War era in the southern U.S., this terror group used threats and other methods of violence to frighten supporters of Reconstruction.163
Terrorism has become the most serious threat for the U.S. administration to deal with. In the past, the U.S. administrations and Congress have found it pertinent to look at the numbers and trends of terrorist incidents which have been taking place in the past from time to time as a predicate for formulating policy decisions. Terrorists are using sophisticated modern computers and communication technology which is resulting in more information being collected in this regard. For example, an attack on terrorist hideout is increasingly likely to result in the seizure of their computers and other valuable data.
Terrorism was not the foremost national security concern or the priority agenda either for the senior Bush or Clinton Administrations in the early 1990s. But during President Clinton’s term in office, Al-Qaeda began to surface as a major terrorist threat to the U.S. National Security.
In the late 20 century, terrorism was used as a tool for many groups to exert political influence in
Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. The spreading out of international terrorism resulted in many instances ranging from kidnappings, hijacking and bombings of airplanes, and destruction of infrastructure and armed attacks on government and public installations.
163Snauwaert, “The Bush Doctrine and Just War Theory.” p. 128
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4.2 1993 World Trade Center (WTC) Attacks
The 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) was not the first attempt on the Twin Towers.
The WTC was the target of another terrorist strike executed in a well planned manner on
February 26, 1993, when a bomb exploded on a second level of the World Trade Center’s parking basement thus creating a twenty-two feet wide deep crater. The resulting explosion killed six people and injured more than a thousand. More than fifty thousand people were evacuated from the WTC building immediately following the blast and resulted in the disruption of business in the building for next six months.164 FBI and the Joint Terrorist Task Force working in a close collaboration; identified and brought 21 Islamic militants to trail who were involved in conspiracy and were suspected behind the attacks. The trail later revealed intensive plans for terrorists’ acts in the U.S. mainland including attacks on government facilities.165
The main objective of the terrorists’ attack was to demolish the foundation of the north tower in such a way that it would ultimately collapse onto its twin. The attack was meant to pressurize the U.S. administration to refrain from meddling in the Middle East affairs and to restrain its support to Israel. Terrorists selected the WTC as a target because it was a mark of western economic standards; and destruction would enable terrorists to cause damage of infrastructure and human causalities at a wider scale thus posing a direct threat to the U.S.
National Security. Ramzi Ahmed Yousaf and Sheikh Omer, masterminds behind the attack were sentenced to death for plotting the attacks.166
Sheikh Omar Abdul Rehman, who was a cleric and was known as a “Spiritual leader” of
Osama bin Laden, and he was considered an instigator of 1993 WTC explosions and numerous
164 Dwyer, Kocieniewski, Murphy, & Peg Tyre, Two Seconds Under the World, New York: Crown Publishers, 1994. 165 Feb 26, 1993: WTC bombed. Available from www.history.com/this-day-in-history/world-trade-center-bombed 166 Ibid.
99 other lethal plots against the U.S. Rehman was also well-known for declaring many anti-
American religious verdicts; one of these in particular authorizing the robbing and killing of
Christians anywhere in the world if they do any anti-Islamic activities. Rehman entered the U.S. with a great ease claiming he had a tourist visa. The most interesting fact to mention is that, his name was already on the official U.S. terrorists’ list which is quite astonishing. The Immigration and Naturalization (INS) provided him permanent resident status as a religious leader. Rehman quickly gathered a large number of people as devoted followers in New York by preaching in mosques.167 Ramzi Ahmed Yousaf was another known Islamist terrorist who underwent a trial in the U.S. for conducting acts of terrorism on American soil including the bomb blasts at the WTC in 1993.168
4.3 Unsuccessful Diplomacy before 9/11
After the Oklahoma City terror attack in 1995, President Clinton and other members of Congress stressed the importance to take severe measures to address terrorism which had badly threatened the National Security. The Anti-Terrorism Act was signed in this regard which turned into law in
April 1996. Under this law, $1 billion were allocated to help the smooth running of federal programs to fight terrorism. This Act also predetermined death penalty for terrorists and further fortified penalty for crimes like threatening or frightening the federal employees on official duties. In addition, this Act augmented and set the punishments for plotting and involving explosive devices in order to get possession of nuclear materials in an illegal way, and thus criminalized the use of chemical weapons in all forms.169
167 Dwyer, Kocieniewski, Murphy, & Tyre, 2 Seconds Under the World, New York: Crown Publishers, 1994. 168 Ibid. 169 Thomas P.M.Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map, New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004.
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Under the law, the U.S. Secretary of State can authorize certain groups as terrorist networks based on their notorious and suspicious activities and banned fund-raising of these groups within the U.S. The Secretary of Treasury is allowed to freeze financial assets of these terrorists’ organizations and strictly warned the U.S. citizens not to conduct any business venture with the citizens and states which are being declared terrorists by the U.S. Any person who is reported spokesperson or member of a nominated terrorist organization on the basis can be denied entry into the U.S. on basis of clear evidences against him. The U.S. Attorney General has the official right to deny asylum to suspected terrorists and would ask other peace loving nations to follow suit.170
From February 1997 till September 2001, the U.S. Administration had been trying hard to use diplomatic pressure to persuade the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan to stop providing a safe asylum for Al-Qaeda’s leaders and to expel Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan unconditionally to a country where he could face justice. But all these diplomatic efforts included repetitive warnings and sanctions from the UN time and again failed due to non-serious attitude of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan which was not interested in deporting Osama to any country.
Before 9/11 attacks, the U.S. administrations also pressurized Islamabad to cease its diplomatic relations and all kinds of support to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda who provided safe haven to most wanted terrorist Osama bin Laden. But the U.S. was not able to compel Pakistan leadership to withdraw its support and to reconsider its deep relationship with the Taliban government in Kabul because of very little influence on the country.
170 Op.cit.
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4.4 U.S. National Security Strategy for Al-Qaeda before 9/11
Before 9/11 attacks on the U.S. mainland, the Bush Administration did not pay any attention to the threat from Al-Qaeda and instead was interested in setting the stage for a war with Iraq. It seemed that the Bush Administration was occupied with many other issues other than security, pertaining to employment and health sectors. The U.S. National Security was last on a list of major issues which President Bush planned to deal with in the fall of 2001 at the end of the year.171
Richard Clarke exposes the Bush Administration’s failure and ineffectiveness to deal with the security threat posed by the Al-Qaeda to the U.S. in multiple ways in his book, Against
All Enemies. He says, the Bush Administration was so much preoccupied with Iraq’s possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) before the 9/11 terrorist attacks which had become immediate concern of the Administration to deal with. Condoleezza Rice was then acting as a
National Security Advisor to President Bush interviewed by dozens of journalists between
January and September 2001 clearly reflects that Rice never once showed any uneasiness about the threat posed by Al-Qaeda and its growing network under the leadership of Osama bin
Laden.172
Though Dr. Rice highlighted terrorism in public speeches and interviews throughout
2001; apparently terrorism seemed as a characteristic of only rogue nations such as Iraq. Dr. Rice seemed more interested in promoting President Bush’s National Missile Defence Strategy which
171 Peter Slevin, “Will Cheney Retract His Statements,” Washington Post, 27 September 2003.
172 Richard Clarke, Against All Enemies, New York: Free Press, 2004.
102 the Bush Administration considered more essential and wanted to execute it as a top priority.
President Bush wanted to build a sophisticated missile defence system to defend the U.S.’ mainland against minor missile attacks by so-called rogue states like North Korea, Iraq and
Iran.173
4.5 Al-Qaeda’s Terrorist Activities before 9/11
It is noteworthy that the Bush Administration was already planning an invasion of Afghanistan long before the attacks on the WTC occurred in 2001. Though FBI released 19 names of suspected hijackers but did not point out terrorists in Afghanistan in particular. All suspected terrorists belonged to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and UAE; all across the Middle East without a particular focus on any one region.174
The terrorist attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda were directed against American symbols of power which were deliberately chosen. The embassies in Africa and the U.S. Navy destroyer in
Yemen also constituted a prelude to the main attacks of September 2001 on the U.S. territory.
In December 1994, according to a general perception in the U.S. State Department, international terrorism was waning because of the ongoing Middle East peace process which was underway between Israel and Palestine. The fall of the Soviet Union was another major reason which previously had provided support for terrorist organizations.
In early 1995, police in Manila revealed a plot of terrorists’ activities which was executed by Ramzi Yousaf and the main purpose was to blow up the U.S. airliners while they were flying over the Pacific. In 1995, a car bomb exploded in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia outside the office of the
U.S. Program Manager for the Saudi National Guard. This explosion killed five American
173 Clarke, Against All Enemies, New York: Free Press, 2004. 174 Ibid.
103 citizens and two others nationals. It is widely believed that Osama had warned of a spectacular action against the U.S. Ramzi Yousaf was convicted with 1995 plotting to hijack 12 U.S. airliners.175 This plan was actually devised in Manila but Ramzi somehow managed to escape to
Pakistan in order to get safe haven. Pakistan authorities arrested him and he was immediately handed over to the U.S. for trial.
In 1996, in another attempt, a truck bomb completely knocked down the Khobar Towers apartment complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, which ended up in killing of 19 U.S. servicemen and injured many hundreds. The attack was carried out largely by Saudi Hezbollah, an organization that was known to receive assistance from the government of Iran and later admitted the responsibility of carrying out the terrorist attack.176
Bin Laden moved to Sudan where he continued his terror campaign until 1996. During this period, bin Laden as a leader of Al-Qaeda established a strong foothold and got connected more globally with other terror like- minded groups and networks with the support of its
Sudanese hosts in Iran. Whereas, in Sudan, Al-Qaeda was mainly involved in several terror incidents and guerilla actions which were carried out with the close collaboration of other prime organizations. In May 1996, after getting substantial U.S. pressure, the Sudanese government expelled bin Laden from Sudan and from there he moved to Afghanistan, found asylum and joined hands with the ruling Taliban who welcomed him.177
After moving to Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden accelerated his anti-American campaign and this time with full force and vigor. In an interview with the reporter of the Independent in
July 1996, bin Laden admired terrorist attacks in Riyadh and Dhahran on the U.S. stationed
175 National Research Council, Information Technology for Counterterrorism, Washington: National Academics Press Release, 2003. 176 James Bamford, Body of Secrets, New York: Doubleday, 2001. 177 Ibid.
104 forces by declaring it a commencement of war between the U.S. and Muslims all across the globe. Though he did not take responsibility in a direct manner of executing these attacks but said that he gave his sincere advice to the U.S. much before the attacks to remove its troops from
Saudi Arabia but the U.S. did not pay any heed.178
Analysts who have been observing Al-Qaeda’s structure and activities say bin Laden’s
Al-Qaeda network is very dissimilar from the other terrorist groups that had been previously involved in carrying out bombings and hijackings. It is not a firmly knit group with some clear command and control structure, but in fact it is a loose alliance of different groups who fight for similar objectives and operates across continents with the greatest of ease.179
In the past, it has been observed that the U.S. has hit out widely and with full force at those countries which it thought to be involved in anti-American acts and campaigns either by supporting terrorists or by providing them safe asylum as a violation of International Law in one way or another.
In 1998, Osama bin Laden and four other likeminded leaders publicly gave an anti-
American self-styled fatwa openly stated that it was God’s consent and every Muslim should try his best to kill any American across the globe.180
4.6 Attacks in Kenya and Tanzania
In 1998, a car bomb carrying about three quarters of a ton of explosives was detonated next to the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi. As a result of this lethal explosion, 224 people were killed. Most of them were Kenyans along with a dozen American citizens who were Embassy employees and
178 Independent, July 1996 179 Op.cit. 180 Osama Bin Laden, Available from http://www.adl.org/terrorism_america/bin_l.asp
105 moreover 5,000 people were injured as a result of this attack. Simultaneously, an additional suicide attack was carried out in a similar manner near the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salam,
Tanzania. As a result of this suicidal attack, 11 people were killed and about eighty five were wounded. These attacks signaled the terrorists’ intentions to perpetrate indiscriminate mass slaughter in attacks wherever possible against American targets throughout the world.181
In 1998, the Clinton Administration reacted aggressively towards terrorism attempts after the attacks on two U.S. embassies in Africa. In response to the attacks, the U.S. launched cruise missile attack on 20 August, 1998. The main purpose was to strike a terrorism training complex in Afghanistan and the other one was to destroy a pharmaceutical manufacturing facility in
Khartoum, Sudan. The Clinton Administration assumed that a pharmaceutical company was producing deadly poisonous gas. Both targets were believed to be financed by wealthy Islamic radical Osama bin Laden who had been the most wanted target of the U.S. and was allegedly behind the embassy bombings as well as running an international terrorism network targeting the western world, particularly the U.S.182 Suspicious areas of Afghanistan identified by the U.S. as bin Laden’s concentration of troops and equipment bombarded heavily as a strong warning to bin
Laden from the U.S. Three training bases at Khost were suspected by Americans of being used by a number of militant groups and criminals linked with bin Laden and his network. The
Taliban leader in the aftermath to the U.S. missile attack on Afghanistan said, “O God! We do not have missiles to retaliate; we pray that the Americans make the mistake of landing on our
181 Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, 3rd ed., Cambridge: West View, Press, 1995 and 4th ed., 1999. 182 Osama Bin Laden, Available from http://www.adl.org/terrorism_america/bin_l.asp
106 soil so that we can teach them a lesson.”183 In 2000, the Clinton Administration came up with the view of considering Al-Qaeda as the primary threat to U.S. National Security.
The U.S. administration was in search of an opportunity which could press the Taliban hard to provide them with solid proof to justify their demand of handling over extradition of bin Laden from Afghanistan because of his involvement in terrorist acts against the U.S.
4.7 The Attack on the USS Cole
In 2000, a boat bomb containing explosives attacked and destroyed the USS Cole at Aden,
Yemen. The suicide attackers belonged and linked themselves to Al-Qaeda organization. This attack caused heavy causalities on the American side and many soldiers were seriously wounded.
This suicide attack was planned in a very sophisticated way. The bomb was disguised in a service boat on its way to handle technical repairs on the American destroyer. The two suicide terrorists were dressed in white as other mariners and therefore did not raise any suspicion at all and thus achieved their objective in a well planned manner.184
WTC bombings, the annihilation of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salam and Nairobi, the assault on the USS Cole were significant terrorist acts against the Western world in general and the U.S. in particular. But the U.S. and other western democracies failed to develop any strong alliance against international terrorism which is considered as a grave mistake on their part. Due to this failure, the U.S. and the West failed to develop any coherent strategy to quarantine the states that supported militants, particularly in the Middle East region and CARs.
By then, President Clinton realized the only possible solution of the problem was to engage the Taliban through dialogue otherwise it would not be possible for the U.S. to achieve
183 Ayaz Wazir, “FATA Needs a Change,” The News, January 21, 2009. 184 9-11 Commission Report, July 22, 2004.
107 its aims in the region in the long run. But on the other hand, the Administration also launched covert operations through CIA to capture bin Laden alive or killed and his main party leaders.185
These measures did not impede bin Laden or stop Al-Qaeda from working against the U.S.
During 2000, President Clinton and his main advisors resumed efforts to get Osama bin Laden out from Afghanistan immediately and unconditionally. In this regard, they engaged the
Taliban’s rival including Northern Alliance in order to get enough intelligence information to attack bin Laden directly.
The U.S. law enforcement agencies wanted to actively pursue all possible options which they had in hand to get hold of Osama bin Laden. The U.S. considered the Saudi militant the most dangerous, most wanted and potential international terrorist who could be a serious security threat for the U.S. in the long run. Al-Qaeda’s main objectives were: the expansion of Islamic revolutions throughout the Muslim world; to stop the foreign meddling in the Middle East; and to restrict the U.S. from providing financial, political, and moral support to Israel against
Palestinians.186
After the Afghan war, these Afghan militants or many other groups who joined these militants in the fight against the Soviet Union either returned to their home countries and joined ongoing conflicts in Somalia, the Balkans and Chechnya or as a last resort, they preferred to stay back in Afghanistan. This benefited Al-Qaeda’s global outreach from all perspectives and later helped to build the second and third generations of Al-Qaeda terrorists across the globe because of terrorists’ multiethnic background.
185 www.9-11 commission.gov 186 Osama Bin Laden, Available from www.adl.org/terrorism
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Chapter -5
September 11 and its Aftermath
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks shook the sole super power’s prestige and pride and exposed the flaws pertaining to its national security apparatus. Eliot Cohen, a Security Analyst declared these terrorist attacks on the U.S. mainland as ‘World War IV’ (the Cold War is termed as World War III) and urged for dramatic changes in the U.S. foreign policy.187
Before the 9/11 attacks Al-Qaeda attacks, the Bush Administration took this terror threat lightly and did not opt for any strategy to combat it effectively. After assuming office in January
2001, President Bush decided to relegate the government’s Chief Counterterrorism Officer and shifted the responsibilities of the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism to a non-Cabinet- level position.188 The President’s Deputy Secretary of Defence, Paul Wolfowitz, very easily put down the possibility of future attacks from Al-Qaeda in April 2001 just five months before the
9/11 attack; stating in a meeting “why we are talking about this one man, Osama? There are more important threats to contain, for instance Iraq than Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.”189
When a possibility of terrorist attacks on the U.S. became obvious in early summer 2001, it was too late for the Administration to gauge the intensity of the threat it posed. The Bush
Administration failed completely to deal with the mounting security challenges ahead as the
Clinton Administration did. President Clinton as compared to his successor President Bush was more aware of the threat and put his Administration on alert in late 1999 on receiving word of
187 Stephen Philip Cohen, “World War IV,” Wall Street Journal, 20 November, 2001. 188 Clarke, Against All Enemies, p. 230. 189 Ibid., pp. 230-233
109 warning from the Al-Qaeda’s terrorist plotting against the U.S.190 In fact, the Bush
Administration did not hold any formal meeting of cabinet members on the U.S. National
Security until September 4, 2001. President Bush did not give any positive response to urgent pleas made by Richard Clarke, the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism. Clarke felt the gravity of the matter much before the actual incident and wanted the President to take effective measures before it gets too late.191
The shocking terrorist attacks on the WTC and the Pentagon in the U.S. on September 11,
2001, shocked the whole world which led to the transformation of world politics and had a far- reaching impact on the U.S. foreign and domestic policy. The television images showed billions of viewers all across the globe, how hijacked airliners hit the symbols of U.S. military and economic power with great ease without facing any resistance. This was not only surprising but strange and it put a question mark on Bush Administration’s security strategy and its inability to secure homeland which raised many questions itself. This was the most demoralizing terrorist attack in the history of the U.S. on its mainland as compared to the previous attacks on Pearl
Harbor in 1941, but it distraught the whole American nation as well. Its pride and poise was deeply shattered as a sole superpower in the world with the urge for taking revenge as soon as possible.192
Within a few hours of the deadly terrorist attacks on September 11, the Bush
Administration without any delay announced Osama bin Laden and his network Al-Qaeda functioning from Afghanistan were responsible for the attacks. Al-Qaeda took the responsibility of executing the terrorist attacks.193 A serious situation developed in Islamabad being a
190 Ibid., pp. 205-215. 191 Clarke, Against All Enemies, p. 237 192 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, p. 240. 193 Op.cit.
110 neighboring country of Afghanistan and the only supporter of the Taliban leadership in the region. It was expected that Pakistan had to face hard choices in the days ahead and it was now obvious it had to pay the price of its relations with the Taliban.194 Before 9/11 US efforts regarding terrorism lacked a coherent strategy and for Pakistan terrorism was not an issue, instead they were more concerned with cultivating alliances with the Taliban government which led to their becoming more distant from the U.S.
The 9/11 attacks can be termed as a huge blow and a setback for the U.S. but these attacks should not have come as an astonishing factor as some of the analysts and research scholars had anticipated. The brutal assault which took place on September 11 proved especially outrageous because they were so devastating and unexpected. The terror attacks resulted in heavy direct and indirect economic damages amounting to billions of dollars, and their impact continues to be felt by the American economy in particular and the world economy in general.
The heavy toll of human life of around 3, 000 casualties and the tremendous financial loss as a direct and indirect result of the attacks, the role of media, and the psychological impact on public opinion throughout the world brought a new warfare and identified new measures in coping with terror. The U.S., the only superpower left in post Cold War period, declared a War against Terrorism and placed this at the head of its international priorities.195
After Al-Qaeda destroyed the economic and military symbols in the U.S., the Bush
Administration started a media campaign at home to contain Al-Qaeda. On October 10, 2001, five major U.S. television networks, CNN, Fox, ABC, CBS, and NBC received strict instructions from the White House to censor Al-Qaeda’s video recording. Former U.S. National Security
Advisor Condoleezza Rice urged all the American network organizers not to broadcast videos of
194 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy. p. 240 195 "Chronology of Terror: World Trade Center," Available from http://articles.cnn.com
111 bin Laden. 196 Bin Laden reacted on this by claiming that the White House was afraid and had no courage to stand up and face the reality. He further stated, President Bush and his followers did not want the American people to realize that Muslims are being oppressed in Palestine, Iraq,
Lebanon, Sudan, Somalia, Kashmir, in the Philippines, and throughout the globe. The U.S. was apprehensive of the reaction of young Muslim generation who are aware that they are being exploited by the West in general and U.S. in particular.197
By attacking the two skyscrapers, Al-Qaeda also appeared to punish the Americans for the quest of what they believed as the godless ways of western culture. The victims of this huge destruction not only were Americans but they were Asians, Latin Americans, Europeans,
Muslims, as well as Christians and Jews from all over the world. Although Osama bin Laden himself was the most wanted man and had been the top most terrorist according to the U.S. State
Department but still he would not emerge as a compelling threat to the U.S. National Security until the late 1990s.198
The Pentagon was selected as a target by the terrorists to show the world that the fundamentalist terrorists had the ability to strike at the heart of the U.S. Military Command and
Control structure with a greater ease without facing any major obstacle. The Pearl Harbor brought the U.S.’ entry into World War II and eventually made it the leader of the alliance of
Western democracies who were fighting against the Nazis and militarists. Before entering the
World War II, the U.S. adopted a neutral policy and kept itself aloof from the international politics.199
196 Hugh Miles, Al-Jazeera: How Arab TV News Challenged the World, London: Abacus, 2005, p. 116. 197 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006, p.112. 198 www.history.com/topics/9-11-attacks 199 Ibid.
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9/11 Commission Report noted that these attacks were carried out in a well planned manner. The 9/11 Commission Report explained to the Congress, the Executive Branch and to the American people that containing terrorism had been the top most National Security concern of the Bush Administration in the wake of 9/11.200 By acknowledging the fact that it is not easy to fight terrorism which is not a physical enemy but just an ideology, the Report further says, it is necessary for global community to deny the safe asylums to the terrorists. As it gives way to plan, prepare, and instigate operations with a greater co-operation and convenience and thus terrorists get the ability in return to inflict damage on massive scale.
After these terrorist attacks on American mainland, Americans were left to question the context and what the attacks meant for the nation as a whole. They do have a historical precedent to mention, many Americans undoubtedly reached back to Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl
Harbor on December 7, 1941, when the U.S. was attacked during the World War II- another “day of infamy.”
To make the matter worse, the militant organization, Al-Qaeda which had already been involved in several pre-planned attacks against Americans and its vital symbols all across the world, not only admired the attacks but its leader wholeheartedly accepted its involvement and declared to face the dire consequences as a retaliation by the U.S. Terror is the tool with which bin Laden and his people sought to make their vision a reality. Since the 1990s, Al-Qaeda has been involved in massive large scale-terror attacks carried out all over the world. This terror campaign included the perpetration of terror attacks and mass killings.201
However, bin Laden’s main contribution to Al-Qaeda and his primary objective was the training of cadres whom he sent throughout the world to execute terrorist activities after
200The 9/11 Commission Report, July 17, 2004, p. 361, Available from http://govinfo.library.unt./911/report. 201 Osama Bin Laden, Available from http://www.adl.org/terrorism
113 undergoing training in terror and guerrilla warfare at his camps in Afghanistan which were established mainly for this purpose.
President Bush declared on September 11, 2001, that the U.S. would lead the world to victory over terrorism in a struggle which he termed as the First War of the 21st century against Al-
Qaeda and its followers. He made known his plans to visit New York, location of the WTC Twin
Towers that were destroyed by the terrorist attacks. By showing his sympathy for the American people, he said, he wept and mourned with the U.S. In a phonic conversation with the New York
Governor, George Pataki, and Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, President Bush reaffirmed his steadiness, resolve and strong determination to win the war that had been imposed on America.
President Bush realized that he had a different enemy and a war to tackle with for which he needed the support of the world community.
Under the guise of its famous slogan, War Against Terrorism, the U.S. made it clear to the world that it would strike and retaliate without any discrimination not only against individuals and groups but countries at large who were promoting, encouraging, and providing asylum to the terrorists.
The U.S. could realize in the very beginning that any winning and productive counterstrike against the Taliban would not give way to any useful outcome without the logistic support military co-operation of Pakistan. In a speech to the American nation after the great national tragedy, President Bush explained the fate of the Taliban regime in very plain and clear words not only to the American nation but this message was for the world at large, “We will make no distinction between those who planned these acts and those who harbor them.” 202 The U.S. handed over a list of 7 demands to Pakistan which were as follow: 203
202 www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/President Bush.speech.text 203 Hussain, Frontline Pakistan the Struggle with Militant Islam, pp. 35-36.
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i. To stop immediately all sort of arms shipments and logistic support through Pakistan
to Al-Qaeda.
ii. To provide blanket over flight and landing privileges to U.S. aircrafts.
iii. To offer the naval and air bases to the U.S. adjacent to areas between Pakistan and
Afghanistan.
iv. To share all intelligence and immigration information.
v. To express verbal condemnation of the September 11 attacks and denounce support
for terrorism.
vi. To put an end to the volunteers migration to Afghanistan and immediately cut off the
supply of fuel to the Taliban.
vii. To cut off all the diplomatic links with the Taliban regime and demanded support for
the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) against Taliban to destroy Osama and his
network.
The dramatic events of 9/11 meant that Pakistan had almost no cards left to play given the determination of superpower like the US to force Pakistan to be ‘either with us or against us’ and given those difficult circumstances Pakistan played the bad hand that it was dealt in the best possible way which is to say to the US that we are with you. There was an obvious danger for
Pakistan’s National Security regarding the U.S. declared War on Terror. President Bush declared, “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. Either you stand with civilization and good (U.S.) or with barbarism and evil (Them). Choose and to those nations that choose wrongly beware.”204
204 Ishaque Fani, “Pak-U.S. Relations after 9/11,” Pakistan Vision 5( July 2004), p.69
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The military regime in Pakistan led by President Musharraf sensing the gravity of the situation immediately announced Pakistan’s unconditional support in the form of bases, blanket over flight rights, logistic support and most important of all, intelligence information which was badly needed by the U.S. and its coalition forces. President Musharraf gave details about the consequences, in case Pakistan would not be a part of the U.S. led coalition in Afghanistan against Taliban.
Pakistan’s support was vital for the U.S. in the region because of two important factors:
Pakistan is a neighboring country of Afghanistan and its vast intelligence information, and its close association with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were seen as imperative factors for conducting any military action against terrorists. Pakistan was badly caught in the middle because of the wrong and ineffective policies towards the Taliban regime and it was very obvious that it had to pay the price. Pakistan was now being asked by the U.S. to make a difficult choice to help the
Bush Administration to eliminate the Islamic fundamentalist government in Afghanistan which had a bad record of human rights violation.205
As President Bush made it clear in his speech, “you are either with us or against.”
Similarly, Osama bin Laden in a speech to the Muslims across the globe explained that they too were in a state of war against western civilization. He argued that “People have been divided into two camps; those who support the attacks against the U.S., and those who condemn them.”206
After the attacks of 9/11, the Muslim world itself had been divided. Bin Laden stated that it is essential for Muslims to know the exact nature, struggle, and significance of War against
Islam in order to exactly determine which side to take in the War on Terror led by the western world. It is a well known fact that in a tape released on December 27, 2001 raised controversy.
205 Hussain, Frontline Pakistan the Struggle with Militant Islam, p. 37 206 Wright, The Looming Tower, p.134.
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Bin Laden refused to take any responsibility of his involvement in the September 11 tragedy.
However, later two more videos tapes appeared on the scene to confirm his guilt and commitment in relation to 9/11 attacks. A key point of disputation for bin Laden had been the difference of understanding between the nature of war which he regarded as a War against Islam and not a War on terror. Bin Laden and his likeminded followers saw the U.S.’ War on Terror as an attempt to take revenge from Muslims. He said, “In light of this clear and evident fact
Muslims must know where they stand in relation to this War.”207
Pakistan, while giving unconditional support to the U.S and allied forces, made it clear that the U.S. in any case would not be allowed for any combat mission from Pakistan’s territory.
Pakistan did not offer blanket over-flight rights, instead an air corridor was given to the U.S. planes. After the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan was prepared to cut off diplomatic ties with the Taliban leadership, but the move was delayed on Bush Administration’s advice. Pakistani Ambassador
Maleeha Lodhi was told in Washington by the U.S. Secretary of State Richard Armitage that
Pakistan should keep the diplomatic channels open with the Taliban government until the U.S. invasion was completed in Afghanistan.208
Pakistan Army, being the main actor on stage was left with no other viable option to consider. It could carry on supporting the Taliban or side with the U.S. in its War against
Terrorism. Pakistan’s arch rival, India showed unconditional support for the U.S. military action in Afghanistan and offered Washington base facilities for invasion purpose while taking advantage of Pakistan’s volatile situation. Similarly, Russia and the Central Asian Republics also offered support from their side for the invasion of Afghanistan. Even Washington’s adversary in the region, Iran, which had been an isolated country because of pursuing nuclear program
207 Wright, The Looming Tower, p.35 208 Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, p. 37
117 conveyed its willingness to support the U.S military operation against the Taliban and condemned the terrorist attacks on the U.S. mainland.209
The threat was quite obvious for Pakistan; the country’s essential interests would be in danger if
India was given a free hand to launch international propaganda against Pakistan which had already labeled the Taliban as hand maiden by Pakistan. The other important concern was the
Kashmiri freedom struggle which India tagged as a terrorist insurgency. India threatened that
Azad Kashmir and Pakistani territory could be attacked from the eastern front. Under the pretext of eliminating terrorist bases, 9/11 attacks provided the real opportunity to India to accuse
Pakistan at the international level for supporting terrorists not only within Pakistan but across the border as well. It was known that in the late 1980s, India had planned an attack on Pakistan’s nuclear installations at Kahuta with the close collaboration of Israel. It might again have similar plans of targeting Pakistan’s nuclear assets.210
The United Nations fully supported the U.S. strategy and urged the world community to help the U.S. in eliminating the menace of terrorism. On September 12, 2001, the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) passed a resolution 1368 which called upon all the nations of the world to work together against terrorism and warned those nations who were assisting and providing safe asylum to terrorists and held them equally responsible for their actions.211
In order to seek Pakistan’s help against the Taliban leadership and Al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan, the U.S. came up with a very strict policy. The U.S. directly threatened to take
Pakistan back to the Stone Age if it did not show conformity with the Bush Administration’s
War on Terrorism. While referring to Richard Armitage’s statement in order to seek Pakistan’s
209 Rizwan Hussain, Pakistan & the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan, London: Ashgate Publishing
Limited, 2005, p. 224. 210 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, p. 242 211 Text of UNSC Resolution No. 1368, adopted by the Security Council at its 4370 meeting on September 12, 2001.
118 help against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, President General Musharraf asserted that then ISI
Director General Lieutenant Mehmood Ahmed, who was in Washington at that time, told him on phone about his conversation during a meeting with Armitage. He warned him without any hesitation that if Pakistan chose to be with the terrorists, i.e. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban whom it had been supporting for long, the U.S. would not hesitate to ‘bomb Pakistan back to the Stone
Age.’212
On the one hand, President Musharraf decided to side his country with the U.S. in its War against Terrorism as it seemed Pakistan was left with no other choice to make. On the other hand, President Musharraf kept on trying to persuade the Taliban leadership through diplomatic channels to hand over Bin Laden immediately and without setting any condition on the table. In addition, he requested them to shut down all the terrorist camps in Afghanistan which were believed to be run by Osama. ISI Chief General Mahmood Ahmed arrived in Kandhar on
September 17, 2001, met with Mullah Omar and conveyed him the message of President General
Musharraf.213
On September 14, the U.S. Congress passed a unanimous resolution supporting the use of force to respond to the terrorist attacks carried out by Al-Qaeda. The resolution allowed the
President to “use all necessary and appropriate force and strict measures in form of sanctions against those nations, organizations, or persons he deems planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 or harbored such organizations or persons.” 214 It stated:
212 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, New York: Free Press, 2006, p. 201. 213 Hussain, Frontline Pakistan the Struggle with Militant Islam, p. 43 214 “11 Sep 2001: The Response” House of Commons Library, London. Research Paper, October 3, 2001, pp. 15- 17.
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Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the U.S. as a hostile regime.215
This open-ended and far-reaching power gave the U.S. President authority to go after Al-Qaeda wherever they may be across the globe.
President Musharraf faced huge pressure domestically and from the U.S. as well on how to proceed vis-à-vis U.S. demands and expectations knowing well the consequences in case of refusing cooperation to the U.S. The public mood was not in favor of Pakistan’s U-turn against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In a formal talk to retired generals, diplomats, and politicians on September 18, President General Musharraf made clear that the decision to extend Pakistan’s
“unconditional support” to the U.S. launched OEF was taken under immense pressure and in the face of fears and dire consequences for Pakistan in the long run. He also explained, in case of refusal from Pakistan to join the U.S. led coalition force, a direct military action by a coalition of powerful countries including the U.S., India, and Israel against Pakistan was inevitable which could not be eliminated.216
President General Musharraf had little choice to make because of the fear from India that
Washington might used India against Pakistan, “either allowing India to conquer the Pakistani- held portion of disputed Kashmir or give Delhi a green light to invade all of Pakistan possibly with American assistance.”217 In President General Musharraf’s opinion, “if we did not join the
U.S., it would accept the Indian offer thus creating much problem for Pakistan in comparison to
215 “11 Sep 2001: The Response” House of Commons Library, London. Research Paper, October 3, 2001, pp. 15- 17. 216 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism, London: M. E. Sharpe, 2005, p. 221 217 Eric S. Margolis, “Pervez Musharraf had little choice,” Daily Times, Karachi, October 2, 2006.
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India. He concluded that Pakistan might have the ability to resist an Indian assault but certainly not a joint U.S-Indian offensive.218
On the other hand, India offered unconditional help to the U.S. in the War against
Terrorism. Indian television reported that the government had stated that its offer of full co- operation to the U.S. was categorical and unconditional. In an interview to the Times of India,
Jaswant Singh, the then Minister of External Affairs and Defence had clearly declared, “There have been contacts at all political, operational and executive levels about this.” When he was questioned by a reporter if this meant India would be ready to offer logistical assistance or a staging ground for a U.S. military operation against Afghanistan, Mr. Singh replied ‘Yes,’ the newspaper quoted.219
Indian willingness to offer every kind of assistance to the U.S. in launching attacks against Afghanistan was considered as a clever tactic to place Pakistan in such a delicate situation where strikes could be launched at Pakistan’s nuclear facilities and international support could be mustered for New Delhi’s expanded war in Kashmir by labeling Pakistan as a terrorist state. During the Dushanbe Conference in Tajikistan in 2001, India joined together with the
Central Asian States to increase support to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, the only remaining force in Afghanistan still capable of fighting the Taliban.
President General Musharraf clearly revealed what was at stake for Pakistan in the long run if it would not render unconditional support to the U.S. Pakistan would be marginalized and cut off in the international community which it could not afford because of its poor economic condition. By highlighting India that had already presented its full length cooperation to the U.S. in the War against Terrorism, President Musharraf warned that in case of Islamabad’s refusal to
218 Op.cit. 219 “India offers help to U.S. against Osama,” Dawn, September 15, 2001.
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U.S. demands’ Pakistan would be labeled as a terrorism-supporting country in the region. He further added that Pakistan would lose its long-term international commitment and sympathy on
Indian held Kashmi, and the fate of Pakistan’s hard-won nuclear weapons which it had attained after a great struggle was at risk.220 He explained the consequences in detail for not offering support to the international coalition led by the U.S.
Pakistan was not in a position to balance the American threat and simply could not afford the
U.S. wrath by supporting the Taliban against the U.S. assault. Consequently, Pakistan decided to bandwagon itself with the U.S. against the threats which it was getting from the U.S.
Administration in order to protect its’ national interests. In a televised speech to the nation on
September 19, 2001 President Musharraf clearly explained the reasons of taking this important decision:
In such a situation, a wrong decision can lead to unaffordable losses; what are our critical concerns and important priorities? These are: First of all is the security of the country from external threat. Second is our economy and our efforts for its survival. Third priority is our strategic, nuclear and missile assets. And finally the Kashmir cause.221
While referring to the participation of India in the Conference, Musharraf in his speech to the nation on September 19, 2001 said:
…recently certain countries met in Dushanbe, India was one of them. They do not have a common border with Afghanistan anywhere. It is totally isolated from Afghanistan. In my view, it is not surprising that the Indians want to ensure that if and when the government in Afghanistan changes and anti-Pakistan government should be installed there.222
India left no stone unturned to get Pakistan declared a terrorist state and fit for a pre-emptive strike by the U.S. led coalition. It was because, according to India:
220 Washington Post, Online, September 19, 2001 221 Washington Post, Online, September 19, 2001. 222 Musharraf’s Speech to the Nation on September 19, 2001.
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a. Pakistan possessed WMD
b. Sheltered terrorists and
c. Lacked democracy.223
While delivering a speech to a joint session of Congress on 20 September, 2001, President Bush said, “The U.S. War on Terror begins with Al-Qaeda but it does not end there. This war will be continued until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.” 224
The U.S. was now committed to hunting down a global, financially strong terrorist organization irrespective of international boundaries. The absence of territorial limits which the U.S. did not set before launching military operations in Afghanistan and the vagueness of this authorization would also become highly controversial later.
Similarly, the UN Security Council adopted another resolution on September 28, 2001, that called all the nation states to:
a. Deny safe haven to those who sponsor, prepare, assist, or commit terrorist acts; and
b. Those who are allowing their territories to be used for any terrorist activities against other
nations and innocent civilians around the globe.225
Immediately after the September 11 attacks, NATO invoked Article V for the first time in its history- a decision which requires willingness by all members of the alliance to act ‘Out of
Area.’ Though the Bush Administration realized that OEF in Afghanistan was not a NATO led operation; in fact there was a mutual understanding between the U.S. and its allies that NATO
223 Ahmed, “India-Pak relations after September 11, 2001.” The World after Sep.11, Karachi: University of Karachi, 2003, pp. 185-187. 224 The Washington Post, “Text: President Bush Addresses the Nation.” Available from http://www.washingtonpost.com 225 Text of UNSC Resolution No. 1368, adopted by the Security Council at its 4385 meeting on September 28, 2001.
123 would enhance its strength manifolds to work together in close collaboration with the
International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan (ISAF).226
The U.S. government must identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries. For each, it should have a realistic strategy to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run, using all elements of national power. We should reach out, listen to, and work with other countries that can help.227
The September 11 attacks and the U.S.-led global War on Terrorism and its vigorous campaign against Al-Qaeda has given Pakistan an edge to advance its relationship with Washington which had been on the lowest ebb due to nuclear issue, diplomatic links with the Taliban regime, and the 1999 military take over. The war against Taliban and Al-Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan back in 2001 dramatically enhanced Pakistan’s strategic value to the U.S. in the region and for its western coalition partners. In the post 9/11 world, the U.S. was compelled to reconsider its relations with India which it had been pursuing as an “India-first policy,” in order to contain the
“China Threat” in the region. Above all, the need to fight a fully fledged war against the Al-
Qaeda and the Taliban forces turned Pakistan into a frontline state and forced Washington to maintain a balanced policy toward India and Pakistan, rather tilting towards India.
The U.S. has always been accused on the ground of taking Pakistan as a matter of usefulness to promote its own strategic interests in the region and nothing more than that. There are clear evidences when it comes to the U.S.’ support to Pakistan in a time of need, for instance after the 1965 Indo-Pak War when Pakistan was left alone despite multiple defence agreements.
Another example is the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan when the U.S. left Pakistan on its own to deal with the situation erupted after the withdrawal of Soviet forces. The U.S. not only
226 The UK and the Campaign against Terrorism, September 2002. 227Ibid.
124 abandoned Pakistan but deprived it of substantial economic and military assistance under the pretext of Pressler Amendment.
It is important to mention that none of the hijackers who crashed planes into the Twin
Towers were from Pakistan. It is widely believed Pakistan has always assisted the U.S. whenever it has needed Pakistan’s support to promote its own strategic interest across the region. But as a matter of fact, Pakistan’s role as a U.S. strategic ally was never appreciated and if history is any indicator, it is proved that the U.S. administrations have always favored India over Pakistan to make it a bulwark against Chinese influence in the region. It is interesting to note that India was an ally of the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War period and had been a strong supporter of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan during Red Army’s invasion of Kabul in the 1980s.228
Another important source of disagreement between Pak-U.S. relations is the difference of perceptions and divergent interests. Both partners have their own but different interests in the region pertaining to their respective roles against the War on Terrorism. The U.S. strongly believes that the Pakistani Army is going after those terrorist groups who pose security threat to
Pakistan’s own existence while doing almost very little to get rid of terrorist groups that are a serious security threat to the American strategic interests in Afghanistan and ISAF. According to one analyst, “These terrorists are closely allied to Al-Qaeda and Tehrik-i- Taliban Pakistan
(TTP). The Haqqani family runs the Manba Ulom Madrassa in the village of Danda Darpa Khel, which is considered a hub of terrorist activities and is known for providing safe asylum to terrorists.”229
228 Hasnat, “Hillary Converse with Real Pakistan,” The Nation, November 15, 2009. 229 Bill Roggio, “U.S. hits Haqqani Network in North Waziristan, kills 8.” Available from http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/
125
As time went on, it had become apparent the main aim of the Bush Administration had been to galvanize American public resentment and outrage against the Muslims world across the globe. This was done to justify the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq which the Muslim world saw as an attempt to capture oil wealth of the Middle East and energy resources of Central Asia to pursue its unilateral corporate agenda which in no way is justified when it comes to illegal invasion of Iraq in 2003.”230
Due to geopolitical landscape of Pakistan, and its intelligence information on Al-Qaeda network, the U.S. was desperately looking for Pakistan’s support to fight the terrorists in neighboring Afghanistan. Though, on the eve of 9/11, the U.S. and Pakistan were not on good terms. On the political front, Pakistan’s engagement with the U.S. led War against Terrorism proved to be a blessing in disguise as it did for President General Zia-ul-Haq in 1980s. President
Musharraf received recognition and legitimacy for his military rule from the Bush
Administration. His categorical submission to protect the U.S. strategic interests in the region were all well acknowledged by the U.S. Administration and duly rewarded afterwards.231
Before 9/11, President Musharraf’s military regime had been the main source of diplomatic and military assistance for the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan. Musharraf was charged with many accusations by the U.S. as he brought an end to the democratic process in the country; he assisted and extended full support to militant Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Kashmir; and he advanced Pakistan’s nuclear program, etc. The extended support from the U.S went to such an extent where the U.S. lifted sanctions that were a basic source of disturbance in Pak-U.S. relations. These sanctions had been imposed on Pakistan in the
230 Sajjad Shaukat, “Whereabouts of Osama Detected,” The Statesman, December 8, 2009. 231 Hilali, “U.S. Policy Towards Pakistan After September 11, 2001 and its Implications.” IPRI Journal, Winter 2009, Vol.9, No. 1, p.149
126 aftermath of its nuclear explosions in 1998 and President Musharraf’s military takeover in 1999 which brought the end of democratic era.
After getting much needed logistic and intelligence support for OEF, the Bush
Administration regarded President Musharraf as a “courageous” and “visionary” leader. In exchange of his pro-American approach, President Musharraf had been pleased with the U.S. diplomatic backing for his military regime and massive substantial military and economic aid which Pakistan needed badly due to sanctions and poor economic profile of the country under
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.
President Musharraf surprised the U.S. Administration by showing no reluctance in taking the crucial decision. He extended full support on behalf of Pakistan to the War against Terrorism. He promptly said yes to all demands set by the U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell.232 On October
7, 2001, the U.S. started OEF and by November 12, 2001, Kabul had fallen without showing any strong resistance to U.S led NATO forces. Pakistan provided the U.S. access to numerous military bases in order to facilitate and it in establishing a number of facilities including
Intermediate Staging Bases at Jacobabad, Pasni, Dalbandin and Shamsi- the most required bases by the U.S. Along with this, Jacobabad and Shamsi bases were provided to U.S. and coalition forces which were frequently used by over 50 aircraft and 2,000 coalition military personnel in all that were stationed at these bases.233 The level of support could be demonstrated from the fact that initially Pakistan provided fuel to aircraft, averaging 100,000 gallons per day without any prescribed criteria for reimbursement mechanism. Pakistan provided over 35,000 Pakistani military troops as a security force for protection of these bases234 and it also increased security along its border with Afghanistan that resulted in the capturing of 420 high value and most
232 Ayaz Amir, “A Passion for Selling Ourselves Cheaply,” Dawn, 21 September 2001 233 C. Christine Fair, The Counter-terror Coalitions, Washington: RAND Corp, 2004, pp. 28-32 234 Ibid.
127 wanted Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders by the U.S. Finally, Pakistan provided intelligence information pertaining to Taliban and Al-Qaeda to coalition forces, most notably human intelligence which coalition forces desperately needed to harmonize its technical intelligence in order to get the maximum with its partnership with Pakistan.235
U.S. National Security Strategy required Pakistan to fight terrorism with all available tools including military, intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement, information, finance and economic support:
One of the four short-term priorities of action in combating terrorism strategy is to prevent terrorists from exploiting ungoverned or under-governed areas – including physical, legal, cyber, and fiscal safe havens.236
In return for Pakistan’s unconditional support, the U.S. granted $1 billion worth aid and waived off $1 billion in external debt. In June 2003, the U.S. also declared a $3 billion aid package for
Pakistan; this amount was to be divided equally between economy and military. Between 2002 and 2005, the U.S. provided Pakistan with US$ 2.63 billion which was a direct aid.237
The U.S. considers Pakistan as a vital ally in the War against Terrorism. Keeping in view its broader strategic paradigm in the region, the U.S. has acknowledged the importance of
Pakistan’s military operations in South and North Waziristan in order to eliminate the Taliban and Al-Qaeda’s network. To compensate Pakistan’s military needs for this ongoing operation in the Tribal areas of Pakistan, the U.S. created the Coalition Support Fund (CSF) which was purely meant to support and assist Pakistan in meeting the expenditures of fighting terrorism in its own territory. Pakistan received nearly two-thirds, 60 percent of the money from the U.S. as a part of
235 Fair, The Counter-terror Coalitions, pp. 28-32. 236 Bush, National Strategy for Combating Terrorists (Washington DC, September 2006), pp. 20-22.
237 K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pak-U.S. Relations.” Congressional Research Service, February 10, 2006.
128 the CSF.238 Robert Gates, a former U.S. Secretary of Defence emphasized the importance of CSF funds that have been given to Pakistan’s army keeping in view its growing needs to combat terrorism and to increase its effectiveness in the battle field.239
In order to boost Pakistan’s military capability to defeat terrorism, Washington began to provide generous military and economic assistance, including debt forgiveness; thus qualifying it for speedy U.S. sales and grants, a wide array of military equipment, including military transport aircrafts, surveillance radars, air traffic control systems, patrol aircraft anti-armor missiles giving
Pakistan a tremendous boost to its military capabilities that can be used in the fight against terrorist enclaves in Pakistan.240
Much of the logistical support from Pakistan was initially provided to the U.S. led coalition forces without any prescribed agreement on both sides keeping aside all the terms and conditions to which extent Pakistan territory should be used as a coalition partner in this War against Terrorism. The military leadership under President General Musharraf showed no hesitation and charged no user fees as transportation charges which is normally required for offering such concessions thus indicating Pakistan’s full support to the U.S. war.241
The invasion of Afghanistan could not have been possible without the co-operation and active support of Pakistan. The U.S. administration praised Pakistan for its contribution to the
War on Terror. The Commander of the U.S. Central Command, General Abizaid, admitted this fact in January 2004, that Pakistan has done more for the U.S. in its fight against Al-Qaeda than
238 Azeem Ibrahim, “U.S. Aid to Pakistan—U.S. Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption” Belfer Center Discussion Paper 2009, Harvard Kennedy School, July 2009, p. 6. 239Robert Gates, Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 6, 2008, Available from http://armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2008
240 Rajshree Jetley, Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics , London: Routledge, 2009, p. xvii. 241Fair, The Counter-terror Coalitions, p.15
129 any other coalition partner. By acknowledging its sacrifices and contribution, the U.S. declared
Pakistan as its key ally and upgraded its status in June 2004 as a “major non-NATO ally.” 242
In the 1990s, American policy makers and lawmakers strongly viewed Pakistan as a state that was not only readily losing strategic importance in the region but on the other hand, it was also increasingly becoming untrustworthy partner and a “failed state.” There were growing signs of “Talibanization,” that is, the growing strength of radical/militant Islam within Pakistan.
Pakistan showed unwillingness to sign NPT and thus posed a serious challenge and a threat to the U.S.’ interests in this region. From the U.S. perspective, extending diplomatic support to the
Taliban despite of getting severe criticism from international community meant promoting terrorism. In this given context, Pakistan was becoming another rogue state like Iran and North
Korea.243
The September 11 attacks dramatically changed the regional situation specifically the
U.S. strategy regarding South Asia. The U.S. which had been considering China as “foremost threat” now became much concerned to the Global War on Terrorism (GWoT).
There were several reasons from Pakistan’s perspective for aligning itself with the U.S. led global campaign against terrorism:
i. Pakistan wanted to undo India’s propaganda to isolate Pakistan on the international
front. As India claimed from time to time that the Taliban were hand-made-en of
Pakistan.
ii. The U.S. not only had received Russia, China’s support but gathered Muslim
countries support against terrorism. That was a grave situation; it was not possible for
Pakistani leadership to go against the mainstream.
242 Kronstadt, “Terrorism in South Asia.” Congressional Research Service: Report for Congress, December 13, 2004. 243 Douglas Jehl, “Pakistan Is Facing Terrorist Listing,” New York Times, April 25, 1993.
130
iii. President Bush made a clear distinction among the countries to join the U.S. for its
War against Terrorism or to join the Taliban who represented terrorism. He also
warned the nations throughout the globe that provided alleged asylum to terrorist or
had become breeding ground to promote terrorists activities.
By waiving the Glenn, Symington and Pressler amendments, the Bush Administration gave official approval to the military coup of President General Musharraf. 244 Washington also showed willingness to rearrange Pakistan’s outstanding debt to the U.S. which was worth $400 million. It also provided support for loan rescheduling through financial institutions, including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Inter-American Development Bank
(ADB), thus facilitating and giving relief to Pakistan’s $38 billion foreign debt.245
Washington also offered an aid package of nearly $1 billion to Islamabad for numerous purposes including, border control, refugee assistance and poverty alleviation.246By the end of
2001, IMF and the Paris Club showed their satisfaction pertaining to Pakistan’s unconditional support and pronounced that they were satisfied with Pakistan’s economic progress and further relieved its foreign debt and offered fresh credits subsequently.247The Pakistani government was aware of the prime significance of its contribution in the War against Terrorism.
5.1 Growth of Talibanization
The Taliban movement emerged in Afghanistan as a result of continuous political instability and breakdown of administrative machinery after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.248A small group of students who called themselves the Taliban became successful in bringing so called
244 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, pp. 247-250. 245 Ibid. 246 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, pp. 247-250. 247 “Pakistan and the U.S.,” The Economist, September 22, 2001. 248 Begum, The Impact of Soviet-Afghan War on Pakistan, p.200
131 peace, law and order to the Afghan society. Later, they imposed Sharia Law in Afghanistan which not only received popularity from the Afghan masses but also gave their government legitimacy to stay in power. The Afghan Taliban not only received homegrown support of the people but they had close links with various seminaries and clerics across the border in adjacent provinces of Baluchistan and Khyber Pashoonkhwa (KPK) of Pakistan as well. The Taliban declared Mulla Omer as their Amir ul Momineen (Commander of the Faithful).
After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. retaliated with full force against Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces when it invaded Afghanistan. The leftovers were thought to have escaped from
Afghanistan and later found safe shelter in Pakistan’s Tribal areas for executing terrorist activities.249
Since 9/11 attacks, the U.S. and its allies have killed or captured top most wanted Al-
Qaeda’s leadership, destroyed their secret hideous throughout Afghanistan and relentlessly brought damage to the organization.250 The U.S. intelligence agencies have been frequently reported attacks designed by Al-Qaeda. Working with close collaboration of other overseas security services, the CIA effectively broke up some of Al-Qaeda’s major network but bin
Laden’s organization remained intact and has been effective thus posing a serious threat to the world in general and to the U.S. in particular. Before 9/11, many officials of the Clinton and
Bush administrations were of the view that the U.S. should have invaded Afghanistan much before 9/11.
Pakistan in order to curb and eliminate safe havens of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the
North-west province launched numerous military operations in its Tribal areas. Though these
Tribal people had never accepted the presence of Pakistan Army and in order to show their anger
249 Time Magazine, 1st October, 2001, pp.33-35. 250 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fight against Terrorism, Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Deputy Spokesman,” Press Release, February 19, 2002.
132 they retaliated against Pakistan’s military operations in the Tribal areas. In 2007, with the help of
Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda members, the Tribal people formed their own militant terrorist organization which is known as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Taliban movement of Pakistan).251
Baitullah Mehsood was chosen as the first leader of this organization. TTP is known for carrying out most deadly suicide attacks across Pakistan, especially targeting military personals. These terrorist attacks have further given rise to massive violence, hatred, sectarianism, extremism and militancy in Pakistani society.
Since 2004, soon after Pakistan’s military decision to conduct operations in order to eliminate terrorist networks from Pakistani territory, the country has observed the emergence of various belligerent groups within Pakistani territory and called themselves as “Pakistani Taliban.” They have not only successfully asserted their power but they have a leading role in propagating self- originated Islamic Shariah within large number of people in the Pashtun belt. There are now about more than fifty splinter groups of the Taliban making it difficult for the law enforcement agencies to deal with the situation. On the other hand, it is not wrong to say that many Pakistani
Taliban commanders have carried out deadly offensive operations against Pakistani security forces.
251 Hussain, Frontline Pakistan the Struggle with Militant Islam, pp.143-145.
133
Pakistan Military Casualties 2001-2011 In August 2009, Baitullah Mehsud was killed in a U.S. drone attack. After his death, Hakimullah
Mehsud assumed the leadership of the TTP and executed deadliest terrorist attacks against
Pakistani security forces. Hakimullah Mehsud was killed in a drone attack conducted by the U.S. on 1 November, 2013. The rise of these militant groups and their agenda of forming state within the state has posed a very serious threat to Pakistani security and survival. Today the north western part is experiencing heavy drone strikes which are being carried by the U.S.252
Following the events of 9/11 and fall of the Taliban, remnants of militant groups have unleashed a new spate of violence and unrest in Pakistani society. These militants have inspirations to continue Jihad, as one of the militants when interviewed said, “We would not stop
252 Tom Coghlan, Zahid & Jeremy, “Secrecy and denial as Pakistan lets CIA use airbase to strike militants,” Times, 17 February 2009.
134 even if India gives us Kashmir …. We will also bring Jihad here (in Pakistan). We want to see the Taliban style regime here.”253
The so-called trend of bringing militancy to Pakistani society has continued since then.
As Pakistan joined the U.S. led global campaign against terrorism, terrorists’ groups consider
Pakistan as their vital enemy and have waged an un-declared war against Pakistan. In fact, even many hardliners who are deadly against Pakistani government policies support these radicals to a greater extent and offer refuge to them.254
The process of Talibanization started gaining momentum in Pakistan by 2005 and these militants exerted strong influence beyond the Tribal areas calling themselves Pakistani Taliban.
These terrorists directly challenged the writ of the government right in the heart of Pakistani capital Islamabad and the siege of Lal Masjid operation in July 2007255 was the most alarming incident for the government. This episode resultantly ended with a military crackdown against terrorists. The siege of the mosque, which according to official sources resulted in just over 100 deaths, was the intense outcome from the militants who showed resentment of military presence in Waziristan.256 The trend of targeting security forces, government offices, installations, and a range of soft targets (shrines, markets, mosques, churches, schools, and other public spaces) gained momentum as time went by.
The Taliban are moving beyond FATA in the settled Tribal districts of Bannu, Kohat and
Dera Ismail Khan where they are in a position to challenge the writ of the government and are imposing their own ideology thus posing a serious threat for both civil and military leadership.257
253 Jessica Stern, “Pakistan’s Jihad Culture,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 6, Nov-Dec 2000. 254Talat Masood, “Extremism:Causes and Consequences,” Dawn 19 June 2007, p-6. 255 Geo TV Program, “Apas ki Baat-Najam Sethi k Saath.” 256 Interview with serving officer of Pakistan Army, 11 February 2013. 257 Abbas, “Increasing Talibanization in Pakistan's Seven Tribal Agencies.," Terrorism Monitor, Volume V, Issue 18, 27, September, 2007, pp. 1-5
135
The Government of Pakistan seems helpless to control these elements and clearly reveals its ineffectiveness to tackle them with an iron hand. The Swat uprising that was successfully put down in 1994 resurfaced after 9/11, attracted many hard core radical insurgents who were battle- hardened militants from Waziristan, Bajaur and the adjacent district of Dir.258 The military campaigns of Swat and South Waziristan have proved nothing but only destructive outcomes.
The militants have targeted security forces, police, politicians and brought extensive damage to the infra structure thus creating pro-Taliban Islamic militancy.259
The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 not only devastated the Taliban but destroyed their strong foothold in Kabul too. Recognizing that this force would remain significant for maintaining Pakistani influence in Afghanistan, the U.S. accused Pakistani intelligence agencies as they secretly welcomed them on Pakistani soil in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks. President
General Musharraf’s strategy of working with the Bush Administration to defeat terrorism worked as an effective strategy to a greater extent in the initial phase but lost momentum in the later phase. With the passage of time, American demands to abandon the Taliban became more resolute, and the Taliban also grew upset with Pakistan on this double game strategy. As it becomes more obvious to the Taliban that Pakistan would be used as an instrument to promote the U.S. objectives in the region, the Taliban came up with more harsh and severe agenda to weaken law and order situation in Pakistan.
The U.S. National Security Strategy required Pakistan to fight terrorism with all available tools including military, intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement, information, finance and economic support:
258 Abbas, “Increasing Talibanization in Pakistan's Seven Tribal Agencies,” pp. 1-5 259 Ibid.
136
One of the four short-term priorities of action in combating terrorism strategy is to prevent terrorists from exploiting ungoverned or under-governed areas – including physical, legal, cyber, and fiscal safe havens.260
Although the U.S. administration all along have been pressurizing Pakistan to ‘do more,’ and it is not satisfied with Pakistan’s current role as a frontline state in this ongoing War on Terrorism.
On the other hand, the Obama Administration and the Congress recognized that the difficult war in Afghanistan requires Pakistan’s close co-operation and coordination in logistics, specifically human and military intelligence in order to get the required objectives from the War on Terror.
Nevertheless, Islamabad has always rejected Washington’s diplomatic pressure to ‘do more.’
President Bush on June 17, 2004, declared Pakistan a “major non-NATO ally of the U.S. for the purposes of the Arms Export Control Act.” BBC explained:
This move is in recognition of Islamabad's primary contribution in the fight against Al- Qaeda from every perspective, and is being seen and acknowledging as Washington's way of saying thank-you. Pakistan will now enjoy a special security relationship with the U.S… Pakistan's new status means that it is now eligible for getting a series of benefits in the areas of foreign aid and defence co-operation, including priority delivery of defence items to enhance Pakistan’s military strength to combat terrorism in most effective way…. (but this) symbolism is more important than the substance itself.261
The 9/11 attacks changed the whole situation vis a vis Pakistan’s policy of ‘Strategic Depth’ in
Afghanistan.262 Since the War against Terrorism has started in 2001, Pak-U.S. military and intelligence authorities have shared intelligence information on terrorist groups and their activities on border areas which are considered to be safe places for the terrorists to seek asylum.
The U.S security and intelligence forces have conducted joint operations, i.e. drone attacks in
Pakistan’s Tribal areas with close cooperation and assistance of Pakistani security and
260 Bush, National Strategy for Combating Terrorists, Washington DC, September 2006, pp. 20-22.
261 “Bush names “Pakistan major ally,” BBC News, 17 June, 2004, Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk 262 Ashok K. Behuria, The Rise of Pakistani Taliban and the Response of the State, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 31, Issue No. 5, p.703.
137 intelligence agencies in order to eliminate Al- Qaeda and the Taliban hideouts. The U.S military authorities and the Afghan government have been constantly mounting pressure on Pakistani government to make effective measures to flush out the Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements that take sanctuary in Pakistan's Tribal areas and have carried out violent suicidal campaigns against
NATO and ISAF forces in Afghanistan.263
Pakistan’s categorical choice to support the U.S invasion of Afghanistan by providing
Pakistan’s territory and airspace brought short and long term important consequences.
Undoubtedly, the U.S. has poured massive military and economic grant to Pakistan in the last few years including the rescheduling of its international debt that has been a great source of relief for Pakistan from economic perspective. The U.S. also attended Pakistan’s security needs and its financial requirements. To meet military requirement, the U.S. authorized a $ 1.2 billion arms- sale package to Pakistan that includes roughly $950 million for the purchase of P3C Orion aircraft. Besides, in 2006, Pak-U.S. arms purchase deal reached US$3.5 billion which made
Pakistan the largest receiver of the U.S. arms sale in the world that year.264
There is an intense debate over Pakistan’s role as a frontline state in on-going War against
Terrorism. The U.S. Congress that has been viewing Pakistan as an ally who has joined this War against Terrorism as a matter of compulsion and not as a matter of choice. Pakistan’s due
Coalition Support Funds (CSF) have been delayed on one or the other pretext thus making it obligatory for Pakistan to come up to the U.S. expectations if it needs continuous flow of aid to its defense and economic sectors. However, it is quite clear that up till now, no Pakistani government has been powerful and successful enough to tackle militancy in the autonomous
Tribal areas of Pakistan. It is evident from the fact that Pakistan military has intervened in the
263 Hasan Askari, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy”, PILDAT Briefing Paper, April 2004
264 P. Buxbaum, “U.S. Pakistan Personality Politics,” ISN Security Watch, Jan 10, 2008.
138
Tribal Areas for the very first time in the history of Pakistan and it has faced severe resistance to combat insurgents.
After 9/11, the Tribal people of Pakistan perceive this War against Terrorism as War against Islam. They have severely resisted the intervention of Pakistan Army and are strictly against government’s policy of aligning with the U.S. Tribal areas have semi-autonomous status that dates back to the days of British colonial rule of the Sub-continent. These Tribal people have a history of not welcoming and accepting foreign forces on their soil and have refused to go along with any sort of intervention. So they show no sincerity and have never been on negotiating terms with the government especially in the presence of Pakistani Army there. In addition, due to numerous ongoing military operations, they have suffered numerous hardships.265
Mr. Ghalib Iqbal, Pakistani Ambassador in France, says “the U.S. War against Terrorism has affected Pakistani socio-economic fabric. It has created negative impact. We have lost 78 billion dollars as investment in economic terms. Deficit of energy is growing high which is further adding problems. Socially, the country has gone under a negative change due to terrorists’ acts; the whole nation psyche has become a trauma. Coalition Support Funds are being delayed on one or the other pretext. The U.S. has not given fair acknowledgement to Pakistan’s role as a frontline state which has added to anti-American feelings in Pakistani society. We have done more than any other coalition country led by the U.S. in this War against Terrorism.
Pakistani security forces have killed 1,000 Al-Qaeda’s top wanted leaders and we have captured more than 1,000 terrorists; we have frozen $1 million worth of assets of terrorists.”266
265 “Pakistan's IDP Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities,” International Crisis Group, June 3, 2009. 266 Interview with H.E. Mr. Ghalib Iqbal , Pakistani Ambassador in Paris, France, 30 May, 2013
139
He further added, that 2008 was the year when perception within the country started changing due to numerous suicide blasts. Pakistan’s sacrifices are not acknowledged by the
Western world. In fact they do not understand what sort of price we are paying as a nation. He said, “The animal life in the Western world is very precious but a human life loss in Pakistan in the War against Terrorism is not even considered worth a condolence message.” By referring to
Raymond Davis case, Osama bin Laden’s death and Salala incident of 2011, he termed three incidents in a row as “a clear violation of Pakistani laws and sovereignty.”
He added, “We cannot quit this War against Terrorism, we have to clear the mess.” By commenting on Pakistani elections held in May 2013, he said, “if election is the yard stick of measuring any country’s maturity, then it is a shining example for the West to understand that people in Pakistan have rejected extremists and militant tendencies and have voted for progressive, liberal and enlightened leadership in Pakistan.” He welcomed Government’s initiative of holding talks with terrorists. Answering to drone attacks and media’s responsibility in Pakistan, he said “We are extremely against drone attacks and we have condemned them at every forum. Media is not playing a constructive role but playing Politics vs. Terrorism. While answering another question, he said, “perceptions are not based on in-depth knowledge, perceptions are usually based on superficial knowledge half cooked half baked which aims to distort the fact while in-depth fact cannot distort information.”267
Pakistan government’s efforts to exert military control and the use of force against militants in FATA have met little successes so far. Pakistan’s military operations in the Tribal areas of Pakistan are in no way a success story. In fact several hundred Pakistani soldiers and officers fighting militant insurgents are being killed by these terrorists since the beginning of
267 Interview with H.E. Mr. Ghalib Iqbal , Pakistani Ambassador in Paris, France, 30 May, 2013
140 operation till 2016, including ambushes, explosive mines attacks, and poor counterinsurgent tactics by the military establishment. After acknowledging the failure of military strategy against the terrorists, President General Musharraf tried to seek diplomatic negotiations with these warring factions and made several “peace agreements with Tribal leaders,” who in fact have had strong influence in the area. Under the “Miran Shah Peace Agreement” for North Waziristan concluded in 2006, the Pakistani Army had to release all prisoners and weapons that it had already seized. The Army showed willingness to pay reimbursement for maneuver damages in order to retain a few established garrisons. The other conditions from terrorists included the dismantling of temporary checkpoints established by Pakistan Army in the area, and to stop patrolling within FATA. This agreement offered concessions in order to bridge a wide gap between people of FATA and Pakistan Military.268
Militants never showed compliance to the peace deals which they brokered with Pakistan military and violated these peace accords from time to time. By August 2007, the peace deals had widely collapsed and Musharraf’s government was once again looking for the use of force and resorted to military options available to get the required results.269What become known and has been a disturbing factor is the loose dispensation and lack of trust between Pakistani military and Tribal militants. While on the other hand, in some Tribal areas, the Pakistani Army concentrated on targeting hard core extremists who have been a potent threat, while the lashkars acted as localized forces to clear the remnants of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban out from their areas with the close collaboration of Pakistan Army.270
268 Government of Pakistan, FATA Sustainable Development Plan, p. 14, 55-57 269 Ibid. 270 Perlez & Zubair, “Pakistan Uses Tribal Militias In Taliban War.” New York Times, 24 Oct 2008, www. ebird.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20081024635683.html , pp. 1-5
141
After years of engagement in the region with Pakistan as a frontline state, the U.S.
Department of Defence in December 2007 started a review of military aid given to Pakistan which reportedly found that while the U.S. was spending “significantly” to enhance Pakistan-
U.S. co-operation it was “not seeing any results in a long run.”271 This strict observation brought a drastic change in releasing of military funding by the Department of Defence and the basic focus remained on the training of Pakistani forces in KPK region and building of a counterinsurgency force. The U.S. is supposed to refund the required grant under the CSF to
Pakistani military.
only in the cost incurred in fighting terrorism, over and above its normal military costs. … The United States has been assuming that Pakistan will use the funds for counterterrorism. But up until early 2009, the U.S. has given Pakistan the funds without attempting to set particular outcomes against terrorism which it expects Pakistan would deliver.272
From 2002 to 2007, the U.S. Congress approved more than $9.7 billion worth of arms sales for
Pakistan, and the U.S. “has traditionally assumed that the military equipment will be used for counterterrorism in the region.”273
Aijaz Ahmed, Minister, Chef de Mission Adjoin, Embassy of Pakistan, Paris, while describing
Pak-U.S. relations says, “The War against Terrorism has redefined and impacted our relations with the U.S. The U.S. has engaged Pakistan as a full time ally in this war. Afghanistan is a difficult country to deal with and if history is any indicator, Afghan people have never allowed anyone to rule them.”274 While emphasizing the importance of geo-strategic location of Pakistan,
271 Azeem, “U.S. Aid to Pakistan—U.S. Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption,” pp. 8-10
272 Ibid. 273 Ibid.
274 Interview with Muhammad Aejaz, Minister Chef de Mission Adjoin, Embassy of Pakistan, Paris, 15th June , 2013
142 he claimed, “Pakistan’s geo-strategic importance is a vital factor not only for the regional powers but for the global powers which has enhanced Pakistan’s importance manifold to the U.S.
Pakistan has important role to play socially, economically and politically.” He said, “Media is playing a mixed role which is a commercial based profitable organization, and the enhancement of the economic activity is the only way of raising living standard of poor Afghans.” He shared a very important piece of information pertaining to Afghan people’s social stratification, “The top most concern for the Afghan people comprises of 3 set of priorities: first, economic activity; second, tradition, and third, religion. They have never disturbed this order throughout their history but since this War against Terrorism started, this set of priorities has been in disorder.” 275
By ruling out the possibility of war at every front, he says “talks with the Taliban are inevitable, the other option is to create a buffer zone but that would later turn into potential zone for the terrorists that of course may not be a viable option from any perspective. A meaningful dialogue should be conducted because a stable and peaceful Afghanistan is in our interest.” He emphasized that the only solution of the problem is enhancement of economic activity in
Afghanistan. He further added, “Pakistan today is in such a situation where the decision of withdrawal from the U.S. led War on Terrorism should not be taken in a hasty manner. We have to disengage gradually by solving many important problems rather than leaving them behind.”
Discussing the role of Pakistan Military in this on-going War against Terrorism, he says,
“Pakistan military role has been commendable throughout history of Pakistan, they have always strengthened the fragile political system of Pakistan whenever needed.” Referring to Pakistan’s political situation he states, there is a well-known saying for Pakistan, “whenever a democrat takes power, he tends to be a dictator and when dictator takes power, he tends to become a
275 Ibid.
143 democrat.” He emphasized, “Establishment is the 5th pillar of state in Pakistan.” He concluded by saying, “people of Pakistan are ultimate guardian of Pakistan’s sovereignty and integrity and national interest is supreme. Post Malala period has brought a radical change in the general perception and election results of 2013 have further augmented this change in masses and only those parties have come up to the surface who have joined masses’ sentiments.”276
According to Mr. Aijaz, “every institution in Pakistan has undergone a huge transition.
Drone attacks have targeted some high value top most wanted leadership of Al-Qaeda and drone strikes are restricted to FATA region. The world should understand that Pakistan is not the part of the problem but a part of solution.”277
ISI has had a remarkable impact in the region of FATA and KPK. Co-operating with the
CIA in the peak days of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the main primary task fell on ISI to equip the Mujahedin with sophisticated weapons to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and later in 1990s. They backed the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan to contain the powerful warlords that appeared on the political horizon when the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from
Afghanistan. Since 9/11, ISI has come under heavy attacks by the U.S. administrations with frequent allegations from time to time that ISI operatives have been providing money, supplies, and above all assistance required to Taliban commanders.278
While the Afghan government under President Karzai faced quite a difficult situation because the main elements in the insurgency are Pashtun themselves which have been a troubling source for the Afghan government to tackle with. The expelled Taliban leaders are still revealing themselves as representatives of the Pashtun and are still determined to fight and get their
276 Interview with Muhammad Aejaz, Minister Chef de Mission Adjoin, Embassy of Pakistan, Paris, 15th June , 2013 277 Ibid. 278Mazzetti & Eric Schmitt, “Afghan strikes by Taliban get Pakistan’s help,” The International Herald Tribune , March 25, 2009, Available from http://www.iht.com/
144 country back from foreign coalition forces led by the U.S stationed in Afghanistan. Whether their actions have some validity on the ground or not, it has always been used to reinforce perceptions among the Afghan people at large and specifically among those Pashtun who live inside FATA and KPK region and have been traditional rulers of Afghanistan.
The Taliban leaders used this prevailing perception as a fuel for recruitment of youngsters in their organization and for gathering support in the Pashtun territories not only inside Afghanistan but across the border areas in Pakistan too. Consequently, the Taliban gradually started aligning themselves with various affected groups who think that they have not been given due status and rights due to one or the other pretext. These Taliban are headed by former Mujahidin commanders who are the main source of unrest in the society. They are quite active in different sections of Afghanistan and FATA and execute insurgency against foreign forces inside Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Afghanistan government considers these Taliban and their allies as traitors who are trying to take back power by applying different tactics primarily the use of violence. These elements blame Pakistan for providing safe havens to these insurgents who are a threat to Afghanistan in general and NATO and ISAF forces in particular.
In July 2008, Afghanistan accused Pakistan’s Intelligence Service and Army are behind the
Taliban-led insurgency which in turn creates unrest in Afghanistan, calling Pakistan’s security forces “the world’s biggest producers of terrorism and extremism.”279
It is strongly believed that most of the Taliban leadership and followers of major
Mujahedin commanders of the Soviet Afghan War during the 1980s have taken sanctuary in
FATA among their fellow tribesmen due to close ethnic ties where they are able to carry out military operations against the U.S. and Afghan government alike in a very sophisticated and
279 Associated Press, July 14, 2008
145 effective way. In the past, the tradition has been strictly observed that the Afghan Taliban have always avoided getting into direct conflict with their Pakistani hosts in the southern part of
FATA. But this tradition is now shifting.
In the northern section of Pakistan, in Bajaur in particular, there is a clear evidence regarding the presence of former Afghan leadership which is responsible for carrying out Taliban insurgency. With the passage of time, it has become very complicated to make a distinction between the Afghan Taliban and the local ones. In addition, elements of Al-Qaeda, the global terrorist organization is now comprised of multinational ethnic backgrounds which has used
FATA and KPK region as a primary base and training ground for Al-Qaeda operations since decades. Joint U.S. and Pakistan military official sources have strongly indicated the presence of
Uzbeks, Tajiks, Arabs, and other foreigners who have carried deadly suicidal attacks against
Pakistan and Afghanistan thus become the main source of disruption of peace efforts in the region.280
The balance has been moved back and forth in favor of the militants which have been a source of disturbance for both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The situation has become more severe as Afghanistan is now facing a remarkable turn from insurgency to civil war while on the other hand, the Taliban and now the presence terrorists from Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIS) in
Afghanistan has given rise to numerous problems pertaining to security for the translantic alliance to deal with.
Islamabad too has sought different options to deal with deteriorating security situation in
FATA and is trying to establish the writ of government in a credible manner. This effort has yielded no productive result so far. Pakistan Army is fighting to regain control over parts of the
280 Briefing by Gen. David McKiernan, Commander NATO, ISAF in Afghanistan; Washington Post, October 2, 2008.
146
KPK and now this insurgency has spread to Balochistan where home-grown militancy prompted by separatists has created a parallel regime. The U.S. and other coalition partners in Afghanistan under NATO flag with the help of the United Nations-mandated ISAF have been involved and fighting on both military and economic fronts to help in reconstruction of war-torn Afghanistan which has been in shambles since 2001 since the U.S. invaded Afghanistan.281
Air Commodore Syed Nasir Raza Hamdani, Defense and Air Attache, Embassy of Paris,
Pakistan, expressed his views by saying, “Present Government in Pakistan has tried to get unanimous consensus on the War against Terrorism which is extremely important in order to justify Pakistan’s alliance with the U.S. led campaign against terror. Lack of sense of ownership of this ensuing War against Terrorism within masses creates a sense of disengagement. Pakistan has been confronted with ethnic and militancy problems since the very beginning of its inception but it is a country which has never accepted these militant tendencies as a norm for the society.”282 While referring to Kashmir and Afghan wars, he said, “We throughout the history have been very tolerant and welcoming people coming from the Middle East who had different motives and these people had different mindsets like participating in the freedom struggle for
Kashmir or Afghan Jihad; we accommodated them without showing any objection to their presence in our country. That is the reason we have suffered at the end of the day instead of getting any benefits from the situation.”283
Referring to the Kashmir situation, he added, “Unfortunately we do not have any concrete coherent Kashmir strategy since the very beginning. It only remained an emotional
281 Nawaz, “FATA-A Most Dangerous Place: Meeting the Challenges of Militancy and Terror in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, January 2009, pp.8-10
282 Interview with Air Commodore Syed Nasir Raza Hamdani Defence and Air Attache, Embassy of Pakistan, Paris 27 September, 2013 283 Interview with Air Commodore Syed Nasir Raza Hamdani Defence and Air Attache, Embassy of Pakistan, Paris 27 September, 2013
147 approach. Nationalism was never a coherent force or supreme emotion and agenda in Pakistan.
There should be a group of intellectuals, scholars and think tanks who can formulate policies for the government in a long run and the implementation of these policies should be strictly monitored by the Pakistani government. Intolerance and lack of opportunities created and manifested many other additional problems.” He says, “We have inherited a very strong armed forces structure from the British which has been a symbol of pride, glory and strength. But undue military interventions in the political process have created problems. Institutions should be strong rather individuals.”
Pakistan has always behaved in a mature and responsible manner at regional and international levels but things changed when Pakistan had become a nuclear power. Those who are not happy with us thought very long and deep, they tried to label Pakistan with different connotations.” While describing the role of Pakistan as a U.S. ally, he said, “Pakistan is a responsible ally in the U.S. War against Terrorism. We have paid socially, economically and militarily. But we have not established any coherent strategy and this has been a process of error and elimination. Today we are not facing any immense threat from external sources but the threat comes from within. Afghanistan with tribal tradition is a landlocked country which has no access to the outside world but through Pakistan.”
At the international level, the image of Pakistan is badly damaged. We could not establish our relevance in an assertive way. As a result, we have become scapegoat or black sheep. We have overlooked important elements of statehood which is a failure. Despite our official position, we have been successful in asserting ourselves.”284 On the controversial issue of drone attacks and hiding of Osama in Pakistan, he said, “Drone attacks is an international subject which is in
284 Interview with Air Commodore Syed Nasir Raza Hamdani Defence and Air Attache, Embassy of Pakistan, Paris, 27 September, 2013
148 contradiction to International Law. It is a blatant use of force against civilians and the killing of
Osama bin Laden has badly damaged Pakistan’s repute all over the globe.”
Mr. Hamdani says, “Government has taken a good step in bringing the Taliban to negotiation table,” but he also emphasized that Pakistan should never negotiate with weakness.
This is a set principle we cannot be on our knees and beg to negotiate.” In the end, he emphasized upon the importance of National coherence and National strategy which he considers essential for mainlining peace, generating economic activity and education of masses.”285
The events of September 11 dramatically changed and transformed the nature of the U.S. aid programs for Pakistan, that is, from developmental aid, which had dominated the Pak-U.S. relations during the decades of 1950s and 1960s to obtaining Pakistan’s willingness pertaining to its cooperation in counter-terrorism campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. While the U.S. aid in the earlier decades mainly focused on helping the people of Pakistan in strengthening military’s capability and supporting economic growth; aid in the 1980s was given with a particular purpose to fortify Pakistan’s military and its intelligence agencies. The U.S. aid, which had been largely seen as productive and considered extremely essential against arch rival
India in the early phase, thus started creating problems with lethal consequences for Pakistan in later years. Moreover, “developmental aid” which the U.S. had been offering and the “war aid” are two very different categories of support which Pakistan received from the U.S, thus produced very different results in Pakistan. For instance, the aid given to Afghan Mujahidin through
Pakistan to contain Communism from Afghanistan is one notable example which later resulted with severe complications for Afghanistan in general and Pakistan in particular. This given aid required Pakistan to serve America’s strategic purposes in the region more than Pakistan’s own
285 Ibid.
149 national interests gave rise to such factors that were to cause serious problems three decades later.
Chapter -6
Pakistan- Frontline State in the War against Terrorism
150
Since Pakistan and the U.S. became partners in the War on Terror, a lot has happened with regards to U.S.-Pakistan relationship in the wake of 9/11. It would have been rather inconclusive if the discussion was to be terminated at events occurring till 2008. In order to gain a better insight into the dynamics of U.S.-Pak relationship, especially after the departure of both
President Bush and President General Musharraf, a brief overview of the subsequent events has also been included at the end of this chapter in order to draw relevant conclusions.
From the beginning of the 1980s through September 2001, Pakistan has been one of the three countries, supporting numerous Pashtun militant groups in Afghanistan. These groups were considered to be friendly and a valuable asset for Pakistan against other regional players, particularly India, to secure Pakistan’s own strategic interests in Afghanistan.286 Musharraf writes in his memoir, In the Line of Fire:
Pakistan could not afford a new enemy on the western border, or a vacuum of power which in turn would give rise to Northern Alliance which is comprised of ant-Pakistan elements. This is not any hidden reality that Northern Alliance is comprised of anti-Pakistan elements.287
There is a general concern in Pakistan that the Pashtun ethnic majority in Afghanistan will join the Pashtuns across the border in Pakistani territory for the revival of decade old problem of
“Pashtunistan.” Afghanistan has been supporting the issue of Pashtunistan with active collaboration of India and Soviet Union in earlier decades in order to destabilize Pakistan. It is quite important to mention here, though Pakistan developed friendly and cordial relations with the Taliban in the 1990s, but the Taliban regime refused to accept the Durand Line as
286 Sunawar, “Pakistan as a Frontline State in War Against Terrorism: Cost & Benefit Analysis,” Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 22, Issue - 1, 2015, p. 44 287 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, p. 202.
151 international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan.288 Similarly, Pakistan did not acknowledge Afghan claim to the Pashtun areas of Khyber Pakhtunkwa that were annexed by the
British in 1892 and handed over to Pakistan when it came into being in 1947.289
Pakistan’s decision had both internal and external corollaries. However, external security loomed larger in the minds of Pakistan’s policy makers keeping in view security conditions on the northwest frontier and east as compared to internal security matters. Pakistan has always been well aware of its ethnic composition which is linked with its brethren across the Durand
Line and the religious affinities of the Pakistani masses with the popular Islamic clerics in
Afghanistan. These sensitivities sparked a host of problems for the already fragile socio-political set up of Pakistan. However, hard problems require harsh decisions. Pakistan had to opt for the choice that would guarantee its own survival.
That was quite evident from the beginning that the U.S. would retaliate with full force against the perpetrators of 9/11; secondly, 9/11 brought significant implications for Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policy options. The post 9/11 developments had profound effects on: Pak-
U.S. relations, territorial integrity, political stability, economic situation and geo-strategic location of Pakistan.290The Bush Administration announced a war to eliminate terrorists’ network and terrorism.
This led to the War on Terrorism and the re-evaluation of American foreign policy and its
National Security Strategy from a very new perspective where security of the U.S. mainland had become the top most priority for the Bush Administration to deal with. Does this new doctrine which was proposed by then President of the U.S. constitute an applicable response to terrorism?
288 Sunawar, “Stopping Illegal X-Border Movement: A Must for Peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” pp. 103-105 289 Ibid. 290 Fani, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities after 9/11,” Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 58, Number 4, October 2005, p.53.
152
The U.S. National Security Strategy states clearly:
History will judge strictly those who saw this coming danger (terrorism) but failed to act promptly in order to combat this menace. In addition, it says the new world we have entered in, the only path to peace and security is the path of action to deal with this threat effectively.291
This strategy reveals a very important relationship between terrorist and a state that could provide aid and shelter to such elements. President Bush articulated this code of conduct on 9/11:
“We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.”292 Both were seen as equally responsible and should be dealt with accordingly.
Just War Theory forbids and denounces terrorism or wars of terror in all forms. The intended killing of non-combatants in the battle field and civilians is a serious war crime which needs accountability. Such a military strategy which brings out the brutal use of force against the weaker rival is directly related to an act of terror that is never acceptable. It contravenes the basic civil rights of population on a huge scale without clearly determining any clear jurisdiction and making any clear distinction between already set criteria of “Dos and Don’ts” in order to accomplish military and political ends. The terrorists’ ideology cannot be justified for whatever purpose the act is carried out. In the given context, terrorism can be seen as morally wrong and unlawful tactic to apply from the perspective of the Just War practice. It can be disagreed, for that particular reason, the weaker opponent has got the right of self-defence in the face of overdue projection of force against terrorism is permissible, and ethically this is an acceptable norm in International Law.293
291 Fani, Shahab, and Yasin, “Pakistan’s Post 9/11 US Policy: Prospects & Constraints,” Pakistan Vision Vol. 11 No. 2, p. 51. 292Bush. Speech of the President in His Address to the Nation, September 11, 2001. Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov 293 Sunawar, “Pakistan as a Frontline State in War Against Terrorism: Cost & Benefit Analysis,” p. 45
153
In a global context, the U.S’ strategy is power-driven and is more based on projection of force. It would not be wrong to call it imperialistic tendency of the only super power to rule the world. The vital question to address here is: Is the War on Terrorism directly related with the foreign policy of the super power, especially when its own National Security is at stake? Does it obtain all the rights to expand its influence and can use military force and power projection by employing all means against weaker nations? If the expansion of power is the only driving force behind the U.S. intention, then one can come to the conclusion that the doctrine of pre-emption is unjustified; it is being driven by the U.S. with wrong intentions in order to rule the world in a hegemonic manner.294
Undoubtedly, this Bush Doctrine has put Pakistan in a very grave situation with no clear viable strategy either to back out as a frontline state or go along with the U.S. in supporting its military engagement and dismantling of Al-Qaeda remnants who have taken refuge within
Pakistan. President General Musharraf himself admitted the fact that in case of Pakistan’s refusal to join the U.S. led coalition; the use of blatant force was a real and decisive possibility against
Pakistan.295 On the other hand, Pakistani military was very much aware of its close association with the Taliban regime and Pakistan’s strategic position in the region in the wake of 9/11, and knew that the relationship formed with the Taliban regime during the 1990s would never come back to its former strength after Pakistan’s U-turn against the Taliban.
It is believed, terrorism is a new threat replacing Communism in the post 9/11 world for the U.S. with a new context and dimension in the region. This political situation which emerged after 9/11 was very much different from the one U.S. confronted during the 1980s to defeat
Communism in Afghanistan. The war against Soviet Union could not be won without the co-
294 Ibid., p.46 295 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, p. 201
154 operation of Pakistan; similarly, 9/11 put Pakistan in the same place where fight against terrorism was not possible without Pakistan’s full length co-operation. But in order to get
Pakistan’s categorical support, the U.S. had to readjust its security dynamics according to the needs of the situation in a radically changed international setting.296
If a sovereign national government authorizes major violations of the human rights of its own citizens within its territory by using the option of force against them, and is heavily involved in committing serious crimes against civilians on massive scale; then a government basically lost the claim of sovereignty, credibility, protection of citizens, and law of the state. In such a situation, on moral grounds, the international community can intervene in order to protect the civilians from aggression.297
296 Pirzada, “Kashmir: Indian Strategic Initiative since 9/11 & Imperative for U.S. Policy in the Region,” IPRI Journal 11 (Winter 2003): 126. 297 Sunawar, “Pakistan as a Frontline State in War Against Terrorism: Cost & Benefit Analysis,” p. 46
155
Map of Pakistan
156
6.1 U.S. War on Terror: Impact and Apprehensions for Pakistan
The U.S. Administration and major U.S. think tanks have acknowledged the importance of
Pakistan as a crucial ally and are of the view to establish long-term, workable and strategic partnership with Pakistan even after the drawdown of U.S led NATO troops from Afghanistan.
Former Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton confessed the fact in a briefing to the U.S. Congress that one of the biggest U.S. mistakes after the Soviet withdrawal was to leave Pakistan on its own to bear the consequences emerged consequently from the unsettled political situation of
Afghanistan in the early 1990s. This precarious situation afterwards led to the emergence of extremism and militancy in Pakistan. Being the most allied ally of the 1950s, the U.S. had treated
Pakistan poorly in the past.298In a later testimony before the U.S. Armed Services Committee, she said:
The case for action against Al-Qaida and its allies has always been clear, but the United States course of action over the last eight years has not. The fog of another war obscured ourfocus. And while our attention was focused elsewhere, theTaliban gained momentum in Afghanistan. And the extremist threat grew in Pakistan - a country with 175 million people, a nuclear arsenal, and more than its share of challenges.299
The events of 9/11 and the declaration of War on Terror by President Bush gave the U.S an exclusive opportunity to expand its influence around the globe with the help of power projection and intervention against those states who are not economically strong enough.300
In Pakistan, it is widely assumed that the U.S. has proved that it is not a reliable and trustworthy ally. It introduced many sanctions against Pakistan time and again which further
298 Sunawar, “Pakistan as a Frontline State in War Against Terrorism: Cost & Benefit Analysis,” pp. 48-49
299 Amer Rizwan, “South Asian Security Complex & Pak-U.S. Relations Post 9/11,” IPRI Journal X, 2 (Summer 2010), pp. 39-68
300 Wilkinson, International Relations, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
157 diminished its credibility. As the U.S. needed Pakistan to fight against terrorism, so it was asked to join the coalition forces led by the U.S. Though reluctantly but Pakistan has actively pursued its role as a frontline state. In the beginning, both the nations formed a close collaboration pertaining to human intelligence sharing of Al-Qaeda network and the Taliban but with the passage of time this relationship lost momentum. Though the objective is same and that is to eliminate Al-Qaeda and the Taliban leadership but interestingly both countries have different strategies with varying degrees to attain this common objective. International media has been underlining Pakistan’s ineffectiveness as a potential player in this War against Terrorism.
Selig Harrison wrote in Los Angeles Times explaining the importance of U.S. relations with India as primary and growing economic power in South Asia and is the right choice for U.S. to defend its strategic interests in the region. While he showed his apprehension by saying: “if
Pakistan is an ally of the U.S., good luck to the United States of America.301 The Bush
Administration was not happy at all with the military coup led by President General Musharraf in the beginning; later saw him as a powerful leader to serve its interests in the region as military regimes in Pakistan did during the Cold war period under President Ayub, Yahya and Zia.
After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. never threatened Pakistan in a straight-forward manner but U.S. officials threatened to add Pakistan to the U.S. State Department’s list of seven terrorist- sponsoring nations; so there was a possibility of the U.S.’ projection of force against Pakistan due to its close association with the Taliban regime.302 President General Musharraf was told
301 Selig Harrison, “If Pakistan is an Ally of the U.S., Good Luck to the United States of America,” Los Angeles Times, Jan 27, 2001. 302 Barbara & Nichols, “U.S. pressures Pakistan’s leaders to help bring in Bin Laden,” USA Today, 14 September 2001.
158 firmly to either abandon support for the Taliban leadership or be prepared to be treated like the
Taliban; the U.S. tone was aggressive and alarming.303
President General Musharraf states, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, was even more blunt in saying:
Armitage told the Director General of ISI, (General Mehmood) that we had to decide whether we were with America or with the terrorists, but that if we chose the terrorist, we should be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age.304
In his book, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, President Musharraf claimed that some of the demands were “ludicrous.” For example, he explained that the fifth demand depended “on the interpretation of what comprises of verbal support for terrorism.” In his memoir, President
Musharraf strongly asserted that he never agreed to the second or third demand because granting the U.S. total access to Pakistan’s naval ports and fighter aircraft bases would jeopardize
Pakistan’s “strategic assets.” He stated that he only agreed to give the U.S. permission to use two bases, far from “sensitive areas,” that could only be used for logistics and aircraft recovery purpose, and not for any offensive operations. According to President Musharraf, “The rest of the demands we could happily live with.” There was a general conception in Pakistan that
President Musharraf accepted the demands completely and without any adjustments.305
Pakistan has always preoccupied a major place in the strategic calculations of the
American policy makers and they are completely aware of Pakistan’s worth in this War on
Terror. Pakistan military once again got a pivotal position and the Bush Administration preferred
303 Fair, “The Counterterror Coalitions,” p.17 304 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, p. 201 305Sunawar, “Pakistan as a Frontline State in War Against Terrorism: Cost & Benefit Analysis,” p. 51
159 to rely upon the ISI for sharing important intelligence information pertaining to Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.306
Soon after the start of the War against Terrorism in October 2001, Pakistan faced immense international pressure to intervene in the sensitive region of the western border (FATA) in order to eliminate the Taliban elements that were linked with Afghan insurgency and had been a constant source of disturbance for peace in region.307 Initially, Musharraf regime not only banned several militant terrorist organizations308 but it acted in a prompt manner in detaining thousands of extremists from its territory. It captured many high value Al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorists thus extending full length support to the U.S. military and law enforcement agencies in rooting out terrorists’ network.309 Many peace accords were signed with the militants in order to restore peace but all efforts failed due to non-seriousness of the Taliban forces. Islamabad urged the tribal leaders to play an effective role and take serious measures in rooting out foreign elements mainly comprised of Afghan, Tajiks, Usbeks, and Chechens, etc.310 The basic provisions of these peace deals were that Pakistan will not allow its territory to be used as a base camp to execute terrorist attacks anywhere in the world. In return for such guarantees, Pakistan
Army also provided support to help the local population pertaining to reconstruction and development of infrastructure destroyed during military operations in the Tribal Areas of
Pakistan.311
Pakistan is an active coalition ally of the U.S. which has done much to eliminate Al-
Qaeda and the Taliban network. A Pakistan Embassy official told in Washington, D.C, “Pakistan
306 Ibid., p. 52 307 Javaid, “War on Terror,” pp. 125-131. 308 From the Text of President Musharraf’s speech to the Nation on Jan 12, 2002. p. 46 309Hussain, “U.S.-Pakistan Engagement the War on Terrorism and Beyond,” Regional Studies, Vol. XXIV, No. 1 Winter 2005-06 pp. 3-25. 310Safia Aftab, The 2014 ISAF pullout from Afghanistan, Norwegian Peace Building Resource Centre, Dec 2013. 311 Ibid.
160 has deployed more than 1,50,000 of its troops to the Afghan border and has successfully launched more than 38 operations in its Tribal Areas in order to eliminate terrorists and their networks who are a threat to stability of the region in general and Pakistan in particular. More than 8,000 Pakistan army and paramilitary troops have been killed, and even larger number wounded. This number accounts for more causalities than any other U.S ally in the War on
Terrorism. Pakistan is the only South Asian country which has participated in the U.S. coalition maritime interdiction operations, which is one of the vital maritime components of OEF.
Pakistan helped in the arrest of more than 800 Al-Qaeda suspects. Pakistani government froze 32 bank accounts which were known as terrorists’ accounts.312
Pakistan has certain reservations and raised concern from time to time regarding its role in the War against Terror. There is a general perception in Pakistani masses and policy makers, that once the U.S. achieves its objectives in Afghanistan in ongoing War against Terrorism, it would turn its back on Pakistan. Pakistan will once again be left alone to deal with the after effects of the war. Pakistan will not lose its frontline status but also the interest of the U.S. in the region and this is what exactly happened after Soviet withdrawal from the region.313
The main stage of War against Terrorism was Afghanistan but today this war is not confined to Afghanistan but has entered Pakistani tribal areas which have become the hub of home grown militancy and fundamentalism. Militants across the border have taken asylum into
Pakistani territory. Pakistani Tribal belt is considered the safest zone for these militants to launch their terrorist activities. This has been an area where the writ of Pakistani government does not run. These militants and their activities are a serious threat to Pakistani state and its survival.
312 “Pakistan and the United States: Caught in the Middle,” The Economist, September 22, 2001. 313Sunawar, “Pakistan as a Frontline State in War Against Terrorism: Cost & Benefit Analysis,” p. 53
161
This factor has compelled Pakistan Army to take a strict military action against them. The most worrying aspect of all is that is that these militants are carrying suicide attacks in streets, markets, mosques, churches and on other security installations and security personals are their main targets. These militants have mostly foreign nationalities and they are particularly from
Central Asian Republics have now been joined by many local religious militant groups within
Pakistan.314
After the death of Osama bin Laden, these groups have gained more strength; they are more organized and well equipped than ever before and have established a strong foothold to carry out terrorist activities. Now after 16 years since the War on Terror started, a large section of people in Pakistan strongly consider that Pakistan is the net loser as a U.S. partner in the long run.315
Camile Grand, Director of Foundation Pour la Recherche Strategique, Paris, in a talk pertaining to Pakistan’s role as a frontline state says, “Perception is ambiguous pertaining to
Pakistan’s position as a frontline state in the Western world, a country who has suffered from terrorism but on the other hand, due to track record of relations of Pakistan’s ISI with the
Taliban.” He further added, today Pakistan is fighting a dual war against enemies who are non state actors. It is containing domestic insurgents but also has a suspicious political role and involvement in the rise of insurgency in neighboring Afghanistan. Pakistan is looking to attain a
“strategic depth” in Afghanistan which makes its role skeptical for other regional countries.
Pakistan is a difficult partner in the War against Terror to work with.”316
314Sunawar, “Pakistan as a Frontline State in War Against Terrorism: Cost & Benefit Analysis,” p. 53 315 Umbreen Javed. “War on Terror,” African Journal of Political Science & International Relations, 5 March 2011. pp. 125-131 316Interview with Camile Grand, Director of Foundation pour la Recherche Strategique Paris, June 27, 2013.
162
Mr. Grand went on saying, “Pakistan’s future role as a neighboring country of
Afghanistan is very crucial. Pakistan is a legitimate stakeholder and it has a say in the peace process of Afghanistan. It can play a vital role in convincing the Taliban not to spoil the peace process and this role will be judged by the West as a friend or foe as far as the mediation process is concerned. Pakistan has a dual role to fulfill as a responsible neighbor in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan and its ability to exert influence in Afghanistan. Much is dependent on the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.” He emphasized, “There is a need to labeling the Taliban as terrorists. Drone strikes in Pakistan has been worse regarding killing of civilians, but has killed several high value terrorists; technology is not the issue but the policy against which it is used should be based on rational grounds. The U.S. should probably be more careful in using drones.”317
Mr. Grand believes that Pakistan is a fragile society with host of economic problems.
Pakistan has been a coalition partner in the War against Terrorism where militancy has played a very crucial role. Pakistan remains in a dangerous and uncertain situation; radical groups are very active in Pakistan that pose threat to its internal security.318 These militant groups should be engaged in a meaningful peace dialogue process and if they show reluctance, Afghanistan would remain in a state of chaotic condition that would lead to civil war situation, and pose a threat to
Pakistan’s security as well. He stated, “For Pakistan, regional developments are intertwined and interlinked to a greater extent; today Pakistan cannot take a unilateral decision of withdrawal from the U.S. led War against Terrorism.”319
Gerald Stang, a Senior Canadian Research Fellow at European Union Institute, Paris, while, explaining his view point on Pakistan’s role as a frontline state against terrorism stated,
317 Interview with Camile Grand, Director of Foundation pour la Recherche Strategique Paris, June 27, 2013. 318 Ibid. 319 Ibid.
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“Pakistan and the U.S both have divergent interests pertaining to Afghanistan crisis in the region.
In the western world, Pakistan is perceived as a country which has a suspicious track record with its relations to the Taliban.” Mr. Stang was quite optimistic for a stable and peaceful Afghanistan in the long run. He says, “The presence of Osama in Pakistan carried a bad image of Pakistan in the Western world. The U.S. and Canada have the same objectives to bring peace and stability to
Afghanistan. Complexity is real but we have to make deals. Media is powerful and it has played a very constructive role.” Talking about aid and Pakistan’s role as a frontline ally he commented,
“aid to Pakistan can play an essential role not only in raising living standard of people in FATA but would help in eradicating terrorism. Pakistan and Afghanistan can improve bilateral trade in the region. Pakistan cannot get out from this U.S. led War against Terrorism, it should stay engaged and must help in eradicating terrorism which is the only option.”320
A well known sociologist, Dr. Mariam Abu Zahab, while giving her perspective on the ongoing War on Terrorism says, “Pakistani government should create economic opportunities for the Tribal people this is the best way to bring them to the mainstream. Pakistan’s role as a frontline state in the U.S. led War on Terror unfortunately has not been acknowledged in the
West as Pakistan is an ally with double game strategy.”321
At present, with the widespread U.S engagement in Afghanistan, the U.S. is mindful of the fact that this War against Terrorism could not be won without a strong and stable Pakistan which must possess capability and strength to fight terrorism and militant insurgents. On the other hand, the relationship between the two countries at the same time has both advantageous and disadvantageous dimensions. Today, Pakistan’s whole security apparatus is fighting the menace of terrorism. Pakistan is heavily involved in this War against Terrorism which has now
320 Interview with Gerald Stang, Senior Canadian Research Fellow at European Union Institute Paris, June 19, 2013
321 Formal discussion with Dr. Mariam Abou Zahab, Paris, July 30, 2013
164 become its own War because its military is fighting with the militants within Pakistani borders which is no more confined to the Tribal areas but has spread to the major settled areas of the country.322In the War against Terrorism, Pakistan entered as a front line state to combat terrorism but today Pakistan is struggling hard for its own security and survival not only from external forces which pose a serious threat but from the internal tendencies, i.e. homegrown militancy and fundamentalism that has made Pakistan the frontline target of the terrorists and their plans.323
The situation which Pakistan is facing today regarding terrorism and extremism is directly linked back to 1980s of General Zia’s era. Pakistan inherited the legacy of the Afghan war because of its participation in Afghan War against the Soviet Union. Many controversial laws in the name of religion were introduced which led to weaponization of Pakistani society, violence, sectarianism, gun culture, cross border smuggling thus further strengthened militant sectarian and religious groups within Pakistan and they started gaining strong foothold.324 But despite all these facts, Zia was supported by the U.S. because it needed support for Afghan war which Pakistan’s military provided. It was also during this period in the 1980s when Mujahedin were trained and equipped from the Pakistani soil with the active support of CIA and ISI camps and they were sent into Afghanistan to fight the Soviets and against the expansion of Communist agenda in the region.
The hundreds of Madrassas established in KPK and Baluchistan under a policy by the
Zia regime, primarily facilitated and encouraged the youth to participate in the Afghan War of the 1980s. Many of these Madrassas in-return imparted religious educational cum military training especially in the Tribal areas of KPK and Baluchistan. This Madrassa system was well
322 Gunaratna & Iqbal Khurram, Pakistan, London: Reaktion Books Ltd., 2011, p. 258. 323 Gunaratna & Khurram, Pakistan, p.25 324Sunawar, “Pakistan as a Frontline State in War Against Terrorism: Cost & Benefit Analysis,” p. 54
165 established and incorporated in the areas of KPK inhabited by the Pashtun tribes.325Madrassas were also fully utilized to prepare its students in a guerrilla warfare thus introducing militarization into the centuries old Madrassa system which had never experienced this trend before.
The Mujahedin who were left behind after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan had no clear future vision who joined hands with like- minded people and later emerged as the Taliban and supported Al-Qaeda. These Mujahedin carried hostile agenda, fueled anti-Americanism and backlash in the region against the Western world and became the most wanted terrorists of the day thus posing a grave challenge to the security and survival of Pakistan in the aftermath of
9/11. Amir Rana writes in his work:
religious parties, Jihadi groups and former Mujahedin who had fought on behalf of the U.S. against Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and also remained vital to the rise of Taliban regime in Afghanistan from 1994 to 2001 were later strongly encouraged, supported and motivated in the aftermath of 9/11 to form or join the local Taliban militant groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well.326
It is worth mentioning that the U.S.-Pakistani relations remain narrowly based on one common agenda in the region and that is, counter-terrorism, despite increasingly successful strategic cooperation against militants but with divergent interests to pursue on both sides. Whatever
Pakistan has gained economically and military, it also sees a host of interconnected problems lining up with the U.S. encountering terrorism policy. Islamabad has strong reservations pertaining to its relationship with the Washington in the long run combating terrorism. Despite the U.S. assurances time and again, Pakistan fear that it again will be left on its own once the
325 Robert G. Wirsing, Pakistan’s Security under President Zia, New York: St. Martin’s Press,1991, pp.54-59. 326 Muhammad Amir Rana, “Taliban Insurgency in Pakistan: A Counterinsurgency Perspective,” Pak Institute for Peace Studies, 2009, p.12.
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U.S. strategic interests in the region are achieved. In this context, the real game for Pakistan and the other regional players will be started in Afghanistan who would try to fill the power vacuum in the post U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.327 Pakistan, in particular, would likely experience growing violence within its borders and refugee influx if the violence in Afghanistan spreads over. Increased militancy in Afghanistan is already spreading to Pakistan’s adjacent tribal areas of FATA and Balochistan bordering Afghanistan.328
In addition to the external front where Pakistan is heavily involved in fighting terrorism against militants and facing threats from both its neighbors in the east and north-west, there are numerous problems and serious internal challenges in the form of ethnic violence, sectarian hatred, incompetent police, poor law and order condition, widespread corruption, endemic poverty, and a deepening financial crisis accompanied by ineffective economic policies which has made the domestic situation more vulnerable.329 One of the major causes of instability within
Pakistan is due to the lack of good governance since its inception which itself is the root cause of other problems stem from it. Apparently, it seems Pakistani government has failed to address the major security challenges.
Thus, despite Pakistan’s offering of unconditional cooperation to the U.S. led coalition in post 9/11 era to eliminate terrorists’ networks within Pakistani territory, a cloud of ambiguity still hangs over Pakistan-U.S. relations which have widened the trust deficit on both sides. The three factors need to be analyzed in this regard:
327 Polly Nayak, “U.S. Security Policy in South Asia Since 9/11,” Asia Pacific Centre for Security Studies, February, 2005. pp. 2- 5 328 Sunawar, “The 2014 U.S. Withdrawal: An unsettled Quagmire for Pakistan,” Regional Studies, Vol. XXXII, No.4, Autumn 2014, pp. 98-120 329 Jonathan S. Landay, “Pakistan on Course to become Islamist State,” McClatchy Newspaper, 16th April 2009. Available from http://www/mcclatchydc.com
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The first is the “do more” rhetoric by the U.S. without acknowledging to what extent it
has dragged Pakistan in its own so-called War on Terrorism. Since 2003, the U.S.
military commanders who oversee “Operation Enduring Freedom” have been
continuously raising this concern that Al-Qaeda and the Taliban fighters have gathered
immense strength with the passage of time; and have full capability to attack ISAF and
coalition troops stationed in Afghanistan and then they cross the Pakistani border with
great ease where they could get asylum.
President Musharraf denied the accusations in his interview with CNN:
I don’t think any other leader has said that we are not doing enough and we need to do more. It is unfortunate that these statements come from the Afghan leadership’….we are fighting the same enemy. If we start throwing blame on each other, we weaken our positions.330
After 2003, President Musharraf had sent Pakistani troops that started combat operations against militants in Waziristan.
Second, in August 2004, during President Karzai’s visit to Islamabad, Musharraf assured
him of Pakistan’s support in combating terrorism and to dispatch additional 9,500 troops
to border areas for security purpose. As a result, in February 2006, in his visit to
Islamabad, President Karzai handed over a list of names, addresses, and phone numbers
to his Pakistani counterpart of most wanted Taliban fighters and confirmed the possibility
of their alleged links and movements with the approval of ISI. President Musharraf not
only dismissed this possibility but criticized President Karzai’s assertion during his
meeting with President Bush in Islamabad in March 2007. President of the U.S.
330 Musharraf’s Interview with CNN (London), Friday 23 Jan, 2004, Available from www.cnn.com
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persuaded President Musharraf to do more,331 to take more effective measures to control
Islamic militancy and to stop cross-border movement of the Taliban insurgents into
Afghanistan from Pakistani territory while ignoring Pakistan’s perspective.332
Third, the U.S. strongly believes that Pakistan and especially its western Tribal areas
adjacent to Afghanistan have become a safe haven for the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban
elements. These terrorists have developed sanctuaries and they execute terrorist activities
inside Afghanistan against NATO and ISAF forces and then get back to Pakistan’s Tribal
areas where they enjoy support of masses. In sum, “the Tribal areas of Pakistan are
believed to be an important support base and focal point for the Afghan Taliban engaged
in fighting against foreign troops in Afghanistan.”333
This has been the most serious concern taken up by the U.S. to negotiate with Pakistan civil and military leadership as it thinks that Pakistan’s territory is being used by the terrorists for protection and future attacks.
To restrict and eliminate terrorists’ outfits, the U.S. compelled Pakistan to carry out military action in North Waziristan without any further delay. Due to extreme domestic pressure from within, Pakistan Army launched fully fledged Operation Zarb-e-Azb against terrorists on
15th June, 2014. The basic objective is to completely destroy Al-Qaeda and the Taliban network in Pakistan.334Though earlier, Pakistan’s military had carried out an operation in South
Waziristan but the government had to face severe domestic opposition of its action from the media, masses and leading political parties. In addition to this governments’ initiative, terrorists’
331 Syed Adnan, “Internal Dynamics of Afghan after the 2005 Parliamentary Elections,” Strategic Studies, 2 September 2006, pp. 100 – 121. 332 New York Times, 4 March 2006. 333 Khurram, “Evolution of Suicide Terrorism in Pakistan and Counter Strategies,” Conflict & Peace Studies, 2010, p. 132 334 ISPR briefing, 16th June 2014
169 incidents have enormously increased in Pakistan and become norm of the day. The expenditures of the operation which is an essential component in the War against Terror also added an extra burden to an already strained economy of Pakistan. Large numbers of military personnel are taking part in the ongoing operations in different Tribal areas of Pakistan’s western border for the first time in the history of Pakistan; Pakistan army has intervened to contain terrorists with the use of force into the Tribal belt. The growing trust deficit in Pak-U.S. relations accompanied with the lack of acknowledgement of Pakistan’s role as a frontline state has fraught Pak-U.S. relations. The U.S. believes that Pakistan government has not done enough to eliminate the terrorists from its territory and this has created a serious rift in Pak-U.S. relationship.
The ever mounting pressure of CIA in Pakistan is a genuine source of concern. Pakistan is now in a dire need to protect itself from hostile and unfriendly neighbors. As a result, it has deployed forces accordingly; especially the deployment of troops on Pakistan’s western side is a tough job as it is a long and undefined border with Afghanistan. The people generally are highly critical towards the government for being the U.S. coalition partner and anti-American sentiments are rapidly increasing thus giving rise to feelings of hatred and retaliation. The people of the region assume that the War on Terror is actually turned into a War against Islam not in the region but across the globe.
The deployment of international troops in Afghanistan led by the U.S. in 2001 brought new challenges for Pakistan to deal with. With American troops based in Afghanistan, the question of where the border was and Pakistan’s responsibilities for maintaining peace, law and order in its own territories acquired international attention.335 After a decade long war in
Afghanistan, the U.S. remains spiteful to regional sensitivities and the Global War against
335 Sunawar, “Stopping Illegal X-Border Movement: A Must for Peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” pp. 103-105
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Terrorism has been a struggling venture for the U.S. and coalition forces. It was believed that the death of bin Laden will make it easier to create a narrative of victory for the U.S. led coalition against Al-Qaeda and perhaps give way to negotiate directly with the Afghan Taliban but the death of Al-Qaeda’s leader further exacerbated violence and instability in Afghanistan and the
Tribal Areas of Pakistan as well.
It is generally believed that with the drawdown of the U.S. and NATO forces from Afghanistan, the situation will be challenging for Pakistan in particular because the U.S. priorities will also be changed accordingly. In that situation, the U.S. would not hesitate to move closer to India which it considers economically strong strategic partner than Pakistan in the region. This drastic policy shift and inclination towards India will definitely make a big difference in this region in general and for Pakistan in particular.336
India also sees Afghanistan through the lens of its decades old hostility and conflict with
Pakistan. In comparison to Pakistan which has somewhat difficult history of relations with
Afghanistan, India has historically had excellent relations with Afghanistan, apart from the rule of the Taliban who were deeply hostile to India.337 India has tried rebuild its influence in
Afghanistan since 2001 by investing in the country; but they only delivered 40% of the total US$
2.5 billion they have pledged so far. Pakistan is also contributing its part by investing in development sector in Afghanistan and has also given US$360 million for different ongoing projects.338
Reimbursement for the losses incurred by Pakistan in the War on Terror in terms of human lives and infrastructure is nowhere to be seen till the date. Even the funds as coalition partner as promised by the U.S. are being postponed, over audited and drastically reduced on the
336 Op.cit 337 Interview with retired Colonel of Pakistan Army. 03March 2013. 338 Maria Sultan, Interview with HILAL, The Pakistan Armed Forces Magazine. May, 2014. p. 22
171 basis of various lame excuses by the U.S. It looks like Pakistan is paying the price of War on
Terror all by itself which is an additional burden on its weak economy.339 In addition to this,
Pakistani civil and military leadership considers Pakistan as a proxy tool to fulfill the U.S. strategic interests in the region and this time in the form of combating terrorism.
Pakistan’s economy is facing down turn because of heavy external debts and the loss of foreign investments in the country accompanying inflation and employment which contribute to numerous problems. People are demanding from the government to get out of this useless and thankless venture purely keeping in view human, military, and infra structure losses. Pakistan, while in an utter state of despair, fully understands this fact that it is very actively committed in the War on Terror and there is no looking back. Its mighty neighbor India would take advantage of all available options to reckon Pakistan’s stability.
Being the neighboring country of Afghanistan, Pakistani society, politics, security environment, continuous political turmoil and economic structure has undergone drastic change in the post 9/11 period. The U.S. installed Northern Alliance soon after taking hold of Kabul.
This Alliance is well known for anti-Pakistan policies; despite Bush Administration’s assurances to President General Musharraf that no anti-Pakistan government would come to power in Kabul.
This move gave India a value added advantage to intervene in Pakistan via Afghanistan and the construction of numerous consulates and missions adjacent to the border of Pakistan. This has also enabled India to sabotage Pakistan’s efforts for peace dialogue process with the Taliban as well.340
339Sunawar, “Pakistan as a Frontline State in War Against Terrorism: Cost & Benefit Analysis,” p. 56
340Sunawar, “Pakistan as a Frontline State in War Against Terrorism: Cost & Benefit Analysis,” p. 57
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World’s major powers have been paying attention to five areas of special concern by keeping their own national interests supreme: counterterrorism, nuclear proliferation, democracy, human rights, and narcotics. Pakistan has been at the center of each which clearly underlines its significance as a major partner in the War against Terrorism. The majority of Pakistani public do not support terrorism, drug trafficking, and nuclear proliferation. There is a small faction who supports the first two, and though even smaller numbers of people support the third option. But a majority of Pakistanis do oppose Pakistan’s support to the West in the War on Terror and they simply do not want to backup the official policy of their government in this regard.341
It is generally believed that effective counter insurgency operations launched by Pakistani military in South and North Waziristan require time and patience to achieve productive results in the long run. The terrorists are equipped with sophisticated weapons, are well trained and financed, familiar with the terrain and above all, they enjoy the support of a local friendly population. The Tribal areas of Pakistan have become the most affected areas due to ongoing military encounters between the security forces and insurgents and need five to ten years for rehabilitation and reconstruction to be pacified through economic development, administrative and social reforms. This is a challenging task that has already being taken by the government as the foremost priority.342
Pakistan Army is conducting raids to curb terrorist elements in the Tribal areas. However, this situation is very much different than in the past when CIA-ISI worked closely together after
Afghanistan’s invasion by Soviet Union in 1980s. According to an Army officer, who requested for anonymity, the U.S. has always given assurance to Pakistani establishment that the U.S. would not execute any ground operation prior to consultation of Pakistani establishment as and
341Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, p. 332. 342Sunawar, “Pakistan as a Frontline State in War Against Terrorism: Cost & Benefit Analysis,” p. 58
173 when possible, and American and Pakistani troops would work together to attain mutual objectives. However, the U.S. appears to have conducted ground and air raids inside Pakistan’s
Tribal belt without sharing any prior information in this regard.343 The death of Osama bin Laden in May 2011 without consulting their military counterparts is one of the clear examples in this regard.
The presence of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan was a big question mark for Pakistani security and law enforcement agencies. American decision makers have openly speculated and raised concern about the effectiveness of military aid to Pakistan if Pakistani government and military establishment were already aware of bin Laden’s presence in a highly sensitive zone. In some cases, the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies have not come up to the U.S. expectations.
This has further worsened the condition and puts a question mark to what purpose the U.S. aid is being given to Pakistan if it meets such huge failures and outright deception. This broadens trust deficit between the two allies. Congressman Howard Berman, Democrat of California and one of the signatories to the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill stated that “I don’t think our military assistance is serving the interests we are intending it to serve” and that aid “has not been effective.”344
For the Pakistani military, the real problem is not the ongoing insurgency in its Tribal areas, Afghan and Pakistani Taliban forces or Al-Qaeda, etc. For them, the real threat comes from India which is deliberately maneuvering the crisis in Pakistan while exerting strong influence in Afghanistan.345 The close alliance between the U.S. and India has deeply shaken
Pakistani trust confidence in its own alliance with the U.S.
David Sanger in his book, The Inheritance, narrated a conversation between a CIA officer and a Pakistani military officer in the following words: “when America pulls out, India
343 Interview with serving Army Officer posted in Waziristan, 07 March 2013. 344 Interview to CNN 345 Interview with serving Army Officer posted in Waziristan. 07 March 2013.
174 will have full control over Afghanistan due to their strong presence. In this way, Pakistan would face a two front threat.”346
A Pakistani stance emphasizes that with an effective U.S. support and by exerting unequivocal pressure against terrorists who are a security threat to NATO and ISAF forces in Afghanistan,
Pakistan and its military can play an important role in weeding out terrorism.
President Musharraf in a speech to the nation emphasized the importance of Pakistan as an ally of the U.S by saying no other country on this planet has put more at risk than Pakistan on this issue of combating the menace of terrorism and no other country of the world has gone to the extent as Pakistan did in the U.S. led fight against terrorism.347 The U.S. has a long list of demands towards Pakistan to fulfill in order to achieve its objectives of fighting terrorism and
Washington’s expectations have gone beyond and are all time high whereas Islamabad has certain strong reservations in carrying out the U.S rhetoric ‘to do more’ and is unable to cope up with new demands from Washington every now and then. For Pakistan, it has been a long and a hard-hitting war which has already left it in a position of chaos and is still an ongoing struggle.
6.2 Legal Position – Are Drone attacks justified?
Drone attacks are carried out secretly, thus, it is very important to know whether these actions which accompany massive use of force are legally justified or not, under International Law.
According to the International Law experts, “Washington appears to be ordering the drone attacks which are based on far-reaching legal opinions but these opinions may differ that the U.S. can operate in self-defence to any extent to safeguard itself and coalition forces in Afghanistan; if neighboring countries are reluctant or incapable to attack militants.” Many legal scholars speak
346 David Sanger, The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power, London: Bantam Press, 2010, pp. 244-247
347 Musharraf’s Speech to the Nation. 19 September 2001.
175 out, “This is per se illegal unless it is proved that the state is supporting or encouraging the militants.”348
The strongest conclusion to draw under the jus ad bellum is the U.S. has no legal and moral justification to use drones in Pakistan. Drone attacks are being conducted with the collaboration of Pakistani government. Using drones for the sake of self-defence is an argument which carries no validity under any circumstances. Pakistan has not specifically invited the U.S. to give it a hand by using blatant force against civilians. In order to probe this, there might be some understanding between the U.S and Pakistan military establishment. Further, even if due approval is granted by Pakistan, the attacks can only be carried out and would have to be a part of Pakistan’s own military operations in areas where required. The U.S. has been responsible for the deaths of many innocent civilians in the region leading to some serious questions pertaining to drone attacks validity or whether they may be used consistently under what moral principles and what sort of legitimacy they carry? 349
Washington has asserted this fact time and again that drone attacks are being conducted with the support of Pakistan. Even then this assertion is considered unwarranted as far as
International Law is concerned. Article 20 of the United Nations under the heading
“Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,” clearly states endorsement by a state for the execution of an act to another state to thwart the wrong action in relation to the affected state, but this action must remain within the limits of that consent.350 But this has never been the case when it comes to drone attacks in Pakistan’s Tribal areas.
Under the laws, drone strikes which are being conducted by the U.S. are a clear violation of:
348 Op.cit. 349Mary Ellen O’Connell, “Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan- (2004-2009)” in Shooting to Kill: The Law Governing Lethal Force in Context Simon Bronitt ed., Hart Publishing, 2010, pp. 19-25
350 (http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments.pdf
176
The Charter of United Nations
Rome Statue of International Criminal Court and
The Geneva Conventions of 1949
All the above ruled out the unruly homicide or a show of unnecessary projection against weaker country. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter which clearly states:
All Members shall refrain in International relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.351
The attacks also breach articles of the Additional Protocol I; the Article 51(2) which says, “The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations”. Article 51(5) states, “Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate”:
(a) “An attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single military
objective located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration
of civilians or civilian objects;”
(b) “An attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”352
351 (http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/.html) 352 www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/opendocument
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U.S. Drone strikes in Pakistan
This drone technology may have served the U.S. specific objectives but these targeted killings are causing serious damage to the interests of Pakistan. Islamabad has put this request before
Washington many times during high level official meetings to transfer this drone technology to
Pakistan’s military which is undertaking military operations in the Tribal areas so that it could eradicate the militants and terrorists who in turn pose a security threat to Pakistan and
178
Afghanistan. But CIA probably has its own strategic interests in Pakistan to pursue in the long run which go parallel to safeguard Israeli and Indian interests in the region.353
The highly controversial drone attacks in north-west of Pakistan have raised serious concern and discourse around the world over the credibility of the U.S. as a promoter and protector of democracy and human rights. Drone strikes in Pakistan are subject to Public
International Law. This factor needs to be analyzed in the light of human rights violation and other moral justified norms.
Drone attacks which are carried out by CIA within Pakistani territory on its civilians are clear violation of International Law of Armed Conflict (ILOAC) and this makes the action of the
U.S unlawful against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to deal with. Drone strikes not only targeted Al-
Qaeda and the Taliban leadership, but in drone attacks hundreds of civilians have lost their lives with the loss of infrastructure as well. The U.S. strategy of using drones is productive to some extent as many Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders are being killed as a result of these attacks but here the killing of civilians is a clear violation under Article 3 of Geneva Convention which says if a person is not actively involved in any sort of criminal hostile act, he cannot be killed or subjected to violence, torture or vicious treatment.354 The U.S. Administration has asserted time and again that it has taken a position in the light of International Law of Armed Conflict to eliminate the
Taliban and Al-Qaeda which justified the U.S. standing.355
353 Zaheer-ul- Hassan, “U.S. to Redefine Drone Attack Policy.” Available from http://www.defence.pk/forums/world-affairs 354H Hongju , “The Obama Administration & International Law,” Washington D.C, March 25, 2010 http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases 355 Ibid.
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In retaliation, the U.S. has attacked suspected targets with drones in the FATA region with regular rate of recurrence and civil causalities are more than expected in the process.356
These drone attacks in Pakistan could not be executed without the patronage, approval and help of the Pakistani government. A huge section of Pakistani public condemns and wants the government to withhold its support regarding drone attacks. In this situation, it has become ever harder for the government to carry out its dual policy in the face of severe condemnation at home. These outstanding concerns and trust deficit on both sides have generated more misconceptions and thus give rise to misunderstandings which need to be reduced. In such an uncertain setting between the two unequal partners, it becomes even more difficult for the U.S. and Pakistan to form a long term sustainable strategic relationship.
The drone attacks gained momentum in 2007 but the earlier attacks were kept secret, and were even denied by the government officials.357 This led to a widespread outrage amongst masses that fully condemned these drone attacks as intrusion on Pakistan’s sovereignty. Whereas the government of Pakistan fully refutes taking any blame of giving any authorization for these attacks and it has been condemning these drone attacks at international forums.
The United Nations Charter does not authorize any nation to use aggressive means of force against other sovereign nations to carry out unilateral attacks and the U.S. has no justified reason to use drones as a mean of retaliation and revenge. After the 9/11 attacks, however, the
UNSC passed Resolution 1368 and also activated the Article 51 of Self-Defence; 358 but along with this, it is pertinent to mention that the Security Council did not endorse the use of force against any state for any self-vested reason.
356 Bill Roggio & Alexander Mayer, “Charting the data for U.S. airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004-11,” The Long War Journal. Available from http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistanstrikes.php
357Sunawar, “Pakistan as a Frontline State in War Against Terrorism: Cost & Benefit Analysis,” p. 57 358 Ibid., p. 47
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In the Congressional hearing in March 2009, David Kilcullen said:
I think one of the things we could do that would send a strong message right now is we could call off the drone strikes that have been mounted in the western part of Pakistan. I realize that they do damage to al Qaeda leadership. Since 2006 we have killed 14 senior al Qaeda leaders using drone strikes. In the same time period we have killed 700 Pakistani civilians in the same area. The drone strikes are highly unpopular. They are deeply aggravating to the population. And they have given rise to a feeling of anger that coalesces the population around the extremists and leads to spikes of extremism well outside the parts of the country where we are mounting those attacks. Inside the FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas] itself some people like the attacks because they do actually target the bad guys. But in the rest of the country there‘s an immense anger about them. And there is anger about them in the military and the intelligence service. I realize it might seem counterintuitive, but we need to take our foot off the necks of these people so they feel that there‘s a degree of trust. Saying we want to build a permanent relationship, a friendship with them whilst continuing to bomb their population from the air, even if you do it with robot drones, is something that they see through straight away.359
It is evident that drones kill not only targeted militants but there is a great possibility that these drones kill high numbers of civilians. The use of unnecessary missiles and bombs in places where no terrorist activity occurs and where civilians are living and working in a normal way is completely unjustified. In armed conflict zones, civilians evacuate or take some prior precautions in order to be on safe end.360
The drone attacks in Pakistan’s north western frontier are an important factor which has taken the attention of world and international media. Pakistani leaders apparently condemn such drone strikes to attain political objectives, but there is clear evidence that they not only turn a deaf ear to the growing resentment by the masses but favor them allowing the U.S. to get rid of terrorists within Pakistani territory. In May 2011, WikiLeaks documents came to the limelight
359Sunawar, “Pakistan as a Frontline State in War Against Terrorism: Cost & Benefit Analysis,” p. 48 360 Op.cit.
181 and revealed a very interesting fact that Pakistani government supports the drone attacks in private, but condemns them in public in order to avoid resentment from the masses.361
6.3 Postscript
6.3.1 AF-PAK Strategy
The strategy was first proposed by President Obama in March 2009. Af-Pak strategy was later redefined in December 2009 by U.S. military officials. The strategy concisely outlines the overall objective of the U.S. towards Pakistan and Afghanistan in the region: “to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.”362
The strategy apparently promises a broad range of co-operation from the U.S. to its coalition ally Pakistan in the War against Terrorism and further insisted the international community to help Pakistan in overcoming the major political, economic, and security challenges which it is confronted as a coalition partner in the War against Terrorism.363
Islamabad shows deep reservation over Af-Pak strategy which considers Afghanistan-
Pakistan border areas as a single zone pertaining to military operations. There are considerable differences regarding the U.S. approach of considering Pakistan and Afghanistan on the same level when it comes to fight terrorism. Former President of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari had criticized the Obama Administration for considering two regional countries under a single
361 Hassan Zaidi, “Army Chief Wanted More Drone Support,” Dawn, May 20, 2011. 362 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the U.S. President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan & Pakistan,” Washington: The White House, 27 March 2009, Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ 363U.S. Department of State, Afghanistan & Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy. Washington: Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan & Pakistan, January, 2010, Available from http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
182 strategy. In an interview with the Financial Times, he clearly pointed out that Afghanistan and
Pakistan are two different countries of South Asia with different political history and cannot be associated together in a same framework for any reason.364
Pakistan is an established democracy and a country of 180 million people, it possesses one of the best professional military that is nuclear capable and has an influential middle class with comparatively better economy with influential print and electronic media at local, provincial, and state level. On the other hand, Afghanistan is a war torn state with a poor democratic record, a country where drug trafficking is common with poor law and order situation with almost no writ of the government exists outside its capital Kabul. The one factor that is common between two countries is terrorism which is a blatant threat to their security and survival. Pakistani government disapproved Af-Pak strategy. If the U.S. links Pakistan and Afghanistan together and it takes action within Pakistani territory to contain the Taliban and Al-Qaeda then this would certainly undermine Pak-U.S. strategic relationship in this region.
The Af-Pak strategy has brought Pakistan into the limelight and it put a greater emphasis on Pakistan’s ability to combat terrorism than in the past. It urged the need of pouring more economic and military assistance to Pakistan from the U.S. and international community. This lucrative aid package is directly linked to country’s performance in counterterrorism in the region.
The Obama Administration has acknowledged the “trust deficit” and AF-Pak Strategy is an effort to reduce the gap, which further states, “that the U.S. government must engage the
364 Lamont & Farhan, “Zardari Rejects Obama’s Af-Pak Strategy,” Financial Times, Available from http:// www.ft.com/cms/s/0/93986082-9d46-11de-9f4a-00144feabdc0.html?catid=5&SID=google.
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Pakistani people based on our long-term commitment to helping them build a stable economy, a stronger democracy, and a vibrant civil society.”365
Unlike his predecessor President Bush, the Obama Administration has clearly asserted the importance of strengthening the U.S. relations with Pakistan via economic and military assistance, rather than to put pressure on Pakistan with its old rhetoric to “do more,”- a failed strategy which did not produce any concrete results. A stable and peaceful Afghanistan is in the interest of all regional as well as global powers and it could be only possible with the co- operation and diplomatic support of Pakistan which needs to be strengthened in order to combat terrorism.
However, the basic objective of the Af-Pak strategy is to offer substantial U.S. civilian assistance to fulfill Pakistan’s requirement in building agricultural sector, to create more jobs, education and training, and to facilitate its’ infrastructure. In addition to that, it supports for rehabilitation and reconstruction of areas that are badly affected by militancy and military operations.366
6.3.2 Kerry-Lugar Bill (KLB)
This bill which is popularly known as “Biden-Lugar bill,” or Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan
Act 2009 was introduced in the Senate by its former Chairman Senator Joseph Biden and Senator
Richard Lugar. The Senate Committee had approved the Bill unanimously in July 2009. The Bill acknowledged the role of Pakistan as the U.S. frontline ally in fighting terrorism and Pakistan received $15 billion economic assistance under this Bill over the next 10 years beginning 2009.
At that time the civil government of Pakistan accepted it considering it as the best aid package
365 White House, “Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan & Pakistan.” 366 Daniel S. Markey, “AfPak to PakAf: A Response to the New US Strategy for South Asia,” Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2009, p. 2.
184 under circumstances when it badly needed external assistance.367 There has always been a strong rift between Pakistan’s civil and military leadership over Kerry-Lugar Bill.
The U.S. believed that this piece of legislation would allow the U.S. to attack Al-Qaeda and their sanctuaries within Pakistani territory. Pakistan Army also showed great concern over this Bill and showed its reaction to the civil government and U.S. officials in form of disapproval. Pakistani Army believes this Bill would give the U.S. an extra power to interfere in
Pakistan’s internal affairs.
Under the Kerry-Lugar Bill, Pakistan has received $7.5 billion for civilian sector for the five years and the primary purpose is to improve the country’s education, health facilities, reforming police service, infrastructure, strengthening judiciary and democracy, and development of other civilian sectors in order to make them progress. Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton, during her visit to Pakistan in October 2009, announced that Pakistan would receive an additional amount of over $243 million as civilian aid for improving its power sector, raise the level of its higher education, and in order to meet other important socio-economic needs.368
In one way or the other, this Bill is important for Pakistan, as the U.S. has not only recognized Pakistan as an important ally, but it also has acknowledged that Pakistani people have given more sacrifices than any other coalition nation. The U.S. has played a critical role in encouraging the economic financial institutions like IMF and the World Bank to facilitate
Pakistan in external payment obligations. The economic, financial and political support of the
U.S. for Pakistan is highly acknowledged in the wake of 9/11. This Bill is aimed to strengthen the Pak-U.S. economic relations.
367 Najam Rafique, “Analyzing the Kerry-Lugar Bill,” Institute of Strategic Studies, Volume XXXI, Issue Number 1 & 2, 2011, pp. 261-262 368 Ishtiaq Ahmed, “The U.S. Af-Pak Strategy: Challenges & Opportunities for Pakistan,” Asian Affairs: An American Review, Taylor & Francis Group, LLC., 2010. p. 200
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The main purpose of the KLB is to provide and invest funds for people and programs related to their social development. Under KLB, the U.S. is more interested to shift its focus from military spending to public spending in Pakistan including education, health, raising living standard and building new public institutions. 369
KLB is of great importance to Pakistan when its’ military is heavily involved in combating terrorism. According to the Kerry-Lugar- Bermann Bill of 2009, Pakistan received $ 10 billion in next five years on the primary condition that Pakistan will make every effort to ensure peace along its western border with Afghanistan. This is an opportunity for Pakistan to convince the
Obama Administration that Pakistan’s economic progress is vital and is directly linked with the prosperity and progress for the region. Moreover, economically strong Pakistan can combat terrorism more effectively.
Pakistan-U.S. relationship faces a sharp downturn since 2011. Three major incidents in a row of 2011, including Raymond Davis Case, Osama bin Laden’s death and Salala tragedy at the end of year marked a clear trust deficit and lack of understanding on both sides.370 Other three subsequent developments had deep repercussions for U.S.-Pak relations. These are briefly discussed in the following paragraphs:
6.3.3 The Raymond Davis Case
On January 27, 2011, Raymond Davis, CIA contractor who had been working for CIA covert operations in FATA in tracking militant groups inside Pakistan killed two men in public in
Lahore. While running away from the scene, he was arrested by the local police who then took him into custody. After three weeks, the Obama Administration admitted the fact that Raymond
369 Susan B. Epstein and Kronstadt, “Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance, Congressional Research Service,” June 7, 2011, Available from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row.pdf 370Sunawar, “Pakistan as a Frontline State in War Against Terrorism: Cost & Benefit Analysis,” p. 58
186 was a contractor of CIA in Pakistan and described Raymond Davis as being “our diplomat.” 371In mid-February, then Senator John Kerry paid a visit to Islamabad in an effort to reduce rising tensions between both countries and offered compassion over the loss of life and played a central role in the release of Raymond Davis.372 Under extreme political pressure from Washington.
Islamabad accepted his diplomatic immunity which shielded Davis from prosecution. He was freed and flown out of the country after paying $2.3 million in diyat or blood money to the victims’ families, under the Islamic Law373 There was public rage against the government decision to let go a criminal who was involved in murder cases of two men. Raymond’s presence and his covert activities within the country were also taken as a violation of the sovereignty of
Pakistan. This incident badly damaged Pakistan’s government credibility and brought embarrassment and condemnation from masses for bowing down to the U.S. demands.
It is a fact that the issue of Raymond Davis case was allowed to grow beyond due proportions with the help of over projection of this case by domestic and international media.
6.3.4 The Death of Osama bin Laden
The other incident that badly violated the sovereignty of Pakistan took place on 2 May, 2011 when the U.S. helicopters landed in Abbottabad to conduct operation to arrest Osama Bin Laden from his place of hiding. On May 2, 2011, the most wanted terrorist of the world was captured and killed by the U.S. Special Forces at his hideout in Abbottabad that was located just one-half mile away from the Pakistan’s Military Academy. The U.S. Special Operations Forces, led by the Navy SEALs conducted a successful 45-minute operation, and returned swiftly to their bases
371 Press Conference of President Obama, February 15, 2011. 372 The U.S. Embassy’s February 16, 2011, Available from http://Islamabad.usembassy.gov/pr-html 373 “Blood Money Tradition Might Help Resolve U.S.-Pakistani Row,” Los Angeles Times, March 13, 2011
187 in Afghanistan. Bin Laden was subsequently buried at sea. The Pakistani civilian and military leadership was uninformed about the raid.374
The death of Osama bin Laden reinforced the U.S. doubts regarding Pakistan as a non- credible ally in the War against Terrorism as it was not possible for Osama to manage to escape to Pakistan without internal support. John Brennan acted as a Chief Counterterrorism Advisor in
President’s Obama Administration told reporters “it was beyond belief that bin Laden did not have any support system” within Pakistan.375 Pak-U.S. relationship before this incident was already in jeopardy due to trust deficit on both sides. Pakistan protested for violating its sovereignty and territorial integrity but the fact was Pakistan’s credibility suffered a serious blow at the international level.
Pakistan Army and its military agencies came under heavy domestic criticism for being unable to detect the presence of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. Ex- Pakistan Army Chief General
Ashfaq Pervez Kyani warmed the U.S. that such incursions by the U.S. would not be tolerated in future under any circumstances. Pakistan also threatened to close NATO road supply via
Pakistan which was considered vital for the NATO troops stationed in Afghanistan.376 Osama’s presence in Pakistan however has further intensified the mistrust between two countries; the relationship was already strained due to Raymond Davis episode earlier in 2011.
The Pakistani government had been embarrassed, cornered, and faced criticism at domestic and international level. Osama’s presence in Pakistan provided concrete evidence that it is Pakistan, and not Afghanistan that remains the problem for the U.S. Osama bin Laden’s presence in Pakistan and retaliatory terrorist attacks within the country raise many serious concerns and questions; and this particular incident highlighted domestic fault lies in Pakistan’s
374 Pakistan, the U.S. & the End Game in Afghanistan,” Jinnah’s Institute Research Report, pp. 49-52 375 “Osama Bin Laden Killed in U.S. Raid, Buried at Sea,” Washington Post, May 2, 2011. 376 Interview with senior retired Colonel of Pakistan Army. 17 March 2013
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National Security Strategy. The presence of Osama bin Laden in Pakistani territory gave
President Karzai and his security forces the opportunity to blame their failures against the insurgency on Pakistan’s security policies.
In the run-up to the Afghanistan transition, the Pakistan Army and intelligence agencies need to address major challenges, for instance, homegrown militancy and border infiltration by militants on both sides and they will have to formulate concrete strategies in this regard.377
6.3.5 Salala Border Incident
On November 26, 2011, U.S. NATO forces who were on a patrolling mission opened heavy machine gun fire from the hill-top on Pakistani check post adjacent to Afghanistan-Pakistan border just inside the Pakistani territory. The U.S. maintained this claim that its commanders on the ground had no prior knowledge of two small Pakistan Army outposts who were in the area which came under heavy attack by NATO helicopters. Pakistani officers kept on telling their
American counterparts that Pakistani soldiers were coming under attack, but 24 Pakistan Army officers and soldiers were killed before the air assault ended. Pakistanis officials were infuriated over this national tragedy. Prime Minister Yousaf Raza described and termed the attacks as a
“violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty, and a flagrant violation of International Law.”378
As a matter of fact, Pakistan responded against Salala incident with a strong reaction. The political and military leadership were on the same page and passed unanimous Resolution from the Parliament and condemned this incident. Pakistan asked the U.S. to vacate Shamsi Air Base, located in the province of Balochistan. Pakistan gave fifteen days’ ultimatum to vacate the airbase after which the U.S. vacated it. This Air base was thought to be used by the U.S. and
377 “Osama Bin Laden Killed in U.S. Raid, Buried at Sea,” Washington Post, May 2, 2011. 378 November 26, 2011, release at http://www.mofa.gov.pk/mfa/pages/article
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NATO forces for stationing and operation of drone attacks in the Tribal areas of Pakistan.
Besides, Pakistan also boycotted the Bonn conference which was held in December 2011, which was meant to discuss the political future of Afghanistan in protest to Salala incident.379 Bonn conference which was attended by more than 90 countries was important pertaining to
Afghanistan’s political situation after the drawdown of the U.S. and NATO troops from the region.380 Pakistan also suspended NATO supply route for 06 months after the resolution which was passed unanimously from the Parliament of Pakistan as a means of protest against the attacks carried out by NATO helicopters.
Pakistan refused to participate in the investigation launched by the Pentagon. That investigation came to an end in late December 2011. The U.S. Military General who was leading investigation panel announced that, “the U.S. forces primarily acted in self-defence and there was no intentional effort to target Pakistani army within its border.” It was revealed that serious miscommunication and poor coordination between the two militaries were a central factor which resulted in the killings of Pakistani soldiers, but no NATO personnel were found guilty.381
Pakistan’s military refused to accept the investigation report and labeled it as unjustified and unacceptable. Pakistani military dismissed NATO claim that NATO forces and ISAF were unaware of the presence of Pakistani military posts in the border areas with Afghanistan.382
6.3.6 Operation Zarb-e-Azb Zarb-e-Azb operation was launched by Pakistan Army on June 15th 2014 which continues till date with full force in North Waziristan. Terrorists have been killed in airstrikes and their hideouts have been destroyed by Pakistan Air Force using jet air-crafts. In ongoing military offensive, a huge stockpile of explosives and heavy weapons have been recovered from the
379 Interview with senior retired Colonel of Pakistan Army. 22 March 2013 380 November 26, 2011, release at http://www.mofa.gov.pk/mfa/pages/article 381 Kronstadt, “Pak-U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Servive, May 24, 2012, p. 13 382 Ibid., p. 14
190 militant-occupied region. Pakistan Army is fighting on both fronts against foreign and local terrorists to weed them out from North Waziristan Agency and to ensure a free and secure
Pakistan.
According to an ISPR press briefing, terrorists’ hideouts and underground explosive tunnels have been destroyed. Pakistan civil and military leadership decided to launch a fully fledged operation against local and foreign terrorists in Waziristan agency. These militants have been a source of grave concern from security perspective and have taken safe asylum in the
Tribal areas which is considered to be safe haven to execute terrorist activities within Pakistan and across the globe.383
Jets and artillery began hitting militant targets in North Waziristan to take back full control of the areas earlier occupied by militants. The assault was finally launched after a dramatic attack on Karachi Airport on 08th June, 2014 which resulted in the killing of dozens of people and finally marked the end of an undecided peace process with the Pakistani Taliban.
6.3.7 2014 U.S. Drawdown –Muddling through situation for Pakistan
For many, the U.S. led NATO-ISAF coalition forces have failed in Afghanistan to bring peace and stability. The announcement of hasty drawdown from Afghanistan clearly reflected that the
Obama Administration is trying to get safe exit without fulfilling its commitment towards a war torn country. American foreign policy makers consider Pakistan as a vital state- a state which can play an important role for political reconciliation due to its ethnic and cultural links with
Afghanistan.
383 ISPR briefing on Operation “Zarb-e-Azb.” June-July 2014
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Apparently, Pakistan lies nowhere in the U.S. exit strategy. It is quite evident that Bush and
Obama Administrations both have failed in Afghanistan without achieving the desired objectives. President Obama stated: “We will not try to make Afghanistan a perfect place; we will not police its streets or patrol its mountains indefinitely. That is the responsibility of the
Afghan government.”384
Sectarian violence and terrorist incidents have gained impetus after the death of Akbar
Bugti in Balochistan. Quetta is known as the headquarters of the exiled Afghan Taliban leadership. The former ISAF commander, General Stanley McChrystal, declared “Quetta Shura” as the greatest threat to ISAF forces in Afghanistan. Whether or not the shura exists in Quetta today, the fragile security condition of the province can be easily exploited by militant groups and there is enough evidence to support that this is happening. Despite tackling the Taliban threat, on one hand, Islamabad also has to deal with the Baloch separatist movement. Pakistan believes India is the main player behind the scene and the major source of provoking insurgency in the province of Balochistan. In addition to that, Islamabad Foreign Office has evidence against
India that it is using Afghan soil to destabilize Pakistan and providing regular funding and equipment to militants and separatist elements to continue work against the interest of
Pakistan.385
Many of the problems affecting Afghanistan and Pakistan are entangled and should be addressed simultaneously. This includes economic cooperation, cross-border issues such as refugees, drugs smuggling, and safe havens for militants groups operating in both countries and thus posing a high security risk. On another level, being a neighboring country Pakistan will be
384 The New York Times, June 22, 2011 385Sunawar, “The 2014 U.S. Withdrawal: An unsettled Quagmire for Pakistan,” Regional Studies, Vol. XXXII, No.4, Autumn 2014, p.103
192 in limelight and will have a primary role after the U.S. drawdown to bring peace and stability to
Afghanistan. Pakistan and Afghanistan do not want an abrupt withdrawal of the U.S troops from the region as they believe it will exponentially multiply Afghanistan's problems. They believe that the rapid withdrawal may further embolden the Taliban forces which can become a source of problem for all regional countries in the future.386 Today Islamabad needs to formulate concrete and effective strategies to address internal extremism which spreads its tentacles all across the country.
Failure to reach any political settlement in Kabul is therefore likely to have a spill-over effect that would further wane Islamabad’s ability to control different extremist groups operating inside Pakistan’s Tribal Area.387 Despite the complexity of U.S-Pak relations, and being a front line state in the U.S. led Global War on Terrorism, a complete U.S. withdrawal would not only give rise to a security vacuum in the region but this would not be in Islamabad’s interest as well.
In early 2012, Pakistan’s Foreign Office publicly declared a ‘strategic shift’388 in its policy towards Afghanistan which would be based on wide-ranging reconciliation process and actively reaching out to elements of the Northern Alliance which are believed to be anti-Pakistani.389
As a result, Pakistan’s conception of a friendly Afghan government has evolved overtime which is vital to Pakistan’s strategic interests.390 At the moment, Pakistani security establishment following pragmatic approach and is of the view that the Taliban may not be capable enough of seizing power alone.391 As a result, officially Pakistan does not float the idea that the Taliban should form the Afghan government alone. This strategic shift In Pakistan’s foreign policy
386 Asmatullah Wazir, “Withdrawal of the U.S. Troops from Afghanistan and its Implications for Pakistan- Challenges and a Way Forward,” TIGAH, A Journal of Peace & Development, Volume: 2, December 2012, FATA Research Centre, Islamabad. p. 94 387 Interview with senior retired Colonel of Pakistan Army. 11 November 2013 388 Moeed Yusuf, “Decoding Pakistan’s ‘Strategic Shift’ in Afghanistan,” SIPRI, May 2013, p.17. 389 Ibid. 390 M. Asim, Pak-U.S. Security Relationship 1947-2006, PhD Dissertation, 2010.pp. 507-509. 391 Interview with senior serving officer of Pakistan Army posted in Bajaur. 22 November 2013.
193 reflects that Pakistan’s perception has changed vis a vis Taliban which is no longer a reliable proxy.392
392 Geo TV program, “Apas Ki Baat Najam Sethi k Saath.” July 2014
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Conclusions and Recommendations
I refer back to my two hypotheses from Chapter 1- Introduction:
i. War on Terror put Pakistan‘s security under severe strain and may not be able to
sustain Pak-U.S. relationship in the long run, and
ii. Implications of War on Terror have adversely affected Pak-U.S. relations and
undermined Pakistan‘s security as well.
The discussion in previous chapters has indeed shown that both of these hypotheses are valid.
Realism has been the dominant model of International Relations which seems to provide a useful framework for understanding the collapse of the post-World War I international order in the face of serial aggressions in the Far East and Europe, World War II, and the Cold War. In international system, the security of the state is the primary aim of every nation. State’s strategies are based on their threat perceptions, and mostly aimed at balancing the threats not power.
Moreover, they do not unconditionally opt for a strategy but with a rational calculation of costs and benefits. Pak-U.S. relationship is driven by security needs, power politics and balance of power dynamics.
It is not necessary that the model of Complex Interdependence always reflects world’s political reality but both Interdependence and Realist assumptions portray ideal types of behavior for nation states to adapt according to the changing situations and circumstances. Most situations fall somewhere between these two extremes. Sometimes, realists’ assumptions carry more weight and dominate Complex Interdependence. While at times, Complex Interdependence presents clearer picture than the Realist assumptions. But in order to make both Complex
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Interdependence and Realist assumption work at the same time, one must decide which one is most applicable and co-relate to the present situation.393
Security and survival of the nation state is the most vital and determining factor for the foreign policy makers while formulating foreign policy and in the progress and growth of any nation. Without security, there is no peace, progress and prosperity in a nation’s life. Pakistan since inception has been facing more external threats than internal ones; these threats have come from both hostile India in the east and unfriendly Afghanistan on its western borders. Disturbing and continuous hostility on the eastern front, however, forced Pakistan especially the military establishment to form Indo-centric defence and foreign policy.
In order to understand U.S.-Pakistan relationship, it is important to understand different perceptions of two countries based on self-vested interests over the past 67 years. Thus, it is not surprising that the history of Pak-U.S. relations is much like a roller costar ride but the most interesting and remarkable thing is that both countries have a relationship which has survived many ups and downs, stresses and upheavals, even during the worst times both countries have managed to sustain a working relationship. The ups and downs are a result of different national interests and objectives because the relationship between the two countries had been one of convenience and not based on common conviction. Traditionally speaking, the relations between the two countries have always been based on single issue which brought them together for limited or uncertain periods with divergence of interests on both sides. This relationship exists sometimes between the military or military-dominated government in Pakistan and the White
House, the Pentagon, and the CIA largely determine the course of action towards Pakistan.394
393 Art & Jervis, International Politics, New York: Harper Collins College Publisher, p. 241.
394 Hussain, The U.S-Pakistan Engagement: The War on Terrorism and Beyond, p. 2.
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Pakistan’s relations with the U.S. were established and developed during the period of
Cold War. However, as time went on, this closeness lost its impetus and a variety of issues started to dominate the relationship. Pak-U.S. relationship was primarily based for defence purposes and Pakistan signed defence pacts with the U.S. during the 1950s. During the wars of
1965 and 1971, the U.S. did not come to support Pakistan against its traditional rival India. In the past, during the Cold War despite the alliances such as SEATO and CENTO, Pakistan has always been a low profile country in the U.S. calculations.
The U.S. policy towards South Asia has revolved around certain national objectives. In order to achieve these goals and to promote its own strategic interests in South Asia, the U.S. never followed any permanent policy throughout the Cold War era. After World War II, containing Soviet Union’s influence in South Asia was the top most priority for the U.S. and
Pakistan served as a frontline state. Geo-strategic location of Pakistan is one of the main vital factors influencing Pakistan’s security. The geopolitical realities and strategic compulsions in the region brought both Pakistan and the U.S. together but divergence of perceptions and policies over a number of bilateral and international issues kept them apart. Thus, it is not surprising that the history of Pak-U.S. relations is much like a roller costar ride but the most interesting and remarkable thing is that both countries have a relationship which has survived many ups and downs, stresses and upheavals, even during the worst times, both countries have managed to sustain a working relationship.
Pakistanis have noted that Pak-U.S. relationship can be termed as a relationship which lacks credibility and trust; while the Americans on their part have found the relationship futile and frustrating. An eminent American analyst of South Asian affairs has called it a “tortured relationship for both the partners which got closer to each other keeping their entirely different
197 national interests supreme.”395 Suspension of the U.S. military aid to India and Pakistan after the
Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971 was clearly demonstrated as a betrayal by Pakistani civil and military leadership. Pakistan was the country which was heavily dependent on the U.S. military economic aid and such like sanctions over and over again by the U.S. administrations proved to be a great setback for Pakistan’s fragile economy. On the other hand, India was ahead in receiving military and economic aid from other powers including Israel and the Soviet Union other than the U.S. Taking advantage of this situation, Moscow fully supported India against
Pakistan and fueled Pushtoonistan issue on the western front thus tried to manipulate the situation in its own favor by deliberately taking advantage of strained relationship between
Pakistan and the U.S.396
The Soviet attack on Afghanistan was a major event in the history of the Cold War which changed the structure of the international system. During the Soviet Union occupation of
Afghanistan in the 1980s, Pakistan acted as a frontline state in order to contain Communist threat. Pakistan received millions of dollars to assist Mujahedin who fought against the Red
Army. Soviet Union could not gain its desired objectives in Afghanistan and had to retreat. The
U.S. policy makers and analysts were fully aware and concerned that a large and massive aid provided for Mujahedin during the Afghan war through ISI was used in the development of
Pakistan’s nuclear capability. But at that time because of the U.S. involvement in the Afghan
War, Pakistan’s nuclear program was set aside. But, once the Afghan war ended, and the Soviet troops pulled out from Afghanistan, the U.S. dramatically cut-down its aid for Pakistan, and
Afghanistan was dragged into a situation of civil war and political anarchy that resulted in the
395 Norman Palmer, “The U.S. & Pakistan: A Tortured Relationship,” Paper presented at the First Bilateral Conference on Pak-U.S. Relations held at Arlington, VA., June, 1981. 396 Op.cit.
198 rise, expansion and strengthening of Al-Qaeda network and other Mujahedin groups. 397 When the Soviet threat was no more there, Pakistan also lost its frontline status along with the U.S. interesst in the region.
The War against Terrorism is a new kind of war with a new dimension. The threat of
Communism is replaced by Terrorism. Both the U.S. and Pakistan are fighting against a common enemy but like the Cold War period- with different objectives. In this assessment, the achievements are far less as an ally even after a decade long war than the losses which Pakistan has to bear. Pakistan was dragged into the War on Terrorism and now it has to face the consequences all by itself in multiple forms which exhibit in form of: militancy, extremism, terrorism, burden on economy with loss of foreign investment, involvement of military in the
Tribal areas, drone attacks, and Talibanization of Pakistani society, etc. Pakistan’s pro-Taliban policy therefore, proved to be a disaster in the post-9/11 period.
The question arises: What could be the likely repercussions and challenges for Pakistan in the long run if the War in Afghanistan is continued for an indefinite period of time? Firstly, the so-called nascent democratic regime and continuous anarchic situation in Afghanistan means a prolongation of the political turmoil that would result in the influx of refugees across the border with drugs and weapons into Pakistani territory as they already did during the 1980s. This would eventually create an additional burden on Pakistan’s economy which is already in a precarious shape; and has also given rise to the criminalization of the Pakistani society at a massive scale. In addition to this, it will further augment extremism, and political instability in Pakistan.
Pakistan is also keen to build a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan to
Pakistan to supply its growing energy needs and for this reason, it wishes to see peace and
397 Clarke, Against all Enemies, New York: Free Press, 2004.
199 stability in Afghanistan. However, a stable and peaceful Afghanistan is an important prerequisite in this regard. Therefore, Islamabad further needs to look at the implications of the War against
Terrorism and its strategy to contain Al-Qaeda and the Taliban forces and their influence on
Pakistani state and society.
Though, both countries have not shown trust and full satisfaction of the other’s role in combating terrorism. There are a number of reservations which the U.S. has shown from time to time pertaining to Pakistan’s role as the closest ally in the region and its contribution in the War against Terrorism. The situation in Afghanistan is unstable, highly alarming and precarious, and it will be quite difficult to bring peace to the region as long as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are able to find refuge in Pakistan. The Obama Administration has been facing a lot of pressure from within the Congress to curtail economic and military assistance to Pakistan as it has failed to come up to the U.S. expectations to stop terrorists from using its territory.’398
From the Pakistani military perspective, the real problem is India in the wake of the U.S. drawdown from Afghanistan, which is manipulating and taking the advantage of aggravated crisis in Pakistan. The close alliance between the U.S and India has deeply shaken Pakistani confidence in its partnership with the U.S. The U.S. should develop a comprehensive and friendly policy towards Pakistan by extending invitation to all major political players who are stakeholders to come onboard and find the way out to peace process in Afghanistan.399
The U.S policy makers have failed to convince Pakistani establishment that Afghanistan would not become an Indian client state after the U.S. led NATO forces departure from
Afghanistan. Indian consulates located at the Pak-Afghan border are seen as a threat by Pakistan to its security and stability in the region. A serving Army officer who is posted in Quetta, on
398 Afsir Karim, War on Terror (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2008), pp. 145-147 399 Muhammad Khurshid Khan, “Analyzing Domestic Terrorism as a Threat to Pakistan’s Security & the Policy Response,” Islamabad Policy Research Institute, IX(2), p. 66. 2009.
200 condition of secrecy, confirmed the fact that the Pakistan Army has numerous evidences and witnesses that the Indian- Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) agents are funding and supplying sophisticated weapons to the Pakistani Taliban forces in order to facilitate them in carrying out insurgency operations in Balochistan and Waziristan as well.
Apart from bad governance, terrorism and worst kind of law and order situation have badly affected security condition in Pakistan. Another estimate depicts that Pakistan has lost almost $ 200 million worth as far as foreign investment is concerned from the other foreign countries due to severe impact of terrorism.400
The U.S strongly believes that Pakistan’s northern Tribal areas which have been a neglected zone in the past have become a safe asylum for Al-Qaeda and the Taliban elements.
They cross lengthy porous border, take refuge in the Tribal areas of Pakistan with a great ease where they find sanctuary without any difficulty due to their ethnic ties with local people. To curtail and destroy the terrorists’ outfits which are a potential threat to its security forces, the U.S has been pressing Pakistan hard to carry out military operation in North Waziristan. The Pakistan
Army has launched a massive crackdown against local and foreign terrorist in North Waziristan
Agency. The basic objective is to eliminate and dismantle al-Qaeda’s and the Taliban’s hideouts there.
Earlier, as a result of military operation in South Waziristan, Pakistani government faced severe resentment from within the masses including media, civil society and various political parties. The terrorist events have enormously increased across the country and the suicidal attacks have gained momentum since then. The expenses of the on-going operation also put an additional load on the fragile economy of Pakistan. A large number of military personnel have
400 Daily Times, September 28, 2004
201 been deployed to the northwest border with Afghanistan and for the very first time in the history of Pakistan, its military forces have put their boots on the ground into the semi-autonomous
Tribal belt.
Time and again, serious uneasiness has been expressed by the U.S. for Pakistan’s nuclear program. The U.S. believes that poor security situation of the country would strengthen the militants who can get easy access to nuclear weapons. The weak and unstable civil government at the center is apparently failed to tackle the major security challenges and it has not come up with any effective strategy and firm resolve to deal with the internal issues which Pakistan is facing at the moment. The U.S is of the view that such a fragile situation may arise if government fails to assert its supremacy. Though Islamabad has assured Washington pertaining to the safety of its nuclear assets, but the U.S has never showed satisfaction for the explanation given from Pakistan’s side.
Without any doubt, no coalition state in the War against Terrorism has done as much as
Pakistan has done in combating terrorism that today its own internal security is endangered. In doing so, Pakistan itself has become a victim of aggression and terrorism. Pakistan at many times is being accused of not doing enough by the western world in general and the U.S. in particular and its role being a frontline state is often being questioned on many grounds. While doing so, the sacrifices which Pakistan has rendered through military and civilian casualties, in addition to infrastructure damage are not taken into account by the U.S. As a result, trust deficit has become widened on both sides.
Pakistan’s role as a ‘frontline state’ is not a new phenomenon for Pak-U.S. relations for two important reasons: as a result of its association with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan during the 1990s and its new role in the wake of 9/11 against terrorism in the region.
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In this background, there is a need to redefine security relationship that is bringing Pakistan closer into a conflict with the only super power in the world. If the U.S plans to withdraw from
Afghanistan then it has to set the terms that are appropriate and satisfactory to both Pakistan and
Afghanistan unlike the political vacuum which it created years back after Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan leaving Pakistan on its own to fix the problem. Now is the time to get out of this militancy quagmire which has badly affected Pakistan. There is a dire need to take a clear position against these Islamic militants which are the creation of Jihad phenomenon came to the limelight during the 1980s and the concept of Jihad has been misinterpreted in the name of Islam since then. Pakistan needs serious attempts to negotiate with all stakeholders in the Tribal belt in order to bring demilitarization, reconstruction and rehabilitation process. Pakistan government should take initiative pertaining to development, education and better governance.
Afghanistan is propagating this factor that Pakistan is exporting terrorism and instability to Afghanistan today more than yester years. They strongly feel that Pakistan is sending terrorists to Afghanistan and has provided sanctuaries to militants, who are fighting in Afghanistan but they are located in Pakistan. The reality is far different from assumptions, which says both
Pakistan and Afghanistan are the victims of terrorism. Pakistan in comparison to any other country in the region has paid heavily being the neighboring country of Afghanistan which has badly sabotaged not only its repute all over the globe but its socio-economic fabric which in return has given birth to extremism and violence.
Afghanistan today is known as a breeding ground for the spread of militancy, terrorism and narcotic trafficking. The policy makers lack clear vision and effective measures to tackle the challenges ahead. Kabul while attaining close collaboration with the international community should be in a position to formulate an independent foreign policy keeping its national interests
203 supreme. International community should not miscalculate Afghanistan’s national interests and it is essential for Afghanistan to give assurance that its territory will not be used in any case by the terrorists. The international community can play a vital role pertaining to create balance and symmetry through strengthening Afghanistan. Above all, Afghanistan needs better security apparatus to run law and order in the country after the drawdown of the U.S. led coalition forces from Afghanistan.
The U.S. led War on Terror which the U.S. initiated in 2001 has gone on for almost sixteen years (at the time of writing) with thousands of lives lost on both ends and today it is not confined only to Afghanistan but has been spread to the settled areas of Pakistan. In addition, it has a long lasting impact on Afghanistan which is already a war-torn society and has always been under heavy influence of regional and international powers. The severe bombing campaign which was a brutal projection of force in Afghanistan had caused a lot much collateral damage and particularly civilian community has suffered immensely, and led to anti-American sentiments.
Fighting Terrorism is not just an uphill task for Pakistan and the U.S. who are facing massive repercussions and severe consequences but for the entire World community to deal with this threat. It is clear that a new Pak-U.S. relationship in the wake of 9/11 is crucial and this has brought a clear shift from the short-term objectives of confronting terrorist threats towards decisive end. By eliminating extremism and terrorism, it is believed that the U.S. can be victorious in its pursuit to defeat violence and terror which for now is like a utopian model to achieve. If the two unequal partners in the War against Terrorism want to achieve their objectives; mutual faith, support and collaboration must be central to Pak-U.S. relationship.
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Unreasonable demands accompanying criticism on past failures from both sides will not serve the interests of any partner that both countries want to achieve at the end of the day; but will instead damage the mutuality of their common understanding. The trust deficit has become widened after three major incidents, the Raymond Davis case, Osama’s death, and Salala incident. These three events in 2011 put Pakistan in the limelight and highlighted the fact that nothing is going smoothly between both countries. The U.S. in particular and the international community in general raised questions on Osama’s presence in Pakistan. Building a unanimous agreement to deal with the threats Pakistan is facing requires an effective strategy at both civil and military level. Terrorism today is a deadly disease which is deeply rooted in Pakistani society but can be weeded out by a joint strategy.
Pakistani public has shown severe resentment and out-rightly rejected any possibility of compromising state sovereignty at government level. For instance, drone attacks, presence of foreign troops on Pakistani soil for a long period, allowing much room for foreign intelligence agencies to work within the country with greater ease, with interference, the signing of non- transparent agreements without determining any clear limits to what extent this co-operation must be extended on the War on Terrorism, etc. All these highlighted concerns have caused great uneasiness among people; as a result, masses have lost trust on the elected parliament. In the wake of 9/11, Pakistani nation supported President Musharraf’s decision for joining the anti- terrorism partnership for the protection of the national interests and in the face of imminent threats which it faced from India and the U.S. led coalition forces. But it is the high time when the conditions and limits of collaboration with the U.S should be redefined in a clear-cut way, especially keeping in view the worsening security situation on Pak-Afghan border.
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FATA today is one of the troublesome regions in the world where the U.S. War against
Terrorism is more unpopular than before. Although it is not an easy task for any government to deal with the situation which Pakistan is facing but Pakistan will have to make hard choices ahead since time is running out. Undoubtedly, in the absence of law and order, peace would not prevail which in turn gives the extremists an opportunity to assert themselves and are shifting their bases from FATA to Balochistan to carry out terrorist agenda without any difficulty. In addition to this, the weak provincial government, and ineffective law and order situation in
Balochistan are the crucial factors that provide separatists and extremists enough room to go with their planning. Without having a concrete strategy, transparency and efficient institution system,
FATA and Balochistan would remain behind and not be able to catch up with the technological development of the time and benefits from the socio-economic reforms.
It is the foremost effort and one of the priorities of the government of Pakistan to bring the region of FATA into governance and economic mainstream. For this specific purpose, the
Pakistani government has put into operation a comprehensive ¨Frontier Strategy” plan for the development which is a two-fold process; Firstly, it emphasizes both economic and social development for this remote poorly developed region which has been isolated from the mainstream development program since decades. Secondly, it strengthens the influence of governance in the center and subsequently increasing the size of the Frontier Corps to regulate law and order.
The Obama Administration given an affirmative response and is supporting Pakistan’s contribution pertaining to the Security Development Plan, which is a multidimensional program to enhance Pakistan’s capability to protect its long porous border with Afghanistan. This plan which is a result of mutual collaboration of the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad and the U.S. Central
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Command (CENTCOM) further gives support for the development, preparation and supplying of necessary equipments to the Frontier Corps and special operations units of the Pakistan Army including Special Services Groups (SSG) in a modern and sophisticated way.401
Pakistan and the U.S have many conflicting issues and the most upsetting one is of drone strikes in Pakistan’s Tribal region which contributes one of the major causes of anti-Americanism in this region. The U.S. has concerns over Pakistan’s double dealing pertaining to this War against
Terrorism.
Even after the half-done pulling out of the U.S. led NATO troops from Afghanistan, this
War on Terror has no ending. Looking to the future, the Pakistani government with an appropriate strategy, resources, and action should be able to stabilize the Tribal areas, FATA, and Balochistan by removing their outstanding grievances. In the short run, government must set parameters for the public to participate in the political process, by giving them incentives in the forms of education and employment opportunities which would ultimately lead in the defeat of
Al-Qaeda and extremist Islamists from the society.
National security paradigm of any country exists in a certain context, and when the circumstances change due to regional or international developments, the paradigm has to be revisited according to the desirability of time. The U.S. confronted a major challenge in the post
9/11 era, with the elimination of the Taliban government in Afghanistan. The Obama
Administration is concerned about the political set up of Afghanistan and the role of regional players, particularly Pakistan. The U.S. does not want a political vacuum there to allow Al-
Qaeda and any other non-state actors to gain ground and to reestablish themselves.
401 John Negroponte, “Pakistan's Fata Challenge: Securing One of the World's Most Dangerous Areas” Available from http://merln.ndu.edu/ archivepdf
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In the dramatically changing security environment, it is of vital importance for the policy makers of Pakistan to reduce country’s heavy dependence on the U.S. Pakistan needs to look into other more realistic and unfailing options on fair and equal grounds; and it should move closer towards time tested friends who withstood with Pakistan in the time of need unlike the U.S. which has proven itself to be less consistent. For Pakistan’s politics and society, this on-going War against
Terrorism has left far-reaching effects in the long run which are not only difficult to tackle but are quite challenging at the same time. Extremism and militancy- by products of Pakistan’ alignment with the West in the War on Terror have badly damaged the socio-economic fabric of the country and divided the society between the two extreme ends- that is, the extremists and moderates. With no level of tolerance, extremism has further led to militant violence in the already fragmented Pakistani society. The rise of radicalism has further damaged the society leaving Pakistan an isolated state with an uncertain future.
Findings • From the start, Pak-US relationship is complicated and based on convergence and divergence pattern. It has been at times very close in terms of enhancing military co- operation and faces breaks in forms of sanctions. • After 9/11 attacks, the U.S. initiated the War against Terrorism which gave it a new dimension and Pakistan became a frontline ally. • Today this war is not confined to Afghanistan, but entered into the Tribal and now settled areas of Pakistan. Pakistan Army is fighting this war against non-state actors within its territory. • Pakistani public has not approved this war. • Many believe militancy is a result of Pakistan’s engagement with the U.S. as a frontline state.
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• Pakistan-US-Afghanistan form a conflict triangle, they need each other to contain non- state elements and to defeat terrorism in the region. They are fighting the same war but with different objectives. • After the U.S. drawdown, things would not be easier for Pakistan, it would face militancy and Pak-Afghanistan relations would not be trouble free. Pak-U.S. relationship faces challenges with this background. • Continuity and Change- Communism is replaced by Terrorism; Republican administrations have always formed a “special relationship” with Pakistani establishment in times of crisis. • The strategy of military force and power projection in Afghanistan by transatlantic alliance is failed to yield any effective outcomes even after a decade long war. • It is not necessary that the model of Complex Interdependence always reflects world’s political reality but both Interdependence and Realist assumptions portray ideal types of behavior for nation states to adapt according to the changing situation and circumstances.
209
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Shah, Mehtab Ali. “Pak-US Relationship in the Post Cold War.” Pakistan Journal of American Studies, Vol.17 (Spring & Fall 1999) pp. 9-20.
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Thesis/Research papers
Arya, H.C. “A Study of Some Aspects of the Relations of the U.S. with Pakistan,” (Ph.D Thesis), Indian School of International Studies. New Delhi, 1966
Beghum, Imrana. “The Impact of Afghan-Soviet war on Pakistan.” Master Thesis, Area Study Center, Europe, Karachi University. 2010
Colonel Kirk H. Nilsson, “Dealing with Terrorist Sanctuary in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas.” USAWC CLASS OF 2009.
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“11 September 2001: The Response,” House of Commons Library (London), Research Paper 01/72, October 3, 2001, pp. 15-17.
Margaret M. Huffman (2012) “The United States and Pakistan during Crisis: From the Russian intervention in Afghanistan to 9/11.” Master Thesis, Faculty of the Department of History, East Carolina University.
Asim, Muhammad. “Pak-U.S. Security Relationship 1947-2006.” PhD Dissertation, 2010.pp. 507-509.
O’Connell, Mary Ellen. “Next Generation” Strategies: Challenging Abuse in Transnational Counterterrorism Practices. Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009. Palmer, Norman D. “The United States and Pakistan: A Tortured Relationship,” paper presented at the First Bilateral Conference on Pakistan-U.S. Relations held at Arlington, VA., June 7-10, 1981.
Newspapers
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USA Today Wall Street Journal Periodicals
Independent Newsline Newsweek The Guardian Weekly The Statesman The Economist Time Magazine
Websites
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Hassan, Zaheerul. “U.S. to Redefine Drone Attack Policy”. Retrieved from http://www.defence.pk/forums/world-affairs/105317- us-redefine-drone-attack-policy- zaheerul- hassan.html
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