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Reinhard Gehlen Was a (Coward Please r,:turr. If Uhruschev Aemem bers is to be trusted, they I think it is less than faithful to say that Vlasov was subverted, for Stalin personally engineered capture and that of his ernortnus army and the largo p)pulation with them, the deaths and tortures of so many, and (.;ave sou very many Russian and ulm- raintans reason for bitterness. I have ;f ten wondered how many of my relatives unlmown to me are among these victims. This also the recruit; here described an anti-Communist may • well have been largely anti-Stalin Communists who rewarded Hitler as the only means of getting rid of him and —rth the cost under the circumstances. EW Super Spy, Strange Ally Reviewed by , Books Arthur M. Con GEHLEN: Spy of the Century. By E. H. Cookridge. The reviewer, a former Senior Fellow at the Brook- mina= House. 402 pp.. Mustrakod. 110.00) ings Institution and a spe- THE GENERAL WAS A SPY: The Truth About cialist on international com• monism, is a consultant, General Gehlen and His Spy Ring. By Heinz Hohue writer and lecturer on for- & Hermann Zoning. Introduction by Hugh Trevor- eign affairs. Roper and Preface to the American Edition by Andrew Tully. Reinhard Gehlen was a (Coward. McCium & 0e021201111. 34'1 pp.. Illustrated. $10.00) Nazi general with an obses- sive hatred of communism who may have had more in- fluence on the course of the Cold War than any other man. Soviet articles refer to him as a fascist warmonger who was the biggest single factor in the Prevention of an East-West detente. These two books tell his extraordi- nary story. From late 1941 to the end of the war Gehlen was Hit,' lees chief of into""- -" the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Eu- rope. Then. having arranged to be captured by the Amer- icans, he soon emerged as the principal source of CIA intelligence from the Com- munist world until 1955, when he became Chanc. Adenauer's chief of intelli- gence for the West German Republic. Gehlen wns one of the planners of "Operation Bar- barossa," the 1941 German attack on the Soviet Union, which sent Nazi divisions six hundred miles into the U.S.S.R. in seven weeks., Gen. Reinhard Gehlen in 1954. See BOOKS, C4, Col. I THE WASHINGTON POST C 4 Saturday, April 8,1972 LEISURE Reinhard Gehlen: Super Spy, BOOKS, From Cl a large housing development Khrushchev's secret speech rope. A proponent of revolu- placing 50 million Russians formerly for SS officers, denouncing Stalin, and gave tion not evolution, he be- it to Allen Dulles. His intel- .under Hitler's rule. When Gen. Gehlen built a walled- lieved that all communism Gehlen became chief of in- in headquarters for what ligence operations exposed was bad and dreamed of war •telllgence for the Eastern was soon to become the spy some of the most successful between the U.S. and Front, he immediately base of the Cold War, pro- Soviet secret agents. His U.S.S.R. He had no sympa- began organizing a Russian viding the CIA with 70 per plans led to the 600-yard thy for national commu- Army of Liberation among cent of Its intelligence on tunnel the CIA dug Into nism, Titoism, and revision- anti-Communist prisoners of the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Eu- East Berlin. where the main ism. He didn't seem to be- war and partisans. By the rope. Thus, in a matter of telephone trunk lines lead- lieve that the political proc- spring of 1943 he had organ- months Hitler's chief anti- ing to Moscow and other ess in Moscow and Eastern ized this army under Soviet Soviet spy had become the capitals in Eastern Europe Europe would allow for a Gen. Andrei Vlassov, who Soviet expert for the United were tapped for nine struggle for power between had been captured by the States. months until this incredibly Germans and turned against There can be little doubt successful operation was dis- Stalin. Vlassov and Gehlen that the Soviets, fearing the covered. In June, 1967, CIA estimated that there were Germans more than any Director Richard Helms was hundreds of thousands of peoples, were greatly influ- able to make high marks . anti-Communist Russians enced in their assessment of from President Johnson by prepared to join with the U.S. policy by the fact that prediction the exact date of Germans in the overthrow Gehlen was selected for this the six-day Israeli attack in of Stalin. role. But there can be little the Middle East. His source: But Gehlen's plans ran doubt too that given Stalin's Gen. Gehlen. head-on against Hitler's aggressive moves the U S. It wasn't until he became 'view that the Slays were would use the only available head of German intelligence sub-human beings who source of intelligence. Prob- that Gehlen began to have should he controlled by ter- ably the revisionist histori- defeats mixed with his suc- ror and mass execution. At ans of the Cold War will be cesses. The Communists be- first Vlassov's propaganda debating for years the es- came more effective in pen- leaflets promising good sence of the conclusion E. H. etrating his organization and planting fake informa- treatment td deserters and Cookridge reaches in his employment in the Vlassov book: "Whether we like It or tion. But the greatest blow movement produced massive not, Western democracy to Gehlen was the discovery defections, but soon Hitler's must be prepared in times in 1962 that his chief of ruthless treatment of the of danger to accept such counter-intelligence, Heinz Russians brought an end to strange allies as Reinhard Felfen, was a Soviet double agent. The Felfe Affair, that. Had Hitler not been a Gehlen in defense against maniac, it is conceivable totalitarianism." combined with changes in that Gehlen's plans would German political leadership According to Cookridge, and the new technology of have provided the basis for who is a British author of a German victory in the spy planes and satellites all many fine books on espio- contributed to the fading East, certainly a substantial nage, the CIA pumped over prolongation of the war. impact of Gehlen. He re- $200 million into the Gehlen tired in 1968 at 65. Gehlen remained loyal to organization. But the results Hitler, but seeing how the Gehlen probably was the more than paid off. Among "spy of the century," but his war would end he made its sensational exploits were rightist proclivities and plans for his future. He ar- the accurate forecasts of the ranged to have all his intel- rigid anti-communism proba- East German uprisings In bly contributed to prolong- ligence files on the Soviet 1953, the Hungarian revolt ing the most dangerous pe- Union packed in 50 steel in 1956, and the Soviet Inva- riod of the Cold War and cases and hidden away until sion of Czechoslovakia in may have slowed the evolu-' he could be captured by the 1968. tionary political process in LT.S. Army. As Stalin's ag- Gehlen secured the text of gressive program in Eastern the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Eu- Europe, the Balkans and Iran began to unfold, it was apparent to the Americans that they were totally unpre- pared, without intelligence about the Soviets. But Geh- len was prepared and had soon negotiated a remarka- ble deal in Washington giv- ing him authority to estab- lish an all 7,erman intelli- gence appar, tus with com- plete contro. over its per- sonnet. In the little village of Pul- lach outside: of Munich in • Strange Ally the rightist• Stalinists and Both of these books are the anti-Stalinist revision- lively reading, well docu- ists. Even after the advent mented and cover essen- of Khrushchev his opera- tially the same events. The tions continued to give Cookridge book is better or- weight to the arguments of ganized and better written, those Communist leaders but spy buffs may enjoy the who most feared the Ger- operational detail of The mans and who were most op- General Was A Spy" by posed to relaxing the Stalin- Hahne and Zoning, two Ger- 1st tactics of Walliy and man newsmen who write for terror. Der Spiegel. .
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