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c Copyright 2019 David Neil Carlos Lopez State Building, Elite Ideology, and Mass Schooling: The Formation of Education Leviathans Since the Nineteenth Century David Neil Carlos Lopez A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Washington 2019 Reading Committee: Victor Menaldo, Chair Joel Migdal, Chair James D. Long Chris Adolph Program Authorized to Offer Degree: Political Science University of Washington Abstract State Building, Elite Ideology, and Mass Schooling: The Formation of Education Leviathans Since the Nineteenth Century David Neil Carlos Lopez Co-Chairs of the Supervisory Committee: Professor Victor Menaldo Department of Political Science Professor Joel Migdal Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies Why do some states develop highly centralized education systems while other states develop education systems that are less centralized? This dissertation presents a theory of the de- velopment of mass education to explain variation in the degree to which states monopolize control over public education at the central level of government. The project develops a theoretical framework of the political dynamics that influence the timing and centralization of public education during state-building, and derives a set of hypotheses that are tested us- ing statistical techniques and comparative historical analysis. In particular, two factors are highlighted: the subnational distribution of central state capacity, or infrastructural power, and the deployment of ideas by political elites to mobilize support for state-controlled public education. In the context of state formation, in which policy decisions often occur in an en- vironment rife internal instability and scarce resources, both infrastructural power and elite ideas help resolve uncertainty over whether mass education as a state (and nation) building project will contribute to legitimacy and political order. States introduce mass education to delimit the boundaries of citizenship, inculcate domi- nant values, and (re)produce social and economic relations. Ruling elites in particular value centrally-governed mass education as a means to legitimate their political authority, but they face material and political constraints in pursuit of its development. During early phases of state-building, regimes trade off between investing in the regulated provision of education or consolidating military and fiscal capacity to ensure political survival. Given that educa- tion systems are highly information-intensive institutions and logistically complex to govern from the political center and yield longer-term benefits for state legitimacy, centralized mass education is a costly trade-off relative to other state-building projects. First, absent sufficient monitoring and enforcement capabilities, rulers' efforts to impose `education-from-above' risks provoking political conflict with subnational actors. The state requires the necessary infrastructural power to collect and disseminate complex information about the population (i.e. informational capacity) before the regime can centralize control over education. However, state capacity may not be evenly distributed throughout the na- tional territory. The more evenly distributed the infrastructural power of the state, the more likely that the central state will monopolize control over education. The project introduces a composite measure of centralized education based on an original historical dataset of laws, decrees, and institutions in forty-five countries in Europe and the Americas from 1800 to 1970. The results provide strong supportive evidence of the relationship between education centralization and the distribution of infrastructural power|specifically, the administration of national population censuses over time. Second, elite ideologies also contribute to divergent levels of education centralization be- tween states, even those with similar levels of infrastructural power. This study examines the cases of Argentina and Chile. The historical evidence shows that intellectual elites in both countries engaged in political entrepreneurship in order to steer the central govern- ment's state-building priorities. In the case of Argentina, state-sponsored primary education emerged early as a critical component of consolidating political order in the liberal na- tionalist discourse of influential elites. By contrast, Chilean political thought prioritized state-sponsored, but elite-centered secondary and university education as more important for political order. In the Chilean case, elite consensus prioritized maintaining traditional social institutions as a means to construct the masses as citizen-subjects. As a consequence, Argentina's education system consolidated as more centralized than Chile's by 1900 despite the more rapid development of state capacity and political centralization that took place in the latter during the first half of the 19th century. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page List of Figures . iv Chapter 1: Introduction . .1 1.1 Introduction . .1 1.2 National Education Systems in Historical and Comparative Perspective . .7 1.3 The National Educational Moment and State Centralization . 18 1.4 Research Strategy . 21 1.4.1 Case Selection for Comparative Historical Analysis: Argentina and Chile 23 1.5 Preview of Study . 29 References . 29 Chapter 2: Theory . 37 2.1 Introduction . 37 2.2 The State as an Education Leviathan in Waiting . 38 2.3 Conceptual Terrain . 41 2.3.1 A Note on Terminology . 46 2.4 Information Capacity and Education Centralization . 51 2.4.1 Mechanism 1: Information Capacity and Political Uncertainty over Education Centralization . 55 2.5 Elite Ideas and Education Centralization . 59 2.5.1 Mechanism 2: Educational Ideology and Political Uncertainty over Education Centralization . 63 2.6 Conclusion . 67 References . 68 Chapter 3: Data and Methods . 77 3.1 Introduction . 77 i 3.2 Data . 80 3.2.1 Descriptive Analysis of Education Centralization in Comparative Per- spective . 85 3.3 Econometric Results: Infrastructural Power and Education Centralization . 93 3.4 Conclusion . 101 References . 104 Chapter 4: Argentina . 108 4.1 Introduction . 108 4.2 Education in the Early Argentine Republic: From the Rivadavian Epoch to the Fall of Rosas . 110 4.2.1 The Rivadavian Epoch . 113 4.2.2 Juan Manuel Rosas and the Dictadura Unificada . 118 4.2.3 The Generation of 1837 and the Intellectual Foundations of National Organization . 122 4.3 The Educational Moment in Argentina: From the Fall of Rosas to the Orden Conservador, 1852 - 1884 . 123 4.3.1 Sarmiento and Education Reform in Buenos Aires Province . 130 4.3.2 Education Reform in the Interior . 135 4.3.3 Sarmiento's Presidency . 142 4.3.4 The Generation of 1880 and Educational Consolidation during the Or- den Conservador . 152 4.4 Conclusion and Analysis . 166 References . 173 Chapter 5: Chile . 179 5.1 Introduction . 179 5.2 Education in the Early Chilean Republic: From Independence to the Conser- vative Consensus . 181 5.2.1 The Generation of 1842 and the Intellectual Foundations of Chilean Education . 189 5.3 The Educational Moment in Chile: From the University of Chile to the Prin- ciple of Free Primary Education, 1842 - 1860 . 192 5.3.1 The University of Chile and the Organization of Mass Education . 192 ii 5.3.2 Lastarria, Montt, and the Struggle to Reform the Portalian Education Regime . 195 5.3.3 Manuel Montt and The General Law of Primary Education of 1860 . 198 5.4 Conclusion and Analysis . 206 References . 211 Chapter 6: Conclusion . 214 References . 219 .0.1 Bivariate Relationships between Control Variables and Centralization 229 .0.2 Generalized Method of Moments Estimates . 235 .0.3 Pooled OLS Estimates . 237 iii LIST OF FIGURES Figure Number Page 1.1 Onset of National Laws of Compulsory and Free Primary Education . 11 1.2 Mass Education Around the World in 1900 . 13 1.3 Mass Education in Selected Countries during State Formation . 16 1.4 Economic Development: Per Capita Wealth and Urbanization in 1900 . 26 1.5 State Capacity: Central Government Revenue and Material Capabilities in 1900 28 2.1 A Conceptual Map of Infrastructural Power, State Capacity, and Informa- tional Capital . 48 2.2 A Theory of State Formation and Educational Development . 51 2.3 State Elites versus Provincial Elites and Education Centralization . 60 2.4 State and Intellectual Elites versus Provincial Elites and Education Central- ization . 66 3.1 Education Centralization in Europe, 1900 . 87 3.2 Centralization of Mass Education across Latin America during the 19th Century 88 3.3 Bivariate Relationship between Informational Capacity and Education Cen- tralization . 89 3.4 Bivariate Relationship between Communications Infrastructure and Educa- tion Centralization . 90 3.5 Bivariate Relationship between Transportation Infrastructure and Education Centralization . 91 3.6 Time-Series Relationship between Informational Capacity and Education Cen- tralization, 1800-1930 . 92 3.7 Summary Plot of Panel Estimates of State Infrastructural Power and Educa- tion Centralization . 102 3.8 Summary Plot of Difference GMM Estimates of State Infrastructural Power and Education Centralization . 103 4.1 Primary School Enrollment and Educational Development in the Republic of Argentina, 1830-1920 . 171 iv 5.1 Primary School Enrollment and Educational Development in the Republic of Chile, 1830-1920 . 209 1 Independence and Onset of Compulsory and Free Primary . 225 2 Independence and Onset of Compulsory and Free Primary, Europe . 226 3 Independence