NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE: THE CASE OF RUSSIA Center for International Trade and Security The University of Georgia NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE: THE CASE OF RUSSIA © Center for International Trade and Security University of Georgia December 2004 nuclear security culture: the case of russia ABOUT THE CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND SECURITY he Center for International Trade and Security (CITS) works to address the dangers posed by transfers of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and WMD-related technology and materials. CITS seeks to Taccomplish its mission by: • Engaging and informing policymakers, industry representatives, educators, and the public, both in the United States and abroad, about dangers stemming from the trade in and theft of weapons and weapons components. CITS communicates these concepts through policy research, public forums, editorials, briefings, Internet publications, and the publication of a journal, The Monitor: International Perspectives on Nonproliferation • Facilitating international dialogue through exchanges of officials and experts that will promote greater cooperation in preventing the spread of dangerous weapons and technology • Establishing training programs for government officials and others in “best practices” for controlling, monitoring, and preventing the trade in WMD and related items • Preparing future leaders for careers in international security and nonproliferation The CITS Security Policy Program is focused on: • Improving understanding and awareness of the importance of training and motivating personnel responsible for protecting nuclear and other WMD-related materials • Promoting U.S.-Russian dialogue on nonproliferation and threat reduction • Facilitating U.S. assistance to Russia and the other former Soviet states through analysis of their nuclear and military-industrial complexes • Analyzing and strengthening security at WMD-related facilities internationally Center for International Trade and Security 120 Holmes/Hunter Academic Building University of Georgia Athens, GA 30602 Dr. Gary K. Bertsch, Director Dr. Michael D. Beck, Executive Director (706) 542-2985 fax (706) 542-2975 [email protected] http://www.uga.edu/cits ii NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE: THE CASE OF RUSSIA EDITORS Igor Khripunov and James Holmes CO-AUTHORS Igor Khripunov Dmitriy Nikonov Maria Katsva This report has been supported in part with funds from the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the University of Georgia. Its contents represent the views, findings, and opinions of the authors, and are not necessarily those of the supporting organizations. iii nuclear security culture: the case of russia Acknowledgments This report has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their perspectives and technical expertise. Specifically, the authors and editors would like to express their gratitude to: Peer Reviewers: • Michael Beck (Center for International Trade and Security) • Allen Blancett (Independent expert, USA) • Matthew Bunn (Harvard University/Belfer Center) • Christopher Eldridge (U.S. National Academies) • Irina Kupriyanova (Institute of Physics and Power Engineering, Russia) • William Potter (Center for Nonproliferation Studies) • Yuri Volodin (Federal Service for Ecological, Technical, and Nuclear Oversight, Russia) Although the reviewers listed above provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the content of the report, nor did they see the final draft before its release. In addition, Charles Packer (Cherrystone Management Inc., Canada) and Paul Ebel (BE Inc., USA) contributed to Chapter I; Nikolay Ischenko, Rector, and Vladimir Kornelyuk, Head of Department at the Moscow Institute for Professional Training “Atomenergo,” participated in the development of Appendix II; and Jessica Howard (CITS) helped design and lay out the final publication. About the Project Team Igor Khripunov is the associate director of the Center for International Trade and Security and an adjunct professor at the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs. Dr. Khripunov served for six years as an international civil servant at the UN Secretariat in New York before joining the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1977. In 1983, he received a Ph.D. in international relations from the Moscow-based Diplomatic Academy and resumed his diplomatic career as an arms control expert. He has served at the University of Georgia since 1992. James Holmes is a senior research associate at the Center. He edits the Center’s journal, The Monitor. A former U.S. Navy officer, Dr. Holmes served on board the battleship USS Wisconsin, taught engineering at the Surface Warfare Officers School Command, and served as professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College. He is a graduate of Vanderbilt University, Salve Regina University, the Naval War College, Providence College, and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Dmitriy Nikonov is a senior research associate at the Center. He has been affiliated with the Center since 1995. Dr. Nikonov received a B.A. from the Pyatigorsk State Institute of Foreign Languages in Russia, an M.A. from Western Illinois University, and a Ph.D. from the University of Georgia. Maria Katsva is a research associate at the Center. Ms. Katsva graduated from Moscow State University and earned an M.P.A. from the University of Georgia. Before coming to UGA, she served as a research associate at the Moscow-based Center for Policy Studies in Russia. iv Contents About the Center for International Trade and Security. .ii Acknowledgements. iv About the Project Team . iv Table of Contents . v List of Abbreviations . vii Preface . viii Introduction . .1 Chapter I: SECURITY CULTURE: CONCEPT AND MODEL. .5 1.1 Background . .5 1.2 Safety and Security Overlap. .6 1.3 Nuclear Security . .7 1.4 Model of Nuclear Security Culture . .10 1.5 Model of Security Culture Mechanism . .13 Chapter II: HARDSHIPS OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TRANSITION . .19 2.1 Weak Economy and Insufficient Funding . .19 2.2 Aging Infrastructure. .22 2.3 Federal System in Decay . .24 2.4 Antisocial Behaviors . .25 2.4.1 Corruption and Crime . .25 2.4.2 Drug Abuse and Alcoholism. .27 Chapter III: RUSSIAN LEADERS’ PERCEPTION OF SECURITY . .29 3.1 National Level. .30 3.1.1 The President . .31 3.1.2 Government/Cabinet . .33 3.1.3 Parliament . .35 3.2 Regional Level . .37 3.2.1 Regional Elites. .37 3.2.2 The General Public. .38 v nuclear security culture: the case of russia Chapter IV: NUCLEAR INDUSTRY FRAMEWORK . .41 4.1 Industry Leadership . .41 4.2 Facility Leadership . .45 4.2.1 Top Management . .45 4.2.2 Mid-level Management . .48 4.2.3 Rising Nuclear Managers . .49 Chapter V: PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE . .51 5.1 Professional and Work Culture . .52 5.1.1 Impact of History and Tradition . .52 5.1.2 Professional and Work Culture in Rosatom . .55 5.2 The Importance of Motivation . .56 5.3 Personal Responsibility . .58 5.3.1 Inadequate Job Description . .58 5.3.2 Whistle-blowing . .58 5.4 Education and Training. .59 5.5 Use of Guards . .60 Chapter VI: MPC&A LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK . .63 6.1 Current Legal Framework . .63 6.2 Legal and Regulatory Obstacles . .64 6.3 Russian Legal Culture . .66 Chapter VII: ENFORCEMENT AS DETERRENT. .69 7.1 Legal Provisions . .69 7.2 Investigation Procedures . .71 7.3 Vague Reporting Practice . .72 7.4 Poor Prosecution . .73 Chapter VIII: CONCLUSIONS . .75 Appendix I: Case Studies . .81 Case Study 1: Isotope Diversion at Elektrokhimpribor Facility . .81 Case Study 2: Corruption and Theft at Priokskiy Gold Refining Factory . .84 Appendix II: Learning and Professional Development: A Methodology for Security Culture in Russia . .87 Appendix III: Nuclear Security Culture Evaluation . .93 vi List of Abbreviations CIA Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.) CTR Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Nunn-Lugar Program) DBT Design Basis Threat DOE Department of Energy (U.S.) FIS Federal Information System (Russia) FSB Federal Security Service (Russia) GAN (Gosatomnadzor) Federal Nuclear and Radiation Oversight Agency (Russia) GAO General Accounting Office (U.S.) IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency INFCIRC Information Circular (IAEA) IPPAS International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IAEA) KGB State Security Committee (USSR) LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory (U.S.) MC&A Material Control and Accounting Minatom Ministry of Atomic Energy (Russia) MOD Ministry of Defense (Russia) MPC&A Material Protection, Control, and Accounting MVD Interior Ministry (Russia) NKVD People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (USSR) NSC National Security Council (U.S.) PPS Physical Protection System Rosatom Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Russia) Rostekhnadzor Service for Environmental, Technological, and Nuclear Oversight (Russia) VA Vulnerability Analysis WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction vii nuclear security culture: the case of russia PREFACE his report on Nuclear Security Culture: The Case of Russia probes an obvious, yet often overlooked dimension of security: the human dimension. It examines security measures at facilities in Russia’s civilian nuclear sector and finds that, after over a decade of U.S. and European security Tassistance, security unfortunately remains porous. Why? In 1991 the U.S. government, under the visionary leadership of Sen. Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Sen. Dick Lugar (R-IN), created the Nunn- Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to help Russia safeguard its inventory of nuclear weapons, fissile materials, and the associated technology. The Nunn-Lugar