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William James's Pragmatism HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES William James’s Pragmatism: The Practical Value of Personal truth and Liberation from Truth Sam Fogarty College of Arts and Science, Vanderbilt University It is easy to mistake one’s beliefs about the world as absolute knowledge. In this paper, I argue that any view of knowledge as absolute, or objective, is a misrepresentation of the limits of hu- man understanding. In contrast, I argue for the pragmatic use of truth as conceived by William James. I contend that if one views truth as a practical instrument valued solely for its ability to help humans, one can place scientific and religious beliefs on equal footing. By valuing truth for its practical effects, one may return truth to its intended function: to be one’s closest ally in overcoming life’s challenges. “The influences of the senses has in most men overpow- make to any one if this notion rather than that notion ered the mind to the degree that the walls of space and were true?” (60). time have come to look solid, real and insurmountable; In this paper, I will delineate James’s pragmatic and to speak with levity of these limits in the world is the view of truth and its proposed effect on the way that sign of insanity.” we navigate our lives and derive meaning. As I discuss -Ralph Waldo Emerson his philosophy, I will point out and respond to com- mon objections to James’s philosophy. I will argue that With Pragmatism, William James expounds James’s practical epistemology is a refreshing view that the practical value of truth by applying the pragmatic frees a thoughtful person from the distractions of “Ob- method to abstract metaphysical questions. James chal- ject Truth” and abstract ponderings by reorienting the lenges the traditional view of truth as objective, existing belief-verification process towards tangible experience. separate from the human experience. Rather, he offers In doing so, Pragmatism leads the thoughtful individual a method of “experiential empiricism” to explore life’s out of contemplative stagnation and towards action. I most important and challenging questions. The essays will argue that by allowing a person to amalgamate the comprising Pragmatism employ easily intelligible lan- most life-enhancing and instrumental beliefs with full guage, as they were originally delivered as eight sepa- conviction, Pragmatism empowers the individual to craft rate lectures in 1906 and 1907. Motivated by his own a personal philosophy capable of overcoming their most dissatisfaction with scientific theory and spiritual belief pressing challenges and of satisfying their most funda- as sufficient guides to human satisfaction and sources mental needs. meaning, James offers more than an academic treatise. In order to fully understand the purpose of With the work, James directly addresses the seemingly James’s philosophy and the function it seeks to serve, incompatible views of spiritual belief and modern scien- it is necessary to first describePragmatism’s historical tific discovery in order to illustratePragmatism’s ability context, James’s view of human psychology, and his to, “be the happy harmonizer of empiricist [scientific] motivation for developing a guide to life. James grew ways of thinking with the more religious demands of up in an affluent family and received little practical human beings” (70). To accomplish such a task, James guidance as to what to do with his life. Driven by intel- expounds a practical method for navigating life that lectual curiosity, James studied medicine and eventually requires open-mindedness and intellectual humility. He the new field of psychology, both of which shaped his proposes that a belief’s validity is determined by its tan- understanding of human beings and subsequently his gible impact on or usefulness for human beings, rather pragmatic method. As the author of Pragmatism’s intro- than by some external standard of Truth (Capital T for duction notes, for James, “the world was constituted by an objective, singular, eternal Truth). James rejects soci- the activity of mind or consciousness acting upon a con- ety’s obsession with the ever-elusive “Objective Truth,” fusion of unorganized data. And it was the willing aspect and calls for a shift of focus onto simply what works, or of consciousness that imposed the order which gave us what “pays.” Thus, to test a belief’s validity, the prag- a world of reality and which enabled us to survive in a matist must ask, “what difference would it practically precarious universe” (xii). Or, as James poetically states Spring 2012 | Volume 8 | © 2012 • Vanderbilt University Board of Trust 1 VANDERBILT UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH JOURNAL in reference to our knowledge and awareness, “the trail of You want a system that will com- the human serpent is thus over everything” (68). As will bine both things, the scientific become clear, James’s understanding of human conscious- loyalty to facts and willingness to ness as subjective perceptions, unique to the individual, take account of them, the spirit of likely contributed to his epistemology and his promotion adaptation and accommodation, in of the practical use of truth. Upon completing his degree, short, but also the old confidence James moved back in with his parents and struggled with in human values and the resultant extended bouts of depression due to a sense of aimless- spontaneity, whether of the reli- ness and meaninglessness. gious or of this romantic type” (49). Unfortunately, scientific and philosophic pursuits For James, the pragmatic method accomplishes this goal provided little guidance for James, because in his eyes, of marrying fact with human meaning in a valid and life- both fields offered unsatisfactory and contradictory an- enhancing way, by reframing the way that we appraise swers to life’s questions. On the one hand, the empirical our knowledge of the world (using we in reference to all approach of science offered the Darwinian explanation for human beings). James starts by challenging our epistemo- life. This ontology meant materialism, determinism, and logical abilities and by defining a pragmatic definition of fatalism to James: an existence of arbitrary origin, mean- truth. ingless existence, and definite extinction1. On the other James rejects the common human conviction that hand, after classical religion had been extinguished by we can witness facts and deduce perfect knowledge about scientific findings, James saw only “retreating” religions the world untouched by human bias, stating that, “purely and abstract philosophies. Each belief system offered objective truth…is nowhere to be found” (68). In con- ontologies crafted outside of tangible fact, likely in order trast to pragmatism’s view of truth, James points out that to remain semi-compatible with Darwinism, which for individuals frequently mistake their understanding of the James meant that they were inapplicable to the human world as constant, unyielding, and determined (46). As experience. As he articulates, the abstract philosophies the scientific method encourages, we measure the world that developed in response to Darwin force the believer to, through our senses, acting as, “an absorber,” of informa- “pay for your escape by losing contact with the concrete tion. However, “the great [false] assumption of the intel- parts of life…. You can deduce no single actual particular lectualists is that truth means essentially an inert static from the notion of it. It is compatible with any state of relation” (124), where the information we receive and the things whatever being true here below” (49). But does this ideas we hold are pure, “copies [of] reality” (123). This incompatible dichotomy still exist today, tormenting those view lead one to believe that we, “record truth, inhuman who crave evidence for the eternal meaning of their lives? though it be, and submit to it!” (48). With this epistemo- I argue yes; science and spirituality are equally in- logical view, your focus becomes that of a passive ob- compatible today, especially for those who crave coherent server such that you can only believe what you can verify. evidence for why human lives matter on an eternal scale. Once verified or experienced, the knowledge gained is Science has not yet offered an explanation of the existence considered perfect knowledge of the observed phenom- of human beings beyond the random chance of evolution enon, object, or system: an assumption resting on both the and life’s precursors, and all empirical evidence indicates infallibility of the knowledge and the permanence of the that there is no life after death. Similarly, explanations that world. Further, knowledge is valued without reference to attempt to give human life eternal meaning lack scien- the belief’s effect on human beings and is considered a tific evidence to support their ontologies. So where does possession of the mind. With such a view, “when you’ve this leave a fact-minded person seeking evidence for the got your true idea of anything, there’s an end of the mat- meaning of his or her existence? As James succinctly puts ter. You’re in possession; you know; you have fulfilled it, “you find an empirical philosophy that is not religious your thinking destiny… Epistemologically you are in enough, and a religious philosophy that is not empirical stable equilibrium” (124). By believing one’s knowledge enough for your purpose” (47). Separately, each belief to be objective in this way, one easily falls into passivity system falls short of fully satisfying human’s practical after developing a belief; you consider the world to be and value-centered needs. So what type of philosophical permanent and your truths to be objective knowledge of system does one need? James puts it perfectly: that world, so you do not need to reevaluate your beliefs or develop a more thorough understanding of the world. Searching for the answers to more metaphysical questions, 1 Pragmatism, x.
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