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Governing through reality television in contemporary The case of Hunan Satellite Television Nauta, A.P.M.

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Citation for published version (APA): Nauta, A. P. M. (2021). Governing through reality television in contemporary China: The case of Hunan Satellite Television.

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Download date:26 Sep 2021

Leonie Schmidt, Arnoud Arps, Yiu Fai Chow, Gladys Pak Lei Chong; thank you!! As Chapter 1 – Governmentality within and through well as the countless other colleagues, friends, and acquaintances with whom I discussed Chinese television (or other interesting things) at conferences and Reality TV in Contemporary China: the Case of elsewhere. Hunan STV Of course, this dissertation would never have been possible without the many people that helped me during my fieldwork. First and foremost is Li Yan, who helped me during so many interviews, always provided interesting insights, and 1.1 Introduction 5 managed to find the nicest restaurants in . Thank you to all the producers, 1.2 Hunan Television and the Calibration of Government in 7 directors, and all other (ex-) employees at Hunan Satellite TV in Changsha and Contemporary China elsewhere for sharing your thoughts and insights with me and allowing me to 1.3 Foucault in Changsha: Chinese Governmentalities and Reality 15 wander around production sets and join live shows. TV

1.4 Moral Schlock or Lessons for Better Living? Studying Reality 20 Last but not least, I would like to thank my family for their unrelenting Television support. Most of all to my wife Elaine; thank you for putting up with me, and for 1.5 Methodological Considerations: Struggling with 25 tolerating my grumpiness after frustrating hours of bad writing, as well as the long Contradictions and Access hours spent behind the computer screen. 1.6 Where To Go From Here: An Orientation 31

Islamabad, 25 January 2021

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1.1 Introduction

Turning on the television in your hotel room or home in China, zapping along the many channels, you would encounter lots of elements familiar from elsewhere: advertisements, product placements, and the usual genres: talk -and variety shows, reality programs and drama series. The stereotype that Chinese TV is dull and propagandistic has been left far behind. Nowadays, Chinese television is fully commercialized, and features programs that defy these stereotypes. In Angel loves beauty (天使爱美丽 [tianshi ai meili]), a reality show produced and broadcasted by Hunan Satellite Television (HSTV), the goriness of plastic surgery is displayed in full force. Another reality show, Wonderful friends (奇妙的朋友 [qimiaode pengyou]), features Chinese celebrities and their interaction with exotic animals, dressing monkeys and giving a pedicure to elephants. More conventional shows include localizations of well- known international formats such as The X-Factor, Wife Swap, Take Me Out, Big Brother, and Idols. In recent years, Korean formats such as Where are we going dad, I am a , , and have become highly prevalent on Chinese television screens. When one zaps around Chinese TV channels, content-wise it does not seem any different from commercial entertainment broadcast practices elsewhere on the planet. Hunan Satellite Television (HSTV) has played an important part in this development. Revolutionizing Chinese television by focusing almost solely on entertainment television, HSTV took the television industry by surprise in the late 1990s. Its strategy involved borrowing heavily from foreign formats. Many of HSTV’s programs became highly popular, although regularly forming the target of vehement criticism by intellectuals for their irreverent cultural attitude and sheer focus on entertainment (Zhong 2010a). Its success resulted in topping the list of the most popular provincial television stations. HSTV showed that a focus on entertainment programming and reality TV was a highly successful (and rather cheap) way to compete in the national television market (Zhu 2012a). Other provincial stations soon followed in HSTV’s footsteps. thus moved far beyond the pure focus on political communication in the starting years of Chinese television in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Like all of China, it has come a

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1.1 Introduction long way: it is a cliché to say that the socio-economic changes in the past decades have been enormous. Through it all, the Communist Party of China (CCP) has managed to Turning on the television in your hotel room or home in China, zapping along the stay in power and oversee the vast overhaul of the country. Nowadays, China many channels, you would encounter lots of elements familiar from elsewhere: combines an authoritarian system of government with socialist discourse and advertisements, product placements, and the usual genres: talk -and variety shows, capitalist practice—perhaps what Xi Jinping (and earlier Deng Xiaoping) termed as reality programs and drama series. The stereotype that Chinese TV is dull and ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics.’ In a similar way, despite the commercial propagandistic has been left far behind. Nowadays, Chinese television is fully outlook in advertisements as well as programming, the CCP still holds a tight reign commercialized, and features programs that defy these stereotypes. In Angel loves over television, and emphasizes its role for political communication—‘television with beauty (天使爱美丽 [tianshi ai meili]), a reality show produced and broadcasted by Chinese characteristics?’ Hunan Satellite Television (HSTV), the goriness of plastic surgery is displayed in full These considerations have led me to wonder how this works in practice: if the force. Another reality show, Wonderful friends (奇妙的朋友 [qimiaode pengyou]), features Chinese government still uses television for their own political purposes, then how? Chinese celebrities and their interaction with exotic animals, dressing monkeys and How can commercial imperatives (TV stations need to fend for their own revenues) giving a pedicure to elephants. More conventional shows include localizations of well- coexist with the state-ascribed propagandistic function of television? What known international formats such as The X-Factor, Wife Swap, Take Me Out, Big Brother, consequences does this have for production? And how do audiences react to it? If and Idols. In recent years, Korean formats such as Where are we going dad, I am a singer, television needs to accede to stringent political requirements, and simultaneously Takes a real man, and Divas hit the road have become highly prevalent on Chinese generate income by advertisements and product placements, which is dependent on television screens. When one zaps around Chinese TV channels, content-wise it does the eyeballs that programs manage to attract (i.e. satisfy audiences), then it seems that not seem any different from commercial entertainment broadcast practices elsewhere television makers need to navigate a social, political, economic, and cultural minefield. on the planet. It is to these questions that I turn in this dissertation. Based in the provincial capital of Hunan Satellite Television (HSTV) has played an important part in this Changsha, Hunan Satellite Television, the station that pioneered commercialization development. Revolutionizing Chinese television by focusing almost solely on and entertainment programming, thereby forms a highly relevant and interesting case entertainment television, HSTV took the television industry by surprise in the late study. By taking HSTV as a case study, I engage with my main research question: How 1990s. Its strategy involved borrowing heavily from foreign formats. Many of HSTV’s does governmentality work within and through Chinese reality television? How are political, programs became highly popular, although regularly forming the target of vehement economic, social, and cultural imperatives configured in the making and consumption of reality criticism by intellectuals for their irreverent cultural attitude and sheer focus on television? entertainment (Zhong 2010a). Its success resulted in topping the list of the most The term governmentality, developed by philosopher Michel Foucault, refers to popular provincial television stations. HSTV showed that a focus on entertainment the processes through which individuals shape and guide their own conduct—and programming and reality TV was a highly successful (and rather cheap) way to that of others—with certain aims and objectives in mind. It allows me to look beyond compete in the national television market (Zhu 2012a). the formal institutions of official government to emphasize the proliferation and Other provincial stations soon followed in HSTV’s footsteps. Television in China diffusion of the everyday techniques through which individuals and populations are thus moved far beyond the pure focus on political communication in the starting years expected to reflect upon and organize their lives. These techniques, I will show, do of Chinese television in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Like all of China, it has come a not emanate directly from state institutions, nor can they be traced to any singular

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source. Rather, these techniques of governmentality are circulated in a dispersed fashion by social and cultural intermediaries and the institutions (i.e. education, work environments, regulatory agencies) that authorize their expertise (Ouellette and Hay 2008b, 473). Television is an important part of this mix in that it too operates as technology called upon to assist and shape citizens “who do not need to be governed by others, but will govern themselves, master themselves, care for themselves” (Rose 1996, 45). How does this work, especially in the context of contemporary China, where disciplinary power (through surveillance and e.g. the new social credit system) is very much alive and penetrating? In the next section, I explore by example of Where are we going dad, a reality show produced and broadcast by HSTV, how individuals are invited to govern themselves, reflecting what I call the ‘calibration of government.’

1.2 Hunan Television and the Calibration of Government in Contemporary China

In 2013, Hunan Satellite Television (HSTV) debuted a reality TV series featuring famous Chinese fathers and their children. A localized version of a Korean-developed format, in Where are we going dad (爸爸去哪儿 [baba qu na’er]) fathers and their children are taken to different locations in the countryside to complete assignments. The underlying motive for the program is the alienation between Chinese fathers and sons in contemporary life. These fathers are all busy and have little time for their children. The dads in the program acknowledge their lack of commitment and say they feel distant from their child and their upbringing. In order to remedy this and foster closer relations between busy and famous fathers and their children, the program makers take them to different rural locations in China, where five fathers and their children participate in all kinds of team-building activities. The encounters between fathers and their children, and amongst the children are endearing and emotionally affective, but also serve an educational goal: how to stay in touch with your children while at the same time pursuing your career? This is a very urgent and real question especially for the urban middle classes. Which emotional techniques and strategies are effective in raising children and ensuring a good and healthy relationship? Parents want to make sure they are doing the right

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source. Rather, these techniques of governmentality are circulated in a dispersed thing, and WAWGD provides techniques for successful parenting. TV viewers are fashion by social and cultural intermediaries and the institutions (i.e. education, work thereby invited to envision their own role as parents in a similar process of self- environments, regulatory agencies) that authorize their expertise (Ouellette and Hay improvement. In this respect, WAWGD responds to the anxieties of the urban middle 2008b, 473). Television is an important part of this mix in that it too operates as class and illustrates reality TV’s preoccupation with self-improvement, but also tells technology called upon to assist and shape citizens “who do not need to be governed us about the calibration of government in a rapidly changing China (Sun 2014). by others, but will govern themselves, master themselves, care for themselves” (Rose WAWGD is part of an explosion of reality TV on television, in China as well as 1996, 45). How does this work, especially in the context of contemporary China, where elsewhere, that started in China in the late 1990s, and, albeit with some hindrances disciplinary power (through surveillance and e.g. the new social credit system) is very (censorship), continues to this day (cf. Bai 2015a). Several reality TV formats have much alive and penetrating? In the next section, I explore by example of Where are we become increasingly popular: subgenres such as variety shows, game shows, music going dad, a reality show produced and broadcast by HSTV, how individuals are talent shows, talk shows, traveling programs, and dating shows have increasingly invited to govern themselves, reflecting what I call the ‘calibration of government.’ featured on nationwide accessible satellite channels. While dramas remain the most popular genre of Chinese television, reality TV has gradually risen to the top in entertainment television (Lü 2011 in Bai and Song 2015). Where are we going dad 1.2 Hunan Television and the Calibration of Government in Contemporary China operates at the intersection of related phenomena that will be addressed in this dissertation. These include (1) a gradual transformation of television as a In 2013, Hunan Satellite Television (HSTV) debuted a reality TV series featuring governmental instrument, in terms of content as well as the industry itself, and (2) a famous Chinese fathers and their children. A localized version of a Korean-developed ‘calibration’ of government, in the context of the vast socio-economic changes that format, in Where are we going dad (爸爸去哪儿 [baba qu na’er]) fathers and their children have pervaded China in the post-Mao era. Let me elaborate on this by briefly reflecting are taken to different locations in the countryside to complete assignments. The on reality TV itself. underlying motive for the program is the alienation between Chinese fathers and sons In 2008, media scholars Laurie Ouellette and James Hay published a study on in contemporary life. These fathers are all busy and have little time for their children. reality TV in which they examined reality TV’s relationship to ‘governing at a The dads in the program acknowledge their lack of commitment and say they feel distance.’ With this, they referred to the ways in which reality TV diffuses and distant from their child and their upbringing. In order to remedy this and foster closer amplifies the governance of everyday life, utilizing the cultural power of television to relations between busy and famous fathers and their children, the program makers assess and guide the ethics, behaviors, aspirations, and routines of ordinary people. take them to different rural locations in China, where five fathers and their children Reality TV offers guidelines for living. These are not clear-cut state-sponsored participate in all kinds of team-building activities. directives, but “highly dispersed and practical techniques for reflecting on, managing, The encounters between fathers and their children, and amongst the children are and improving the multiple dimensions of our personal lives with the resources endearing and emotionally affective, but also serve an educational goal: how to stay available to us” (Ouellette and Hay 2008a, 2). In times of vast socio-economic changes in touch with your children while at the same time pursuing your career? This is a in China, where capitalism and consumerism have since several decades been very urgent and real question especially for the urban middle classes. Which promoted as new techniques of governing, embedded in socialism and communism, emotional techniques and strategies are effective in raising children and ensuring a reality TV provides Chinese citizens with practical tools to conduct and empower good and healthy relationship? Parents want to make sure they are doing the right themselves in everyday life: how to be a good father, how to further your career, how

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to be a good citizen, etc. At the same time, reality TV can approach audiences in multiple ways: as I argue in this dissertation, WAWGD provides parents with practical guidelines and techniques for child-rearing, but at the same time provides ideal types of what parenthood in contemporary China should look like, thus influencing the ethics of parenthood. However, simultaneously, many highly political and ideological elements are incorporated in this seemingly innocuous program: I show how WAWGD also approaches its audiences with ‘correct’ standard of Chinese citizenship, based on a nationalist and Confucianist discourse. Within the domain of reality TV many subgenres can be identified that share a preoccupation with testing, judging, advising the conduct of ‘real’ people in their capacities as contestants, participants, parents, singles looking for partners, consumers, or travelers—to name just a few examples (Ouellette and Hay 2008a). Reality TV emanates guidelines for the right conduct or modes of living that the viewers are called upon to engage with and implement in their lives. This begs the question what possibilities for different subjectivities reality TV opens up or closes down. What desired or aspirational modes of conduct does reality TV present, and what specific subjectivities does this enable? What do audiences do with it? But also: who decides, based on what considerations, what these aspirational modes of conduct and specific subjectivities should look like? This takes us to the making of television and the producers themselves. The environment in which television production takes place in contemporary China has changed considerably since the Mao-era contingent on socio-economic, political, and technological developments. Even though it has always carried its role for political communication (cf. Sun and Zhao 2009; Fung 2009), this has by no means been a linear development. When television first entered China in 1958, all broadcasts were purely propagandist, but this changed in accordance with the political climate. In the early 1980s for example, it was possible to broadcast a critical show such as River Elegy ( 河殇 [heshang]), while its complexity and critical approach would nowadays be unthinkable (He 2008; Di 2011; cf. Kraus 1989). At the same time, television screens are nowadays dominated by entertainment programs, which would be unthinkable in the 1960s.

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to be a good citizen, etc. At the same time, reality TV can approach audiences in One important reason for this development has been the increasing multiple ways: as I argue in this dissertation, WAWGD provides parents with practical commercialization of television in China. A series of reforms since the late 1970s has guidelines and techniques for child-rearing, but at the same time provides ideal types led to increasing market dependence and commercialization. They were the result of of what parenthood in contemporary China should look like, thus influencing the exponentially growing operating costs, as the number of television stations in China ethics of parenthood. However, simultaneously, many highly political and ideological equally increased rapidly, becoming a considerable burden for local, county, and elements are incorporated in this seemingly innocuous program: I show how provincial government budgets (Di 2011). Commercialization was gradually allowed WAWGD also approaches its audiences with ‘correct’ standard of Chinese citizenship, in the guise of market competition and advertisements, but took a leap in 1992, the based on a nationalist and Confucianist discourse. year in which Deng Xiaoping went on his Southern Tour which marked the informal Within the domain of reality TV many subgenres can be identified that share a establishment of a market economy (Vogel 2013, 689). TV stations now had to compete preoccupation with testing, judging, advising the conduct of ‘real’ people in their for their market share, and were thus forced to develop new formats to attract capacities as contestants, participants, parents, singles looking for partners, audiences (Latham 2006). consumers, or travelers—to name just a few examples (Ouellette and Hay 2008a). The government pursued marketization to the extent allowed by the current Reality TV emanates guidelines for the right conduct or modes of living that the political system. Central to the reforms of the early 2000s was the idea of “spinning viewers are called upon to engage with and implement in their lives. This begs the off market-oriented operations from existing party-state media conglomerates and question what possibilities for different subjectivities reality TV opens up or closes turning these operations into relatively autonomous market entities that are free to down. What desired or aspirational modes of conduct does reality TV present, and absorb outside capital and pursue market-oriented expansion” (Zhao 2008, 112). This what specific subjectivities does this enable? What do audiences do with it? But also: reference to ‘outside capital’ did not extend to foreign capital though. Television who decides, based on what considerations, what these aspirational modes of conduct stations, now clearly stimulated to pursue market success in a competitive media and specific subjectivities should look like? This takes us to the making of television environment, started to increasingly turn to entertainment television. Many aspiring and the producers themselves. TV stations, on local and provincial levels, appropriated Hunan TV’s model. Even The environment in which television production takes place in contemporary (CCTV) was forced to rethink its strategies: its state-funded China has changed considerably since the Mao-era contingent on socio-economic, pedagogic-propaganda themed productions received decreasing viewer ratings, political, and technological developments. Even though it has always carried its role leading the station to take steps to emulate the model of commercial entertainment for political communication (cf. Sun and Zhao 2009; Fung 2009), this has by no means television (Bai and Song 2015). The general focus was increasingly shifted to urban been a linear development. When television first entered China in 1958, all broadcasts and youth entertainment, as these groups proved highly attractive for advertisers were purely propagandist, but this changed in accordance with the political climate. (Zhu 2013, 94–95; Bai and Song 2015, 5). In the early 1980s for example, it was possible to broadcast a critical show such as The entertainment turn in Chinese television has infused personal advice and River Elegy ( 河殇 [heshang]), while its complexity and critical approach would instruction with elements of consumerism, suspense, stardom, humor, and emotional nowadays be unthinkable (He 2008; Di 2011; cf. Kraus 1989). At the same time, intensity. Reality TV programs nowadays owe less to pedagogic lectures of what good television screens are nowadays dominated by entertainment programs, which would behavior consists of, and more to learning engagement. While these lectures might be unthinkable in the 1960s. have lessened however, the anxiety of middle-class parents as to how to raise a child has not disappeared. Programs such as WAWGD connect the process of learning and

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mastering valuable ‘rules’ of self-government with games and emotional intensity. Billed as ‘entertainment,’ rather than as ‘educational programming,’ such programs are part and parcel of TV’s relevance to diffuse techniques of government (cf. Andrejevic 2011). Its capacity to insert guidelines for conduct and living in the daily life of ordinary Chinese is part of what I mean with the calibration of government. As Ouellette and Hay state, “by aligning TV viewers with proliferating techniques for shaping and guiding themselves and associations with others, reality TV has become the quintessential technology of neoliberal citizenship” (2008a, 4; cf. Couldry 2010, 73– 90). Even though their research was located in the United States, I argue that this is valid within a Chinese context as well. Generally speaking, with the risk of reifying such problematic categories, neoliberal strategies governing through the desires of individuals as customers, property owners, or citizens in general, have been combined with socialist technologies of government (cf. Harvey 2005, 120–51). As Aihwa Ong and Li Zhang stated in 2008, “the adoption of neoliberal reasoning has made possible a kind of socialism at a distance, in which privatizing norms and practices proliferate in symbiosis with the maintenance of authoritarian rule” (2008, 4). Twelve years onwards, the term neoliberalism increasingly fits China poorly (as well as China fitting neoliberalism poorly) (Horesh and Lim 2017). I therefore seek to stay clear of such terms as much as possible as they are more obfuscating than clarifying. Yet in contemporary China, despite witnessing a gradual increase in (selective) marketization and commercialization since Deng’s reforms in the late-1970s, the authoritarian rule of the CCP seems unchallenged. Academics have explained the success of the party’s strategy within the ‘authoritarian resilience’-paradigm (see e.g. Nathan 2003; Tsai and Kou 2015), in contrast to the Soviet Communist Party, which collapsed in the wake of far-reaching political and economic reforms. The calibration of government can thus be seen as a response to the challenges of government in a contemporary era of reforms and globalization. The result has been a hybrid socialist- neoliberal form of political rationality that is simultaneously authoritarian and micro- managing, and seeks to govern individuals from a distance through their own autonomy, while enhancing its surveillance capabilities to great heights (Ong and Zhang 2008; Lee 2018, 283). While the state remains in power of determining what

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mastering valuable ‘rules’ of self-government with games and emotional intensity. falls in its domain, television stations and its creative personnel has some autonomy Billed as ‘entertainment,’ rather than as ‘educational programming,’ such programs over its programming. It is therefore important to note that (1) the guidelines that are part and parcel of TV’s relevance to diffuse techniques of government (cf. reality TV provides are not (only) those extolled by the state, and that (2) television Andrejevic 2011). Its capacity to insert guidelines for conduct and living in the daily induces audiences to govern themselves. life of ordinary Chinese is part of what I mean with the calibration of government. As An important reimagination is taking place of local, national, and global space Ouellette and Hay state, “by aligning TV viewers with proliferating techniques for in China. Whereas its version of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ may seem to shaping and guiding themselves and associations with others, reality TV has become point to its unique situation, it mainly functions as a conceptual bridge linking China the quintessential technology of neoliberal citizenship” (2008a, 4; cf. Couldry 2010, 73– with the world, which would have been inconceivable within a socialist ideological 90). Even though their research was located in the United States, I argue that this is framework (Sigley 2006, 495). The market on the national as well as global level is seen valid within a Chinese context as well. as a highly competitive space where only the fittest survive. Therefore, the link Generally speaking, with the risk of reifying such problematic categories, between the suzhi (素质 [quality]) of individuals with the ‘overall national strength’ is neoliberal strategies governing through the desires of individuals as customers, a source of constant reflection for the national government (Yan 2003; Anagnost 2004; property owners, or citizens in general, have been combined with socialist Ong 2006b). Comprising a hybrid amalgam of capitalist characteristics with socialist technologies of government (cf. Harvey 2005, 120–51). As Aihwa Ong and Li Zhang values, the strategies of government have been calibrated considerably in recent stated in 2008, “the adoption of neoliberal reasoning has made possible a kind of decades. One important discursive shift, which is also noticeable within HSTV, is the socialism at a distance, in which privatizing norms and practices proliferate in changing notion of government ( 政府 [zhengfu]) as planning ( 計劃 [jihua]) and symbiosis with the maintenance of authoritarian rule” (2008, 4). Twelve years administration (行政 [xingzheng]) to management (管理 [guanli]) and governance (治 onwards, the term neoliberalism increasingly fits China poorly (as well as China 理 [zhili]) (Sigley 2006, 496). fitting neoliberalism poorly) (Horesh and Lim 2017). I therefore seek to stay clear of The calibration of government places the emergence of a discourse of such terms as much as possible as they are more obfuscating than clarifying. Yet in ‘governance’ within both a domestic and a global context. Whereas theories of contemporary China, despite witnessing a gradual increase in (selective) governance often refer to a step back of the state (e.g. Sending and Neumann 2006), marketization and commercialization since Deng’s reforms in the late-1970s, the the emergence of governance should not be seen as a retreat of the state, but as a authoritarian rule of the CCP seems unchallenged. Academics have explained the retrenchment or calibration in a different position. In China, the establishment of a success of the party’s strategy within the ‘authoritarian resilience’-paradigm (see e.g. socialist market economy has not entailed a retreat of the state but has rather required Nathan 2003; Tsai and Kou 2015), in contrast to the Soviet Communist Party, which the state to intervene in different ways. Television has followed a similar pattern: collapsed in the wake of far-reaching political and economic reforms. The calibration television stations have commercialized and are responsible for their own finances, of government can thus be seen as a response to the challenges of government in a and yet they are subjugated to the social-political function the CCP ascribes to TV contemporary era of reforms and globalization. The result has been a hybrid socialist- stations. They are required to create their own programs, but television makers need neoliberal form of political rationality that is simultaneously authoritarian and micro- to censor themselves according to largely undefined boundaries of what constitutes managing, and seeks to govern individuals from a distance through their own acceptable content (except for clear red lines, such as e.g. criticism of the CCP, autonomy, while enhancing its surveillance capabilities to great heights (Ong and independence, LGBTI-related content). If commercialization has allowed Chinese Zhang 2008; Lee 2018, 283). While the state remains in power of determining what television stations to become (more) independent from government financing and

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direct control by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), then what does that mean for the state’s ability to govern at a distance? This directly involves basic questions from political economy: who controls Chinese television stations (here: HSTV), and who profits? How does government regulation work in the context of commercialization, and how is HSTV structured, i.e. how are power structures formed and how do they operate? Most studies turn to either a cultural or a political-economic analysis of their object of study, insinuating a dichotomy between both forms of analysis. However, John T. Caldwell has problematized this distinction, arguing that “political economics and textual and cultural analysis are not mutually exclusive but rather are inseparable from each other (…) Creating a hierarchy of these approaches is an empty, myopic exercise” (2013, 157–58). The complex systems defining television industries everywhere, and in China in particular, demand an approach which acknowledges connections and interdependence between these different approaches and registers, ranging from production and industrial context to textual analysis and audience research. In fact, they have led me to subdivide the main research question into two distinct subquestions. On the one hand, in the context of a calibration of government, how does governance work within television production practices? This refers to the making of television: which imperatives political (censors, ideology), economical (advertising, attracting eyeballs), cultural (personal preferences, history) guide television making? In what context does television making take place, and how does television integrate political communication with commercial incentives? On the other hand, how does governance through television work? With this, I have the audiences in mind. How do programs seek to influence individuals, and how do audiences read, consume, and interpret these media texts? And it is exactly this last issue that requires a further nuancing of the calibration of government: one where government, or its equivocation with the ‘state’ is relegated to a modest role. I stated above that economic imperatives also play an important role in television making, but I argue in this dissertation that they are not the only ones. While the government continues to outline the framework in which television making can take place, I show that calibrated government, which seeks to govern television stations and television makers from a

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direct control by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), then what does that mean for distance through their own autonomy, leaves more space for economic and other the state’s ability to govern at a distance? This directly involves basic questions from considerations. political economy: who controls Chinese television stations (here: HSTV), and who Moreover, if governance through television has become more overt and complex, profits? How does government regulation work in the context of commercialization, then what do individuals do with indirect or ‘subtle’ directives? How do they identify, and how is HSTV structured, i.e. how are power structures formed and how do they interpret, and appropriate these techniques in everyday life? These questions shift the operate? perspective from the apparatus to the audience as the agent of governance (cf. Parkin Most studies turn to either a cultural or a political-economic analysis of their 1971; Ang 1985; 1985; Morley 1986; Hall 2006; Hermes 2008). When individuals are object of study, insinuating a dichotomy between both forms of analysis. However, (partly) governed through their own autonomy, such as fathers through Where are we John T. Caldwell has problematized this distinction, arguing that “political economics going dad, then it is also necessary to assess how individuals use that autonomy. and textual and cultural analysis are not mutually exclusive but rather are inseparable Television makers have told me how they circumvent censorship, and I similarly from each other (…) Creating a hierarchy of these approaches is an empty, myopic discuss how audiences sometimes interpret television content in unexpected ways. exercise” (2013, 157–58). The complex systems defining television industries The calibration of government helps me to contextualize and answer important everywhere, and in China in particular, demand an approach which acknowledges questions that delimit the space of agency and of television making. Chapter 2 connections and interdependence between these different approaches and registers, unravels the history of television as governmental instrument, exploring the societal ranging from production and industrial context to textual analysis and audience context in which television-making takes place. In chapter 3, I zoom in on HSTV itself, research. by investigating how the creativity of television makers is regulated through political, In fact, they have led me to subdivide the main research question into two economic and cultural narrative arrangements by the TV station. These chapters distinct subquestions. On the one hand, in the context of a calibration of government, elaborate the calibration of government, enunciating the conceptual space in which how does governance work within television production practices? This refers to the television makers themselves do their work, and under what constraints they work. making of television: which imperatives political (censors, ideology), economical Chapter 4 then inverts the focus bottom-up, on television makers themselves, showing (advertising, attracting eyeballs), cultural (personal preferences, history) guide how they deal with these constraints/imperatives and navigate the governmentalized television making? In what context does television making take place, and how does field of television making. A similar conundrum appears in the consumer part. television integrate political communication with commercial incentives? On the other Chapter 5 investigates the ‘text,’ the program itself, and the ways it seeks to approach, hand, how does governance through television work? With this, I have the audiences assess, and guide audiences in particular ways, i.e. how does a TV program seek to in mind. How do programs seek to influence individuals, and how do audiences read, govern at a distance? In chapter 6, this top-down focus shifts to the bottom-up ways consume, and interpret these media texts? And it is exactly this last issue that requires in which audiences read, interpret, and/or appropriate these media texts. In this way, a further nuancing of the calibration of government: one where government, or its the circuit of televisual products comes together: its context (chapter 2), production equivocation with the ‘state’ is relegated to a modest role. I stated above that economic (chapter 3-4), text (chapter 5), and reception (chapter 6) following a long tradition of imperatives also play an important role in television making, but I argue in this inquiry, which was inspired by cultural theorist Stuart Hall’s Encoding/Decoding (1973). dissertation that they are not the only ones. While the government continues to outline Yet these questions also probe the limits of the calibration of government: it sets the the framework in which television making can take place, I show that calibrated context, but its focus on ‘government’ falls short of effectively addressing questions government, which seeks to govern television stations and television makers from a such as: how do individuals use this autonomous space? If so, which other economic,

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cultural, social etc. imperatives guide their actions? And how do these agents then navigate this highly governmentalized field? Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality can help to take these issues into account.

1.3 Foucault in Changsha: Chinese Governmentalities and Reality TV

The calibration of government has resulted in a relatively autonomous space, where individuals are expected to act upon themselves in their everyday lives. Reality TV here provides tools for the government of everyday life: by assessing and guiding the ethics, behaviors, aspirations, and routines of ordinary people through their programming. In the same way, television makers have become more autonomous in their daily work: instead of receiving clear guidelines and directives, they engage in self-censorship and are expected to perform their tasks by means of self-discipline and self-organization. At the same time, audiences and television makers are not just receivers: they read, interpret, and appropriate. It is exactly the subjectivity of these actors—their agency of interpretation and action—that is hard to conceptualize within the frame of ‘government’ or ‘governance.’ The concept of governmentality, developed by philosopher Michel Foucault during his lectures at the Collège de France in the 1980s, allows for such conceptualization and therefore his work offers a useful way to analyze television’s power (e.g. Andrejevic 2008, 610–11). Generically, governmentality deals with “how we think about governing others and ourselves in a wide variety of contexts” (Dean 2009, 267). This conceptual approach has been used to examine the techniques through which individuals and collectivities reflect upon, work on, and organize themselves and their lives. In this dissertation, I turn to the question how television governs and is governed: on the one hand, I show how and by who(m) Chinese television practitioners themselves are governed, while on the other hand, I examine to what extent people are governed through television, and how television is an important resource for appropriating and implementing the offered techniques for managing the various aspects of individuals’ lives. The concept of governmentality will therefore be highly relevant in my analysis

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cultural, social etc. imperatives guide their actions? And how do these agents then of reality TV and how it presents desired or aspirational modes of conduct—at home navigate this highly governmentalized field? Michel Foucault’s concept of and at work—and life organization. governmentality can help to take these issues into account. Michel Foucault first coined the term ‘governmentality’ in his lectures given at the Collège de France in 1977–1978, which have been published in English under the title Security, territory, population. It stands for “the ensemble formed by institutions, 1.3 Foucault in Changsha: Chinese Governmentalities and Reality TV procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, The calibration of government has resulted in a relatively autonomous space, where political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its individuals are expected to act upon themselves in their everyday lives. Reality TV essential technical instrument” (2009, 108). Foucault scholars have redefined here provides tools for the government of everyday life: by assessing and guiding the governmentality as “a range of forms of action and fields of practice aimed in a ethics, behaviors, aspirations, and routines of ordinary people through their complex way at steering individuals and collectives” (Bröckling, Krasmann, and programming. In the same way, television makers have become more autonomous in Lemke 2011, 1). Foucault’s study of governmentality signals a refinement of his their daily work: instead of receiving clear guidelines and directives, they engage in analysis of power. In Discipline and Punish, he undertook a genealogical study of the self-censorship and are expected to perform their tasks by means of self-discipline and development of disciplining and punishing criminals in pre-modern Europe: a self-organization. At the same time, audiences and television makers are not just gradual shift from torture or execution—sovereign power—to more gentle forms such receivers: they read, interpret, and appropriate. It is exactly the subjectivity of these as imprisonment. This development of disciplinary power signifies more effective actors—their agency of interpretation and action—that is hard to conceptualize within control and gradually becomes the mode for control of society, with schools, hospitals the frame of ‘government’ or ‘governance.’ The concept of governmentality, and other institutions modeled on the modern prison. However, there is no central developed by philosopher Michel Foucault during his lectures at the Collège de agency creating this system of disciplinary power, Foucault asserts, merely a France in the 1980s, allows for such conceptualization and therefore his work offers a convergence of techniques and institutions (Gutting 2014). useful way to analyze television’s power (e.g. Andrejevic 2008, 610–11). In the mid-1970s, Foucault recognized that his conception of power has two Generically, governmentality deals with “how we think about governing others shortcomings. First, the focus on the individual body and its disciplinary formation and ourselves in a wide variety of contexts” (Dean 2009, 267). This conceptual does not consider the more comprehensive processes of subjectification. Thus, it does approach has been used to examine the techniques through which individuals and not do justice to the double character of subjectification as a practice of subjugation collectivities reflect upon, work on, and organize themselves and their lives. In this and a form of self-constitution. Second, the focus on individual institutions (such as dissertation, I turn to the question how television governs and is governed: on the one the mental hospital and the prison) turned out to be insufficient. Foucault deemed it hand, I show how and by who(m) Chinese television practitioners themselves are necessary to return to the state and examine its strategic role in the historical governed, while on the other hand, I examine to what extent people are governed organization of power relationships and the establishment of global structures of through television, and how television is an important resource for appropriating and domination—conceptualized by Jeffrey T. Nealon as an intensification of power (2007). implementing the offered techniques for managing the various aspects of individuals’ Therefore, a double-sided expansion of the analytical apparatus was needed, in order lives. The concept of governmentality will therefore be highly relevant in my analysis to account for the processes of both (1) subjectification and (2) state formation (Bröckling, Krasmann, and Lemke 2011).

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In his lectures at the Collège de France from 1976 until 1979, Foucault responded to these analytical shortcomings by focusing on the problem of government and the genealogy of the modern state. He does not refer to government as generally understood in contemporary dominant discourse however, but to a broader, more inclusive concept of government, including the ways in which the conduct of individuals or groups might be directed (Foucault 1982, 790). For Foucault, the problem of government is the link between power and subjectivity, the technologies of domination and the technologies of the self, reflecting the problem I set out at the end of the last section. Government was thus not only discussed in political texts, but also applied to problems of self-control, guidance for children and the family, management of the household—the “conduct of conduct.” In his history of governmentality, Foucault analyzes how the modern sovereign state and the modern autonomous individual co-determine each other’s emergence (Lemke 2002). Governmentality then denotes its mediating role between power and subjectivity, connecting the techniques of domination with technologies of the self and how forms of political government have recourse to “processes by which the individual acts upon himself” (Lemke 2002, 4). Moreover, it allows scrutiny of the close relationship between “techniques of power and forms of knowledge, since governmental practices make use of specific types of rationality, regimes of representation, and interpretive models” (Bröckling, Krasmann, and Lemke 2011, 2). As noted above, this forms a theoretical shift from his earlier work on disciplinary power, where he investigated subjectivity primarily with a view to ‘docile bodies’ and over-determined the workings of disciplinary power. The governmentalization of the state, Foucault asserts,

“has nonetheless been what has allowed the state to survive. And it is likely that if the state is what it is today, it is precisely thanks to this governmentality that is at the same time both external and internal to the state, since it is the tactics of government that allow the continual definition of what should or should not fall within the state’s domain” (2009, 109–10).

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In his lectures at the Collège de France from 1976 until 1979, Foucault responded Governmentality thus refers, in Foucault’s view, to how power functions in modern to these analytical shortcomings by focusing on the problem of government and the societies. Power emanates from knowledges and procedures that are associated with genealogy of the modern state. He does not refer to government as generally social institutions. Truth claims are not only specific to certain societies, Foucault understood in contemporary dominant discourse however, but to a broader, more argues, but also to particular institutional rationalities. Institutions exercise authority inclusive concept of government, including the ways in which the conduct of over individuals in society because of their capacity to authorize certain knowledges individuals or groups might be directed (Foucault 1982, 790). For Foucault, the as truthful. Foucault argues that power operates as a network: there is a connection problem of government is the link between power and subjectivity, the technologies between the multiplicity of rationalities in a society (and between societies) and the of domination and the technologies of the self, reflecting the problem I set out at the dispersion of how and where power is exercised. It is distributed across the ‘spheres’ end of the last section. Government was thus not only discussed in political texts, but of authority that manage individuals through specific skills, techniques, regimens, also applied to problems of self-control, guidance for children and the family, and technologies. These spheres manage society by setting guidelines and regulations management of the household—the “conduct of conduct.” In his history of through which individual conduct is regulated and social life is structured. governmentality, Foucault analyzes how the modern sovereign state and the modern As I have established above, this seems equally valid for Chinese television autonomous individual co-determine each other’s emergence (Lemke 2002). makers: while the government decides what is in its purview, it is not the only ‘sphere’. Governmentality then denotes its mediating role between power and Other spheres include the economic (advertisements, related to the need to attract subjectivity, connecting the techniques of domination with technologies of the self and eyeballs) and the cultural (as attracting eyeballs means that programs need to be how forms of political government have recourse to “processes by which the attractive; but also adhere to other criteria, such as standards of creativity). Yet to what individual acts upon himself” (Lemke 2002, 4). Moreover, it allows scrutiny of the extent can governmentality be made to work in a Chinese context? In contemporary close relationship between “techniques of power and forms of knowledge, since China, governmentality, as the conduct of conduct, seems to be increasingly regulated governmental practices make use of specific types of rationality, regimes of through the establishment of technological systems such as the social credit system representation, and interpretive models” (Bröckling, Krasmann, and Lemke 2011, 2). that the Chinese government currently develops. Yet at the same time, disciplinary As noted above, this forms a theoretical shift from his earlier work on disciplinary power intensifies by extensive surveillance of outside (street cameras with facial power, where he investigated subjectivity primarily with a view to ‘docile bodies’ and recognition) and online (e.g. surveillance of WeChat) spaces. over-determined the workings of disciplinary power. The governmentalization of the Foucault traced the genealogy of governmentality throughout Western history, state, Foucault asserts, and links it closely to the emergence of ‘liberal governmentality.’ He understands liberalism not as political ideology, but as a specific art of government oriented “has nonetheless been what has allowed the state to survive. And it is likely that towards the population, replacing external regulation (such as the church) with inner if the state is what it is today, it is precisely thanks to this governmentality that production. Liberal governmentality does not simply guarantee freedoms (such as is at the same time both external and internal to the state, since it is the tactics of market freedom, private ownership, freedom of opinion, etc.), but organizes the government that allow the continual definition of what should or should not fall conditions under which individuals can make use of these freedoms (Kavka 2012, 138). within the state’s domain” (2009, 109–10). The subject’s freedom does not stand opposed to liberal government, but forms its necessary reference, thus forming an indispensable instrument of liberal government (Bröckling, Krasmann, and Lemke 2011, 5). This evokes the question whether the

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concept of governmentality can be detached from its liberal components, and somehow be made valuable in a non-liberal and non-Western context, such as television in contemporary China. In this respect, I follow Dipesh Chakrabarty’s attempt to ‘provincialize’ Europe: “the point is not to reject social science categories but to release into the space occupied by particular European histories sedimented in them other normative and theoretical thought enshrined in other existing life practices and their archives” (2000, 20). Only in this way, Chakrabarty asserts, it is possible to create plural normative horizons specific to our existence and relevant to the examination of our lives and their possibilities. Instead of putting up dichotomies between supposed entities such as ‘West’ and ‘East,’ or by detaching China from global discourses by pointing to its uniqueness, how can the concept of governmentality be made to work for the study of television in contemporary China? Sociologists Mitchell Dean and the late Barry Hindess have problematized this equivocation of governmentality with liberalism and provide clues how the concept can be made to work in a Chinese context. They point out the persistent deployment of sovereign and authoritarian measures in what are labeled ‘liberal’ societies, challenging the supposed primacy of ‘freedom’ (Hindess 2001; Dean 2002; 2009). Liberal government comprises authoritarian dimensions that are sometimes deployed to produce and sustain liberal rationalities. Thus, the contrast between liberal forms of government as opposed to non-liberal forms of government become hard to distinguish and highly problematic as distinct analytical categories. Nowadays, many ‘modern’ systems of government are cut from the same cloth. Contrasts between the deployment of ‘freedom’ in one situation, and that of ‘non-freedom’ in another become much more complex. Thus, the dynamics of government must be analyzed within particular contexts, nuancing instead of emphasizing these problematic categorizations. Governmentalities in China are both liberal and illiberal, and most often somewhere in between. Asian studies scholar Gary Sigley asserts that “Chinese socialist governmentality differs from liberal Western variants in its perception of the limits to what one can know about the object to be governed” (2006, 494). Whereas liberal reasoning maintains a skeptic attitude regarding the ability to know the object to be governed,

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concept of governmentality can be detached from its liberal components, and thereby employing more indirect methods of steering conduct, China’s socialist somehow be made valuable in a non-liberal and non-Western context, such as governmentality, based on Maoist interpretations of Marxism, implies that there is television in contemporary China. nothing about the object to be governed it does not know (Sigley 2009). Since the In this respect, I follow Dipesh Chakrabarty’s attempt to ‘provincialize’ Europe: reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping, socialist strategies of government has been “the point is not to reject social science categories but to release into the space occupied syncretized with strategies of governing through autonomy, market mechanisms, and by particular European histories sedimented in them other normative and theoretical the self-government of individuals (cf. Ong 2007), resulting in a hybrid thought enshrined in other existing life practices and their archives” (2000, 20). Only governmentality that denotes the space, as well as its constraints and limitations, to in this way, Chakrabarty asserts, it is possible to create plural normative horizons television making as well as watching. At the same time, governmentality mediates specific to our existence and relevant to the examination of our lives and their between top-down power and the subjectivity of individuals—connecting techniques possibilities. Instead of putting up dichotomies between supposed entities such as of domination with technologies of the self. Within this governmentalized ‘West’ and ‘East,’ or by detaching China from global discourses by pointing to its environment, how do television makers and audiences act upon themselves? How do uniqueness, how can the concept of governmentality be made to work for the study they establish their agency and employ tactics to navigate this environment? of television in contemporary China? Governmentality thus poses a useful concept to study and conceptualize the Sociologists Mitchell Dean and the late Barry Hindess have problematized this governmentalization of television, as well as governmentalization through television. equivocation of governmentality with liberalism and provide clues how the concept can be made to work in a Chinese context. They point out the persistent deployment of sovereign and authoritarian measures in what are labeled ‘liberal’ societies, 1.4 Moral Schlock or Lessons for Better Living? The Study of Reality TV challenging the supposed primacy of ‘freedom’ (Hindess 2001; Dean 2002; 2009). Liberal government comprises authoritarian dimensions that are sometimes deployed Reality shows in particular are a valuable demonstration of this double-edged sword to produce and sustain liberal rationalities. Thus, the contrast between liberal forms of governmentalization. Reality TV has the ability to present audiences techniques to of government as opposed to non-liberal forms of government become hard to take care of themselves (e.g. to become better parents), thereby supporting the distinguish and highly problematic as distinct analytical categories. Nowadays, many calibration of government and its pivotal rationality of self-reliance in contemporary ‘modern’ systems of government are cut from the same cloth. Contrasts between the China. In Better living through reality TV, Laurie Ouellette and James Hay argue that deployment of ‘freedom’ in one situation, and that of ‘non-freedom’ in another reality TV in the US does not ‘divert’ passive audiences from the serious operations of become much more complex. Thus, the dynamics of government must be analyzed public life and civil duties: it translates resources and instructions for the changing within particular contexts, nuancing instead of emphasizing these problematic expectations of citizenship. They show how reality shows explicitly address viewers categorizations. Governmentalities in China are both liberal and illiberal, and most as subjects exercising freedom and civic agency within entertainment: by applying often somewhere in between. documentary techniques to the demonstration and performance of technologies of the Asian studies scholar Gary Sigley asserts that “Chinese socialist governmentality self in everyday life makes reality TV relevant for ‘governing-at-a-distance,’ requiring differs from liberal Western variants in its perception of the limits to what one can individuals to govern their own lives through personal autonomy. Despite appearing know about the object to be governed” (2006, 494). Whereas liberal reasoning superficial and staged, reality programs help to constitute models for appropriate maintains a skeptic attitude regarding the ability to know the object to be governed, civic conduct and problem-solving. I consider these insights highly valuable and

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argue in this dissertation that the mechanism works rather similar in contemporary China. Yet in China, as elsewhere, reality TV has long been sidelined as superficial ‘schlock TV,’ in popular as well as academic discourse (Barmé 1999, 103; Hill 2005, 7). In China, as initially elsewhere, it has received considerably less scholarly attention than other genres, in particular television dramas. While the study of dramas has proliferated around the world, reality TV has long been relegated to the crevices of television studies. Critical as well as popular responses to reality TV have long been in thrall with the authenticity: what is real, and how do we know? Richard Kilborn, Bill Nichols, and John Corner were among the first to take up the ‘reality’ in reality TV, and debated the factual and fictional elements of reality TV (Kilborn 1994; 1998; Nichols 1994; Corner 1995). Nichols lamented the lack of documentary sobriety in the new “tele-reality” and the absence of authenticity dominated scholarly analysis as well as critical popular debates (1994, 54; Kavka 2014). These questions are still relevant today, although the value-laden discourse on reality TV has diminished somewhat. It has become clear that reality TV is commercially attractive and here to stay. The growth and visibility of reality TV has triggered a surge of scholarship in the early 2000s and has now resulted in a plethora of publications dedicated to the critical analysis of reality television (cf. Hill 2005; Kavka 2012; Ouellette 2014). As most studies concern themselves with particular dimensions of reality TV, such as business model, production, genre, aesthetics, ethics, or politics, I discuss relevant debates in my respective chapters. What is important to note here is that debates on reality TV in China have evolved along a similar pattern. In the early 2000s, critics frequently lambasted reality TV in popular media, and the CCP concluded that Chinese television failed to contribute to a healthy moral society because of the excessive tendencies of reality television under the pressure of commercialization. During the 2000s, ‘harmonious society’ was Hu Jintao’s signature ideology; the CCP sought to position itself as the moral center in society, and reality TV did not subscribe to this vision. This discourse of the vulgarity of television entertainment dovetails with the discourse of moral crisis that has permeated dominant discourse in China—in the public sphere as well as in government policy. Whether this crisis is real or imagined, what matters is that the

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argue in this dissertation that the mechanism works rather similar in contemporary discourse is pervasive and powerful in China, up until this day, and that has been China. central to the self-legitimation efforts of the CCP. The alleged vulgarity and Yet in China, as elsewhere, reality TV has long been sidelined as superficial immorality of entertainment television clearly implicated the media as part of this ‘schlock TV,’ in popular as well as academic discourse (Barmé 1999, 103; Hill 2005, 7). crisis of morality. In 2002, the government therefore started the ‘Purify Television’- In China, as initially elsewhere, it has received considerably less scholarly attention campaign to restore television as promoting ‘correct’ values and reigning in the than other genres, in particular television dramas. While the study of dramas has excesses implicated in the ongoing commercialization (Bai 2015a). I discuss the role of proliferated around the world, reality TV has long been relegated to the crevices of this campaign and its influence on the making of television more extensively in television studies. Critical as well as popular responses to reality TV have long been chapter 2. in thrall with the authenticity: what is real, and how do we know? Richard Kilborn, The study of reality TV in China only took off very slowly. Hunan Satellite Bill Nichols, and John Corner were among the first to take up the ‘reality’ in reality Television’s 2005 Supergirl (超级女声 [chaoji nüsheng]) talent contest sparked a short TV, and debated the factual and fictional elements of reality TV (Kilborn 1994; 1998; publishing frenzy, mostly focusing on the nation-wide SMS voting that decided the Nichols 1994; Corner 1995). Nichols lamented the lack of documentary sobriety in the contest (democracy avant la lettre?) (Meng 2009; Keane, Fung, and Moran 2010, 123– new “tele-reality” and the absence of authenticity dominated scholarly analysis as 40). Others examined the way in which the winner, Li Yuchun, became a symbol for well as critical popular debates (1994, 54; Kavka 2014). These questions are still LGBTQ communities in China (see e.g. Grindstaff 2009; de Kloet and Landsberger relevant today, although the value-laden discourse on reality TV has diminished 2012; Yang and Bao 2012; Huang 2014), the outbreak of fandom (de Kloet and somewhat. It has become clear that reality TV is commercially attractive and here to Landsberger 2012; Fung 2013), and the unpaid labor of reality TV (Jian and Liu 2009). stay. The growth and visibility of reality TV has triggered a surge of scholarship in the Uniting these studies is a line of enquiry that focuses on television as a site for early 2000s and has now resulted in a plethora of publications dedicated to the critical ideological contestation and hegemony. In a similar way, some studies conceived analysis of reality television (cf. Hill 2005; Kavka 2012; Ouellette 2014). As most television dramas as opening up a relatively free space where new ideas and imaged studies concern themselves with particular dimensions of reality TV, such as business circulated became resources with which Chinese audiences might imagine a different model, production, genre, aesthetics, ethics, or politics, I discuss relevant debates in world and forge new self-identities (Lull 1991; Keane 2001a). In this dissertation, I my respective chapters. argue that we need to be careful with such assessments. While these studies are highly What is important to note here is that debates on reality TV in China have insightful, and show aptly how television entertainment can be claimed to construct evolved along a similar pattern. In the early 2000s, critics frequently lambasted reality alternative identities, they risk falling into the trap of extrapolating morality-based TV in popular media, and the CCP concluded that Chinese television failed to Eurocentric ideas about authoritarianism and resistance to China (Abbas and Erni contribute to a healthy moral society because of the excessive tendencies of reality 2005). In addition, my research suggests (chapters 4 and 6) that we need to be careful television under the pressure of commercialization. During the 2000s, ‘harmonious about mainstreaming such readings. Interviews with television makers and audience society’ was Hu Jintao’s signature ideology; the CCP sought to position itself as the give little reason to suggest that these contestations are representative of wider society moral center in society, and reality TV did not subscribe to this vision. This discourse and extend beyond subcultures or fan groups. of the vulgarity of television entertainment dovetails with the discourse of moral crisis At the same time, I argue that we should be equally wary of overdetermining that has permeated dominant discourse in China—in the public sphere as well as in the grip and power of the Chinese state over television-making and television- government policy. Whether this crisis is real or imagined, what matters is that the watching. Media scholar Stefan Kramer argued that “television has taken over the role

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of an announcement medium; namely, to communicate the official discourse and, by virtue of the impact its narratives and images have on emotions and identifications, of controlling not just information but also on the self-perception of its recipients—the entire Chinese population” (2004, 39). The suggestion that television content is nothing more than government propaganda is simplistic, if not outrightly misleading. While the CCP holds strong control over Chinese media, and employs an array of censorship instruments to maintain this control (Brady 2009; Stockmann 2013), I argue that the government of daily life television making has also been calibrated. Overarching claims of television as either mere propaganda, or as a relatively liberal space for new ideas are too binary. Furthermore, in this dissertation I show that the reality of television production and consumption, and its governmentalization, is much less fixed and more ambiguous than these binary statements would suggest. The short interest in Chinese reality TV diminished again after Supergirl, only remerging again after around 2013, with specific attention to other music talent shows as well as localizations of foreign formats. These studies mostly focus on specific programs, such as the highly popular dating show If you are the one (非诚勿扰 [feicheng wurao]) (Kong 2014; Morrow 2014; Sun 2014; Li 2014; Chen 2016; Li 2011), produced by Jiangsu Satellite Television (JSTV); and most recently, HSTV’s Where are we going dad (Li 2016; Keane and Zhang 2017; Song 2018; Jiang 2018). Only few studies seek to address the entire cycle and analyze the governmentalization of television. Chinese media scholar Michael Keane is among the keenest observers of Chinese television. His 2015 book The Chinese Television Industry aptly analyzes current trends in Chinese television in relation to historical developments (Keane 2015). I closely follow Keane’s observation that televised products cannot be studied in a vacuum: the historical role of television in China and how industrial developments impact the production of content and the nature of television are pivotal in a comprehensive study on Chinese television. Yet Keane pays scant attention to televisual products and audiences themselves, even though audiences cannot be disregarded in this configuration: while the socio-political context regiments television making and also influences the interpretive frame of audiences, television making in contemporary China means attracting eyeballs. Keane’s approach therefore reflects the difference that I set out in the previous section

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of an announcement medium; namely, to communicate the official discourse and, by between governance and governmentality: it neglects the agency of subjects virtue of the impact its narratives and images have on emotions and identifications, (television makers and audiences). While Michael Keane remains a close observer of of controlling not just information but also on the self-perception of its recipients—the the political economy of Chinese television in general, other dimensions of television entire Chinese population” (2004, 39). The suggestion that television content is are relatively scant: the above studies focus on the televisual text, and it is rare to find nothing more than government propaganda is simplistic, if not outrightly misleading. studies of production or reception. While the reasons for this dearth are While the CCP holds strong control over Chinese media, and employs an array of understandable—doing production or audience studies is notoriously difficult in censorship instruments to maintain this control (Brady 2009; Stockmann 2013), I argue China due to government regulations, the few examples do provide invaluable that the government of daily life television making has also been calibrated. insights into how production works in China. Overarching claims of television as either mere propaganda, or as a relatively liberal Based on participant observation and interviews with production personnel, space for new ideas are too binary. Furthermore, in this dissertation I show that the Wenna Zeng and Colin Sparks show in their study of the localization of TV’s reality of television production and consumption, and its governmentalization, is (奔跑吧 [benpao ba]) (formerly known as Running man (奔跑吧兄弟 [benpao much less fixed and more ambiguous than these binary statements would suggest. ba xiongdi]) that television production is a process of constant negotiation between the The short interest in Chinese reality TV diminished again after Supergirl, only actors involved: between Chinese and Korean teams on the production set (2017), and remerging again after around 2013, with specific attention to other music talent shows with SAPPRFT and local governments (2018). Earlier, Xiaoxiao Zhang and Anthony as well as localizations of foreign formats. These studies mostly focus on specific Fung’s studies of Ugly Wudi (丑女无敌 [chounü wudi]), the HSTV-produced version of programs, such as the highly popular dating show If you are the one (非诚勿扰 [feicheng ABC’s (United States) comedy-drama series Ugly Betty similarly showed how wurao]) (Kong 2014; Morrow 2014; Sun 2014; Li 2014; Chen 2016; Li 2011), produced localization of TV drama’s involve similar interactions. By observing production by Jiangsu Satellite Television (JSTV); and most recently, HSTV’s Where are we going practices, they show how controversial features from the original format were omitted, dad (Li 2016; Keane and Zhang 2017; Song 2018; Jiang 2018). adjusted, and added to gain approval from the Chinese censors (Fung and Zhang 2011; Only few studies seek to address the entire cycle and analyze the Zhang and Fung 2014, 513). These studies show how an examination of the production governmentalization of television. Chinese media scholar Michael Keane is among the and localization process can shed invaluable insights on how production communities keenest observers of Chinese television. His 2015 book The Chinese Television Industry deal with practical issues such as the renegotiation of ideology and censorship, and aptly analyzes current trends in Chinese television in relation to historical the consequences that these interactions have on the end product. In this dissertation, developments (Keane 2015). I closely follow Keane’s observation that televised I build on these studies and seek to supplement them by integrating production in the products cannot be studied in a vacuum: the historical role of television in China and larger television cycle. how industrial developments impact the production of content and the nature of In line with Fung and Zhang’s work is Florian Schneider’s 2012 monograph television are pivotal in a comprehensive study on Chinese television. Yet Keane pays Visual political communication in popular Chinese television series. Besides providing a scant attention to televisual products and audiences themselves, even though thorough discourse, visual, and semiotic analysis of political communication in drama audiences cannot be disregarded in this configuration: while the socio-political series, he shows how media practitioners are not political agents who simply context regiments television making and also influences the interpretive frame of superimpose clearly designed and targeted official propaganda. Instead, they are audiences, television making in contemporary China means attracting eyeballs. imbedded in a cultural governance of media ecology shaped by many intertwining Keane’s approach therefore reflects the difference that I set out in the previous section forces, such as political agendas and governmental regulations, but also commercial

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motivations, audience preferences, organizational procedures, and the ideological assumptions of television makers (Schneider 2012). In this dissertation, I seek to extend Schneider’s field of research to the genre of reality television. This dissertation seeks to make three important contributions to the field of Chinese television studies. Firstly, this is one of the few studies that incorporate the entire circuit of televisual products: its context, production, text, distribution, and reception, in order to create a comprehensive overview, emphasizing the interdependence and interaction between these different components (cf. Zhang 2012). Secondly, the concept of governmentality provides a unique vantage point to analyze the workings of power on the different levels of analysis that I turn to in this dissertation, showing how governance and power work in Chinese television. Thirdly, by taking on oft-heard dichotomies regarding China vis-à-vis the West, such as freedom vs. repression, creativity vs. copying, socialism vs. capitalism, I show how realities on the ground are much more ambiguous and complex than these rhetorical devices suggest. Despite their often-clear-cut artificiality, reality TV programs prime and influence individuals and establish norms and conventions for (in-)appropriate behavior (cf. Ouellette 2010). It is therefore important to investigate exactly how this process works, for television makers themselves as well as the audiences they seek to reach.

1.5 Methodological Considerations: Struggling with Contradictions and Access

“If a man sets out on an expedition, determined to prove certain hypotheses, if he is incapable of changing his views constantly and casting them off ungrudgingly under the pressures of evidence, needless to say his work will be worthless. The more problems he brings with him into the field, the more he is in the habit of molding his theories according to facts, and of seeing facts in their bearing upon theory, the better he is equipped for the work” (Malinowski 1922, 8–9).

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motivations, audience preferences, organizational procedures, and the ideological In this section, I concisely present my research design and set of methods that I have assumptions of television makers (Schneider 2012). In this dissertation, I seek to employed in my research to answer the main research question: how does extend Schneider’s field of research to the genre of reality television. governmentality work within and through television? How are political, economic, This dissertation seeks to make three important contributions to the field of social, and cultural imperatives configured in the making and consumption of reality Chinese television studies. Firstly, this is one of the few studies that incorporate the television? First, I introduce my set of methods per chapter and explicate how they entire circuit of televisual products: its context, production, text, distribution, and allow me to address the research questions I engage with in this dissertation. Second, reception, in order to create a comprehensive overview, emphasizing the I reflect on the ways these methods worked out in practice: what difficulties I interdependence and interaction between these different components (cf. Zhang 2012). encountered in the field, and the advantages and problems of analyzing reality Secondly, the concept of governmentality provides a unique vantage point to analyze television. In appendix 1, I explain in full detail how I have employed these methods, the workings of power on the different levels of analysis that I turn to in this including examples of interview questions, templates for focus groups, and sequence dissertation, showing how governance and power work in Chinese television. Thirdly, protocols. by taking on oft-heard dichotomies regarding China vis-à-vis the West, such as freedom vs. repression, creativity vs. copying, socialism vs. capitalism, I show how Theme Method realities on the ground are much more ambiguous and complex than these rhetorical Cht 2 History of Chinese TV Document Analysis, Historical Method devices suggest. Despite their often-clear-cut artificiality, reality TV programs prime Cht 3 Political Economy HSTV Interviews, Participant observation, Document Analysis and influence individuals and establish norms and conventions for (in-)appropriate Cht 4 Production / Localization Interviews, Participant observation behavior (cf. Ouellette 2010). It is therefore important to investigate exactly how this Cht 5 Text TV Analysis, Sequence Protocols process works, for television makers themselves as well as the audiences they seek to Cht 6 Reception Focus Groups, Discourse Analysis reach. This dissertation draws on four sets of data: (1) the analysis of policy documents, business reports, yearbooks, and other primary sources, as well as the analysis of 1.5 Methodological Considerations: Struggling with Contradictions and Access secondary sources (chapter 2) (2) ethnographic methods, including semi-structured interviews, and participant observation (chapters 3 and 4); (3) television analysis, “If a man sets out on an expedition, determined to prove certain hypotheses, if involving textual, visual, narrative, and discourse analyses of Where are we going dad he is incapable of changing his views constantly and casting them off (chapter 5); and (4) audience research through focus groups. In reality, these ungrudgingly under the pressures of evidence, needless to say his work will be boundaries are less clear-cut than presented: I occasionally refer to interviews in non- worthless. The more problems he brings with him into the field, the more he is ethnographic chapters and combine focus groups with a discourse analysis of the in the habit of molding his theories according to facts, and of seeing facts in their transcripts in chapter 6. bearing upon theory, the better he is equipped for the work” (Malinowski 1922, (1) Engaging with the research question ‘which imperatives guide the 8–9). production of television in China’ at first means assessing its historical role. How did TV function as a governmental instrument since the early 1960s? This question guides chapter 2, and the analysis of secondary sources, English and Chinese-written reports

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on historical developments of television in China, or on specific programs, seems the best way to explore this question historically. For the more recent sections of this chapter, I have included primary sources, such as policy documents (from government offices such as SAPPRFT and the CAC, as well as HBS itself), business reports, and yearbooks. These primary sources have also been valuable in chapter 3, where I attempted to unravel the organizational structure of HSTV itself. (2) For the chapter on television production, focusing on localization, I have chosen to use semi-structured interviews and participant observation to see how practitioners deal with imperatives influencing production and what localizing a foreign TV format actually entails. These data have been compiled during fieldwork in Changsha and at HSTV (including visits to production sites and show rehearsals), which took place from September 2015 until June 2016. I hold that interviews and participant observation adequately complement each other: it allowed me to analyze the difference between what people say and what they do. It must be said that participant observation involved more observation than participation: I had no role myself in the production process, and merely observed those present. (3) An analysis of the end product, the televised show itself, can take many different forms, and ‘television analysis’ itself is a rather nondescript term which needs clarification. In order to identify the ideological dimensions of WAWGD, I have created sequence protocols which structure narrative sections, allowing me to identify and analyze recurring sequences and narratives. Sequence protocols have allowed me to access the interaction and juxtaposition of different discourses in one scene, as well as to clearly identify the most prominent and recurring discourses in the show itself. This was crucial in answering the research question how individuals are constituted and reinvented as active, self-governing citizens. (4) Upon realization that audiences are a crucial part of the circuit of television and taken into consideration that WAWGD is aimed at families, I decided to conduct focus groups with families representing two or more generations. Observing and analyzing how families discussed the show, allowed me to identify several discourses that characterized their evaluations of (scenes of) WAWGD. Thus, these focus groups provide critical insights into the ways target audiences evaluate, interpret, negate, or

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on historical developments of television in China, or on specific programs, seems the possibly appropriate the narratives in this show. For a more extensive description of best way to explore this question historically. For the more recent sections of this the methods, and how I have used them in practice, see appendix 1. chapter, I have included primary sources, such as policy documents (from The apparent contradictions I encountered during my stay in China initially government offices such as SAPPRFT and the CAC, as well as HBS itself), business confounded me. It often seemed like the whole outline of my research was just plain reports, and yearbooks. These primary sources have also been valuable in chapter 3, wrong, and contradicted experiences in the field. If censorship is rampant in China, where I attempted to unravel the organizational structure of HSTV itself. and part of the daily life of media workers, then how come none of my informants (2) For the chapter on television production, focusing on localization, I have seemed to regard it a big, or even interesting, issue to talk about? With the risk of chosen to use semi-structured interviews and participant observation to see how appearing naïve, I did not believe it had anything to do with my being a foreigner— practitioners deal with imperatives influencing production and what localizing a and as a white, Caucasian male, clearly recognizable as such. My informants just foreign TV format actually entails. These data have been compiled during fieldwork found the topic boring. And what to do with programs such as Supergirl and Where in Changsha and at HSTV (including visits to production sites and show rehearsals), are we going dad, that were both banned from television screens, and both reappeared which took place from September 2015 until June 2016. I hold that interviews and in reinvented forms on the Internet? Why would the Chinese authorities allow that? participant observation adequately complement each other: it allowed me to analyze And if Chinese television is colloquially (and academically) often talked of in terms of the difference between what people say and what they do. It must be said that copying or cloning, then how come television workers that I interviewed regarded participant observation involved more observation than participation: I had no role their work in localizing foreign formats as highly creative? Surely it could not just be myself in the production process, and merely observed those present. a reaction to reverse a negative framing to a positive one? And what to think when an (3) An analysis of the end product, the televised show itself, can take many executive producer tells me that he hopes that China can develop a very distinct different forms, and ‘television analysis’ itself is a rather nondescript term which television industry from Western countries, while asking a minute later whether I needs clarification. In order to identify the ideological dimensions of WAWGD, I have think his program can match the quality of Western television programs? Confronting created sequence protocols which structure narrative sections, allowing me to identify these contradictions was initially hard and destabilizing, but I slowly realized there is and analyze recurring sequences and narratives. Sequence protocols have allowed me a fine line between clear contradictions and apparent ones. Paradoxically, in the end, to access the interaction and juxtaposition of different discourses in one scene, as well many of these contradictions turned out to be highly productive, shedding crucial as to clearly identify the most prominent and recurring discourses in the show itself. insights into the dynamics of governance in Chinese television, and several chapters This was crucial in answering the research question how individuals are constituted directly engage with what started off in my mind as a clear contradiction. Perhaps the and reinvented as active, self-governing citizens. best example is the creative vs. copying dichotomy that underlies chapter four. But (4) Upon realization that audiences are a crucial part of the circuit of television politics vs. commerce (chapter 3), or the many dichotomies (i.e. wu-wen, Chinese- and taken into consideration that WAWGD is aimed at families, I decided to conduct foreign, urban-rural) presented in chapter 5 cannot be left unmentioned. My single focus groups with families representing two or more generations. Observing and biggest frustration turned out to be remarkably productive. analyzing how families discussed the show, allowed me to identify several discourses Doing fieldwork in the Chinese television industry has proven to be complicated that characterized their evaluations of (scenes of) WAWGD. Thus, these focus groups and was often frustrating. In retrospect, it is easier to identify why. Firstly, the political provide critical insights into the ways target audiences evaluate, interpret, negate, or climate in China has not been conducive for foreign researchers studying the media landscape. In recent years, president Xi Jinping has intensified his control over media

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outlets, demanding “absolute loyalty” to the CCP and adherence to its ideology and policies (see e.g. Associated Press 2016). These policies have made media outlets increasingly wary over permitting access to foreign researchers. When I applied for official permission at HSTV to do on-site fieldwork, they first asked for an official letter from the University of Amsterdam. After I complied with their request, I waited for several months but I did not receive any reply, positive nor negative. Many of my informants, some high-placed officials in HSTV, told me that obtaining official permission to do fieldwork at HSTV was impossible as it was deemed ‘too sensitive’ at the moment. They explained the absence of an official response as an evasion: they would not allow me official formal permission, but at the same time would not object to me trying to find informal ways in via my contacts. Consequently, some doors remained closed, while others could be opened via networking. Sometimes informants would withhold information from me as I was not officially sanctioned. At other times, they would speak more openly (and often anonymously) because I was an outsider. Having been denied formal permission can in retrospect thus be described as an impediment as well as a blessing. The sensitivity of my research made diplomatic framing, in interviews or elsewhere, rather crucial. I explicitly wanted to avoid eliciting discussions or provoke suspicious reactions. By clearly showing how I seek to understand ‘China’ on its own terms, and not from the starting point of criticizing China, I attempted to avoid falling into ‘us vs. them’-dichotomies. Several interviewees expressed their wariness with me on this particular topic, explicitly expressing their reluctance to tell negative stories out of fear for negative reports about China. Moreover, academic research in China has historically been closely connected to state officialdom, making the ethics of research and clearly explaining the intentions of the research project particularly relevant (Hansen 2006). Thus, it was always a diplomatic balancing act between framing my research positively, while simultaneously assuring that I was in no way misleading my informants (cf. Svensson 2006; Brinkmann 2013). Besides the issue of sensitivity, television workers are indirectly also state employees and need to sign a disclosure agreement upon the start of their contract. The television industry is under strict government control (SAPPRFT), and the party secretary of HSTV, Lü Huanbin, answers directly to the CCP (Zhang and Fung 2010).

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outlets, demanding “absolute loyalty” to the CCP and adherence to its ideology and The threshold to speaking to outsiders, especially a foreigner, thus becomes high. At policies (see e.g. Associated Press 2016). These policies have made media outlets the same time, being a foreigner has also been an advantage as many contacts and increasingly wary over permitting access to foreign researchers. When I applied for interviewees were surprised and sometimes honored that a Dutch postgraduate official permission at HSTV to do on-site fieldwork, they first asked for an official student would come to China to do research on HSTV. Some interviewees admitted letter from the University of Amsterdam. After I complied with their request, I waited to me that their curiosity prevailed over their caution. However, ‘playing the foreigner for several months but I did not receive any reply, positive nor negative. Many of my card’ also means affirming the alleged privileged status of Caucasian whites in informants, some high-placed officials in HSTV, told me that obtaining official China—something which can be quite unsettling in daily life. Emphasizing that I am permission to do fieldwork at HSTV was impossible as it was deemed ‘too sensitive’ an academic researcher and not a journalist has been helpful too; several television at the moment. They explained the absence of an official response as an evasion: they makers that I spoke to distrusted journalists, who, in their opinion, just seek to disclose would not allow me official formal permission, but at the same time would not object classified information about programs, or cite them wrongly or very selectively. to me trying to find informal ways in via my contacts. Consequently, some doors Nevertheless, requests for interviews have more often been denied than granted. remained closed, while others could be opened via networking. Sometimes Many television personnel were very reluctant to meet with a foreign researcher, often informants would withhold information from me as I was not officially sanctioned. because of political reasons. However, in many cases I did not receive an explanation At other times, they would speak more openly (and often anonymously) because I was for the denial of an interview request. When contacting possible new interviewees, it an outsider. Having been denied formal permission can in retrospect thus be often took considerable effort to persuade reluctant industry employees to meet. In described as an impediment as well as a blessing. some cases, this worked out, when the interviewee agreed to meet ‘as friends,’ not in The sensitivity of my research made diplomatic framing, in interviews or any official capacity such as the role of interviewer and interviewee. Some also did elsewhere, rather crucial. I explicitly wanted to avoid eliciting discussions or provoke not agree to have the interview recorded, while others did not object at all. suspicious reactions. By clearly showing how I seek to understand ‘China’ on its own Interestingly, some of the people most willing to accept the interview request terms, and not from the starting point of criticizing China, I attempted to avoid falling without additional preconditions were producers and directors, where employees into ‘us vs. them’-dichotomies. Several interviewees expressed their wariness with me with lower standing were more cautious and reluctant. According to official HSTV on this particular topic, explicitly expressing their reluctance to tell negative stories rules, producers are not allowed to give interviews without explicit permission and out of fear for negative reports about China. Moreover, academic research in China the presence of a media spokesperson to monitor content. Yet I found that many has historically been closely connected to state officialdom, making the ethics of producers were happy to meet, and talked seemingly quite freely, in disregard of the research and clearly explaining the intentions of the research project particularly rules. Generally, they also did not object to using their own name, while others relevant (Hansen 2006). Thus, it was always a diplomatic balancing act between preferred to be anonymized. The interviews (28 in total, see appendix 2) have been framing my research positively, while simultaneously assuring that I was in no way undertaken in coffee shops or restaurants in and around Changsha. misleading my informants (cf. Svensson 2006; Brinkmann 2013). Besides the issue of sensitivity, television workers are indirectly also state employees and need to sign a disclosure agreement upon the start of their contract. The television industry is under strict government control (SAPPRFT), and the party secretary of HSTV, Lü Huanbin, answers directly to the CCP (Zhang and Fung 2010).

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1.6 Where To Go From Here: An Orientation

Chapter 2 – Between Commercialism and Politics: Television in China, 1958-2018

While ‘context’ might sometimes be regarded as the static location or situatedness of a particular case or phenomenon, I would like to note here, taking Lawrence Grossberg’s important message into account, that context is not some reified entity— something ‘out there’ within which practices occur. These practices are always involved in a dialectical process, and simultaneously constitute the context in which they are practices (Grossberg 1997; cf. Slack 1996). This chapter therefore investigates the historical development of television to unravel and explicate the social, economic, political, and cultural context in which television-making takes place. I show how the commercialization process resulted in a dualistic system, whereby television stations became responsible for their own management and finances, and yet retained their social-political function for the state: as a governmental instrument for political communication. Yet the introduction of increasing regulations and censorship since the early 2000s suggest that friction exists between the political and ideological imperatives of CCP officials on the one hand, and the commercial imperatives of television stations, that are competing for viewer ratings and advertising revenue. Why did the authorities allow this dualistic system to emerge in the first place? What consequences did this have for television as a governmental instrument? And what does the emergence of private platforms mean for the Chinese television industry?

Chapter 3 – ‘Create or Die’: Governmentalizing Creativity and the March of the ‘Hunan Television Army’

In chapter 3, I then zoom in on Hunan Satellite Television to show how this station employs narrative arrangements about creativity to governmentalize television makers. An alternative commercialization model (vis-à-vis other Chinese television stations) has enabled HSTV to gain a ten-year head start in the industry, and to structure its organization accordingly. Thanks to these reorganizations, and the

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1.6 Where To Go From Here: An Orientation establishment of effective metanarratives, I analyze how HSTV has managed to effectively governmentalize creativity, reconfiguring the role of television makers as Chapter 2 – Between Commercialism and Politics: Television in China, 1958-2018 creative workers and soliciting their participation in the cultivation of particular behaviors and skills to produce successful television programs. How has HSTV While ‘context’ might sometimes be regarded as the static location or situatedness of utilized commercial incentives to governmentalize creativity? a particular case or phenomenon, I would like to note here, taking Lawrence Grossberg’s important message into account, that context is not some reified entity— Chapter 4 – Between Copying and Creating? Integrating the ‘Three Qualities’ in the something ‘out there’ within which practices occur. These practices are always Localization of Reality TV involved in a dialectical process, and simultaneously constitute the context in which they are practices (Grossberg 1997; cf. Slack 1996). This chapter therefore investigates The experiences of television makers themselves are the main topic in chapter 4. By the historical development of television to unravel and explicate the social, economic, asking what factors are involved in the creation of a successful localization of a foreign political, and cultural context in which television-making takes place. format, I show how television makers navigate the governmentalized field and I show how the commercialization process resulted in a dualistic system, balance social, cultural, political, and economic imperatives in their daily jobs. How whereby television stations became responsible for their own management and such imperatives play out on the working floor: what does creativity mean in finances, and yet retained their social-political function for the state: as a everyday television production? How do television makers conceptualize and balance governmental instrument for political communication. Yet the introduction of these economic and political imperatives? Which other imperatives guide the increasing regulations and censorship since the early 2000s suggest that friction exists production of television shows, and how do television makers deal with them in their between the political and ideological imperatives of CCP officials on the one hand, daily work? Which insights can production practices provide to this study of and the commercial imperatives of television stations, that are competing for viewer governance through television? And what tactics do television makers employ to ratings and advertising revenue. Why did the authorities allow this dualistic system navigate this politically laden domain? to emerge in the first place? What consequences did this have for television as a governmental instrument? And what does the emergence of private platforms mean Chapter 5 – Good Fathers, Real Men, and Proper Citizens: Unpacking ‘Where Are We Going for the Chinese television industry? Dad’

Chapter 3 – ‘Create or Die’: Governmentalizing Creativity and the March of the ‘Hunan In chapter 5, I assess what images Where are we going dad presents about ‘good Television Army’ fatherhood’ and what having a good relationship between father and child entails. By asking these questions, I place Where are we going dad within a discourse of masculinity In chapter 3, I then zoom in on Hunan Satellite Television to show how this station and fatherhood in China, and in strategies of governance. So, what is successful employs narrative arrangements about creativity to governmentalize television parenting according to this program? What does it mean to be a good father in China makers. An alternative commercialization model (vis-à-vis other Chinese television today? Which techniques are employed to construct these particular images? Drawing stations) has enabled HSTV to gain a ten-year head start in the industry, and to on a visual and narrative analysis of season three of WAWGD I examine how WAWGD structure its organization accordingly. Thanks to these reorganizations, and the presents an important resource for parenting strategies, suggesting the appropriation

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and implementation of the offered techniques in the management of various aspects of individuals’ (and their children’s) lives. This also leads me to consider related questions: how does the show present desired or aspirational modes of conduct? What kinds of citizens does it seek to produce?

Chapter 6 – Brainwashing, Fakeness, and Learning from the ‘Red Wedding’: Audience Research Through Focus Groups

Finally, chapter six turns to audiences, to examine how audiences read, consume, interpret, and/or appropriate televisual texts—in this case, HSTV’s reality show Where are we going dad. If the calibration of government entails governing through individuals’ autonomy, then how do they use this autonomy? Through focus groups with audiences, in this chapter I analyze recurring discourses in the discussions to frame audience interpretation of reality TV content. Understanding how audiences engage with this show is a necessary step to complete the circuit of communication that constitutes the social life of media: without an examination into audiences, it makes little sense to speak of governance structures, political economy, production, or textuality. This chapter thus forms the last albeit necessary chapter in this circuit of communication.

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