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Home , Archdeacon of Taunton, Arminianism, Ecclesiastical polity, Edgar Gibson, Impanation, John Rainolds

THE OF GRACE OF

BY

WILLIAM DA YID NEELANDS College

A thesis submitted In Conformity with the Requirements of The Department of Theology of the Toronto School of Theology

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Theology awarded conjointly by Trinity College and the University of Toronto

March, 1988 Permission has been granted L'autorisation a ite accordee to the National Library of a la Bibliotheque nationale Canada to microfilm this du Canada de microfilmer thesis and to lend or sell cette these et de preter OU copies of the film. de vendre des exemplaires du film. The author (copyright owner) L'auteur (titulaire du droit has reserved other d'auteur) se reserve lea publication rights, and autres droits de publication: neither the thesis nor ni la these ni de longs extensive extracts from it extraits de celle-ci ne may be printed or otherwise doivent etre imprimes OU reproduced without his/her autrement reproduits sans son written permission. autorisation ecrite.

1 -J 5 8151- TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter

I Introduction: the Life and Writings of Richard Hooker 1

II , , 30 1. J ustifica tion 30 2. Sanctification 38 3. Glorification 47 4. Attitude to "the Papists" 57 III Nature and Grace, Reason and : Hooker's 64

1. Nature's two-fold need of grace 66 2. Human "Imbecility" and 's need for grace 81 3. The natural desire for an end beyond nature 87 4. Grace presupposes nature 91 5. Reason criticizes Scripture 96 6. The consonance of reason and revelation, nature and grace 97 7. Grace does not destroy, but perfects nature 105 8. The 110 9. Peter Munz on Reason and Revelation 120 10. Gunnar Hillerdal on Reason and Revelation 122 IV and : the of Richard Hooker 134 1. 137 2. The antecedent and the consequent will of God 148 3. 156 4. 160 5. The Irresistibility of Grace 172 6. The Perseverance of the Elect 176 7. Assurance and Security 185 8. The Seed of God 204 9. Hooker's 208

-1- -ii-

V The and the Participation of Christ 226

I. The Eucharistic Sacrifice 227 2. Hooker's Minimalism 237 3. The Definition of Sacraments and the Eucharistic Presence 240 4. Baptismal 277 5. The distinction between the visible and the invisible 287 VI Richard Hooker and the Theological Tradition: the Platonism of Richard Hooker 293

I. Attitude to Thomas 301 2. Hooker's Thomistic 307 3. Hooker on Analogy 316 4. The sweet and amiable ordering: Wisdom 8.1 325 5. Exitus-reditus and the structure of theology 327 6. Conclusion 345

VII Bibliography 354 I Introduction: the Life and Writings of Richard Hooker Despite the fact that he is recognized on all sides as one of the most important literary and theological figures of the age of Queen , Richard Hooker still awaits an adequate biography.1 He was, of course, the subject of one of the still most frequently read biographies of the seventeenth century, Izaac Walton's (1593-1683)

1. The case is different with the publication of Hooker's Works, at least after an initial brief period of neglect. Keble's excellent edition of 1836, in its seventh edition, revised after Keble's death by R.W. Church and F. Paget, remains the most complete and readily available text of the Works. Where possible, for this reason, references will be made to it, by volume and page number, e.g. (iii, 299). The Works of that Learned and Judicious Divine Mr. Richard Hooker, with an account of his life and death by Isaac Walton, ed. J. Keble, 7th ed., revised by R.W. Church and F. Paget, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1888). In progress is a remarkable new edition, incorporating original spellings, from the Folger Library. For minute textual purposes, it will, when it is completed, undoubtedly replace Keble's. W. Speed Hill, (general editor) The Folger Library Edition of The Works of Richard Hooker (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977- ). Four volumes out of the proposed six have now been published. References to it may be made through the paragraph numbers from Keble's, which have been maintained. It makes use of some manuscripts unknown to Keble, and a considerable amount of work on the posthumous publications, particularly the three last books of Of the Lawes of . The title of this work, Hooker's principal legacy, has traditionally been abbreviated here as Ecclesiastical Polity, but this traditional abbreviation emphasizes the less significant part of the title; it will generally be abbreviated, throughout this discourse, using the sixteenth century spelling to avoid any easy and misleading associations, as simply Lawes. References to the Lawes will simply be by section or book, chapter and paragraph, e.g., V, xlviii, 3. Quotations will usually be taken from the 1888 edition, since it is still more complete than the Folger edition, and since its normalized spelling makes it easier to integrate into the text of this discourse. In quotations, italics are added without note, for emphasis.

-1- Introduction -2-

famous Life of Hooker.2 This biography, despite its significant literary value, was written more than sixty years after Hooker's death, and offers relatively little independent historical information about

Hooker that is not also available in the sources that still remain. In

fact, except for some rather dubious oral history derived from an aged relative of both Walton and Hooker, Walton appears to have had no sources that we lack. Walton's account of the hard facts of Hooker's

life has been quite effectively discredited, in this century, by the amazingly thorough detective work of C.J. Sisson, relying on documents

available in the Public Records Office.3 An even more recent study of Walton and his methods has shown the overwhelming amount of "art" that

went into Walton's Life of Hooker, and into its subsequent revisions by Walton. This study makes clear that Walton's work was based on a small number of sources but was directed towards discrediting the last books

2. Izaac Walton, The Life of Mr. Rich. Hooker, The Author of those Learned Books of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (London, 1665). The second edition was published with the second complete edition of The Works of Mr. Richard Hooker (London, 1666). Speed Hill, no. 23. W. Speed Hill, Richard Hooker, a descriptive bibliography of the early editions: 1593-1724 (Cleveland, 1970), 99f. Walton published several more editions of his biography, and introduced quite a number of editorial changes in the subsequent editions, but the 1666 edition remained the one printed in all subsequent editions of The Works until Keble's edition in 1836 brought the text to the state of Walton's latest version. Beginning with the fifth edition of the Works in 1705, John Strype's three substantial additions to Walton' Life of Hooker, were invariably printed. Speed Hill, Bibliography, no. 27, 120ff.

3. C.J. Sisson, The Judicious Marriage of Mr. Hooker and the Birth of The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (Cambridge, 1940). Introduction -3- of Hooker's great work Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Polity, which had been published long after Hooker's death, and just before Walton's Life of Hooker, and which must have proved some embarrassment to the government of Charles II, since they offered a view of episcopal authority and of the royal supremacy that was quite different from that favoured in the Restoration.4

Walton's Life of Hooker was, in fact, the second biography of Hooker, apparently deliberately composed, perhaps even commissioned, to replace the earlier biography of John Gauden (1605-1662), published as a 5 preface to the first complete edition of the Works, in 1662. Gauden had published, for the first time, the seventh and most unfortunate (from the point of view of the ecclesiastical ministers of the

Restoration) of the books of the Lawes; in addition, his gossipy and circumstantial picture of Hooker was of a rather unattractive and shambling -- not to say stupid -- figure. Gauden had, apparently, even fewer hard facts to go on than Walton, but Walton's life was clearly intended, perhaps commissioned, to improve the portrait of Hooker, by making him an ideal parson of the Restoration church, simultaneously learned, charitable and pastoral, and opposed to the views of those who

4. David Novarr, The Making of Walton's Lives, (Ithaca, New York, 1958).

5. "The Life & Death of Mr. Richard Hooker, (The Learned and justly Renowned Author of the Ecclesiastical Politie.) Written by John Gauden D.D. and of Exon.," in The Works of Mr. Richard Hooker (London, 1662), 1-40. Speed Hill, Bibliography, no. 22, 88ff. Introduction -4- had dominated the Commonwealth period now over and whose pathetic current circumstances raised sympathy they had not commanded before they were ejected from their livings. This attempt to re-draw the portrait of Hooker undoubtedly produced many anachronistic details in the account of his theological views, as we shall see.

There is, thus, a double defect in Walton's Life of Hooker from the point of view of factual biography: Walton introduced or exaggerated details to discredit the authenticity of the three last books of the

Lawes, by giving an account of their "mutilation" at the hands of unsympathetic "puritan" ministers, with the connivance of his unthrifty wife, 6 and he introduced anachronistic theological explanations in his attempt to make Hooker into the model parson of the late seventeenth century. Several recent short biographical sketches have offered more accurate accounts of Hooker's life, but a thorough full-length biography is still needed.7 For the purposes of this discourse, since questions

6. It seems that the unique authentic source of the story of the mutilation is an ambiguous remark made by Dr Spenser, one of Hooker's literary executors, in his address to the Reader, appearing first in the 1604 edition. (i, 123) Sisson has shown that all others depend on this. Judicious Marriage, 81f. But Spenser's witness to the mutilation is, as Novarr has pointed out, "confusing and incomplete." Novarr, Walton's Lives, 209. 7. For example, two sketches by Ronald Bayne that did not have the advantage of the work of Sisson and Novarr, but which are still worth reading and suitably judicious, are "The Life of Hooker," in Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, the Fifth Book ed. Ronald Bayne (London, 1902), xv-xxxvii, and Ronald Bayne, "Richard Hooker," in Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, ed. James Hastings (New York, 1914), vi, 772-776. Introduction -5-

of the interpretation and of the authenticity of Hooker's writings are bound up with biographical questions, the main events of Hooker's life,

as now established, will have to be listed.

Richard Hooker was born in March 1553/4 at Heavitree, a suburb of ,8 in the first year of the reign of Mary Tudor, and the beginning of the official interruption of the English . In

1568, he was appointed one of the two "clerks" at Corpus Christi College, in Oxford. Corpus had been founded in 1517 by Richard Fox,

Bishop of Winchester. It was one of the new Renaissance and humanist foundations, and, although a small college, was set up with a

thoroughness and completeness that makes it a model for current study of the "undergraduate college.119 Hooker's appointment as clerk was in the gift of the President. He was appointed at the very time Dr. William Cole became President of Corpus, and there was already an association between Dr. Cole and Bishop

John Jewel of Salisbury, who was acknowledged later as Hooker's patron.

A more recent sketch, which takes into some account the work of Sisson, is that of Stanley Archer, Richard Hooker (, 1983), 1-19. Archer is remarkably uncritical of Walton's character portrait of Hooker; see, e.g., p. 7, where a long passage of Walton is quoted.

8. Bayne, "Life of Hooker," xvi, note 2. 9. James McConica, "The Rise of the Undergraduate College," in McConica, The Collegiate University (Oxford, I 986), 17-29. See also Fr McConica's study of Corpus' government, discipline and membership, "Elizabethan Oxford: The Collegiate Society," 645-732. Introduction -6- Corpus was, however, divided in its theological allegiances, and retained a significant "papist" element that resisted Dr. Cole for some time. Hooker's family was indisputably in favour of the Reformation, his uncle John having shared exile with Cole, Jewel and in Frankfurt and having visited Peter Martyr in Strassburg as they did. When Jewel died in 1571, Sandys took up Jewel's interest and support for

Richard Hooker. Elizabeth succeeded to the throne in 1558, when Hooker was four years old, restoring a form of the reformed and order, and remaining the sovereign for the rest of Hooker's life. On December

24, 1573, Hooker was admitted as one of the discipuli, or scholars of the foundation, and proceeded to Bachelor of Arts on January 14, 1573/4.

He graduated Master of Arts on July 8, 1577 and was admitted scholaris, or probationary fellow, on September 16, 1577, and taught logic. He 10 became socius, or full fellow, in 1579. In July 14, 1579, he became the deputy Regius Professor of Hebrew, owing to the illness of Thomas Kingsmill.11 The Oxford curriculum of the time was remarkably conservative, having changed little during the first half of the sixteenth century. It generally took four years to complete the Bachelor of Arts, and another three years for the Master of Arts. was still

10. Bayne, "Life of Hooker," xviiif. 11. G.D. Duncan, "Public Lectures and Professorial Chairs," in James McConica, The Collegiate University, 357. Introduction -7- studied intensively in the Faculty of Arts in the sixteenth century, even though he had been attacked elsewhere, and had been replaced by Ramus in some "Reformed" universities. But at Oxford, Aristotle was the basis of the study of logic (Organon), 12 and of the "three philosophies", moral (the Ethics and Politics), metaphysical (Metaphysics) and natural (Physics).13

After completing the curriculum in the Faculty of Arts, the student might enter one of the professional faculties: theology, law and medicine. The Bachelor of Theology took seven years, at the end of which the theology student lectured on a book of the Sentences of Peter

Lombard. After an additional four years, the student might graduate with the degree Doctor of Theology. The "new statutes" of 1564/5 replaced the text of with scriptural texts.14 Hooker appears to have been a little slow at taking his B.A., but completed the Master of Arts after an appropriate interval. He did not stay in Oxford long enough to graduate B.Th. His appointment to deliver the Hebrew lectures in the absence of the Regius professsor is evidence of contemporary recognition of his capacity.

12. J.M. Fletcher, "The Faculty of Arts," in McConica, The Collegiate University, 176-179.

13. Ibid., 195.

14. S.L. Greenslade, "The Faculty of Theology," in McConica, The Collegiate University, 297. Introduction -8-

About 1577, Hooker became the tutor of Edwin Sandys, son of Bishop

Sandys, and of George Cranmer, grand nephew of the Marian martyr.15 Both of these younger men would figure in the literary project that became the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Polity. In October 1580, five fellows, including Hooker, and his former tutor , were expelled from

Corpus by the vice-president, John Barfoote. They were restored one month later by action of the Visitor of Corpus, Bishop Watson of

Winchester. The incident has suggested to some signs of Hooker's alignment in theological and ecclesiastical politics of the time since, as we shall see, Rainolds would outlive Hooker to represent the party of further reform at Hampton Court in the next reign, and Barfoote would gain a reputation for harsh suppression of representatives of that same party.16

15. Bayne, "Life of Hooker," xvii, note 7.

16. This issue will become important in the interpretation of what Novarr has characterized as Hooker's "early Calvinist leanings." Walton's Lives, 285f. See below, chapter IV. There it will be suggested that friendship with Rainolds, who was a candidate to succeed Dr. Cole, and therefore a rival of Barfoote, has as much to do with the interpretation of the incident than any clear cut "party differences." A Letter supposed to be from Rainolds to George Cranmer was appended to Walton's Life of Hooker. In the letter, Rainolds compares Scotus, Thomas and Joseph Justus Scaliger (1540-1609), the French Calvinist scholar, famous for his philological and editorial work on classical Latin authors: "For I value Scotus less than Aquinas, and Aquinas less than Scaliger; indeed, I make one Scaliger more than six hundred Scotuses and Aquinases." Life of Hooker, Additional App. II (i, 106f). The point of comparison is obscure: the theological orientation of Scaliger was clearly Calvinist after 1562, but he was not a theologian but rather a stylist and philologist. It would seem most likely that the point of comparison is on Latin style and not on the basis of any Introduction -9-

In 1581 Hooker was, apparently, ordained, and, in the same year, probably on the nomination of Bishop Aylmer of London, preached a formal public sermon at Paul's Cross, beside the cathedraI.17 Walton records that the sermon gave some offence, since it appeared to challenge a

Calvinist assumption. Although Hooker claimed to have a copy of the sermon later, no copy survives. The description Walton gives of

Hooker's views is hard to reconcile precisely with Hooker's known views in the published writings, and may be an "Arminian" anachronism.18

In 1583, Hooker's supporter and benefactor for the rest of his life, , became of Canterbury. On December 9,

1584, Hooker was presented to the living of the of Drayton theological point at all. But, in any case, Scotus is hardly a "stylist." Scaliger visited and Scotland in 1566 and was professor at Geneva from 1572 to 1574. The editors' foot-note to this passage clearly mistakes the case, and suggests that Hooker admired Scotus more than Rainolds did, and possibly more than he admired Thomas. The latter is impossible, as we shall see; the former is hard to establish. What is clear is that Rainolds presumes that Cranmer, who was his student at Corpus, will have read both Thomas and Scotus. See chapter VI.

17. Millar MacLure, The Paul's Cross Sermons 1534-1642 (Toronto, 1958), 212. MacLure describes the method of appointment and pay for these preachers (p. 11), at least as described in a later document, and notes that they were usually from the universities (p. 12).

18. See chapter IV, belows, where we will argue that Walton did not have the text of the sermon either, and that he seriously misrepresented Hooker's views for his own dramatic effect. Hooker's own account of the incident suggests that it was not, at the time, so controversial. Stanley Archer (1983) holds that Hooker defended Walton's version of the Paul's Cross theses all his life. Archer, Richard Hooker, 8. Introduction -10-

Beauchamp, in Buckinghamshire, which he may not ever have visited, despite the vivid and touchingly pathetic picture Walton gives of a visit by Cranmer and Sandys to him there.19 On March 17, 1584/5, Hooker was named Master of the Temple in London, by royal warrant, apparently through the influence of Bishop

Sandys on Whitgift.20 As Master of the Temple, Hooker soon came into a position of tension with , a pronounced "disciplinarian" and a fine preacher, who had been appointed Reader during the previous Mastership, and was favoured by some to succeed. Their relationship, which may have been complicated by a distant marital relationship, was not always stormy, but, at the end of a year, Travers was silenced for his factious and insubordinate criticism from the pulpit of sermons

19. Walton, Life of Hooker (i, 25f). Walton's picture of Hooker's domestic arrangements is famous, but a tissue of falsehood. The picture of Hooker's tending sheep outside in what would have had to be the middle of winter is improbable; and Hooker had no known children (or wife) until more than four years later. Sisson, Judicious Marriage, 20. Sisson has shown that Hooker was in London during December 1584 (p. 21). "The story [of Hooker's residence in Drayton Beauchamp, and the visit of his former students] is false in every detail. But every false and magnificent detail, especially that of reading Horace's Odes as he tended his flock, is a tribute to Walton's ability to construct a picture powerful in its appeal and beautifully integrated to the Life as a whole in its revelation of Hooker's character and in its bearing on Hooker's career as Walton saw them." Novarr, Walton's Lives, 274f. But note that John Butt and Peter Ure, review of Novarr in Modern Language Review 54 (I 959), 589, refer to evidence in the Lincolnshire Archives that Hooker held the benefice of Drayton Beauchamp from October 1584 to October 1585.

20. Bayne, "Life of Hooker," xxii. Introduction -11- preached by Hooker on March 20 and 28, 1586.21

Sermons I, ll and Ill. In 1612, three little tractates were published at Oxford under Hooker's name. These posthumous publications

were called A Learned and Comfortable Sermon of the Certaintie and

Perpetuitie of Faith in the Elect, A Learned Discourse of Justification,

Workes, and how the Foundation of Faith is Overthrowne, and A Learned

Sermon of the Nature of Pride. Keble's edition refers to them as Sermons I, II, and III respectively. A substantial addition to Sermon III, based on a manuscript in Dublin, was printed for the first time in

Keble's edition of 1836. All three are related by the sequential texts

from Habbakuk with which they begin, and the first two at least are

related to sermons Hooker preached at the Temple. Although they are posthumous, their authenticity can hardly now be in doubt, since they were clearly issued for publication by the successors of Hooker's literary executors, and must be assumed to have come away from

Bishopsbourne in the portmanteau of manuscripts.22 Furthermore, at least the first two, and probably the third, were related to sermons

Hooker is known to have preached while Master of the Temple.

The subject of Sermon I is clearly referred to by Travers, as having been preached "another time," apparently before the really

21. [Ronald Bayne] in Richard Hooker: Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, 2 vols. (London, 1907), 14, note l.

22. For their literary pedigree, see Sisson, Judicious Marriage, passim; Speed Hill, Bibliography I 9, 22, 23. Introduction -12- offensive sermon on "how the foundation of faith is overthrown.1123 Hooker claimed that the sermon had been written out and circulated privately "long before this late controversy,1124 possibly even before he came to the Temple. In its current state, it is clearly a fragment.25

Sermon II, the Learned Discourse on Justification, is very clearly related to the offending sermons of March 1586.26 But, in its current form, it is not precisely these sermons. In the first place, its enormous length would preclude its being delivered orally, even on two or three Sundays. As published, it refers to an earlier sermon for

23. Travers' Supplication (iii, 559f). For a description of this tractate, see below.

24. Answer to Travers, 10 (iii, 577). For a description of this tractate, see below. 25. On the first page, Hooker pauses before he comes to his "fourth point." Sermon I (iii, 470). The previous three points have clearly been "what is assented to," "why assent not universal," and "why assent varies in degree." One must suppose that the first part of the sermon is lost, or that there was a preceding sermon on the same topic. In addition the "third" and "fourth questions" are alluded to but not dealt with. (iii, 473) One must allow also for the possibility that the Sermons were considerably expanded in their published form. At the moment, they are all much too long to have been delivered at one service, even by the generous standards on the length of sermons current in the sixteenth century. And Sermon I, although long, is still only a quarter of the length of Sermon II. 26. It is quite puzzling why Speed Hill thinks "this work was originally three sermons preached on consecutive Sundays in April, 1586." Speed Hill, Bibliography, 19. As will be shown, the published version takes the ensuing controversy into account, and the dates given in the sources refer to sermons in March, 1586, not April. The sermons, would have been preached in April, according to the new Gregorian calendar, which may be the standard that Speed Hill has assumed. Introduction -13-

27 which this written document is an apology. Indeed, Travers'

Supplication seems to refer to a third Sunday sermon, in which Hooker amplified what he had said the previous Sunday.28 It would seem, then, that the Discourse on Justification is a conflation of material preached in several sermons, and amplified after the controversy, whether or not, like the Sermon of the Certainty and Perpetuity of Faith in the Elect, it was based on a yet earlier sermon Hooker had circulated in manuscript.

Sermon III, the Learned Sermon of the Nature of Pride, although not referred to in the contemporary controversy, is clearly related to

Sermons I and II, particularly in that it begins with a text from

Habbakuk that follows the texts of Sermons I and II. The authenticity of the substantial addition to the sermon published in 1612 that was published for the first time in 1836 cannot be questioned,29 since it is

27. Sermon II, 9, 36 (iii, 495, 543) quotes the offending thesis; and Sermon II, 39 indicates that this written sermon did not initiate the controversy on the particular subject of the salvation of the papists (iii, 546). This must refer to an existing controversy more further developed than the one about the subject of Sermon I. Travers' Supplication, (iii, 561) though, seems to refer to Hooker's sermon as answering him, and indeed Sermon II refers to Travers' texts. Sermon II, 10, 19 (iii, 496, 504). The provenance of these sermons will be considered again in chapter II.

28. Travers' Supplication refers to several parts of the published Discourse on Justification as being part of this third Sunday sermon: Sermon II, 4, 5, 20 are mentioned at iii, 562; Sermon II, 17, 25 at iii, 564; Sermon II, 29, 30, 35 at iii, 566f.

29. That is, the section that begins "Now what we did II Introduction -14- found in an old Dublin manuscript clearly connected to Archbishop Ussher, who had an extensive collection of authentic Hooker manuscripts corresponding to other undoubted publications, and since it follows directly on the portions earlier published. Indeed, its authenticity has never seriously been questioned.

An apparently contemporary account of the objectionable Hooker preached is preserved by Strype, and included, as Strype's third 30 addition, in Walton's Life of Hooker from 1705 on. This account is in three parts; fifteen points, apparently gathered by Travers or a supporter, comprise the first part; Hooker's own account of the offending sermon, and his vindication of himself against Travers' charges comprise the second; Archbishop Whitgift's judgment, in five parts, comprise the third. This document affords an interesting comparison with the printed Sermons, in determining to what extent they correspond to the actual sermons preached in March 1586.

Travers' Supplication and the Answer to Travers. Also published by Thomas Barnes at Oxford in 1612 were two tractates that had apparently circulated widely in manuscript before, A Supplication made to the Privy

(iii, 610).

30. Works i, 59ff. An independent manuscript, with minor variations is described by Booty in Richard Hooker: Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Attack and Response, ed. John E. Booty (Cambridge, 1982), xxvii, note 23. Booty indicates that Strype's versions are corrupt and that the manuscripts will be published in the sixth volume of the Folger edition. Introduction -15-

Counsel by Mr Walter Travers and The Answere of Mr. Richard Hooker to a

Supplication preferred by Mr Walter Travers to HH. Lords of the Privie

Counsel!. These two tractates were reprinted consistently in the editions of Hooker's Works from 1622 on. They are clearly and explicitly related to the controversy at the Temple in 1586, Travers' being addressed to the Privy Council, and Hooker's to Whitgift. They are an authentic contemporary account of the views expressed by the two adversaries and are therefore useful in defining Hooker's own views, as carefully stated for Whitgift.31

Other Sermons. Joseph Barnes also printed a sixth tractate in

1612, A remedie against Sorrow and Feare, delivered in a funeral/

Sermon. This sermon, which will have little bearing in this study, has been reprinted consistently since 1622, and was designated Sermon IV by

Keble. There is no evidence of the date of its composition, and little attention has been paid to it. But its authenticity is not in doubt, its pedigree being clearly visible.32

In 1614, Joseph Barnes published two further sermons attributed to

Hooker, Two Sermons upon Part of S. Ju.des Epistle. These sermons, although coming a different route, through Sir Edwin Sandys, have now been determined to have an authentic pedigree, although they were

31. They are described in Speed Hill Bibliography, 21, 15; their authenticity is not seriously questioned.

32. Speed Hill, Bibliography, 24. Introduction -16- questioned by Keble and by Paget.33 They were numbered V and VI by

Keble, and from internal evidence appear to have been composed in 1582- 3, just after the Paul's Cross Sermon or in 1593-4, while Hooker was still Master of the Temple, and just after the first four books of the 34 Lawes was published. A final sermon, was published for the first time, by Walton, in

1678, in his Life of Sanderson. It is entitled simply "A Sermon of Richard Hooker author of those Learned Books of Ecclesiastical Politie, Found in the Study of the late Learned Bishop Andrews." Numbered VII by Keble, it has no clear pedigree, although no one has attended much to

33. The sermons were explicitly mentioned by Nicholas Everleigh in the court of Chancery, and almost certainly remained in his possession from 1600 to January 1614, when George Sellars of Corpus Christi College and Joseph Barnes requested them for publication. Sisson, Judicious Marriage, 108-111, 123, 140. Keble questioned them on both stylistic grounds and on matters of content, Editor's Preface, 27 (i, Iv). Sisson has pointed out that Hooker's letters and sermons adopt styles different from the Lawes, so that stylistic consideration cannot be decisive. Sisson, Judicious Marriage, 109ff, 140. Paget also questioned its authenticity, on a question of content. Paget, Introduction, 265. In chapter II, we will see that these questions of content and "tone" are not inconsistent with the external evidence of Hooker's authorship. In chapter IV, wheh we consider predestination and assurance, we will see that there is no major doctrinal discrepancy between Sermons V and VI and Sermon I.

34. We must wait for the critical apparatus that will be published with the Folger edition of the Works to appear to gain a current assessment of the argument about the date of composition. A reference to "four and twenty years" in Sermon V, 15 (iii, 675), has suggested a date of twenty-four years from accession of Elizabeth in 1558 or from the excommunication and deposition by Pius II in 1569-70. The second event is much more likely to have been the remarkable one. This gives a slight favour to the later traditional date. Introduction -17- the question of authenticity. If it is by Hooker, it probably comes from the last fifteen years of his life: it is a beautifully composed short sermon by division, emphasizing God's grace and providence, and 35 the need for our Iabour.

Marriage and transfer to Kent. On February 13, 1589, Hooker married Joan Churchman, the daughter of a wealthy London merchant, with whose family he had been resident since 1584, and w.hose house was the centre of a movement in defence of the against its critics.36 In July 1591, Hooker exchanged benefices with Nicholas Baldgay, rector of Boscomb, in Wiltshire, and was appointed to be

Prebend of Netheravon attached to . He was probably 37 never resident in this parish. But it was while he held this living

35. Izaac Walton, The Life of Dr. Sanderson, late , to which is added, Some short Tracts or Cases of Conscience, written by the said Bishop (London, 1678), 253-276. In fact, of all the extant sermons by Hooker, this is the most remote from the various styles of the other works, and would have undoubtedly been questioned if it posed any difficult doctrinal points. Once again, we must await the Folger edition to learn the current state of the question. 36. The rehabilitation of the reputation of Joan Churchman Hooker, and with it the rehabilitation of the authenticity of the posthumous publications, was accomplished by Sisson. See Sisson, Judicious Marriage, 22-24 for an account of the Churchman family, of Hooker's lodging with them since 1584, of the marriage, and of the four of their children baptised between 1589 and 1596 and registered in the baptismal register of St Augustine's parish, the Churchmans' parish, in London. 37. Sisson believed that Hooker never went to Boscomb, as Walton held (Life of Hooker, i, 68), but stayed in London to write the first four books of the Lawes, Sisson, Judicious Marriage, xiii, 45. More recently, some documentary evidence has come to light that Hooker did Introduction -18- that his first published work appeared. In March 1593, the Preface and first four books of Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie appeared.38

The Lawes is, by a very large measure, Hooker's major work. As planned from the first appearance, it was to consist of eight books, a long general introduction on the topic of laws, then seven books, each to deal with one point of the Puritan platform, as it had emerged in the writings of Thomas Cartwright in his literary debate with Whitgift. But the definition of the seven specific topics was not given in the preceding debate; it was an organizational structure that was built into the Lawes and must have come from Hooker or, possibly, from his editorial associates, his former students Edwin Sandys and George

Cranmer. It was clearly enunciated in I 593, although the publishing project was not complete until 1662.39

In January 1595, Hooker was appointed to the parish of

Bishopsbourne, in the of Canterbury -- a royal appointment in this case, since the previous incumbent had been named a bishop by the

take up residence at Salisbury: he had undertaken solemnly to be resident in Salisbury as sub-Dean; ample lodging was provided in the Sub-deanery, within the close; the cathedral library and the sympathetic scholars resident would have suggested Salisbury as a suitable place for writing the Lawes. Elsie Smith, "Hooker at Salisbury," Times Literary Supplement (March 30, 1962), 223.

38. Sisson, Judicious Marriage, 60-61. Walton had erroneously written that the Lawes did not appear until 1594.

39. Preface ix, 4 (i, 196). Introduction -19-

Queen, which act gave the Crown the right of presentation of the next incumbent. Hooker clearly resided at Bishopsbourne, and died there.

While he was incumbent of Bishopsbourne, the fifth book of the Lawes was published, in 1597.

The texts of the first five books of the Lawes are fairly secure and well-established.40 They were all published in Hooker's life-time.

About the last three books, a significant debate exists, as we shall note in a moment.

In 1599, a small anonymous tract, in twenty-two sections and forty­ nine pages, appeared, A Christian Letter of certaine English Protestantes, unfayned favourers of the present state of religion, authorized and professed in England: unto that Reverend and Learned man,

Maister R. Hoo. requiring resolution in certayne matters of doctrine

(which seeme to overthrowe the foundation of Christian Religion, and of the Church among us) expresslie contayned in his five bookes of 41 Ecclesiastical! Politie. Hooker's copy of this tract has survived;

40. George Edelen, in Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity: Preface, Books I to IV (Cambridge, 1977), xiii­ xxxviii; W. Speed Hill, in Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Book V (Cambridge, 1977), xiii-I; Speed Hill, Bibliography, 3-5, 7f, 1 If, etc.

41. Keble's edition cited passages from the Christian Letter in the notes to the text, at the places attacked. The letter was printed, entire, by Ronald Bayne as a second appendix in his Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, the Fifth Book, by Richard Hooker (London, 1902), 588-635. This useful work is cited as "Bayne ed." A new critical edition has recently appeared in John E. Booty (ed.) Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Attack and Response (Folger edition, Introduction -20- it is filled with marginal notes, indicating the grounds for rejecting the points of his accusers.42 Other manuscripts survive, which sketch out a response, based in part on these marginal notes, but going much farther. One, the "Dublin Manuscript," is a preliminary draft, working notes, largely of textual references that would become quotations in the planned response.43 The second, referred to as the "Dublin Fragments," is an incomplete extended essay beginning the response to the Christian

Letter, in three sections, using the Dublin Manuscript and other materiaI.44

Before the last three books of the Lawes, or the planned response iv, Cambridge, 1982), 1-79. Unfortunately, this new edition does not give page numbers from the original text, making some references more difficult. This work will be cited as "Booty, Attack and Response"

42. Hooker's notes were first printed, as notes to the text of the Lawes by Keble. Bayne places them at the foot of the page in his edition, or refers to the place in the text of the Lawes. Booty's edition places them in the text in the order in which they occur. For a description of the copy, see Booty, Attack and Response, xiii-xxxiii.

43. This was published for the first time in 1981 in the third volume of the Folger edition. P.G. Stanwood (ed.), Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Books VI, Vil, Vil/ (Cambridge, 1981), 523-538. Republished in Booty, Attack and Response, 83-97. This document will be referred to as Dublin Manuscript. It will be ref erred to in the argument of chapter IV of this discourse.

44. Published first by Keble, as Appendix I to Book V, in Works ii, 538-610. Re-published in 1983, in a critical edition in Booty, Attack and Response, 101-167. Keble expressed the opinion that the central section, dealing with the sacraments, was not related to a response to the Christian Letter. Editor's Preface 9 (i, xxvi) This view will be questioned when the material is examined in chapter V of this discourse. Introduction -21- to the Christian Letter could be published, Hooker died, at

Bishopsbourne, on November 2, 1600. Books VI and VIII of the Lawes were published in 1648.45 And Book VII was finally published, by John

Gauden, in the first complete edition, in 1662.46

More than any others of the posthumous works, the three last books of the Lawes have been thought to lack integrity. And the question of these books is linked to the considerable amount of recent attention to the history of composition and purpose of the Lawes. Since these questions have some bearing on the interpretation of Hooker's theological views, and since the posthumous books certainly provide some indication of a theological position, it may be worthwhile to allude to these debates.

The principal problem about Book VI, aside from Walton's dubious account of its mutilation, is internal: it is apparently not, in its current form, about lay elders at all, which had been the subject

45. Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politte; The Sixth and Eighth Books (London, 1648). See Speed Hill, Bibliography, 80. The text of the eighth book in particular was somewhat mangled. A text related to Book VIII had appeared earlier, in Certain Briefe Treatises, written by diverse learned men, concerning the ancient and Moderne government of the Church, (Oxford, 1641). See Speed Hill, Bibliography, 75. R.A. Houk made enormous progress in establishing the text of Book VIII, in his edition in 1931. R.A. Houk (ed.), Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity, Book VIII (New York, 1931). The books have been re-edited in the third volume of the Folger edition: P.G. Stanwood (ed.), Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Books VI, VII, VIII (Cambridge, 1981).

46. Speed Hill, Bibliography, no. 22, pages 88-98. Introduction -22- announced in the Preface in 1593. Although there has been little recently expressed doubt that the Book is Hooker's, there has been doubt 47 that it belongs to the Lawes at au.

47. Sandys' and Cranmer's notes on a version of Book VI were published by Keble (VI, App., iii, 108-139). On the basis of these notes, Keble offered a summary of the topics of the original Book VI (i, xxxvi) and decided that the treatise on penitential discipline that survives is not at all Book VI. For Keble, this is evidence of the suppression of Book VI, and therefore, of the corruption of the last three books by . Editor's Preface (i, xxviii-xxxix). Sisson established that the tract was a genuine part of Hooker's remains: it was, in fact, the principal subject of controversy between Sandys and Andrewes on the committee to publish the posthumous works. Sisson concluded that the tract did form part of Book VI, after page 85, when Cranmer's and Sandys' notes ran out, but that the first 85 pages were lost. He noted a link between confession and jurisdiction made at VI, iv, 15 (iii, 57). Sisson, Judicious Marriage, 96-106. Although Speed Hill concluded that Book VI as we have it was not originally part of the Lawes, W. Speed Hill, "The Problem of the 'Three Last Books'," The Huntington Library Quarterly 34 (197 I), 317-336, Arthur S. McGrade later argued for its inclusion. Arthur S. McGrade, "Repentance and Spiritual Power: Book VI of Richard Hooker's Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity," in Journal of Ecclesiastical History 29 (1978), 163-176. McGrade refers to evidence from John Spenser, Hooker's literary executor, to William Covel, and to Sisson to show that Hooker did complete Book VI. There are apparently two "additions" to Book VI, yet the book must be read in conjunction with a Cranmer-Sandys reconstruction. Hooker's autograph notes for Book VI and Cranmer's and Sandys' notes have been republished in the third volume of the Folger edition, P.G. Stanwood, Books VI, VII, VIII, 105-140, 462-538. Pages 463-490 relate to Book VI. See pages xiii-xliv for a summary of the state of the text and the case. Book VI has been reconstructed on the basis of these notes and other materials. See Rudolph Almasy, "Richard Hooker's Book VI: A Reconstruction," in The Huntington Library Quarterly 42 (1978), 117-139. For a brief summary of Hooker's teaching on church discipline, confession and penance, see John T. McNeill, A History of the Cure of Souls (London, 1952), 226-8. In the nineteenth century, Hallam and Coleridge uttered suspicions on the last three books, but not because of supposed Puritan Introduction -23-

The principal problem of Book VII, besides the absence of any surviving sources for the first edition, is the apparent tension between the view of episcopacy in Book VII and that indicated in Book III: to some, it has appeared that Book III represents the tolerant and

mutilations, but because of supposed Laudian ones. Sisson has shown that this thesis was also wrong; Andrewes, for instance, protected Hooker's manuscripts, he did not mutilate them. Judicious Marriage 98, 104, 185ff. Novarr has suggested an account of the non-publication of most of Book VI and all of Book VII in 1648: "it has been suggested that Ussher was responsible for this volume, hoping thereby to influence the King toward a more moderate view of his power and to influence the people to a reasonable allegiance to the King. Neither the remainder of Book VI, which dealt with lay elders, nor Book VII, which dealt with episcopacy, would have served to unite the royalists and the non-conformists, and perhaps for this reason they were omitted." Novarr, Walton's Lives, 211. Speed Hill has proposed that Books VI - VIII became stalled because Hooker and his collaborators could not make their purposes compatible, and this was the reason for the non-publication at the time. W. Speed Hill, "The Evolution of Hooker's Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity," in W. Speed Hill, Studies in Richard Hooker: essays preliminary to an edition of his Works (Cleveland, 1972), 145-150. Olivier Loyer rejects Speed Hill's thesis (which follows Keble) that the present text of Book VI is not at all the text Hooker intended; Loyer argues that the points made by Cranmer and Sandys forced Hooker to consider the question of "spiritual jurisdiction" more carefully and rewrite the book. But he was still not satisfied with the text when he died. Olivier Loyer, L'Anglicanisme de Richard Hooker (Lille, 1979) i, 63-78. Brendan Bradshaw has altered Sisson's view that the tract on followed the 85 pages commented on by Cranmer and Sandys: for Bradshaw, Book VI can be regarded as belonging logically "before" the version Cranmer and Sandys commented on, "a kind of prolegomenon to the body of the text composed by Hooker, concerning the spiritual jurisdiction of the Church in the internal forum (over sin and grace) with special polemical reference to Calvinist consistories." Brendan Bradshaw, review in Journal of Ecclesiastical History 34 (1983), 489. Houk also held that the present treatise preceded the text Cranmer and Sandys read. Houk, Book VIII, 72. Introduction -24- comprehensive spirit of the Elizabethan Church, whereas Book VII more nearly approximates the "high doctrines" of Sutcliffe, Saravia and Bilson.48 Book VIII, although clearly flawed, is not widely questioned. It is apparently authentic and appears to have been in draft as early as 1593. The failure of Hooker and his editors and promoters to agree on its text may have caused the unfortunate delay in its publication.49

48. V, lxxx, 13 refers to VII, 14 as if it were already written. (ii, 308). See Hill, "Problem of the 'Three Last Books'," 336, notes 41, 42. The doctrinal consistency of Book VII and the first five books is supported in Houk (pp. 102-104), in Munz (pp. 59-62), and in Novarr (pp. 215-217). Keble had believed that the bad state of the text is an argument for genuineness in this case. Editor's Preface (i, xiii). Novarr has rehearsed the story of Gauden's publication of Book VII; he suggests that Archbishop Sheldon handed over the manuscript of Book VII without recognizing it was not compatible with Restoration views. Novarr, Walton's Lives, 218-225. As the pagination shows, Book VII was inserted late in the printing. Stanwood has now established that Book VII as we have it is virtually the final version of the text. Stanwood, Books VI, VII, VIII, xliv-li. 49. At Preface viii, 2 (i, 177), Hooker wrote, "as in the last book of this treatise we have shewed at large." This must mean that Book VIII was at least sketched as early as 1593. Houk has shown that it is authentic: this view is supported by Hooker's own words, by historical references to Book VIII, by a comparison of ideas with the genuine Book IV, by a study of the form of the book, and by the collation of the extant manuscripts and publications. Houk, Book VIII, 144. Keble had offered moderate support for the genuineness of Book VIII, even though he thought it must have been mutilated after Hooker's death. Editor's Preface, 20 (i, xiii-Iii). , who attempted to "confute" Hooker's views (1673), believed that the objectionable views of Book VIII were also in Book I. Novarr, Walton's Lives, 212. P.G. Stanwood has concluded that Hooker failed to produce a final version, and that the Folger edition "approaches a state as near to Hooker's intentions as is possible to come." Stanwood, Books VI, VII, VIII, Ii-Ixxv. Introduction -25-

We have already referred to another significant problem of interpreting Hooker, but in this case, it is a problem that infects both those parts of the Lawes published under direct supervision of Hooker and those not. For it is clear that Hooker was advised by his two former pupils, George Cranmer and Edwin Sandys, and that their interest was in the immediate political and polemical relevance of the publication of the Lawes. Sisson showed how closely the publication of the first four books was related to events of ecclesiastical legislation in parliament. This led him to conclude:

Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity is probably the greatest book ever published, and published of necessity, on commission. 50 Sisson's view went against a received set of assumptions about Hooker's work, which had been admired by a remarkably diverse group of figures, and that over a long period of time.51 But a more devastating

50. Sisson, Judicious Marriage, xii. Sisson showed that the first four books were published in 1593, and that they were rushed because it was "essential for political reasons, that [they] should appear in time to support the moves which led to a Conventicle Act presented simultaneously in Parliament." (p. xiii) The publication also coincided with the execution of Penry, Barrow and Greenwood. (p. 12) 51. Walton stressed this point, listing Clement VIII, James VI and I, Charles I, Charles's children, and "Dr Earle," who translated it into Latin. Life of Hooker (i, 71-73). Keble followed suit, by pointing to the admiration and dependence expressed by "Covel, Edwin Sandys, Field, Raleigh, Laud and his generation, James II, as well as the "Rationalists" and "Liberals", and does not conceal his own admiration in the nineteenth century. John E. Booty has offered a very useful treatment of Hooker's effects and notice in the first half of the seventeenth century; his work shows that Hooker was read by many experts. John E. Booty, "Hooker and ," in Speed Hill, Introduction -26- principle of interpretation was later introduced into studies of Hooker. Hooker had long been considered as pointing forward to later developments in liberal political theory. Studies earlier in the twentieth century had established that, in political theory at least, Hooker did not look forward, but rather backward to the medieval period.

But various theories of inconsistency and incoherence in Hooker's views were brought forward. W.D.J. Cargill Thompson addressed these studies in a comprehensive and masterful essay published in 1972, "The Philosopher of the 'Politic Society'.1152 Cargill Thompson offered a survey of twentieth century work on Hooker's political thought, and showed that various theories of incoherence in Hooker were incorrect, at least in their political theory, in part because they failed to take adequate note of Hooker's purpose of propaganda. In this he suggested that Hooker needed to be treated, not as an early social contract thinker, but as "eclectic," making use of what was available and useful

Studies, 207-239, especially p. 235, note 14. This helps overcome the effect of the new commonplace that Perkins sold better than Hooker. The first edition of the Lawes did not sell well. But the first edition of Sermon II sold well and quickly. Speed Hill, Bibliography, 19, 26. These sermons may have had a naturally wider audience, that of the consumers of the more popular "domestic theology," rather than that of the learned and expert audience of the Lawes. But it is clear that Hooker remained a recognized and admired authority, even beyond the circles of those who had a political motive for supporting and encouraging him in the l 590's. 52. W.D.J. Cargill Thompson, "The Philosopher of the 'Politic Society': Richard Hooker as a Political Thinker," in Speed Hill, Studies, 3-76. Introduction -27- for his (and his sponsors') current political program. Although he did not go so far, many who have learned of Cargill Thompson's work have come to consider it as authority to consider Hooker as far less interesting than earlier generations had thought. Now there is a corrective concern, to emphasize the "originality" of Hooker's thought.53 And previous studies that have tried to describe the evolution of the composition of the Lawes have taken on a new significance. Walton had suggested that the Lawes arose out of the controversies at the Temple, beginning in 1585.54 Sisson altered the assumptions about this, and suggested that the "government" had identified Hooker as a possible propagandist soon after the Paul's Cross Sermon in 1581.55 It seemed to Sisson that Hooker had been appointed to

53. See, for example, the title of Leslie Croxford, "The Originality of Hooker's Work," Proceedings of the Philosophical and Historical Society xv (1973), 15-57, which seems to be related to an "oral tradition" of Cargill Thompson's views. For a judicious account, "post" Cargill Thompson, of Hooker's objectives, see Rudoph Almasy, "Hooker's Address to the Presbyterians," Anglican Theological Review (I 979), 462-464. Almasy writes: "If we expect to come to grips with Hooker's original conception, we need to demonstrate that he did not avoid the polemic but used it as part of his deliberate study." (p. 463) Almasy has argued that, in theory and in practice, Hooker addressed his arguments to the opponents, not to the reader supposed to be unsympathetic to them, as his polemical predecessors had done. See also Loyer's treatment of Hooker, as conservative and yet appealing to a wide variety of movements later: Hooker's humanism went along with his catholicism. Loyer, L'Anglicanisme de Richard Hooker ii, 684-692.

54. Walton, Life of Hooker (i, 66). Houk followed him in this view. Houk, Book VIII, 50.

55. Sisson, Judicious Marriage, xiii, 5. Introduction -28- the Temple precisely with something like the Lawes in view, and the

Lawes were, in effect, commissioned by Whitgift. More recent studies have indicated that Sisson cannot have been right in this. In particular, W. Speed Hill has shown that there is reason to return to the view that the Lawes arose out of the controversy with Travers at the

Temple, as a sort of extension of the Answer to Travers.56 Speed Hill came to this view by an analysis of Hooker's Answer and of the notes of Cranmer and Sandys on Book VI. This provided for him evidence of the nature of the collaboration of Hooker and his more political editors.57 On the basis of this evidence, Speed Hill argued that there was a valid and important inner logic to the Lawes, a logic by which the resolution of the problem of conscience is at the base of the question of conformity. This inner problem was Hooker's contribution to the Lawes; it was the work of his collaborators to deal with more trivial matters.

It is the purpose of this discourse to attempt to describe Hooker's views on the Christian doctrine of grace. This study will need to refer to Hooker's works other than the Lawes, but will necessarily have to consider what the Lawes have to offer as indicating Hooker's sources and

56. W. Speed Hill, "The Evolution of Hooker's Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, in Speed Hill, Studies, 117-158. 57. See also Speed Hill's unpublished Ph.D. thesis: William Speed Hill, The Doctrinal background of Richard Hooker's Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, , 1964, especially chapters 1 and 2, on "Background" and "The Collaboration," pp. 1-125. Introduction -29- his views of grace. If the conclusion of this study is that Hooker had a consistent and credible account of the theology of grace, the central theological problem of the sixteenth century ecclesiastical controversies, that in itself will be some evidence against Cargill Thompson's conclusions about the "eclectic" and opportunistic Hooker. II Justification, Sanctification, Glorification

In one sentence, in a work that represents material composed in the earliest part of his career, 1 Richard Hooker at once identified himself with the Lutheran revolution on the meaning of "justification," absorbed the Calvinist revolution on the sanctification that always accompanies it, and restored the Augustinian account of the continuity between this act and this process and the final state of blessedness of the blessed:

There is a glorifying righteousness of men in the world to come: and there is a justifying and a sanctifying righteousness here. The righteousness, wherewith we shall be clothed in the world to come, is both perfect and inherent. That whereby here we are justified is perfect, but not inheren . That whereby we are sanctified, inherent, but not perfect. 2

l. Justification

On the topic that, more than any other, was thought, in the sixteenth century, to distinguish the Reformation from what had gone before, and from the that defined itself as not Protestant,

Hooker consistently adopted a position that accommodated Luther's treatment and its sequel. For Hooker, as for his Protestant predecessors, justification is primarily declarative, an entirely

1. The sermons on Habbakuk (Sermons I-III), although not published until 1612 and 1836, are clearly the published versions of the sermons preached in March, 1585 (or 1586) in the Temple, that led to the public dispute with Walter Travers. But Hooker claimed to have circulated the off ending sermon "long before this late controversy rose." Answer to Travers, 10 (iii, 577).

2. "A Learned Discourse of Justification, Works, and How the Foundation of Faith is Overthrown" (Sermon II), 3 (iii, 485f).

-30- Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -31- gratuitous act of God, the condition of which is faith and which involves a righteousness imputed to and not imparted in the justified person. This position is clear in the Sermons on Jude, possibly the earliest composed of the surviving works:

It is God that hath given us eternal life, but no otherwise than thus, If we believe in the name of the Son of God; for he that hath not the Son of God, hath not life.

Imputation of righteousness hath covered the sins of every soul which believeth; God by pardoning our sin hath taken it away: so that now, although our transgressions be multiplied above the hairs of our head, yet being justified, we are as free and as clear as if there were not one spot or stain of uncleanness in us. For it is God that justifieth; "and who shall lay any thing to the charge of God's c\osen?" saith the Apostle in the eighth chapter to the Romans.

3. Sermon VI, 17, 25 (iii, 690, 693f). It was apparently Keble who first questioned the authenticity of the Sermons on Jude on the basis of stylistic differences with the Lawes and the appeal made to men's consciences in Sermon V, 13 (iii, 672f). Keble pointed out, quite correctly, that it is hard to square this "infallible internal evidence" with the well known views about the relative certainties of sense and conviction in Sermon I and with the "jealousy on the role of men's private spirits" in Lawes V, 9. He concluded that the sermon was either spurious or early. Editor's Preface, 14 (i, lvf). Paget went further to argue that, since an expression in Sermon V, 15 (iii, 675) seems to fix the date of the Sermon either in 1582 or in 1594, but the sermon mentions a book published in 1583 (iii, 677, n. 4), it cannot be early and therefore "someone else than Hooker wrote it." Paget, Introduction, 265. Sisson has dealt with Keble's reservation about style. He notes that Hooker's letters and sermons adopt styles different from the Lawes. Sisson restored confidence in many of the posthumous publications, not least these Sermons on Jude. For they are explicitly mentioned by Nicholas Eveleigh in the Court of Chancery as being taken in the cloak­ bag from Bishopsbourne, and they remained in his possession from 1600 to January, 1614, when George Sellars of Corpus Christi College, printer to the , requested them for publication. Sisson, Judicious Marriage, 103, 109ff, 140. Paget's reservations might be qualified by noting that the internal reference would point to an Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -32-

This view of justification was built into the first book of the

Lawes, chapter 11. There Hooker argued that the natural way to the

"reward" of happiness is by works. This way was open to Adam, but

because of Adam's sin, it is not open to us. The light of Nature,

however, shows no other way to perfect happiness. God has, accordingly,

revealed "the secret way of salvation," a supernatural way, "the law for

them to live in that shall be saved." This supernatural way, prepared

before all worlds, revealing God's compassion and , is faith,

which is also the ground of hope and charity. This reference to the

doctrine of justification by faith apart from works, is the basis Hooker

gives for his important category of divine laws, since laws concerning

this "supernatural way" must be supernatural, that is, from revelation,

both in substance and in the mode of communication. 4 We will have to

return later to look at the actual state of the human race under the

approximate date of 1582, not a precise date, and by suggesting that Hooker may have added the material from the 1583 publication after the sermon was first delivered, since he apparently kept the sermon until his death, and was used to editing, re-using and circulating his significant sermons in manuscript. The question of the "infallible internal evidence" will have to wait for the discussion of the whole question of assurance, in chapter 4. It should be noted that Augustine and Thomas, and many contemporary catholic scholars, continued to teach clearly the entirely unmeritted justification by faith, and gave an account close to Hooker's. Hooker indeed recognized the strength of Thomas' account by distinguishing his views on grace and merit from the "schoolmen" who followed him (V, App. I, IO and note, 17 (ii, 545 and note, 554)); but he clearly believed that current teaching contained a tendency to "deny the foundation" (Sermon II, 5 (iii, 486-490)). See the section "Attitude to the Papists" below in this chapter. In this way, it is not misleading to see Hooker as a self-defined "Protestant," although he appears not to find the word itself useful.

4. I, xi, 5,6 (i, 258-262). Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -33- aspect of sin when we consider Hooker's views on human depravity, and to look at the relationship displayed here between reason and revelation, when we consider his model of the relation of nature and grace. But for the moment, let it be noted simply that Hooker's Protestant convictions on justification are built into the very fabric of the Lawes.

Hooker's last composition shows the same conviction. The Dublin

Fragments, which include a draft for his response to the Christian

Letter, and which therefore must be dated, in their final form, within the last two years of Hooker's life, return to an explicit statement of the classical Protestant view of justification by faith without works:

Remission of sins is grace, because it is God's own free gift; faith, which qualifieth our minds to receive it is also grace, because it is an ef feet of his gracious Spirit in us; we are therefo e justified by faith without works, by grace without merit. 5

If the Sermons on Jude are indeed his, Hooker was also apparently prepared to rehearse one of the most dramatic comparisons used by his

English predecessors: justification is as great a miracle as the miracle of creation out of nothing: "To make a wicked and a sinful man

5. V, App. I, 16 (ii, 553). But this statement would be totally compatible with Thomas' account too. Compare Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 113, a. 4 (i, 1147). Thomas also treats justification as "remission of guilt," but this is treated as a "movement towards justice," that is, as a "right order in men's acts." Hooker would have called such the "beginning of sanctification," not "justification." Because it involves a standard and consistent translation of Thomas' vocabulary, the older Dominican translation will be used here, in the edition published by Benziger: Summa Theologica, 3 vols. (New York, 1947). But citations will be by part, question and article from the Summa Theologiae, to make references easier, as well as by volume and page number from this New York edition of the older Dominican translation. Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -34- most holy through his believing, is more than to create a world of nothing. 116

This vivid comparison could be traced back through the English

Reformation to the Elizabethan homily for Rogation Week, probably written by Archbishop Parker himself:

To justify a sinner, to new create him from a wicked person to a righteous man, is a greater act ... than to .piake such a new and earth as is already made.

And before Parker, this image had been used by John Bradford and was to be used again by William Fulke in 1583. In fact Luther had already used it. 8 But, as Bradford and Parker noted, the image went back to Augustine. In fact, it had also been quoted by St Thomas. 9

Furthermore, this justification was based on a unique foundation.

To "deny the foundation" was to reject salvation. In his controversial sermon at the Temple, his thesis that God was merciful to save thousands of our fathers living in popish superstitions, inasmuch as they sinned ignorantly, lO was def ended precisely because such papists had not denied

6. Sermon VI, 28 (iii, 694).

7. Certain Sermons (London, 1908), 507.

8. "Justification is a much more excellent work that the whole of our creation," John Bradford, Writings (Cambridge, 1848) i, 217. William Fulke, Defence (Cambridge, 1843), 386f. For Luther's use, see Benjamin Drewery, in Hubert Cunliffe-Jones, History of Christian Doctrine (Philadelphia, 1980), 323.

9. Augustine, Sermon clxix on Philippians 3. Thomas quotes Augustine ad Jn 14.12. Summa Theologiae 1-11, q. 113, a 9 (ii, 1152).

10. Sermon II, 9, 36 (iii, 495, 543). Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -35-

"the foundation." The general ground, that is, the

Scripture, is embraced by Roman Catholics, though not rightly interpreted by them. The principal thing believed, however, that which is contained in these Scriptures, is Christ, who is the true foundation of faith. If Roman Catholics deny that Christ is the ground of salvation, they cannot be saved, for they have truly denied the foundation:

If the name Foundation do note the principal thing which is believed, then is that the foundation of our faith which St. Paul hath unto Timothy: "God manifested in the flesh, justified in the Spirit," &c. that of Nathaniel, "Thou art the Son of the living God: thou art the king of Israel:" that of the inhabitants of Samaria, "This is Christ the Saviour of the world:" he that directly denieth this, doth utterly raze the very foundation of our faith. 11

Hooker here declares a clear adherence to some form of the

Reformation principles of justification by faith without works, of the primacy of the Scriptures, and of faith in Christ alone, disclosed by the Scriptures.

But what Hooker meant by faith was really quite different from the fiducia that had been insisted on by the English Lutherans. In fact, it must have looked very much like the "dead faith" or assensus Cranmer had

11. Sermon II, 15, 16 (iii, 501). Note that the (obvious) metaphor of "foundation" was used by Augustine, of adherence to Christ: "those who hold Christ as their foundation" in commenting on the parable of the houses and I Corinthians 3.12, On the Proceedings of Pelagius 9 (iv), NPNF 1st ser., v, 186f. Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -36- rejected, from the time of the homily on faith on. 12 Hooker is quite clear that faith is the gift of God: "the true reason wherefore Christ doth believers is because their belief is the gift of God. 1113 And he insists that, just as there are interrogatories at involving both faith and will, the faith involved in justification inevitably involves the will:

Although faith be an intellectual habit of the mind, and have her seat in the understanding, yet an evil moral disposition obstinately wedded to the love of darkness dampeth the very light of heavenly illumination, and permitteth not the mind to see what doth shine before it. . . . Their assent to his saving truth is many times withheld from it, not that the truth is too weak to persuade, but because the stream of corrupt affection carrieth them a clean contrary way. That the mind therefore may abide in the light of faith, there must abide in the will as constant a resolution to have no f eJlowship at all with the vanities and works of darkness. 1

12. William Tyndale, "Prologue upon the Epistle to the Romans," in Doctrinal Treatises and Introduction to Different Points of the Holy Scriptures (Cambridge, 1848), 10. Hugh Latimer, "Sermon of the Plough," in Sermons (Cambridge, 1844), 61. , "Homily of Faith," in Miscellaneous Writings and Letters (Cambridge, 1846), 135. For early Calvinists, on the other hand, faith is a "persuasion, assurance, or apprehension." R.T. Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinists to 1649 (Oxford, 1979), 3. The English "experimental predestinarians," like Perkins, emphasized faith as an act of the will not simply "a passive persuasion of the mind." Calvin and English Calvinists, 62. had also treated faith as assurance rather than fiducia. D.F. Wright (ed.), The Common Places of Martin Bucer (Appleford, I 972), 65, n. 109, 171-200, esp. p. 178. Wright notes the likely dependence of Bucer upon Thomas, especially on Summa Theologiae II-II, qq. 1-7 (p. 197, n. 30). Hooker, without admitting any borrowing from Thomas, Bucer or Calvin, clearly holds a similar view.

13. V, lxiii, I (ii, 305).

14. V, Ixiii, 2 (ii,306). Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -37-

He had already made clear, however, that the faith that is involved in justification is a combination of apprehension and assent to what is apprehended. The word of God is given for salvation; it must therefore be apprehended and assented to:

The end of the word of God is to save, and therefore we term it the word of life. . . . To this end the word of God no otherwise serveth than only in the nature of a doctrinal instrument. It saveth because it maketh "wise to salvation." . . . And being itself the instrument which God hath purposely framed, thereby to work the knowledge of salvation in the hearts of men, what cause is there wherefore it should not of itself be acknowledged a most apt and a likely mean to leave an Apprehension of things divine in our understanding, and in the mind an Assent thereunto? 15

Hooker carefully distinguishes the faith that justifies from the faith devils have, but despite the differences, both involve apprehension and persuasion:

Devils know the same things which we believe, and the minds of the most ungodly may be fully persuaded of the truth; which knowledge in the one and persuasion in the other, is sometimes termed faith, but equivocally, being indeed no such faith as that whereby a Christian man is justified. 16

There are four differences between the two states: the presence or absence of "the spirit of ," which "worketh faith" in the elect, but not in "the ungodly;" the apprehension of truth as good or not; whether the increase of faith brings joy or fear; and a "different

15. V, xxi, 3 (ii, 85).

16. Sermon II, 26 (iii, 515). The distinction between living (formata) and lifeless (informis) faith was a scholastic commonplace. See, for example, Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 4, a. 4 (ii, 1193). Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -38- disposition" of the heart. 17

Later, Hooker equates "apprehension" with proper conceptualization, to conceiving "as behoveth," and "assent" to acknowledging God's authority, as the giver of the "words" of Scripture or sermons that are apprehended, and insists that people arrive at such belief in a variety of ways, through a variety of teachers. Thus, though God gives the belief, the means and instruments God uses must be various. 18

2. Sanctification

But Hooker also went beyond the early English Lutherans in

17. The second distinction, "the things which we believe, are by us apprehended, not only as true, but also as good, and that to us: as good, they are not by them [the ungodly] apprehended; as true, they are," is very important for Hooker. In Sermon I, this was made the defining point of the "certainty of adherence," the basis of the perseverance of the elect in faith: "the faith of the Christian doth apprehend the whole of the law, the promises of God, not only as true, but also as good; and therefore even when the evidence which he hath of the truth is so small that it grieveth him to feel his weakness in assenting thereto, yet is there in him such a sure adherence unto that which he doth but faintly and fearfully believe, that his spirit having once tasted the heavenly sweetness thereof, all the world is not able quite and clear to remove him from it; but he striveth with himself to hope against all reason of believing." Sermon I (iii, 471) For Hooker, lively faith is the recognition of God as the object of natural desire. See Hooker's treatment of the relation between nature and grace in chapter III, and his treatment of perseverance in chapter IV. The fourth distinction, "of a different disposition" of the heart, may echo Thomas' distinction, which is "in respect of something pertaining to the will," i.e., charity, and not in respect of something pertaining to the intellect. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 4, a. 4 (ii, 1193).

18. V, xxii, 8 (ii,94f). Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -39- identifying a second sense of justification, the "sanctification" of

Bucer and of the circle of his students at Pembroke Hall, and of Calvin and his disciples in England. For God simultaneously justifies the sinner with the imputed merits of Christ and begins the process of sanctification, which is a growth in inherent righteousness, where

Christ is imparted to the justified person: as, for example, by the :

Because the work of [Christ's] Spirit to those effects [the grace of sanctification and life] is in us prevented by sin and death possessing us before, it is of necessity that as well our present sanctification unto newness of life, as the future restoration of our bodies should presuppose a participation of the grace, efficacy, merit or virtue of his body and blood, without which foundation first laid there is no place for those other operations of the Spirit of Christ to ensue. So that Christ imparteth plainly himself by degrees. . . . The participation of Christ importeth, besides the presence of Christ's Person, and besides the mystical copulation thereof with the parts and members of his whole Church, a true actual influence of grace whereby the life which we live according to godliness is his, and from him we receive ~hose perfections wherein our eternal happiness consisteth. 1

In fact, for Hooker, justification by the imputation of Christ's merits is, in some sense, not sufficient for salvation; it is certainly not the whole story. Sanctification and growth are necessary too, though impossible without justification:

19. V, lvi, 10 (ii, 252f). In the next paragraph, Hooker actually suggests a "universal participation" by imputation, since participation in Christ (through the incarnation) is available to all equally, even though the participation by habitual and real infusion is available to each by degrees. (ii, 254). Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -40-

Now concerning the righteousness of sanctification, we deny it not to be inherent; we grant, that unless we work, we have it not; only we distinguish it as a thing in nature different from the righteousness of justification: we are righteous the one way, by the faith of Abraham; the other v.:ay, exce~b we do the works of Abraham, we are not righteous.

The process of sanctification by impartation of habitual grace to produce a growth in inherent righteousness continues into the glorification of the world to come, when, as the quotation from Sermon

II above indicates, it will be perfect. In fact, this perfect and inherent righteousness to come is the beginning of the definition of both justification and glorification, which we experience now:

We participate in Christ partly by imputation, as when those things which he did and suffered for us are imputed to us for righteousness; partly by habitual and real infusion, as when grace is inwardly bestowed while we are on earth, and afterwards more ;ylly both our souls and bodies made like unto his in glory.

This participation by imputation is universal and equal in all who are justified; but participation by impartation, except for the "seed of

God," which is equal in all who have begun to be sanctified, is by degrees, so that some, making faster and better progress, and having a greater capacity, have more than others. 22 Furthermore, the imputation

20. Sermon II, 7 (iii, 491). Note a similar treatment in Calvin, although the word "sanctification" is not used. Institutes III, 17, 11 & 12 (i, 814-816).

21. V, lvi, 11 (ii, 254).

22. V, lvi, 12 (ii, 254f). Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -41- of Christ in justification, and the beginning of the impartation of

Christ in sanctification, are both involved in baptism, and further imparted in the eucharist:

Baptism is a which God hath instituted in his Church, to the end that they which receive the same might thereby be incorporated into Christ, and so through his most precious merit obtain as well that saving grace of imputation, which taketh away all former guiltiness, as also that infused divine virtue of the Holy Ghost, which giveth to the powers of the sofj their first disposition towards future newness of life.

In the Dublin Fragments, Hooker comes to call sanctification

"second justification," even though he had earlier treated the phrase as a Roman Catholic term: 24

Now between the grace of this first justification [by baptism in infants, by faith and penitency before baptism in converts, that is justification as "remission of sins" and of Christ] and the glory of the world to come, whereof we are not capable, unless the rest of our

23. V, lx, 2 (ii, 265f). We will have to return to look further at the relationship between the impartation of grace and the sacraments in chapter 5, and, when we consider election in chapter 4, to consider what Hooker meant by "the seed of God."

24. "The augmentation [of grace in the soul becoming more and more justified] whereof is merited by good works, as good works are made meritorious by it. Wherefore, the first receipt of grace is in their divinity the first justification; the increase thereof, the second justification." Sermon II, 5 (iii, 488). "He which giveth unto any good work of ours the force of satisfying the wrath of God for sin, the power of meriting either earthly or heavenly rewards; he which holdeth works going before our vocation in congruity to merit our vocation; works following our first, to merit our second justification, and by condignity our last reward in the kingdom of heaven, pulleth up the doctrine of faith by the roots; for out of every of these the plain direct denial thereof may be necessarily concluded." Sermon II, 32 (iii, 532). Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -42-

lives be qualified with the righteousness of a second justification consisting in good works, therefore as St. Paul doth dispute for faith without works to the first, so St. James to the second justification is urgent for works with faith. To be justified so far as remission of sins, it sufficeth if we believe what another hath wrought for us: but whosoever will see God face to face, let him shew his faith by his works, demonstrate his first justification by a second as Abraham did: for in this verse Abraham was justifi~1 (that is to say, his life was sanctified) by works.

This acceptance of the vocabulary of Tridentine Roman Catholic

theology of grace does not necessarily mean that Hooker has changed his

ground on the question of our meriting the grace of sanctification by

congruency, which he had previously rejected. For it is clear that,

although the vocabulary may appear to be Roman Catholic, Hooker's

thought here is inspired by the thought of , and medieval

theology before him. For Hooker followed Calvin and his notion of

"double justification," whereby in justification not only the person but also the person's works are justified, and he followed Thomas, who stood behind Calvin in this thought, in holding that justification and the beginning of sanctification are actually simultaneous. 26 Hooker refers

25. V, App. I, 16 (ii, 553).

26. Calvin, in the third sermon of Abraham's justification, speaks of a "double justification" (though apparently never of a first and second justification). Sermons on various passages of Genesis III, CR XXIII, 718-719, cited by Ford Battles in Institutes, i, 816. Calvin's reference to Abraham might explain Hooker's rather obscure allusion here to Abraham's "justification by works." Sermon II, 7 (iii, 491), quoted in a footnote above, refers to Abraham in a similar vein. See, for comparison, Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 113, a. 8, respondeo (i, 1151). Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -43- directly to Thomas in the Dublin Fragments, indicates his partial agreement, and rejects the Thomistic theology of justification in one respect. Hooker accepts a three-fold significance of grace: grace is first the undeserved love and favour of God himself towards us, second,

God's offered means of outward instruction, and third, the created grace that worketh inwardly. He rejects what he takes to be Thomas' scholastic disciples' view that God's grace involves a "formal habit or inherent quality, which maketh the person of man acceptable, perf ecteth the substance of his mind, and causeth the virtuous actions thereof to be meritorious. 1127 His point is clearly to agree that faith as a habitual grace is given by God simultaneous with the gift of his favour, 28 but to reject any merit in the works of the person so

27. V, App. I, 10 and note, 17 (ii, 545 & note, 554). Summa Theologiae I-II. q 109, a. 2. Note Hooker's use of the distinction inward/outward at V, App. I, 2 (ii, 540). Whatever his disciples in the sixteenth century may have held, Thomas himself, it should be noted, included a long list of negations in his article on "Merit", Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 114: no one without grace can inherit eternal life (a. 2); no one can merit for himself the first grace (a. 5); no one but Christ can merit condignly for another the first grace (a. 6); no one can merit for himself restoration after a fall (a. 7); and no one can merit perseverance (a. 9). (i, 1153-1161) In the passage, Hooker carefully attached the "Pelagian views" to "the schoolmen which follow Thomas," not to Thomas himself.

28. That sanctification involves an internal habitual quality of the soul, Hooker had made clear in Lawes V, as the passages quoted above in this section indicate. Martin Schmidt, "Die Rechtf ertigungslehre bei Richard Hooker," in Geist and Geschichte der Reformation (Berlin, 1966), implies a criticism of Hooker's plan of attack in Sermon II: having correctly identified the way in which Roman Catholic and reformed doctrines of justification agree in attributing the justification of sinners to God alone and to the merits of Christ, Hooker refrained from Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -44-

justified in that gift of faith itself. As we shall see, the "merit" of

going on to identify "the distinguishing point that [for Catholics] the grace of God [is] an infused Substance [die Gnade Gottes als einflt'.>ssbare Substanz] that inheres in the human being," (p. 387) "grace as a substantial quality of the soul" (p. 388). Instead, according to Schmidt, Hooker went on to follow a "biblical way" -- the "apostolical harmony" of Paul and James and J John, thus anticipating in the next century. While it is true that Hooker implies some suspicion of this view (Sermon II, 5 (iii, 486-490)), the point behind Hooker's criticism of the Roman Catholic position is also clear: the error is not the affirmation of the inherent quality, but the treating of any inherent quality as the ground of justification (Sermon II, 6 (iii, 490)): the righteousness of justification is per feet, and therefore is different from the inherent righteousness of sanctification. Strictly speaking, for Thomas, for instance, grace is not an "inherent substance or substantial quality," but an infused habitus. Hooker seems to recognize this; see below. Schmidt incidentally finds Hooker the source for later Anglican "moralism," and even . (pp. 382ff, 39lff) This thesis is manifestly unproven: continental theologians found the , from Tyndale on, unduly moralistic; and this flavour was especially pronounced in the Carolines of the seventeenth century; but Hooker appears to contribute little to this flavour of English Christianity. For Hooker, the "holiness" that matters is that perfect life of glorification to come, of which sanctification is only a stage. In any case, Hooker derives his terms "Justification" and "Sanctification" directly from his English predecessors, and only indirectly from the New Testament, although of course he would insist that he was reflecting the New Testament account of grace. Schmidt also attributes too much to Hooker's text from Habbakuk (pp. 384, 388). The three sermons are, loosely, sermons by division on the text, but there are clearly organized around the questions of assurance and justification, not around the text. Schmidt does not seem to know about the Dublin Fragments, where Hooker again affirms that, in some ways, grace is an internal and inherent quality in the subject of it. He also fails to recognize by just how much the Reformation debates about grace are woven into the Lawes, which he sees as a re-affirmation of classical patristic theology that is therefore in tension with the Reformation doctrine of justification. (pp. 381-383) For Hooker, patristic theology and the Reformation cannot be in conflict: the Reformation is simply a refreshing of the sense of patristic theology, and a restoration of the life of the earlier church. Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -45- the works that follow is a different matter.

In this regard, Hooker was even prepared to declare that, in some sense, justification "follows" sanctification both in order of sense and in order of time:

By grace we always understand, as the word of God teacheth, first, his favour and undeserved mercy towards us: secondly, the bestowing of his which inwardly worketh: thirdly, the effects of that Spirit whatsoever, but especially saving virtues, such as are faith, charity, and hope; lastly, the free and full remission of all our sins. This is the grace which Sacraments yield, and whereby we are all justified. To be justified, is to be made righteous. Because therefore, righteousness doth imply first remission of sins; and secondly a sanctified life, the name is sometimes applied seve ~lly to the former, sometimes jointly it comprehendeth both. 2

The Spirit, the virtues of the Spirit, the habitual justice, which is ingrafted, the external justice of Christ which is imputed, these we receive all at one and the same time; whensoever we have any of these, we have all; they go together. Yet sith no man is justified except he believe, and no man believeth except he have faith, and no man hath faith, unless he have received the Spirit of Adoption, forasmuch as these do necessarily inf er justification, but justification doth of necessity presuppose them; we must needs hold that imputed righteousness, in dignity being the chief est [that is, since it is perfect], is notwithstanding in order the last of all these. . . . Faith is a part of sanctification, and yet unto justification necessary. 30

The failure to note to what extent Hooker absorbed the Calvinist revolution on sanctification in English divinity makes a mockery of those who attempt to identify a consistent Protestant thread through the

29. V, App. 1, 16 (ii, 552)

30. Sermon II, 21 (iii, 507f). This means that the "formal cause" of justification is, in fact, the inherent habitual righteousness of sanctification, in this respect, even though there is no inherent actual righteousness to merit salvation. Lee W. Gibbs, "Richard Hooker's Doctrine of Justification," Harvard Theological Review 74 (1981), 219f. Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -46- account of justification in the English sixteenth century. In his account of sanctification, Hooker was not unique. Indeed, he shared a view of justification with the "practical divinity" of the Calvinists who went far further than he did on the points of with respect to predestination. For, with William Perkins and the practical divines, he acknowledged both the righteousness of justification not inherent but imputed and the righteousness of sanctification, not only imputed but actual though imperfect. 31 But these "practical divines" and Hooker had already taken a significant step beyond Cranmer and beyond the English

Lutherans of the first half of the century, who could make no sense of a real renovation in the justified human being, and who consistently resisted the antinomian tendencies of their own account only by reference to the works of charity and justice done by the justified sinner to show his gratitude to God and to edify his f ellows. 32

31. Dewey D. Wallace, Puritans and Predestination: Grace in English Protestant Theology 1525-1695 (Chapel Hill, 1982), 50f. Wallace fails to notice, however, the extent to which Hooker's account of the continuity between sanctification and glorification, and the sense in which final salvation is a reward takes him beyond the league of the Calvinists.

32. See for instance Philip Edgcumbe Hughes, Faith and Works: Cranmer and Hooker (Wilton, , 1982). On page 5, Hughes quotes the passage from Hooker with which this chapter begins on the same page with a quotation of Cranmer's Homily on Salvation, without seeming to notice the revolution in emphasis that has taken place in the half century in between. Cranmer could have made no sense of any righteousness, except in Christ, that was inherent or perfect. Between Cranmer and Hooker, had come Bucer and Calvin. In Hooker, there was an Augustinian revival under way. Hughes' version of the question on which Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -47-

3. Glorijication

Several of the texts already quoted in relation to justification and sanctification have anticipated the discussion of the third moment in the account Hooker gives of human justification, for the justification and sanctification of this life are connected by a continuum with the glory of the world to come:

he believes the English Reformers from Cranmer to Hooker were united is the (minimal) one of the merit of good works, that is the Pelagian question. On this question Cranmer and Hooker do, of course, agree. But on the question of whether sanctification has anything to do with salvation, Cranmer and Hooker would be a generation apart. On the question of glory as any sort of "reward" for good works, they would be worlds apart. Hughes' treatment of Hooker is seriously vitiated by his failure to recognize that Hooker did come to accept the vocabulary of second justification, and that Hooker went far beyond his early protector Jewel in his account of glorification and of reward. Hooker is, as Hughes points out, in total agreement with his predecessors on the gratuity of grace and in his view that (first) justification is not any inherent quality. In his emphasis on the logical and real continuity of this justification and sanctification and glorification, he goes beyond all of them. Equally groundless is Rees's suggestion that the account of the actus justijicationis in Sermon II, 21 (iii, 508) is "strongly tinged with ," although it is removed from Luther in relation of faith and works. Rees has a totally mistaken account of the movement of theology in the sixteenth century in England, and does not see Hooker's Calvinism. Rees is correct, as we shall see, in noting that Hooker, like Trent, holds that works play a part in final justification, but, on the question of the congruency of grace, Hooker remained a strict Protestant anti-Pelagian. Hooker, alone of the English figures of the sixteenth century, appears to accept the vocabulary of first and second justification, but as we have seen, that use occurs only in the Dublin Fragments, and he there clearly distinguishes his view from what he takes to be the Roman Catholic one. A.H. Rees, The Doctrine of Justification in the Anglican Reformers (London, 1939), 16, 30. Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -48-

By steps and degrees they receive the complete measure of all such , as doth sanctify and save throughout, till the day of their final exaltation to a state of fellowship in glory, with him who~C§partakers they are now in those things that tend to glory.

Thus the work of grace continues in the person justified and on the way to glory, so that, finally, that person may achieve the perfection of the angels, who constantly adore, love and imitate God, their love being, as the human beings' will be, such that they can no longer decline from the path towards God, but "being rapt with the love of his beauty, they cleave inseparably for ever unto him." Such was the meaning of Jesus' prayer that God's will be done in earth as in heaven:

"our Saviour himself being to set down the perfect idea of that which we are to pray and wish for on earth, did not teach to pray or wish for more than only that here it might be with us, as with them it is in heaven. 1134

This bold affirmation accompanied a revival in Hooker of the spirituality of deification or , a pattern well established in the Patristic period, both among the Greek authors and in

Augustine, 35 but a pattern remote from most of the spirituality of the

33. V, lvi, 13 (ii, 255).

34. I, iv, i (i, 212f). This theme will be prominent again when we come to consider the relation between nature and grace and glory in chapter 3, and when the vexed question of indef ectibility is to be examined in chapter 4.

35. G.W.H. Lampe refers to sources in the philosophy of Plato and Plotinos, and examples of the use of the idea in , , Cyril Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -49-

Reformation, which emphasized human solidarity with Adam in sin and the need for healing grace, although deification had, in fact, been suggested in certain passages of Calvin. 36 Hooker is never in doubt about the grievous consequences of our solidarity with Adam. As will be clear when we come to consider the human need for grace and the relationship between "depravity" and our predestination, we "participate

Adam" in that we are causally connected with him in a sinful human nature: "Adam is in us as an original cause of our nature, and of that corruption of nature which causeth death. 1137

of Alexandria, Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysios and Maximus among the Greek Fathers, and in , and Augustine among the Latins. Cunliffe-Jones, History of Christian Doctrine, 149ff. Although this idea has occasionally been considered as showing the inherent of Greek Christian spirituality, it is obviously the very opposite: the emphasis in the Greek fathers on divinization filled a role very much like that of Augustine's insistence on the need for grace preventing, following and perfecting human agency. For Gregory of Nyssa, for example, divinization was a doctrine that showed precisely his anti-pelagian bent: salvation in divinization is so far beyond the power of the human creature, that only God's aid could make it conceivable, let alone possible. For Augustine, see Henri Rondet, The Grace of Christ (Westminster, 1967), 91-95. G.W. Morrel treats deification in Anglicanism as simply the "Greek patristic influence in so much Anglican thinking," not recognizing it in Augustine and Thomas as well. G.W. Morrel, The of Richard Hooker (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pacific School of Theology, 1967), 60.

36. Institutes III, 2, 24 (i, 569-571 ). Francois Wendel, Calvin (London, 1963), 236f.

37. V, lxi, 7 (ii, 250). Hooker could have spoken of a sort of "divinization though creation" since he affirms that all creatures participate the Trinity as creatures, V, lvi, 5 (ii, 247), echoing a pattern of thought from Thomas and Augustine. He refrains, however, Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -50-

But we also, especially through the sacraments, "participate

Christ's humanity," and the creaturely nature, without losing its creatureliness or changing its nature, has been divinized in the incarnation:

By virtue of this grace, man is really made God, a creature is exalted above the di Rity of all creatures, and hath all creatures else under it. 3

In fact, it might be said without exaggeration that the whole account Hooker gives of the gracious work of God in human salvation through human participation in Christ is a gloss on / Peter 1.4:

Life as all other gifts and benefits groweth originally from the Father, and cometh not to us but by the Son, nor by the Son to any of us in particular but by the Spirit. For this cause the Apostle wisheth to the church of Corinth, "The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the fellowship of the Holy Ghost." [/I Corinthians 13.13] Which three St. Peter ~'9mprehendeth in one, "The participation of divine Nature."

Also related to the account of glorification is a relationship from using these terms, since our actual condition is one of corruption in our solidarity with Adam, and, as will appear when we come to discuss the relation of nature and grace in chapter 3, the creature desires naturally the bliss of glory, but cannot achieve it without further aid from God. Thus such a "natural divinization" would be by desire only, not by effect. It is clear that human participation through election to life in Christ, both through Christ's elevating incarnation and his saving death, offers to human creatures participation in the whole Christ, including his divinized humanity, and a growth in that participation to the point of divinization or glory of the redeemed human being.

38. V, liv, 3 (ii, 233).

39. V, lvi, 7 (ii, 249). Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -51- between justification and "reward" that distances Hooker further from the sensitivities of the earlier Reformation. It is clear that Hooker remains, to the very end of his life, on the Protestant side because of his insistence on "imputation" and because of his acute sensitivities about any merit in human action. This, for all that justification and the beginning of sanctification are without regard to anything in the human being other that the gift of faith, does not lead him to deny that glorification is in the form of a reward:

He bestoweth now [after sin] eternal life as his own free and undeserved gift; together also with that general inheritance and lot of eternal life, great varieties of rewards proportioned to the very degrees of those labOJtfs, which to perform he himself by his grace enableth.

To angels and men there was allotted a threefold perfection, a perfection of the end whereunto they might come, eternal life; a perfection of duty, whereby they should come, which duty was obedience; and a perfection of state or quality for performance of that duty. The first was ordained, the second required, and the third given. For presupposing that the will of God did determine to bestow eternal life in the nature of a reward and that rewards grow from voluntary duties, and voluntary duties from free agents; it followeth, that whose end was eternal life, thffr state must needs imply freedom and liberty of will.

Both Thomas Rogers and Henry Bullinger had noted scriptural warrant for the view that God rewards human beings for good works done after

40. V, App. I, 31 (ii, 571).

41. V, App. I, 28 (ii, 566f). Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -52- justification, with both temporal and eternal rewards. 42 And the homily on fasting, possibly by Archbishop Parker, both denied merit in human works, and spoke of rewards greater than these works. 43 But these isolated observations were not incorporated into any larger picture of sanctification and glorification; they seem to have been attempts to come to some terms with the clear references in Scripture to reward.

In this special sense of "reward," Hooker on at least one occasion, was prepared to speak of human "merit." In discussing regular set

Christian fasts, Hooker censures those, like Ambrose and Augustine, who have spoken of the merits of fasting, but strongly supports the virtues of organized fasts, and declines to disagree with the ancient use of the vocabulary of "merit" for such works of satisfaction:

I will not in this place dispute ... whether truly it may not be said that penitent both weeping and fasting are means to blot out sin, means whereby through God's unspeakable and undeserved mercy we obtain or procure to ourselves pardon, which attainment unto any gracious benefit by him bestowed the phJJse of antiquity useth to express by the name of ment.

42. Thomas Rogers, The Catholic Doctrine of the Church of England (Cambridge, 1854), 117; Henry Bullinger, Decades (Cambridge, 1849-52) III, 9 (ii, 320ff), IV, 5 (iii, 204)

43. Homilies, second Book, no. 4 "Of Fasting," Certain Sermons, 291, 292.

44. V, lxxii, 9 (ii, 416f). See also Sermon II, 21: "The ancient Fathers use meriting for obtaining, and in that sense they of Wittenberg [i.e., Wurtemberg] have in their Confession: 'We teach that good works commanded of God are necessarily to be done, and that by the free kindness of God they merit their certain rewards.'" (iii, 508) Keble goes too far in claiming that Hooker accepts "merit" as a qualification Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -53-

Further, the original plan of God to "determine and bestow eternal life in the nature of a reward," was not abrogated by human disobedience, but the actual sinful state of the human race in history made any simple notion of meriting salvation impossible:

The best things we do have somewhat in them to be pardoned. How then can we do anything meritorious and worthy to be rewarded? ... We acknowledge a dutiful necessity of doing well; but l~e meritorious dignity of welldoing we utterly renounce.

Cursed, I say, be that man which believeth not as the Church of England, that without God's preventing and helping grace we are nothing at all able t% do the which are acceptable in his sight. 4

The natural powers and faculties therefore of man's mind are through our native corruption so weakened and of themselves so averse from God, that without the influence of his special grace they bring forth nothing in his sight for a supernatural blessing but denies merit as the ground of dependence. Editor's Preface, 54 (i, cviii and note 2). I do not think Hooker accepts merit in anything but the metaphorical sense, and then only because of its use among the Fathers. The "rewards" obtained for the quality of earthly life are in no literal sense "merited." The punishments may be. Hooker is prepared to use the word "reward" readily, the word "merit" only reluctantly.

45. Sermon II, 7 (iii, 493f). This text was quoted by the Georges to show Hooker's anti-Pelagianism. This it certainly does. But the Georges fail to take notice of the other part of Hooker's account: Augustine's view that we receive salvation finally as a reward. Charles H. and Katherine George, The Protestant Mind of the English Reformation 1570-1640 (Princeton, 1961), 45. Hooker argues that Adam would have received it "as a reward," even though he would have required grace and could not have achieved it naturally; this character of salvation is not eroded by the actual sinful state of the human race; in some sense salvation remains a reward, and the loss of salvation a punishment.

46. V, App. I, l (ii, 537). Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -54-

acceptable, no not the bwsoms or least buds that tend to the fruit of eternal life.

We deserve God's grace, no mo g than the vessel doth deserve the water which is put into it. 4

For Hooker, nevertheless, it remains of the utmost importance that human beings know that salvation for them remains a matter of punishment and reward. Preaching is important primarily in giving a knowledge of

God, not because right belief is the condition of justification, as it is, but because ignorance leads to iniquity and knowledge to virtue:

Because therefore want of the knowledge of God is the cause of all iniquity amongst men, as contrariwise the very ground of all our happiness, and the seed of whatsoever perfect v~rt_ue§ oweth from us, is a right opinion touching things d1vme. 9

In line with this view, Hooker held that the moral duty taught by divine law is necessary to the life to come.50 This view was objected

47. V, App. I, 2 (ii, 539).

48. V, App. I, 46 (ii, 595). This text was quoted by Malone to contrast the rejection of merit in Hooker and in William Perkins. Malone rightly points out that Hooker emphasizes faith in his rejection of merit, whereas Perkins emphasized the sovereignty of God and predestination. Michael T. Malone, "The Doctrine of Predestination in the thought of William Perkins and Richard Hooker," Anglican Theological Review lii (1970), 108, 112. As Malone notes, Perkins and Hooker have many points of agreement on the precise doctrines of predestination, as well as differences. But for Hooker, as for Augustine, it is the life of the human being in grace that is emphasized more than the eternal foreknowledge and election of God.

49. V, xviii, I (ii, 6lf).

50. I, xvi, 7 (i, 283). Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -55-

to in the Christian Letter, as compromising the Protestant view of

salvation through faith in Christ alone and as obscuring the real motive

to morality, "the glorie of God our Father, his great mercies in Christ;

his love to us; example to others, [and not] that we must do it to merit

or to make perfitt that which Christ hath done for us.1151 Hooker's

marginal notes reveal by how much he accepted the account of his

Protestant predecessors, but continued to assert the consistency between

this view and the additional view that final salvation was in the nature

of a reward:

A thing necessarie as you graunt that by good workes we shold seeke God's glory, shew ourselves thankfull for his mercyes in Christ, answer his loving kindnes towardes us, and give other men good example. If then these things be necessarie unto eternal! life, and workes necessarily to be done for these ends, how should workes bee but necessary unto the last end, seing the next and neerest cannot be attained without them? And is there neither heaven nor hell, neither reward nor punishment hereaner, to be respected here in the leading of our lives?

Again, in defending the prayer of the that prayed for deliverance "from sudden death," Hooker alludes to the relationship between the actions of our life before death and the reward and punishments of everlasting life: "Our good or evil estate after

51. Christian Letter, 13 (i, 283, note 3).

52. Christian Letter, 13 (i, 283f, note 3). Hooker refers to Augustine's On Faith and Works. The editors suggest chapter x - xiv, but especially chapter ix. Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -56- death dependeth most upon the quality of our lives. 1153

Similarly, in def ending the prayer that we may be delivered "from all adversity," Hooker argues that, in the sense of sin as crime, we may be preserved from all sin. 54 Precisely such crimes, which are acknowledged by all men, both Christians and pagans, interrupt the process of justification and sanctification in us, and exclude us not only from the visible church, but from salvation. 55 The Christian

Letter objected again to this view, and wondered if Hooker could possibly mean that Scripture approved the view that such virtues, although taught by the light of reason, were of such necessity "that the wante of them exclude from salvation." 56 Hooker's manuscript note, otherwise a little obscure, refers to his insistence that eternal reward and punishment depend upon the quality of life. To deny this principle would be a great boon to the cruel and the wicked:

A doctrine which would well have pleased Caligula, Nero, and

53. V, xlvi, I (ii, 195).

54. V, xlviii, 12 (ii, 211). This distinction between crimes and other sins, and their effect, is an important one, possibly borrowed from , who held that sin was "compatible with virtue," in the sense that mortal sin could co-exist with the habit of acquired virtue, and venial sin with the habit of infused virtue as well. This means that a sinful human being might nonetheless be free from vicious acts, especially serious crimes. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 71, a. 4 (i, 899). See also Hooker's view that and crimes exclude from salvation yet errors and faults do not. III, i, 13 (i, 350).

55. III, i, 7 (i, 341 ).

56. Christian Letter, 8 (I, 341, note 4). Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -57-

such other monsters to hear. Had the apostles taught this it might have advanced them happily to honour. The contrary doctrine [that is, that the quality of a person's life has a bearing on ~ternal life] hath cost many and martyrs their lives. 5

Hooker goes on to explain that the works of the heathens are not

acceptable, since they are not justified, but that "moral works done in

faith, hope and charity are accepted and rewarded with God," the want of

such virtues and the presence of such crimes bringing punishment, both

for heathen and justified. To deny these rewards and punishments puts

the Reformed Christian in the position of the Atheist, whose error is

precisely to deny "the joys of the kingdom of heaven, and the endless

pains of the wicked. 1158

4. Attitude to "the Papists"

Walter Travers accused Hooker of preaching "sour leaven" in his

57. Christian Letter, 8 (I, 34lf, note 4).

58. V, ii, I (ii, 19). Some recent work on Paul's attitude to the Law has suggested a remarkably similar view, correcting previous antinomian tendencies of interpreting Paul. Although Paul is recognized as denying the law to be "an entrance requirement" and affirming that faith is this requirement, since the Gentiles can have it too, Paul is seen as rejecting the view that the law leads to "legality" and the view that it is impossible to fulfill the law. Instead, Paul is seen as demanding that the law be fulfilled, and of seeing no means of atonement for transgressions of the law, and of repeating the general Jewish view that election and salvation are by God's grace, and that reward and punishment correspond to deeds. See E.P. Saunders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People (Philadelphia, 1983). Reviewed in Studies in Religion, 14 (1985), 262f. Needless to say, Hooker would not have accepted all of this as Paul's view, but the study does make sense of a Pauline notion of the rewards of the quality of a life lived in grace. Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -58- sermons at the Temple. 59 This phrase was a code phrase, based on a frequent New Testament allusion to leaven as being rejected from the

Passover bread, and used in both the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to ref er to corrupt pre-Reformation and contemporary Roman

Catholic views, particularly on the Pelagian question and the doctrine of justification by faith. It was so used by Cranmer in the Homily of

Good Works, and Hooker himself refers to it in Sermon II, in defence of his views that not all papists perish: "why might not thousands which were infected with other leaven, live and die unsoured by this, and so be saved. 1160 In Travers' mind were, no doubt, the questions of assurance and of Hooker's notorious view of the two wills in God;

Travers and Hooker do not seem to have quarreled on sacramental theology; but principally involved must have been Travers' conviction that Hooker's generous view about the possibility of salvation of Roman

Catholics compromised the principle of the gratuity of justification.

We have seen that Hooker consistently denied that there was any real merit in any sort of human work, but that there was a real growth in virtue in those being sanctified, and that the divinization of the

59. Travers' Supplication (iii, 558).

60. Sermon II, 20 (iii, 506). See Cranmer, "Homily of Good Works," Miscellaneous Writings, 147; John Scary (ca 1556), in his translation of St Augustine, On Predestination and On Perseverance, quoted in Wallace, Puritans and Predestination, 25; and nearly a century later, William Eyre Justification without Conditions, 1653, written against Richard Baxter. Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -59- elect in glory was as a reward for their works. This emphasis and series of connections was certainly novel in the English Reformation, but the individual parts had all been affirmed before, however tentatively and confusedly. Hooker certainly did, however, consistently hold a particularly generous view of his contemporary papists. He mocked those who wanted to avoid papist errors by avoiding customs shared with the papists: since papists are closer to us than Turks, it is irrational to imitate the Turks in order to be unlike the papists, he argued. 61 Imitating the continental Reformed churches in something that made no sense in itself was also foolish: "we had rather follow the perfections of them whom we like not [the papists], than in defects resemble them whom we love [other Reformed churches]. 1162 Roman

Catholics were members of the visible church, 63 since the visible church is made up of those who profess Jesus Christ as Lord, and only , the rejection of this profession, can separate the Christian from the church. 64

But, although even Whitgift did not agree with Hooker on the

61. IV, vii, 6 (i, 441[). For a recent treatment of Hooker's "ecumenical vision," see William P. Haugaard, "Richard Hooker: Evidences of an Ecumenical Vision from a twentieth-century perspective," Journal of Ecumenical Studies 24 (1987), 427-439.

62. V, xxviii, I (ii, 127).

63. V, lxviii, 9 (ii, 375).

64. V, lxviii, 6 (ii, 368). Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -60- question,65 earlier English Reformers had expressed Hooker's view. 66

And Hooker made no secret of his rejection of Roman Catholic views: although the Church of England retained "part of their ceremonies and almost their whole government ... we are divided from the Church of

Rome by the single wall of doctrine. 1167 "Heretics they are 1168[though not apostates]. The principal of Roman Catholics is on the matter of justification, as we have seen. They attribute merit to human actions in sanctification, so that grace is merited congruently, and glory condignly. 69 As we shall come to see, Hooker also believes they wrongly attribute a causal efficacy to the elements of the eucharist.

Furthermore, they erect "traditions" on a par with Scripture. 70 But

Hooker at least twice, in the Answer to Travers, refers to the

65. Strype, third addition to Walton's Life of Hooker, 1705 (i, 66). Apparently Martin Marprelate, in his criticism of the preacher at the funeral of Mary Queen of Scots in 1587, who was "too favourable concerning her final condition," agreed with Travers and Whitgift. Walton, Life of Hooker (i, 49 and note 4).

66. Hugh Latimer, Sermons (Cambridge, 1844) i, 306. See also the views of Dering, and Perkins as described in George and George, Protestant Mind, 378-380.

67. IV, iii, 1 (i, 424).

68. IV, vi, 2 (i, 434).

69. Sermon II, 5ff (iii, 186ff).

70. III, viii, 14 (i, 376); V, lxv, 2 (ii, 318). In fact, the word "tradition" always has a negative sense for Hooker, as distinct from "custom" and "experience," which are generally positive in tone. For a discussion of "papist errors" on the sacrament, see chapter 5. Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -61- at the as "the fathers of Trent," far from an abusive term.7 1

There is stronger language addressed to "the reprobates" alluded to in the sermons on Jude. 12 On the supposition that these sermons were directed primarily against papists, some have found the tone to be quite different from that of the Temple sermons. The tone is quite different indeed, but it is clear that the reprobates mentioned include papists 73, atheists 74, and Puritan "separatists 1175. The severe phrase "son of perdition and Man of Sin" used of the pope in Sermon V,76 is shocking to modern ears, but the second part of the phrase, "Man of Sin" occurs twice in the undisputedly genuine Sermon II 77 and, for that matter, in the Preface to the Authorized Version of the Bible of 1611. Hooker was eirenic, but he was a man of his time in many respects; his "sympathy"

11. Answer to Travers, 13 (iii, 580, 582).

72. Sermons V and VI (iii, 659ff).

73. Sermon V, 7 (iii, 666).

74. Sermon V, 9 (iii, 668).

75. Sermon V, 11 (iii, 670).

76. Sermon V, 15 (iii, 676).

77. Sermon II, 5, 27 (iii, 489, 525). Compare the equally disobliging formula, "Babylonian strumpet" in Sermon IV (iii, 661 ). There, in a funeral sermon, the Roman is criticized for leading to pride and security, instead of humility and watchfulness. Comparable accusations would be leveled at the Pharisaical Puritans in Sermon I. Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -62- for Roman Catholics depended upon an objective and accurate account of the genuine doctrines shared with them by the Church of England, and an objective and accurate account of those very important matters wherein the Roman Catholic church held different views. But, in any case, the

"tone" and vocabulary of the sermons on Jude cannot be used to illustrate a different attitude to Roman Catholics than that displayed in the Lawes and the Temple sermons, or else the spuriousness of the sermons on Jude.

It is clear that Hooker maintained an accurate acquaintance with the writings of his Roman Catholic contemporaries on the eucharist, 78 although as we shall see he was little affected by them. His not least contribution to the accuracy of sixteenth century debates on the eucharist was his direct denial of the venerable canard of the supposed errors of the pseudo-Thomas and Catharinus, that Christ's sacrifice was for original, the sacrifice of the for actual, sin. 79 In this regard, Hooker distanced himself from others involved in the polemical debates: for him, it was important to describe accurately what the

78. V, App. I, 14-18 (ii, 550-556). See Bayne, Book V, 654, n. 47.

79. Travers' Supplication (iii, 563), Answer to Travers, 14 (iii, 584). Francis Clark has traced the rise of this puzzling misapprehension, from the 1520's where it was related to polemic from Lutherans on the subject of the need for penance, down to the near present in order to justify the view that the Reformers had real errors to combat. Francis Clark, Eucharistic Sacrifice and the Reformation (London, 1960), 469-503. Justification, Sanctification, Glorification -63-

Roman Catholic Church believed, and to indicate where the Church of

England and the Roman Catholic Church were in agreement, in order to refute "their" charge "that when we cannot refute their opinions, we propose to ourselves such instead of theirs, as we can refute. 1180

But, although Hooker clearly had the same apologetic motive that led to the production of his benefactor Jewel's extended apologies, in fact, his insistence on describing accurately the "matter itself" was part of his spirituality of the truth. For him, in the debate about justification as elsewhere, the new forces in the Church of England produced a spirituality of hypocrisy and phariseeism: the new piety replaced "hearkening to God's law and the aphorisms of wisdom," with

"preaching and hypocrisy", "the discovery of other men's faults. 1181

Thus there is a pious motive in Hooker's eirenic and objective outlook towards the "papists," and in this outlook he self-consciously opposed himself to the polemical anti-papist stance of the Puritan agitators for further reforms.

80. Answer to Travers, 12 (iii, 578f).

81. V, lxxxi, IO (ii, 523f). III Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation: Hooker's Scholasticism

In some form or other, all of Hooker's theses on grace might have been found in some authority of the English Reformation. His account of the justification, sanctification and final glorification of the redeemed individual was in that sense orthodox and authorized. It is true that he made more of the continuity between the beginning of grace in us and the final glory of the world to come, and that he identified a significant sense of "reward" in glorification, though he constantly denied what he understood to be Roman Catholic views of merit in human action. In the second of these two unusual emphases, he returned to

Augustine's dictum that God, in crowning us, crowns his own work. In the first, he returned to the dictum of the High that grace is the beginning of glory in us.

Behind Hooker's account of justification and sanctification, which could probably be squared in most respects with English Calvinism, lay a philosophical outlook that was very different from that which underpinned all of his English predecessors, and which, for Hooker, accounted for the "novelty" of the continuities he exhibited between justification and final glorification. For the philosophical underpinning of Hooker's theology of grace leapt back beyond the

Lutheran revolution of the sixteenth century, and further back beyond the and Nominalism of the two previous centuries to the scholasticism of Thomas Aquinas in particular. The Reformation generally adopted, as given, the account of fallen human nature that had

-64- Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -65-

been developed and preserved through generations of Augustinians,

including Thomas himself: human nature under sin was recognized to be

intrinsically sinful and guilty, and therefore in absolute need of God's

grace. And the Reformation espoused a thorough, even exaggerated,

reverence for the unique authority of Scripture. But there was very

little attention in the earlier Reformation to a systematic and

organized account of the pattern of the relationships between nature and

grace, and the analogous relationships between natural human reason, and

the aspect of grace that is revelation, or as Hooker would inevitably

call it, "Scripture."

Hooker revived the older theological pattern of Thomas and the High

Middle Ages, of human nature's double need of grace -- gratia sanans,

healing grace to remedy the inherited guilt and stain of sin, and gratia elevans, elevating grace, to "raise" human nature to its original

destiny of the presence of God. Along with this pattern, Hooker

exhibited nature and grace as consistently and specially related to each

other, so that grace does not destroy but perfects nature. These

principles had not been entirely lost in the literature of the

Reformation, as we shall note, but the easy continuity that the High

Middle Ages took for granted, had been fairly constantly eroded by

Nominalism in philosophy and by Voluntarism in theology, so that the

arbitrariness of God's activities and the primacy of God's will came to

be emphasized more than God's "sweet reasonableness" and the co-presence

in God of Intellect and Will. This scholastic heritage Hooker presented Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -66- without apology, and without offending Protestant orthodoxy. It off ended the authors of the Christian Letter, but they were left largely to complain about Hooker's obscure scholastic vocabulary, since they found it difficult to identify false doctrine. Hooker, nevertheless, introduced a revolution into English theology by the particular form of this scholastic revival, and in fact set a tone for English theology that would not soon be forgotten, and which consistently would distinguish it from that of a Protestant world with which the Church of

England shared, for a long time to come, more or less a unity in doctrine.

I. Nature's two-fold need of grace

The Summa Theologiae begins with the question, whether a science of theology is necessary, over and beyond the philosophical or theoretical sciences? 1 The question presupposes the Aristotelian division of the theoretical sciences into physics, mathematics and metaphysics, which is also called theology, since it is the study of things divine.

Aristotelian physics deals with those things which are concrete and subject to change; Aristotelian mathematics deals with those things that are abstract and unchanging; Aristotelian theology deals with those things that are concrete and unchanging, that is, the divine

1. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 1, a. 1 (i, l f). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -67-

intelligences that order the universe. 2 This pattern of the division of

the sciences had fairly recently been introduced into the medieval

account of knowledge in the thirteenth century, and still remained in

the account of knowledge given in the sixteenth. Thomas concludes that

this theology, although it has its own validity and security is not sufficient. Over and above this science derived from natural human

reason, there must be another, sacra doctrina, which is derived from

God's revelation. The reason for the necessity of this revealed

theology is two-fold: in the first place, the limitation of creaturely

reason and, in the second place, its confusion:

It was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human nature should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as regards those truths about God which human reason could have discovered, it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine revelation; because the truths about God such as reason could discover, would only be known by a few, and t~at after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors.

This same pattern, of human need for grace in the first place

because the human being is a natural and creaturely being, with a supernatural end, and in the second place, because the human being bears the guilt and weakness of sin, is displayed in the second part of the

Summa, when Thomas gives his extended and organized account of God's

2. Aristotle, Metaphysics E (VI), 1, 1025b-1026a. The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York, 1941), 778f.

3. Summa Theologiae I, q. 1, a. I, respondeo (i, 1). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -68- grace in general:

Man's nature can be looked at in two ways: first in its integrity, as it was in our first parent before sin; secondly, as it is corrupted in us after the sin of our first parent. Now in both states human nature needs the help of God as First Mover, to do or wish any good whatsoever, as stated above (A. 1). But in the state of integrity, as regards the sufficiency of the operative power, man by his natural endowments could wish and do the good proportionate to his nature, such as the good of acquired virtue; but not surpassing good, as the good of infused virtue. But in the state of corrupt nature, man falls short of what he could do by his nature, so that he is unable to fulfill it by his own natural powers. . .. And thus in the state of perfect nature man needs a gratuitous strength superadded to natural strength for one reason, viz., in order to do and wish supernatural good; but for two reasons, in the state of corrupt nature, viz., in order to be healed, and furth/rmore, in order to carry out works of supernatural virtue.

This distinction was related, as the passage shows, to the point made long before, by Augustine, that Adam needed God's grace, even in

Paradise.

Thomas also had a thematic connection with the revival of interest in biblical authority in the sixteenth century. Thomas spent most of his mature academic career offering lectures on "the sacred page," although this has tended to be forgotten since theology has come to be treated as separate from , and the two Summae of Thomas have been interpreted as "theology" in this later sense that would have been shared by the Reformers as well as the twentieth century. Thomas'

4. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 109, a. 2 respondeo (i, 1124). Paraphrased by Hooker in a footnote in the Dublin Fragments. See V, App. I, 10 (ii, 545, note 2). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -69-

Summae now monopolize the attention paid to Thomas, but, in the context of the patterns of "university" education in the thirteenth century, they should be seen within the framework of biblical teaching. 5 In this way, Thomas' Summae share with Calvin's Institutes a role as a sort of preface or key to the sacred page, and point to the deep convictions

Hooker, the child of the Reformation, would share with Thomas. Thomas would call theology "sacra doctrina," but that phrase, which is related to Augustine's earlier phrase "doctrina Christiana, 116functions as a near synonym for Scripture, which is the word Richard Hooker almost invariably uses.7 And in the rediscovery of Augustine, the sixteenth

5. See the view of Chenu quoted in Commentary on Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians by St. Thomas Aquinas (Albany, 1966), 27. For a good description of Thomas as an exegete, see pp. 3ff.

6. "Many modern commentators have wrenched Thomas' teaching on out of context and have distorted it; similarly certain aspects of his teaching on grace have been distorted. Frequently they fail to see that Thomas' approach is derived from St. Augustine's De spiritu et littera, and De natura et gratia." James Weisheipl, Thomas d'Aquino: His Life, Thought and Work (New York, 1974), 260. "Let the Scriptures be the countenance of God," said Augustine Sermon 22, 7; the Bible is doctrina Christiana, De doctrina christiana II, xxxix, 59. Peter Brown, (London, 1967), 262f.

7. Because it is thus Hooker's technical term, the word "Scripture" will generally be capitalized in this study. Although it is relatively easy to establish near synonymity between "revelation" and Hooker's use of the word "Scripture," the definition of "reason" in Hooker is difficult. Hooker appears to off er no precise definition. A glance at the O.E.D. shows a large number of uses of the term in the sixteenth century. Clearly the following senses approach Hooker's: "10. That intellectual power or faculty (usually regarded as characteristic of mankind, but sometimes also attributed in a certain degree to the lower animals) which is ordinarily employed in adapting Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -70-

century revived, almost unconsciously, the patterns of theological

organization specified by his most accurate thirteenth century pupil.

But the Reformers had not totally forgotten the old principle of

the double human need for grace. Luther expressed the conviction

clearly in the Babylonian Captivity, though only in passing:

Now there are two things that are constantly assailing us so that we fail to gather the fruits of the mass. The first is that we are sinners, and unworthy of such great things because of our utter worthlessness. The second is that, even if we were worthy, these things are so high that our fainthearted nature does not dare to aspire to them or hope for them. For who would not stand awe-struck before the of sins and life everlasting, rather than seeking after them, once he had weighed properly the magnitude of the blessings which came through them, namely to have God as father, to be his son and the heir of all his thought or action to some end; the guiding principle of the human mind in the process of thinking. 11. The ordinary thinking faculty of the human mind in a sound condition." Hooker would, however, appear to see reason in lower animals only in some "proportional" sense, in which the sensitive soul is an analogue to the intellectual. For Hooker, reason is a divine endowment, naturally shared by human beings and the higher beings, like angels, but specific to the human being; it is related to sense, which can "perceive present needs," but goes beyond sense "to discern what is necessary" beyond sense; it is able to accept and retain the data of revelation. (I, xv, 4) Hooker thus shares, with his contemporaries, a view of reason as an intellectual faculty, specific to the human race; as immortal this faculty looks "upward" to the intellectual world, and yet, as human, it is related to the sensitive soul, imagination or fancy, and memory. At times, for the Elizabethans, "reason" is the rational soul itself, usually with the two faculties of "wit, understanding, or intellect," and will; at times, reason is the faculty of "understanding" alone, as contrasted with will. See Edward Dowden, "Elizabethan Psychology," in Essays Modern and Elizabethan (London, 1910), 308-333. Because of Platonic resonances, of course, reason can also ref er to the "constituted structure of the universe," of which the human being is a microcosm. Donald W. Hansen, From Kingdom to Commonwealth (Cambridge, 1970), 267. Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -71-

goods. 8

But Luther made little of it. For Calvin, the principle was built into the very structure of the Institutes: after the extensive survey of human reason and culture in the first book, Calvin writes:

Even if man had remained free from all stain, his condition would ha e been too lowly for him to reach God without a mediator. 9

But the point was largely ignored for the rest of the sixteenth century in the Protestant world, thus leaving the impressions that grace was needed only because of the corruption of sin and that the benefit of

God's grace was simply to return the human being to the state Adam had enjoyed in Eden. This was usually not more than an impression, until the federal theologians in the seventeenth century explicitly enshrined the notion in their theory of the "covenant of works."

For Hooker, the corruption and confusion of the actual human condition strongly characterize both the need for laws and the form of

God's positive law, as Hooker developed these in extended passages in

Book I of the Lawes. In a passage we will presently examine, Hooker argued that "the last and highest estate of perfection whereof we speak

8. , The Babylonian Captivity of the Church, in Works, vol. 36, ed. Abdel Ross Wentz (Philadelphia, 1959), 45.

9. Institutes II, 12, 1 (i, 465). Calvin remains aware of the human need for a mediator apart from sin in his Biblical commentaries, and clearly emphasizes the distinction between the creator and the creature in this regard. Comm. I Pet. 1.21, Comm. Ac 20.21, and Comm I Ti 6.16. Victor A. Shepherd, The Nature and Function of Faith in John Calvin (Macon, Georgia, 1983), 103. Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -72- is received of men in the nature of a Reward." Hooker argues that the only "natural" way open to the Reward is works. This way was open to

Adam; it is not in us:

Our natural means therefore unto blessedness are our works; nor is it possible that Nature should ever find any other way to salvation than only this. But examine the works which we do, and since the first foundation of the world what one can say, My ways are pure?

This impurity of all human works through sin has two consequences: since "Rewards do always presuppose such duties performed as are rewardable," and human sinful actions are not pure enough for reward, and since "Nature," that is, unaided human reason, can off er no other way, revelation is required:

there resteth therefore either no way unto salvation, or if any, then surely a way which is supernatural, a way which could never have entered into the heart of man as much as once to conceive ofoimagine, if God himself had not revealed it extraordinarily.

This "mystery or secret way of salvation" turns out to be faith, the ground of hope and love as wen. I I Hooker thereby boldly grafts a limb of Reformation doctrine onto the stalk of a scholastic tree.

At times "the supernatural way of salvation and the law for them to live in that should be saved" may sound very much like the "covenant of grace" of the later federal theology and the "natural means to

10. I, xi, 5 (i, 258-260).

11. I, xi, 6 (i, 260ff). See above under "justification," in chapter II. Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -73-

blessedness," that is, "our works," may sound very much like God's

covenant of works with Adam, of that same federal theology. This

theology, which would find a place both in the Westminster Conj ession of

the Commonwealth divines and in the work of the "churchy" Bishop

Beveridge, was a seventeenth century attempt to soften Calvin's apparent

of predestination by the new provision of a covenantal

framework, which would therefore appear gracious. 12 But, as a quotation

from Scotus shows, Hooker recognizes that works (though the only means

reason can suggest) would not be sufficient, even for Adam in

prelapsarian Paradise:

if we speak of strict justice, God could no way have been bound to requite man's labours in so large and ample a manner as human felicity doth import; inasmuch fj the dignity of this exceedeth so far the other's value.

The context is thus not that of the two covenants of the federal

theology, but of the Augustinian point that Adam required grace even

12. "The first was ... a covenant of works, requiring on man's part a perfect and unsinning obedience, without extraordinary grace or assistance from God to enable him to perform it; but here in the second, God undertakes both for Himself and for man too, having digested the conditions to be performed by us into promises to be fulfilled by Himself. . . . [It is] called a covenant of grace." William Beveridge, Private Thoughts upon Religion, Article 9, in Works viii (Oxford, 1846), 188f. For a description of the federal theology and its recognized pioneer Johannes Koch, see Cunliffe-Jones, A History of Christian Doctrine, 437f. This had important antecedents in the theology of Zwingli and Bullinger at Zurich. See J. Wayne Baker, Henry Bullinger and the Covenant (Athens, Ohio, 1980), chap. 2.

13. I, xi, 6 (i, 260). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -74-

independent of the Fall, to attain the Life which is the end of human

lif e.14 Hooker's point is not that God has set "works" as the basic and

only assumption for sinless human attainment of Paradise, but rather

that that is all that unaided human reason could come up with, a not

surprising limit, inasmuch as blessedness is, as we shall see, an end

that nature can identify but not obtain. "After the fall," faith, hope

and love are the only means of salvation, and this must be revealed in

Scripture:

concerning that Faith, Hope, and Charity, without which there can be no salvation, was there ever any mention made saving onI in that law which God himself hath from heaven revealed? 15

Divine positive law, unavailable to human reason, must be revealed in Scripture because of the awful consequences of human solidarity with

Adam. Following Augustine and Thomas, Hooker holds that we participate

14. But there is a recurring tendency to see in Hooker just such a view of the adequacy of human effort independent of the actual sinful state, to attain glory. See John S. Marshall, Hooker and the Anglican Tradition (London, 1963), 11 lf, for a view that comes very close to attributing such a "Pelagianism of Paradisal Man" to Richard Hooker. A sentence such as "God the author of that natural desire had appointed natural means whereby to fulfill it; ... man having utterly disabled his nature unto those means hath had other revealed from God, and hath received from heaven a law to teach him how that which is desired naturally may be supernaturally obtained," taken out of context might suggest such a view, but this would be a fallacy of emphasis. Hooker is emphasizing the need for grace in consequence of the Fall, not the lack of such a need independent of the Fall: the fact that it is God that appointed the paradisal "natural means" makes them supernatural. We will see later that Hooker insisted that Adam's need for grace was not only in respect to the Fall.

15. I, xi, 6 (i, 262). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -75- in the nature of Adam through propagation:

Adam is in us as an original cause of our nature, and of that corruption of nature which causeth death, Christ as the cause original of restoration to life; the person of Adam is not in us, but his nature, and the corruption of his nature derived into all men by propagation; Christ having Adam's nature as we have, but incorrupt, deriveth not nature but incorruption and that immediately from his own person into all that belong unto him. As therefore we are really partakers of the body of sin and death received from Adam, so except we be truly partakers of Christ, and as really possessed gr his Spirit, all we speak of eternal life is but a dream.1

"Eternal Life" and the truth about it (as opposed to the vague dream it becomes under sin) are impossible for the sinful human being, without God's healing grace and Scripture to show the way.

This view of the need for grace and revelation because of sin is an obvious theme throughout the Reformation. Indeed, only the most blatant

Pelagians could have denied it. For Hooker, it becomes an informing principle, so that even little ceremonial matters the church uses may help to remind us of our need for grace. The Cross at Baptism, itself inessential to the rite, is nevertheless a natural reminder, used by religion as an "apt sign of our shame":

By this mean where nature doth earnestly implore aid, religion yieldeth her that ready assistance than which there can be no help more forcible serving only to relieve memory, and to bring to ofr cogitation that which should most make ashamed of sin. 1

16. V, lvi, 7 (ii, 250ff).

17. V, lxv, 6 (ii, 321-323). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -76-

And this account of the need for the grace of revelation on account of sin continues to be exhibited in Hooker's work during the last phase of his writing, in the Dublin Fragments:

Some things there are concerning our good, and yet known even amongst them to whom the saving grace of God is not known. But no saving knn:tedge possible, without the sanctifying spirit of God.

But alongside with, and intermingled with, this Reformation commonplace, Hooker insists that it is not only because human beings are sinful that revelation and other grace is required, but also because the human being is first and foremost a creature, and therefore incapable of the supernatural goal of saving truth and the presence of God. Just before the passage in Book I examined earlier, comes an extended passage showing that God's positive law is required because a "perpetuity of perfection" is not natural, and beyond this life. In this world, human beings cannot persist towards perfection, that is, towards the union with God revealed to us by our desire for the good as our end. In this world, we work upon our object by desire, not yet by love. The soul will be perfect, in perpetuity, by the will of God. In support of this view, Hooker quotes the spurious Platonist author "Mercurius

Trismagister," who was highly influential among the Platonists of Queen

Elizabeth's days, including both the nearly secular humanists like Lord

Herbert of Cherbury, and the more main-line Christian humanists. This

18. V, App. I, 6 (ii, 542). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -77- signals Hooker's belief that the unaided human reason of a pagan author can identify the need for elevating grace. In any case, his argument is based upon the general premises of Greek philosophy, including Plato and

Aristotle's Nichomachaean Ethics: everyone desires to be happy. This desire is, therefore, natural. But natural desires cannot be utterly frustrated, so perfection is possible. The human being naturally seeks a triple perfection: sensual, intellectual, and divine, although this divine perfection we naturally seek without explicitly knowing it. This

"correspondence" between natural desires and the supernatural human end, is def ended by the scholastic dictum that "nature does nothing in vain," which again Hooker would have assumed to be a true principle of natural reason. 19

Further, laws supernatural are divine, "as not having in nature any cause from which they flow":

Laws therefore concerning these things are supernatural, both in respect of the manner of delivering them, which is divine; and also in regard of the things delivered, which are such as have not in nature any cause from which they flow, but were by the voluntary appointment of God ordained beside,_6he course of nature, to rectify nature's obliquity withal.

Why are so many apparently natural laws and rational laws found in

Scripture? Hooker asks. His answer reflects the principle Thomas

19. I, xi, 3, 4 (i, 255-258).

20. I, xi, 6 (i, 262). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -78- enunciates at the opening of Summa Theologiae: there is an obscurity of our knowledge of divine things through natural means. Further, ordinary natural laws are strengthened by being found in Scripture, by the authority of "God's own testimony." Thus Hooker argues that supernatural laws do not void natural laws. Scripture makes obscure natural laws plain, and uses plain ones to prove the obscure, and strengthens the certainty. 21 But, in addition, Scripture "helps our imbecility" by revealing natural laws that human beings ignore or fail to discern. For example, only a few could have obtained knowledge of the (natural) immortality of the soul without the aid of revelation, and the

(supernatural) mystery of the resurrection of the body is totally beyond reason. 22 In summary, Hooker writes of the need for revelation because human beings are fallen and because they are creatures of limited reason:

We see, therefore, that our sovereign good is desired naturally; that God the author of that natural desire had appointed natural means whereby to fulfil it; that man having utterly disabled his nature unto those means hath had other revealed from God, and hath received from heaven a law to teach him how that which is desired naturally must now supernaturally be attained. Finally, we see that because those latter exclude not the former quite and clean as unnecessary, therefore together with such supernatural duties as could not possibly have been otherwise known to the world, the same law that teacheth them, teacheth also with them such natural duties as could not by the light of

21. I, xii, I (i, 262).

22. I, xii, 2 (i, 263). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -79-

Nature easily have been known. 23

The need for revelation for things beyond reason and nature is a conviction that Hooker betrays throughout the Lawes. Thus, in Book II, when he comes to deal with the Puritan assertion that there is a perfect and complete pattern of church order "grounded" in Scripture, if not explicitly commanded, Hooker finds it important to remind his audience that reason has a use too, even though Scripture reveals truths beyond reason:

Scripture indeed teacheth things above nature, things which our reason by itself could not reach unto. Yet those things also we believ~ knowing by reason that the Scripture is the word of God.2

And, in the fifth book, in def ending the appropriateness of reading

Scripture and written sermons, he writes,

The reason, why no man can attain belief by the bare contemplation of heaven and earth, is for that they neither are sufficient to give us as much as the least spark of light ~gncerning the very principal mysteries of our faith.

23. I, xii, 3 (i, 264). "Nature is no sufficient teacher what we should do that we may attain unto life everlasting." (II, viii, 3 (i, 33lf)) "God hath endued us ... with the heavenly support of prophetical revelation, which doth open those hidden mysteries that reason could never have been able to find out." (I, xv, 4 (i, 276)) "In Scripture hath God both collected the most necessary things that the school of nature teacheth unto that end [the knowledge of what is required for salvation], and revealeth also whatsoever we neither could with safety be ignorant of, nor at all be instructed in but by supernatural revelation f ram him." (III, iii, 3 (i, 356))

24. III, viii, 12 (i, 374f).

25. V, xxii, 5 (ii, 92). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -80-

There is a knowledge which God hath always revealed unto [the Paynims] in the works of nature. This they honour and esteem highly as profound wisdom; howbeit this wisdom saveth them not. That whic~gmst save believers is the knowledge of the cross of Christ.

And, in def ending the interrogatories at baptism, Hooker writes:

That which is true and neither can be discerned by sense, nor concluded by mere natural principles, must have principles of revealed truth whereupon to build itself, and an habit of faith in us wherewith principles of that kind are apprehended. The mysteries of our religion are above the reach of our understanding, above discourse of 1¥fn's reason, above all that any creature can comprehend.

Similarly, in the second of the Temple sermons, the need for revelation of saving truths is asserted boldly, in contrast to the natural capacities of reason:

As the light of nature doth cause the mind to apprehend those truths which are merely rational; so that saving truth, which is far above the reach of human reason, cannot otherwise, tran by the Spirit of the Almighty, be conceived. 2

And, in the Dublin Fragments, the need for revelation to discover the supernatural laws on which depend salvation, both "before" and

"after" the Fall, and both to human reason and angelic intelligence, is again asserted:

To find out supernatural laws, there is no natural way, because they have not their foundation or ground in the

26. V, xxii, 9 (ii, 97).

27. V, lxiii, I (ii, 305).

28. Sermon II, 26 (iii, 516). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -81-

course of nature. Such was that law before Adam's fall, which required abstinence from the tree of knowledge touching good and evil. For by his reason he could not have found out this law, inasmuch as the only commandment of God did make it necessary, and not the necessity thereof procure it to be commanded, as in natural laws it doth. Of like nature are the mysteries of our redemption through the blood of Jesus Christ, which presupposeth the fall of Adam, and was in that respect instituted, nor would ever have been imagined by any wit of m~y or angel, had not God himself revealed the same to both.

2. Human "Imbecility" and Adam's need for Grace

Hooker uses the word "imbecility" in an archaic sense, but in a way

that makes it very nearly a technical term. His use demonstrates both of

the ways in which human nature needs grace. At times, he clearly means

"imbecility" to ref er to natural weakness, without respect to human

sinfulness. 30 Thus, when dealing with the natural differences between

male and female as the basis of marriage, Hooker speaks of "the very imbecility of their [women's] nature and sex.1131 As a phrase in his

29. V, App. I, 7 (ii, 543).

30. Paul Forte seems to attribute "imbecility" simply to the inheritance of original guilt. He refers to I, xi and to the discussion of "the end that all men seek but which they are prevented from discovering by reason due to the 'imbecilitie' they have inherited through ." Paul Forte, "Hooker's Theory of Law," in The Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 12 (1982), 149. Forte confuses two things: the loss of the "natural" way of attaining the reward of bliss, which is no longer available as a result of the Fall, but which is still known to reason, and the present inability to discover the "supernatural way" of faith, which is unknown because it exceeds (even unfallen) human reason.

31. V, lxxiii, 5 (ii, 429). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -82-

Preface alluding to women makes clear, this refers to the natural weakness of women, "whose judgements are commonly weakest because of their sex.1132 This unscientific generalization is, of course, a commonplace of classical political philosophy and economics from

Aristotle on. But not only women are imbecilic: the whole human race is infected by "man's imbecility and proneness to elation," which,

Hooker argues, indicates a need for Ministers, as it were to keep before them an accurate sense of their own place in the scheme of things. 33 On a humble note, Hooker adds, in another place, that "we in other men's offences do behold the plain image of our own imbecility. 1134

But, particularly in the late Dublin Fragments, "imbecility" is related to the human being under the aspect of sin, under which aspect there is total equality of the sexes.

If God's special grace did not aid our imbecility, w~a~sfever we do or imagine would be only and continually evil.

32. Preface, iii, 13 (i, 152).

33. V, lxxvi, 5 (ii, 449).

34. V, lxxvii, 4 (ii, 458).

35. V, App. I, I (ii, 538). This idea, of course, was clear in the Lawes, but the word "imbecility" was not so clearly associated with the need for healing grace to restore fallen reason: "The search of knowledge is a thing painful; and the painfulness of knowledge is that which maketh the Will so hardly inclinable thereunto. The root hereof, divine malediction; whereby the instruments being weakened wherewithal the soul (especially in reasoning) doth work, it pref erreth rest in ignorance before wearisome labour to know." (I, vii, 7 (i, 224)) Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -83-

While this might possibly be considered as referring to natural weakness, a natural weakness further powerless under sin, the following text, which occurs on the next page, could not:

Which powers and faculties [of the human mind] notwithstanding retain still their natural manner of operation, although their original perfection be gone, man hath still a reasonable understanding, and a will thereby framable to good things, but is not thereunto now able to frame himself. Therefore God hath ordained grace, to countervail this our imbecility, and to serve as his hand. 36

Like Augustine and Thomas, Hooker recognizes a sort of "general grace," offered by God and required by all creatures in order for them to exercise their natural capacities:

There is no kind of faculty or power in man or any other creature, which can rightly perform the functions allotted to it, without perpeJ~al aid and concurrence of that Supreme Cause of all things.

But there are other senses in which the human being needs grace,

36. V, App. I, 2 (ii, 539).

37. I, viii, 11 (i, 236). See also III, viii, 18 (i, 379f). Egil Grislis treats this as a disagreement with Thomas' position: "According to St. Thomas it is certain that when reason operates within its own proper realm of activity, reason qua reason does not need the assistance of grace. Here Hooker disagrees." Egil Grislis, "Hooker's Image of Man," in Renaissance Papers 1963 (n.p., 1964), 80. But see Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 109, a. 1: "We must say that for the knowledge of any truth whatsoever man needs Divine help, that the intellect may be moved by God to its act." (i, 1124) Thomas goes on to indicate that the human being does not need "a new light," to know things that do not "surpass" natural light. Indeed, Thomas, with others in the thirteenth century who had absorbed the Aristotelian concept of physis, rather minimized the role of this auxilium divinum ut intellectus a Deo moveatur ad suum actum. But then, so did Hooker in the sixteenth. Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -84- even abstracted from the current sinful state. In the Lawes, it is quite clear both that Adam in Paradise is not considered to be immune from law, and that the character of law has changed through sin:

Hereupon hath grown ... that distinction between Primary and Secondary laws; the one grounded upon sincere, the other built upon depraved nature. [For example,] primary laws of nations are such as concern embassage, such as belong to the courteous entertainment of foreigners and strangers, such as serve for commodious traffick and the like. Secondary laws in the same kind are such as this present unquiet world is most familiarly acquainted with; I mejf laws of arms, which yet are much better known than kept.

But it is not until the Dublin Fragments that Hooker makes explicit that Adam needed not only law in his state of sincere nature, but also

God's grace:

If predestination did impose such necessity, then was there nothing voluntary in Adam's well-doing neither, because what Adam did well was predestinated. Or, if grace did impose such necessity, how was it possible that Adam should have done oJgerwise than well, being so furnished as he was with grace?

In the same Fragments, Hooker sometimes appears to assert that Adam did not need grace for natural actions and activities:

38. I, x, 13 (i, 251). See also the reference to at I, xi, 5, discussed below with reference to Gunnar Hillerdal. Hillerdal holds that Hooker's account of the disabling of reason at the Fall "points in the direction that if man had not sinned, he would have been able to perform that which he now never is capable of doing, i.e., approach God." Gunnar Hillerdal, Reason and Revelation in Richard Hooker (Lund, 1962), 62. Whether it "points" in that direction or not, this, as we shall see, is not all that Hooker had to say on the subject. Despite Hillerdal, it is quite clear that Hooker did not "think this way."

39. V, App. I, 2 (ii, 539). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -85-

Concerning such laws and truths as have their ground in the course of nature, and are therefore termed by all men laws of nature, [they] were necessary for Adam although he had kept ... the state of that first perfection, ... These truths and laws our first parents were createJl able perfectly both to have known and kept. ... O

But Hooker seems to indicate that, even here, they were given grace sufficient to have avoided sin, but not the grace of perseverance:

Angels and men had before their fall the grace whereby they might have continued if they would without sin: yet so great grace God did not think good to bestow on them, whereby fhey might be exempted from possibility of sinning. 4

This clear conviction that Adam and the angels required grace even in their state of original integrity was, of course, a commonplace of older Augustinian theology. Pelagius had been interpreted as insisting that the unfallen human being was capable of right or of wrong action through a complete inherent capacity. 42 Augustine insisted that the only goodness for man is in communion with God, and this communion is impossible without God's grace. 43 Thus Augustine wrote:

It was not in man's power, even in Paradise, to live as he ought to without God's help; but it was in his power to live

40. V, App. I, 7 (ii, 543).

41. V, App. I, 28 (ii, 567).

42. George Park Fisher, History of Christian Doctrine (Edinburgh, 1896), 184. Fisher lists the following texts: Ep. ad Demetr. c. 2, 3, 13, 14; Augustine, De Grat. Christ. 4, De Nat. et Grat. 47.

43. Augustine, Enchiridion, 106, NPNF 1st ser., iii, 271. Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -86-

wickedly. 44

This need for grace in Paradise Thomas, following Augustine, clearly described:

In the state of perfect nature, man needs a gratuitous strength superadded to natural strength ... in order to do and wish supernatural good. . .. Beyond this ... man J1{eds the Divine help, that he may be moved to act well.

But, by and large, the English Reformers, in painting a dark picture of the actual depraved state of the human race, tended to paint a brighter picture of the state of human innocence, and usually ignored the question of Adam's need for grace in Paradise, or actually asserted that there was no such need. This fault of omission or emphasis earned

Reformation theology the taunt of Pelagianism of Paradisal Man.46 But this taunt Hooker's awareness of and loyalty to an older allowed him to evade.

44. Augustine, City of God XIV, 27, NPNF, 1st ser., ii, 282. See also City of God, XIV, 26; Against Julian (New York, 1957) V, vii, pp. 269-275; On Rebuke and Grace c. 29, 39 NPNF, lnd ser., v, 483f.

45. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 109, a. 2 (ii, 1124f).

46. William Perkins did recognize the same point of Adam's need for grace in Eden: "But all and every one received holinesse and happinesse in Adam, together with ability to persevere ... in the same holy and happie estate if they would. But Adam would not but did of his owne accord cast away that grace ... for which being lost, it is a wonder that all without exception are not damned." Works ii, 621. Quoted in George and George, Protestant Mind, 56. Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -87-

3. The natural desire for an end beyond nature

From this older Thomistic pattern, Hooker also clearly adopted the rather daring proposition that human nature was so related to grace that it naturally identified as its end through desire a state that was beyond nature altogether. On all sides, except that of the outright

Pelagian, human nature was identified as requiring grace to achieve the end of salvation; some authors admitted that human nature could identify this end that it could not achieve. Thomas and his disciples before the sixteenth century insisted on this natural capacity to desire and identify an end that was beyond any natural capacity, and held that this capacity and inability were independent of the actual fallen condition of the human race. 47 Under pressure from the anti-Pelagian polemic of the Reformers, this concept tended to be modified to the puzzling concept of "pure nature," but it survived in a purer form in Hooker.

Like Thomas, Hooker adopts the "eudaimonean" principle common to Greek ethical thought generally, but most prominent in Aristotle's

Nichomachaean Ethics: all human desires point to one end, human happiness. This end of happiness Hooker explains, following Augustine and the Patristic tradition, in Christian terms as "union with God," the divinization or glorification we have already seen as the end of a process that begins in time for each individual on the way to salvation, with (first) justification, and continues with sanctification, or growth

47. See, for example, Summa Contra Gentiles III, xvii-xxv. Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -88- in grace. But what is striking about Hooker's account is that this pattern of the gracious action of God in the individual on the way to salvation, is based on a natural desire:

Now that which man doth desire with reference to a further end, the same he desireth in such measure as is unto that end convenient; but what he coveteth as good in itself, towards that his desire is ever infinite. So that unless the last good of all, which is desired altogether for itself, be also infinite, we do evil in making it our end; even as they who placed their felicity in wealth or honour or pleasure or any thing here attained; because in desiring any thing as our final perfection which is not so, we do amiss. Nothing may be infinitely desired but that good which indeed is infinite; for the better the more desirable; that therefore most desirable wherein there is infinity of goodness: so that if any thing desirable may be infinite, that must needs be the highest of all things that are desired. No good is infinite, but only God; therefore he our felicity and bliss. Moreover, desire tendeth unto union with that it desireth. If then in Him we be blessed, it is by force of participation and conjunction with Him. . . Then are we happy therefore when fully we enjoy God, as an object wherein the powers of our souls are satisfied even with everlasting delight; so that although we be men, yet by being unto God united we live as it were the life of God.48

In this, of course, Hooker is simply re-iterating the constant pattern of early , of and Clement of

Alexandria. Even Tertullian, who had an extremely negative view of the value of pagan culture, insisted that the human soul is naturally

Christian. The passage just quoted from Hooker, crucial for the development of the argument about the force and nature of laws in Book I of the Lawes, is amplified by the sequel. The state of happiness, or

48. I, xi, 2 (i, 254f). See John S. Marshall, Hooker and the Anglican Tradition (London, 1963), 11 lf. Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -89- bliss, of the individual on the way to salvation, is a formative principle to account for and define the nature and use of laws in the commonwealth and in the church. But the perfection the human being desires always remains frustrated in this life, where complete union

(though not some forms of participation) is never achieved, in part because we cannot persist towards that perfection, in part because the infinity of it eludes the creature:

Happiness therefore is that estate whereby we attain, so far as possibly may be attained, the full possession of that which simply for itself is to be desired, and containeth in it after an eminent sort the contentation of our desires, the highest degree of all our perfection. Of such perfection capable we are not in this life. For while we are in the world, subject we are unto sundry imperfections, griefs of body, defects of mind; yea the best things we do are painful, and the exercise of them grievous, being continued without intermission; so as in those very actions whereby we are especially perfected in this life we are not able to persist; forced we are with very weariness, and that often, to interrupt them: which tediousness cannot fall into those operations that are in the state of bliss, when our union with God is complete. Complete union with him must be according unto every power and faculty of our minds apt to receive so glorious an object. Capable are we of God both by understanding and will: by understanding, as He is that sovereign Truth which comprehendeth the rich treasures of all wisdom; by will, as He is that sea of Goodness whereof whoso tasteth shall thirst no more. As the will doth now work upon that object by desire, which is as it were a motion towards the end as yet unobtained; so likewise upo'¼~he same hereafter received it shall work also by love.

This extended passage is included here to show that persistence of

49. I, xi, 3 (i, 255f). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -90-

Hooker's insistence on the natural capacity of desire, which yet cannot attain its object of happiness in this life, because of the nature of that object. Stability in perseverance is denied in this life; there are temporary lapses, and mistakes on account of natural weakness. But that natural desire will be perfected into full-fledged love, through the grace of God, and perfect in the world to come. For, Hooker insists, as the older scholastics, following their patristic sources, had insisted, that the human being is naturally capable of God, capax

Dei. Hooker at once cites Augustine on this natural disposition towards something beyond nature. And he goes on to indicate, both that there is a three-fold aspect to the natural desire for perfection, as Aristotle claimed, and that it is particularly in the spiritual aspect, which is beyond the sensual and the moral, that perfection continues to elude human beings, as St Paul claimed:

Man doth seek a triple perfection: first a sensual, consisting in those things which very life itself require th either as necessary supplements, or as beauties or ornaments thereof; then an intellectual, consisting in those things which none underneath man is either capable of or acquainted with; lastly a spiritual and divine, consisting in those things whereunto we tend by supernatural means here, but cannot here attain unto them. . . . For man doth not seem to rest satisfied, either with fruition of that wherewith his life is preserved, or with performance of such actions as advance him most deservedly in estimation; but doth further covet, yea oftentimes manifestly pursue with great sedulity and earnestness, that which cannot stand him in any stead for vital use; that which exceedeth the reach of sense; yea somewhat above capacity of reason, somewhat divine and heavenly, which with hidden exultation it rather surmiseth than conceiveth; somewhat it seeketh, and what that is directly it knoweth not, yet very intentive desire thereof doth so incite it, that all other known delights and Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -91-

pleasures are laid aside, they give place to the search of this but only suspected desire. . . . So that Nature even in this life doth plainly claim and call for a more divine perf e_ction Sfian either of these two that have been mentioned.

4. Grace presupposes nature

Beyond this particular thesis of the natural desire for a supernatural end, Hooker indicates a general view that grace presupposes nature, a view which he shared with Thomas and generally, even those sixteenth century Thomists who had lost heart on the particular principle. This principle comes to the fore particularly in the second

Book of the Lawes, where the scope of Scripture, and its relation to reason are addressed. Thus Hooker will insist that divine wisdom was available to the pagans and to Adam, and to those who lived before the law was promulgated through . Wisdom has "two books" wherewith to instruct the human race, "the sacred books of Scripture" and "the glorious works of Nature. 1151 As he had pointed out in Book I, the will of God is known in laws apart from Scripture. 52 Heathens, who do not know Scripture, can discuss good actions. In fact, apostolic exhortation, recorded in the New Testament, to good behaviour in the

Christian community, so that the non-Christian neighbours may be

50. I, xi, 4 (i, 257f).

51. II, i, 4 (i, 289f).

52. II, ii, 2 (i, 29 lf). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -92- impressed by their morality, implies that the heathens can recognize naturally the morality Scripture codifies. 53

This pattern is exhibited in Book I, in the context of political theory. The first step in an account of a political organization is to provide the necessities of life, even though the kingdom of God is a higher priority. But "righteous life presupposeth life," so poverty must be removed before religion is introduced. An illustration is taken from the scriptural account of Adam in paradise: God gave Adam maintenance before the law; similarly, after the expulsion from Eden, the human race is given tilling and herding before religion is mentioned. 54

Hooker quotes at least twice the Pauline verse that was accepted generally as Scriptural warrant for the view that the heathen "had the law written in their hearts," Romans 1.21. Hooker went further than many in his interpretation of the significance of this verse: for him it indicated that natural law is required, as well as positive divine law, positive divine law also being necessary and going beyond what natural law could give, as we have already seen. 55

Most significantly, in terms of Hooker's undermining of the Puritan position as he defined it, Scripture presupposes reason for its

53. II, ii, 3 (i, 292).

54. I, x, 2 (i, 240).

55. I, xvi 5 (i, 281 ); III, viii, 6 (i, 367). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -93- interpretation. Chapter xiv of the first Book addresses this thesis.

There, Hooker deals with the "sufficiency of Scripture to the end for which it was instituted." He argues that the intent of Scripture is to deliver the laws of "duties supernatural." But Scripture incidentally makes all truths more apparent, even those that may be derived independently by reason from nature, that is, as we have already noted,

Scripture aids the frailty of human reason even in those things that reason can attain to. But Scripture presupposes prior knowledge of certain principles, especially the principle of the authority of

Scripture and of the scope of the canon. These principles come by human education and reason:

In the number of these principles one is the sacred authority of Scripture. Being therefore persuaded by other means that these Scriptures are the oracles of God, themselves do then teach us the rest, and lay before us all the duties whi~ God requireth at our hands as necessary unto salvation.

This daring statement is hardly compatible with the general conviction of the English Reformers that it is faith in Christ that is presupposed by the Scriptures, and not conviction arrived at by

"natural" and "human" means. Hooker's daring and controversial views on that subject will be taken up again when we come to consider the topic of assurance. For the moment, let it be said that Hooker has clearly identified the acceptance of the authority of Scripture (as, for that

56. I, xiv, 1 (i, 268). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -94- matter, its interpretation) as taking place within the otherwise natural process of coming to conviction or belief.

Hooker's interpretation of the use of authorities is also related to this question of the presupposition by grace of nature. The author of the Christian Letter objected to Hooker's use of reason in matters of faith. 57 Hooker's reply refers to the behaviour of the Puritans who, like all theologians, cite authorities; this behaviour, notes Hooker, recognizes that, in the words of the objection, there must be some

"naturall light, teaching knowledge of things necessary to salvation, which knowledge is not contayned in holy Scripture":

They are matters of salvation I think which you handle in this booke. If therefore determinable only by Scripture, why presse you me so often with humane authorities? Why alleage you the Articles of Religion as the voice of the Church aganst me? Why cite you so many commentaries bookes and sermons, partly of Bishops, partly of others? 58

And in the Dublin Fragments, when he is attempting to defend at length his use of "aptness" for human nature after the Fall, a position that we will consider when we come to look at his view of human depravity, Hooker points out that healing grace would be useless if it could not presuppose natural aptness, even aptness infested with the effects of sin. Precisely because nature must presuppose grace, aptness cannot be lost in the Fall:

51. Christian Letter, 8. (i, 328, note I).

58. i, 328, note I. Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -95-

Had aptness also been lost [as well as ableness], it is not grace tha~§ould work in us more than it doth in brute creatures.

Hooker must argue that Scripture cannot teach its own sufficiency, which therefore must be taught by something else, since it is not self­ evident.60 Hooker rejects the Roman Catholic appeal to tradition as the only way to come to the knowledge of the sufficiency of Scripture.

Nevertheless, he does recognize the importance of experience, which teaches us that the (current) authority of the church convinces people to give Scripture this place of honour:

The question then being by what means we are taught this; some answer that to learn it we have no other way than only tradition; as namely that so we believe because both we from our predecessors and they from theirs have so received. But is this enough? That which all men's experience teacheth them may not in any wise be denied. And by experience we all know that the first outward motive leading men so to esteem of the Scripture is the authority of God's Church.61

In this, Hooker was adding his echo to Augustine's famous dictum:

But should you meet with a person not believing the , how would you reply to him were he to say, I do not believe? For my part, I should ng believe the gospel except as moved by the Catholic church. 2

59. V, App. I, l (ii, 538).

60. III, viii, 13 (i, 375f); compare II, iv.

61. III, viii, 14 (i, 376).

62. Against the Epistle of Manichaeus i, 4, NPNF, 1st ser., iv, 131. This dictum was quoted by Luther, WA Bd 6, 561; Bd 10.2, 216; by Henry VIII, "the hearts of the faithful more ancient than the books," Assertio, 356; and by Calvin, Institutes I, 7, 3 (i, 76). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -96-

5. Reason criticizes Scripture

Equally shocking must have been Hooker's related view that human reason must somehow or other "stand above" Scripture to criticize it.

Many of the Reformers had held that Christ had abrogated the ceremonial law, including the commandment on the Sabbath, but Hooker held that, because of the relationship of Scripture and reason, some positive laws of God are mutable in the light of reason. And his account of the dependence of Scripture in some way on reason is a basis for a rejection of the view that Scripture gives an unalterable code of conduct. This thesis is of particular importance in the undermining of the Puritan platform as Hooker has defined it: even if church polity is defined in

Scripture, the church may be required and entitled to alter such definitions:

Although no laws but positive be mutable, yet all are not mutable which be positive. Positive laws are either permanent or else changeable, according as the matter itself is concerning which they were first made. Whether God or man be the maker of 1j1em, alteration they so far admit, as the matter doth exact. 6

In Book III, Hooker identifies such (positive) divine laws that are mutable when the end for which they were created is fulfilled in fact.

The ceremonial law was of this kind. 64 But there are cases where, even

63. I, xv, 1 (i, 273).

64. III, x, 2 (i, 385). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -97- though the end of the law is permanent, the law must be altered, as, for instance, the judicial law of theft. 65 In both cases, the alteration of a divine positive law is not only allowable but required, and is accomplished by human and rational means.

6. The consonance of reason and revelation, nature and grace

The systematic consonance of the two members of each of these pairs is apparent throughout Hooker's work, and links him to Thomas and the medieval tradition that rejected the views of some thirteenth century philosophers, like Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia, that .there are "two truths," one from reason, and another from faith, truths that do not threaten each other, because they have no real relationship. 66

For Thomas, as for Hooker, this is impossible. God is the source of nature and of grace; God's wisdom is the source of Scripture as much as human reason. This presumed consequence is, to speak anachronistically, a sort of Kantian "postulate" behind the conviction that reason can pronounce on matters covered in Scripture, since, in attending to the

"matter" of the thing, that is, the matter of the thing as seen through natural reason, one cannot collide with revelation. This "consonance" is visible in the high value Hooker placed on secular wisdom and pagan

65. III, x, 3 (i, 386).

66. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas D'Aquino, 274f. Compare: "now no truth can contradict any truth." II, vii, 7 (i, 327). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -98- philosophy, on the reasonableness of law, and on the integrity of nature.

All of the Reformers displayed their humanist heritage with a certain sort of pride, and quoted freely from Greek and Latin pagan authors. Hooker explicitly gives a value to this appeal to pagan authority. Like Thomas, he explicitly notes what "spiritual" knowledge the pagans could and did arrive at. The "wise and learned among the very heathen" acknowledge a First Cause, an Agent that "observeth in working a most exact order or law.1167 Hooker's examples include Homer and the Stoic philosophers. Sometimes the ancients made estimates that were a "near miss," such as those who identified Providence and

Destiny. 68 But the heathens never really escaped a polytheism of natural operation, though their philosophy pointed beyond polytheism.

It was the Christians who insisted on a monotheism. 69 The "paynims" caught a vision of the angels. 70 And, like those whom God instructed through revelation, some, judged farther from God, like Plato, aspired to a greater conformity with God through knowledge and virtue. 71 The

67. I, ii, 3 (i, 201).

68. I, iii, 4 (i, 210).

69. I, iii, 4 (i, 21 I).

70. I, iv, i (i, 213).

71. I, v, 3 (i, 216). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -99- heathen witness to law built into the structure of the universe: Hesiod made Themis (/us, "Law") to be a daughter of heaven and earth. 72 And

Hooker quotes Sophocles to illustrate his claim that one mark of the laws of reason is that they have always been known. 73

More daring still is Hooker's claim that Jesus' two precepts of charity have been found out "by discourse" like other "great mandates."

By degrees of discourse, "natural men" have attained to know (1) the existence of God, (2) God's properties, such as power, force, and wisdom, and (3) the relation of dependence of all things on God. This has led them to two corollaries, (a) prayer for aid, and (b) the appropriateness of exclusive worship. This amounts to the first of

Jesus' precepts of charity, the exclusive love of God. But "discourse" also leads to a recognition of the equality of all, by a "natural inducement," and to a recognition of a converse of the golden rule, which amounts to Jesus' second precept. Further, that all depends on these two laws, is corroborated by nature. "Wherefore, the natural measure whereby to judge our doings, is the sentence of Reason. 1174 We have already seen that Hooker, like Thomas and the patristic consensus, combined a high evaluation of classical pagan wisdom with a recognition that revelation was also necessary. What is apparent here is the

72. I, viii, 5 (i, 230).

73. I, viii, 9 (i, 233).

74. I, viii, 7, 8 (i, 230-233). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -100- genuineness of the spiritual value of reason in the hands of the best.

Law was a consistent topic of discussion in the Reformation period.

Especially after Calvin, it was recognized as having three uses. The first two uses were for the time being, waiting for the eschaton, in which interim law both restrained evil and educated. The third use of the law was its continuing relevance, but without coerciveness, in the kingdom to come.75 This analysis owed much to the New Testament and to

Augustine. But Hooker's treatment of law was a clear departure from these Reformation themes, although it included them. Hooker borrowed much, and acknowledged the debt, to Thomas' treatise of law. 76 Law was not to be considered negative in the historical present and positive in the eschatological future, as it was for the Reformers after Calvin; for

Hooker, Law is always primarily of positive value, and it is eminently reasonable, or ought to be. In the first place, laws of reason "are investigable by Reason, without the help of Revelation supernatural and divine. 1177 But, conversely, the data of revelation are reasonable;

75. Institutes II, 7, 6-15 (i, 354-364). Hooker, in one way or another, recognizes all three uses, but the organization of his system of laws owes little to Calvin's. For the parallels with Calvin, see the treatment of "depravity" in chapter IV below.

76. Summa Theologiae I-II, qq. 90ff. Hooker cites Thomas at I, iii, I, note (i, 205, note 3). Hooker ignores Thomas' treatment of the old and new law, and adds a section on angelic law. In addition, his category of the second law eternal is not found in Thomas. It seems to derive from Thomas' Neoplatonist sources. See chapter VI.

77. I, viii, 9 (i, 233). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -101- religion and virtue are reasonable; to think otherwise, that religion and virtue are "only as men will account of them," that is, relative and arbitrary, is a "brutish view." This remark is an indirect slam at a view such as that of the Puritans that would make secular laws arbitrary, and therefore, any such view of theirs that would make divine positive law arbitrary. 78 This "positivistic" view would be shared by

Libertines and Puritans, Hooker suggests. But the truth is rather that

"[the general] law of nature and the moral law of Scripture are in the substance of law all one.1179

Other Reformers had identified similarities between human positive law and the law promulgated in Scripture, but there seems no hint in such authors of Hooker's view that all laws, natural or positive, come from God, and are therefore reasonable and divine. Bullinger gives an account of human law that suggests consonances with Scripture, but it falls completely short of Hooker' account:

Now whosoever doth confer the laws and constitutions of princes, kings, emperors and Christian magistrates, which are to be found either in the Code, or in the book of Digests or Pandects, in the volume of the New Constitutions, or else in any other books of good laws of sundry nations, with these judicial laws of God; he must needs confess, that they draw veSU near in likeness, and do very well agree one with another.

78. I, x, I (i, 239).

79. III, ix, 2 (i, 282).

80. Henry Bullinger, Decades III, 8 (ii, 280-1). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -102-

Conversely, Hooker finds it easy to use scriptural illustrations for philosophical positions. This is clearly more than the biblicism of the age, being based on his conviction that Scripture displays the paths of reason. Thus, for instance, the distinction between mandatory, permissive and admonitory laws, is illustrated from the Bible. 81 Hooker uses I Timothy 6.8 to illustrate Aristotle's dictum that happiness is the end of the individual life, and happiness in this world at that. 82

The story of Cain and Abel is used to show the need for law to restrain deep-rooted malice. 83

In the Preface, Hooker boldly uses a principle of nature, in this case a general psychological principle, to illuminate a spiritual problem: the individual discretion that is the beginning of development of mature judgement leads (improperly) to the scruples that make matters otherwise indifferent sinful to the scrupulous. 84 This same principle is used later to help establish Hooker's thesis that "subjective persuasion" is not a hallmark of truth. Confusion on this score is behind the Puritan mistake, that will eventually "oppose their

81. I, viii, 8 (i, 232).

82. I, x, 2 (i, 240).

83. I, x, 3 (i, 241).

84. Preface iii, I (i, 143). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -103- methinketh unto the orders of the Church of England. 1185

A theme that will become prominent in the response to the Christian

Letter is addressed already in the Preface to the Lawes: the reasonable person proportions the degree of credence to the degree of credibility.

This is true in both matters of reason and matters of revelation, since both reason and revelation have a single divine source, as two ways the

"Spirit leadeth into truth." Reason is offered universally to the human race, and revelation to "some few," but the basic principle of reasonable behaviour in both is the same. 86 This rather bold statement is, of course, related to the unusual tack Hooker took on the question of Christian assurance, and we will have to return to it in due course.

For Hooker, human nature has a natural integrity: through knowledge it may grow to glory (with the help of grace). The human being begins with no knowledge, and proceeds to full and complete knowledge of God such as the angels now possess. 87 Human nature shares various faculties with lower forms of life, but "the soul of man [is] capable of a more divine perfection" than those of plants or animals, since the human being has intellectual capacity. 88 It still has a long way to go; in this, Ramus was very naive, and Aristotle more sound, for

85. IV, iv, 2 (i, 430).

86. Preface iii, IO (i, l 50f).

87. I, vi, l (i, 217).

88. I, vi, 3 (i, 217f). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -104-

the human intellect requires a long process of "right helps of true art

and learning. 1189 But the natural process of learning to judge between

"truth and error, good and evil" is on the path to the knowledge of God,

and in this there is a real continuity between the (apparently secular)

knowledge of virtue and the blissful knowledge of God.90

A nineteenth century editor of Hooker summed up this harmony of

reason and revelation in Hooker as follows: Hooker's basic principle is

the concurrence and co-operation, each in its due place, of all possible means of knowledge for man's direction. Take what you please, reason or Scripture, your own reason or that of others, private judgement or general consent, nature or grace, one presupposes -- it is a favourite word with him -- the existence of others, and is not intended to do its work of illumination and guidance without them: and the man who elects to go by one alon

89. I, vi, 3 (i, 218). This view of Hooker's is corroborated by a current observation: "One of the fundamental propositions of the sociology of knowledge is that the plausibility, in the sense of what people actually find credible, of views of reality depends upon the social support these receive. Put more simply, we obtain our notions about the world originally from other human beings, and these notions continue to be plausible to us in very large measure because others continue to affirm them." Peter Berger, A Rumour of Angels: Modern Society and the Rediscovery of the Supernatural (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1969), 42ff. Quoted by Dewey Wallace, Puritans and Predestination, 191.

90. I, vi, 5 (i, 219).

91. R.W. Church (ed.), Hooker: Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Book I (Oxford, 1885), xvii. Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -105-

7. Grace does not destroy but perfects nature

In a Christian man there is, first, Nature; secondly, Corruption, perverting Na~'2re; thirdly, Grace correcting, and amending Corruption.

Supernatural endowments are an advancement, they are no extinguishment of that nature whereto they are given.9 3

These various correspondences between grace and nature, reason and

Scripture are summed up in Hooker's borrowing of the Thomistic and scholastic principle that grace does not destroy but perfects nature. 94

Grace being also the beginning of glory in us, as we have seen, the same pattern is also claimed, by Thomas, for the relation of nature and glory: "nature is not done away, but perfected, by glory. 1195 From what has gone before, it will be clear that Hooker frequently adopts the thesis that grace perfects nature. Less frequently, but equally

92. Sermon IV (iii, 652).

93. V, Iv, 6 (ii, 241).

94. Summa Theologiae I, q. I, a. 8 (i, 6). This view, although perhaps never denied by the English Reformers, was certainly not in sympathy with their position. Compare this recent assessment of Calvin: "God [for Calvin] does not co-operate with nature. He supplants nature with a new will and does this by effacing nature. God does not aid the will already in nature; he gives man a new will outside nature. It is not nature, or flesh, or the will, that is merely 'strengthened'; conversion means a new will altogether. Our natural will is abolished -- 'effaced'." R.T. Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism to 1649 (Oxford, 1979), 21. Calvin referred to the passage from Ezekiel 11.19, and 36.26, on replacing a "heart of stone" with a "heart of flesh." Institutes II, 3, 6 (i, 297). This text, and this thought, had also been expressed in Cranmer's articles of 1553, in Article X "Of Grace." This article was omitted from the Thirty-Nine Articles.

95. Summa Theologiae 11-11,q. 26, a. 13, sed contra (ii, 1304). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -106- clearly, he extends this to the stronger thesis, that glory is a perfection of nature:

Our Sovereign Good or Blessedness [is] that wherein the highest degree of all our perfection consisteth, that which being once attained unto there can rest nothing further to be desired; and therefore with it our souls are fully content and satisfi§g, in that they have they rejoice, and thirst for no more.

But this double thesis is apparent throughout Hooker's writings.

Scripture, Hooker writes, is "the evidence of God's own testimony added to the natural assent of reason"; 97 by Scripture, the human

"light of natural understanding" is perfected:

Any man, what place or calling soever he hold in the , may have [by Scripture] the light of his natural understanding so perfected, that the one being relieved by the other, there can want no part of needful instr~~tion unto any good work which God himself requireth.

In one important analogy, sense itself is linked (by proportion)

with the perfection "prophetical revelation" or divine law gives to

reason: Hooker points out that, just as the senses teach the need for

food, and the reason the need for temperance in the taking of food, so divine law teaches the significance of temperance for the future life,

and by analogy, the significance of bread and wine in the eucharist,

96. I, xi, I (i, 253).

97. I, xii, I (i, 262).

98. I, xiv, 5 (i, 271). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -107- which is an extension of bodily f eeding. 99 As we have seen, Scripture often states a law of nature. IOO Against Cartwright's denial of the authority of human testimony, Hooker affirms that the authority of human testimony, within proper limits, is not destroyed but perfected by being confirmed in Scripture. 1O 1 If the Puritan view were to be accepted, then

Scripture would have to be seen to destroy nature, but God, in giving

Scripture, does not abrogate the law of nature "which is an infallible knowledge imprinted in the minds of all the children of men.11102

In on:e place, the three related theses of grace presupposing nature and perfecting it, of the need for revelation because of the difficulty and importance of spiritual topics, and the elusiveness of some necessary truths from rational inquiry are all enunciated together:

What the Church of God standeth bound to know or do, the same in part nature teacheth. And because nature can teach them but only in part, neither so fully as is requisite for man's salvation, nor so easily as to make the way plain and expedite that many may come to the knowledge of it and so be saved; therefore in Scripture hath God both collected the most necessary things that the school of nature teacheth unto that end, and revealeth also whatsoever we neither could with safety be ignorant of, nor at all be insfh~cted in but by the supernatural revelation from him.

99. I, xv, 4 (i, 276); xvi, 7 (i, 283).

100. II, i, 2 (i, 287f). See also I, xii, xiii (i, 262ff); III, ix, 1 (i, 380f).

101. II, vii, 2 (i, 318).

I 02. II, viii, 6 (i, 334f).

103. III, iii, 3 (i, 355f). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -108-

So Paul's preaching to the pagan Festus is an emblem of the principle that nature needs grace for its perfection, but this is not to deny the principle that grace, when given, does not by-pass nature:

Which example maketh manifest what elsewhere the same Apostle teacheth, namely that nature hath need of grace [I Corinthians 2.14], whereunto I hope wfoai-e not opposite, by holding that grace hath use of nature.

When Hooker comes to defend the prayer in the Book of Common Prayer for delivery from all adversity against the charge that it goes further than any promise in Scripture, Hooker uses the principle that Scripture does not make what is found in nature void: we may pray for things not promised in Scripture, so long as they are not impossible in Nature. 105

As it turns out, many of the customs of the English Church have their ground in nature. Temporalities are defended by an "axiom of nature," that "men are eternally bound to honour God with their substance, 11106and wish to perpetuate good things. 107 Nature, God and

Christ all teach the appropriateness and principles of rest and festival solemni ties. 108 These are based on "the very law of nature." 1o 9 As

104. III, viii, 6 (i, 367).

105. V, xlviii, 4 (ii, 202f).

106. V, lxxix, 1 (ii, 484).

107. V, lxxix, 3 (ii. 485).

108. V, lxx, 5 (ii, 387).

109. V, lxx, 9 (ii, 390). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -109- well, public days of fasting have their ground in the law of na ture. 11O

For nature is the general ground of both fasts and f easts. 111 The office of the burial of the dead is commended "first to shew that love towards the party deceased which nature requireth." 112 In fact, in all church hierarchy and order, there is a mutual assistance of the hierarchy of nature in means and ends:

And therefore the Church, being the most absolute of all his works was in reason to be also ordered with like harmony, that what he worketh might no less in grace than in nature be effected by hands and instruments [that is, ministe s] duly subordinated unto the power of his own Spirit. 11

In the Dublin Fragments, even God's gratuitous election falls under this scholastic principle:

Predestination to life, although it be infinitely ancienter than the actual work of creation, doth notwithstanding presuppose the purpose of creation. . . . Whatsoever the purpose of creation therefore doth establish, the same by the purpose of predestination may be perfected, but in no case disannulled and taken away. Seeing then that the natural freedom of men's will was contained in the purpose of creating man, (for this freedom is a part of man's nature,) grace contained under the purpose of predestinating man may per feet, and doth, but cannot possibly destroy the liberty of man's will [that is, as human beings are considered abstracted from their current state of sin; but now that we live unavoidably under the aspect of the Fall,] predestination in us also which are now sinful, doth not

110. V, lxxii, 1 (ii, 407f).

111. V, lxxii, 15 (ii, 423).

112. V, lxxv, 2 (ii, 438).

113. V, lxxvi, 9 (ii 454). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -110-

imply the bestowing of other natures than creation at the first gave, but the bestowing of gifts, to take away thoi impediments which are grown into nature through sin. 14

8. The Adiaphora

Anglican self-understanding has of ten explained itself in terms of the triple appeal to Scripture, reason and tradition. Quite frequently, this triple appeal has been attributed to Richard Hooker. 115 The view that Hooker was a witness for the authority of tradition was identified at least as early as 's Conference with Fisher the

Jesuit. 116 Hooker could never have accepted this description of the

Church of England: for him, as we have seen, "tradition" is a word with negative connotation, usually associated with the Roman Catholic attempt to erect something "merely human" as an authority independent of and

114. V, App. I, 2 (ii, 539). For another treatment of Hooker on the principle of the perfection of nature by grace, see Olivier Loyer, L'Anglicanisme de Richard Hooker (Lille, 1979) i, 363-366.

115. To let a few stand for many, the following authors might be noted: Paget, Introduction, 226; Horton Davies, Worship and Theology in England from Cranmer to Hooker, 1534-1603 (Princeton, 1970), xv; John E. Booty, "Hooker and Anglicanism," 208 (twice), 211, 222. It may of course be true that, in some sense of "tradition," Hooker supports the attribution, but his extant works in no way support the nearly constant claim of Hooker as the author of this formula.

116. William Laud, Conference with Fisher 6th ed. (Oxford, 1849), IOlff. Laud rejects the attempts of Allerton and the "Romanists" to claim Hooker's support for their views of "tradition," but he himself identifies Hooker's phrase "authority of man" with tradition, and thus may be a source for the commonplace about Hooker and Scripture, Reason and Tradition. Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -111- alongside Scripture. 117

Hooker does recognize three principles relevant to decisions in spiritual matters, and describes them fully only once, in the fifth

Book:

Be it a matter of the one kind or of the other, what Scripture doth plainly deliver, to that the first place of credit and obedience is due; the next whereunto is whatsoever any man can necessarily conclude by force of reason; after these the voice of the Church succeedeth. That which the Church by her ecclesiastical authority shall probably think and define to be true or good, must in congruity of rgason overrule all other inferior judgments whatsoever. 11

Although the formulation occurs only once, it clearly underlies much of what Hooker argues about the particular disputed customs of the

117. I, xiii, 2 (i, 265); I, xiv, 5 (i, 271); II, viii, 6 (i, 334); III, viii, 14 (i, 376); V, lxv, 2 (ii, 318). In "matters indifferent," Hooker does recognize that long usage and custom are important, but does not call such "tradition," II, v, 7 (i, 308). He commends "the weight of that long experience, which the world hath thereof with consent and good liking." IV, xiv, I (i, 481) In one passage, "tradition" is redefined as custom deriving from the earliest ages of Christianity, and in this sense, it is acceptable and valuable: "Lest therefore the name of tradition should be offensive to any, considering how far by some it hath been and is abused, we mean by traditions. ordinances made in the prime of Christian religion, established with that authority which Christ hath left to his Church for matters indifferent, and in that consideration requisite to be observed. . . . So that traditions ecclesiastical are not rudely and in gross to be shaken off, because the inventors of them were men." V, lxv, 2 (ii, 318). This shows that "traditions" as rightly understood is one part of what is included under those matters binding "by the authority of the church" [that is, the patristic church], but does not include those binding because of a current or medieval exercise of church authority in these matters indifferent.

118. V, viii, 2 (ii, 34). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -112-

Church of England. The "voice of the church" is clearly related to what he calls "the authority of man" in the second Book:

By a man's authority we here understand the force which his word hath for the assurance of another's mind that buildeth upon it. . . . The strength of man's authority is affirmatively such that the weightiest affairs in the world depend thereon. In ju1fffent and justice are not hereupon proceedings grounded?

The first two of these three principles are familiar from this examination. Reason and Scripture are not precisely co-equal, as a quotation of Hooker's formula, or one adapted from it, might suggest.

Rather, reason and Scripture are related precisely as nature and grace, not co-equal, but consonant, both having a validity, and there being no radical conflict. Hooker can claim both as authorities, not because he is a "Rationalist" but because he adopts the Thomistic view that there are not "two truths": God is the source both of reason and of revelation, and therefore they do not contradict each other. Scripture contains general laws that reason can discover, for good cause. And in doing so, it simply perfects nature without negating it. But reason can criticize Scripture, both to give it credibility in the first place, and to determine the meaning of obscure or difficult passages. Thus,

Scripture is above reason, in the sense that it delivers saving knowledge that reason is not competent to consider; but this priority does not mean that Scripture is opposed to or immune from human reason.

119. II, vii, 2 (i, 3 l 8f). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -113-

The third principle is of a very different order: human decision is appropriate in those areas where Scripture and reason do not order human religious affairs. And in this sphere, human "experience" is important. For "nature, Scripture, and experience" are usually consonant in what they teach, for instance, the wisdom of seeking an end of contentions by a binding adjudication. l20 In this case, "the equity of reason, the law of nature, God, and man" all favour the same course.

But human decision, at whatever level, is appropriate in the area of "matters accessory," the adiaphora, and not in the area of "matters necessary":

We teach that whatsoever is unto salvation termed necessary by way of excellency, whatsoever it standeth all men upon to know or do that they may be saved, ... of which sort the articles of Christian faith and the sacraments of the Church of Christ are: all such things if Scripture did not comprehend, the Church of God should not be able to measure out the length and the breadth of that way wherein for ever she is to walk, heretics and schismatics never ceasing some to abridge, some to enlarge, all to pervert and obscure the same. But as for those things that are accessory hereunto, those things that so belong to the way of salvation, as to alter them is no otherwise to change that way, than a pat~ is changed by altering only the uppermost face thereof. 1 1

These "matters accessory" to those things that are necessary to salvation as Scripture (and reason) have defined them, include certain

120. Preface vi, 1 (i, 166).

121. III, iii, 3, 4 (i, 356). See II, iv, 4 (i, 296) for another description of "the necessary" and "the indifferent." For a high estimation of the importance of the concept as "a fundamental concept in Anglican theology," see Olivier Loyer, L'Anglicanisme de Richard Hooker (Lille, 1979) i, 126. Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -114- ceremonial matters, such as the sign of the Cross at Baptism, which are explicitly called "matters indiff erent. 11122 That the realm of the

"indifferent" was not limited to those things "neither commanded nor forbidden" in Scripture, but included those things neither required nor prohibited by reason, is clear from Hooker's use of the term "a thing arbitrary" in his general consideration of the origin of government, in

Book I:

The case of man's nature standing therefore as it doth, some kind of regiment the Law of Nature doth require; yet the kinds thereof being many, Nature tieth ~ot to any one, but lea veth the choice as a thing arbitrary. 12

The category of "the indifferent," in between the required and the prohibited, was one derived originally from the Stoics. Paul of Tarsus had made use of the idea. 124 Thomas Aquinas had recognized the notion, and had used it in his scriptural commentaries. 125 It had entered the

122. V, lxv, 2, 11, (ii, 318, 328).

123. I, x, 5 (i, 243). That is, there are adiaphora in the area of Scripture, and there are adiaphora in the area of reason: for instance, while the precise form of polity is not dictated by either Scripture or reason, reason requires that there be a political system of some kind.

124. A.G. Dickens, The English Reformation (New York, 1974), 78f.

125. [Deuteronomy 4.2] "Hence in adding traditions they acted against the command of God and so were not good. To this one may answer that this word of is taken to mean that you shall not add anything contrary or alien to the word which I shall speak. But to add certain things not contrary was lawful for them, namely, certain solemn days and the like, as was done in the time of Mordecai and of Judith, in memory of the blessing they received of God." Commentary on Saint Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -115-

logic of the Reformation at least as early as Luther and Melanchthon.

The notion had entered the English Reformation as early as the Ten

Articles, and the work of Thomas Starkey. 126

The notion had already figured prominently in the "first Vestiarian

controversy" sparked by 's reluctance to wear the disputed

episcopal vestments to be consecrated -- a reluctance that was overcome

by soothing reminders from his allies that these vestments were "matters

indifferent," and a brief stay in the Tower. 127 Hooker's linkage of

church authority and "matters indifferent" had a particularly vivid

precedent in that case. Cranmer and the Council were quite prepared to

use the force that goes with authority in determining matters otherwise

indifferent. had incorporated the idea into his justification of compulsory fast days, in the fourth homily of the second book of homilies. There he had specifically defined the area of

Paul's Epistle to the Galatians by St Thomas Aquinas (Albany, 1966), 22. Later in the commentary, Thomas distinguishes a sense in which circumcision is indifferent "from the general nature of the work," but not indifferent "if you consider the intention of one acting." (p. 157) This distinction might have helped a Puritan rejoinder to Hooker, since they might well argue that, from the point of view of the intention of the one acting, matters polluted were no longer simply indifferent, whatever they might be in themselves.

126. Dickens, The English Reformation, 180.

127. See Bernard Verkamp, The Indifferent Mean (Athens, Ohio, 1977), 149-151. Verkamp notes that in the English Reformation, adiaphorism was first used in debates about ceremonies, then in matters of action, and finally in relation to doctrinal matters, pp. 36, 38, 94. Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -116-

"things indifferent," and claimed that the church had authority in this area. In the case of abstinence from flesh, this church order was, he noted, particularly beneficial to the fishing industry. 128 Whitgift had introduced the concept into the debate about church government, in his debate with Cartwright. 129 Hooker broadened the notion of "things indifferent," by considerably expanding, at least in principle, the

128. Certain Sermons, 297, 301, 303. Cranmer had already set the stage for Hooker's strong claims for church authority. In the fifth homily of the first book, he had insisted on the validity of human laws as well as of God's commandments. But he had also argued the opposite position in exposing the idolatry of the pharisees in elevating human laws to the same level as divine law, and had associated late medieval practices with these pharisaical actions. pp. 54, 55, 57. For the "conformists" like Cranmer and Parker, and for Hooker, it was important to note that the church authority regulating among things indifferent was legitimate, but did not bind the conscience. See Bernard Verkamp, The lndif ferent Mean: adiaphorism in the English Reformation to 1554 (Athens, Ohio, 1977), 70ff.

129. John Whitgift, Works (Cambridge, 1851), i, 363, 366. See W.D.J. Cargill Thompson, in G.V. Bennett and J.D. Walsh, Essays in History (London, 1966), 50-54. Cargill Thompson, whose general tendency involved the view that Hooker was unoriginal, does not note that there are adiaphora with respect to reason as well as with respect to Scripture. In this distinction, Hooker went beyond Whitgift. In another place, Cargill Thompson admitted a development on Hooker's part; he noted that Hooker broadened the philosophical formulation, by importing another traditional theme: "what distinguishes Hooker from his contemporaries is ... his attempt to give a broader philosophical formulation of these two concepts by relating the concept of 'things indifferent' to the traditional medieval theory of the hierarchy of divine law." W.D.J. Cargill Thompson, "The Philosopher of the Politic Society," in Speed Hill, Studies in Richard Hooker (Cleveland & London, 1972), 17. Leslie Croxford puts it more generously, and more adequately: "Hooker took Whitgift's essentially negative arguments and gave them a firm foundation in reason." "The Originality of Hooker's Work," Proceedings of the Leeds Philosophical and Historical Society xv (1973), 29. Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -117- notion of what Scripture said and required, since reason had to be

involved, as we have noted, l30 and by insisting on the church's proper

authority, like any political society, to regulate such matters.

Calvin had included the notion of "things indifferent" in the

Institutes, most conspicuously in a well-known passage that showed a real combination of humorous exaggeration and passionate concern:

The third part of Christian freedom lies in this: regarding outward things that are of themselves "indifferent," we are not bound before God by any religious obligation preventing us from sometimes using them and other times not using them, indifferently. And the knowledge of this freedom is very necessary for us, for if it is lacking, our consciences will have no repose and there will be no end to superstitions. Today we seem to many to be unreasonable because we stir up discussion over the unrestricted eating of meat, use of holidays and of vestments, and such things, which seem to them vain frivolities. But these matters are more important than is commonly believed. For when consciences once ensnare themselves, they enter a long and inextricable maze, not easy to get out of. If a man begins to doubt if he may use linen for sheets, shirts, handkerchiefs, and napkins, he will afterward be uncertain also about hemp; finally, doubt will even arise over tow. For he will turn over in his mind whether he can sup without napkins, or go without a handkerchief. If any man should consider daintier food

130. Cargill Thompson seems to fail to notice to what extent Hooker did broaden the whole platform of the debate by his revival of the scholastic pattern of the relation between reason and revelation. Hooker certainly took the debate out of the realm of the rhetorically convenient in his daring claims for the limiting force of reason, as well as the liberty and guidance reason offered, even in "matters divine." Cargill Thompson, "The Philosophy of the 'Politic Society'," 16. It is not clear what logical (as opposed to rhetorical) value Cargill Thompson hopes to purchase with his refrain about Hooker's "eclecticism." The question is not where Hooker derived the ideas, but whether he can account for them cogently. In fact, Hooker maintains a clear independence from his sources. Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -118-

unlawful, in the end he will not be at peace before God, when he eats either black bread or common victuals, while it occurs to him that he could sustain his body on even coarser foods. If he boggles at sweet wine, he will not with clear conscience drink even flat wine, and finally he will not dare touch water if sweeter and cleaner than other water. To sum up, he will come to the point of considering it w rng to step upon a straw across his path, as the saying goes.13

But Hooker and Calvin generally use the concept in opposite ways.

Calvin argues "indifference" in order either to allow Christian liberty or to avoid certain practices, lest consciences ensnare themselves, whereas Hooker uses the notion so that Christians can observe them freely, or rather so that the church can require them freely. Hooker argues that such matters indifferent may be regulated by the church, and speaks primarily of ceremonies, with no emphasis on the question of consciences. Calvin argues that matters indifferent must remain indifferent, that is should not be regulated by the church, 132 but is not talking primarily of ceremonies. He does however, refer to weak consciences, 133 and explicitly excludes papist services. 134

131. Institutes III, 19, 7 (i, 838f). See also 19, 4 (i, 836). At 19, 8 (i, 840), Calvin quotes Romans 14.22 in a fashion opposite to that of the English Puritans!

132. Institutes III, 19, 9 (i, 84 lf). Calvin does later recognize that the church may regulate and enforce the determination of things otherwise indifferent. Institutes IV, 10, 30; 17, 43. Verkamp, Indijferent Mean, 65f.

133. Institutes III, 19, 10 (i, 842). See the discussion of both the offence of the weak and the offence of the Pharisees, 19, 11 (i, 843f).

134. Institutes III, 19, 12 (i, 849f). That is, because they Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -119-

For Hooker, Puritan arguments from the Pauline dictum that

"whatever is not commanded in Scripture is sin" would rule out all indifferent matters. 135 This would include those things which are considered "expedient" in Scripture, the expedient being a part of the group of things indifferent. 136

The opposite error that might be made in interpreting Hooker is the assumption that because something is indifferent, it is inessential or unimportant. 137 This would be a misconstruction of Hooker, when one takes into account those things which turn out to be "indifferent" but ordained by the church. For Hooker these matters include almost all that is a subject of debate between him and the Puritans. Even episcopacy was such a matter, -- even though it probably had a Dominica!, and therefore divine origin, -- since some churches have deliberately, and some accidentally, abolished bishops. But, for Hooker, as he writes in Book VIII, these are matters that are to be decided definitively by

"the authority of the church," -- in the case of the Church of England, by the Sovereign in parliament, which included Church Convocations, --

offend the weak.

135. II, iv, 3 (i, 295f).

136. II, iv, 4 (i, 296).

137. S.W. Sykes, The Integrity of Anglicanism (London, 1978), 53f, on the of adiaphora generally, as leading to indifference in doctrinal matters. Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -120- and they are to be so decided precisely because they are not inessential or unimportant.

9. Peter Munz on Reason and Revelation

Hooker has occasionally been accused of exalting reason at the expense of revelation's proper sphere. Typical of this kind of appraisal is the older work of Peter Munz. Munz has done invaluable service in pointing out precise passages of St Thomas on which Hooker's argument seems to depend, although he seems to make nothing of the passage quoted above from the prima secundae of the Summa Theologiae and elsewhere showing Hooker's consensus with Thomas on the theology of grace. But Munz concludes that Hooker extends Thomas' "naturalism" to the extent that human reason dominates divine revelation, and the human

"faith" that receives it:

Hooker can say that there are bishops who are to other bishops for causes which 'the wisdom both of God and man' has approved. [footnote: VII,viii,5; cp. the following quotation: 'Inequality of pastors is an both divine and profitable.' VII,xiii,5] He is writing as if the two were really one. Hooker, then, evolved in the end a conception of a truly omnipotent reason. The fine and important distinction which he had derived from St Thomas between reason and faith as two supplementary methods of finding natural and divine law respectively, was wiped out. Reason now was held to extend beyond the sphere of the natural order; it was really equivalent to faith in that its commands extended over the same sphere of the supernatural order and were considered equivalent with divine commands and with revelation: ' ... of His [God's] approbation the evidence is sufficient if either Himself have by revelation in His word warranted it, or we by some discourse of reason find it good of itself.' [VII,xi,10] Hooker had thus at Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -121-

last established the iomplete of human reason over the whole of lif e.13

While there is a grain of truth in seeing Hooker as a predecessor of the Cambridge Platonists and the movement, it is simply false to see him as an ultra Broad Churchman, collapsing reason and revelation, or nature and grace. Hooker could speak of the "wisdom of

God and man" without collapsing faith and reason.

Enough has been shown above to make it clear that Hooker recognized the constant need of God's grace and revelation for human salvation and the knowledge in which this salvation consists. What

Hooker did insist on, as we have shown, was the nearly supreme role of human reason (as healed or aided by grace), not in those matters necessary to salvation, but in the area of "matters indifferent," including the very matter of Church polity to which Munz refers. In this sense, reason has not invaded the area of "divine law" as Munz thinks, but rather has determined, by judgement and the consensus of the community, a form of ecclesial , which is for that very reason consonant with divine will. Munz's position (like that of Gunnar

Hillerdal, which we are to examine next, and to which Munz's conclusions are otherwise almost diametrically opposed) assumes an "either-or" for reason and faith, when what Hooker has stressed is a continuity, that is a "both-and." Thus by failing to notice that Hooker delineates the area

138. Peter Munz, The Place of Hooker in the History of Thought (London, 1952), 6lf. Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -122- of the adiaphora for the exercise of reason, thereby ruling out conflict with those matters "necessary for salvation," and by making the commonplace assumption that reason and faith have separate spheres and that because reason makes judgements in spiritual matters it must therefore have displaced faith, Munz seems likely to have misrepresented

Hooker's position rather seriously.

IO. Gunnar Hillerdal on Reason and Revelation

The only book to be devoted entirely to Hooker's view of reason and revelation comes to very different conclusions about Hooker's account.

After an extensive survey of Hooker's positions on a number of topics, the book concludes:

Hooker actually failed in his attempt to reconcile reason with revelation. The solution means, from a principle point of view, that he required the submission of reason under revelation. Hooker interprets revelation, particularly Christ's mission, in a manner that permits him to speak of a new reason in the Christian who partakes of Christ. This is a kind of reason, however, that differs very much from reason without grace. Hooker claims that man "by steps and degrees" is turned into another man. The soul is by the grace of God elevated to a higher, supernatural level. This perspective, however, actually means that one perspective is put against another. The harmony established between reason and revelation concerns only the reason of the convert. In other words, one must believe in God and in Christ's merciful action on man in order to understand that faith and reason cooperate harmonically .

. . . Hooker's philosophical failure is evident. . .. The final step taken by Hooker is, thus, the step towards a kind of mysticism. He cannot define the work of grace because he all the time presupposes that it is irrational. ... Hooker's attempted solution is interesting from a Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -123-

psychological point of view, althoui8.,~ many would probably characterize it as a pious delusion.

This "irrationalistic" Hooker is almost exactly the opposite of the triumphalist "rationalist" that Peter Munz found, and it will be clear that the treatment of Hillerdal disagrees at almost every point with that we have adopted. While we must agree that the reason Hooker exalts is "right reason," that is reason aided by grace, it is a serious mistake to think that this grace applies only to the "converted," although certain forms of English Protestant piety may have suggested that later: for Hooker, as we have seen, divine grace aids the reason of the pagan and of the inexplicit convert. But Hillerdal has done us a favour: he has shown that if we deny or ignore the principle that grace does not destroy but perfects nature, then we will likely not notice the difference between gratia sanans and gratia elevans, and failing to mark this distinction will amount to blurring the difference between justification, which cleary exhibits the effects of gratia sanans, and sanctification, which clearly exhibits the effects of gratia elevans, a difference Calvin and the English Calvinists, if not the earlier English

Lutherans, acknowledged. As well, we will likely ignore the integrity of a nature that points to its own need for grace, in pointing to an infinite end beyond itself; and, therefore, we will likely not notice that nature and grace, Scripture and reason are, although different, not acting in alien spheres.

Because he fails to notice that Hooker clearly points to the need

139. Hillerdal, Reason and Revelation, 148ff. Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -124- for elevating grace precisely because the creature has an identified end which is beyond his finite means, Hillerdal makes Hooker out to be a sort of Pelagian of Paradisal Man: Hillerdal assumes that Hooker approached the belief that an Adam free from sin would not need either revelation or any other form of God's grace to achieve his divinely given goal:

This thought points in the direction that if man had not sinned, he would have been able to perform f~Bt which he now never is capable of doing, i.e. approach God.

At times, Hillerdal seems to recognize the two-fold need of grace, and

the implication that Adam in Paradise was not naturally capax Dei in

every way:

Man's nature is capable of God merely to a certain degree. The natural reason must be elevate1 to a higher state by God's supernah1ral action on man. 1 1

Man's nature must be supplied by supernatural gifts. Without divine action man will never be saved since his natural talents do not provide knowledge enough. The divine law must supply what is missing. Scripture must give additional ~nowJ~~ge to that which the natural light of reason provides.

But Hillerdal does not seem to make use of the distinction which

he identifies:

140. Hillerdal, Reason and Revelation, 62. Surprisingly enough, Marshall seems to accept the same view on Hooker's position; see John S. Marshall, Hooker and the Anglican Tradition, 11 lf.

141. Hillerdal, Reason and Revelation, 72.

142. Ibid., 75. Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -125-

Both aspects are combined inasmuch as Hooker thinks that man's capacity of mind was weakened in the fall. Before the fall, Adam was in quite another way capable of God. Then no revelation seemed to be necessary. . . . Hooker claims that if Adam had not sinned, there would have existed a natural wa4'. of man's growth toward more and more spiritual maturity. I 3

Thus Hillerdal quotes Hooker as if Hooker were a sort of Adamic

Pelagian; in fact, at times, Hooker might seem to deny the need pre­ fallen Adam had for God's revelation:

In the natural path of everlasting life the first beginning is that ability of doing good, which God in the day of man's creation endued him with; from hence obedience unto the will of his Creator, absolute righteousness and integrity in all his actions; and last of all the justice of God rewarding the worthiness of his deserts with the crown of eternal glory. Had Adam continued in his first estate, this k!d been the way of life unto him and all his posterity. I

It should be noted that Hooker here explicitly refers to "the first beginning," not the whole process of Adam's salvation, and in fact explicitly identifies a "reward" of eternal glory that comes from Adam's works. But it must be admitted that he does not in this passage explicitly identify the divine aid that is necessary for Adam, even apart from his sin, to do what he ought that he may be rewarded. In

Thomistic terms, he also does not ref er to the necessity of God's aid for "surpassing good," the good of infused virtue, ref erred to in the passage from Thomas quoted above; he does, however, refer to what "man

143. Hillerdal, Reason and Revelation, 72.

144. I, xi, 5 (i, 259f). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -126- by his natural endowments could wish and do proportionate to his nature," the good of acquired virtue. In other passages, Hooker does clearly identify this second (internal) operation of grace and revelation:

This last and highest estate of perfection whereof we speak is received of men in the nature of a Reward. Rewards do always presuppose such duties performed as are rewardable. Our natural means therefore unto blessedness are our works; nor is it possible that Nature should ever find any other way to salvation than only this. . .. Seeing then all flesh is guilty of that for which God hath threatened eternally to punish, what possibility is there this way to be saved? ... Had Adam continued in his first estate, this had been the way of life unto him and all his posterity. Wherein I confess notwithstanding with the wittiest of the school-divines [Duns Scotus], ... God could no way have been bound to requite man's labours in so large and ample a manner as human felicity doth import . . . . Howsoever God did propose this reward, we that were to be rewarded must have done that which is required at our hands; we failing in the one, it were in nature an impossibility that the other should be looked for. The light of nature is never able to find out any way of obtaining the reward of bliss, but fl; performing exactly the duties and works of righteousness. 5

This earlier passage shows that Hooker is aware of the need of

God's generosity and graciousness, to off er salvation as the reward for the works of the redeemed, and "that reason must rely on the revelation of duties" and is limited to identifying the works that are to be done.

The reason here limited is clearly reason healed by God's grace, or

"right reason."

145. I, xi, 5 (i, 258-260). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -127-

We have already noted the Augustinian views of Thomas behind

Hooker's words, particularly on the principle of the need for grace to overcome the effects of sinfulness and the additional need for grace to raise the creature to communion with God. It is appropriate to note here further, that Aquinas also explicitly makes the "reward" of salvation generous and gracious precisely because it exceeds the "works"

God has commanded: for Thomas holds that man, healed of the effects of sin, can fulfill the commandments of the law; but he can fulfill these only as regards "the substance of the act, not as regards the mode of such acts, that is do them out of pure charity;" and in any case, without grace he cannot merit so great a gift as everlasting life:

There are two ways of fulfilling the commandments of the Law. -- The first as regards the substance of the works, as when a man does works of justice, fortitude, and of other virtues. And in this way man in the state of perfect nature could fulfil all the commandments of the Law; otherwise he would have been unable to sin in that state, since to sin is nothing else than to transgress the Divine commandments. But in the state of corrupted nature, man cannot fulfil all the Divine commandments without healing grace. Secondly, the commandments of the law can be fulfilled, not merely as regards the mode of acting, i.e., their being done out of charity. And in this way, neither in the state of perfect nature, nor in the state of corrupt nature ggnman fulfil the commandments of the law without grace. 1

Acts conducing to an end must be proportioned to the end. But no act exceeds the proportion of its active principle; and hence we see in natural things, that nothing can by its operation bring about an effect which exceeds its active force, but only such as is proportionate to its power. Now

146. I-II, q. 109, a. 4, respondeo (i, 1126). Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -128-

everlasting life is an end exceeding the proportion of human nature .... Hence man, by his natural endowments, cannot produce meritorious works proportionate to everlasting life; and for this a higher force is needed, viz., the force of grace. And thus without grace man cannot merit everlasting life; yet he can perform works conducing to a good which is natural to man, as to toil in the fields, to drink, to ea,17 or to have friends, and the like, as Augustine says. 1

Now, although Hooker is probably nowhere so explicit about the need for this grace, it is fair to say that he is correcting the incoherent assumptions about the matter that had been current thought in English

Protestantism in his time, by returning to the older Augustinianism of the Middle Ages, as represented by Thomas and Duns Scotus: by insisting that the reward of salvation is so out of proportion with man's nature that man unaided by God, even apart from the Fall, could not attain to it; in a similar way, the grace of revelation, or Scripture, is required by man even apart from the disorder of his reason through sin.

These subtleties Hillerdal does not seem to grasp (as apparently

Peter Munz had failed to grasp them before him), with the result that he attributes circularity 148 and a kind of illegitimate mysticism to

147. I-II, q. 109, a. 5, respondeo (i, 1127).

148. Hillerdal, Reason and Revelation, 95; criticized by Egil Grislis, "The Hermeneutical Problem in Hooker," in W. Speed Hill, (ed.) Studies in Richard Hooker (Cleveland, 1972), 106. Grislis had earlier rejected Hillerdal's argument by showing that the Puritans, with whom Hooker is arguing, without doubt possessed reason under grace, that is, they are Hooker's "fellow believers." Hillerdal had presumed that the Puritans lacked "reason under grace," and therefore, Hooker's argument with them was not based on reason both sides had in common. There was thus a circularity in Hooker's argument against them, since it depended on revelation alone, not reason. Egil Grislis, "Richard Hooker's Image Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -129-

Hooker: he notes quite correctly that Hooker has attempted to base our credence in the articles of Scripture on human reason and authority; he also notes, quite correctly, that Hooker bases the autonomy of reason on

God's grace and revelation, although he supposes that this is because of our sinfulness; he concludes that Hooker has argued in a circle. Later, he concludes that Hooker has "suddenly" turned to grace to support natural reason. 149 But he has failed to notice that Hooker, in good

Augustinian fashion, has all along recognized that reason must be aided by faith in matters theological, both because of its disorder through sin, and because of its limitations in approaching the infinite being

"in knowledge of whom standeth our eternal life." But because he has supposed, with Munz, that Hooker had been talking about an "omnipotent" and autonomous natural reason, this must appear as a "sudden" turning to a position of mysticism he would not otherwise have chosen.

This mistake vitiates most of Hillerdal's negative criticisms of

Hooker:

From the point of view of a strict theory of knowledge this [conclusion that "the grace of God, thus originates firm of Man," 82f. That is, Grislis showed, by noting that the Puritans were, for Hooker, part of the church, that on Hillerdal's assumption of the nature of the problem, there is no circularity. One could push harder than Grislis does, and ask: is the assumption correct that only "fell ow believers" share "reason under grace"? Hooker seems always to assert that pagans and inexplicit believers possess right reason, and some form of God's grace.

149. Hillerdal, Reason and Revelation, 120. Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -130-

belief and hinders the thoughts of unbelief"] certainly is a remarkable attempt at solution. Or to be clear-cut: it is no solution at all of the problem of the relationship between faith and reason! What actually happens is that Hooker claims that the Christian can move to a point over and above logical discourse and that all questions then will be answered by the grace of God. From a strictly philosophical view-point this is, of course, an astonishing turn to a kind of irrationalism. This turn is the more amazing since Hooker in his polemics against the Puritans has energetically fought and stubbornly criticized their turn to irrationalism. However, from a psychologig31 point of view, Hooker's step is perhaps understandable.

It is not necessary to discuss "a psychological point of view," whatever that phrase may mean, because Hillerdal has simply misread

Hooker on this point, ironically falling in with the Puritans who had, as he did, driven far too strong a wedge between Scripture and reason.

Hooker's "problem" was not to define what their relationship was as alien from each other, but precisely the opposite, to define their distinction, since they both had God as source. On top of this misrepresentation of Hooker's very starting point, Hillerdal fails to realize that reason is, from first to last, a reason elevated by grace, because it is a creaturely reason, and not simply because the disorder consequent on the fall needs to be overcome.

At other points, Hillerdal fails to notice the real continuity of grace and nature for Hooker, and finds that Hooker has failed to give a reasonable account of how to reconcile them: Hillerdal simply assumes that "grace cannot be rationalized." This conclusion may be part of

150. Ibid., 135. Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -131-

Hillerdal's theological impedimenta; it is very nearly the opposite of

Hooker's consistent position:

The chief problem ... is the question of how grace ... can change the mental capacities, particularly reason, so that he who has received grace will understand what he could not grasp formerly. This certainly is an unsolvable prg?lem, inasmuch as grace cannot be rationalized. 1

Likewise, since he thinks of God's grace as primarily dealing with man's sinfulness (gratia sanans), he cannot make any more sense of gratia increata than he can of gratia elevans:

It is obvious that his teaching about a ~~nd of grace preceding divine law is contradictory. 1

In a similar way, it is the Luther of the "two kingdoms" that

Hillerdal appeals to, not the Luther of the two kinds of grace, as in the passage from the Babylonian Captivity quoted above. He seems to assume that, just because he happens to read Luther in terms of an

"obvious" separation between the kingdoms of nature and grace, state and church, Hooker ought to make the same separation. As we have tried to show, Hooker's underlying theology, to say nothing of his political and ecclesiological theses, would suggest continuity rather than gaps and gulfs between the two realms. Nevertheless, Hillerdal does criticize

151. Ibid., 137.

152. Ibid., 142. This is a reference to Hooker's reference to Thomas in the Dublin Fragments, "the grace whereby God doth incline toward men," that is, an aspect of God's self. V, App. I, 12 (ii, 548) Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -132-

Hooker for failing to accomplish a work Hooker, in effect, did not think needed doing:

God's grace grows to a serious problem, however, when man's reason and are put as the crucial tenets that always are to be stressed. Hooker's anthropological starting-point causes him trouble. The stress laid on reason and will, the emphasis put on the disablement of man's nature after the fall, etc., makes it necessary to relate all theological subjects to anthropology. Then the problems immediately arise. Luther was able to talk freely about the pagan wisdom without facing the problem of grace in a manner similar to Hooker, owing to the distinction made between God's external government and his action on man in Christ. The latter only has significance when man's way to communion with God is debated. Hooker, on the other hand, always relates fellowship with God to map;s ability to follow what reason points out to be good. 3

As will be seen, this treatment, because it limits the work of grace to remedy for sin, treats Hooker's "anthropology" as entirely secular, and in origin, "outside" the realm of grace, as it might be for some Lutherans. But from first to last, Hooker is an older sort of

Augustinian, and treats human reason, in all its operations, to some degree or other as both needing and receiving God's grace.

Hillerdal's mistakes are, however, useful. He has shown us that, if we do not catch all the Augustinian nuances of Hooker's theology, we will find him a rationalist, or an illegitimate "mystic," or contradictory. Hooker is, in fact, both a rationalist and a mystic: behind his criticisms of various related Puritan positions on both "law"

153. Ibid., 145. Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation -133- and "ecclesiastical polity," lies a clear theology of nature and grace that finds these concepts in close relationship, even in continuity: this theology he uses to "correct" his native English Protestantism.

But Hillerdal's criticisms do not establish that he was inconsistent in the attempt. p

IV. Predestination and Assurance: the Arminianism of Richard Hooker

Along with his revolution on the nature of justification, Luther

had carefully taught a doctrine of the total inability of the sinful

human will to perform any meritorious works, and a doctrine of

unconditional election. In both he followed Augustine and the

Augustinian tradition of the middle ages, including Thomas. For

Augustine, the two ideas are related: the doctrine of unconditional

predestination is to be deduced from the sinfulness and impotence of all

human beings. 1 Later in the sixteenth century, some Lutherans softened

Luther's teaching on unconditional election, although they tended not to

make any compromise on the total depravity of the sinful human being. 2

Calvin expanded Luther's emphasis on the Augustinian and Pauline picture

of predestination, so that, for many, the teaching of predestination was

the distinctive mark of Calvinism and the central doctrine of that

theology. 3 This interpretation of Calvinism was current in seventeenth

century England. Thus Walton can make an inexplicit reference to it

when he introduces into the Life of Hooker, as a preparation for the

account of the controversy that attended Hooker's sermon at Paul's Cross

in 1581, a letter --possibly fictitious -- from an "ingenious" Italian

1. G.P. Fisher, History of Christian Doctrine, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh, 1896), 19lf.

2. Dewey D. Wallace, Puritans and Predestination (Chapel Hill, 1982), 34f.

3. Fran9ois Wendel, Calvin (London, 1965), 263f.

-134- Predestination and Assurance -135- visitor to England, who remarked, ironically, about the wide public involved in debates about predestination. 4 Calvin particularly emphasized the described in Romans 8.28f, but later

Calvinists scholasticized Calvin's teaching on this point and treated these important points under the general theological topic of God's

Providence. 5

At the end of the sixteenth century there was a movement to soften some of the developments of Calvin's account of predestination; this movement achieved its definitive form in the debate about Arminianism in

Holland, and the of Dort in 1617, which defined five points against the teaching of Arminius. But the debate was already under way

4. "That the common people of England were wiser than the wisest of his nation; for here the very women and shopkeepers were able to judge of predestination, and determine what laws were fit to be made concerning church-government." Life of Hooker (i, 36f). The letter is perhaps an anachronism if attributed to the Elizabethan period. It would probably be more in keeping with the public debates of the reign of Charles I and the Commonwealth. The Elizabethan catechisms were remarkably sparing in their discussion of predestination, although some popular preachers of the l 590's followed the learned ones and addressed this topic.

5. Wallace, Puritans and Predestination, 57ff. In the 1559 edition of the Institutes, Calvin divided Providence from Predestination, placing the former topic in Book I, 16-18 and the latter in Book III, 21-24. The topics had been together in chap. 8 in 1539-41, and in chap. 14 in 1543-5 and 1550-4. They had been separate in the 1536 Latin edition, under Apostles' , section 1, Creation and Providence, and Apostles' Creed, section 4, Benefits of Faith, The Church, General Resurrection, Hope and Love, Predestination. See Peter Wyatt, Jesus Christ and Creation in the Theology of John Calvin, unpublished Th.D. thesis, Emmanuel College, Toronto, 1982. Appendix A. Predestination and Assurance -136- in England in the mid l 590's, particularly at Cambridge, and was resolved, to some extent, by the adoption of an unofficial set of nine

"Lambeth Articles" to resolve the Cambridge disputes, in November 1595.

The topics for debate were slightly different from those in the continental Arminian dispute, in that they were defined in terms of two topics, unconditional election and assurance, but the ground covered was remarkably the same as jn the later debate on the continent.

Richard Hooker was not a direct participant in the disputes at

Cambridge in 1595. But, according to Walton, he had been, at least since his Paul's Cross Sermon in 1581, an identifiable member of a movement of resistance to some of the implications of the Calvinism that had set the agenda of English theology since the beginning of

Elizabeth's reign, even though the official formulas were merely patient of Calvinist interpretation and did not explicitly require assent to it.

Furthermore, Hooker actually borrowed ' written opinion on the earlier draft of the Lambeth Articles, and, at the end of the

Dublin manuscripts, which must have been composed between the appearance of the Christian Letter in 1599 and his death in November 1600, provides his own version of the Lambeth Articles, amending them in certain critical and typical ways. 6 It will be convenient to organize Hooker's

6. See Figure A at the end of this chapter. For the view that there is a tension between the body of the Dublin Fragments and the amended version of the Lambeth Articles at the end of the Dublin Fragments, see W. Speed Hill, The Doctrinal Background of Richard Hooker's Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Predestination and Assurance -137- views of these topics around the five points eventually defined in the

Arminian controversy.

I. Unconditional election

Hooker seems at all times in his written works to give, at the very least, lip service to the doctrine of unconditional election. But

Travers, in his list of Hooker's erroneous doctrines dated March 30,

1585, accused him of the Arminian view, election conditional on

(foreseen) good works. In fact, three of Travers' points deal with election:

12. Predestination is not of the absolute will of God, but conditional.

13. The doings of the wicked are not of the will of God positive, but only permissive.

14. The reprobates are not rejected, but for the ~vil works which God did foresee they would commit.

The views expressed in points thirteen and fourteen do represent, as we shall see, a fairly accurate account of views Hooker would publish and would express in his unpublished fragments. This invites the question of what was behind Travers' point twelve, since there is no extant text that would support the accusation. As we shall see, Hooker

Harvard, 1964), l 32f.

7. Found in John Strype's addition to Walton's Life of Hooker, 1705, etc., Works i, 60. Hooker does not note these points in his response, but does affirm perseverance of the elect, i, 62. Predestination and Assurance -138- did insist on the connection between God's foreknowledge and his predestination to life and that election is always "in Christ," and

Hooker denied the "unconditional reprobation" of the double decree of

Calvinism, but these positions, which might have off ended many

Calvinists, do not amount to a view of . ls it just possible that Hooker changed his mind after reflection on the question?

Or was he misheard by Travers, who in other respects transcribed his view accurately?

In the Dublin fragments, the starting point for the discussion of predestination is clearly and deliberately the doctrine of God's providence. This is especially clear from the recently published notes in Dublin ms. 364 f. 80 on the divine knowledge and will, which are clearly earlier notes for the Dublin fragments, which pick up the quotations of the notes in precisely the same order. 8 The Christian view of providence is midway between an absolute necessitarian destiny and completely random fortune or chance, and goes along with God's foreknowledge. But God's foreknowledge does not make all things necessary. 9 In his close linking of providence and predestination,

Hooker approaches the organizational pattern of the scholastic

8. Published in John E. Booty (ed.), Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity: Attack and Response (Folger ed'n iv, Cambridge, 1982), 84-86.

9. V, App. I, 23 (ii, 561). Predestination and Assurance -139-

Calvinists, like William Perkins, his contemporary, and avoids the older

Calvinist view, expressed in the last edition of the Institutes, that predestination is primarily related to the ordo salutis, and not to creation and providence. Like Andrewes in his writings on the Lambeth

Articles, Hooker also clearly insists that election is in Christ. 10 We will look at Hooker's views on the supposed limits of Christ's atoning work in a moment, but for Hooker this link may well be related to his rejection of a decree of reprobation. William Perkins, by way of contrast, in his treatment of "reprobates of riper age," describes a place prepared by God for infidels. But as has been pointed out, 11 this version of the doctrine of reprobation, like Perkins' view of assurance, is really based on particular observations and on a subjective reaction.

As well, it represents a picture of God that is a long way from Jesus' posture as the "friend of sinners," and provides a perfect theology for a Pharisee. 12 And this was, of course, the very opposite from the intention of Calvinism to insist on the grace of God in Jesus Christ, and the mercy of "the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ." In fact, some have suggested that Calvin did not go so far as to teach a

10. V, App. I, 35 (ii, 577); 40 (584); 45 (595). Lancelot Andrewes, Minor Works (Oxford, 1846), 290, 295.

11. Michael T. Malone, "The Doctrine of Predestination in the Thought of William Perkins and Richard Hooker," in Anglican Theological Review, Iii (1970), 114.

12. Wallace, Puritans and Predestination, 59-61. Predestination and Assurance -140- symmetrical double decree, but taught rather that reprobation was a

"permissive decree," not an absolute one. 13 And Calvinists consistently insisted that they did not make God the "cause of sin"; like Augustine, they taught that it was punishment, not sin, that was decreed in the decree of reprobation. 14 But most have attributed the double decree to

Calvin, unconditional election and unconditional reprobation. Whether or not Hooker thought this was Calvin's view, he distances himself from the whole notion: "Lord, thou art just and severe, but not cruel.' 115

In the Dublin fragments, Hooker briefly rehearses the history of the Pelagian controversy with Augustine and his successors, as this controversy related to Augustine's developing doctrine of predestination. This procedure is precisely comparable to the

Trinitarian and Christological summaries in Books I and V of the Lawes in preparation for Hooker's treatment of the nature of law and the doctrine of the sacraments. Hooker notes that Augustine had first taught the "Arminian" view, that election was by foresight of merit, but

13. Fisher gives evidence that Calvin believed that God did not decree the Fall, except by a permissive decree. Fisher, History of Christian Doctrine, 301. But see Institutes III, 23, 8, [ii, 956], where Calvin rejects the distinction between God's will and his permission.

14. The elect are ordained to be the recipients of faith, and thereby of heavenly reward (Predestination of the Saints 37 (xviii), NPNF, 1st ser., v, 516), whereas the others were left to perish, not predestined to sin but to punishment. Fisher, History of Christian Doctrine, 191f.

15. V, App. I, 35 (ii, 576). Predestination and Assurance -141- had corrected himself and, by stages, arrived at his extreme view of the double unconditional decree. But Hooker goes on to show how the church shied away from accepting Augustine on this point, even though

Augustine's account of grace became decisive in the church's rejection of Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism, an illustration of Hooker's conviction of the authority of the church in matters left undefined in

Scripture. 16 Hooker clearly accepts the view that the church officially rejected Augustine's harsher views on grace, and notes with approval the earlier patristic conviction that "reprobation presupposeth foreseen sin." 17

That election is positive only, and involves participation in

Christ, is clear from Book V of the Lawes, published before the Dublin fragments received their final form:

God therefore loving eternally his Son, he must needs eternally in him have loved and pref erred before all others

16. V, App. I, 36-39 (ii, 577-584). Hooker refers to the "Arausican. Council" (i.e., Orange II, 529) at V, App. I, 12 (ii, 547). He does not seem to notice, as Peter Baro had, the intermediate view Augustine came to in the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, about 394, which distinguished election on the ground of works from election conditioned by faith. According to this view, the elect have hidden merits, a certain disposition of heart which are the ground and reason of their election. Fisher, History of Christian Doctrine, 19lf. Baro treated Augustine's middle view as the lnfralapsarian one. Peter Baro, Summa Trium de Praedestinatione Sententiarum, in The Works of James Arminius (London, 1825) i, 95. Thus, although both Baro and Hooker recognize "stages" in the development of Augustine's views, they differ in the interpretation of these views.

17. V, App. I, 35 (ii, 576). Predestination and Assurance -142-

them which are spiritually sithence descended and sprung out of him. These were in God as in their Saviour, and not as in their Creator only. It was the purpose of his saving Goodness, his saving Wisdom, and his saving Power which inclined itself towards them. They ... thus were in God eternally by their intended admission to life, [and] have by vocation or adoption God actually now in them, as the artificer is in the work, which his hand doth presently frame .... We are therefore in God through Christ eternally according to that intent and purpose whereby we were chosen to be made his in this present world before the world itself was made, we are in God through the knowledge [that is, as is made clear later in the page, foreknowledge, "our being in Christ by eternal foreknowledge"] which is had of us, and tflf love which is borne towards us from everlasting.

It is possible that ignoring Hooker's clear reference to being foreknown in Christ might make Walter Travers conclude that Hooker had some view of conditional election by foresight of personal merit if

Hooker had preached a similar text at the Temple. For Hooker does not in fact use the word "election" at all; but the clear reference to God's saving purpose, antecedent to creation, involving a foresight not of merit, since there would be no appropriate merit, but of our being

"included in Christ,"-- a saving Trinitarian purpose, for Goodness,

Wisdom, Power is one of Hooker's phrases for the inner life of the

Trinity -- must suggest a view of unconditional election.

The passage suggests, further, without being explicit, a supralapsarian view of election, a view of election that abstracts from the fallen state of the human race in actual history. In the Dublin

18. V, lvi, 6, 7 (ii, 248f). Predestination and Assurance -143- fragments, Hooker also speaks in this way:

Predestination to life, although it be infinitely ancienter than the actual work of creation, dy h notwithstanding presuppose the purpose of creation. 9

This is, of course, a statement of the conviction we saw earlier that the gracious Providence of God that brings about creation is also involved in election. This is related to a denial that there is a decree of "unconditional reprobation" at all; such a decree would contradict God's purpose in creation. In this respect, Hooker's view is

"supralapsarian." The actual Fall is not presumed in God's election in

Christ. But there is another passage in the same paragraph that brings in sublapsarian vocabulary:

That which hath wounded and overthrown the liberty, wherein man was created, as able to do good as evil, is only our original sin, which God did not predestinate, bu~Jie foresaw it, and predestinated grace to serve as a remedy.

In other words, Hooker appears to hold that God's elevating grace presupposes only the creation, whereas God's healing grace presupposes the fall as well as the creation. To the extent that election in Christ involves the raising of the creation to participation in divinity, it is supralapsarian; to the extent election in Christ also involves the healing of the creature wounded and helpless in sin, it is sublapsarian.

The debate between the supralapsarians, like Gomarus, and the

19. V, App. I, 2 (ii, 539).

20. V, App. I, 2 (ii, 539). Predestination and Assurance -144- sublapsarians, like the majority at Dort, went on in Calvinist circles for some time. Calvin's own view was not altogether clear, though he more consistently seemed to be supralapsarian. 21 Hooker's interesting contrast, involving both views, appears to be his own novelty; he does not appear to pursue it elsewhere, but does consistently teach that

God's "justice" is only active in respect of punishment for actual guilt, that is, in Travers' words, that reprobation is conditional.

Hooker insisted that God's "justice," that is, God's punishment, is dependent only on the Fall, and the foreknowledge of actual sin, for its execution. This Travers clearly objected to in Hooker's sermons at the

Temple, as would appear from the fourteenth point on the list previously quoted. Hooker's own description of the off ending sermons concentrates entirely on the justification question, and whether papists might be saved. 22 And, indeed, Travers' own words in his Supplication might bear the sense that he has approached Hooker to complain about Hooker's views that were known from his teaching before he came to the Temple, as at

Paul's Cross.23 This is precisely what Hooker's Answer seems to

21. Fisher, History of Christian Doctrine, 300. But John T. McNeill, History and Character of Calvinism (New York, 1954), 263, suggests Beza "added" supralapsarianism to Calvin's view.

22. Works i, 60-64.

23. "Whereas he had taught certain things concerning predestination otherwise that the Word of God doth, as it is understood by all churches professing the gospel, and not unlike that wherewith Corranus sometimes troubled this church " Travers' Supplication, iii, 558f. Predestination and Assurance -145-

suggest, and Hooker had declined to defend himself at that time, since

his views had been well developed, delivered in the presence of the

Bishop of London, and approved by him at the time of the Paul's Cross

Sermon. 24 Hooker seems to ref er to a written version of the Paul's

Cross Sermon, but that has not survived. The Lawes clearly restate the

controversial thesis of the two wills in God, which the Christian Letter

took up for complaint, and for which the Dublin fragments prepare a

defence. To the doctrine of the two wills in God, we will turn

presently.

Hooker insists, apparently because it needs to be insisted upon,

that God's "glory" is not a result of sin, but on account of the mercy

extended to those who are sinful so that they might attain what God had

purposed for them. This seems to be a not so veiled attack on the view that a decree of unconditional reprobation reveals "God's glory," a

Calvinist commonplace that had already earned Calvinism the title "harsh

Calvinian gospel. 1125 Hooker's words were these:

God ... with the good evil of punishment, revengeth the evil good of sin. Sin is no plant of God's setting. He seeth and findeth it in a thing irregular, exorbitant, and altogether out of course. It is unto him an occasion of sundry acts of mercy, both an occasion and cause of punishment: by which mercy and justice, although God be

24. Answer to Travers 7, 8 (iii, 576f).

25. The phrase belonged to Samuel Harsnett, who preached at Paul's Cross in 1584. P.M. Dawley, John Whitgift and the English Reformation (New York, 1954), 218. Predestination and Assurance -146-

many ways greatly glorified, yet is not this glory of God any other in respect of sin than only an accidental event. We cannot say therefore truly, that, as God to his own glory did ordain our happiness, and to accomplish our happiness appoint the gifts of his grace; so he did ordain to his glory our punishment, and for matter of punishment our sins. For punishment is to the will of God no desired end, but a consequent ensuing sin: and, in rega i of sin, his glory an event thereof, but no proper effect. 2

For salvation and reprobation have asymmetrical causes, as the

English theologians in 1595 were to agree, but as both the and the would deny. The Remonstrants held that both election and reprobation were conditional on foreseen goodness or guilt; 27 Dort held that both election and reprobation were unconditional, and involved only the simple will of God, although reprobation was also on account of sin (I, vi).28 Hooker, like the

English theologians generally, held for unconditional election and conditional reprobation:

Death is not a thing which God hath made or devised with intent to have so many thousands eternally therein devoured;

26. V, App. I, 32 (ii, 572).

27. Philip Schaff, The of Christendom (6th ed., 1931, reprinted 1983) iii, 545.

28. Schaff, Creeds of Christendom, iii, 552f. For an exhaustive account of the genesis and subtlety of Dort's view of reprobation, see Donald W. Sinnema, The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort ( 1618- 19) in the light of the history of the doctrine (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, St Michael's College and University of Toronto, 1985), 40lf, 448f. "In its canons Dort adopted a slightly modified version of the late medieval solution. The canons presented a negative-positive definition of reprobation, with God's will as the cause on the negative side and sin as a cause on the positive side. This reflected the late medieval solution. The difference lay in the fact that the Canons placed reprobation within the context of a double decree rather than a single predestination framework and considered also the divine will a cause of positive reprobation .... " (p. 449) In Sinnema's vocabulary, Hooker held "preterition" or "negative reprobation" within a "single predestination framework." See below. Predestination and Assurance -147-

that condemnation is not the end wherefore God did create any man, although it be an event or consequent which man's unrighteousness causeth God to decree. . . . Devils were not ordained of God for hell-fire, but hell-fire for them; and for men, ;o far forth as it was foreseen, that men would be like them. 2

[The general rule of Providence is the happiness of all, but] $}{Jhath awakened justice, which otherwise might have slept.

But life is still offered to all,

except it be where incurable malice, on the part of the sinful themselves, will not suffer mercy with such conditions to take place, leadeth still to eternal life, by an amiable course, framed even according to the very state wherein we now are. He is not wanting to the world in any necessary thing for the attainment of eternal life, though many things be necessary yow. which according to our first condition we needed not. 3

At times the words of Scripture suggest that Christ, rather than sent to redeem the human race, was sent to be a stumbling block; such words refer to the event not to the end for which Christ came. For

Christ died to the end of redeeming the world. 32 By the same token,

Scripture's words that seem to imply that God gave Pharaoh a hardened heart, are to be interpreted, not literally, but in terms of God's foreseeing that Pharaoh would react with a hard heart. 33 Nevertheless,

29. V, App. I, 34 (ii, 575).

30. V, App. I, 30 (ii, 570).

31. V, App. I, 31 (ii, 571).

32. V, App. I, 34 (ii, 575).

33. V, App. I, 42 (ii, 589). Compare ' view: "'God hardened Pharaoh's heart,' can be taken in the same sense as the saying of Paul, 'God gave them up to a base mind and improper conduct,' and the same deed is sin and the penalty of sin. But whomsoever God delivers over to a reprobate mind, he delivers on account of previous desert, like Pharaoh." Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and Salvation, trans. Philip S. Watson (Philadelphia, 1969), 69. Hooker does not accept conditional election, as Erasmus had, but he does accept a similar account of conditional reprobation. Predestination and Assurance -148-

God is always justified in withholding grace since, by definition, no one deserves grace, and God is always just in punishing the guilty.

Those who are saved have only God to thank, those who are not have only themselves to blame:

Neither are we able to shew any cause, why mercy may not do good where it will; and wheresoever it will, justice may withhold good. . . . Of all the good we receive, mercy is the only cause. . . . Sin [isJ te true original cause of all the evil which we suffer. 3

2. The antecedent and the consequent will of God

In his controversial view of the two wills of God behind this asymmetrical view of election and reprobation, Hooker goes further than almost all of his contemporaries except perhaps Lancelot Andrewes and

Peter Baro. 35 In his Paul's Cross Sermon, 1581, Hooker was reported to have argued that there was in God an antecedent and a consequent will.

Although Hooker retained a copy of the sermon, it has not survived, and may not have been available to Walton either. We are left with Walton's brief and uncorroborated description, written eighty years later:

That in God there were two wills; an antecedent, and a consequent will: his first will, that all mankind should be saved; but his second will was, that only those should be

34. V, App. I, 43, 44 (ii, 592f).

35. From the 1580's Lancelot Andrewes had adopted the distinction between the secret will (voluntas beneplaciti) and the revealed will (voluntas signi) in God. See H.C. Porter, Reformation and Reaction in Tudor Cambridge (Cambridge, 1958), 369. Predestination and Assurance -149-

saved, that did live answerable to that degree of grace which he had off erect or afforded them. 3

The sermon was given a pivotal place in Walton's account of the life of Hooker. A twentieth century study of Walton's skill and art has shown that the dramatic purpose of the Paul's Cross Sermon episode in the structure of the Life:

Walton foreshadows Hooker's controversies by telling that in this, his first public appearance, Hooker crossed an opinion of Calvin, and he enhances Hooker's point of view by relating that it was later supported by Dr. Jackson, Dr. Hammond, and Bishop Aylmer who was then and one of Hooker's audience. 37

This judgement does not mean that Walton made up the incident, for we have Hooker's own oblique description of it in the Answer to Travers.

But the clause "only those should be saved, that did live agreeable to that degree of grace which he had offered or afforded them" would not represent a very careful account of Hooker's later view, which linked the consequent will to punishment and reprobation on account of sin, and not to an Arminian view of election by virtue of the use made of God's grace offered. Hooker indeed held, at the end of his life, that in some sense grace could be resisted, but he appears always to have held that election was entirely gratuitous, and not based on foresight of the use made of grace offered, though of course all those elected did in fact

36. Life of Hooker i, 22.

37. David Novarr, The Making of Walton's Lives (Ithaca, N.Y., 1958), 237. Predestination and Assurance -150- make use of the grace offered them. Hooker's own words are:

Touching the first point of (Travers'] discovery [that is, that I taught the doctrine of predestination of Anthony de Corro], which is about the matter of predestination, to set down that I spake, (for I have it written,) to declare and confirm the several branches thereof, would be tedious now in this writing, where I have so many things to touch that I can but touch them only. Neither is it herein so needful for me to justify my speech, when the very place and presence where I spake, doth itself speak sufficiently for my clearing. This matter was not broached in a blind alley, or uttered where none was to hear it, that had skill with authority to control, or covertly insinuated by some gliding sentence. That which I taught was at Paul's Cross; it was not huddled in amongst other matters, in such sort that it could pass without noting; it was opened, it was proved, it was some reasonable time stood upon. I see not which was my Lord of London [Bishop Aylmer], who was present and heard it, can excuse so great a fault, as patiently, without rebuke or controlment afterwards, to hear any man there teach otherwise than "the word of God doth" .... 3

When I saw that Mr Travers carped at these things, only because they lay not open, I promised at some convenient time to giake them clear as light both to him and to all others. 3

Is it possible that Walton wrote the detailed account of the Paul's

Cross Sermon with nothing more available than these two texts of Travers and Hooker, and with the doctrine Hooker stated in Book V of the Lawes, which was attacked in the Christian Letter, of God's antecedent and consequent wills? This action would be consistent with Walton's methods elsewhere, and it would account for the strange view of the consequent

38. Answer to Travers 7, 8 (iii, 576f).

39. Answer to Travers 23 (iii, 593). This seems certainly to imply that Hooker had not yet written his work on justification and predestination. Predestination and Assurance -I 51-

will of God he gives, for that might be construed as a version of

Anthony de Corro's doctrine, but is hard to reconcile with Hooker's surviving writings. 40

In the fifth book of the Lawes, Hooker comes to state the doctrine in the course of his apology for the petition in the Great Litany of

1544 "that God would have mercy upon all men." But in the previous section, he had defended the petition for deliverance from all adversity, and had provided a long doctrinal digression on the two wills of Christ, the divine and the human. The divine will was, simply, that

Christ should suffer and die; but in Christ, this will struggled, in

Gethsemane, with Christ's human will, which resisted the divine will temporarily in shunning the grievous physical pain of the execution,

"which simply not to have shunned had been against nature, and by consequent against God.1141 Thus the human will and the divine will in

Christ, although they are in temporary opposition, are in some sense, both the will of God.

A distinction more important than that between the two wills of

40. Disputed Points of Theology 1 (London, 1879), llf makes precisely this Arminian interpretation of Hooker, based on accepting Walton's account as accurate. Speed Hill, Doctrinal Background, 136ff, has made a case for a consistency between Walton's account of Hooker's view and Hooker's views in the Lawes and the Dublin Fragments. But, even if there is not a doctrinal difference, as we have argued, it would still remain likely that Walton is using his own words, not Hooker's.

41. V, xlviii, 10 (ii, 209). Predestination and Assurance -152-

Christ, which are nevertheless, in the action of salvation, in agreement, follows in the next chapter, when Hooker distinguishes two wills in God. The Puritans had complained that the prayer that God would show mercy upon all men "is impossible, because some are the vessels of wrath to whom God will never extend his mercy." Hooker does not commit himself on the occasion to an opinion whether there are some beyond the extent of God's mercy. He does, however, introduce the distinction between the general inclination and the occasioned will in

God:

Such suits God accepteth in that they are conformable unto his general inclination which is that all men might be saved, yet always he granteth them not, forasmuch as there is in God sometimes a more private occasioned will which determineth the contrary. So that the other being the rule of our actions and not this, our requests for things opposite to this will S~God are not therefore the less gracious in his sight.

The Christian Letter jumped on this distinction, and quoted Hooker himself against it, but did not ref er to any earlier display of it at

Paul's Cross sixteen years earlier:

Have we not cause to fear that the wittie schoolmen have seduced you, and by their conceited distinctions made you

42. V, xlix, 3 (ii, 215f). Keble's observation, that Hooker made a "protest against irrespective predestination to death" in his controversy with Travers at the Temple is based on a misreading of the Answer, as we have seen. His further observation that Hooker repeated this protest in the chapter of Book V, is equally unfounded. The "protest" seems to have waited for the proposed Answer to the Christian Letter. There is not doubt that Hooker rejected unconditional reprobation, as we have seen; but Keble may be too eager to distance Hooker from Calvin. See Editor's Preface, 55 (i, ex). Predestination and Assurance -153-

forget, 'That you are neither able nor worthie to open and looke into the booke of God's law, by which he guideth the worlde?' [I, ii, 5 (ii, 204)] A.ff yet you will say, There is in God an occasioned will.

The Christian Letter succinctly states the Calvinist point of anxiety about this view, but as Hooker remarks in the margin of the same page, the Puritans also have their go at searching the hidden will of

God, "which speake of Him and His they neither care nor know what."

Hooker in fact quotes from two sources, Tertullian, an undisputed

Patristic source, and the Pseudo-Dionysius, a supposed apostolic source:

The book of that law I presume no farther to look into, then all men may and ought thereof to take notice. I have [not] adventured to ransack the bosom of God, and to search out what is there to be read concerning every particular man, as some have done. 'Vis divinae magnitudinis et no ~nobis objectit et ignota.' Tertul. Contra gent. p. 634. 4

This brief note to the tenth point of the Christian Letter hardly broke the surface of the problem. In the third and longest portion of the Dublin fragments, which in fact bears the title "The Tenth Article

Touching Predestination," Hooker made good his off er in the Answer to

Travers to "declare and confirm the several branches thereof [that is,

43. Christian Letter, 17 (ii, 216, note 1).

44. Book V, ed. Bayne, 225, n. 8. Apology, chap. xvii. The whole passage runs, ' ... Now that which can ordinarily be seen, which can be comprehended, which can be conceived, is less than the eyes by which it is scanned, and the hands by which it is profaned, and the sense by which it is discovered: but that which is immeasurable is known to itself alone. This is it which causeth God to be conceived of, while He admitteth not of being conceived. Thus the force of His greatness presenteth Him to men both known and unknown.' Compare Works, ii, 216, note 1. Predestination and Assurance -154-

of the matter of predestination]." There is no reason to think Hooker

had in hand any other elaboration of the Paul's Cross Sermon. The

recently published Dublin manuscripts do cast light on his careful

preparation for the proposed answer to the Christian Letter. In Ms.

364, f. 80, we find, densely packed, citations in preparation for the

following topics, in the same order in which they appear in the extended

fragments: divine knowledge and will, creation and governance, the

origin of sin in the world, and possibly God's justice. 45 Although

there are some deviations, after the topic of the origin of sin, from

the skeleton now published, there is ample reason to believe that Hooker

did not begin to work on these fragments until after he had received the

Christian Letter. The point behind this elaborate preparation is clear:

God's determinate will is both positive and permissive; 46 as permissive

it permits both sin in all human beings and (temporary) defection in the elect; but the punishment of sin in God's positive will is a consequent of the creature's misuse of freedom and not God's antecedent positive

will. That is, there is not two but one determinate will in God, the

45. See Attack and Response, 84-97. The topics are organized in the manuscript and in the fragment as follows:

Divine knowledge and will Folger ed iv, 84-86 App. I, 23 Creation and governance 86-88 27 Origin of sin the the world 90-93 29 "Justice" 95-97 42

46. V, App. I, 26 (ii, 564). Predestination and Assurance -155- distinction concerning only the things willed, and not the divine willing itself, in which no distinction can be discerned: 47

If therefore we look upon the rank or chain of things voluntarily derived from the positive will of God, we behold the riches of his glory proposed as the end of all, we behold the beatitude of men and angels ordained as a mean unto that end, graces and blessings in all abundance ref erred as means unto that happiness, God to be blessed for evermore, the voluntary author of all those graces. But concerning the heaps of evils which do so overwhelm the world, compare them with God, and from the greatest to the least of them, he disclaimeth them all. He refuseth utterly to be intituled either Alpha, or Omega, the beginning, or the end, of any evil. The evil of sin is within the compass of God's prescience, but not of his predestination, or fore­ ordaining will. The evil of punishment is within the compass of God's fore-appointed and determining will, but by occasion of precedent sin. For punishments are evil, because they are naturally grievous to him which must sustain them. Yet in that they proceed from justice thereby revenging evil, such evils have also the nature of good.48

Hooker finally declares authorities for his view. Peter Lombard is quoted, under the general reference of "the schoolmen" for the term

47. See Summa Theologiae I, q. 19, a 6 (i, 108) and John E. Booty in Attack and Response, 256. Disputed Points of Theology 1, !Off, takes a different tack, and distinguishes the two wills on the analogy of "wishing" and "willing determinately," as if God wished the salvation of all, but determinately willed the punishment of the wicked.

48. V, App. I, 32 (ii, 572). The most "scholastic" figure of the English Reformation before Hooker had indeed spoken of two wills in God, a secret effectual will, and a signified will: "We might also adde with manie divines that there is a certeine will of God, which they call ef fectuall; and also another of the signe: for there are given to all men one with another certeine signes of salvation; such as are outward vocation, which doth chieflie consist of the word of God, of preaching, and of the administration of the sacraments. Another will there is of God secret, which is called eff ectuall; and belongeth not unto all men together: for if it comprehended all men, no doubt but all men should be saved." Peter Martyr, Common Places III, i, 61 (London, 1583), 43. Predestination and Assurance -156-

"signified will" of God, and John Damascene for the term "principal will of God"; later Damascene is cited for the term "consequent will. 1149

Hooker then introduces his long doctrinal and historical digression on

Augustine's views and the church's resolution of them that we have already mentioned, but this digression does not seem to be hinted at in the newly printed Dublin manuscripts. The purpose of the digression would appear to be to provide an explanation both of the advantage of the Augustinian solution and of the problem it created, which had to be resolved by the use of the distinctions of Damascene and the Latin schoolmen. 50

3. Limited Atonement

Hooker's treatment of this topic of later Calvinist dispute,

49. V, App. I, 32, 34 (ii, 573, 576).

50. Hooker did not, apparently feel he should quote Thomas, whose distinction between antecedent and consequent will Thomas had probably taken from Damascene. Summa Theologiae I, q. 23, a. 4, Reply Obj. 3 (i, 128). It is unfortunate that Jaroslav Pelikan's Christian Tradition, vol 4, lumps together the Scotist distinction between the absolute and the ordinate will of God, and the earlier scholastic distinction between the antecedent and consequent wills of God. Scotus' distinction was a short-sighted attempt to solve a problem presented by the Semi-Pelagian implications of treating salvation as a "reward"; God's "ordinate will" avoided the need to assume a supernaturally infused habit of grace within the person in order to gain merit. In a way this anticipated the Reformers' concerted effort to separate any internal state of grace and God's reward. The older scholastic distinction in Thomas had tried to do justice to a larger problem of the contrast between God's mercy and his justice. See Gordon Leff, Review of Pelikan, Theology lxxxviii, (1985), 470. Predestination and Assurance -157-

follows from his view just exhibited, of the general or antecedent will

of God that all human beings be saved:

For sin altereth not his nature, though it change ours. His general will, and the principal desire whereunto of his own natural bent he inclineth still, is, that all men may enjo the full perfection of the happiness, which is their end. 51

Immediately after this passage, Hooker lists signs of this general

will that are apparent in Scripture, in the promises included there, in

the precepts of godliness, in the prohibitions and in the works of

providential mercy. But especially such a general will is seen in the

scope of the atoning work of Christ. The formularies of the Church of

England gave many clear expressions of the extent of the benefits of

Christ's atoning work to all mankind. Indeed, the idea of a "limited

atonement" is a rather peculiar one, a point of Calvinism that can

probably not be found in Calvin, 52 although it was held by Dort and by

Jansenists, and derived as a logical consequence of the actual

reprobation of some human beings, and the relationship between that and

God's supposed will. For Christ's work could obviously not extend

beyond God's will.

51. V, App. I, 32 (ii, 573).

52. Calvin almost certainly held that Christ died for all human beings, "but he doth not pray for all." Beza did teach that Christ died for the elect alone. This created a pastoral problem for later Calvinism, since one could not simply look to Christ to determine one's salvation; for Beza, "Christ may not have died for me." R.T. Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism to 1649 (London, 1979), 2, 13ff, 29f, 32. Predestination and Assurance -158-

In Book V of the Lawes, Hooker repeatedly affirms the implicit universalism in the proclamation of the Christian gospel:

Life and salvation God will have offered to all; his will is that Gentiles should be saved as well as Jews. Salvation belongeth unto no!1§ but such "as call upon the name of our Lord Jesus Christ." 3

Such formulations are, in themselves, ambiguous. They may be interpreted in terms simply of "all human beings," or they may be interpreted in terms of "human beings of every kind and nation," as

Augustine and Calvin had argued. 54 But Hooker explicitly rejects any such interpretation. In the passage of Book V where he must def end the prayer that God will have mercy on all men, he does so in that such a prayer is:

53. V, xxii, 9 (ii, 96).

54. For the interpretation of 1 Timothy 2.4 as applying, not to all individual human beings, but to all types or races of human beings, see Augustine, Enchiridion 103; De corrept. et grat., c. 14 (44); De Civ. Dei, xxii, 1, 2; Contra Julianum, iv, 8; Fisher, History of Christian Doctrine, 192. In this interpretation, Augustine was followed, as is well known, by Calvin. See Victor A. Shepherd, The Nature and Function of Faith in the Theology of John Calvin (Macon. Georgia, 1983), 85. But Augustine had also been followed by Peter Martyr, Common Places (London, 1583) III, 1, pp. 31, 33. So also the early Luther: "All these sayings [such as J Timothy 2.4] must be understood only with respect to the elect, as the Apostle says in II Timothy 2.10: 'All for the elect.' Christ did not die for absolutely all, for he says: 'This is my blood which is shed for you' (Luke 22.20) and 'for many' (Mark 14.24) he did not say: for all ... 'to the remission of sins.' (Matthew 21.28) Wilhelm Pauck (ed.), Luther: Lectures on Romans (Philadelphia, 1961), 253. Richard Harsnett, in his Paul's Cross Sermon, October 24, 1584, rejected this interpretation as a "Genevian conceit." Three Sermons (London, 1657), 153. Predestination and Assurance -159-

a service according to [God's] heart whose desire is "to have all men saved" [/ Timothy 2.[4]], a work most suitable with his purpose who gave himself to be the price of redemption for all, and a forcible mean to procure the conversion of all such as are not yet acquainted wit\~he mysteries of that truth which must save their souls.

Yet Hooker also must square this universalism with the fact that not all are elect. Calvin had suggested that the Son did not know the will of the Father in respect of the decree of election. 56 Hooker rejects this problematic view, but distinguishes between the human soul of Christ, which is as human, given perfect human but not divine knowledge by the grace of union, and the divine mind of Christ, which shares the knowledge of the identity of the elect:

To pray for all men living is but to shew the same affection which towards every of them our Lord Jesus Christ hath borne, who knowing only as GPJd who are his did as man taste death for the good of all men.5

Hooker's account is somewhat abstract, and may raise other problems, but it does indicate his conviction against any limit in the atoning work of Christ. Dort was to admit that the death of Christ is

"abundantly sufficient to expiate the sins of the whole world" (II, ii), but Hooker would go further and insist on its infinite possibility of application:

As every number is infinite by possibility of addition, and

55. V, xlix, 1 (ii, 213f).

56. See Victor Shepherd, Nature and Function of Faith, 94f.

57. V, xlix, 5 {ii, 217). Predestination and Assurance -160-

every line by possibility of extension infinite, so there is no stint which can be set to the value or merit of the sacrificed body of Christ, it hath no measured certainty of limits, bounds of efficacy unto life it knowetg none, but is also itself infinite in possibility of application. 8

Sacramental grace in baptism is also seen in the context of a universal off er of life, to which baptism is itself effectually linked:

Life [supernatural] being therefore proposed unto all men as their end, they which by baptism have laid the foundation and attained the first beginning of a new life have here their nourish~ent and food prescribed for continuance of life in them.

This universalism of atoning value and application is reiterated in the careful exposition of the Dublin fragment on predestination:

He that willeth the end [that is, that all men might be saved], must needs will also the means whereby we are brought unto it. And [our] fall in Adam being presupposed, the means now which serve as causes effectual by their own worth to procure us eternal life, are only the merits of Jesus Christ. . . . He paid a ransom for the whole world; on him the iniquities of all were laid; and, as St. Peter plainly witnesseth, he bought hem which deny him, and which perish because they deny him. 60

4. Total Depravity

This phrase is not Hooker's, but it represents the Calvinist account of a conviction, which would have been shared by Augustine and

Thomas, that the human being is now capable of no meritorious work.

58. V, Iv, 9 (ii, 245).

59. V, lxvii, 1 (ii, 348).

60. V, App. I, 33 (ii, 573f). Predestination and Assurance -161-

Hooker provides a clear picture of the older conviction that grace does not destroy but perfect nature that will colour but not compromise his clear orthodoxy on this question. Indeed, even the Remonstrants admitted the terrible effect of the Fall, and would speak of the impossibility of any salvific act on the part of the human being without the help of God. But they suggested that the human being had not lost all of his faculties of intellect and will; these simply needed to be liberated by the Holy Spirit. Hooker would be more careful than the

Remonstrants, though he too accepted with them the conviction that it was the helpless human being that was given life, not a "brute." And he would, of course, agree with Calvinists and Remonstrants, that human beings were capable of social and political virtue without God's special grace; but these virtues were spiritually irrelevant, Augustinian

"splendid vices."

Book I of the Lawes sounds at times as if nothing like 'depravity' had infected human nature. For human nature seems capable of a great deal, even in spiritual matters. Hooker affirms boldly that all things seek God and desire ("covet") more or less the participation of God himself. This natural desire for God is more visible in human beings than elsewhere, but is a characteristic of all creatures. In knowledge and virtue, human beings uniquely aspire to conformity with God. 61 But

61. I, v, 2, 3 (i, 215f). Predestination and Assurance -162-

Hooker soon identifies a contrary motion: there is a general ignorance of the laws of reason; this derives from a "lewd and wicked custom" and from the "sluggishness of the human soul," for "men will not bend their wits." This means that human beings need perpetual aid and the concurrence of God. 62 There is sin, but sin is only attributed to human beings whose observance of the law of nature is voluntary; like righteousness, reward and punishment, the concept of sin implies a voluntary capacity in the human being. 63 But Hooker acknowledges the need for law to restrain human wills, since human beings use their freedom improperly. This resembles Calvin's second use of the law, the use of "laws politic" because human beings are depraved:

Laws politic ... are never framed as they should be, unless presuming the will of man to be inwardly obstinate, rebellious, and averse from all obedience unto the sacred laws of his nature; in a word, unless presuming man to be in regarctff his depraved mind little better than a wild beast.

There is a deep-rooted malice and wickedness as the source for the need for civil government, Cain and Abel being scriptural illustrations of this need. 65

The corruption of our nature being presupposed, we may not deny but that the Law of Nature doth now require of necessity

62. I, viii, 11 (i, 235f).

63. I, ix, I (i, 23 7).

64. I, x, I (i, 240).

65. I, x, 3 (i, 241). Predestination and Assurance -163-

some kind of regiment. 66

The whole logic of reward and punishment presupposes that human actions are voluntary, but the need for rewards and punishments is also an illustration of natural human brutishness:

The greatest part of men are such as pref er their own private good before all things, even that good which is most divine; and for that the labour of doing good, together with the pleasure arising from the contrary, doth make men f~r the most part slower to the one and proner to the other. 6

This is related to Hooker's justification for "mixedly human laws":

The common sort are led by the sway of their sensual desires, and therefore do more shun sin for the sensible evils which follow it amongst men, than for any lJnd of sentence which reason doth pronounce against it.

This means that there is need for laws to educate (Calvin's first use of the law): "laws do not only teach what is good, but enjoin it. 1169 Reason itself is opposed to such evils as incest and polygamy, but the human being needs the "mixedly human law" because without positive law, there is nothing to bind the brutish human being. 70 It is not always clear, however, whether this "human sluggishness" or

"imbecility" is simply a natural limitation, or an effect of the

66. I, X, 4 (i, 243).

67. I, X, 6 (i, 244).

68. I, x, l O (i, 248f).

69. I, X, 7 (i, 245).

70. I, x, l O (i, 248). Predestination and Assurance -164- fallenness of human nature, and the deprivation of God's grace that is warranted thereby. The distinction between primary and secondary positive laws does bring this distinction out. For primary laws are related to "sincere" and secondary to "depraved" nature. The results of actual human depravity require additions to human positive law, for instance, since, under sin, nations are now prone to off er "violence, injury and wrong." 71

But human "imbecility" is both natural and spiritual. Human weakness is the opportunity for human pride, a proneness to fawn upon ourselves. And this imbecility is linked explicitly to concupiscence, which is further defined as sin. The human being needs divine law, that is, revelation, to learn that concupiscence is sin, even though the roots of depravity are natural. 72

Just as Book I had suggested an ambivalence about human capacity, on the one hand pointing to a natural desire for the supernatural, and on the other hand to a natural imbecility, that led to pride and sin, and the need for supernatural grace, even to know that which is natural, so in Book V, there are similar ambivalences. When Hooker comes to talk

71. I, X, 13 (i, 251).

72. I, xii, 2 (i, 263). See Article ix, "concupiscence and lust hath of itself the nature of sin." But see also, "This concupiscence, which the Apostle at times calls sin, the declares that the catholic church has never understood to be called sin, as being truly and properly sin in the regenerate, but because it is of [ex] sin, and induces to sin." Council of Trent, Session V, On Original Sin, 5. Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Deere ta (Bologna, 1973), 667. Predestination and Assurance -165- of the church, he unashamedly uses John 15.2 twice to suggest that those who inhere in the church bring forth fruit, that is, bring forth the products of their natural capacities. This was precisely the text the

Remonstrants were to use to justify their view that natural capacities remained after the fall, and simply needed to be liberated by the

Spirit. 73

But when Hooker comes to speak of the graces of baptism, he speaks as if, without baptism, the human being is spiritually dead:

No man therefore receiveth [the Holy Eucharist] before Baptism, because no dead thing is capable of noll{jshment. That which groweth must of necessity first live.

The candidate for baptism is, in some sense, a spiritual corpse, but he is certainly a human corpse, and regeneration does not abrogate human nature; for the human being is made in the image of God, and resembles God in human free will, that is, in autonomy, wherein the human being resembles God, in "manner of working"; and this image of God is not extinguished entirely by the Fall, though it is enslaved. 75 Thus

73. V, lvi, 7, 9 (ii, 250, 25lf).

74. V, lxvii, i (ii, 348).

75. I, vii, I (i, 220). Hooker is silently following Thomas (and John of Damascus) here. For Thomas began the second part of the longer Summa precisely with a discussion of the image of God enduring in the human being. "Since, as Damascene states, man is said to be made to God's image, in so far as the image implies an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement: now that we have treated of the exemplar, i.e., God, ... it remains for us to treat of His image, i.e., man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions, as having Predestination and Assurance -166- the human being is "dead" in the sense of being helpless or enslaved, not in the sense that there is no continuity between the human fallen state and the human regenerated state.

For Hooker spoke simply of a natural "aptness" in the human being, and suggested thereby a residual freedom:

There is in the Will of man naturally that freedom, whereby it is apt to take or refm% any particular object whatsoever being presented unto it.

"Apt" and "aptness" are terms frequently employed by Hooker, and seem always to indicate a natural created capacity. 77 But the Christian

Letter objected violently to the phrase, for it seemed to deny human depravity, the corner-stone of the Reformation view both for the doctrine of justification and for the doctrine of unconditional election:

Heere we pray your helpe to teach us, how will is apt (as you say) freelie to take or refuse anie particular object whatsoever, and that reason by diligence is able to find out any good concerning us: if it be true that the Church of England prof esseth, that without the preventing and helpini, grace of God, we can will and doe nothing pleasing to God. 8

free-will and control of his actions." Summa Theologiae I-II, Prologue (i, 583).

76. I, vii, 6 (i, 222).

77. For example, see I, i, I (i, 198) and I, iii, 4 (i, 210).

78. Christian Letter, 11. Works i, 222, note 2. The reference is to Article x, which itself borrowed from Augustine, Grace and Free Will 33 (xvii) NPNF, 1st ser., v, 458. Predestination and Assurance -167-

In the margin of the Christian Letter, Hooker responded to this accusation of teaching doctrine incompatible with Article ten of the thirty-nine:

There are certaine wordes, as Nature, Reason, Will, and such like, which wheresoever you find named, you suspect them presently as bugs wordes, because what they mean you do not indeed as you ought apprehend. You have heard that man's Nature is corrupt, his Reason blind, his Will perverse. Whereupon under coulour of condemning corrupt Nature, you condemn Nature, and so in the rest. Vide Hilarium, p. 31. Vide et Philon., p. 33 Et Dionys. p. 338 "Voluntas hominis ... decernit." ["The will of man is not in bondage by its own nature, but by force of the viciousness which has been added to its nature."} 'Apt,' originally 'apta,' 'able.' Reason can find every necessary good when it is supported by divine aid, but none at all without it. It has in itself sufficiently all good by which it can prove itself to a man who is painstaking and diligently pays heed. But our sloth turns us away in other directions until the Holy Spirit stirs up zeal for virtue. Consult on his conversion. See also what Wisdom says of herself in Proverbs and elsewhere. Human reason then is slothful because of the great difficulty of seeking out good things. That difficulty the light of divine grace abolishes. Thus we are made eager, being otherwise averse to labour and prone to lust. Virtue has more things and stronger things than vice has with which to allure man. But those things escape the notice of most men. How so? Because Reason, which is the eye of the mind, lies in us slothfully buried in a deep sleep. But stirred up and illuminated by the power of the Holy Spirit it judges among other things which once through pride were h1~den, being now perceived, are to be embraced in all ways."

19. Book V, ed. Bayne, 598, note 49. See Works, i, 222f, note 2. Bayne also gives the following notes. re: Hilary: "This is the peroration of Book iii. of the de Trinitate, on the limitations of human knowledge. The passage in ii. 35, quoted by Hooker in his first fragment ... suits better." re: Philon.: "cc. 14 and 15 of The Allegories of the Sacred Lawes. Paradise (Gen. ii, 8) is expounded as virtue. "God sows and implants terrestrial virtue in the human race." But (c. 15) "though God sows and plants good things in the soul, the Predestination and Assurance -168-

Hooker here sketched out an answer that was along the lines of the

Remonstrants' account: the human faculties are enslaved in the new sluggishness that came through pride and sin, and need to be liberated by the Holy Spirit. On the basis of these texts, Hooker drafted the first of the Dublin Fragments, and referred, at paragraph thirteen, to the fifth article of the Christian Letter. But his answer is only slightly more acceptable to Calvinist orthodoxy:

But must the will cease to be itself because the grace of God helpeth it? That which confoundeth your understanding in this point is lack of diligent and distinct consideration, what the will of man naturally hath; what it wanteth through sin; and what it receiveth by . Aptness, freely to take or refuse things set before it, is so essential to the will, that being deprived of this it looseth that nature, and cannot possibly retain the definition, of will: "Voluntas, nisi libera sit, non est voluntas. [Augustine, On the Freedom of the Will, iii, 8] To actuate at any time the possibility of the will in that which is evil, we need no help, the will being that way over-inclinable of itself: but to the contrary so indisposed through a native evil habit that if God's special grace did not aid our imbecility, whatsoever ()e do or imagine would be only and continually evit. 8

The triple distinction that had eluded the Christian Letter is explained again later in the Fragment:

Freedom of operation we have in nature, but the ability of virtuous operation by grace; because through sin our nature mind which says, 'I plant,' is acting impiously." And re: Dionys.: "In cap. iv. of De Divinis Nominibus, the author asserts that evil has no being and does not partake of, nor exist in, what has being; s. 33 which Hooker refers to, defines evil as he elleipsis tau agathou."

80. V, App. I, I (ii, 537f). Predestination and Assurance -169-

hath taken that disease \1d weakness, whereby of itself it inclineth only unto evil.

In the Dublin Fragments, the sinful human being is not dead, but only very unwell. In other words, there is a certain level of integrity that does remain, although it is useless without grace:

How should we separate from Will natural possibility and aptness to shun or follow, to choose or reject, any eligible object whatsoever? . . . Had we kept our first ableness, grace should not need; and had aptness been also lost, it is not grace /fat could work in us more than it doth in brute creatures.

That is, we are "spiritually dead" in our absolute need of grace; but we are merely sick and still human, in the residue of the image of

God that is left to us. The metaphor of illness amounts to the same effect as the earlier vocabulary of slavery and helplessness. At times,

Hooker seems to hearken back to the patristic tradition that did not have the advantage of Augustine's encounter with Pelagius, when sin was sometimes treated as a sort of miscalculation, as in Irenaeus and the

Cappadocians:

We have therefore a will, the nature whereof is apt and capable as well to receive the good as the evil; but sin is fraudulent, and beguile th us with evil under the show of good; sloth breeding carelessness, and our original corruption sloth in the power of reaso1g which should discern between the one and the other. 3

81. V, App. I, 2 (ii, 539).

82. V, App. I, I (ii, 538).

83. V, App. I, 8 (ii, 544). See also App. I, 9. Predestination and Assurance -170-

Hooker goes on to point out that we need precedent grace to

"quicken" reason, and subsequent grace, as a "spur" to keep it in motion, but the effect seems to be to give lip service to Protestant orthodoxy on the matter, while preserving the patristic sense. This

"cautious Augustinianism" is not an invention of the Dublin fragment though, for it is also exhibited in Book I of the Lawes. Hooker there held that sin involves choosing a lesser good, that is something against nature and reason. The human being makes wrong choices through the neglect of reason, because of the "subtlety of the deception of ," or the "hastiness of our Wills," or our "obdurate hearts from the custom of evil." The effects of original sin, "divine malediction," are this precise sluggishness of the will. But there is too an "original weakness in the instruments," that allowed the sluggishness to set in. 84

Hooker thus adopted a careful position on the question of human spiritual anthropology: the human being was paralyzed in sin without the grace of God; but human beings did retain their natural capacities, though dimmed. In this, Hooker may have taken several hints from his

84. I, vii, 7 (i, 224). This "original weakness" is a natural factor, not a spiritual one; it is related to creation, not to the Fall. See the "common imbecility," I, viii, 2 (i, 226). See also Hooker's interpretation of vox populi, vox dei: if all agree then they have been taught by nature, that is by God, whose instrument nature is, I, viii, 3 (i, 277); for example, the "light of reason" in the Gentiles that Paul alludes to in Romans 2.14 is not revealed by "extraordinary means," but by nature, even though the nature is fallen. Predestination and Assurance -171- less cautious predecessors in the English Reformation. 85 But, in fact, when careful statements were made about the real anthropological effects of the Fall, Hooker differed very little from the supposed position of the authors of the Christian Letter. What distinguished him most from his Puritan contemporaries was not his Augustinian orthodoxy, but his scholastic optimism about the potential of the human being, created and remaining in the image of God. This was, however, an aspect of his special views of the relation between nature and grace, not any wavering about the real facts of human depravity in the loss of original righteousness.

85. Horton Davies has pointed out that Cranmer seemed to assume that men could choose the good without the help of sanctifying grace: "he that doth good deeds, yet without faith ... " Works (Cambridge, 1846) ii, 1143. And Jewel had stated that "natural reason, holden within her bands, is not the enemy, but the daughter of God's truth." Works (Cambridge, 1845) i, 501. But Horton Davies goes beyond the evidence when he states that for them "men's reason is unimpaired." Hooker, Jewel and Cranmer would surely insist on the need for grace. The following contrast between Anglicans and Puritans is absurd: "Both Anglicans and Puritans accepted the doctrine of original sin, but they estimated differently the seriousness of the effects of man's wounds. Anglicans find man to be deficient in spiritual capacity, his other powers were weakened, but not desperately wounded and in need of redemptive blood transfusions as the Puritans claimed. Man's reason was, for the Anglicans, unimpaired; it had a natural capacity to distinguish between good and evil in a moral order." Horton Davies, Worship and Theology in England from Cranmer to Hooker, 1534-1603 (Princeton, 1970), 54. Equally incautious is the simple generalization, "Hooker rejected the puritan belief in man's total depravity." Christopher Morris, Political Thought in England: Tyndale to Hooker (Oxford, 1953), 178. Hooker did not reject the notion of depravity, he balanced it with an account of the image of God in the fallen creature, waiting to be liberated, but "paralyzed," that is, absolutely helpless. Predestination and Assurance -172-

5. The Irresistibility of Grace

Since human beings are, for the hard line followers of St

Augustine, "spiritual corpses," incapable of doing anything for their own salvation, except turning the wrong way, and especially incapable of unselfish love of God and neighbour without God's aid, it seemed to them that salvation would be impossible if human beings could effectively resist the grace of God that was necessary for even the beginning of salvation, for then no one would be saved, since the only exercise of human free will that was possible apart from grace was to turn from God.

To assume, further, that the human being could refuse to accept God's grace seemed to the Calvinists of the last half of the sixteenth century to reverse totally the true picture: to make God revolve around the human being, and not the human being around God's sovereign grace. But

Hooker did not go so far, in part because of his view of the manner of

God's operations, wherein grace did not destroy but perfect nature, in part because of his view that human beings are real participants in the process of justification, in spite of their natural depravity.

This balance between an insistence on the absolute need for God's grace, and a place for human initiative and will in the process was apparent in the Lawes when Hooker described the grace that is offered in the sacraments: for Hooker, the sacraments are moral instruments, or

"means conditional," precisely because human beings can refuse to accept

God's grace therein. Hooker speaks more frequently of grace offered -- Predestination and Assurance -173- apparently inevitably offered -- in the sacraments, than he speaks of grace conveyed, although he uses this vocabulary as well.

Many times there are three things said to make up the substance of a sacrament, namely, the grace which is thereby offered, the element which shadoweth or signifieth grace, and the word which expresseth what is done by the element. 86

Baptism ... hath every where the ifme substance and of fereth unto all men the same grace.

That is, God offers the same grace to all in the sacraments; but clearly some do not receive the grace offered because they refuse it.

Development of this thesis had to wait for the response to the Christian

Letter. In the Dublin Fragments, Hooker clearly spells out his view that the human being may resist God's grace: to deny this view would change the account of how God works, and suppose that grace imposed a necessity on those offered grace. It would also deny human free will, without which the human being would not be human.

Prescience, predestination and grace, impose not that necessity, by force whereof man in doing good hath all freedom of choice taken from him. If prescience did impose any such necessity, since prescience is not only of good but of evil, then must we grant that ... Adam sinned not voluntarily, because that which Adam did ill was foreseen. If predestination did impose such necessity, then was there nothing voluntary in Adam's well-doing neither, because what Adam did well was predestinated. Or, if grace did impose such necessity, how was it possible that Adam should have done otherwise than well, being furnished as he was with

86. V, lviii, 2 (ii, 260).

87. V, lxii, 4 (ii, 283). Predestination and Assurance -174-

grace?88

Adam was, perhaps, not of the elect, so there might still be some kind of grace Adam lacked-- a grace peculiar to election -- that imposed necessity, but Hooker does not mention it here. His point is related to the underlying theological premise that grace (of any kind) does not destroy, but perfects, the nature that needs and receives it. God draws the human being by grace, and God's drawing is amiable. This view is distinguished from the Pelagian view that God issues an invitation to which the human being is free to respond; Hooker follows Augustine in insisting on the inward character of God's grace, but this does not mean that God imposes the result without the creature's free consent.

Yet what man should ever approach unto God, if his grace did no otherwise draw our minds than Pelagians and semi­ Pelagians imagined? They knew no grace but external only, which grace inviteth but draweth not: neither are we by inward grace carried up into heaven, the force of reason and will being cast into a dead sleep. Our experience teacheth us, that we never do any thing well, but with deliberate advice and choice, such as painfully setteth the powers of our minds on work: which thing I note in regard of Libertines and Enthusiasts, who err much on the one hand, by making man little more than a block, as the Pelagians on the other, by s19aking him almost a god in the work of his own salvation.

It is the capacity of the human being to resist God's grace that accounts for the fact that not all achieve salvation, despite the universal salvific will of God and the wrought by

88. V, App. 1, 2 (ii, 538).

89. V, App. 1, 2 (ii, 540). Predestination and Assurance -175-

Christ, on both of which Hooker insists:

But if God would have all men saved, and if Christ through such his grace have died for all men, wherefore are they not all saved? . . . It is on all sides conf est, that his will in this kind oftentimes succeedeth not; the cause whereof is a personal impediment making particular men [unacceptable] of that good which t~~ will of his general providence did ordain for mankind.

Reprobation for Hooker, as we have already seen, is not unconditional: it is the damnation merited by human guilt. But

Hooker's view displayed here, of the actual resistance in those who are not saved, takes this position one step further. Those who are not ultimately saved "achieve" this state not just because of the inherited guilt of Adam, but because of actual refusal to accept the grace that is offered consistent with God's will that all intelligent creatures achieve the saving knowledge of God. Election is entirely undeserved, as we have seen, but grace would be less than grace unless it could be resisted. There is thus (at least temporarily) the capacity, even in the elect, to resist grace:

It must ever in the election of saints be remembered, that to choose is an act of God's good pleasure, which presuppo;e~1 in us sufficient cause to avert, but none to deserve 1t.

Those who achieve salvation have only God to thank, those who fail have only themselves to blame, that is, by implication, God offers grace

90. V, App. l, 34 (ii, 574).

91. V, App. l, 39 (ii, 584). Predestination and Assurance -176- to all, but its riches are visible only in those who accept it (though they do not deserve it). Those who refuse it get what they deserve. We have already noted that Hooker interpreted scriptural passages implying that God "hardens" human hearts as indicating not God's purpose, but the actual result. The difference here is the human capacity to resist.

Hooker quotes Prosper of Aquitaine with approval:

"Jacob I have loved," behold what God doth bestow freely~ "I have hated Esau," behold what man doth justly deserve. 2

This means that reprobation is not just an abandoning by God of some "on account of" inherited and actual guilt; it is far from that sort of incomprehensible omission. Actual reprobates actually resist grace sufficient that is offered to them, as to all human beings:

Now there are that have made themselves incapable of both [goodness and salvation], thousands there have been, and are, in all ages, to whose charge it may truly be laid, that they have resisted the Holy Gh~1t, that the grace which is offered, they thrust from them.

Our obstinate resistance may hinder thatJ9-fusion, which nothing in us could procure, or purchase.

6. The Perseverance of the Elect

This bold assertion of the capacity of the human being to resist an inward sufficient grace offered, especially in the sacraments, to all

92. V, App. l, 39 (ii, 584).

93. V, App. I, 42 (ii, 590).

94. V, App. 1, 46 (ii, 595). Predestination and Assurance -177- human beings without regard to their state of election, clearly makes

Hooker agree with Peter Baro and Lancelot Andrewes in their position in the troubles in Cambridge in 1595. But, like Andrewes, Hooker differed from Baro, on the question of the possibility of defection in the elect.

And indeed in this they agreed with Calvin. 95 The "strong" party had argued that such defection was not possible, either temporarily or finally. Whitgift was persuaded that such defection might be temporary, but could not be final. All would have agreed that it would not be final, since what was predestined was foreseen, and what was foreseen would take place. But for Whitgift there was a stronger form of necessity involved than this logical one: there was a causal necessity.

In the elect, God would inevitably prevail.

The Sermons related to the controversies at the Temple seem to give a quite unqualified view of the perseverance of the elect -- in fact, of the perseverance in grace of any one who had once partaken of grace.

In this we know we are not deceived, neither can we deceive you, when we teach that the faith whereby ye are sanctified can11y

95. It is said that Calvin and his followers "added" in def ectibility to the received account of grace. See Oxford Dictionary of the Church ed. F.L. Cross (London, 1958), 577a.

96. Sermon I (iii, 473). Peter Heylyn was prepared to admit that Hooker accepted this point of Dort, but held that the Sermons were early and that Hooker later adjusted his view. Peter Heylyn, Historia Quinqu­ Articularis (London, 1681) Part III, chap. xx iii, 8 (p. 626). Predestination and Assurance -178-

The faith ... of true believers, though it have many and grievous downfalls, yet doth it still continue invincible; it conquereth and recovereth itself in the end. The dange:ous ~onfl_ic~~whereunto it is subject are not able to prevail agamst 1t.

The justified man, being alive to God in Jesus Christ our Lord, doth as necessarily from that time forward always live, as Christ, by whom he hath life, liveth always .... The man which i~gnce just by faith, shall live by faith, and live for ever.

In his summary of his own doctrinal propositions in dispute at the

Temple, Hooker gives a clear statement of this view: there may be temporary back-sliding, that is temporary lapses, but final perseverance

97. Sermon I (iii, 476).

98. Sermon II, 26 (iii, 517). The whole of section 26 deals with this conviction, which is in fact a cornerstone of Hooker's argument that led him into conflict with Travers on the state of salvation of Roman Catholics. For Hooker in Sermon II, 26, justifying faith is indef ectible; those who are chosen, effectually called, and justified cannot deny the foundation precisely because God cannot finally fail them. Dewey Wallace seems to have misinterpreted Hooker's view of Lutheranism on this. In Sermon II, Hooker does note that the Lutherans are in error on certain points, but that does not mean they cannot achieve salvation. Wallace states that the "error" involved is precisely the error of denying the perseverance of the elect: Hooker "did not doubt that Lutherans would attain salvation in spite of holding an error so serious as that the elect could fall from grace." Wallace, Puritans and Predestination, 35f. In fact, Hooker does not name the Lutheran error, but, if the note in the manuscript is his, he is ref erring to an error Lutherans received from Luther himself. As Wallace recognizes (pp. 34f), Luther gave an account of the questions of predestination that was very similar to Calvin. It was his successors at mid-century that tempered his view of unconditional election and may have held so radical a view of human obstinacy that they suggested a denial of the perseverance of the elect. Much more likely, Hooker is ref erring to the typical Lutheran doctrine of or , or even the Christological error of the ubiquity of Christ's body, suggested by Luther and championed by his successors. Sermon II, I 7 (iii, 503 and note I). Predestination and Assurance -179- is certain:

The elect of God cannot so err that they should deny directly the foundation: for that Christ doth keep them from that extremity: and there is no salvation to such as deny the foundation .... may prevail much against them [viz. the elect], and they may receive the sign of the beast in the same degr~~ but not so that they should directly deny the foundation.

This clear affirmation of the doctrine of the final indef ectibility in the elect continues in the Lawes:

The Scripture [Revelation 7.3, 9.4] ... describeth them marked of God in the forehead, whom his mercy hath undertaken to keep from final confusion and shame. Not that God doth set any corporal mark on his chosen, but to note that he giveth Yb5c/lect security of preservation from reproach ....

The first thing of [Christ's] infused into our hearts in this life is the Spirit of Christ, whereupon because the rest of what kind soever 18all both necessarily depend and infallibly also ensue . . . . 1

And this view is repeated in the Dublin fragments. There, Hooker comes to consider the text John 17.9, 20, "I pray for them: I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given me; for they are thine . . . Neither pray I for these alone, but for them also which shall believe on me through their word." This prayer of Christ was associated with the prayer of Christ for Peter in Luke 22.32, a text

99. Strype's third addition, 1705, to Walton's Life. Works i, 62.

100. V, lxv, 7 (ii, 324).

101. V, lvi, 11 (ii, 254). Predestination and Assurance -180- used in Cambridge in 1595 to support the Lambeth Articles against

William Barrett's denial of perseverance in order to deny

"assurance. 11102 Hooker's interpretation shows him clearly on the side of the Lambeth Articles in this case:

In that prayer for eternal life, which our Saviour knew could not be made without ef feet, he excepteth them, for whom he knew his sufferings would be frustrate, and commendeth unto God his own .... That they should be finally seduced, and clean drawn away from God, is a thing imposrb~le. Such as utterly depart from them, were never of them.

But in the Dublin fragments, there is an additional qualification placed on the indef ectibility of the elect. Indef ectibility is not owned (although it may be certain), until the elect have the perfect knowledge of God which is their final bliss. In this they are like the angels, not all of whom persisted:

[The grace whereby angels and men] might be exempted from possibility of sinning ... belongeth to their perfection, who see God in fulnesfoof glory, and not to them, who as yet serve him under hope. 4

102. H.C. Porter, Reformation and Reaction, 344, 359, 361.

103. V, App. 1, 46 (ii, 596). See Porter, Reformation and Reaction, 317.

104. V, App. 1, 28 (ii, 567). This view Hooker expressed early in Book I of the Lawes, in discussing "the law which angels do work by": "Impossible it was that ever their will should change or incline to remit any part of their duty, without some object having force to avert their conceit from God, and to draw it another way; and that before they attained that high perfection of bliss, wherein now the elect angels are without possibility of falling." I, iv, 3 (i, 214). See Summa Theologiae I, q. 62, a. 8 (i, 318), for the view that the angels, in beatitude, can no longer sin. Predestination and Assurance -181-

Thus, it appears, the elect will not finally defect, because glorification will confer stability of will on them. In the mean time, the outcome of their progress and back-sliding is certain, but this does not depend on them, but on God, who both foresees the outcome, and ensures it comes to pass (at the same time without compelling the creature, who retains a freedom to resist). In this mean time, the means of grace are essential; election does not provide an easy road to glory even though it is a certain one:

The fruits of the Spirit do not follow men, as the shadow doth the body, of their own accord. If the grace of sanctification did so work, what should the grace of exhortation need? It were even as superfluous and vain to stir men up unto good, as to request them when they walk abroad not to lose their shadows. Grace is not given us to abandon labour, but labour required lest our sluggishness should make the grace of God unprofitable. Shall we betake ourselves to our ease, and in that sort ref er salvation to God's grace, as if we have notpJgg to do with it, because without it we can do nothing?

In the elect, the grace of God will not in fact be "unprofitable."

But this is simply to indicate the need for the normal means of grace,

105. V, App. 1, 13 (ii, 549). See also Hooker's peroration to Sermon I, wherein perseverance involves never ceasing to work and pray for assurance: "The earth may shake, the pillars of the world may tremble under us, the countenance of heaven may be appalled, the sun may lose his light, the moon her beauty, the stars their glory; but ... what is there in the world that shall change [the heart of the man that trusteth in God]? ... The assurance of my hope I will labour to keep as a jewel unto the end; and by labour, through the gracious mediation of [Christ's] prayer, I shall keep it." Sermon I (iii, 481). Pollard mistakes this as resembling Calvin's assurance based on Christ as mirror. Arthur Pollard, Richard Hooker (London, 1966), 26. For Hooker, Christ's prayer is the cause of perseverance, not its mirror. Predestination and Assurance -182- especially exhortation, in order to secure it. In the mean time, God's grace is sufficient, but it does not make sin and defection impossible:

Grace, excluding possibility to sin, was neither given unto angels in their first creation, nor to man before his fall; but reserved for both till God be seen face to face in the state of glory, which state shall make it then impossible for us to sin, who now sin of ten, notwithstanding grace, because the providence of God bestoweth not in this present life grace so nearly illustrating goodness, that the will should have no power to decline from it. Grace is not therefore here given in that measure which taketh away possibil!ty of sinYb?f• and so effectually moveth the will, as that 1t cannot.

But this drives Hooker to the edge of contradiction: grace is offered to all; grace cannot fail; but some, it seems, are not saved.

And Hooker had already in the Lawes identified two classes of participation in Christ: all human beings participate in Christ in creation and in providence, but some do not in salvation. 107 In the

Dublin Fragments, Hooker, in distinguishing the determinate will of God from God's occasioned will, identifies three forms of the determinate will:

He willeth positively whatsoever himself worketh; He willeth by permission that which his creatures do: He only assisting the natural powers which are given them to work withal, and not hindering or barring the effects which grow from them. Whereunto we may add that negative or privative will also, whereby he withholdeth his graces from some, and so is said to cast them asleep whom he maketh not vigilant [Romans 2.8]; to harden them whom he sof teneth not; and to

106. V, App. 1, 4 (ii, 541).

107. V, lvi, 10 (ii, 253). Predestination and Assurance -183-

take away that, which it pleaseth him not to bestow. 108

Hooker is clearly dealing here, in a generally typical fashion, with the interpretation of passages in Scripture where human obduration is attributed to God. But he goes further here than in other accounts and attributes something to God's purposive (and unoccasioned) will, that is, God's will without respect of anything external to it, even human sinfulness. This "prelapsarian" withholding of grace might sound close to a decree of unconditional reprobation, since it seems to be entirely without regard to anything but itself. It apparently is not so, however, but related to God's determinate positive and permissive will.

Hooker finally, but briefly does indicate that there is a distinction in the grace actually given by God in this life: there are some human beings who genuinely participate in God's grace but fall away, since they do not possess the "grace which abideth":

The same men [that is, the reprobate apostates] were once enlightened, and had been partakers of the heavenly gift of the Holy Ghost, and had tasted of the good word of God, and of the power of the world to come. On the other side, perpetuity of inward grace belongeth unto none, but eternally foreseen elect, whose difference from castaways, in this life, doth not herein consist, that the one have grace always, the other never: but in this, that the one have grace that abideth, the other f?Jther not grace at all, or else grace which abideth not. 10

108. V, App. 1, 26 (ii, 564).

109. V, App. 1, 45 (ii, 594). Compare, "To many is given grace, to whom perseverance in grace is not given." Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 109, a. Predestination and Assurance -184-

This unnamed distinction, parallel to Augustine's distinction of adiutorium sine quo non, "assistance without which something cannot be attained" and adiutorium quo, "assistance by which something can be attained," was parallel to the distinction defended by the Jesuits and resisted by the Dominicans between sufficient and efficacious grace in the debates in the Roman Catholic world during precisely the same decade of the sixteenth century. 110 On the one hand, the distinction allows

Hooker to maintain the perseverance of the elect, who alone receive

"efficacious grace," and, on the other, the real participation in grace

10 (i, 1131).

110. Karl Rahner, "Augustin und der Semipelagianismus," in Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie 62 (1938), 181. See Augustine, On Rebuke and Grace, cc. 26-38 [x-xii], NPNF, 1st ser., v, 482-487. See also G.W.H. Lampe in Cunliffe-Jones, A History of Christian Doctrine, 166f. The debate between Banez and the Dominicans and Molina and the Jesuits on the question was ref erred to a commission appointed by pope Clement VIII in 1597, the . Although the congregation twice reported against the Jesuits, the pope and his successor Paul V refused to accept the recommendation. In 1607, Paul V ended the discussions, without condemning either view, and forbade that the Jesuits be accused of Pelagianism or the Dominicans of Calvinism. The scholastic distinction had already been used by Peter Martyr: "We also will grant [that the benefit of Christ's death is common unto all men], if onelie the worthinesse of the death of Christ is considered; for as touching it, it might be sufficient for all the sinners in the world. But although in itself e is bee sufficient; yet it neither had, nor hath, nor shall have ef feet in all men. Which the Schoolemen also conf esse, when they affirme, that Christ hath redeemed all men sufficientlie, but not eff ectualie." Common Places III, 1, pp. 31, 33. And the distinction would be used by Lancelot Andrewes in advising Whitgift on the seventh Lambeth Article, Minor Works, 293. It was rejected by Samuel Harsnett in his Paul's Cross Sermon, 1584, Three Sermons 157f, 161, 163f, 169. Predestination and Assurance -185- by the reprobate, who do not persist but do receive grace sufficient for salvation, though by God's "privative will" efficacious grace is withheld. Hooker thus adopts, without a specific vocabulary, a view of grace approaching the Jesuit one. And, despite the concurrence, there is neither in Hooker nor in the opinions of the expert advisers to

Whitgift in 1595, any reference at all to the parallel discussions in the Roman of grace.

7. Assurance and security

Whether or not tradesmen and gossips in late Elizabethan England could discuss predestination, the question of assurance was undoubtedly a significant popular pastoral matter, the pastoral edge of the whole

Reformed emphasis on the sovereignty of God in predestination. To make salvation uncertain or doubtful was tantamount to papistry. Undoubtedly the Lutheran doctrine of justification by faith alone was interpreted from the beginning of the Reformation as a "comforting" doctrine, one that could end the "fear" of God's judgement in the consolation that God in Christ had dealt decisively with human alienation. But Calvin had pushed the logic a little further: for him, assurance and faith go together; where there is no assurance, there is no faith:

Scripture shows that God's promises are not established unless they are grasped with the full assurance of conscience. Whenever there is doubt or uncertainty, it Predestination and Assurance -186-

pronounces them void. 111

This could mean, for Calvinists, that no one can be considered as justified unless he firmly believes he is justified. There are variations of certainty in the matter, since the certainty varies with the measure of faith given. And, for Calvin, even assured faith is afflicted with doubt, since unbelief is sinful; but unbelief can never overcome faith. Thus the knowledge of faith is more certain and more enduring that sense-knowledge, since it does not arise from the natural human capacity for knowledge, with all the weaknesses of that capacity:

When we call faith "knowledge" we do not mean comprehension of the sort that is commonly concerned with those things which fall under human sense perception. For faith is so far above sense that man's mind has to go beyond and rise above itself in order to attain it. Even where the mind has attained it, it does not comprehend what it feels. But while it is persuaded of what it does not grasp, by the very certainty of its persuasion it understands more than if it perceived anything human by its own capacity .... The knowledge ~f ffi~ consists in assurance rather than in comprehension.

In the first Sermon on St Jude, Hooker speaks of an infallible internal evidence:

God hath left us infallible evidence, whereby we may at any time give true and righteous sentence upon ourselves. We cannot examine the hearts of other men, we may our own. . . . I trust, beloved, we know that we are not reprobates, because our spirit doth bear us record, that the

111. Institutes Ill, xiii, 4 (i, 767).

112. Institutes Ill, ii, 14 (i, 560f). For further texts and an extended discussion of Calvin's typical position, see Victor A. Shepherd Nature and Function of Faith, 19-27. Predestination and Assurance -187-

faith of our Lord Jesus Christ is in us. . . . The Lord of his infinite mercy give us hearts plentifully fraught with the tre.asure of this blessed assurance of faith unto the end.113

However, in the sermons in the Temple in March 1585, Hooker appears to contradict this contention. The surviving fragments of Sermon I, "A

Learned and Comfortable Sermon of the Certainty and Perpetuity of Faith in the Elect," seem to take a quite different tack. This sermon attempts to reassure those whose "certainty" and assurance is less than perfect that they should not doubt or despair their state of grace, but treat their doubts and questionings, their "scruples," as evidence of the faith that is in them. Hooker goes so far as to claim that a pretending to the "Paradisal joy" of absolute certainty, which the view of some unnamed "others" would attempt to induce in the doubtful, is not only fraudulent, but runs the risk of Pharisaical hypocrisy. Hooker distinguishes "the certainty of evidence" from the "certainty of adherence":

Certainty of Evidence we call that, when the mind doth assent unto this or that, not because it is true in itself, but because the truth is clear, because it is manifest to us. . . . The other, which we call the Certainty of Adherence, is when the heart doth cleave and stick unto that which it doth believe. 1 4

In his list of Hooker's erroneous doctrines, March 30, 1585, Walter

Travers listed one that focused on this distinction:

113. Sermon V, 13, 14 (iii, 673ff).

114. Sermon I (iii, 470f). Predestination and Assurance -188-

15. The assurance of things which we believe by the worp !s not so sure, as of those which we perceive by sense. 1

This criticism Travers repeated in his Supplication to the

Councu. 116 Hooker does not appear to def end himself from this charge in the response to Travers' list of March 30, 1585, although he does affirm the perseverance of the elect. 117 On the sense of "certainty of adherence," however, Travers described Hooker's views entirely accurately, for in the Answer to Travers, Hooker writes:

The next thing discovered, is an opinion about the assurance of men's persuasion in matters of faith. I have taught, he saith, "That the assurance of things which we believe by the word, is not so certain as of that we perceive by sense." And is it as certain? Yea, I taught, as he himself I trust will not deny, that the things which God doth promise in his word are surer unto us than any thing we touch, handle, or see; but are we so sure and certain of them? if we be, why doth God so often prove his promises unto us, as he doth, by arguments taken from our sensible experience? We must be surer of the proof than of the thing proved, otherwise it is no proof. How is it, that if ten men do all look upon the moon, every one of them knoweth it as certainly to be the moon as another; but many believing one and the same promises, all have not one and the same fullness of persuasion? How falleth it out, that men being assured of any thing by sense, can be no surer of it than they are; whereas the strongest in faith that liveth upon the earth, hath always need to labour, and strive, and pray, that his assurance concerning heavenly and spiritual things may grow,

115. Strype's third addition to Walton's Life of Hooker, Works i, 60.

116. Travers' Supplication (iii, 559f).

117. Strype's third addition to Walton's Life of Hooker, Works i, 62. Predestination and Assurance -189-

increase, and be augmented. 118

But there had been a shift of emphasis on assurance after Calvin.

Calvin himself had insisted that one was never to look to oneself for assurance of salvation, but to Christ, the "mirror of election," to find there the persuasion that Christ had died for one. 119 But Calvin had spoken of "transitory faith," given to the non-elect. 120 This might raise doubts about treating one's faith as adequate evidence of one's election. And these doubts gave rise, in England, to an "experimental tradition," that pointed to a reflex act to give assurance: a

"practicall syllogism of the Holy Ghost," to allow one to know that "hee is in the number of the elect." And this practical syllogism was interpreted, in the words of 2 Peter 1.10, as "making [one's] calling and election sure." The principal author of this "experimental predestination" was Hooker's contemporary, William Perkins. 121

Here was, then, in Hooker's Answer to Travers evidence of a clear challenge to much later sixteenth century spirituality of "assurance."

118. Answer to Travers 9 (iii, 577).

119. Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism, 24-28, 75.

120. Institutes III, 2, 11 (i, 555f). Beza spoke of "ineffectual calling," and Perkins of "temporary faith." Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism, 22, 36, 67ff.

121. Perkins in fact pointed in the last case to the "will or desire to believe," as the final evidence for election. In this, he and Hooker approached each other, since this amounts to hope; but Hooker had in fact, as we shall see, taken a different track. For him, the evidence was not "subjective" at all, but "objective." Predestination and Assurance -190-

By placing the degree of assent of the mind in the continuum of the mind's other degrees of commitment, Hooker established that the matters of faith were not so certain as the axioms of mathematics or the evidence of the sense. This must have seemed to invite "papist insecurity." In fact, Hooker did here what few Reformed writers had done: compare the mind's assent in matters of faith with the mind's assent in ordinary matters. But his purpose was not to induce uncertainty, but rather, by being honest about the real subjective uncertainties on matters of faith in the life of growth in grace, to reassure those who did not seem to find in themselves the certainties their more aggressive Reformed neighbours and preachers treated as the only means to discern one's own state of election to salvation.

Sermon I, although it represents a version of a sermon composed and circulated in manuscript before Hooker came to the Temple, 122 is a fragment of what must have been a substantially longer sermon, and in its current form may have been altered and expanded in the light of the controversy with Travers. Certainly, in its published form, it unhesitatingly describes the certainty of matters of faith in themselves, which have greater certainty than other beliefs, although, for the moment at least, less evidence:

That which we know either by sense, or by infallible demonstration, is not so certain as the principles, articles,

122. Answer to Travers 10 (iii, 577). Predestination and Assurance -191-

and conclusions of Christian faith. . . . Of things in themselves most certain, except they be also most evident, our persuasion is not so assured as it is of things more evident, although in themselves they be less certain. . .. The truth of some things is so evident, that no man which heareth them can doubt of them . . . . If it were so in matters of faith, then, as all men have equal certainty of this, so no believer should be more scrupy1~us and doubtful than another. But we find the contrary.

Matters of faith (such as the Articles of the Creed) are thus certain in themselves, though less than perfectly evident to human beings at present. There is thus a distinction between an objective certainty of truth and the subjective certainty of evidence. But the certainty of adherence, though greater because it is of the heart and not of the mind alone, has also a place in the continuum of subjective natural processes. For it is related to the good, the object of desire, and the human being clings to these matters of faith because of recognizing them as ends. The will and the enlightened appetite ensure the certainty in this case, going beyond the evidence. But such matters are certain as well because the faith is a gift of God, a grace that does not destroy the nature it elevates, but perfects it:

The reason [that the certainty of adherence is greater than the certainty of evidence] is this: the faith of a Christian doth apprehend the words of the law. the promises of God, not only as true, but also as good; and therefore even then when the evidence which he hath of the truth is so small that it grieveth him to feel his weakness in assenting thereto, yet is there in him such a sure adherence unto that which he doth but faintly and fearfully believe, that his spirit having once truly tasted the heavenly sweetness

123. Sermon I (iii, 470). Predestination and Assurance -192-

thereof, all the world is not able quite and clean to remove him from it; but he striveth with himself to hope against all reason of believing, being settled with Job upon this unmoveable resolution . . . . For why? this lesson remaineth for eve.r imprinted in him, "It is good for me to cleave unto God."124

Since the love of God is a gift to the believer, even the grief of the scrupulous at the weakness of her or his faith is evidence of the griever's faith:

But are they not grieved at their unbelief? They are. Do they not wish it might, and also strive that it may, be otherwise? We know they do. Whence cometh this, but from a secret love and liking which they have of those things that are believed? No man can love things which in his own opinion are not. And if they think those things to be, which they shew that they love when they desire to believe them; then must it needs be, that by desiring to believe they prove themselves true believers. For without faith, no man thinketh that things believed are. Which argument all the subtilty of infernal powers will never be able to dissolve. The faith therefore of true believers, though it have many and grievous downfalls, yet doth it still continue invincible; it conquereth and recovereth itself in the end. The dan?erou~ con_fli~1s whereunto it is subject are not able to prevail agarnst 1t.

The "infallible internal evidence" alluded to in the first Sermon on St Jude has seemed to many to be at variance with the arguments of

Sermon I to which Travers so objected, for, at first glance, it seems difficult to reconcile Hooker's considered opinion that the human being is more certain of the truths of reason and sense than of matters of

124. [Psalm 73.28] Sermon I (iii, 471).

125. Sermon I (iii, 475f). At this point, Hooker came closest to Perkins' account of assurance through finding in oneself "the will or desire to believe." Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism, 22, 65. Predestination and Assurance -193-

faith with the view that there is any kind of "infallible" evidence at

all. This led earlier editors to doubt the authenticity of the Sermons

on Jude. But these sermons are now known to be as genuine as any other

part of Hooker's works. 126 Is there, in fact, a doctrinal discrepancy

between Sermon V and Sermon II?

We have seen that there is a shift in emphasis. Sermon V def ends

the infallibility of faith, presumably against some sort of accusation

that the Church of England has apostasized in separating itself from the

Church of Rome, as evidence that one can be Christian in the Church of

England, since its members can recognize their own subjective faith,

which could not be of the temporary kind in everyone. Sermon II deals

with the quite different matter of the scruples of the doubtful. Here

Hooker does assert, as a principle of pastoral comfort, that the evidence for matters of faith, and therefore our reasonable assent to

them, is always less than complete and perfect. But he does go on to

describe an infallibility to this albeit incomplete and imperfect faith.

The certainty of matters of faith is not only objective, since it is God

who gives faith, and God cannot fail, though all human beings be weak, but in some sense subjective as well, since the natural capacity of desire and will aid the evidence of reason, and will not let the good,

which is the object of faith, go. Hooker thus argues, shockingly, for a

126. in Editor's Preface, 27 (i, Iv); Francis Paget in Introduction, 265. Sisson, Judicious Marriage, 109ff, 140. Predestination and Assurance -194- sort of natural basis for the perseverance of faith in the elect -- an infallible and permanent hope beyond a wavering faith. The argument is at considerable variance from the point of view of the Reformed tradition generally, but he does, through this argument, establish the same "infallible internal evidence" he spoke of in Sermon V; similarly, in Sermon II, he balanced his further statement with a traditional distinction between the faith of evidence, which the devils possess, and fear, and the faith which justifies. 127 In both cases, protestant orthodoxy was maintained, but, in Sermon II, there is a surprising accompanying argument about the natural basis of assurance.

Further, the "infallible internal evidence" of Sermon V turns out to be a conclusion based on observation though not on a "reflex act" as in Perkins. For the "evidence" we are to look for is evidence of our love of "the brethren," as the first epistle of St John has it:

"That we have passed from death to life, we know it," iith St. John, "because we love our brethren." [J John 3.14]11

The argument sounds like those of the Calvinist divines like

Perkins, but, if pursued, it leads to a very un-Calvinist conclusion: for the "infallibility" is of the love observed, not of our apprehension of the love; believing we are "in love and charity" with our neighbour does not mean that we are; but being so assures us infallibly we are

127. Sermon II, 26 (iii, 515).

128. Sermon V, 13 (iii, 673). Predestination and Assurance -195- saved. Thus Sermon V points ahead to Sermon II, although the vocabulary looks "across" to a Calvinist pattern. In both cases, the important thing is the objective certainty of God's gracious gift of love, or of the articles of the Creed, not any apprehension of anything going on in us at all.

In Sermon II, Hooker repeats emphatically the spiritual importance of recognizing the subjective fallibility and weakness of mental certainty in matters of faith. The assumption of perfect assurance is a presumptuous assertion that the human being has already achieved glory.

The human being has received grace, which gives a confidence (in hope) beyond the evidence of natural "light," but this is not angelic light, which must wait for the completion of grace in glorification: the light of nature is perfected by the light of grace by a process that ends in the light of glory:

The angels and spirits of the righteous in heaven have certainty most evident of things spiritual: but this they have by the light of glory. That which we see by the light of grace, though it be indeed more certain; yet is it not to us so evidently certain, as that which sense o he light of nature will not suffer a man to doubt of. 119

In this, perfect certainty would be like the perfect righteousness of the glorified; it would achieve the reward of final justification:

Now the minds of all men being so darkened as they are with the foggy damp of original corruption, it cannot be that any man's heart living should be either so enlightened in the

129. Sermon I (iii, 470). Predestination and Assurance -196-

knowledge, or so established in the love of that wherein his salvation standeth, as to be perfect, neither doubting nor shrinking at all. If any such were, what doth let why that man should not be justified by his own inherent righteousness? For righteousness inherent, being perfect, ~ill justify. ~nd perf;<~t faith is a part of perfect righteousness mherent. 0

But we walk now by faith mixed with mental doubt, though with hearts invincibly directed to their object in hope, and not by the perfect knowledge of the possession of the object of delight. The faith we have is invincible, since it is from God, but to pretend it is perfect is to adopt the posture of the Pharisee, not the imitation of

Christ:

Better it is sometimes to go down into the pit with him, who, beholding darkness, and bewailing the loss of inward joy and consolation, crieth from the bottom of the lowest hell, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" than continually to walk arm in arm with angels, to sit as it were in Abraham's bosom, and to have no thought, no cogitation, but "I thank my God it is not with me as it is with other men." No, God will have them that shall walk in light to feel now and then what it is to sit in the shadow of death. A gri§ved spirit therefore is no argument of a faithless mind. 1 1

Not to recognize the limitations of our current state leads some to despair, if they recognize they have imperfect assurance, and others to presumption, pretending they have no room to grow. At Luke 22.32,

Christ prayed that Peter's faith fail not. This text was important in the debates that would take place in Cambridge in 1595. There Barrett

130. Sermon I ( iii, 4 7 I).

131. Sermon I (iii, 474f). Predestination and Assurance -197- and others argued that the prayer was for Peter alone. Hooker agrees with the position that William Whitaker would take: the prayer applies to all of the elect, those written "in the Book of Life." But for

Hooker, although this is a sure guarantee, those who suppose it precludes our intensive labour are wrong:

This is our safety. No man's condition so sure as ours: the prayer of Christ is more than sufficient both to strengthen us, be we never so weak; and to overthrow all adversary power, be it never so strong and potent. His prayer must not exclude our labour. Their thoughts are vain who think that their watching can preserve the city which God himself is not willing to keep. And are not theirs as vain, who think that God will keep the city, for which they themselves are not careful to watch? . . . Therefore the assurance of my hope I will labour to keep as a jewel unto the end; and by labour, thr~lJfh the gracious mediation of his prayer, I shall keep it. 1

Hooker's view of the relative degrees of assurance becomes crucial in his polemic in the Lawes against the scripturalism of the advocates of presbyterian government. We are convinced of the truths of scripture only by being taught by natural means. The greatest certainty we have is from matters of observation; even in matters divine, we must proportion our assent to the degrees of evidence. 133 There are three levels of reason (as healed by grace), and these levels have a descending strength of conviction: intuitive beholding, strong and invincible demonstration, and the way of greatest probability. But in

132. Sermon I (iii, 480f).

133. II, vii, 5 (i, 322f). Predestination and Assurance -198- all matters, the reasonable person proportions (mental) assurance to the evidence. 134 This must needs involve reason to support and interpret scripture, and not scripture alone.

Hooker alludes in the Lawes, to the theme of Sermon I: a wrong view of assurance leads honest souls to despair:

When bare and unbuilded conclusions are put into [the minds of "a number of souls" who "are for want of right information in this point oftentimes grievously vexed"], they finding not themselves to have thereof any great certainty, imagine that this proceedeth only from lack of faith, and that the Spirit of God doth not work in them as it doth in true believers; by this means their hearts ar~ much troubled, they fall into anguish and perplexity. 1 5

But this view is related to the whole drift of Book II of the

Lawes, to vindicate reason, nature and human authority in spiritual matters. For, Hooker argues, unless we are assured by something other than Scripture, we would have no assurance at a11.136 It is trusting in the human testimony of our teachers that leads us to trust Scripture in the first place, the assurance we have in one leading to the assurance we arrive at in the other. 137 And even in interpreting Scripture, we must rely on authority. 138 In other words, the objective norm of

134. I, viii, 5, 6 (i, 228ff); Preface iii, 10 (i, l 50f).

135. II, vii, 5 (i, 323); see also II, viii, 6 (i, 335).

136. II, iv, 2 (i, 294f).

137. II, vii, 5 (i, 320f).

138. II, vii, 9 (i, 328f). Predestination and Assurance -199-

Scripture does not occur isolated from the subjective state of our apprehending it. We come to (mental) belief in the doctrines of the faith in a way precisely commensurate with the way we come to be assured of other things; and we ought to proportion the degree of our assurance in both cases to the degree of the evidence. This does not mean that either Scripture or internal faith is simply "natural" and reasonable: faith cannot fail, and Scripture is perfect for the end for which it was ordained. But both are apprehended as part of a natural process, and to pretend otherwise risks many errors, fanaticism and phariseeism.

The "subjectivism" that is hidden in the presbyterian argument is not just an epistemological mistake, it is a spiritual problem. For, once the "rule of men's private spirits" is accepted, all disorder must follow. If this direction is followed, presbyterians turn out to be in the same league with the hated anabaptists. 139 There is a false

"subjective principle" behind the Puritan position, whether on assurance or on church discipline, so that a subjective state is elevated to objective authority. 140 To assert assurance on the public side is as dangerous as to seek it on the spiritual side. Subjective "security" is always dangerous and leads to neglect and a lack of watchfulness: in

Christian history, according to Hooker, this is what happened to the

139. V, X, 1,2 (ii, 4lf).

140. Egil Grislis, "The Hermeneutical Problem in Richard Hooker," 167ff. Predestination and Assurance -200- orthodox Trinitarians after the Council of Nicaea; they became "secure," and allowed the Arians to gain ground. "It plainly appeareth that the first thing that weakened them was their security. 11141

The Puritans, not recognizing the natural limitations and weaknesses of the means of grace in the process of natural , adopt wrong positions on the "perfection" of the ministers of

Christian sacraments. Thomas Cartwright, in objecting to the "usurped jurisdiction" of baptism by a layman, argued that someone so baptized would "lack assurance"; such an administration of the sacrament would be like a stolen seal on a forged document. Hooker rejected the argument.

Administering baptism was not like a seal in this respect: "the grace of baptism cometh by donation from God alone. 11142 In fact, the very weakness of the human agents of the sacraments is the warrant for

"assurance" that they are more than human acts: "regard the weakness which is in us, and they are warrants for the more security of our belief. 11143

In the Lawes, the direct discussion of the "comfortable doctrine of blessed assurance" does not hold the centre of the stage, but the general view is the same as in Sermon I. We are to make a charitable

141. V, xiii, 4 (ii, 179).

142. V, lxii, 19 (ii, 300). Cartwright is quoted in ii, 299, note 2.

143. V, lvii, 2 (ii, 256). Predestination and Assurance -201- assumption that we and all others who care about it, are among the elect, and therefore will persevere, but we are not to search for a particular conviction in ourselves:

There is in the knowledge both of God and man this certainty, that life and death have divided between them the whole body of mankind. What portion either of the two hath, God himself knoweth; for us he hath left no sufficient means to comprehend, and for that cause neither given any leave to search in particular who are infallibly the heirs of the kingdom of God, who castaways. Howbeit concerning the state of all men with whom we live ... we may til the world's end, for the present, always presume, that as far as in us there is power to discern what others are, and as far as any duty of ours dependeth upon the notice of their condition in respect of God, the safest axioms for charity to rest itself upon are these: "He which believeth already is;" and "he which believeth not as yet may be the child of God." It become th not us "during life altogether to condemn any man, seeing that" (for any thing we know) "there is hope of every man's forgiveness, the posfibility of whose repentance is not yet cut off by death." 4

This same view, repeated consistently by Hooker, apparently from before his public quarrel with Travers in 1585, reappears again in his latest composition. At the very end of the Dublin Fragments, Hooker re­ wrote the Lambeth Articles. His adoption of them shows how close he was to the advisers of Whitgift at Lambeth. But there is a startling omission. The sixth Lambeth Article had slightly amended Whitaker's draft, by substituting the Pauline phrase "full assurance of faith" for the Calvinist "certainty of faith," but had otherwise repeated the principle of Christian assurance:

144. V, xlix, 2 (ii, 214f). Predestination and Assurance -202-

The truly faithful man -- that is one endowed with justifying faith -- is sure by full assurance of faith of the remission of sins and his eternal salvation through Christ.

Hooker could, presumably, have agreed with that. In fact, he had said something apparently stronger in the first sermon on Jude. Just how he could accommodate this view with his conviction about uncertainty, we have seen in examining Sermon I: in view of the identity of the giver of faith, faith is certain; in view of the natural desire for the good, hope once given will not be lost. But to say that everyone to whom any sort of faith had been given would persevere, obviously went beyond what Hooker could assert, for "grace sufficient" was clearly offered to all, though "saving grace" was not. There was thus a tension, if not an inconsistency, in the understanding of the articles by Whitgift's advisers, who on the one hand, when interpreting the seventh Lambeth Article, admitted the possibility that a sufficient grace, and therefore some sort of faith, was offered to all, yet held that only those with effectual grace were elect and would persevere. On the other hand, in accepting the sixth Lambeth Article they appeared to hold that all who enjoyed "justifying faith" had assurance of their salvation. Could it be possible to discern one group of the faithful from another? Was "true faith" detectable from the faith of those who had "sufficient" but not "efficacious" grace? The problem led many to deny that there was such a thing as sufficient grace that was not therefore efficacious. But Hooker boldly answered in the negative; Predestination and Assurance -203- there is no way of discriminating between faith that will endure and that which will not, and there are both kinds of faith given. He thus qualified the conviction about assurance held by both Whitaker and his supporters and Whitgift and his advisers. And Hooker, in consistency, omitted the sixth Lambeth Article altogether. The theme of Sermon I, which he clearly held to be important, he boldly attached to the final article. Unchanged from Whitaker's draft, the ninth Lambeth Article read:

It is not in the will or the power of each and every man to be saved.

Hooker apparently interpreted this article as, in effect, rejecting

Pelagianism by asserting the absolute need for grace. In some sense, however, it had to be within the natural will of the elect (elevated of course by grace) to be saved. This was not the case for "each and every man." But the important thing, for Hooker, was watchfulness: effort without grace was useless, but grace without effort would be fruitless.

His version of the final article involves a significant expansion, for explanation and for balance:

And that it is not in every, no not in any man's own mere ability, freedom, and power, to be saved, no man's salvation being possible without grace. Howbeit, God is no favourer of sloth; and therefore there can be no such absolute decree, touching man's salvation as on our part includeth no necessity of care and travail, but shall certainlr, Sake effect, whether we ourselves do wake or sleep. 4

145. V, App. I, 46 (ii, 596f). Thus Hooker undercut both Calvin's Predestination and Assurance -204-

8. The Seed of God

A recurring allusion in Hooker's work to the "seed of God" links

Hooker's views on election with his views on sanctification on the one hand, and with his views on the efficacy of the sacraments on the other.

The source of the allusion is the First Epistle of St John:

Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin; for his seed remaineth in him: and he cannot sin, because he is born of God. (I John 3.9)

The verse had a long and distinguished history in the Reformation.

It appeared in English Protestant literature at least as early as the

Lutheran Tyndale, who used it to illustrate the doctrine of the indwelling Holy Spirit, which joins us to Christ:

Faith justifieth not, that is to say, marrieth us not to God, that we should continue unfruitful as before, but that he should put the seed of his Holy Spirit in us (as St !ohn in his first epistle calleth it,) and make us fruitful. 14

In the next generation, John Bradford would use the same image to illustrate the Bucerian view of a growth in sanctification, as the

"seed" grows and develops, so that we become "more justified":

Which work [of justification and regeneration] in respect of us and our imperfection and falls, in that it is not so full account of assurance through faith, by looking at Christ as a mirror, and the Beza-Perkins account of the reflexive act that brings assurance. The search for assurance is simply misdirected for Hooker, but God is dependable.

146. William Tyndale, Doctrinal Treatises, (Cambridge, 1848), 126. Predestination and Assurance -205-

and perfect but it may be more and more, therefore by the Spirit of sanctification (which we receive in regeneration as the seed of God) we are quickened to labour with the Lord, and to be more justified; that is, by faith and the fruits of faith, to ourselves and others to declare the same; and so to increase from virtue to virtue, from glory to glory, having always need to have opJ feet washed, although we be clean notwithstanding. 7

It seems to have been Calvin who linked this image specifically to baptism, so as to insist on real, though secret, regeneration in baptized infants:

Infants are baptised into future repentance and faith, and even though these have not yet been formed in them, the seed of both lies hidden within them by the secret working of the Spirit. 148

Calvin had already clearly related the text to the perseverance of the elect, an allusion related to its use in Bradford, perhaps indicating a common source. 149 In this, Hooker agreed with the use made of the text: for him too, the seed of God is an infallible basis for indef ectibility:

There was in Habakkuk that which St. John doth call "the seed of God," meaning thereby the first grace which God

147. John Bradford, Writings (Cambridge, 1848), 218. See also pp. 297ff, where the preservation from sin in the "new man" through the seed of God is connected with God's election.

148. Institutes IV, xvi, 20 (ii, 1343). But, for Calvin, there is, strictly speaking, no "seed of election"; the seed depends on vocation. Institutes III, 24, 10 (ii, 976f).

149. Institutes II, iii, 10 (i, 304). And it was later used by the Synod of Dort to describe perseverance of the regenerate, in whom God preserves "the incorruptible seed of regeneration." Canon V, art. vii. Schaff, Creeds of Christendom iii, 593. Predestination and Assurance -206-

poureth into the hearts of them that are incorporated into Christ. . . . They which are of God do not sin either in this, or in any thing, any such sin as doth quite extinguish grace, clean cut them off from Christ Jesus; because the "seed of God" abideth in them, and g9th shield them from receiving any irremediable wound. 1

Hooker also followed Calvin in speaking of this seed as conferred in baptism, although this conferring is not explicitly restricted to children in Hooker's account:

As many therefore as are apparently to our judgement born of God, they have the seed of their regeneration by the ministry of the Church which useth to that end and purpose not only the Word, but the ~fcraments, both having generative force and virtue.1

Hooker's phrases are carefully framed here. He does allow that not all those baptised will persevere, or are of the elect. But all the baptised are "apparently to our judgement" the elect, and all whether elect or not, receive a real infused grace, equal in all, apparently a sufficient, though not efficacious grace in those who are not elect, and do not persevere to glory:

The first thing of [Christ's] so infused into our hearts in this life is the Spirit of Christ, whereupon because the rest of what kind soever do all both necessarily depend and infallibly also ensue, therefore the Apostles term it sometime the seed of God, sometime the pledge of our heavenly inheritance, i~petime the handset or earnest of that which is to come.

150. Sermon I (iii, 473).

151. V, 1, i (ii, 219).

152. V, lvi, 11 (ii, 254). See also lvi, 12 (ii, 255). Predestination and Assurance -207-

Although the phrase "infallibly also ensue" might suggest the indef ectibility of all the baptised, Hooker clearly cannot mean that, and in this respect departs from Calvin, and uses the metaphor to some extent ambiguously. On the one hand, it refers to indef ectibility simply, and taken abstractly; on the other hand, it refers to the real grace infused, even in those not elect, but the basis of our constant charitable assumption that all who now enjoy grace will continue in grace, and all who have not yet come to grace may do so. Hooker must mean, at least, however, that real infused grace is really given in the ministry of the Word and in the sacraments (unless resisted by the recipient). Since "the seed" is infused as first, it would seem to be related "normally" to baptism. Indeed, in baptism, both the perfect merits of Christ are imputed to the recipient to justify by removing guilt, and a real internal renovation, the beginning of sanctification, is effected:

Baptism is a sacrament which God hath instituted in his Church, to the end that they which receive the same might thereby be incorporated into Christ, and so through his most precious merit obtain as well [cleansing of guilt through imputation], as also that infused divine virtue of the Holy Ghost, which giveth to the powers of the s~g! their first disposition towards future newness of life.

This metaphor of the seed planted in baptism seems to be continued in Hooker's account of , as a "watering":

. . . Grace infused into Christian men by degrees, planted

153. V, Ix, 2 (ii, 265f). Predestination and Assurance -208-

in them at the first by baptism [that is, "the seed of God"?], after cherished, watered, and (be it spoken without offense) strengthened as by other virtuous offices which piety and true religion teacheth, even so by this very special benedicti~% whereof we speak, the rite or ceremony of Confirmation. 4

Because of the two sides to his account, Hooker would be quoted by both sides in the nineteenth century debate around the Gorham incident, on the subject of and the doctrine of election. 155

9. Hooker's Protestantism

After this survey of Hooker's views on the questions of election and assurance, it might be opportune to review the biographical details that suggest Hooker's relationships to contemporary English theological movements. Hooker's views on church government, and on the episcopacy, put him in opposition to the "Puritans" of the second half of the reign of Elizabeth, who advocated further reform of the Church of England to restrict the authority of the prince in ecclesiastical matters and to replace the episcopacy with a presbyterian system. In this, Hooker clearly sided with Whitgift and the court party, against Cartwright and

Travers. This debate continued in England and Scotland for a century or more after Hooker's death, when the typical positions on episcopacy and

154. V, lxvi, 9 (ii, 347f).

155. J.C.S. Nias, Gorham and the (London, 1951), 58, 103f, llOf, 139, 176. Predestination and Assurance -209- royal supremacy were debated between groups who showed a significant diversity from each other on the theology of grace and of election and assurance. But it would be an anachronism to read back the seventeenth century theological line-up into the reign of Elizabeth. Although

Hooker was frequently quoted in support of the Stuart position against the sixteenth century Presbyterians, his views were much more moderate than those made official by William Laud; in fact, their "old fashioned" moderation may account for the abandonment of the program of publication of the Lawes, since the extended and developed account of episcopacy and royal supremacy in Books VII and VIII, although opposing presbyterian views, would be embarrassing to those who taught the divine authority of the episcopacy and the divine right of the monarchy.

But the Elizabethan picture was very different from that of her successors. The official formularies, including both the Articles and the liturgy and Homilies, had their birth in an earlier age, and were not so much anti-Calvinist, as pre-Calvinist. The Calvinist questions did not concern them, since the Calvinist theological leadership of the

Reformed world had not yet been accomplished. But the formularies were patient of Calvinist interpretation. Cranmer's cautious formulations did not rule out the stronger theology that was to dominate the

Elizabethan church. But they did not state it either. The Lambeth

Articles of 1595, though unofficial in original intent, were one attempt to narrow the articles so that they would not be so comprehensive, on Predestination and Assurance -210- the questions of assurance and predestination. The case of a certain

Robert Johnson in 1574 offers an interesting parallel. Johnson was arraigned in Bishop's Court and charged, among other matters, with neglecting to use the for a second of the elements when his initial supply was exhausted. He was convicted, even though there were no rubrics about the matter, and even though he accurately cited Cranmer in defence of such a course of action. 156 The case was an indication that the liturgy was to be interpreted in a

Calvinist way, and that Cranmer's original intent and theology was not to be tolerated. Hooker came to consciousness and matured in this

Elizabethan world, where an increasingly triumphant Calvinism became assumed as the official theology, though it had hardly been known when the formularies were given authoritative form.

Hooker's roots were honestly Protestant. His uncle and protector,

John Hooker, was a notable supporter of reform in the Edwardian period, and a friend of Peter Martyr. Hooker was taken up as a protege by John

Jewel, Elizabethan and first official apologist for the Reformed English Church. Through Jewel's sponsorship, Hooker became a member of Corpus Christi College, founded by Bishop Fox as a model of the great Humanist foundations of the reign of Henry VIII. Corpus was

156. A parte of a register (Middleburg, 1593); E.C. Ratcliff, "The English Use of Eucharistic Consecration," Theology Ix (1957), 276-7; Richard F. Buxton, Eucharist and Institution Narrative (London, 1976), 89ff. Predestination and Assurance -211- said to have a papist element. But in any case, Hooker was most clearly associated with John Rainolds, his tutor, who was not in any sense a papist. In October 1580, Hooker and Rainolds were together ejected from

Corpus, because they opposed the appointment of Dr John Barfoote, the

Vice-President, as President. Undoubtedly, they favoured Rainolds' own candidacy, but Barfoote was later noted for his harsh resistance to certain ministers of Puritan tendencies. 157 Rainolds and Hooker remained on friendly and cordial terms to the end of Hooker's life, 158

157. Walton's Life of Hooker, Works i, 19-21. Walton does not tell us the cause of the expulsion, though he probably knew it. Novarr thinks the incident had to do with Hooker's "early Calvinist leanings," and that Walton includes the story (in 1570) because it shows Hooker's importance in Oxford, an aspect of Hooker's career that Gauden had confused, but suppresses the significance of Hooker's associations against Barfoote. Novarr, Walton's' Lives, 285f. Undoubtedly, Hooker did have "Calvinist leanings," but could it not be friendship, rather than "party" affiliation, that was involved in this dispute? Strype is the authority for Barfoote's later hammering of Puritans. The reference is to obstinacy on the part of some clergymen of the Diocese to Lincoln in 1584 to subscription to the Articles. In this incident, John Barfoote appears as a def ender of the authority of Whitgift and of church order, but this is not incompatible with "Calvinist leanings." Annals of the Reformation (Oxford, 1824), iii, 1, 349-352 [239-243]. Strype goes on immediately to describe the incident between Hooker and Travers at the Temple, in which, of course, Hooker is also related to Whitgift's policy against the Puritans.

158. See the two letters, almost certainly Hooker's, written to Rainolds some time after 1586, reprinted as appendices to Walton's Life. They indicate both a common interest in the Old Testament, and assistance given to each other in finding rare books (Rainolds was searching for a copy of Cajetan). Rainolds is even supposed to know the identity of John Churchman's servant by reference to his first name. Does this suggest that Rainolds agreed some of Hooker's views on church government in the Lawes, even though at Hampton Court in 1604 he would attempt to remove the disputed ceremonies of the Prayer Book? Works i, 109-114. Predestination and Assurance -212- even though Rainolds was not on such terms with Dr John Spenser, another of Hooker's friends and his eventual literary executor. 159 Rainolds survived to be on "the wrong side of the table" at the Hampton Court

Conference. Of course, the question of episcopacy was not really on the table at that time, though the disputed questions on predestination might have been, and the disputed ceremonies certainly were. Rainolds' group gained very little, possibly nothing the King had not already determined on, but Rainolds himself remained a "conforming Puritan" until his death in 1607, and was given a place in the committee charged with the preparation of the prophetical books in the Authorized Version of the Bible. Rainolds was thus somewhat more comfortable than Travers and Cartwright with conformity, and the party affiliations in the 1590's far more flexible than at the Savoy Conference more than fifty years later .160 Both Hooker and his friend Rain olds were "conformist" in several senses. Both accepted the authority of the church to regulate matters of "polity." Rainolds and Hooker clearly differed on the question of the disputed ceremonies, but this difference did not, apparently, strain their friendship. In fact, there is no evidence that the Puritan and government parties had any clearly defined disagreement

159. Rainolds opposed Spenser's appointment as Greek Lecturer in 1577. Editor's Preface, 12 (i, xxxi).

160. Edward Cardwell, A History of Conferences (Oxford, 1849), 136-144. Predestination and Assurance -213- in theology at all: differences there were on the disputed matters of church government and ceremonies, but the basic theological climate seems to have been shared by both.

In any case, Hooker consistently praises the origin and goals of the English Reformation. Significantly enough, he does not mention the precursors of Reform in Wycliffe or the Cambridge Lutherans. In the peroration to Book IV of the Lawes, Hooker traces the course of the

English Reformation to show God's providential direction of it. Henry

VIII is chosen as the origin of the movement, as the champion of the independence of the English Church, and the beginning of the eradication of superstition. Edward VI is referred to as "Edward the Saint," "in whom ... it pleased God righteous and just to let England see what a blessing sin and iniquity would not suffer it to enjoy." Mary's reign is noted only as nearly obliterating the beginning and the progress of the eradication of superstition from "the ruins of the house of God."

Elizabeth is reckoned a "most glorious star" arising out of the preceding darkness. 161 This apotheosis of the Tudor sovereigns was not untypical of the expression of the time. 162 And it certainly fits into

Hooker's apology for the established order. The forms and ceremonies of the English church are to be defended for their concurrence with

161. IV, xiv, 7 (i, 487).

162. See Cranmer's speech at the Baptism of Elizabeth in Shakespeare's Henry Vlll, V,v. Predestination and Assurance -214-

Scripture and reason, but especially, as among matters indifferent, by their establishment by ecclesiastical authority, that is, by the prince in the parliament, which includes the ecclesiastical convocations, as

Book VIII, even in its unfinished form, makes clear. But Hooker's summary is singular in not mentioning the significant theological figures of the movement. Indeed, this silence is typical of all

Hooker's extant writings, with one exception. Jewel alone is praised by name, in another place, as "the worthiest divine that Christendom hath bred for the space of some hundreds of years. 11163

Over and over, the Christian Letter criticizes the first five books of the Lawes for their deviations from the Articles and from the writings of the earlier English Reformers, particularly the Marian martyrs. Although he might have done so, Hooker never once quotes these earlier figures, and, more significantly, never quotes the Articles at all. He does quote Calvin, and he does quote an enormous range of medieval and patristic authors, apparently as showing the manner of the interpretation of scripture and the creeds in earlier times of

Christianity. This is consistent with his view of the authority of the church in interpreting scripture. The Thirty-Nine Articles did have authority in the Church of England, although the interpretation of this authority and the nature of subscription were not consistent or clear until the reign of James VI and I. And Hooker subscribed to them at

163. II, vi, 4 (i, 314). Predestination and Assurance -215- least once, on July 17, 1591, when he became prebend of Netheravon attached to Salisbury Cathedrat. 164 In fact, some Puritans objected strenuously to the non-doctrinal parts of the Articles, particularly those dealing with the authority of the king and of bishops. Hooker alludes to the authority of the Articles in two passages in the Lawes, but is otherwise silent on them:

The Form of Common Prayer being perfected, Articles of sound Religion and Discipline agreed upon, Catechisms framed for the needful instruction of the youth, churches purged of things that indeed were burdensome to the people or to the simple offensive and scandalous, all wa1g ought at the length unto that wherein we now stand. 5

This is a reference to the basic skeleton of the Elizabethan settlement as it related to doctrine and discipline, and, once again, interprets the Reformation as primarily the purging of superstition and corruption, rather than a novelty of doctrine. And, later, he explicitly commends subscription to the Articles as a way of combating novelty. 166 Thus Hooker undoubtedly recognizes the authority of the

Thirty-Nine Articles, and their appropriateness, but did not once see fit to quote from their content in support of his view. This need not mean he disagreed with them, or held them in low esteem. Rather, it may

164. Clavi Trabales (London, 1661), 147.

165. IV, xiv, 4 (i, 483). Hooker possibly refers to Article 10 at V, App. I, 1 (ii, 537).

166. V, lxxxi, 11 (ii, 525). Predestination and Assurance -216- simply mean that they were of contemporary authority only, and therefore did not have the force of the patristic and medieval witness to the decision of the church in matters of doctrine and discipline. For

Hooker, the Anglican appeal to history had not yet become the appeal to

Anglican history. In any case, although the Reformation established by the Tudor monarchs is part of the providence of God for the English people, it is not the creation of something new. The English

Reformation is not the beginning of a new commonwealth, but the reform of an old one, and as such, it retains what is valuable in the old:

It is reason we should ... consider how great a difference there is between their proceedings, who erect a new commonwealth, which is to have neither people nor law, neither regiment nor religion, the same that was; and theirs who only reform a decayed estate by reducing it to the perfection from which it hath swerved. In this case we are to retain as g,uch, in the other as little, of former things as we may. 1

It was the role of the three good Tudors to establish the reformation of "a decayed estate," and to reduce the Church of England

"to the perfection from which it swerved." To quote the Tudor articles would be to beg the question. They were a part of the restored perfection, but had to be justified properly, like every other part of the Tudor ecclesiastical settlement, by the appeal to Scripture as interpreted by the earliest church, by reason, and by the previous decisions of the Church. Thus Hooker would not quote them in their own

167. V, xvii, 5 (ii, 60). See also IV, viii and xiv (i, 442f, 480f). Predestination and Assurance -217- defence, or, as it turned out, in his.

Hooker mentions Luther's views only occasionally, and then only as deviating from sound Christianity, particularly in Christology, where the ubiquity of Christ's glorified body is consistently condemned, and in the eucharist, where the typical Lutheran view of the presence of Christ is denied. 168 Lutherans are not criticized for their views of justification or predestination. The Saxon Reformer is never identified as a founder of the movement of Reform.

On the other hand, John Calvin is frequently mentioned, but in a consistently ambivalent fashion. In the Preface to the Lawes, Hooker identifies Calvin as the "founder" of the proposed "discipline" of the

Puritans, but does so with words of praise:

A founder it [your Discipline] had, whom, for mine own part, I think incomparably the wisest man that ever the ~rench Church did enjoy, since the hour it enjoyed him. 16

The preciseness of the allusion should be noted. Calvin is treated as a figure of the French, and not the Swiss Church: that is, he would be a "foreign" and interfering influence in Switzerland (and, for that matter, in England). Hooker claims that the French church has not seen his like since: that does not mean he was as great as Hilary, Prosper

168. V, liv, 9 (ii, 237); lv, 4, 5 (ii, 240ff); lxvii, 10 (ii, 356); Sermon II, 17 (iii, 503).

169. Preface ii, 1 (i, 127). Predestination and Assurance -218- and others who went before. l70 Hooker generally shows a reverence for

Calvin, and undoubtedly follows him in the account of the eucharist in

Book V of the Lawes, although Calvin is not cited. 171 But John Calvin carried himself with an inappropriate lack of humility, 172 even though his work in Geneva was commendable. The solutions he instituted in

Geneva would not be appropriate for the Church of England, which already had episcopacy and a central authority, the king, who could reform the church without refounding it. His uncritical followers err in a dangerous of Calvin, because they forget his human frailty. 173 In particular, the authors of the Christian Letter err in promoting Calvin to an authority apparently above Scripture and the patristic authors:

What should the world doe with the old musty doctors?

170. Egil Grislis gives an extended summary of the variety of interpretations that have been given of this text and of the attitude of Hooker to Calvin. "Hermeneutical Problem," in Speed Hill, Studies in Richard Hooker, 173, 203 note 55.

171. V, lxvii. See Paget, Introduction, 180-182.

172. See for instance, such astonishing statements as the following in a sympathetic and accurate modern commentator on Calvin. "The reformer himself, increasingly convinced that he was acting solely by virtue of a divine mission, did not admit discussion of his ideas." "[Calvin] so completely identified his own ministry with the will of God that he considered Ameaux's words as an insult to the honour of Christ aimed at the person of one of his ministers. . . . A pastor of the country-side dared to criticize Calvin's attitude in this affair: he was immediately unfrocked." Franc;:ois Wendel, Calvin (London, 1965), 82, 86.

173. Preface iv, 8 (i, 162f). Predestination and Assurance -219-

Alleage scripture, and shew it alleaged in the sense that Calvin alloweth, and it is of more force in any man's defense, and to the proofe of any assertion, than if ten thousand Augustines, , Chrysostomes, Cyprians, or whosoever els were brought foorth. Doe we not daily see that men are accused of heresie for holding that which the fathers held, and that they never are cleere, if tJ1ey find not somewhat in Calvin to justify themselves. 7

Hooker undoubtedly gives an unflattering account of Calvin's institution of in Geneva; and this account is undoubtedly a part of the polemical aspect of the Lawes, the aspect in which he was encouraged by the court party, and by his friends Cranmer and Sandys in particular. He has been criticized for one inaccurate tendency, a "pious fraud": that of implying "that Calvin's original reasons for instituting his system of discipline were pragmatic and that he only put forward the claim that it was of divine origin in order to induce the inhabitants of Geneva to accept it the more readily. 11175 Of course, one cannot doubt Calvin's belief that the discipline of Geneva was based on scriptural warrant, and that it was therefore superior to all other forms. But Hooker does not deny the scriptural ground or claim that Calvin's reasons were entirely pragmatic: he denies "any one sentence of Scripture" decisively proves that the presbyterian system is

174. Manuscript note on title page of Christian Letter. Bayne ed, p. 590; Works, i, 139, note 2.

175. W.J. Cargill Thompson, "The Philosopher of the Politic Society," in Speed Hill, Studies in Richard Hooker, 14f. Predestination and Assurance -220- inevitable; 176 that is, he notes, entirely accurately, that the Genevan system is based on a large number of texts, that must be read together in a certain way to achieve the conclusion that the presbyterian system has a unique divine authority. The whole argument of the Lawes is to show that, although the Genevan system may possibly be permissible, it is genuinely defective measured against scriptural and ecclesiastical standards, and is certainly not inevitable. The Lawes, as published, is undoubtedly a work of controversy, and a very clever one at that; the

Preface's sneering picture of the use of the crowds and of weak women in

Geneva is a thinly veiled attack on the Puritan approach in England, and is deliberately meant to be; it is slanted history indeed, but not entirely fiction. 177 It never questions the right of the church in

Geneva to settle its own affairs; it complains about the thorough and uncritical exportation of a local solution to the denigration of legitimate existing structures elsewhere.

Hooker undoubtedly uses Calvin as an authority when Calvin contradicts some part of the Puritans' platform. In the Answer to

176. Preface ii, 7 (i, 139).

177. The essays by Grislis, Porter and Speed Hill in Speed Hill, Studies in Richard Hooker, to some extent temper Cargill Thompson's overstatement of the limited and polemical nature of Hooker's Lawes. Indeed, Cargill Thompson's account of Hooker as opportunistic, eclectic and a hack in the service of the court could not account for the enduring interest in Hooker. Speed Hill's interesting case for the tension between Hooker and his collaborators deserves attention in coming to a conclusion about Hooker's opportunism and polemic. Predestination and Assurance -221-

Travers, Hooker invokes Calvin to answer Travers• charges of substituting "school-points and questions, neither of edification, nor of truth," for "the expounding of Scripture, and [his] ordinary calling"; for Calvin had commended "the distinctions and helps of the schools. 11178 Yet in the Lawes, Hooker characterizes one of Calvin's opinions as seeming "crazed. 11179 Hooker refers to Whitgift's previous use of Calvin as supporting the official view that the church may make additional laws, 180 and cites Calvin as allowing different churches to have different customs. 181 And Hooker appears to prefer the unofficial

"Geneva Bible," which version he seems to quote. 182 Yet he defends the official version on its reading of Psalm 105.28, arguing that both that version and the Genevan version are true, but side-stepping the question of which is the more accurate translation. 183 And he defends the

178. Answer to Travers 16 (iii, 585f).

179. III, i, 12 (i, 348). Farel had asked Calvin about the baptism of children of popish parents. Calvin's judgment was that it is absurd to baptize them that cannot be reckoned members of our body, because the parents were popish. It is probable that Hooker sees Calvin as inconsistent with his own account of baptism, which Hooker clearly adopts and imitates, and by which, baptism is effective, though the "seed" be invisible.

180. III, xi, 13 (i, 403f).

181. IV, xiii, 3 (i, 473).

182. V, xviii, I (ii, 62, and note 1); xxxiv, 3 (ii, 151 and note 2).

183. V, xix, 3 (ii, 65-68). Predestination and Assurance -222- admittedly corrupt version of certain liturgical , 184 although he agrees with Puritan sentiment about the , and indicates that personally he would not read it. 185 This use of scripture and of the

Genevan version would indicate that Hooker was generally familiar with the Puritan positions and views, and often sympathized with them, but was prepared to adjust his personal views in the light of church authority, which was above that of the Reformed Peter Lombard, John

Calvin. 186

As we have seen, on the disputed questions of grace, Hooker maintained a view that resembled that of the strong Calvinist party in certain respects, but differed from Calvin in denying unconditional reprobation and from continental Calvinists in denying a limited atonement. For Hooker, grace was, in some sense, resistible, although perseverance was "achieved" by the elect, who could thus not finally defect. In contrast to Calvin's former student Peter Baro, Hooker would maintain the later Augustinian version of predestination, as opposed to the early "Arminian" view, which conditioned predestination on the foresight of merit and vice. But Hooker, like Whitgift's advisers,

184. V, xix, 4 (ii, 68).

185. V, xx, 10 (ii, 79).

186. "Of what account the Master of Sentences was in the church of Rome, the same and more amongst the preachers of reformed churches Calvin had purchased; so that the perfectest divines were judged they, which were skilfullest in Calvin's writings." Preface, ii, 8 (i, 139). Predestination and Assurance -223- rejected Calvin's conclusion about unconditional reprobation, and tempered Augustine's ambiguous authority for this view with the authority of the councils of the church that followed Augustine and made decisions in the wake of the Pelagian and Semi-Pelagian movements. Most significantly, as we have seen, Hooker had already parted company with

Whitaker, and with Whitgift, and for that matter, with Perkins and the

"experimental predestinarians" on the question of "assurance." For

Hooker, there was a paradox on assurance: the best assurance one could have was derived from a recognition of the weakness of one's faith; perfect assurance was a gift of glory; to presume it here turned one into a damnable Pharisee. 187

Hooker was, nevertheless, identifiable as a Calvinistic theologian, despite these independent positions. In the next century, Hooker would seem to as "on the Calvinist side. 11188 He is thus recognized, with reference to the Calvinist views on predestination and grace, as an orthodox Calvinist in many ways, yet a "bridge figure," pointing ahead as well to the eventual rejection of Calvinism by an

187. O.T. Hargrave places Hooker in the "anti-Calvinist tradition." This is too simplistic, but see Hargrave's treatment of Hooker's "Calvinist debates," which is very thorough. Hargrave ignores the material in the Dublin fragments. O.T. Hargrave, The Doctrine of Predestination in the English Reformation (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee, 1966), 228-234.

188. Henry Hammond, Pacifick Discourse, 9-10. The assertion seems to be based on one of Sanderson's letters. Wallace, Puritans and Predestination, 126 and fn. 78. Predestination and Assurance -224- increasing majority of English divines after the Synod of Dort. 189

At least one important divine of the next century did use Hooker as such a "bridge"; he first read Calvin as recommended, later read Hooker and, on election, moved away from the "harshness" of Calvin and Beza, as interpreted in English Calvinism but without accepting the English

Arminian view. 190

It would perhaps be preferable to see Hooker as a pre-Dortian

English Augustinian, within the general framework of assumptions of

English Calvinism, but deviating from his contemporaries in his scholastic conviction that the image of God in the human being was not obliterated by the Fall, and in the clear rejection of "experimental predestination," in favour of a practical and evangelical "Arminianism," that preached a trust in God's mercy in Christ and the need for watchfulness and labour, since "there can be no such absolute decree

... as on our part includeth no necessity of care and travail."

189. This is G.P. Fisher's assessment of the Dublin Fragments. History of Christian Doctrine, 353f.

190. Robert Sanderson, Works (Oxford, 1854) vi, 351. Sanderson complains of being called "Puritan" for having held the same opinions as Hooker; this must indicate that some Arminians treated those views as Calvinist. v, 265. See G.R. Cragg, From Puritanism to the Age of Reason (Cambridge, 1950), 23. YhitaKer•s Procosed Articles The Lamceth Articles HooKer•s Version Novemcer 1595 · Novemcer 1595 (after 1599) -ti 1. God from eternity has predestined some men 1. God from eternity has preaestined some men :n ... 1. That God hath predestinated certain men, (IQ 0 to life, and reprocated some to death. to life, and reprocated some to death. not all men. i:: 0. 0 ... r.n 2. The C ] efficient cause of 2. The aov;ng or efficient cause of 2. That the cause, moving him hereunto, was 0 ...... Predestination C ] is not the foreseeing predestination to life is not the foreseeing of not the foresight of any virtue in us at all. > ::, of faith, or of perseverance, or of good worKs, faith, or ot perseverance, or ot good works, or PJ or of anything innate in the person of the of anything innate in the person of the ...... predestined, but only the absolute and simole predestined, but only the C 0 will of C l God. will of the good pleasure of God. ::, PJ 3. There is a determined and certain number of 3. There is a determined and certain number of 3. That to him the number ot his elect is ::, predestined, which cannot be increased or predestined, which cannot be increased or definitely ~nown. 0. diminished. diminished. r.n> r.n 4. Those not predestined to salvation are 4. Those not predestined to salvation are 4. That it cannot be but their sins must i:: inevitaoly condemned on account of their sins. inevitaaly condemned on account of their sins. condemn them, to whom the purpose of his saving ..., PJ 111ercydoth not extend. ::, () 5. A true, lively and justifying faith, and 5. A true, lively and justifying faith, and 5. That to God's foreKnown elect final 0 the sanctifying spirit ot God, is not lost, nor the sanctifying Scirit of God, is not lost nor continuance of grace is given. does it pass away either totally or finally in does it pass away either totally or finally in thos~ ~ho one~ Msv~ b~~n osr~aKer~ of it. the elect. 6. The truly faithful man•· that is, one 6. The truly faithful man·· that is one endowed with justifying faith •· is sure by endowed with justifying faith •· is sure by certaintv C Jot faith of the remission of his full assurance ot faith ot the remission of sins and his eternal salvation througn Christ. sins and his eternal salvation through Christ. I tv 7. Grace sufficient to salvation is 7. Saving grace is 6. That inward grace, whereby to be saved, is tv not granted. is not maae common, 1s not ceded not granted, is not made common, is not ceded deservedly not given unto all men. Vl to all men, by which they mignt be saved, it to all men, by which they mignt be saved, if I they wish. they wish. a. No man can come to Christ unless it be a. Ho man can come to Christ unless it be 7. That no man cometh unto Christ, whom God, granted to him, and unless the Father draws granted to him, and unless the Father draws by the inward grace of his Spirit, draweth not. him: and all men are not drawn by the Father him: and all men are not drawn by the Father to come to the Son. to come to the Son. 9. It is not in the will or the power of each 9. It is not in the will or the power of each 8. And that it is not in every, no not in any and every man to be saved. and every man to be saved. man's own mere ability, freedom, and power, to be saved, no man•s salvation being possible without grace. Howbeit, God is no favourer of sloth; and thererore there can be no such absolute decree, touching man's salvation as on our part includeth no necessity of care ana travail, but shall certainly take erfect, whether we ourselves do wake or sleep. Sources: H.C Porter, Reformation and Reaction in Tudor Cambridae, (Cambridge, 1958), 365·371 Richard Hooker, ~ 7th eon. (1877), vol. ii, p. 596. V The Sacraments and the Participation of Christ

Hooker has usually been regarded as an important voice on the

Anglican view of the sacraments. This attention is entirely justified, since a good portion of Book V of the Lawes is given over to a discussion of the points of sacramental practice questioned by those voices within the Church of England in the late sixteenth century that pressed for further reform of the Church. Hooker prefaced this discussion with an extended summary of christological doctrine, since this was, for him, the framework of consideration of the place of the sacraments: the person and work of the Christ is the basis for the

Christian doctrine of the sacraments. And before the particular points of controverted practice were discussed, Hooker offered extended treatments of the doctrine of the sacraments in general, and of baptism and the eucharist in particular. Thus we may suppose a certain thoroughness in Hooker's treatment. But this account has often disappointed those who came after, who expected a doctrinal position more in line with the sacramental views made common in the Stuart period. To these persons, Hooker has appeared unduly "Protestant," and as giving a somewhat thin account of the sacraments, particularly of the eucharist.

But it must be kept in mind that Hooker's ultimate purpose was to defend the ceremonies required by the Book of Common Prayer, not to go beyond what the prayer book and the Church said. Like those who went before in the preceding decades, and those who came after for several

-226- Hooker on the Sacraments -227- centuries, Hooker was limited to finding an account of which the formularies were patient. It is worth noting that there was very little serious charge of deviation from established doctrine on the eucharist on the part of the authors of the Christian Letter. They did bring up some charges of views incompatible with the earlier and official voices of the church of England, but these charges centred on what Hooker appeared to allow, not what he himself held. The central interest in an examination of Hooker's views remains with his view of the nature of

Christ's presence in the eucharist. Hooker's account of baptismal regeneration was destined to achieve a quite unexpected prominence in the controversies on baptismal regeneration surrounding the Gorham case in the nineteenth century, and thus deserves some attention. But before turning to these topics, Hooker's brief reference to the vocabulary of

"sacrifice" in relation to the eucharist should be examined.

1. The Eucharistic Sacrifice

Hooker only three times refers to the eucharist as a sacrifice.

Only one of these references occurs in the section of Book V of the

Lawes that is devoted to consideration of matters of dispute in the administration of the eucharist. In the long summation of the proper attitude of the communicant in approaching the sacrament that comes at the end of the general treatment of the eucharist, Hooker paraphrases a twelfth century author Arnold of Chartres, who was, in fact, the of Hooker on the Sacraments -228-

Bonneval and a friend of , but whose works Hooker erroneously considered to be patristic, the work of the third century author Cyprian of Carthage. 1 In this long passage, which is as it were put into the mouth of the pious communicant, the following phrase occurs:

This bread hath in it more than the substance which our eyes behold, this cup hallowed with solemn benediction availeth to the endless life and welfare both of soul and body, in that it serveth as well for a medicine to heal our infirmities a~d purge our sins as for a sacrifice of thanksgiving.

Yet even here Hooker's paraphrase significantly softens the sense of the original text, which spoke of "this more-than-substantial bread and cup consecrated by a solemn benediction (,which] produces the life and salvation of the whole human being, (and is] at the same time a medicine and a sacrifice to the healing of infirmities and purging of sins."3 Hooker accommodates the text to the words "sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving" of Cranmer's prayer (which had amplified a phrase in its antecedent, the Gregorian canon, "sacrifice of praise"), and relates the healing of infirmities and purging of sins to the medicinal value, whereas the original text had related these benefits both to the medicine and the sacrifice, in a parallelism that Hooker avoided.

1. Works ii, 25 I, note 3.

2. V, lxvii, 12 (ii, 36 l f).

3. Works ii, 362, note I. Hooker on the Sacraments -229-

But Hooker does nothing with this text. It is simply left standing as a relatively minor incident in the whole account, undoubtedly attracted into the account by its presence in the supposed patristic source. The text itself, particularly in its original form, would have added a new theme in the English Reformation: for it would have identified the eucharist with a sacrifice that actually removes sins.

Even in Hooker's softened form, it would have invited spiritualizing and theological elaboration. But Hooker offers neither.

Later in Book V, after he has dealt with the supposed defects in the administration of the sacraments in the prayer book, Hooker takes up the question of calling Christian "." He does not seem to recognize that the word "" is in fact a verbal corruption of the word "," but rather looks for a way in which the eucharistic president might be considered a priest. He categorically denies that the Christian ministry is in any sense a real sacrifice:

"sacrifice is now no part of the church ministry. . . . [Christian ministry has] properly now no sacrif ice."4

Rather, when the prayer book uses the title "priest," it does so in the way the had, in terms of a metaphor or "proportion," in the way in which Paul could speak of the substance of fish as

"flesh," which it is by analogy, -- that is, although it is not flesh, which belongs properly to mammals, because it is that which in fishes

4. V, lxxviii, 2 (ii, 47lf). Hooker on the Sacraments -230- corresponds to flesh:

The Fathers of the Church of Christ with like security of speech call usually the ministry of the Gospel Priesthood in regard of that which the Gospel hath proportionable to ancient sacrifices, mynely the Communion of the blessed Body and Blood of Christ.

Hooker's explanation is in terms of what might be called "improper proportion,!' the sheer metaphor of poetry. Earlier Reformers, especially the Zwinglians, had linked the Christian sacraments with circumcision and the Passover, so as to identify the grace available through each, and to deny the presence of Christ in the sacraments of the New Testament in any other than the sense in which he was present in those of the old; Hooker uses the analogy to distinguish the old and the new: the old really were sacrifices propitiatory (or .at least were assumed to be so by those who practised them), the new are recognized by the participants not to be such propitiatory sacrifices. Hooker underlines his view that the metaphor of sacrifice is a "dead" one, where the association with the original sense of the image is not conscious, so that the word is really used in two senses:

As for the people when they hear the name [of "priest"] it draweth no more their minds to an cogitation of sacrifice, than the name of a Senator or of an Alderman causeth them to think upon old age or to imagine that every one so termed must needs be ancient begause years were respected in the first nomination of both.

5. V, lxxviii, 2 (ii, 47lf).

6. V, lxxviii, 2 (ii, 472). Hooker on the Sacraments -231-

But in Book IV, Hooker had given a similar account that was stronger than this one, and at variance with it in one respect. There

Hooker had similarly def ended the use of sacrificial language in the

Christian dispensation, but he had treated it as a "live" metaphor, intended to provide conscious psychological associations with the ancient sacrifices, particularly those of the Jews:

The names themselves ["altar," "sacrifice," "priest"] may (I hope) be retained without sin, in respect of that proportion which things established by our Saviour have unto them which by him are abrogated. And so throughout all the writings of the ancient Fathers we see that the words which were do continue; the only difference is, that whereas before they had a literal, they now have a metaphorical use, and are as so many notes of remembrance unto us, that wha they did signify in the letter is accomplished in the truth. 1

This text is, in fact, the germ of a view that the eucharist is a sacrifice "proportional, but not proper," but Hooker does not appear to develop the notion. 8 Hooker clearly recognizes that there is a

7. IV, xi, 10 (i, 460).

8. There has been a certain nervousness, in later Anglican theology at least from the time of Waterland, about the thinness of Hooker's account of sacrifice. (See the quotation from Waterland in Works ii, 472, note l.) Paget's attempt to show that Hooker must have thought the doctrine more important is valiant but unproven. Paget points out that Hooker's rejection of the current possibility of sacrifice is always balanced by his view that the communion is a sacrifice by proportion; Paget also asserts that Hooker must be interpreted as agreeing with the patristic voices he alludes to, and as deliberately rejecting current Roman views. F. Paget, An Introduction to the Fifth Book of Hooker's Treatise (Oxford, 1899), 200. Keble's implied defence is much more fanciful and poetic: he makes a valiant attempt to show that Hooker accepted the principle of sacrifice, though denying any expiatory sacrifice; instead, he suggests that Hooker Hooker on the Sacraments -232- patristic witness to the use, in other authors as well as in the pseudo­

Cyprian. And his friend and teacher John Rainolds happily wrote, in

1584, of the patristic witness to spiritual sacrifices rather than the true or proper sacrifices attributed to them by Roman polemical authors.9 Indeed, in those who went before Hooker in the English

Reformation, there was a much more frequent explanation of the sense in which the eucharist is sacrificial. Cranmer had spoken frequently of the sacrifices gratulatory rather than propitiatory. 1O He and Ridley had both spoken at the end of their lives, of the eucharist as a representative sacrifice. 11 But they, like Rainolds, had done so in the def ended the establishment of a national church as a "grand public sacrifice"! Editor's Preface, 53 (i, cvii). While those, like Fisher and the Georges, who repeat Hooker's negatives as his whole view are offering an incomplete picture, Dugmore, who recognizes the balancing theme of "proportion," still concludes that Hooker "assigned small importance to the sacrificial aspect of the eucharist." Dugmore assumes that this emphasis is in line with Hooker's insistence that the eucharist is concerned with the saving motion of God towards the human being, rather than any motion of the weak human being towards God. But this part of his case is suggestive rather than proven. It would be safer to say that the matter was not, in the 1590's, a matter of dispute. Hooker's silence tells nothing else. G.P. Fisher, History of Christian Doctrine, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh, 1896), 354; C.H. George and K. George, The Protestant Mind of the English Reformation (Princeton, 1961), 323; C.W. Dugmore, Eucharistic Doctrine in England from Hooker to Waterland (London, 1942), 20.

9. Quoted by Waterland. See Paget, Introduction, 200.

10. Thomas Cranmer, Writings and Disputations (Cambridge, 1844), 346, 348ff, 362.

11. Thomas Cranmer, Miscellaneous Writings and Letters (Cambridge, 1846), 150; Nicholas Ridley, Works (Cambridge, 1841), 250. Hooker on the Sacraments -233- early Reformed apology against the opinions of the Roman Catholics and the Roman Catholic claim to the Fathers. In fact, for Cranmer, at least, the eucharist was not the primary locus of the "gratulatory sacrifice": all manner of works of charity and contrition were comprised in these sacrifices.

Those who came after Hooker also spoke of the eucharistic sacrifice; from William Laud on, they even adopted the important distinction between spiritual and mystical sacrifices, precisely to show the opposite of Cranmer's view, for they held that the commemorative sacrifice of the eucharist is precisely the focus of the "mystical sacrifice," though and "justice" are also spiritual sacrifices. Thus they reforged the link between the liturgy and sacrifice that Cranmer and his generation had broken. 12

Hooker stands between these two stages. Unlike the first generation of public Reformers, he was not primarily involved in a defence of the Reformed view against Roman apologists, and did not usually mention the view that the eucharist is a representative sacrifice. In using the vocabulary of representative sacrifice, Cranmer and Ridley had echoed the vocabulary used by Thomas Aquinas. 13 For

12. Stephen Reynolds, "Sacrifice by Resemblance: the Protestant Doctrine of Eucharistic Sacrifice in Late Elizabethan and Early Stuart Divinity," Toronto Journal of Theology 3 (1987), 83, 89f.

13. Thomas devoted only one article in the Summa Theologiae to the question of the sacrifice of Christ in the eucharist, indicating perhaps Hooker on the Sacraments -234-

Cranmer and Ridley, this echo of Thomas' view was heard in a very un­

Thomistic context, for they could have made no sense of the other half of the Thomistic position that there was a real causal connection between the unrepeatable immolation of Christ on Calvary and each repetition of the representation of this immolation in each celebration of the eucharist. For Cranmer and Ridley, a representation is distinguished from what it represents, not identified with it and, for

Cranmer especially, Christ's sacrifice was of more interest to God than to men, who simply benefited from it. For Cranmer, the means of appropriating these benefits is faith, which is not particularly limited to the eucharistic liturgy at all.

Hooker restored, as we shall see, a far fuller real causal connection between the saving work of Christ and the believer who really participates in the glorified humanity of Christ, not just in the gift

that the matter was not one of any lively debate in the thirteenth century. In that article, he gives his typical view that the eucharist is a sacrifice because it is "a representation or memory of Christ's sacrifice" and because by the eucharist, the participants are made "partakers of the fruit of Christ's Passion." The "figures" of the Old Testament were also "representations" of Christ's sacrifice; but they were not like the sacrifice of the eucharist in the second way, in that they did not make the participants partakers of the fruits of Christ's Passion. Thomas asserts in the same article that Christ was sacrificed only once; and that Christ is both priest and victim in the eucharistic sacrifice, since the celebrating priest "bears Christ's image." See III, q. 83, a. I (ii, 25 I 2); but see also q. 73, a. 4 (ii, 2436). Martin Bucer had recognized that Thomas Aquinas might provide the key to the solution of the problem of defining the sacrifice of the Mass. D.F. Wright (ed.), Common Places of Martin Bucer (Appleford, 1972), 39. Hooker on the Sacraments -235- of faith through the ubiquitous divinity of Christ, but through the eucharist itself: "these mysteries do as nails fasten us to his very

Cross." 14 And Hooker's Platonism could make far greater sense of the view that a symbol and its reality are more connected than distinguished. Thus, the underpinning of Thomas' account of the eucharistic sacrifice was restored in Hooker, but the account itself was apparently missing. Whereas Cranmer and Ridley appeared to have the language, but missed the significance, Hooker caught the significance, but avoided the language, even though it was current in Rainolds and others around him.

This suggests that Hooker was not, in principle, inimical to describing the eucharist as a sacrifice, but did not treat it as an essential description. As we shall see, Hooker did not believe there was properly any difficulty about the "Pelagianism" of the sacrament: for him, sacraments are "moral instruments," and acts of human duty. They are thus, in some sense, human actions. But, for Hooker, they are not meritorious actions, since they are not, as we shall see, what Hooker calls "physical instruments," by which human beings are the agents of the conferral of grace; but as "means conditional" they are human actions by which God unfailingly confers grace. The "merit" in them is not, therefore, the merit of those who celebrate or those who receive:

God gives the grace according to his conditional promise, and commands

14. V, lxvii, 12 (ii, 361). Hooker on the Sacraments -236- the means to be used. Thus Hooker had attempted to do away with the problem Luther had posed in the Babylonian Captivity, of the sacrifice of the mass as a work. 15 And thus the way was open to revive an account of the eucharist as sacrifice.

But, although Hooker had thus disposed, as he thought, of the principal Reformation objection to the doctrine of the eucharistic sacrifice, he had relatively little to say about it. It was not a matter in contention between him and the Puritans, and was not even prominent in the sense of the prayers of the Book of Common Prayer, whose composition was determined in a period where the suggestion that the eucharist was anything but a "sacrifice of praise" would have suggested merit in human work. Thus Hooker had much less to say about it than Cranmer had, even though some will suspect he had much more he could have said.

15. The problem of "causality" in the conferring of grace by means of the sacraments went back at least to the thirteenth century. favoured an account of the sacraments as "moral" instruments, Thomas as "physical" instruments. Thomas' account, about which Hooker clearly hesitates, was not necessarily more "Pelagian" than the account using the vocabulary of "moral instruments": although the sacraments are physical instruments, they are still the works of God through human agents, Christ being the real . Summa Theologiae III, q. 62, a. 3 (ii, 2357). The "moral instrument" vocabulary may, in fact, have been more open to the unfortunate semi-Pelagian interpretation of doing "quod in se est," than the account in terms of "physical instruments," since it seemed to emphasize the human action, rather than the Christological and divine, as in Thomas. But Hooker was clearly reluctant to admit the view that the sacramental signs in any sense "cause" what the signify. See below in this chapter. Hooker on the Sacraments -237-

2. Hooker's Minimalism

Hooker repeatedly argues for what he takes to be the agreed consensus on the mode of the presence of Christ in the eucharist, among all but a few extreme Zwinglians. And he argues for it as the "highest common denominator" between three groups, Sacramentarians, Lutherans and

Roman Catholics. This "minimalist posture" was an old theme in the

Ref ormation. 16 And, indeed, there were many attempts to "reconcile" various opposing positions on the presence of Christ in the eucharist, both including the Roman Catholics, as at the meeting at Ratisbon

[Regensburg], and excluding them, as at the Colloquies at Marburg between

Lutherans and Zwinglians. Indeed, the position of Bucer and Calvin might very conveniently be seen as an attempt to bridge the differences between Zwingli and Luther. The title "Sacramentary" had been attached, as a term of abuse, to the Calvinist and Zwinglian positions together, by the Lutheran Westphal, in 1552. And indeed, the Zwinglians tended to accommodate their account more and more to the Calvinist, so that divisions softened between them. Hooker repudiated the supposed

Zwinglian view that the eucharist was "a shadow, destitute, empty and

16. In a rare quotation from any of the pre-Elizabethan English divines, Hooker cites Frith on this point against the authors of the Christian Letter. See Bayne ed., p. 377, note 9: "I will not hold it [real presence] as an article of faith, but that you may without danger or damnation either believe it or think the contrary." Hooker on the Sacraments -238- void of Christ, 1117and he was not the first to suggest that later

Zwinglians, the Sacramentarians, might not have said what was attributed to them by their Lutheran and Roman detractors; for an examination of their writings would show that they affirmed more than that the sacrament is a bare sign or figure, and that the eucharistic gift was more than the imputation of the merits of Christ's body and blood, that is, the views of Cranmer's generation. 18

Hooker invites the whole Christian world, in effect, to an eirenicon on the disputed question of the mode of Christ's presence in the eucharist. And he puts his point most vividly in the mind of the worthy communicant:

Let it therefore be sufficient for me presenting myself at the Lord's table to know what there I receive from him without searching or inquiring of the manner how Christ performeth his promise; let disputes and questions, enemies to piety, abatements of true devotion, and hitherto in t~~s cause but over patiently heard, let them take their rest.

The Christian is not to be like the people of Capernaum in John 6 but rather like the disciples in John 20: "the one because they enjoyed not disputed, the other disputed not because they enjoyed. 1120 This

"Minimalism" is related to the attitude of tolerance advocated elsewhere

17. V, !xvii, 2 (ii, 349).

18. V, !xvii, 8 (ii, 355).

19. V, !xvii, 12 (ii, 361).

20. V, !xvii, 3 (ii, 350f). Hooker on the Sacraments -239- in Hooker's program: for Hooker, zeal has devoured the church. 21

Suspense of judgement and the exercise of charity is recommended in matters of controversy. 22 In the Preface to the Lawes, Hooker had exhorted the separatists to peace and agreement:

Think ye are men, deem it not impossible for you to err. . . . Far more comfort it were for us (so small is the joy we take in these strifes) to labour under the same yoke, as men that look for the same eternal reward of their labours, to be joined with you in bands of indissoluble love and amity, to live as if our persons being many our souls were but one, rather than in such dismembered sort to spend our few an? w jtched days in tedious prosecuting of wearisome contentzons 2

This Minimalism, or apparent tolerance of opposing views, has often been treated as a significant and distinctive mark of Anglicanism. 24

And indeed, some have seen this as Hooker's "positive view of the

21. IV, i, 1 (i, 4 I 7).

22. Hooker believed that the Elizabethan settlement, though a moderate Reformation, had brought peace and prosperity, unlike the more extreme movements. He concluded, "it may be that suspense of judgement and exercise of charity were safer and seemlier for Christian men, than the hot pursuit of these controversies, wherein they that are most fervent to dispute be not always the most able to determine. But who are on his side, and who against him, our Lord in his good time shall reveal." IV, xiv, 6 (i, 486f).

23. Preface ix, 1, 3 (i, 194).

24. D.R.G. Owen, "Is there an Anglican Theology?" in M Darrol Bryant, The Future of Anglican Theology (Toronto, 1984), 8ff. See also the opinion of Stephen Sykes: "The historic Anglican position is acceptance of the institution of episcopacy and of the two gospel sacraments, but toleration of disagreement on their interpretation; and it needs to be said this toleration is in itself a highly significant ecclesiological matter." S.W. Sykes, The Integrity of Anglicanism (London, 1978), 85. Hooker on the Sacraments -240- presence of Christ" in the eucharist, that is the view that one is to refrain from making a judgement -- to enjoy the presence of Christ in oneself as receiver and not argue about it. 25 The view would become a point of apology for the Church of England in the succeeding generation and thereafter: that the Church of England def ended what all the contending parties disagreed about. 26 Whether this was indeed "the positive doctrine of Hooker on the presence" we will have to re-examine presently.

3. The Definition of Sacraments and the Eucharistic Presence

Because of the nature of Hooker's account, it is appropriate to look at his definition of sacrament and his own account of the eucharistic "presence" together, especially since, in continuity with earlier English theology, Hooker finds that the analogy of the eucharist with baptism illuminates the problem of defining the presence of Christ in the eucharist: for Hooker, Christ is not more, and not less,

25. "[Book V, chapter lxvii] is among the deepest and noblest parts of Hooker's work; it is pathetic to think how strenuously and earnestly he must have laboured for accuracy and balance in it, and how often a single sentence is recalled, as warrant for ranking him with the disputants on one side of the very debate he wrote to deprecate." Paget, Introduction, 172.

26. "All sides agree in the faith of the Church of England, That in the most Blessed Sacrament the worthy receiver is, by his faith, made spiritually partaker of the 'true and real Body and Blood of Christ, truly and really,' and of all the benefits of His passion." William Laud, Conference with Fisher, 35 in Works (Oxford, 1849) ii, 320f. Hooker on the Sacraments -241-

"present" in the element of water than in the elements of bread and wine.

It is characteristic of Hooker's account to be comprehensive with respect to the wide variety of previous accounts of the nature of the sacraments, with the one exception of the Lutheran account of the presence in the elements. Thus Hooker recognizes a wide variety of other views as correct, though presumably not as perspicuous as his own.

The sacraments can accurately be considered as bonds of obedience, obligations to charity, and as memorials; they are the analogues in the new covenant of the sacraments of the old testament; they are "warrants for the more security of our belief"; they are marks to distinguish

Christians from others. 27

Hooker appears not ever to have committed himself to one precise definition of 'sacrament,' but it is clear that the general consideration beneath such a definition would be the distinction between the form and the matter of the sacrament, that is the word and the material element. 28 In this, Hooker was deliberately following a line of thought that descended from Augustine. This dependence is more betrayed than declared. Thus, for instance, in arguing for the necessity of certain ceremonials, over and above the essential parts of the sacraments,

27. V, lvii, 2 (ii, 256).

28. V, lxii, 14 (ii, 293). Hooker on the Sacraments -242-

Hooker cites Augustine on what is essential:

The substance of all religious action is delivered from God himself in few words. For example's sake in the sacraments. "Unto the element let the word be added, and they both do make a sacrament," saith St. Augustine. Baptism is given by the element of water, and that prescript form of words which the Church of Christ doth use; the sacrament of the body and blood of Christ is administered in the elements of bread and wine, if those mystical words be added thereunto. But the due and decent form of admini ~ering these holy sacraments doth require a great deal more. 1

And Hooker repeatedly refers to the sacraments as (outward) signs of grace conferred. For instance, in emphasizing the generality of the promised grace, that is, that grace is promised to everyone, and promised in every celebration of the sacraments, Hooker writes,

Sacraments are those which are signs and tokens of some general promised grace, which always really i5scendeth from God unto the soul that duly receiveth them.

Thus sacraments are found among the wider variety of religious signs. In discussing public religious ceremonial, Hooker argues that, since godliness is the end of ceremonials, in public religious observance we are to seek matters consonant with the greatness of God, the dignity of religion, and the celestial provenance of grace, for

29. IV, i, 2 (i, 418). Augustine's dictum was a commonplace in the sixteenth century. The text is from Homilies on the Gospel of John, tractate lxxx, 3: "The word is added to the element, and there results the Sacrament, as if itself also a kind of visible word." NPNF, 1st ser., vii, 344.

30. IV, i, 4 (i, 421). Hooker on the Sacraments -243-

"signs must resemble the things they signify." 31 This conviction about signification, which was based ultimately on Augustine's supposed Letter

98 [alias 23] to Boniface, had been expressed consistently since

Cranmer. 32 But the signification in sacraments, as distinct from other religious ceremonials, is always to something "secret" or mystical:

As oft as we mention a Sacrament properly understood ... our restraint of the word to some few principal divine ceremonies importeth in every such ceremony two things, the substance of the ceremony itself which is visible, and besides that somewhat else more secret in reference whereunto we conceive that ceremony to be a Sacrament. 33

In fact, Scripture reading and preaching share a great deal in this regard with the sacraments properly so called:

The word of God outwardly administered (his Spirit inwardly concuf ing therewith) converteth, edifieth, and saveth souls. 4

Preaching and the sacraments both have "generative force and virtue":

As many therefore as are apparently to our judgement born of God, they have the seed of their regeneration by the ministry of the Church which useth to that end and purpose not only the Word, but the Sacraments, both having

31. V, vi, 2 (ii, 29).

32. Cranmer, Writings and Disputations, 123f, 225.

33. V, 1, 2 (ii, 219).

34. V, xxi, 5 (ii, 88). This "concurrence" of the Holy Spirit with the administration of the elements, was precisely Cranmer's account of the way grace was conferred in the eucharist! Hooker, of course, goes beyond Cranmer in distinguishing the sacraments from the other ways in which God may "spontaneously" act. Hooker on the Sacraments -244-

generative force and virtue.35

But the sacraments do more than teach, which is the ordinary use of

Scripture reading and preaching. Hooker rejects Cartwright's view that the sacraments are not "necessary" since teaching can be accomplished in other ways. 36 It is not just that the sacraments teach the mind, by other senses, what the Word teaches by hearing, but rather that the words added to the elements teach something about the special and unique character of the elements in that use: "that [the words of Jesus] might infallibly teach what [the elements] do most assuredly bring to pass.1137

That is, without the accompanying words, which make the elements a sacrament, we would not know the divine significance of the elements.

Revelation is required to tell us what sense and reason cannot. One of

Hooker's most vivid analogies in Book I illustrates this: just as the sense tells us of the need for food, and reason the need for temperance with respect of food, so "divine law," that is Scripture, is required to tell us the significance of the bread and wine in the eucharist, which significance is consonant with the use and virtue of food discovered naturally by sense and reason, but is beyond what sense and reason can

35. V, 1, i (ii, 219).

36. See the references to Thomas Cartwright ii, 364; i, 158; and iii, 126 in Paget, Introduction, 148.

37. V, lviii, 1 (ii, 259). Hooker on the Sacraments -245- tell, though it perfects and sustains what is learned there. 38 The error of Lutheran and papist alike is not to recognize that without the word, we know nothing of the significance of the sacrament, and, for

Hooker, Scripture is silent about the presence of Christ in the elements, so it should not be talked about. 39 Thus Hooker's view of the relation between reason and revelation is the basis for his "tolerance" of and consubstantiation together with his insistence on the "Minimalist" Sacramentarian view (which we shall examine presently):

A thing which no way can either further or hinder us howsoever it stand, because our participation of Christ in this sacrament dependeth on the co-operation of his omnipotent power which maketh it his body and blood to us, whether with change or without alteration of the element ~uch _as J8ey imagine we need not greatly to care nor mquire.

The authors of the Christian Letter were disposed to object to the apparent softness on transubstantiation implied by Hooker's

38. I, xvi, 7 (i, 283ff).

39. This sort of argument, from the silence of Scripture, is analogous to Thomas' on the question, "whether, if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate?" Thomas writes, in opposition to the view that the incarnation does not depend on sinfulness, "Such things as spring from God's will, and beyond the creature's due, can be made known to us only through being revealed in the Sacred Scripture, in which the Divine Will is made known to us. Hence, since everywhere in the Sacred Scripture the sin of the first man is assigned as the reason of the Incarnation, it is more in accordance with this to say that the work of the Incarnation was ordained by God as a remedy for sin." Summa Theologiae III, I, 3 (ii, 2028).

40. V, lxvii, 6 (ii, 353). Hooker on the Sacraments -246-

"Minimalism." To tolerate transubstantiation, even though one did not adopt it, was giving away the principles of the Reformation. 41 Hooker's answer declares simply that transubstantiation is, he believes, false; but his point is that, since scripture does not teach it, papists should not make it a matter of faith. 42

But Hooker balances his agnosticism about the presence of Christ in the elements with an assertion that, as signs, they really exhibit the grace conferred in them:

As for the sacraments, they really exhibit, but for aught we can gather out of that which is written of them [that is, in Scripture], they are not really nor do really contain in themselves that Jrace which with them or by them it pleaseth God to bestow. 4

The vocabulary of "exhibition" was typically Zwinglian at the beginning of the Reformation period, and was always linked to the power of signs to show that which they signified. Hooker's view of signs is much more infected with a revived Platonism than the view of Cranmer and the earlier English Zwinglians. So for Hooker, exhibition can amount to instrumental effectiveness: the Calvinist view read into the earliest

41. "In all which words you seem to make light of the doctrine of transubstantiation, as a matter not to be stood upon, or to be contended for, cared for, or inquired into: which maketh us marvel, how our Church and reverend Fathers have all this time past been deceived!" Christian Letter, 34, in Bayne ed., 619.

42. Bayne ed., 619; Works ii, 353, note 2.

43. V, lxvii, 6 (ii, 352). Hooker on the Sacraments -247-

Zwinglian vocabulary.

In any case, Hooker explicitly rejects the early Zwinglian view that Cranmer had adopted, that Christ was present in the eucharist only in his divinity. 44 This was the significance Cranmer gave to "spiritual presence," and the view persisted perhaps in certain "separatist circles," in contrast to the dominant Calvinist view that was shared by the court party, the conforming Puritans, and the outright separatists. 45 For Hooker, as for most English Calvinists, we are related to Christ not just as souls to his divine nature, but through our bodies and Christ's as well:

These things St. Cyril duly considering, reproveth their speeches which taught that only the deity of Christ is the vine whereupon we by faith do depend as branches, and that neither his f~ish nor our bodies are comprised in this resemblance.

Thus, although it is important to remember that Cranmer had a strong sense of the significance of the Incarnation with respect to baptism, this conviction was contradicted when he came to speak of the eucharist. For Cranmer, the dwelling in Christ which was mentioned (not brought to pass) in the eucharistic liturgy was equivalent to having faith: Christ's presence was "spiritual," that is, only through his divinity, and only available through the gift of faith. Hooker, by

44. Cranmer, Writings and Disputations, 3.

45. As for instance, the case of Robert Johnson in 1574 shows.

46. V, lvi, 9 (ii, 251). Hooker on the Sacraments -248-

contrast, built his whole sacramental theology, and his , on

the Incarnation, and clearly signaled his view by presenting a long and

detailed summary of orthodox Christology as the preface to his treatment

of the church and its sacraments. This emphasizes that, for Hooker,

there is a participation of Christ's humanity in the sacramental gift,

no less than his divinity. And, for Hooker, this gift of Christ's

presence is far more clearly narrowed to the sacraments of the gospel,

whereas Cranmer had attributed this spiritual presence to many other

rites, and to private prayer.

By the same token, Hooker is unmistakably, like Cranmer and Zwingli

on the one hand, and like Calvin on the other, a "Receptionist." The

"presence" of Christ -- and Hooker will even call it the "real presence"

-- is to be looked for not in the elements, but in the worthy recipient:

The real presence of Christ's most blessed body and blood is not .. to be sougi~ for in the sacrament, but in the worthy receiver of the sacrament.

47. V, lxvii, 6 (ii, 352). Hooker's has been denied: "It is hardly open to doubt that Richard Hooker personally believed in the Real Objective Presence sacramentally identified with the elements, previous to reception; but, in the face of the state of the Eucharistic controversy in his day, he desired to direct attention from current contentions and disputations." Vernon Staley, Richard Hooker (London, 1907), 150f. Staley quotes Hooker: "This bread hath in it more than the substance which our eyes behold." (V, lxvii, 12) John Keble was slightly more cautious, but equally unjustified: "I will say at once that I do not agree with those expressions of Hooker which are commonly quoted in proof that he denied a Real Objective Presence. / question, however, whether he really meant to deny any but a gross, corporal, carnal Presence." Letters of Spiritual Counsel and Hooker on the Sacraments -249-

The argument Hooker uses for this view refers back to a dispute

about consecration that had taken place long before the sixteenth

century, but which provided a corollary for the Reformers: in the

synoptic gospel versions of the institution of the eucharist at the Last

Supper, Christ said "take eat" before he said "this is my body." This suggested that the words "this is my body" were to be construed as words of administration, not words of institution, and that Christ's words

Guidance (London, 1885), cxxi. Quoted in Staley, Richard Hooker, 153. In the Editor's Preface, Keble held that Hooker, although reticent on the Presence, affirms it. Keble believed Hooker was reticent to the extent that affirming a Presence would compromise the "most true and substantial" manhood of Christ, as Lutheran Ubiquitarianism would do. Hence, according to Keble, Hooker's "limitations, under which the doctrine of the Real Presence must be received." Editor's Preface, 45 (i, xci). It will be seen at once that Keble has misplaced Hooker's problem: Hooker is not trying to provide the account Keble gave at all, but rather remains loyal to the doctrine of the Church of England as he has received it, in its Calvinist period dress. J.R. Parris' assertion that Hooker insisted "on a 'real presence' in the Eucharist which is nevertheless not to be explained in a corporal or substantial sense" is somewhat misleading, though in some sense true. As long as it is recognized that Hooker is a Receptionist, and actually denies our capacity to say anything whatever about a presence in the elements, the conclusion is not misleading. "Real presence" usually refers to something more. Parris goes on to say: "This third way [the Anglican via media], which refused to conform either to Zurich on the one hand or to Rome on the other, has remained to this day the most characteristic position of distinctively Anglican teaching." J.R. Parris, "Hooker's Doctrine of the Eucharist," Scottish Journal of Theology 16 (1969), 164. This statement is seriously misleading. As we shall see, Hooker's "Via media" on the presence of Christ, would almost certainly enclose the contemporary English Calvinists, including most of the active separatists. In fact, after 1549, the view had been shared by Zurich too. Hooker goes beyond Calvin principally in his account of the manner of the participation of Christ, not in his account of the "presence" of Christ in, or "effect" of, the eucharist. Hooker on the Sacraments -250-

(pace Luther) should not be interpreted as indicating that Christ's body was present in the bread, but rather in the person as an effect of the eating of the bread. 48 At times, Hooker distinguishes 'real' from

'mystical': that the priest makes the "real body" of Christ to be present in the elements of the eucharist is the Roman Catholic view, whereas his view is that God uses the elements as a means to make the

"mystical body. 1149 But at other times, he insists that in some sense, real and mystical are both accurate descriptions of the manner of the

"imparting" of Christ's whole person, human body and soul, and divine nature. 50 The elements are tokens Christ uses, really to impart himself

48. Cranmer had offered a "theory" of consecration, as the action of the minister in setting aside bread and wine for sacred use, particularly using Christ's words. From 1552-1559, the words, "the Body of our Lord Jesus Christ ... ," which are a third person version of Christ's words, "this is my Body ... " were not part of the words used at Administration at all. This suggests that Cranmer did not adopt this view of the words of "institution." Hooker apparently did not off er any account of consecration at all, but had he followed this argument for Receptionism from the synoptic accounts of the Last Supper to its logical conclusion, he might have provided the account of consecration later offered by Bishop Morton: consecration by giving thanks or blessing. See Richard Buxton, Eucharist and Institution Narrative (Great Wakering, 1976), 112, 116.

49. See note on Christian Letter, 33: "Whereas popish doctrine doth hold that priests by words of consecration make the real, my whole discourse is to show that God by the sacrament maketh the mystical body of Christ." Bayne ed, 377, n. 9.

50. "These holy mysteries received in due manner do instrumentally . impart unto us even in true and real though mystical manner the very Person of our Lord himself, whole, perfect, and entire." V, lxvii, 8 (ii, 355). The passage is a description of the view of the "Sacramentaries," but it is clear that Hooker is both attempting to vindicate the view, and defending it as his own. Hooker on the Sacraments -251- in these "heavenly mysteries." 51

But, in fact, all are agreed on the positive assertion of

Receptionism. For all parties to the disputes of the sixteenth century agree "that the soul of man is the receptacle of Christ's person." Some

(and here Hooker includes himself and the Church of England) add a restrictive condition, holding that Christ is present "whole" (that is, both God and man, and both human soul and body) only within the receiver; while others go further and assert a further presence of the body and blood "externally" seated in the consecrated elements themselves. This further assertion both the Roman adherents of transubstantiation and the Lutheran adherents of consubstantiation share. 52

Hooker repeats the earlier Protestant comparison of baptism and the eucharist to show that it is as mistaken to see a presence in the elements of the eucharist as it would be to argue, as no one did, for a presence in the water of baptism: none of the disputing positions would speak of a real presence in the water, though the Church of England

51. Hooker defends the use of the Lord's Prayer, repeated by the people after the minister after communion, "when together we have all received those heavenly mysteries wherein Christ imparteth himself unto us, and giveth visible testification of our blessed communion with him." V, xxxvi, 3 (ii, 157).

52. V, lxvii, 2 (ii, 349). Hooker on the Sacraments -252- recognized that grace is conveyed in the sacrament. 53 In fact, Hooker insists, against the authors of the Christian Letter, that grace is conveyed in baptism, and that it must be, in some way, "in" the sacrament, that is by the means or instrument of the administration of the sacrament, although not by virtue of the sacramental elements or the minister in themselves. 54

As far as the ministration of the sacraments is concerned, Hooker calls them "moral instruments." The word "moral" refers to the ministration or use of the sacraments. They are "moral," in the first place, as part of human duty, since they are commanded in the dominical

53. V, lxvii, 6 (ii, 353).

54. "What warrant have you of present "grace" in the very work wrought of baptism?" Christian Letter, 36 (Bayne ed, 621). "Warrant sufficient I hope for present grace in the sacrament. As for in the very work wrought, they are not my words but yours. What mean you by this your gloss? Doth it not shew that in my speech there is less than you looked for, and therefore to draw it somewhat nearer to your own construction, you help it with a word or two, but so botched, that one piece will not hold with another. Had you placed ex opere operato where you use in opere operato, it might have stood you in more stead, and yet the labour all one. But in and ex make no great odds, I suppose, in your theological dictionary." (Bayne ed., 333, note 8). Hooker's manuscript note chides the authors for not distinguishing "in" from "ex," hinting that "in" would have a tolerable sense, whereas "ex" would not. His earlier criticisms of the Roman view would indicate that the error involved is in assuming that the minister offers the grace by what he does, whereas the perspicuous explanation of the efficacy of the sacrament is to explain that God uses the minister's actions and the elements really to convey the grace. The removal of the phrase "of the woorke wrought" from Article 25 in the Elizabethan revision may have rested on some similar sense that the phrase had a valid use. The original version criticized the phrase as unscriptural, and obscure, and as leading to "superstition," presumably to a magical and Pelagian view of the sacraments. Hooker on the Sacraments -253- institution of them: "moral, as being a duty which men perform towards

God." As Hooker explains it, this duty includes both the outward action and the inward religious affection to God, making the ministration an opus operantis and not a mere opus operatum, from the point of view of the minister. The sacraments are, of course, "mystical" as well, "if we respect what God doth thereby intend to work." 55

That is, the sacraments are moral and not physical instruments: their use, by worthy receivers, that is, by those who approach with respect, claims the conditional promise on God's part. They are thus, in fact, the only ordinary means of God's grace:

This is therefore the necessity of sacraments. That saving grace which Christ originally is or hath for the general goal of his whole Church, by sacraments he severally deriveth into every member thereof. Sacraments serve as the instruments of God to that end and purpose, moral instruments, the use whereof is in our hands, the ef feet in his; for the use we have his express commandment, for the effects his conditional promise: so that without our obedience to the one, there is of the other no apparent assurance, as contrariwise where the signs and sacraments of his grace are not either through contempt unreceived, or received with contempt, we are not to doubt but that they really give what they promise, and are what they signify. For we take not baptism nor the eucharist for bare resemblances or memorials of things absent, neither for naked signs and testimonies assuring us of grace received before, but (as they are indeed and in verity) for means effectual whereby God when we take the sacraments delivereth into our hands that grace available unto eternalJJf e, which grace the sacraments represent or signify.

55. V, lxii, 15 (ii, 294f).

56. V, lvii, 5 (ii, 258). Hooker on the Sacraments -254-

Thus the sacraments in use (as contrasted with the elements apart from the use) are inevitably effective in the worthy receiver, really conveying the grace they signify, and not merely "remembering" or resembling it. Thus, sacraments are not only human actions, something we do, but something God does:

For we all admire and honour the holy Sacraments, not respecting so much the service which we do unto God in receiving them, as the dignity of that sacred and secret gift which we thereby receive from God. . .. Sacraments ... consist altogether in relation to some 1;ch gift or grace supernatural as only God can bestow. 3

Because sacraments are something God does, through the agency of human ministers and human receivers, and through the instruments of material elements, it is absurd and annoying to hold that "sacraments are not effectual to salvation, except men be instructed by preaching before they be made partakers of them. 1158 For although Hooker has a clear notion that the grace is not conveyed automatically in the sacraments, since the human recipient may exercise "contempt," that is, put up an obstacle to the grace God offers, yet the sacraments are the principal and ordinary way such grace is conveyed:

For all receive not the grace of God which receive the sacraments of his grace. Neither is it ordinarily his will to bestow the grace of sacraments on any, but by the

57. V, i, 2 (ii, 219).

58. V, xxii, 17 (ii, 108). Hooker on the Sacraments -255-

sacraments. 59

This is a direct denial of one of Cranmer's principal themes, that

the sacraments are occasions of grace, but that there are many other such occasions that are not sacraments. The vocabulary of "virtue, force and efficacy," however, which was Cranmer's, Hooker adopts, and is prepared to use of the participation of Christ in the sacraments and of effective grace available elsewhere. In the list of seven propositions all who dispute about the sacraments agree upon, Hooker's third is,

"that what merit, force or virtue soever there is in his sacrificed body and blood, we freely, fully and wholly have it by [the sacrament of the eucharist]. 1160 This seems to be a reference to the imputation of

Christ's merit to those who worthily receive the sacraments: there is a forgiveness of sins and a reconciliation with God, like that of justification. But Hooker does not restrict this vocabulary of "force" and "virtue" to the sacraments. Indeed, Christ is present in force and efficacy in everyone simply because of the taking of humanity in the

Incarnation:

Forasmuch as it is by virtue of that conjunction made the body of the Son of God, by whom also it was made a sacrifice for the sins of the whole world, this giveth it a presence of force and efficacy throughout all generations of men . . . . The sacrificed body of Christ [is] ...

59. V, lvii, 4 (ii, 257f).

60. V, lxvii, 7 (ii, 354f). Hooker on the Sacraments -256-

infinite in possibility of application. 61

The Virtualism Cranmer defended as a view of the sacramental presence of Christ, Hooker sees as universal in application, and certainly not bound to the sacraments, although it may be "applied" by the sacraments. Indeed, there are many sorts of spiritual "virtue, force and efficacy." Church buildings 62 and ordered common prayer 63 have such vital efficacy, which seems to involve little else than

"moving by efficient causality," by stimulating dormant human spiritual capacities. Medicine thus has a natural "virtue, 1164as does the rhetorical effect of preaching, which, as the Puritans insist, has a

"force and virtue 1165and "a vigour and vital efficacy. 1166

61. V, Iv, 9 (ii, 245).

62. "Manifest ... it is, that the very majesty and holiness of the place, where God is worshipped, hath in regard of us great virtue, force, and efficacy for that it serveth as a sensible help to stir up devotion, and in that respect no doubt bettereth even our holiest and best actions in this kind." V, xvi, 2 (ii, 57)

63. "A great part of the cause, wherefore religious minds are so inflamed with the love of public devotion, is that virtue, force, and efficacy, which by experience they find that the very form and reverend solemnity of common prayer duly ordered hath, to help that imbecility and weakness in us, by means whereof we are otherwise of ourselves the less apt to perform unto God so heavenly a service, with such affection of heart, and disposition in the powers of our souls as is requisite." V, XXV, 1 (ii, 118).

64. V, xxii, 20 (ii, 114).

65. V, xxii, 19 (ii, 11 I).

66. V, xxii, 19 (ii, I 13). Compare also the (privative) use of the phrase "by force and virtue" in Hooker's denial that the hypostatic Hooker on the Sacraments -257-

Thus, for Cranmer, Christ's presence in the eucharist is a presence of "force and virtue," in the sense that the merits of Christ's saving death, which he accomplished in his body now glorified and in heaven, are available to faith, since faith justifies, and in justification

Christ's merits are imputed to us, but this is a presence of force and virtue that could be anywhere, "wherever" faith finds it to apply it.

Hooker agrees, so far as the "ubiquity" of this "force and virtue" is concerned, but disagrees as to the mode. For Hooker, this is not the special nature of the "virtue, force and efficacy" of Christ's body in the sacraments. For Hooker, "virtue, force, and efficacy" is a real relation, a connection in some sort of causal sequence, not simply the external "imputation" of the "virtue or merit" gained by Christ's body as a sacrif ice.67

The basis for the conferring of any sort of grace on the human race is now the Incarnation of the Word, who taking flesh, took on a human

union effects an alteration in the human nature assumed by the Word: "neither are the properties of man's nature in the person of Christ by force and virtue of the same conjunction so much altered, as not to stay within those limits which our substance is bordered withal." V, liv, 5 (ii, 234 ).

67. Thus, for Hooker, the participation of Christ goes beyond Cranmer's type of "Virtualism," the participation in the "virtue" and benefits of the Passion of Christ, who is "present" in his divinity, by faith; Hooker's version of Virtualism is a participation of the substance of the risen humanity of Christ, the "Dynamic Receptionism" of Bucer and Calvin. See Cyril Richardson, Zwingli and Cranmer on the Eucharist (Evanston, 1949), 20-23. Hooker on the Sacraments -258- soul and a human body. Hooker spends considerable time dealing with the graces conferred on Christ's human nature, in order to identify Lutheran errors on the one hand, and to provide the christological underpinning for the sacraments on the other. The natural properties of divinity "be not communicable to man's nature, [but] the supernatural gifts graces and effects thereof are. 1168 In the , the grace of unction gives the human soul of Christ universal (though not infinite) knowledge; it gives the human body of Christ incorruptibility; and it gives the glorified body "vital efficacy," 69 though not ubiquity. 70

Any discussion of the "presence" of Christ presupposes, for Hooker, a discussion of how Christ is "present" anywhere. This begins with the hypostatic union, by which God is in Christ, a "medicine to cure the whole world." But this medicine would be useless without being received; Christ's incarnation and passion are available to one's good only if one is a partaker of Christ, and only if Christ is present.

Therefore, Christ must be "in us." In the first place, Christ is present as God, but not as man, to all things. This is Cranmer's view of the presence. But Hooker goes far beyond this mode of presence.

Christ's human body has only local presence; neither the grace of

68. V, liv, 5 (ii, 235).

69. V, liv, 6-9 (ii, 235-237).

70. V, Iv, 4, 5 (ii, 240ff). Hooker on the Sacraments -259- unction nor the grace of unity changed this. 71 Christ's soul and body are now locally present in heaven only. Nevertheless, Christ's

(undivided) Person is present everywhere by force of the deity with which the soul and body are united, and by co-operation, the humanity of

Christ is present in that Christ exercises a universal government.

Because of the conjunction with deity, Christ's human body has no limit in the effect of its sacrifice. This is the basis of the "presence of force and efficacy" of Christ everywhere, not just in the sacraments.

On the surface, this sounds, of course, very much like Cranmer, but is quite different, in that the link is the Incarnation, not the power of divinity to justify the faithful. 72 And, while Cranmer clearly affirmed the Incarnation, he made no connection between the doctrine and the partaking of Christ in the eucharist, for which he had a different interpretation. He would thus fall under Hooker's criticism of "too cold" an interpretation:

It is too cold an interpretation, whereby some men expound our being in Christ to import nothing else, but only that the selfsame nature which maketh us to be men, is in him, and maketh him man as we are. For what man in the world is there which hath not so far forth communion with Jesus Christ? It is not this that can sustain the weight of such sentences as ~eak of the mystery of our coherence with Jesus Christ. 1

71. See V, liv, 7-9 (ii, 236f).

72. V, Iv, 1-9 (ii, 238-245).

73. V, lvi, 7 (ii, 250). Cranmer had written, "Where you say that Christ uniteth Himself to us as man, when he giveth His body in the Hooker on the Sacraments -260-

If the incarnation is the basis of our partaking of the humanity of

Christ, it is not the whole story. For there are "degrees" of such

partaking, and this must mean that we "really participate" Christ by an

impartation, and not just the imputation of the merits of his body's

sacrifice. The key word here for Hooker is "participation":

Participation is that mutual inward hold which Christ hath of us and we of him, in such sort that each possesseth other b~ w, of special interest, property, and inherent copulation. 4

The notion of participation informs the whole christological and

sacramental section of the Lawes and is related to that of causality, as

Hooker understood it. The effect participates the cause because the

effect is "in" the cause or source. Thus the Son and Father

"participate" each other. 75 The Son is in the Father by Being, but also

by Love. 76 But, through creation, God as Trinity and the creatures co­

inhere, since "all things are ... partakers of God." 77 But saving

Sacrament to such as worthily receive it; if you will speak as Cyril and other old authors used to do, Christ did unite Himself to us as man at His incarnation." Writings and Disputations, 170. See Editor's Preface 46 (i, xciiif, note 3) for further quotations from Cranmer.

74. V, lvi, 1 (ii, 245).

75. V, lvi, 2 (ii, 246).

76. V, lvi, 3 (ii, 246f).

77. V, lvi, 5 (ii, 247f). Hooker on the Sacraments -261- efficacy is also a form of participation. 78 Salvation is by actually participating in the church, in an actual adoption taking us beyond election, which is not sufficient itself for salvation. 79 In this adoption, we receive the "quickening Spirit" of Christ. 8° Christ, as human flesh, is the "vine" whereby our bodies, as branches, are quickened. 81 This quickening involves no "mixture of bodily substance," but a mystical participation of our flesh and Christ's. Christ

"imparteth himself by degrees, the participation in Christ being the real effects in us. All participate in Christ through creation and providence, but not all do so in salvation; and those who participate in saving grace, do so in varying degrees:

And because the divine substance of Christ is equally in all, his human substance equally distant from all, it appeareth that the participation of Christ wherein there are many degrees and differences, must needs consist in such ef feels as being derived from both natures of Christ really into us, are made our own, and we by having them in us are truly said to have him from whom they come, Christ also more or less to inhabit and impart himself as the graces are fewer or mog:2greater or smaller, which really flow into us from Christ.

This is obviously a long way from Cranmer's account, even in the

78. V, lvi, 6 (ii, 248f).

79. V, lvi, 7 (ii, 249ff).

80. V, lvi 8 (ii, 251).

81. V, lvi 9 (ii, 251f).

82. V, lvi, 10 (ii, 253). Hooker on the Sacraments -262- residual element of incarnational doctrine in Cranmer's theology of

baptism. 83 But Hooker interprets this view as one that all parties

(except Zwingli and Oecolampadius) shared. Thus the first point of agreement of the seven points, deals with the agreement that grace is imparted in the sacraments:

This sacrament is a true and real participation of Christ, who thereby imparteth himself even his whole entire Person as a mystical Head unto every soul that receiveth him, and that every such receiver doth thereby incorporate or unite himself unto Christ as a mystical member of him. 84

They [the Sacramentarians] grant that these holy mysteries received in due manner do instrumentally both make us partakers of the grace of that body and blood which were given for the life of the world, and besides also impart unto us even in true and real though mystical manner the ver~ Pg son of our Lord himself, whole, perfect, and entire. 5

The "Sacramentaries" might be thought to include both the Calvinists and the Zwinglians, as well as Hooker himself, and Hooker suggests that the Zwinglians may have been misinterpreted. But he does clearly distinguish his own from some supposed Zwinglian views. 86 Thus Zwingli

83. Richardson, Zwingli and Cranmer, 42ff, 5lff.

84. V, lxvii, 7 (ii, 354f).

85. V, lxvii, 8 (ii, 355).

86. J.R. Parris is wrong to conclude that Hooker linked Zwingli himself and the Calvinists under the name "Sacramentaries," and treated their views on the eucharist as identical. J.R. Parris, "Hooker's Doctrine of the Eucharist," 155. As we shall see, Hooker distinguishes Zwingli (and Oecolampadius) from the "Sacramentaries," who include Calvinists and himself. In fact, the late Zwinglians had come to agree with the Calvinists, in the Consensus Tigurinus of 1549, but Zwingli was Hooker on the Sacraments -263- and Oecolampadius remain outside the "consensus," because of a tendency to treat the sacrament as "a shadow, destitute, empty and void of

Christ." Within the consensus, however, there is, Hooker believes, general agreement:

Seeing that by opening the several opinions that have been held, they are grown for aught I can see on all sides at the length to a general agreement concerning that which alone is material, namely the real participation of Christ and ~; life in his body and blood by means of this sacrament.

Hooker then turns to his doctrine of eirenic minimalism; he invites all concerned to enjoy rather than dispute; 88 like the disciples at the

Last Supper, they are invited to be fed, not to test their wits. 89

Without being further "opened," Calvin himself might be a clear adherent to the view of the participation in Christ, as he certainly was the source of the view that the elements were instruments used by God.

Thus Calvin had written:

When I say Christ is received by faith [I do not mean] that he is received only by understanding and imagination. For the promises offer him, not for us to halt in the appearance and bare knowledge alone, but to enjoy true participation [vera communicatione] in him. . . . I say, therefore, that in the mystery of the Supper, Christ is truly shown to us through the symbols of bread and wine, his very body and by that time long dead. Thus Hooker could, without contradiction, agree with the Zwinglians and disagree with Zwingli.

87. V, lxvii, 2 (ii, 349).

88. V, lxvii, 3 (ii, 350).

89. V, lxvii, 4 (ii, 351). Hooker on the Sacraments -264-

blood, in which he has fulfilled all obedience to obtain righteousness for us. Why? First, that we may grow into one body with him; secondly, having been made partakers of his substance, that ~e may also feel his power in partaking of all his benefits. 9

But Hooker almost certainly goes beyond Calvin in treating participation as a causal connection. Thus Hooker accounts for Paul's

"realism," in calling the bread and cup "body" and "blood" -- a favourite text for the realists in the sixteenth century -- not with language of symbolism, but with a causal account. Paul calls them this because they are causally connected with our participation in Christ's body and blood:

The bread and cup are his body and blood because they are causes instrumental upon the receipt whereof the participation of his body and blood ensueth. For that which produceth any certain ef feet is not vainly nor improperly said to be that very ef feet whereunto it tendeth. 91

Thus Hooker in effect restates Calvin's Instrumentalism in terms of the Greek metaphysical account of cause and effect. In describing the

"force of the sacraments," which is tantamount to his account of the

"presence" of Christ in the eucharist, Hooker describes "how they are effectual," that is "how they make us partakers of Christ." Grace, he claims, is the end for which the sacraments were instituted; the matter of the sacrament, accordingly, "signifieth, figureth and representeth their end," that is, grace. The particular grace of the sacraments, as

90. Institutes IV, xvii, 11 (ii, 1372).

91. V, lxvii, 5 (ii, 352). Hooker on the Sacraments -265- opposed to the wide variety of graces and participations available through other instruments, is "that which worketh salvation," and for that reason, is relevant only in this life. "Sacraments be the powerful instruments of God to eternal life." That is, the sacraments are the instrumental, formal and final causes of the grace they signify and effect. Then Hooker offers an analogy:

For as our natural life consisteth in the union of the body with soul; so our life supernatural in the union of the soul with God. And forasmuch as there is no union of God with man without that mean between both which is both, it seemeth requisite that we first consider how God is in Christ, then how Christ is in us, aijq how the Sacraments do serve to make us partakers of Christ.

This passage from the introduction to the discussion of the sacraments indicates in advance the theological structure that is involved. This structure would take Hooker beyond Cranmer, boldly to

92. V, l, 3 (ii, 220). Thornton recognized, then criticized, Hooker's "theory of instrumentality." For Thornton, who is clearly disappointed that Hooker did not offer a "Realist" account, and did not have any developed account of the eucharistic sacrifice, "piety is no substitute for theological clarity," and Hooker failed to draw the eucharistic implications of the doctrine of the Incarnation. Lionel Thornton, Richard Hooker (London, 1924), 87f. Undoubtedly, Thornton is correct about the account of the eucharistic sacrifice, although we have seen that there may be more suggested in Hooker than first appears. But, in fact, Hooker is (relatively) clear in the development of his account, and in the context of the Elizabethan Church of England, did indeed off er a cogent account, based on a current consensus. Further, it was an account that began with a thorough study of the Incarnation and grace, in Book V, chapters l to lvii, in order precisely to account for the church's sacramental life in terms of the participation of the Incarnate Christ. Then, in chapters lviii to lxvii he deals with specific questions about the sacraments. Hooker on the Sacraments -266- embrace the Calvinist revolution in in England.

For this "participation in Christ" would involve more than "the benefits of his passion," more than the bare justification of the earlier English

Reformation, obtained by the imputation of Christ's merits on account of our faith. Through the instruments of the elements of the eucharist, sanctifying grace is actually given, and the human being comes to share more and more, the glorified human life of Christ, until sacraments shall pass away, in the glorification of the world to come:

Our souls and bodies quickened to eternal life are effects the cause whereof is the Person of Christ, his body and his blood are the true wellspring out of which this life floweth. So that his body and blood are in that very subject whereunto they minister life not only by effect and operation, even as the influence of the is in plants, beasts, men, and in every thing which they quicken, but also by a far more divine and mystical kind of union, whi~~ maketh us one with him even as he and the Father are one.

Cranmer had left the Church of England a liturgy which spoke boldly of "dwelling in Christ" even as "he may evermore dwell in us," and of

"our sinful bodies being cleansed by his body," but his account of this indwelling fell far short of his poetry. One of the best approaches he could make to the account was the so-called "Ratramnianism" of the two­ level feeding: of the human body by the bread and wine, of the soul by the faith which brings justification, "the benefits of Christ's

93. V, lxvii, 5 (ii, 352). Hooker on the Sacraments -267-

passion." 94 But for Hooker, this is a shallow view. Nutrition, the feeding of the body, is a significant enterprise, a stage on the ladder of being, with its proper analogies with other stages. To speak, however, of any bodily feeding as having a bearing on the reception of

Christ in the eucharist, except by a proportion, is simply foolish:

Hooker is totally indifferent to any "two-level" feeding whatsoever:

The manner of their [sacraments'] necessity to life supernatural is not in all respects as food unto natural life, becag1Sethey contain in themselves no vital force or efficacy.

This remark is, of course, directed against those who did find the grace of Christ contained in the elements. But it shows both utter indifference to one of Cranmer's favourite accounts, and undermines the whole theme of "resemblance," def ended by Augustine's Letter to

Boniface, upon which Cranmer's symbolist account was based.

And Cranmer's Articles had clearly distinguished themselves from what must have been taken to be the inadequate side of Zwingli's account, that they are bare signs, or signs adopted by Christians to show others their profession, or to "teach":

[Sacraments'] chief est force and virtue consisteth not herein [that is, in the use human beings make of them to be badges or teaching aids] so much as in that they are

94. Cranmer, Writings and Disputations, 15. See J.W. Bakhuizen van den Brink, "Ratramn's Eucharistic Doctrine and its Influence in Sixteenth-Century England," in G.J. Cumming (ed.), Studies in Church History ii (London, 1965), 54-77.

95. V, lvii, 4 (ii, 257). Hooker on the Sacraments -268-

heavenly ceremonies, which God hath sanctified and ordained to be administered in his Church, first, as marks whereby to know when God doth impart the vital or saving grace of Christ unto all that are capable thereof, and secondly as 7:ieans conditiongl which God requireth in them unto whom he zmparteth grace

But Hooker can give the formularies a much richer sense than

Cranmer could. Cranmer had very little sense of any imparted grace at

all. He did come to the conclusion that God used the occasion of pious

reception of communion to strengthen his gift of faith in the souls of

the justified person, but God might choose any such occasion. Hooker

writes after the full impact of the Calvinist revolution had been felt

in England, and enhances that tradition. God both imputes Christ's

merits to justify, and demands the obedient reception of the sacraments

in those so justified, and as well imparts sanctifying grace, such that

the faithful recipient grows in that process of sanctification that

leads to glorification. Hooker agrees, on the one hand, with Cranmer,

that the signs are efficacious because of what God does, but, on the

other hand, offers a far richer picture of what God does in granting

grace, and limits the occasion much more to the sacraments than Cranmer

would.

The authors of the Christian Letter taxed Hooker on this passage, and demanded to know "where find you that God ordained the sacraments to

96. V, lvii, 3 (ii, 256f). Hooker on the Sacraments -269- tell us when God giveth grace?" 97 Hooker def ends his position on the basis of Cranmer's words in the Articles:

If the thing they signify be grace, and God the giver of that grace, in the ministry of the sacraments, then are they ordeined to tell us when Gg>f giveth grace, yea, and further, what grace God doth give.

And Hooker takes for granted that he speaks for a consensus in the

Church of England, a consensus that has grown through debate through thirty or forty years. Significantly enough, this would place the beginning of the debate during the first decade of Elizabeth's reign, that is, it would exclude Cranmer from the debate! 99

The second part of the Dublin Fragment gives an account of "the nature and number of the sacraments." This section is less clearly directed as an answer to objections of the Christian Letter than the sections that precede and follow it. Although Hooker had been attacked in the Christian Letter for things he had written on the sacraments, particularly of their necessity, and that they did not follow but, in children, preceded faith (section 14), and for his apparent tolerance of

Transubstantiation (section 17), the Dublin Fragments do not ref er

97. Christian Letter, 27 (Bayne ed., 613).

98. Hooker's note at Christian Letter, 27 (Bayne ed., 273, note I; Works ii, 256, note 1).

99. "You speake of sacraments as if by the space of these thirty or forty yeares you had lived in some cave of the earth, and never heard in what points the Church doth either varie or agree concerning them." Hooker's note at Christian Letter, 26 (Bayne ed., 273-4, note I; Works ii, 256f, note I). Hooker on the Sacraments -270- directly to these attacks, but rather seem to criticize Roman Catholic doctrines. 100 However, the Fragment may fit into the controversy precisely in relation to distinguishing Hooker's view from the Roman

Catholic one. For Hooker, in declaring that the Church of England held a consensus on the mode of Christ's presence in the sacrament, had seemed to the authors of the Christian Letter to adopt Roman Catholic views.

In the Christian Letter, and in Book VI of the Lawes, Hooker took the opportunity to distinguish his views from those of the Roman Catholics.

In Book VI, the treatise on Absolution, there is a passage that defends the Church of England from Cardinal Bellarmine's accusation that it accepted a Protestant view of the sacraments as "naked, empty and uneffectual signs." In this passage, sacraments are held to have the

"power of infallible signification," because God unfailingly gives in them "grace effectual to sanctify":

Because in sacraments there are two things distinctly to be considered, the outward sign, and the secret concurrence of God's most blessed Spirit, in which respect our Saviour hath taught that water and the Holy Ghost are combined to work the mystery of new birth; sacraments therefore as signs have only those effects before mentioned [that is, the natural power of the outward signs to picture and teach, "to stir up

100. Keble questioned the relationship of the section to the controversy around the Christian Letter, Editor's Preface 9 (i, xxvi). John Booty has recently suggested that this section was previously written, but notes that it is consonant with Lawes, lxvii in that it avoids any attempt to define and overdefine, in that it emphasizes the mystery of Christ's presence, and in that it focuses the attention on the change in the faithful receiver, not on the elements. Attack and Response, xxvff, xlff. Hooker on the Sacraments -271-

the mind,'' and the other matters Bellarmine assumes as the Reformed account of sacraments]; but of sacraments, in that by God's own will and ordinance they are signs assisted always with the power of the Holy Ghost, we [here Hooker cites Calvin's treatise against the Council of Trent] acknowledge whatsoever either the places of Scripture, or the authorities of councils and fathers, or the proofs and arguments of reason which he allegeth, can shew to be wrought by them. The elements and words have power of infallible signification, for which they are called seals of God's truth; the spirit affixed unto those elements and words, power of operation within the soul, most admirable, divine, and impossible to be exprest. For so God hath instituted and ordained, that, together with due administration and receipt of sacramental signs, there shall proceed from himself grace effectual to sanctify, to cure, to comf Yo\•and whatsoever is else for the good of the souls of men.

Thomas was wrong, the treatise continues, to see sacraments as signs which cause what they signify. He held that they are instrumental causes of a preparation for grace, "whereupon immediately from God doth ensue the grace that justifieth" [that is, that sanctifies]. Thomas erred in holding that in some inappropriate sense of "cause," sacraments cause what they signify, but Thomas recognized that sanctifying grace came from God and not from the sacraments. Hooker, as we have seen, had treated "signification" as a real and causal relationship, in fact, as a relationship of instrumental, formal and final causation, but not as a productive or efficient cause. The treatise goes on to condemn a contemporary Thomist extension of Thomas' view so that grace itself becomes an immediate effect of the outward sign. The point this

101. VI, vi, 10 (iii, 89). Hooker on the Sacraments -272- treatise makes in distinguishing the Roman Catholic from the correct view of sacramental grace is that sacraments have no vital force in themselves; rather, it is God who conveys grace through them. This is precisely what Hooker had contended as the view of the Church of England in Book V of the Lawes:

[The sacraments] contain in themselves no vital force or efficacy, they are not physical but moral instruments of salvation, duties of service and worship, which unless we perform as the Author of grace requireth, they are unprofitable. For all receive not thfo~race of God which receive the sacraments of his grace.

The Church of England, adopting and developing the account of

Calvin, accepts, with the Roman Catholics, the view that grace is conferred in the sacraments; it differs in construing the elements as moral instruments, not "physical instruments" or causes, that is, in insisting that it is God that gives the grace, not the sacraments.

This view, clearly enunciated in Book V of the Lawes, and directly contrasted with the Roman Catholic view in the treatise on Confession that now comprises Book VI, is precisely the point that Hooker takes up again in the Dublin Fragment. He seeks to put a distance between himself and what he takes to be the Roman Catholic view, possibly since the authors of the Christian Letter have accused him of un-Protestant views on the conferring of grace in the sacraments. Grace is conferred

102. V, lvii, 4 (ii, 257f). See also the view that baptism is not a cause of grace, but an instrument or means whereby we receive grace. V, Ix, 2 (ii, 265). Hooker on the Sacraments -273- in the sacraments, and that is the witness of the Church of England, he replies, but it is not any "meritorious habit," or "inherent quality" derived "from the very sign itself as the true coefficient with God."

It is the will of God, the giver, not the efficacy of the sign itself, to which the grace is attributed. Peter Lombard had led the way in defining sacraments as "signs which cause grace." Thomas had supported the view but softened this dictum by defining the grace as a

"preparative quality in the soul." But contemporary disciples of Thomas recklessly go further:

they hold the very elements and words for causes which immediately produce grace by being moved with the hand of God till an effect i~b~ite degrees above them in excellency proceed from them.

Hooker then goes on to quote from recently published works of Roman

Catholics that seem to report the view Hooker attributes to them. In making the signs causes of the grace they convey, such Romans Catholics simply create more obscurity: for they attempt to express what they admit they cannot understand. The fact that Hooker refers to material published only in the last decade of the sixteenth century, and that the marginal title in the manuscript refers to modus quo sacramenta conferunt Gratiam suggests that this portion of the fragment was not previously written, but also belongs to the controversy about the

Christian Letter, with which it is contemporary. The paragraph thus

103. V, App. I, 18 (ii, 554f). Hooker on the Sacraments -274- becomes an elucidation of Hooker's marginal note in the Christian

Letter, recalling the authors of the Christian Letter to the consensus, shared with Calvin, and developed thirty or forty years earlier, of the

Church of England, on the "manner in which the sacraments confer grace" and distinguishing this from erroneous and obscure Roman Catholic views. 104

To return to the question of whether Hooker's Minimalism represents his "positive view of the presence of Christ" in the eucharist, we must consider that, in fact, Hooker has opted for one of the cases. After

"classic" Zwinglianism was discarded, in part because it was superseded by the work of Calvin and Melanchthon, there remained three basic accounts of the presence of Christ, the Romanist view of transubstantiation, the Lutheran view of consubstantiation, and the

"Sacramentarian view," which Hooker does not otherwise name, but which since it identifies the presence of Christ as "in" the worthy receiver, might accurately be called Receptionism. 105 Hooker's Minimalism was

104. J.R. Parris' claim that, in rejecting the simple Zwinglian account, Hooker was "defining his position over against the Puritans" is supported neither by the text, nor by the situation. Parris, "Hooker's Doctrine of the Eucharist," 153. A few separatists, like Robert Johnson, were, perhaps, old-fashioned Cranmerian Zwinglians. Most were, like Hooker, some sort of Calvinist Receptionists. That this is so is clear from the complaints and from the silence of the authors of the Christian Letter.

105. Darwell Stone, following Francis Paget, held that Hooker deliberately concealed his own views of the presence of Christ in order to produce a consensus. Darwell Stone, A History of the Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist (London, 1909) ii, 239. His view was, in a way, in Hooker on the Sacraments -275- def ended, in fact, by showing that the other two positions were either clearly wrong, or at least lacked any shred of support in Scripture.

The Sacramentarians held so much, 106 and Scripture teaches no more;

Scripture gives no support for the view, shared by the adherents of transubstantiation and of consubstantiation, that there is a "literal, corporal and oral manducation of the very substance of [Christ's] flesh and blood. 11107 Hooker must, in fact, show that the other positions are wrong or unsupported if he is to def end his Minimalism. This is his point in the marginal note in the Christian Letter, where he was accused of being soft on transubstantiation:

It is but needles and unprofitable for them to stand, [Lutherans] upon consubstantiation, and upon transubstantiation the [Romans], which doctrines they neither can prove nor are forced by any necessity to maintein, but might very well surcease to urge them, if they did hartily affect peace, and seeke the quietnes of the Church. . . . They ought not to stand in it as in a matter of faith, nor to make so high accompt of it, inasmuch as the Scripture doth only teach the communion of Christ in the holy Sacrament, and neither the one nor the other way of

lineal descent from that of Keble, but it is as untenable as Keble's was, as we have seen. J.R. Parris correctly shows that, while Hooker has at least two "tones of voice" on the question of the presence, one when he argues the truth of his own particular view, and another when he is "primarily irenic in intent," Paget and Stone have seriously misinterpreted Hooker. J.R. Parris, "Hooker's Doctrine of the Eucharist," 159, 162.

106. V, lxvii, 8 (ii, 355).

107. V, lxvii, 9 (ii, 355f). Hooker on the Sacraments -276-

preparation thereunto. 108

But in fact, he does more. He argues that those who support consubstantiation base their theology on the ubiquity of Christ's humanity, which he had already shown was based on an error. 109 And those who support transubstantiation do so by inventing a miraculous power of

God, following "upon the words of consecration." But neither Scripture nor the witness of antiquity supports the view of transubstantiation. 110

Thus, in fact, Hooker does commit himself to the Receptionism of the

"Sacramentaries," which alone is defensible. As we have seen, he develops this view in its "dynamic" form, following Calvin and the

Calvinists. God inevitably offers participation in the glorified body of Christ, that is, sanctifying grace, to those who worthily receive, that is, without contempt, the elements. The elements are instruments in the hand of God, and duties in human hands. This advances the case far beyond what Cranmer could have accepted or even understood. But it is clear that it was a near consensus in the English church by the end of Elizabeth's reign. This point is significant. The Christian Letter does not, in fact, question Hooker's view of the presence. On rather specious grounds, it suggests he does not condemn transubstantiation

108. Christian Letter, 33, 34 (Bayne ed., 377, note 9; Works, ii, 354, note; 353f, note 2).

109. V, lxvii, 10 (ii, 356). See V, liv, 9 (ii, 237) and V, Iv, 4, 5 (ii, 240ff) for the Christological errors of Lutheranism.

110. V, lxvii, 12 (ii, 359f). Hooker on the Sacraments -277- sufficiently. It also worries a little about the vividness of Hooker's account of the inevitability of God's grace. But Hooker does recognize that grace is not conferred if the recipient does not come in humility.

And, in fact, this whole section of the Lawes presumes a near uniformity in the Church of England on the interpretation of the significance of the eucharist, and a debate only about certain ceremonials. Hooker offers not one contrary opinion in his doctrinal sections on the eucharist, whereas the revealing initials "T.C." appear very frequently in the chapters following, where disputed ceremonies are discussed. 111

4. Baptismal Regeneration

If there was no current debate about eucharistic doctrine in the

Church of England as far as Hooker is concerned, the case is different for his account of baptism. Here there were divisive issues about

111. V, lxviii (ii, 362-380). This study thus agrees, in most respects, with those who have identified in Hooker a Receptionism rather than a realist account. But this Receptionism is of the "Dynamic" kind, like the lnstrumentalism of the Calvinists, and unlike the simpler Receptionism of Cranmer, that affirmed the action of God, but denied the relevance of the elements as instruments. We have also seen the sense in which Hooker offers an account of Virtualism, but again this is defined in terms of participation of the glorified humanity of Christ, not in terms of Cranmer's "reception" of the benefits of the Passion, that is, remission of sins. See C.W. Dugmore, Eucharistic Doctrine in England from Hooker to Water/and (London, 1942), 14ff, where Hooker is seen as a "precursor of the 'central churchmen'"; W.H. Griffith Thomas, The Principles of Theology (London, 1930), 388ff, where Hooker is seen as both a Receptionist and a Virtualist; Richard F. Buxton, Eucharist and Institution Narrative (Great Wakering, 1976), 94-95, where Hooker is called a "real receptionist." Hooker on the Sacraments -278- doctrine involved in the interpretation of the rite of baptism, as well as of the accompanying ceremonies and practices. Cranmer had, of course, in 1549, provided a very conservative rite, based on the

Consultations of Hermann of Cologne, and, in 1552, revised little of the words of the baptismal rite derived from this Lutheran source, except for the omission of a prayer of "blessing" on the water. And his baptismal rites retained a strong sense of medieval sacramentalism that he might have been quite unable to explain. The rites spoke strongly of regeneration in the rites themselves. This suggestion of regeneration accomplished in the administration of baptism was cause for a serious debate within the Church of England during the reign of Elizabeth, but here the debate was not about the presence of Christ in the elements.

It was about the efficacy of the administration, and since the normal subjects of the sacraments in the Elizabethan period, indeed, the only sort of subject the Elizabethan Book of Common Prayer provided for, were infants, the rise of a Calvinist consciousness about election after

Cranmer raised a genuine theological problem. For clearly -- so people assumed -- not every child baptised was of the number of the elect.

This raised a question Cranmer had hardly faced -- he had been forced to fight the Anabaptist logic, not the Calvinist; he had built in an apology for , but had not guarded himself on the problem of predestination -- leaving it for a new age to ask how a baby who was not, in fact, elect, could be said to be regenerated. Much of the Hooker on the Sacraments -279- criticism of the ceremonies of the Church of England on baptism that

Hooker deals with is based on this quandary.

There had long been objections to the "interrogatories" addressed to the godparents at baptism, and even to the presence of godparents at all. Zwingli had abolished the office of godparent, but the other

Reformers were more conservative about the outward appearances. All acknowledged that baptism was connected with faith, and it was an attractive and available suggestion to link the faith, in some way or other, with the godparents.

Hooker noted that godparents were not strictly required for baptism. Whether there were godparents or not was not determined by the institution of the sacrament. It was a "matter indifferent," that human, that is, ecclesiastical, authority might determine, and had determined. 112 But Hooker explained the office of godparent in several different ways. The articles of faith were appropriately recited in baptism, even though the infant could not understand them, because:

the habit of faith which afterwards doth come with years, is but a farther building up of the same edifice, the first foundation whereof was laid by the sacrament of baptism. For that which there we professed without any understanding, when we afterwards come to acknowledge, do we any thing else but only bring unto ripeness the very seed that was sown before? We are then believers, because then we begin to be that which the process of time doth make per feet. . .. The whole Church is a multitude of believers, all honoured with that title, even hypocrites for their profession's sake as well as saints because of their inward sincere

112. II, vii, 3 (i, 320). Hooker on the Sacraments -280-

persuasion, and infants as being in the first degree o{ their ghostly motion towards the actual habit of faith. 13

But Hooker also follows earlier Reformers, particularly Calvin, in another type of justification of infant baptism, and argues that there is a covenant in baptism, analogous to that ref erred to in the circumcision of the older covenant, and in that respect, the children of believing parents are included. 114 Further, it is not the parents, but the church that offers the children for baptism, by the ministry of the presentors, who in that represent the church: because the godparents affirm the faith, we can observe that it is the church's act, not the candidate's. ll 5 Hooker then cites Augustine's letter to Boniface, the very letter that Cranmer had cited to support his view of the symbolic character of sacraments, which were, for Cranmer, signs because they

"resemble" what they signify. For Hooker, the point of Augustine's letter is not the character of sacramental signs, but the view that "in the answer the effect wrought through the Sacrament is taken into account. 11116 For Cranmer, the godparents are primarily public sureties to bring the children to confirmation, so that they may profess the faith we all hope God has given them by that time; for Hooker, it is

113. V, lxiv, 2 (ii, 310f).

114. V, lxiv, 5 (ii, 313).

115. V lxiv, 5, 6 (ii, 315f).

1 I 6. Paget, Introduction, I 68. Hooker on the Sacraments -281- symbolic -- "effectually" symbolic -- the "seed" is conferred in baptism by a real infusion of grace, and that seed grows into the mature habit of faith in the Christian on the way, and, one is to hope, into the indef ectible trust of the saint.

There is, of course, no salvation, that is, no justification, without faith. But, in fact, both faith and the sacramental administration are necessary:

Sacraments are in their place no less required than belief itself. . . . If Christ himself which giveth salvation do require baptism [Mark 16.16], it is not for us that look for salvation to sound and examine him, whether unbaptized men may be saved, but seriously to do that which is required. . . . Now being taught that baptism is necessary to take away sin, how have we the fear of God in our hearts if care of delivering men's souls f t;.pm sin do not move us to use all means for their baptism? 11

However, it would be foolish to expect actual faith in children, who inevitably receive the grace of baptism, since they cannot raise any barrier or resist God willfully:

The fruit of baptism dependeth only upon the covenant which God hath made; that God by covenant requireth in the sort Faith and Baptism, in children the Sacrament of Baptism alone. . . . Infants, therefore, which have received baptism complete as touching the mystical perfection thereof, are by virtue of his own covenant and promise cleansed from all sin.118

Baptism must be considered as necessary for rebirth: Hooker takes the allusion to water and the Spirit in John 3.5 literally and as

117. V, Ix, 4 (ii, 267).

118. V, lxii, 15 (ii, 295f). Hooker on the Sacraments -282- ref erring to baptism. But this, he believes, is the ancient interpretation and the unvaried use "of Christ and his Church. 11119

Considerations of "equity" include a recognition of baptism by blood and by desire in unusual circumstances. 120 And the unbaptised infants of

Christian parents are not to be thought of as beyond salvation; Christ's intention for them will not allow this to be said. We are to presume that the parents desired baptism for them. Thus, in this sense, "grace is not absolutely tied unto sacraments. 11121

Although, as we have noted, Hooker does use the argument of covenantal inclusion as part of the set of arguments in apology for infant baptism, it is clear that he considers it a weak argument. Thus, although he considers sound the judgement of the church of Geneva against on the question of the refusal to baptise bastards and children of papists, he considers the arguments weak. The college at

Geneva ruled against Knox on the grounds that God's promise included the children of the faithful "to a thousand generations." Hooker accepts

1 I 9. V, lix (ii, 262-4).

120. V, Ix, 5 (ii, 268-270).

121. V, Ix, 6 (ii, 271). The use of this quotation by Bayford in defence of Gorham obviously totally ignores the context in Hooker: Hooker is examining a very limited list of exceptions to the universal necessity of baptism; and his list involves reducing the exception to cases of "equity," that is the "fairness" of Christ, and the presence in the exceptions of what is presumed as necessary in the sacraments, aside from the form and matter. J.C.S. Nias, Gorham and the Bishop of Exeter (London, 1951), 58. Hooker on the Sacraments -283- the condemnation, but refrains from accepting this extension of the argument of covenantal inclusion. Rather, he believes that so long as the outward acknowledgment of Christianity is not clean gone and extinguished, the children may be baptised. 122 Hooker emphasizes not so much the covenant as the ecclesiastical exercise of baptism, which is exercised by the church, and in which the candidate really receives

Christ:

By baptism therefore we receive Christ Jesus, and from him that saving grace which is proper unto baptism. 123

Baptism is admission into the visible church. 124 "But our naming of Jesus Christ the Lord is not enough to prove us Christians, unless we also embrace that faith, which Christ hath published unto the world. 11125

Yet, "although we know the Christian faith and allow of it, yet in this respect we are but entering; entered we are not into the visible Church

122. III, i, 12 (i, 349f).

123. V, lvii, 6 (ii, 259).

124. III, i, 3 (i, 339).

125. III, i, 5 (i, 340). Quoted by Bayford in defence of Gorham. Bayford held that this was Hooker's "earlier" view, from which he later departed. Bayford also quoted two other passages, that from V, Ix, 6 cited above, and "the door of our actual entrance into God's house, the first apparent beginning of life, a seal perhaps to the grace of Election, before received." (V, lx, 3). Nias, Gorham, 58. We shall see that, so far as election is concerned in relation to baptism, there is another side of Hooker's view, which more clearly ties baptism and election. Hooker on the Sacraments -284- before our admittance by the door of Baptism." 126

But the doctrine of election is a problem; for probably not all that are baptised are elect. Yet the converse is true: all of the elect must be baptised. Election does not make the means of grace unnecessary, and sacraments are necessary to sanctification and the path towards glorification:

There are that elevate too much the ordinary and immediate means of Iif e, relying wholly upon the bare conceit of that eternal election, which notwithstanding includeth a subordination of means without which we are not actually brought to enjoy what God secretly did intend; and therefore to build upon God's election if we keep not ourselves to the ways which he hath ap£finted for men to walk in, is but a self-deceiving vanity.

The means whereby we are actually brought to enjoy what God has foreseen and decreed for the elect, involves the very participation, by growth and degrees, in the humanity of Christ, which the sacraments confer. 128 Although not all are so, we are to presume that those who have received the sacrament of baptism are elect. In this, we but follow Paul, who called Christians elect after baptism and the children of wrath before:

126. III, i, 6 (i, 341). This was also quoted by Bayford, but it surely suggests, in the context, that just as Philip needed to baptise the eunuch, so admission to the visible church is, in some sense, required. The whole matter rests on Hooker's view of the visible church.

127. V, lx, 3 (ii, 266).

128. V, lvi, 10 (ii, 253). Hooker on the Sacraments -285-

So that by sacraments and other sensible tokens of grace we may boldly gather that he, whose mercy vouchsafeth now to bestow the means, hath also long sithence intended us that whereunto they lead. . . . Predestination bringeth not to life, without the grace of external vocation, wherein our baptism is implied. . . . We justly hold [baptism] to be the door of our actual entrance into God's house, the first apparent beginning of life, before received, but to

Here certain points of Hooker's view of election come to the fore: there is not given to any an infallible assurance here and now of his own election; grace is given even to those who do not receive efficacious grace; grace is resistible, but the elect are in def ectible.

Thus Hooker could say that all who receive baptism receive grace, that all the elect receive baptism, and that not all that receive baptism are elect. Just as we are to presume our salvation from our hope that we will be saved, even though we cannot have assurance of it, as Hooker teaches in the sermons on Habbakuk, so we are to presume that all the baptised are of the elect, even though there is no certain sign that they are:

When we know how Christ in general hath said that of such is the kingdom of heaven, which kingdom is the inheritance of God's elect, and do withal behold how this providence hath called them into the first beginnings of eternal life, and presented them at the well-spring of new birth wherein original sin is purged, besides which sin there is no hinderance of their salvation known to us; ... hard it

129. V, lx, 3 (ii, 266f). Bayford, in quoting from this passage, omitted the crucial last phrase, "but to our sanctification ... " which affirms that no one is elect who does not, as it turns out, actually receive the grace that begins in baptism and no where else. See Nias, Gorham, 103, 139. Hooker on the Sacraments -286-

were that having so many fair inducements whereupon to ground, we should not be thought to utter at the least a truth as probable and allowable in terming any such particular infant an elect babe, as in presuming the like in others, whose saf §&'nevertheless, we are not absolutely able to warrant.

The ordo salutis contains vocation as well as election and foreknowledge. Vocation is heard and uttered "after" natural birth:

Our being in Christ by eternal foreknowledge saveth us not without our actual and real adoftjon into the fellowship of his saints in this present world. 3

The sacraments are, therefore, inevitably related to the grace of predestination, as indicating our vocation and the justification that is the beginning of sanctification, which is itself the path towards glorification in us.

Thus Hooker comes to defend Cranmer's rites with a view of grace that is somewhat different from Cranmer's. Cranmer apparently ignores the question of the problem of relating baptism to election, and suggests that in baptism, God's grace is universally offered, and appropriated by the vows of the sponsors for the candidates. These assumptions were to become a problem once the Calvinist revolution had been absorbed, for it would be ridiculous to assume that efficacious grace was given to all infants who came to baptism. 132 The Calvinists

130. V, lxiv, 3 (ii, 311f).

13 I. V, lvi 7 (ii, 249).

132. See R.I. Wilberforce, The Doctrine of Holy Baptism (London, 1850), 254ff, for a descrption of the "Puritan views" on this matter Hooker on the Sacraments -287- thus drove a wedge between the sacraments and the availability of grace.

But Hooker did not: for him, not all grace is efficacious, so there is no hesitation to say grace is conferred on all in baptism. As well, for

Hooker, God indeed does not desire the death of any sinner; in some sense, God really offers a sufficient grace to all. And Hooker inserts baptism within the ordo salutis itself; it is a "necessary" part of our external vocation, and thus, far from being in tension with the doctrine of election, presupposes election. Hooker can agree, with the obvious sense of the words of the rites, and with the permission of the

Elizabethan articles, which had removed the suspicion about "the work wrought," that God uses both sacraments as instruments of grace, which is inevitably offered. But, by distinguishing between efficacious and sufficient grace, and by denying to any but those in glory the assurance of salvation, he can off er a sensible account of the link between the

(unknown) decree of election, and the necessity of baptism.

5. The distinction between the visible and the invisible church

Hooker took over the Reformation distinction between invisible and visible church. There is one mystical body, involving a conjunction of members invisible. 133 But there is also a "sensibly known company,"

rejected by Sanderson and Hammond.

133. III, i, 2 (i, 338). Hooker on the Sacraments -288- continuous with the Israel of the Old Testament. 134 The distinction was, in origin, Augustinian, a reflection on the case of those

"citizens" of the city of God on pilgrimage in this world. At times,

Augustine had nearly identified the church with that city; at times, he had clearly distinguished the two, and indicated that the citizens of the city of God were known but to God. For the Reformers, the distinction was useful in limiting the authority of the visible church.

But Hooker spoke rather boldly, as we have just seen, of "our actual and real adoption into the fellowship of his saints in this present world."

And the upshot of his account of the necessity of vocation, adoption and sanctification in the sacraments for all those who were in fact elect, left only a few loop-holes for "anonymous Christians," elect outside the church. It looks, therefore, as if, for Hooker, the invisible church was nearly entirely included within the visible.

The distinction was an important one for him in his apology against the separatists. Since the church they were debating about was the visible one, and not the invisible, human institutions and human decisions were involved. This meant that human political considerations were relevant, and that it was foolish to look for a "divine" polity by piecing together disparate passages from Scripture. But Hooker's line of argument here might sound as if he made the church a secular institution. This was, of course, not Hooker's view. The church was a

134. III, i, 3 (i, 339). Hooker on the Sacraments -289- natural society (in Christian lands co-extensive with the nation and state), with a supernatural end. The natural society witnessed and sought for an end beyond itself, a kingdom of grace. Thus the visible and invisible were related much on the pattern of nature in general and grace in general: the natural was not destroyed, but perfected, by grace. Even hypocrites and sinners within the church were offered grace, and should be presumed not to be reprobate.

Calvinists made the same distinction Luther had between the visible and invisible church. The distinction depended on Augustine, but had been current in Wycliffe, Hus, and Zwingli, as well as in some of the conciliarists before the Reformation. 135 And Hooker indeed seems to approach the view of the following passage from the Institutes:

Holy Scripture speaks of the church in two ways. Sometimes by the term "church" it means that which is actually in God's presence, into which no persons are received but those who are children of God by grace of adoption and true members of Christ by sanctification of the Holy Spirit. Then, indeed, the church includes not only the saints presently living on earth, but all the elect from the beginning of the world. Often, however, the name "church" designates the whole multitude of men spread over the earth who profess to worship one God and Christ. By baptism we are initiated into faith in him; by partaking in the Lord's Supper we attest our unity in true doctrine and love; in the Word of the Lord we have agreement, and for the preaching of the Word the ministry instituted by Christ is preserved. In this church are mingled many hypocrites who have nothing of Christ but the name and outward appearance. There are very many ambitious, greedy, envious persons, evil speakers, and

135. Fisher, History of Doctrine, 304; see long list of citations in note in Ford Battles' translation of the Institutes ii, 1022, note 14. Hooker on the Sacraments -290-

some of quite unclean life. Such are tolerated for a time either because they cannot be convicted by a competent tribunal or ~1fause a vigourous discipline does not flourish as it ought. 1

For Calvinists, the invisible church is the home of sanctification; hypocrites have no grace whatsoever. We have seen that Hooker came to temper this view; for Hooker, grace was offered and, for a time, taken up, wider than the circle of the elect. But -- and this is important for Hooker's argument about church polity -- the only divine "polity" of the mystical or invisible church is the divine law of justification by faith:

So far forth as the Church is the mystical body of Christ and his invisible spouse, it needeth no external polity. That very part of the law divine which teacheth faith and works of righteousness is itself alone sufficient for the Church of God in that respect. But as the Church is a visiblf ~ciety and body politic, laws of polity it cannot want. 3

The Puritans have, in effect, made a mistake, for they have transposed the divine polity of the church qua mystical to the church qua politicat. 138 This quotation makes clear that, for Hooker, as for

Calvin, it is the gift of grace that marks membership in the invisible church. For Hooker, this gift of faith justifies by the imputation of

Christ's merits and begins the process of sanctification. But not all

136. Institutes IV, i, 7 (ii, 1021f).

137. III, xi, 14 (i, 406).

138. Paget, Introduction, 107. Hooker on the Sacraments -291-

who so begin persevere. And all who are baptised so begin. This brings

the invisible church very close to the visible at the point of the

administration of baptism. It is only hypocrisy of profession that

separates those baptised from the invisible church. Error, fault and

sin do not separate from the church; but heresies and crimes do. 139

Yet, even here, a heretic dying for the profession of the faith would

have to be counted a martyr. 140 Justification, not election, is the key

to the invisible church for Hooker, that is faith and not perseverance

in the faith. This means that, on the one hand, there is a justification for human decisions in church polity, since the visible

church is involved, but, on the other, that grace is available in the

visible church, which means that, for the moment, it entirely overlaps

the invisible. One generally speaks in fact of the visible church. 141

The visible faith is characterized by profession, but the

profession is the profession that "Jesus is Lord." Making that

profession, "no one is accursed." Thus all churchgoers are presumed to

be elect (just as are all the baptised, as we have seen). 142 To make

139. III, i, 13 (i, 350).

140. III, i, 12 (i, 348).

141. Hooker would agree with Edgar Gibson's remark, in the discussion of Article 19, that the article speaks of course of the visible church, since we cannot speak much of the invisible. Edgar C.S. Gibson, The Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England explained with an introduction Ninth ed. (London, 1915), 497ff.

142. V, lxviii, 6 (ii, 368). Hooker on the Sacraments -292- this profession without hypocrisy is to belong to the mystical church.

The visible church even shares a unity with the invisible, for the ground of the unity of the church is "one Lord, one faith, and one baptism." 143 Although the visible church is not incorruptible, it shares with the invisible universality and like it, will endure to the end. It is the visible church which is the Church of Christ. Luther did not erect a new church but, rather, "the Church of Christ which was from the beginning is and continueth unto the end. 11144 This amounts to saying that there is no effective difference, just as there is not perceptible difference, between the visible and invisible church, except at the end, when it shall be clear if there be any in the church who do not persevere. 145

143. I, x, I 4 (i, 252).

144. III, i, 10, 11 (i, 345-8).

145. This conclusion might have reduced somewhat the note of disappointment in Lionel Thornton's account of Hooker's over-dependence on the Protestant notions of the invisible church. Thornton, Richard Hooker, 74f. Hooker accepts the distinction, but pushes it in a very different direction, using it effectively to undermine the Puritan claim for a divine authority to their polity, on the one hand, and yet, on the other hand, making bold claims about the visible church as a kingdom of grace inevitably and really offered through the outward sacramental means. VI Richard Hooker and the Theological Tradition: The Platonism of

Richard Hooker

This review of the doctrinal topics of the Reformation has indicated Hooker's Protestant orthodoxy in most respects. The Church of

England's reaction to the Reformation had initially been one of gradual absorption. The assimilation to the Protestant doctrines on grace and the sacraments came by slow stages. Lutheran notions appeared early and clearly in the reign of Henry VIII. These challenged the official view of the church and court, but found a half-sympathetic ally in the young

Cranmer. The ecclesiastical separation from Rome and the negotiations with the Lutheran states gave the Lutheran views a chance to gain a foothold. Undoubtedly, on grace, Cranmer became more and more convinced about the correctness of the Lutheran view. On the sacraments, continental Lutheran liturgical models had a great influence, because of their availability. But, on the mode of the presence of Christ in the eucharist, Cranmer moved away from a view like that of the Lutherans, to a view more closely aligned to the earlier Zwinglians.1 Cranmer left enduring formularies, but few disciples.

I. This agrees with the view of J.I. Packer: "on all these questions [scripture, salvation, the church] save that of eucharistic presence and reception of Christ, Cranmer took an essentially Lutheran line." In G.E. Duffield, Works of Thomas Cranmer (Appleford, 1964), xxi. After 1531, some Lutherans, like Melanchthon, moved away from Luther's "physical presence" view. Thus Cranmer's own view might well be Lutheran though not Luther's. See Clyde Manschrek in Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine (New York, 1965), xvff.

-293- The Pia ton ism of Hooker -294-

Martin Bucer's circle at Cambridge in the reign of Edward VI introduced a new theological orthodoxy, especially on the significance of sanctification. This was reinforced by the Calvinist ascendancy among the returned exiles at the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth, an ascendancy that dominated the whole of Elizabeth's reign. This

Calvinist theology, agreed upon generally as superior to all other systematic Reformed accounts of Christian doctrine, was, more or less successfully, read back into the Edwardian formularies. But, in fact, particularly in its account of grace, it provided a form of Reformed

Catholicism, advancing on the English Lutherans in being able to give a cogent account of the grace of sanctification, while maintaining the

English Lutheran restatement of anti-Pelagianism, in the doctrine of justification by faith. Towards the end of the reign of Elizabeth, doubts arose about the perfection of the Calvinist case, particularly on the matter of reprobation and security, and Calvin was corrected, even among his disciples, as, long before, Peter Lombard had been among his.

Richard Hooker was a child of the period and, by and large, a loyal one. As we have seen in chapter II, he paid more than lip service to the Protestant conviction about justification by faith; but faith had become, for him, much more a part of the natural spectrum of intellectual activities, and the early English Lutherans' sense of the overwhelming intrusion by the Holy Spirit had given way to a distinction between the faith that justifies and the devils' faith in terms of the presence or absence of hope. The faith that justifies had come to look The Platonism of Hooker -295- much more like the apprehension of God that brings assimilation to God,

"in knowledge of whom standeth eternal life," that is, through engraced reason on the way to the vision of glory.

On predestination, as we have seen in chapter IV, Hooker remained remarkably like the orthodox English Calvinists. Like many others in

England, he rejected the decree of "unconditional" reprobation, which he tended to attribute to an overreaction of Augustine corrected at the time and thereafter by the decisions of the church. Like Augustine, and like some contemporary Calvinists in England, he held that grace was given more widely than election, and was, for a time, resistible. But he certainly retained the Calvinist conviction about the perseverance of the elect. He departed from other English Calvinists most clearly on the question of assurance which, except perhaps in the sermons on Jude, he always took as a dangerous attitude: assurance leaves no room for hope, so that the English Calvinist emphasis on assurance simply licenses Pharisees. The person who is uncertain about her or his ultimate destiny is in a better spiritual condition than the person who is certain: doubt about this is evidence of faith; certainty about this is evidence of presumption in claiming the state of the blessed in glory.

As we have seen in chapter V, on the eucharist, Hooker's views and vocabulary are clearly part of the established Calvinist consensus within the English church. Hooker makes a case, as many Calvinists The Platonism of Hooker -296- including Calvin himself had, for this position as mediating between other conflicting views, and as providing the basis for a pan-Christian agreement. But it is clear that he also accepted it as the only true account. God uses the elements of the sacraments as instruments both to impute the merits of Christ so as to reconcile the recipients to God, and to impart the real perfection of Christ's human soul and body to the recipient so that he or she might continue to grow in sanctification towards the perfect justification of glory. Like Cranmer, Hooker was a

"Receptionist," going beyond Cranmer in recognizing the significance of the instruments God invariably makes use of, but accounting for the presence of Christ only in the recipient. This Receptionism was not, as in Cranmer, a receiving of the divinity of Christ, that is, of the indwelling perfection of the Holy Spirit, but a receiving of the humanity as well, locally in heaven, as Cranmer had held, but "by participation" given to the recipient, body and soul.

Hooker stands out from his contemporaries and from those who had gone before in the Reformation of the Church of England, however, in the revival of the scholastic account of the relationship between nature and grace, which we examined in chapter III. This revival avoided the hotly debated elements of the English Reformation, so that Hooker could make his assertions without off ending orthodox teaching itself. But, by implication, it went against much of what the Reformation, and the

Nominalism that had preceded it, had assumed. Nominalism had stripped the thesis that nature presupposes grace, and is not destroyed but The Platonism of Hooker -297- perfected by it, of much cogency. The fundamental irrationalism of the voluntaristic outlook would choose to ignore the consonances between nature and grace, reason and revelation. For the Reformation reaction against this Nominalism, the gap would be further widened: the insistence on the total lack of merit in the fallen human being would go along with an insistence that nature was "irrelevant" for the work of grace: if nature could neither look for perfection in grace nor co­ operate in it, to affirm a relevance of nature for the work of grace would come too close to affirming some residual natural spiritual capacity.

This assumption rested on a forgetting of the distinctions the scholasticism before Nominalism had made; Thomas, for instance, could quite easily affirm both the natural incapacity of the human being to any meritorious work without grace and the capacity of nature to identify an end beyond itself, to be perfected by grace and not destroyed, and to co-operate with it. This pattern Hooker revived, apparently from a consideration of scholastic theology. It is a pattern that he simply exhibits, from time to time, apparently without feeling any need to justify it, but indicating, perhaps, deeper differences, also unargued, from the ascendant English Reformed theology.

A touch-stone of Hooker's orthodoxy is the list of errors he was accused of by the authors of the Christian Letter, not all of which accusations, it must be admitted, were very accurate. In form, the The Platonism of Hooker -298-

Christian Letter is a list of twenty-one accusations against Hooker on the grounds that, in the first five books of the Lawes, he was inconsistent with Scripture and the Anglican articles and Reformers.

Hooker's answers are based largely on patristic texts, not on appeals to the sixteenth century at all. The twenty-one errors are as follows:

I. Hooker subordinates the Son by saying that the Father alone is originally that Deity which Christ originally is not. 2. Hooker denies the co-eternity of the Son and the procession of Spirit from the Father and Son literally set down in Scripture. 3. Hooker teaches that the light of nature "teacheth some knowledge natural" which is necessary to salvation, and that Scripture is a supplement and making perfect of that

knowledge. 4. Hooker makes assurance depend on the church and not on

Scripture. 5. Hooker holds that the human will is free to take or

refuse, and that reason by diligence finds the good. 6. Hooker teaches

that God rewards works. 7. Hooker makes acts done by the light of

nature virtuous. 8. He teaches works of supererogation. 9. He

teaches that it is possible to avoid all great and grievous sins. 10.

He teaches, against predestination, that God has a mutable and

occasioned will. 1 I. Hooker allows the Church of Rome to be a real

church. 12. Hooker treats sermons as only from "the wit of man" and

not the "strong and forcible word of God." 13. He makes the ordained

separate by charism from the , not just by office. 14.

Hooker teaches wrongly on the sacraments: he holds that the sacraments

themselves have a mystical force and virtue; he teaches that they are The Platonism of Hooker -299- marks to know when God imparts grace rather than seals to strengthen faith already given; and he treats them as necessary "means conditional." 15. Hooker teaches that the "intention of the church" makes these actions sacraments, not the of God. 16. Hooker makes baptism (not just predestination) necessary to salvation. 17.

Hooker does not hold that transubstantiation is against Scripture; he holds the ubiquity of Christ's manhood; he holds that it is the co­ operation of Christ's omnipotent power now rather than his institution that makes the sacrament Christ's body and blood for us. 18. Hooker refers to beliefs not in Scripture or the Creeds, such as angels' histories, the sign of the cross, grace conveyed in baptism. 19.

Hooker attacks John Calvin, sometimes with historical falsehoods, and treats the godly "Discipline" as a recent novelty. 20. Hooker relies on Aristotle, the scholastics, reason and reading in a way that threatens to revive papery. 21. Hooker uses a confusing and tedious style, and includes no good arguments that are not found in Whitgift, who is easier to read. 2

Not all of the accusations were equally serious, and it proved fairly easy to defend Hooker from the texts of the Lawes. 3 Hooker

2. John E. Booty, Attack and Response, 6-79. Bayne (ed.), Book V, 589-635.

3. William Covel, A Just and Temperate Defence of the Five Books of Ecclesiastical Policie written by M. Richard Hooker: against an uncharitable Letter of certain English Protestants ( as they terme The Platonism of Hooker -300- himself provided marginal notes suggesting his own rejoinders in his copy of the Christian Letter, and, in the Dublin Fragments, gives direct responses to numbers five, seventeen and ten.

It is clear that the authors of the Christian Letter intended to discredit Hooker by branding him with popery. But a pattern emerges indicating their real concerns: Hooker's account of grace is the subject, or partial subject, in twelve of the twenty-one points. 4 The sacraments occur in four, christology in one and ecclesiology and details of "polity" in four. 5 Doctrine of God occurs in one.6 But, as the relative length of the nineteenth point and the attention to topics of grace indicate, it was the English Calvinist interpretation of the questions of grace and the reverence for Calvin himself that informs the composition of the Christian Letter. The authors, even though anonymous, might have felt that it was imprudent to attack the disputed themselves) craving resolution, in some matters of doctrine, which seeme to overthrow the foundation of religion, and the Church amongst us (London, 1603). Reprinted in Benjamin Hanbury (ed.), The Ecclesiastical Polity and other works by Richard Hooker, 3 vols. (London, 1830) iii, 430-568. Hanbury indicates several of the many direct quotations or paraphrases from the Lawes that Covel uses in order to def end Hooker from the accusations. Booty has argued that the author of the Christian Letter was Andrew Willet, not himself an incipient separatist, but a Calvinist and strongly anti-papist. Attack and Response, xixff.

4. Nos 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 18, 20, 21.

5. Nos 14, 15, 16, 17; I (see also no. 17); 10, 11, 12, 13.

6. No. 2; no. 10, on predestination and God's will might be included here as well. The Platonism of Hooker -301- points of polity, although they may still have favoured Cartwright's views on these. They do pay lip service to the work of Whitgift, who was still alive, but may not have been deeply sympathetic to him. They do clearly believe that Hooker had offended the prevailing theological orthodoxy, though, and they seem to believe that a majority of those alert to these questions will agree with them.

We have seen that, strictly speaking, Hooker introduced no novelties of doctrine to the Elizabethan church. But it was clear that in his presentation of these doctrines, particularly in his account of sanctification and works, in his account of election and assurance, and in his defence of the place of reason, he went against the dominant theology of some claiming the name of John Calvin. Was there another theology that held together Hooker's novelty?

1. Attitude to Thomas

Recently, it has become stylish to recognize Hooker's indebtedness to medieval authors but to think of him, particularly in his political theories, as "eclectic." This is held to include even his

"scholasticism":

Hooker's outstanding characteristic as a thinker is his eclecticism. . . . It is becoming increasingly apparent, as a result of recent research into the history of universities in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, that the study of scholasticism survived the Reformation even in Protestant countries and that there was a wide­ spread revival of interest in the writings of the scholastic theologians in England, as well as on the Continent, in the The Platonism of Hooker -302-

later years of the sixteenth century. In the present state of research, Hooker's position in relation to this movement is obscure, and it would be interesting to know to what extent he was himself a pioneer or was simply following in the footsteps of others. Even in his study of scholasticism, however, his eclecticism is apparent. If he considered Aquinas "the greatest amongst the School-divines" (III.ix.2) and drew more heavily on him than on any other scholastic writer, he also had a high appreciation of Scotus, whom he described as "the wittiest of the school­ divines" (I,xi,5). Hooker, in other words, was far from being a doctrinaire Thomist. He used St Thomas when it suited him, but he viewed the Summa Theologica with the same critical detachment with which he viewed the rest of his sources, and it is important not to exagg

While there is a grain of truth in the claim that Hooker quoted widely from authors in themselves incompatible, it is also quite clear that some were closer to his heart than others, and the list of priorities is significant. We have, incidentally, a partial list of the priorities of John Rainolds, Hooker's teacher and friend. Rainolds' letter to George Cranmer, which has long been printed as part of

Hooker's Works, includes the off-hand remark that Rainolds values "one

Scaliger more than six hundred Scotuses and Aquinases," but, then, he values Aquinas more than Scotus. 8

7. W.D.J. Cargill Thompson, "The Philosopher of the 'Politic Society'," in Speed Hill, Studies in Richard Hooker (Cleveland, 1972), 21f.

8. Life of Hooker, Further App. II (i, I 06). The footnote there reports that "Hooker did not quite agree with his tutor. For he calls Scotus 'the wittiest of the school divines'." (i, 106, note 4). Indeed, it is almost certain that Hooker did not agree with Rainolds on Scaliger, for he never mentions him at all. But he may, as we shall see, have agreed on the relative merits of Scotus and Thomas. Joseph The Platonism of Hooker -303-

Hooker undoubtedly venerated Scotus for his learning, and, in fact, cites his work at least three times, usually to support a Reformed thesis against papists. 9 But the title "wittiest of the school- divines" is not obviously a term of spontaneous and unqualified praise.

In the first place, it probably represents Hooker's loose translation of the standard Latin courtesy title for Scotus, the "subtle doctor." In the second place, "wit" is an ambivalent quality, indicating cleverness both positively and intelligently used, and negatively and unwisely used. For Hooker can naturally speak of "a wit disposed to scorn, 1110 and he calls Cartwright "wittier and better learned" that the authors of the Admonitions. 11 But it is clear that Hooker viewed Cartwright, for

Justus Scaliger (1540-1609) was a noted French Calvinist. He produced notable editions of classical Latin authors and a learned work on chronology, which, incidentally, attacked the new Gregorian Calendar, but he did not write theology in the technical sense. Rainolds' admiration must come from his learning and letters, as much as from doctrinal agreement.

9. At I, xi, 5 (i, 260); I, xiv, 1 (i, 267); and VI, vi, 9 (iii, 87f). In the first of these, Scotus supports the view that God was not bound in justice to reward the unsinning Adam with felicity, but rather would have done so out of generosity. In the second Scotus is cited to support the view that all things necessary to salvation must be set down in Scripture. In the third, Scotus is cited as rejecting Thomas' false interpretation of Peter Lombard, in a way that made the sacramental elements causes of grace rather than moral instruments. The second and third citations oppose supposedly current Papist notions, the first a false conclusion from a favourite Reformed premise.

10. IV, i, 3 (i, 419).

1 I. III, xi, 16 (i, 408). The Platonism of Hooker -304- all his learning and cleverness, as woefully wrong on the fundamental points, which real learning would have disclosed.

Thomas is explicitly cited by Hooker only a few times more than

Scotus, probably only about eight times in an. 12 And more than half of these explicit citations are critical. Thomas was suspect throughout the sixteenth century, not simply because of his scholasticism that appeared to interrupt the appropriation of the Scripture, but because of his association with the "novel" doctrine of transubstantiation. Thomas had, in fact, softened a popular understanding of transubstantiation, which term was a dogmatic given for him, coming as it did from the formulation of the Fourth Lateran Council. Whereas some popular belief

12. The General Index in the Keble edition is obviously incomplete. Under "Thomas Aquinas," it lists four texts, under "Aquinas," three further texts. The editors have missed the important references to Thomas as a source of the classifications of laws, (I, ii, 1, i, 205) and in the Dublin Manuscripts, (V, App. I, 17, ii, 553f) where the criticism that occurs in Book VI is also recorded. Most of the places cited by the editors ref er to criticisms of Thomas. Hooker criticizes Thomas for his idea of confession as a sacrament (VI, iv, 3, iii, 14; VI, vi, 9, iii, 87); for his view that the sacramental elements cause at least a grace of preparation in the recipient (VI, vi, 10, iii, 88; V, App. I, 17, ii, 553); for his plea to put Christian priests above kings (VIII, iii, 6, iii, 366). But Hooker correctly denies the charge that Thomas held that Christ's death was limited in effect to taking away original sin (Travers' Supplication, iii, 563; Answer, 14, iii, 584); and points out that Thomas held the peccability of the Virgin Mary (Travers' Supplication, iii, 563; Answer, 13, iii, 580). Hooker also cites him with approval for correctly describing human laws (III, ix, 2, i, 381.) And Hooker distances Thomas from the accusation of Pelagianism in his treatment of grace and merit, by attributing the error to "the schoolmen which follow Thomas" V, App. I, 10 and note, 17 (ii, 545 and note, 554). See chapter II for an interpretation of these last two passages. The Platonism of Hooker -305- had undoubtedly adopted an extremely "realist" view of the material presence of the glorified body and blood of Christ in the eucharistic elements by consecration, Thomas' Aristotelian distinction between substance and accidents, allowed him to express the dogma in a much less physical way: the matter of the species remains, only the essence changes in consecration. But Thomas' memory was hounded, from Luther on, as legitimizing a novel and erroneous view. Hooker does not follow this criticism precisely; his criticism is more closely related to the distinction of Calvin's instrumentalism from Thomas' view of how grace is conferred by the sacramental elements. Thomas is wrong, Hooker argues, for treating the elements as physical causes, rather than instruments of grace, but in this not so wrong as some of his sixteenth century disciples. Hooker does not appear to discuss Thomas' account of transubstantiation at all, but he does, in the treatise on absolution in

Book VI, criticize Thomas' view that confession is a sacrament. And

Thomas was wrong to exalt the priest above the king, a horror to someone loyal to the official Tudor position on the royal supremacy. 13

The best form of admiration is, however, not citation, but

13. Leslie Croxford has listed six or seven ways in which Hooker implies criticism of Thomas. Except for the account of his "rejection of analogy," which we will examine later, this list seems to be accurate. It should be noted that almost all the points of divergence from Thomas, which Croxford uses to support the thesis of Hooker's "originality," have to do with relationships between church and state. Leslie Croxford, "The Originality of Richard Hooker," Proceedings of the Leeds Philosophical and Literary Society xv (1973), 27-34. The Platonism of Hooker -306- imitation. Hooker does, with one footnote, indicate a reference to

Thomas' treatise on Law in the Summa Theologiae. But the debt is enormous and far deeper than this one reference to an established authority would suggest. 14 Peter Munz has collected well over a hundred passages in the Lawes that are paraphrases, or at least verbal echoes, of passages in Thomas. 15 And John S. Marshall has compared the Lawes to a "Summa," pointing out that, if one attends to the theological and doctrinal parts of the Lawes, which he identifies as Book I, Book V

(chapters 1-lxxxi), Book VII, and Book VIII, we find that Hooker deals with the principal doctrinal topics in the order, and in the spirit, of

14. G.W. Morre! rejects the view that Hooker is a Thomist, although he recognizes that Hooker had a high regard for Aristotle as a philosopher. For Morrel, Hooker had "more in common" with Augustine and the Reformers than with Thomas. G.W. Morrel, The Systematic Theology of Richard Hooker (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pacific School of Religion, 1967), 18. Morr el 's assumption that Thomas' Aristotelianism is basic to the exclusion of other thought, especially of Platonism, and his assumption that Augustine and Thomas are opposed and to be contrasted, are both wrong. But his list of "un-Thomistic points" in Hooker has some utterly unconvincing items: "his emphasis on the supremacy of Holy Scripture, ... his disavowal of any doctrine of merit, his insistence upon the doctrine of justification by faith, all would suggest Hooker's orientation is more Reformed than Scholastic." It might indeed, if that were all Hooker had held: but his way of describing even these items, and the very near agreement, even on these topics, with Thomas, suggest that Morre! puts "Reformed" and "Scholastic" in false opposition. In any case, as Hooker went some way to show, Thomas was not so clearly opposed to the Reformers on these questions as simplistic histories of the Reformation have often suggested.

15. Peter Munz, The Place of Hooker in the History of Thought (London, 1952), Chapter 2 and Appendix A. The Platonism of Hooker -307-

Thomas' Summa Theologiae.16 Hooker's treatment of these doctrinal questions is, Marshall recognizes, in summary fashion only, his primary literary interest in the Lawes being the particular items of dispute on church "polity." But Marshall has identified points of contact that cannot be ignored, and Hooker's treatments so clearly follow Thomas on certain topics that dependence must be assumed. To the deeper significance of these consonances we must return.

2. Hooker's Thomistic Christology

This study has already shown that there are many further parallels, throughout Hooker's works, with the second part of the Summa Theologiae, but especially with Thomas' treatises on law and on grace. To these resemblances we must also return, but it will repay the attention to note briefly here Hooker's clear dependence on Thomas in his account of orthodox Christology.

Hooker's summary of orthodox Christology, as the church has come to define it based on Scripture, and now protected by "the authority of the

16. God the One, and the Triune God (Summa Theologiae I, qq. 1-43; Lawes I, i-ii); God as Creator (I, qq. 44-49; Lawes I, iii); the created world, angels, the work of the six days, human beings (I, qq. 50-102); Hooker re-orders these topics as non-intelligent beings, angels and men (Lawes I, iv-viii); the end of Iif e, human acts, and the virtues, natural and supernatural (I-II, II-II; Lawes I, v-xv); the Incarnation (III, qq. 1-59; Lawes V, I-Iv); the Sacraments and the ministry (III, qq. 60-90; Lawes V, lvi-lxxxi, VII); eschatology (Supplement, qq. 69- 99), which Hooker replaces with "a study of the Church and the Church in union with the State" (Lawes VIII). John S. Marshall, Hooker and the Anglican Tradition (London, 1963), 66-74. The Platonism of Hooker -308- church," comes at a point of transition in Book V of the Lawes. As

Hooker turns to consider Puritan objections to the rites and administration of the sacraments, he first considers Christ, since the force of sacraments is that they make us "partakers of Christ" and, therefore, partakers of God in Christ. 17

The treatment begins with a consideration of the triune God, whose three Persons are distinguished by a double procession, described in terms summarizing Augustine's treatise De Trinitate:

Seeing therefore the Father is of none, the Son is of the Father and the Spirit is of both, they are by these their several properties really distinguishable each from other. For the substance of God with this property to be of none doth make the Person of the Father; the very selfsame substance in number with this property to be of the Father maketh the Person of the Son; the same substance having added unto it the property of proceeding from the other two maketh the Person of the Holy Ghost. So that in every Person there is implied both the substance of God which is one, and also that property which causeth the same person really and truly to differ from the other two. Every person hath his own subsistence which no other besides hath, although tJtre be others besides that are of the same substance.

Hooker cites John of Damascus at this point, but the treatment is precisely parallel to that given by Thomas in the prima pars of the

Summa Theologiae. 19 Hooker then proceeds to account for the

17. V, l, 3 (ii, 219f).

18. V, li, 1 (ii, 220f).

19. Summa Theologiae III, qq. 27-43, esp. qq. 33, 34 and 36. Marshall misses this parallel. In fact, in I, i-ii, which Marshall The Platonism of Hooker -309-

Incarnation. In the first place, the Incarnation is appropriate, consonant and "convenient":

Concerning the cause of which incomprehensible mystery, forasmuch as it seemeth a thing unconsonant that the world should honour any other as the Saviour but him whom it honoureth as the Creator of the world, and in the wisdom of God it hath not been thought convenient to admit any way of saving man but by man himself, ... we may hereby perceive there is cause sufficient why divine nature should assume human, that so God might be in Christ reconciling to himself the world. . .. The world's salvation was without the incarnation of the Son of God a thing impossible, not simply impossible, but impossible it being presupposed that the will of God was no ot~

The passage is reminiscent of Anselm's Cur Deus Homo, but seems to come more directly from Thomas. 21 Hooker then proceeds to show how, cites, as a parallel on the treatment of the Triune God, Hooker declines to develop an account of the Trinity.

20. V, li, 3 (ii, 221f). Note the use of "unconsonant" and "inconvenient." These are marks of Thomas' theological discourse. Compare, on knowledge of the Trinity: "Reason is employed in another way, not as furnishing a sufficient proof of a principle, but as confirming an already established principle, by showing the congruity of its results ... [ostendat congruere consequentes ef fectus]" Summa Theologiae I, q. 32, a. 1, ad 2 (i, 169); on the necessity of the Incarnation: "Hence it is manifest that it was fitting for God to become incarnate [quod conveniens fuit Deus incarnari]" III, q. 1, a. I (ii, 2026). See M-D. Chenu, Toward Understanding Saint Thomas (Chicago, 1964), 185f.

21. "A thing is said to be necessary for a certain end in two ways. First, when the end cannot be without it; as food is necessary for the preservation of human life. Secondly, when the end is attained better and more conveniently, as a horse is necessary for a journey. In the first way, it was not necessary that God should become incarnate for the restoration of human nature. For God of His omnipotent power could have restored human nature in many other ways. But in the second way it The Platonism of Hooker -310- since "the divine mystery is more true than plain," the authority of the church, through the early ecumenical councils, was required to preserve the divinity and the humanity of the Saviour from error. He describes the Councils of Nicaea I and Constantinople I very briefly, since he had already traced the in great detail in dealing with the was necessary that God should become incarnate for the restoration of human nature. . .. Now a mere man could not have satisfied for the whole human race, and God was not bound to satisfy; hence it behooved Jesus Christ to be both God and man." Summa Theologiae III, q. 1, a. 2 (ii, 2027). Thomas clearly adopts an Anselmian account of the doctrine of satisfaction, but modifies Anselms's account of the "necessity." This is precisely Hooker's account of the matter. Where Hooker does borrow directly from Anselm, the source is very clear. In the treatise on absolution in Book VI, Hooker, in defining satisfaction, gives a more direct summary of Anselm's Cur Deus Homo: "Satisfaction is a work which justice requireth to be done for contentment of persons injured: neither is it in the eye of justice a sufficient satisfaction, unless it fully equal the injury for which we satisfy. Seeing then that sin against God eternal and infinite must needs be an infinite wrong; justice in regard thereof doth necessarily exact an infinite recompense, or else inflict upon the off ender infinite punishment. Now because God was thus to be satisfied, and man not able to make satisfaction is such sort, his unspeakable love and inclination to save mankind from eternal death ordained in our behalf a Mediator, to do that which had been for any other impossible." VI, v, 2 (iii, 56) "It is, incidentally, very interesting, that R. Hooker, in his Ecclesiastical Polity, in a few lines states a completely Anselmic ." John McIntyre, St. Anselm and his Critics (Edinburgh, 1954), 127. Hooker's accuracy, in recognizing that Anselm's argument is aut satisf actio aut poena, "either satisfaction or punishment," was nearly unique in the English sixteenth century; the usual assumption was aut poena aut poena, "either Christ is punished or the human race is punished." Hooker, however, may have accepted the Calvinist view, of Thomas Rogers and others, that explained Christ's descent into hell as Christ's suffering the punishment of the damned: "Better it is sometimes to go down into the pit with him, who beholding darkness, and bewailing the loss of inward joy and consolation, crieth from the bottom of the lowest hell, 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?'." Sermon I (iii, 474f). The Platonism of Hooker -311- so-called "" and the Gloria Patri. 22 Having guarded its

Trinitarian faith, the church had then to labour to protect the unity of the one in his two natures. According to Hooker's analysis, it was Nestorius who caused the problem, his description providing a merely moral union, "two persons linked in amity," whereas the faith required

"two natures human and divine conjoined in one and the same person"' which Nestorius could not adequately account for. 23 Nestorius and his disciples ignored the Scriptural references to the unity of the

Redeemer, who as Son, took on human nature, not a human person. In explaining this, Hooker uses clearly Cyrilline language:

If the Son of God had taken to himself a man now made and already perfected, it would of necessity follow that there are in Christ two persons, the one assuming and the other assumed; whereas the Son of God did not assume a man's person unto his own, but a man's nature to his own Person, and therefore took semen, the seed of Abraham, the very first original element of our nature, before it was come to have any personal human subsistence. The flesh and the conjunction of the flesh with God began both at one instant; his making and taking to himself our flesh, was but one act, so that in Christ there is no personal subsistence but one, and that from everlasting. By taking only the nature of man he still continueth one person, and changeth but the manner of his subsisting, which was before in the mere glory of the Son of God, as is now in the habit of our flesh. . .. Christ is a Person both divine and human, howbeit not therefore two persons in one, neither both these in one sense, but a person divine, because he is personally the Son of God, human, because he hath really the nature of the

22. V, lii, 1 (ii, 223). Compare V, xlii (ii, 175-189).

23. V, Iii, 2 (ii, 224). The Platonism of Hooker -312-

children of men. 24

Christ is divine; Christ has human nature. This is, succinctly put, the Alexandrian account of the Christological union, deriving from

Cyril himself. The church adopted this pattern, according to Hooker, at the , and later, at Chalcedon, made a definition that would prevent a misunderstanding of Cyril in the direction of

Eutyches. 25 In fact, the view was restated by the fifth ecumenical

Council, Constantinople II, and by John of Damascus.

Cyrilline Christology was not prominent in the English Reformation before Hooker. Christological matters were not at centre of the stage, since all parties close to power apparently accepted the standard conciliar definitions, especially that of Chalcedon. Cranmer had used an argument from the two natures of Christ in the debates about the eucharistic presence: "two natures of Christ hath been ever received by the church," he argued, in the disputation in the House of Lords on the occasion of the first Book of Common Prayer; "this body is not in the evil man for it is on the right hand [of God]"; that is, Christ cannot be present in his humanity, since the glorified human body is present only in heaven; he can, therefore, be present only in his divinity. 26

24. V, lii, 3 (ii, 224f).

25. V, Iii, 4 (ii, 226f).

26. F.A. Gasquet and Edmund Bishop, Edward VI and the Book of Common Prayer (London, 1890), 440, 419. The Platonism of Hooker -313-

The propositions involved no novelty or heterodoxy, of course: Thomas, for instance, had argued from the same premise, of the local presence of

Christ's body in heaven, to the very different conclusion of a presence by transubstantiation in the elements. But it may be significant that the one obvious use of Christological premises in the English

Reformation had to do with insisting on a sharp division of the two natures. Calvin has usually been thought of as offering an Antiochene account of Christ's person and natures. 27 Thomas Cartwright appears to have made a strange "Nestorian" suggestion at one stage, perhaps on the basis of an opinion of Beza.28

The suggestion has been made that Hooker derived his Christological account from Luther, who, in contrast to Calvin, is usually thought to have adopted a Cyrilline account. 29 But the clearer path of derivation must be from Thomas, who took over the Cyrilline account of John of

27. But Wendel has pointed out some Cyrilline passages in Calvin. Francois Wendel, Calvin (London, 1963), 220f.

28. In VIII, iv, 6 (iii, 374ff), Hooker deals with the Christological problems that underlie Cartwright's distinction between civil authority, which he relates to Christ's divinity, and ecclesiastical authority, which he relates to Christ's humanity. Editor's Preface, 45 (i, xci, note 1).

29. Ronald Bayne, in Book V, cix, believes these chapters reflect "implicit" sympathy with Luther, although Hooker explicitly condemns Lutheran ubiquitarianism. He quotes Dorner on Luther's Christology to show the concurrence. The real source of the sympathy is, perhaps, a common dependence on Alexandrian Christology, or a common insight on the importance of the Alexandrian account in explaining the unity of the saving Person, and not a dependence of Hooker on Luther. The Platonism of Hooker -314-

Damascus, and enhanced it with his own metaphysics of esse. Although

Hooker does not explicitly take over the Thomistic metaphysics in this regard, he clearly follows the pattern in his description of the hypostatic union, and uses the Aristotelian term, borrowed from Thomas, of "subsistence." 30 The Christological account will have, for Hooker, an impressive application when he comes to consider Christ's headship over the whole world in Book VIII: the error of dividing civil authority and ecclesiastical authority is analogous to dividing Christ's humanity and divinity. 31

Hooker then goes on to discuss the concept of communicatio idiomatum: the attributes of either nature belong to the one person.

Thus, since attribution is to the one person, and not to the two natures, Scripture often uses startling expressions to point to the communicatio idiomatum. 32 Hooker has been thought to treat the

30. Summa Theologiae III, qq. 2-6.

31. VIII, iv, 6 (iii, 374-376). See especially: "as the consubstantial Word of God, he had with God before the beginning of the world, that glory which as man he requesteth to have. . . . For there is no necessity that all things spoken of Christ should agree unto him either as God, or else as man; but some things as he is the consubstantial Word of God, some things as he is that Word incarnate." (iii, 376) "The cause of error ... doth seem to have been a misconceit, that Christ, as Mediator, being inferior unto his Father, doth, as Mediator, all works of regiment over the Church; when in truth, government doth belong to his kingly office, mediatorship to his priestly." (iii, 379) While Hooker's conclusions about royal supremacy are very un-Thomistic, his Cyrilline premises are from Thomas.

32. V, liii, 1-4 (ii, 227-234). The Platonism of Hooker -315- communicatio as "merely verbal", because of his phrase "cross and circulatory speeches." 33 But this conclusion fails to note Hooker's clear dependence on Thomas' account of the suppositum, which Hooker calls the "whole person". 34

Hooker ends this Christological transition with a chapter of elevated style that treats of the three "gifts" Christ has received: by the gift of eternal generation, Christ has received deity; by the gift of union, flesh is made one with God, which has bestowed supernatural gifts on human nature; by the gift of unction, our nature is blessed with power and perfection beyond its nature, since Christ's human soul is given universal (though not infinite) knowledge, and Christ's human body is given incorruptibility (but not ubiquity). 35 While one of his motives in this chapter is clearly to rule out Lutheran ubiquitarianism, the chapter is a rich transfer of a clearly Thomistic material, included in part because of the emphasis on the grace of God in which the human being through the sacraments of Christ may participate. 36

33. Bayne ed., Book V, cix, compares Hooker's Christology to Luther's generally, but treats Hooker's account of the communicatio idiomatum as "merely verbal" or formal, like that of Calvin. See Institutes II, 14.

34. Summa Theologiae III, q. 2, a. 3 (ii, 2035f). Morrel correctly notes the consonance with Thomas, Systematic Theology, 63.

35. V, liv, 1-10 (ii, 231-238).

36. Summa Theologiae III, qq. 7f (ii, 2065-2081). The Platonism of Hooker -316-

3. Hooker on Analogy

Such dependence on Thomas would suggest that Hooker should deal with, and probably assume, Thomas' doctrine of analogy, one of his most clearly typical doctrines. Thomas deals with analogy in the prima pars of the Summa Theologiae, in the question, "The Names of God," but the treatment is brief, and must be amplified by reference to other writings. 37 Hooker rarely uses the word "analogy" or its derivatives.

37. "No name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures. Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense, as some have said. Because if that were so, it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about God at all; for the reasoning would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who proved many things about God, and also against what the Apostle says: The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made (Rom. 1.20). Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, that is, according to proportion. "Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things are proportionate to one, thus for example healthy is predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body, of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause: or according as one thing is proportionate to another, thus healthy is said of medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in the animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and creatures analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures (A. 1). Thus, whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simply univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one thing; thus healthy applied to urine signifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine signifies the cause of the same health." Summa Theologiae I, q. 13, a. 5 (i, 64). The Platonism of Hooker -317-

He does, however, use "proportion" and its related words fairly frequently, including at several significant turning points in his argument, and treats proportion as conveying some sort of information.

It is now commonly recognized that Thomas' primary type of analogy in theological discourse was not the analogy of proportionality, as it was long supposed to be, but rather the analogy of intrinsic attribution, by which creatures are related to God by analogy, God being the "prime analogate" and the creatures related to God by a real likeness, though with no determinate relation. 38 Analogies of proportionality are, like

38. Battista Mondin, The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology {The Hague, 1963), 53 et passim. Thomas had described "proportion" earlier: "In one sense it means a certain relation of one quantity to another, according as double, treble and equal are species of proportion. In another sense every relation of one thing to another is called a proportion. And in this sense there can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it is related to Him as the effect to its cause, and as potentiality to its act." Summa Theologiae I, q. 12, a. 1, ad 4 (i, 49). Hooker does repeat the classical Aristotelian proportion about soul and form: "Form in other creatures is a thing proportionable unto the soul in living creatures." I, iii, 4, note (i, 210, note 1) See John S. Marshall, Hooker and the Anglican Tradition {London, 1963), 79. C.C. Landon distinguished the analogy of attribution and the analogy of proper proportionality, which he alone considers useful in theology, and argues that Hooker adopts this kind of analogy in this passage. C.C. Landon, "The Relevance of Richard Hooker," His Dominion x {1961), 7-9. As Mondin has shown, the proper distinction that is important is that between extrinsic and intrinsic attribution, and it is the latter that Thomas actually adopts. Thomas related the "positive perfections" to God's causality: although he denied that "God is good," for instance, means "God is the cause of goodness, or, God is not evil; but the meaning is, Whatever good we attribute to creatures pre-exists in God, and in a more excellent and higher way. Hence it does not follow that God is good, because he causes goodness; but rather, on the contrary, He causes The Platonism of Hooker -318-

Aristotle's analogies, equations of relationship between two pairs of

terms.

Hooker quite easily sees analogies in political life. The "Law of

Commonweal" is, for him, "the very soul of a politic body." That is, the Law of the Commonweal is to the Commonweal, as the soul is to the body. 39 Similarly, public prayer is "more worthy" than private, since the whole society is of more worth than any individual:

As men, we are at our own choice, both for time, and place, goodness in things because He is good." Summa Theologiae I, q. 13, a. 2 (i, 61).

39. I, x, i (i, 239). Leslie Croxford has shown how Hooker must undermine Thomas' obvious analogy that makes the church the soul of the state. In this, of course, he followed Marsilius of Padua. Croxford goes too far in saying that "Hooker's rejection of the conventional similitude entails the abandonment of analogies as a basis for argument," or that "by examining the relationship between Church and State within the structure of Thomist cosmology, whilst discarding the analogy appropriate to the two jurisdictions, Hooker implicitly threatened the whole cosmological system." For Croxford, Hooker treats analogy or proportion as "a stylistic device": "[the comparison] is not the foundation of [Hooker's] argument. It simply points and vivifies his theme. Here, and elsewhere, similitude is predominately a stylistic device. The [illustration's] function is essentially decorative. Consequently, Hooker's rejection of the conventional similitude entails the abandonment of analogies as a basis for argument." Croxford claims that Hooker "undermines an analogical cosmos" and that his real originality is in that he "substitutes a form of descriptive analysis which could be discussed and weighed rationally." Leslie Croxford, "The Originality of Hooker's Work," The Proceedings of the Leeds Philosophical and Literary Society xv (1973), 37, 44-46. Whatever this might mean, it can hardly be true. As we shall see, Hooker used proportions as really significant in theological topics, and, like Thomas, he strongly retained in his notion of participation, a basis for a form of analogy of instrinsic attribution, beyond Aristotle's analogy,which is little more than a rhetorical device. The Platonism of Hooker -319-

and form, according to the exigence of our own occasions in private; but the service, which we do as members of a public body, is public, and for that cause must needs be accounted by so much worthier than the other, as a whole /oociety of such condition exceedeth the worth of any one.

This conviction of the information value of proportions, is related to Hooker's sense of "convenience" or appropriateness: the physical is proportional to the spiritual and divine, especially in consideration of its purpose or final cause. Thus, there is a "natural conveniency" of the decoration and sumptuousness of churches, beyond the merely utilitarian and practicat. 41 "Churches receive as every thing else their chief perfection from the end whereunto they serve." 42

Thus there is a proportion between the rites of circumcision and sacrifice in the old covenant, and baptism and the eucharist in the new:

"that which the Gospel hath proportionable to ancient sacrifices [is] the Communion of the blessed Body and Blood of Christ." 43

40. V, xxiv, 1 (ii, 117).

41. V, xv, 4 (ii, 55).

42. V, xvi, 1 (ii, 57).

43. V, lxxviii, 2 (ii, 47lf). This is, of course, totally different from the Zwinglian claim, repeated by Cranmer, that the sacraments of the old covenant, and those of the new, were identical except for time. For Hooker, the sacraments of the new covenant are genuinely effective because Christ has now come; for Zwingli and Cranmer, the same faith was available to Abraham as to the Christian, the external sacrament being only an occasion for the beginning, strengthening or renewal of faith. For Hooker, the basis of the analogy is the proportion of the natural life stages: circumcision and baptism at the beginning of life, sacrifices and the eucharist in the middle of life. Hooker does not claim that the sacraments of the old testament The Platonism of Hooker -320-

But there are proportions that are built into nature itself: in explaining the sense in which "priest" may be used of the Christian ministry, and hence "sacrifice," Hooker points to the custom of calling the body of fish "flesh," although only mammals have flesh properly so called:

St Paul applieth the name of Flesh unto that very substance of fishes which hath a proportionable corresp<>ffence to flesh, although it be in nature another thing.

The idea here is clear, although the biology is outmoded. One may speak of fish's flesh or of a Christian "Priest," even though, strictly speaking, fish do not have flesh, and the Christian ministry offers no proper sacrifice, because there is an analogy between fish and meat, between the Christian sacraments and the old sacrifices. This analogy is based upon a "correspondence," that is, a real similarity, a common shared determinate element, "life" in the case of the two sorts of flesh, something else in the case of the sacraments and the old rites.

What this "something else" is becomes clearer in another passage:

That which groweth must of necessity first live. If our bodies did not daily waste, food to restore them were a thing superfluous. And it may be that the grace of baptism would serve to eternal life, were it not that the state of our spiritual being is daily so much hindered and impaired after baptism. In that life therefore where neither body nor soul can decay, our souls shall as little require this sacrament as our bodies corporal nourishment. But as long were the normal instruments for conveying grace at all.

44. V, lxxviii, 2 (ii, 471). The Platonism of Hooker -321-

as the days of our warfare last, during the time that we are both subject to diminution and capable of augmentation in grace, the words of our Lord and Saviour Christ will remain forcible, "Except ye eat the flesh of the ~on of man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you. 4

The analogy in this case is a complex one, to show at once both the necessity and the temporariness of the sacrament of the eucharist.

"Life" is the point of comparison in both cases, the "life" of the body, and the "life" of the soul, which is analogous. Just as the natural human being must begin life through bodily birth before she or he can grow, so the human being, qua spiritual, cannot have eternal life without the spiritual birth in baptism, which must by analogy precede spiritual growth in the eucharist. As well, the embodied being would die without constant food, so birth is not enough; just so, baptism is not sufficient, because of the daily spiritual "hindrances" and

"impairments." As food is to the body, so the grace given in the eucharist is to this spiritual life. In glory, these hindrances and impairments are removed, so the eucharist is no longer needed; for our bodies would not need food if they did not waste away.

Parts of this complex analogy appear from time to time in the

Lawes. Indeed, the parts of the analogy belong to the received tradition, and are fairly obvious. In another place, Hooker again compares the two Gospel sacraments, on the basis of the clear analogy of water washing and giving growth to the seed, and food and drink feeding:

45. V, lxvii, I (ii, 348). The Platonism of Hooker -322- baptism removes guilt in justification (analogous to physical washing) and inaugurates the infused grace of sanctification (analogous to the growth given to a dry seed by moisture); the eucharist continues the process of sanctification through the increase of infused grace

(analogous to bodily f eeding). 46 But, in fact, for Hooker, there is more than a merely conventional or suggestive connection between the outward and the inward in these sacraments:

The inward grace of sacraments may teach what serveth best for their outward form, a thing in no part of Christian religion, much less here, to be neglected. Grace intended by sacraments was a cause of the cho~f, and is a reason for the fitness of the elements themselves.

Hooker is therefore saying that the (divine) choice of the particular sacramental elements for the sacramental use to be instruments of conveying divine grace was not arbitrary: Christ chose water and bread and wine because of the fittingness of these elements, in their relation to physical washing, sprouting and growth and nourishment. They correspond according to their final purpose, the eternal life of the vision of God which is the end of the infusion of

God's grace in the sacraments, which is also the supernatural per fee ti on of natural life. For Hooker, therefore, the basis of these received analogies is the theological pattern of the relation between nature and

46. V, lx, 2 (ii, 265f).

4 7. V, 1viii, I (ii, 259). The Platonism of Hooker -323- the grace to which it is directed, which does not destroy or nullify it, but perfects it.

In one passage, Hooker's sense of the real connection between sign and signified through the process of the supernatural perfection of human nature, returns to Thomas' sense of a more proper sort of analogy than proportionality, though Hooker calls it neither analogy nor proportion: for the actual relationship of grace and nature is, for him, the basis of the use of the word "body" for the "instrument," that is the element of bread:

For that which produceth any certain effect is not vainly nor imp~~perly said to be that very effect whereunto it tendeth.

That is, the bread that is God's instrument for the conveying of the grace that makes the human being, body and soul, a greater participant in Christ, may properly be called the "body of Christ."

This is not the analogy of proportionality, but, in a certain way, the analogy of intrinsic attribution, precisely because it is related to the participation of the body of Christ, as the instrumental cause of that participation. The human body of Christ, now glorified, being the medium of participation of the divine and human, is the cause of the grace of Christ conveyed though the instrument of the bread: therefore, the bread may "properly" be called "body." On this occasion, Hooker makes explicit what is behind his use of analogies in the sacramental

48. V, lxvii, 5 (ii, 352). The Platonism of Hooker -324- descriptions: participation, or causality, is the basis of the analogy.

This means that participation, which is, for Hooker, a causal connection, is the basis of a proper type of analogy, which he does not call a proportion at all, but which resembles analogy of intrinsic attribution, as it is found in Thomas. In this sense, the bread and the cup of the eucharist are (analogically) the body and blood of Christ:

who is able and will bring to pass that bread anJb cup which he giveth us shall be truly the thing he promiseth.

For Hooker, "the strength of his glorious power," enables Christ as divine and human to effect his promise in the instruments: Hooker's receptionism is tempered, through his sense of the effective participation, which makes the (analogical) words "body" and "blood" to apply to a real (though not physical) presence:

What these elements are in themselves it skilleth not, it is enough that to me which take them they are the body and blood of Christ, his promise in witness hereof sfJ°ficeth, his word he knoweth which way to accomplish.

The eucharistic "realism" of certain passages in the Lawes that we saw in chapter V, is thus explained in terms of Hooker's view of something like analogy, which he accounts for in terms of participation.

To a consideration of the notion of "participation" we must presently turn.

49. V, lxvii, 7 (ii, 355).

50. V, lxvii, 12 (ii, 362). The Platonism of Hooker -325-

4. The sweet and amiable ordering: Wisdom 8.1

One of Thomas' favourite biblical verses is found in the deuterocanonical writings: [Sapientia] attingit ergo a fine usque ad

Jinem jortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter, "Wisdom reacheth from one end to another mightily, and sweetly doth she order all things. 1151

It is of significance that this is one of Hooker's favourite verses as well as a token of the theological consonance between Thomas and

Hooker. Hooker can easily use this verse to explain at the same time the limits of God's power and the measure of creation:

If therefore it be demanded, why God having power and ability infinite, the effects notwithstanding of that power are all so limited as we see they are: the reason hereof is the end which he hath proposed, and the law whereby his wisdom hath stinted the effects of his power in such sort, that it doth not work infinitely, but correspondingly unto that end for which it worketh, even "all things chrestos, in most decent ~~d comely sort," all things in "Measure, Number and Weight."

This "decent and comely" operation has two significant aspects for

51. Wisdom 8.1 The passage is frequently quoted in Thomas' writings. A survey of some of the passages in the Summa Theologiae shows how many different topics the text could illumine. Thomas uses it in discussions of divine government (I, q. 103, a. 8), grace (I-II, q. 110, a. 2), charity (II-II, q. 23, a. 2), the temptation of Adam and Eve (II-II, q. 165, a. 1), Christ's miracles (III, q. 44, a. 4 ), the passion of Christ (III, q. 46, a. 9), and the manifestation of the Resurrection (III, q. 55, a. 6).

52. I, ii, 3 (i, 202). Hooker is also here using Wisdom 11.20, as his footnotes indicate. The Platonism of Hooker -326-

Hooker: God's will is never more apparent than his reason: in particular, the voluntaristic suggestions of the description of creation by God in Genesis l, where there are a series of "God said ... and it was done" are to be interpreted away; the Bible speaks of God as creating through speech, according to Hooker, as a means to exhibit the laws of nature, 53 which are not arbitrary. The second aspect of this treatment of God's operations becomes apparent when Hooker describes the way in which God influences the human being in history: Hooker speaks of God's causality as a "sweet compulsion" of human action. 54

The text comes again to the surface of Hooker's writing in the

Dublin Fragments:

The axiom of the providence of God in general, whereby he is said to govern all things amiably according to the several condition and quality of their natures, must needs especially take place in ordering the principal actions wherffnto the hand of his grace directeth the souls of men.

And, once again, the themes and the biblical verse are to stress the manner of God's operations: to have his way, inevitably and finally, but not in such a manner as to remove human initiative:

God hath ordained grace ... that thereby we, which cannot move ourselves, may be drawn, but amiably drawn. If the grace of God did not enforce men to goodness, nothing would

53. I, iii, 2 (i, 207).

54. V, xlviii, 10 (ii, 376).

55. V, App. I, 2 (ii, 538). The editors have provided a corresponding passage from Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles IV, 56. The Platonism of Hooker -327-

be more unpleasant unto man that virtue: whereas, contrariwise, there is nothing so full of joy and consolation as the conscience of well-doing. It delighteth us, that §j,odhath been so merciful unto us as to draw us to himself.

The vocabulary of being drawn by God is that of the Lambeth

Articles, taken from the Gospel of John; the thought behind them is far removed from the deterministic assumptions of the framers of those

Articles. Not to understand this as God's manner, is to misconstrue the whole life of grace:

In power he ordereth [all things], but et with gentleness: mightily, but yet in amiable manner. 57

Not to understand this as God's manner makes a puzzle of relating

God's occasioned will to the general will of God:

[Even after sin, God] leadeth still to eternal life, by an amiab~e course, fram§i even according to the very state wherem we now are.

5. Exitus-reditus and the structure of theology

The philosophical structure of the theology of the Reformation is often obscure. Indeed, even to ask about it would have seemed impious and Pelagian to many figures. "The schools" are often treated as obstacles to the absorption of the words of Scripture, although Luther,

56. V, App. I, 2 (ii, 539f).

57. V, App. I, 27 (ii, 565).

58. V, App. I, 31 (ii, 571). The Platonism of Hooker -328-

for example, does cite widely from late scholastic figures, and the

whole period shows the influence of the humanistic revival that

accompanied the ecclesiastical Reformation.

But no one in the period wrote out a systematic philosophical

theology. Calvin, who followed the Reformers of the Rhineland in

explaining the sense of the sanctification wrought in the person by

grace, was chiefly influenced by the new logic of Ramus, which Hooker

criticized. Beza revived the logical apparatus of Aristotle, but this

revival did not seem to penetrate into theological structure, and did

not include the "theology" of Aristotle's Metaphysics. Nominalism was

officially suspect, in part because its distinctions had supported

current supposed errors on transubstantiation, in Occam, Gerson, d'Ailly

and Biel, and in part because of the supposed Pelagian tendencies of the

famous distinction between the "ordered power" and the "absolute power"

of God, a distinction that had actually been made to protect the

Augustinian position of the human need for grace, and of the lack of intrinsic merit in human deeds. But the Nominalist picture of the

primacy of God's will over God's intellect was usually assumed, without acknowledgment of the source.

Cranmer's nearly unconscious philosophical theology is startling: it anticipates strikingly the development Descartes made a century later. For Cranmer, one of the rational principles behind the debates about the mode of the presence of Christ in the elements is a The Platonism of Hooker -329- metaphysical one: matter and spirit can have no relation. Cranmer disguises the philosophical source of this conviction by using the New

Testament as his authority. The Preface of the Defence quotes the text

"It is the spirit that giveth life, the flesh profiteth nothing. 1159 And this is apparently advanced for a refutation of the real presence. But it is clear that Cranmer's metaphysical assumptions have here infected the interpretation of the fourth gospel, which was hardly advancing a metaphysical proposition at all in this verse, and whose general

"philosophical" theme suggests anything but the spiritual irrelevance of the material order. Indeed, one of Cranmer's most noteworthy accomplishments was the articulation of a view that had been far less conspicuous in the first generation of the Reformation, which was nevertheless in its thrall:

Nature is split from the categories of consciousness and personality, and cannot participate in the holy .... The whole fluid, mystical, substantial way of thinking, whereby the divine can impregnate the natural, is overthrown in the interests of an emphasis on conscious faith and of relitJons between God and man in terms of personal encounter.

Calvin and the Reformers of the Rhineland had insisted, of course,

59. Thomas Cranmer, Writings and Disputations (Cambridge, 1844), 7.

60. Cyril C. Richardson, "Cranmer and the Analysis of Eucharistic Doctrine," in Journal of Theological Studies xvi (1965), 427. See also pp. 42lff, 426ff, for a treatment of "Nominalism" as a "certain temper of thought which affected the later Middle Ages," as distinct from the precise accounts of Occam and his school, -- "thinking of things as self-enclosed objects, without further reflection," and for a treatment of Cranmer's assumption of this "popular" non-technical outlook. The Platonism of Hooker -330-

that God really did interact with the human being, but, since this

interaction was, by its very nature, miraculous, no metaphysical

underpinning had to be given, and the anticipated "Cartesian" dualism of

the early English Reformation went unnoticed, unquestioned, and

uncorrected, -- hidden under the new Bucerian and Calvinist strata of

interpretation.

Hooker has not left us with a sustained account of his

philosophical theology. But various allusions, particularly in the

Lawes, suggest that he was on the way to a "correction" of the

unreflective Nominalism of the Reformation. And this correction was to

be seen in terms of a revival of some Platonist convictions.

Platonism and Christianity had, of course, a long history of

association. Middle Platonism had been used by the early Christian

Apologists, especially to provide a Trinitarian model. When the

subordinationist tendencies of this model came to be noticed during the

Arian debates, the model was quickly dropped. But the influence

persisted in the deep theological convictions of the Cappadocians,

especially Gregory of Nyssa, just as it had been felt in the

Alexandrians. And Augustine's appropriation of Neoplatonism was so

profound that some have held that he was "converted," not to

Christianity, but to Platonism in the style of Plotinus. His list of

the consonances between Plato and the prologue of the Fourth Gospel is famous and significant. For he clearly held that Christianity needed to The Platonism of Hooker -331-

correct Platonist metaphysics, principally by insisting on the

Incarnation, a horror to the orthodox Platonist as to the Gnostic two

centuries earlier. Indeed, the rediscovery of Aristotelianism in the

thirteenth century, which so informed Thomas' great synthesis, did not

exclude the dominant and long-assimilated Platonism. Thomas accepted

Aristotle's account of science and logic, but he also insisted on a

pattern of theology that went back to Plato, through the Pseudo­

Dionysius, Erigena, and John Damascene. And we now, accordingly,

commonly recognize the Platonic debt Thomas owed, particularly in the

controlling structure of exitus and reditus, which, apparently, must be

seen as indicating not just the pattern of the longer Summa, but of all

theological topics: God, the coming forth from God of all things, and

the return of the creature to God. 61

Renaissance Humanism owed a great deal to a revival of knowledge of

and interest in Plato himself. The Homilies, curiously, witness this

revival of interest in Plato and commend Socrates as a patient husband,

thereby putting him beside worthy examples drawn from Old Testament

narrative. And there were near contemporaries of Hooker, like Lord

Herbert of Cherbury (1583-1648), who moved into a non-Christian

mysticism in their Platonism. Others were influenced in a less radical

way. And, indeed, the Platonist influence must often be seen as nearly

61. M.-D. Chenu, Toward Understanding Saint Thomas (Chicago, 1964), 304-317. W.J. Hankey, God in Himself: Aquinas' Doctrine of God as expounded in the Summa Theologiae (Oxford, 1987), 22 et passim. The Platonism of Hooker -332- unconscious in the Renaissance. But the conscious or unconscious allusions in Hooker illustrate something more than the "Platonism in the air."

Hooker's use of the word "shadow" is fascinating in this regard.

When he criticizes the supposed Zwinglian account of the relation between the elements and Christ's Body and Blood, he uses the word in its ordinary sense, whereby the lack of reality in the sign is emphasized: the Zwinglians hold that the eucharist is "a shadow, destitute, empty and void of Christ. 1162 For Platonism, the word is not entirely negative: although Platonism originally expressed the conviction the the reality of the spatio-temporal world was a pale one compared with the reality of the ideal world, there was an important relation between them. The "things" in the supposed real world were called "shadows" to indicate their relative unreality, but also to indicate their real relation to the archetypes. Curiously enough,

Hooker quite easily uses the verb "shadow" to be a synonym of "signify," a use which presupposes both a Platonist understanding of "shadow," and a real, though limited, link between the sign and the thing signified:

In definitions ... we find grace expressly mentioned as their true essential form, elements as the matter whereunto that form doth adjoin itself. But if that be separated which is secret, and that considered alone which is seen . . the name of a sacrament in such speeches can imply no more than what the outward substance thereof doth

62. V, lxvii, 2 (ii, 349). The Platonism of Hooker -333-

comprehend. And to make complete the outward substance of a sacrament, there is required an outward form, which form sacramental elements receive from sacramental words. Hereupon it groweth, that many times there are three things said to make up the substance of a sacrament, namely, the grace which is thereby offered, the element which shadoweth or signifieth grace, a1IB the word which expresseth what is done by the element.

The passage is not without its interest in showing the distinction between the word, which is "added to" the element, and the "true essential form," which is the grace conveyed. The use of "form" goes back to a scholastic use, derived ultimately from Aristotle, and indicates that the sacrament is not sacrament without the grace conveyed. But more fascinating is the almost unconscious use of

"shadow" as a verb to name the symbolic relation. If the underlying metaphysical assumption were as Platonist as the vocabulary, this would indicate a "re-discovery" of the pre-nominalist sense of "symbolism," wherein the sign had a real connection with what it signified. The earlier Reformers of the Zwinglian and Rhineland schools had followed

Augustine gladly when he offered the symbolist account; for, as they understood symbolism, in post-Nominalist terms, to say that the elements

were a sign of the sacramental grace was to say that they were only conventionally connected, and to deny a real relation. Augustine, of course, by the same vocabulary, would have assumed a real relation,

based on the Platonist assumption that the sign participates in the

63. V, lviii, 2 (ii, 260). The Platonism of Hooker -334-

reality of which it is a sign. If Hooker had absorbed this earlier

theory, his "symbolism" would have marked a substantial departure from

that of Cranmer and his contemporaries. Hooker did, in fact, borrow a

word that could have come as much from Calvin as from Plato, to describe

the sacramental relation: it was participation. And Calvin's

instrumentalism could be interpreted as indicating that there was a real

causal relationship between the elements and the grace received, not

because one was the direct cause of the other, but precisely because

God, the moving cause, used the elements as instruments. Thus

"participation" could be interpreted as a real relationship.

When Hooker comes to speak of Christian ministry, and of public

worship, he does use the language of exitus and reditus in a very vivid

way. The whole presupposition of ministry is the principle of return

through desire: Christian ministry is, for Hooker, related to temporal felicity, which is always ordered to a higher (and more enduring) end. 64

Ministerial power is instituted by God, and is therefore, an awesome power:

They are therefore ministers of God, not only by way of subordination as princes and civil magistrates whose execution of judgement and justice the supreme hand of divine providence doth uphold, but ministers of ~gd as from whom their authority is derived, and not from men.

64. V, lxxvi, 3 (ii, 445f).

65. V, lxxvii, 1 (ii, 455). For Hooker, the royal supremacy was a potestas jurisdictionis, not a potestas ordinis. Paul E. Forte, "Richard Hooker's Theory of Law," The Journal of Medieval and The Platonism of Hooker -335-

The contrast between this and the view of Cranmer on the source and the non-mystical quality of ministerial authority is extreme, for

Cranmer believed precisely that ministers of religion, like ministers of state, did derive their authority by delegation from the prince who got it from God.66 The Elizabethan view was a clear advance on the

Henrician and Edwardian, and makes clear that Calvin's insistence on the authority of the church separate from the magistrate had, in some sense, sunk in, even though Elizabeth continued to exercise a monarchial royal prerogative, which Hooker, in Book VIII, would come to consider an authority delegated on her by the representatives of the church, the monarch in parliament, including the convocations.

But there is more than Calvinism at stake here. There is a new view of the exitus-reditus relationship: ministry take its place as a moment in that great movement of the return to God of the creature, through desire and through grace. For the following high praise of the place of Christian ministry would probably not be typical of the

Elizabethan Calvinists generally:

The power of the ministry of God translateth out of darkness into glory, it raiseth men from the earth and bringeth God himself down from heaven, by blessing visible elements it maketh them invisible grace, it giveth daily the Holy Ghost,

Renaissance Studies 12 (1982), 153.

66. Thomas Cranmer held that both ius ordinis and ius jurisdictionis derived from God through the "Christian prince." Thomas Cranmer, Remains and Letters (Cambridge, 1846), 116. The Platonism of Hooker -336-

it hath to dispose of that flesh which was given for the life of the world and that blood which was poured out to redeem souls, when it poureth malediction on the heads of the _wi~ed they perish, when it revoketh the same they revive.

For Hooker, the very reason people go to church is for "a conversation" with God:

Places of public resort being thus provided for, our repair thither is especially for mutual conference jnd as it were commerce to be had between God and us. 6

This "commerce between God and us," involves a mingling of prayer with teaching and preaching, in a public liturgy:

For prayer kindleth our desire to behold God by speculation [that is, by sight, not by "conjecture" or "surmise"]; and the mind delighted with that contemplative sight of God, taketh every where new inflammations to pray, the riches of the mysteries of heavenly wisdom coi~nually stirring up in us correspondent desires towards them.

Thus in making the case for the set and ordered public liturgy of the Church of England -- a liturgy that probably contradicted the

67. V, lxxvii, 1 (ii, 456). This passage was cited in defence of the Tractarian, George Anthony Denison, who was accused of heresy for his views of the "real presence" and the "effect of consecration." Defence of the Archdeacon of Taunton (London, 1856), 32. It need hardly be said that Hooker did not hold the views of Denison on these subjects; we have already seen the Hooker would not have much excited the Tractarians on that score, although he was frequently quoted, particularly by Newman, on matters of the theology of grace; the fact that his paean on the ministry could be so used does suggest, however, that more is going on in Hooker than his doctrinal would indicate by itself.

68. V, xviii, 1 (ii, 61).

69. V, xxxiv, 1 (ii, 149). The Platonism of Hooker -337-

theology of the Reformation in no significant way, but which, in form,

fell far below the requirements of the non-Lutheran Reformers -- Hooker

went beyond the English Calvinists' understanding of ministry and

liturgy, though not beyond Calvin's doctrine on grace and the

sacraments. For Christian ministry and the public offices of preaching

and prayer had, for Hooker, a significance far beyond their use as means

of order in a "visible" church. They were the very instruments of the

human being's return to God, an orientation built into the natural

desire for earthly happiness, but involving God's gifts to grace and

glory towards the end of the knowledge through vision of God, wherein

"standeth our eternal life." God is thus the end of desire and of

curiosity, that is, of love and of faith. And, in this intercourse with

heaven, there is the "down and up" that would be expected with the exitus-reditus model:

His heavenly inspirations and our holy desires are as so many Angels of intercourse and commerce between God and us. As teaching bringeth us to know that God is our supreme truth; ~o prayer estifieth that we acknowledge him our sovereign good. 70

Thus the structure of public and corporate worship, involving both preaching and prayer, points to God as the end, both of desire (the good) and of inquiry (the truth). In fact, in defending the Collect for

Trinity Sunday, and its petition for deliverance from all adversity,

Hooker indicates that every natural desire has the "substance" (though

70. V, xxiii, 1 (ii, 115). The Platonism of Hooker -338- not the "form") of a prayer, and may be counted as such by God:

Every good and holy desire though it lack the form, hath notwithstanding in itself the substance and with him the force of a prayer, who regarde,fp the very moanings, groans, and sighs of the heart of man.

Hooker would insist, with the mature Augustine, that prayer implies grace already given, and this may be involved in the defect of "form" alluded to. This "Platonic" viewpoint Keble compares to "poetry" -- a term of praise in the writings of a professor of poetry -- but to do so might seem to minimize the significance of what is going on, for there is more than rhetorical device in these flights of eloquence. 72

It cannot be doubted that Hooker, following Aristotle and Thomas, explicitly rejected an epistemology that relied on Plato's doctrine of the pre-existing Ideas:

We are not of opinion therefore, as some are, that nature in working hath before her certain exemplary draughts or patterns, which subsisting in the bosom of the Highest, and

71. V, xl viii, 2 (ii, 201 ).

72. "In this sense, the whole world, to [the Fathers], was full of sacraments. No doubt such a view as this harmonizes to a considerable degree with Platonism; no doubt, again, it has much in common with the natural workings and aspirations of poetical minds under any system of belief .... It is not affirmed that this view of Church ceremonies is any where expressly set down, either by Hooker or by his guides, the early Fathers. But surely something like it lies at the root of their mystical interpretations of Scripture, and of their no less mystical expositions of many portions of their ritual. . . . On this point as on many others, Hooker's sympathy with the fourth century rather than the sixteenth is perpetually breaking out, however chastened by his too reasonable dread of superstition." Editor's Preface 49, 50 (i, xcix- cii). The Platonism of Hooker -339-

being thence discovered, she fixeth her eye upon them, as travellers by sea upon the pole-star of the world, and that according t:Jiereunto she guideth her hand to work by imitation. 7

Hooker is thus properly considered a precursor of Locke's model of the human mind as a tabula rasa:74

Men, if we view them in their spring, are at the first without understanding or knowledge at all. Nevertheless, from this utter vacuity they grow by degrees, till they come at length to be even as the angels themselves are [that is, having "full and complete knowledge in the highest degree"]. That which agreeth to the one now, the other shall attain unto in the end; they are not so far disjoined and severed, but that they come at length to meet. The soul of man being therefore at the first as a book, wherein nothing is and yet all things may be imprinted; we are to search by wha steps and degrees it riseth unto perfection of knowledge. 15

This might seem to look forward to Locke, who claimed Hooker's influence on his political theory, but it more clearly looks backward to an earlier "empiricist," Thomas Aquinas, and to his famous dictum that

"nothing is in the intellect which is not first in the senses."

But, although Hooker rejects Plato's general epistemology, he

73. I, iii, 4 (i, 209). This is not, of course, to deny the proposition of middle and late Platonism that the exemplars or ideas are "located" in the mind of God before actual creation; this Hooker affirms: "All things which God in their times and seasons hath brought forth were eternally and before all times in God, as a work unbegun is in the artificer which afterward bringeth it unto effect." V, lvi, 5 (ii, 248).

74. D.R.G. Owen, "Is there an Anglican Theology?," in M Darrol Bryant (ed.) The Future of Anglican Theology (Toronto, 1984), 6.

75. I,vi,l(i,217). The Platonism of Hooker -340- agrees verbally with a Platonist saying about God:

Dangerous it were for the feeble brain of man to wade far into the doings of the Most High; whom although to know be life, and joy to make mention of his name; yet our soundest knowledge is to know that we know him not as indeed he is, neither can know him; and our safest eloquence is our silence, when we confess that without confession that his glory %inexplicable, his greatness above our capacity and reach.

And, moreover, one of Hooker's favourite "technical" terms, is

"participate," which is at the heart of his account of the Incarnation

76. Here, the thought is biblical; but the expression is Platonist. Hooker is quoting, without acknowledgement. The editors refer to a beautiful passage of Arnobius, a figure of the third and fourth centuries, who taught Lactantius. The whole passage runs: "Infinite, unbegotten, everlasting, eternal alone art Thou, whom no shape may represent, no outline of body define; unlimited in nature and in magnitude unlimited; without seat, motion, and condition, concerning whom nothing can be said or expressed in the words of mortals. To understand Thee, we must be silent; and for fallible conjecture to trace Thee even vaguely, nothing must even be whispered." Arnobius of Sicca, The Case against the Pagans, trans. George E. McCracken, 2 vols. (Westminster, Maryland, 1949) i, 80f. But there are more obvious later texts. On "Negative" knowledge, compare: "Concerning the Divine Essence, we must consider:- (I) Whether God exists? (2) The manner of His existence, or, rather, what is not the manner of his existence ... " Summa Theologiae I, q. 2, prologue (i, 11). This idea is developed in the next question: "When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the further question of the manner of its existence, in order that we may know its essence. Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather what he is not, we have no means for considering how God is, but rather how he is not." I, q. 3, prologue (i, 14). On the theological "silence", compare: "0 Trinity beyond being, beyond divinity, beyond goodness, and guide of Christians in divine wisdom, direct us to the mystical summits more than unknown and beyond light. There the simple, absolved and unchanged mysteries of theology lie hidden in the darkness beyond light of the hidden mysterious silence ... " Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite, Mystical Theology, 1, in The Divine Names and Mystical Theology, trans John D. Jones (Milwaukee, 1980), 211. The Platonism of Hooker -341- and of the relationship between the recipient and the humanity of Christ offered in the eucharist, as we have seen. 77 But Hooker's use of the term is exceptional: for Hooker, the verb is transitive, and reciprocal: Christ "participates" the human being through the eucharist, and the human being "participates" Christ. Normal English use, before and after Hooker, would speak of "participating in" and the relationship would not be considered reciprocal: if "a" participates in

"b," then almost certainly "b" does not participate in "a," especially since the grammatical subject of the verb is usually a concrete individual, and the object of the preposition not. But Hooker's use is singular in this respect: 78

Thus we participate Christ partly by imputation

77. John E. Booty has shown the significance of "participation" in a variety of topics in Hooker's work, and terms it "the key to Hooker's theology." The Spirit of Anglicanism (Wilton, Connecticut, 1979), 17f. According to Booty, the notion links Hooker's view of nature, of the saving efficacy of Christ, and of the church. Booty finds the source in New Testament Greek and does not seem to note the more obvious Neoplatonic source, although he does mention Gregory of Nyssa. He suggests the following New Testament Greek words: koinonia, "fellowship," menein "to abide in," and, of lesser significance, metousia, "to share, partake," and metalambano, "to partake of or share in." Olivier Loyer has argued that the source and structure of Hooker's use of "participate" is Platonic. L'Anglicanisme de Richard Hooker i, 371-379. Loyer has shown that "resemblance" and "imitation" are related to "particpation" in Hooker, just as in Plato.

78. OED gives one earlier reference for the use of "participate" as a transitive verb, meaning "partake": "The one [the soul] we participate with goddes, the other [the body] with bestes." Sir Thomas Elyot, the Governour, 1532. The Platonism of Hooker -342-

partly by habitual and real infusion. 79

And Hooker will always say "participation of" rather than

"participation in," that is, use the "objective genitive" to show what would have been the grammatical object if "participation" had been used in its verbal form. 80 This strongly suggests the influence of the tradition of the Neoplatonist Proclus, whose technical term metechein might be so translated, and whose principal thesis is reflected in the following propositions Hooker outlines immediately after his definition of "participation" as:

that mutual inward hold which Christ hath of us and we of him, in such sort that each possesseth other by way of special interest, property, and inherent copulation. For plainer explication whereof we may from that which hath been before sufficiently proved assume to our purpose these two principles, "That every original cause imparteth itself unto those things which come of it;" and "whatsoever taketh being from any other,lpe same is after a sort in that which giveth it being."

These two principles are clearly related to Proclus' propositions

25 to 39, "Of Procession and Reversion." For instance, Proclus wrote:

Prop. 30. All that is immediately produced by any principle

79. V, lvi, 11 (ii, 254).

80. When E.R. Dodds came to translate the Elements of Proclus, he made use of the transitive verb "participate" to translate Proclus' verb metechein. He introduces the following note at the beginning of the text: "The transitive use of participate throughout the translation is dictated by the convenience of the passive form: the authority of Milton and Hooker may serve to excuse it." Proclus, The Elements of Theology, trans. E.R. Dodds, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1963), 3.

81. V, lvi, 1 (ii, 245f). The Platonism of Hooker -343-

both remains [menei] in the producing cause and proceeds from it. ... ~rop. 35. Every effe~t emains in its cause, proceeds from 1t, and reverts upon 1t.82

Although the first Greek text of Proclus was not printed until

1618, there was a Latin translation published by Patrizzi in 1583.83 It

is just possible that Hooker knew of this work; in any case, a

contemporary work, Edmund Spenser's "Mutability Cantos" in the Faerie

Queen, cite the thirty-fifth proposition of Proclus.

Hooker apparently never cites Proclus directly, but he does cite

the Pseudo-Dionysius, whose work incorporated much of Proclus, once in

82. Proclus, Elements, 28-43. Compare: "God is above all things by the excellence of His nature; nevertheless, He is in all things as the cause of being of all things." Summa Theologiae I, q. 8, a. l, ad l (i, 34). "God is said to be in all things by essence, not indeed by the essence of the things themselves, as if He were of their essence; but by his own essence; because His substance is present to all things as the cause of their being." I, q. 8, a. 3, ad I (i, 36). Compare Hooker: "God hath his influence into the very essence of all things, without which influence of Deity supporting them their utter annihilation could not choose but follow. Of him all things have both received their first being and their continuance to be that which they are. All things are therefore partakers of God, they are his off spring, his influence is in them, and the personal wisdom of God is for that very cause said to excel in nimbleness or agility, to pierce into all intellectual, pure, and subtle spirits, to go through all, and to reach unto every thing which is. . .. All things which God hath made are in that respect the offspring of God, they are in him as effects in their highest cause, he likewise actually is in them, the assistance and influence of his Deity is their life." V, lvi, 5 (ii, 247ff). "Therefore all beings apart from God are not their own being, but are beings by participation. Therefore it must be that all things which are diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be more or less perfect, are caused by one First Being, who possesses being most perfectly." Summa Theologiae I, q. 44, a. I (i, 229).

83. Proclus, Elements, xxxii. The Platonism of Hooker -344- the Lawes, and once in the Dublin Fragments. 84 The Pseudo-Dionysius, a fifth or sixth century Syrian figure, was mistakenly identified with

Dionysius the Athenian convert of Paul. His works were thus held to have apostolical authority, and circulated widely, especially in the

Latin translation of Erigena (ca 810- ca 877). Their authenticity was questioned in the sixteenth century by Cajetan (1469-1534) and Jacques

Sirmond (1559-1651), but since they were defended by Cesare Baronius

(1538-1607), Robert Bellarmine (1542-1621) and Leonard Lessius (1554-

1623), Hooker, if he did know of the suspicion about authenticity, may also have known that there were other reasoned opinions. He does not indicate, but clearly accepts Dionysius as an authority against the authors of the Christian Letter, as late as 1599.85 The Pseudo-

84. "Aut Deus naturae patitur, aut mundi machina dissolvetur," I, iii, 4 (i, 211); "We will not therefore accept the foolish view of the many who say that Providence should lead us to virtue even against our wills. For to destroy nature is not the part of Providence. Therefore, as Providence preserves the nature of each thing, it provides for the self-determining as self-determining; and for wholes, and for individual's distinctively, as for whole and individual, so far as the nature of the thing provided for can receive the providential benefits of universal and manifold Providence, distributed in proportion to each." V, App. I, 13 (ii, 549f), translated in Bayne ed., Book V, 648, note 36.

85. Dionysius had indeed been used in the English Reformation. The various authors in the Parker Society series cite Dionysius at least 72 times, although many, including Bullinger, Calfhill, Fulke, Jewel, Philpott, Ridley, Tyndale, Whitaker and Whitgift recognize that these works are wrongly ascribed to Paul's convert. Only Fulke and Whitaker appear to reject their authority altogether. The range of citations show on how many subjects they were cited. Henry Gouge, A General Index to the Publications of the Parker Society (Cambridge, 1855), 279. The Platonism of Hooker -345-

Dionysius and Thomas appear to be the only clear sources for Hooker's

Neoplatonist structures.

6. Conclusion

The whole drift of the Scripture of God, what is it but only to teach Theology? Theology, what is it but the science of things divine? What science can be attaii'if unto without the help of natural discourse and reason?

The theology of Hooker has called forth a variety of interpretations. Broadly speaking, these interpretations must be related to two different grids of comparison. The first of these is the question of the Reformation issues. Recently, Hooker has been treated as primarily a "catholic figure", in opposition to the figures of the middle of his century who moved the church away from medieval catholicism. 87 But another scholar has found Hooker "thoroughly rooted

... in the theology of the Protestant Reformation. 1188 Yet another scholar has found Hooker a follower both of Luther and of "catholic teaching. 1189 It should now be clear, that this study, concentrating on

86. III, viii, 11 (i, 374).

87. L.S Thornton, Richard Hooker: a study of his theology (London, 1924), 59; John S. Marshall, Hooker and the Anglican Tradition: an historical and theological study of Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity (London, 1963), l 12f.

88. Dewey D. Wallace, Puritans and Predestination: Grace in English Protestant Theology 1525-1695 (Chapel Hill, 1982), 76, 219 note 252.

89. "In the theory of justification, Hooker is neither Catholic The Platonism of Hooker -346- the topics of "grace," has found that Hooker probably does not deviate from Protestant orthodoxy, but that his manner of presentation raised the concerns of some Protestants in England at the end of the century, in particular because of his deviation from certain Calvinist tenets.

On a second question, the philosophical basis of theology, there is a more interesting debate. Hooker, in the first place, pointed out that philosophy could not be ignored in the arenas of doctrinal considerations: a chapter of Book III is given over to the question.

In that chapter, Hooker points out that philosophy in the hands of men of bad will is warned against by the best teachers; but philosophy is needed to def end against the guileful use of philosophy. 90 This means

that the attempt to do without philosophy or ignore it, will result in the importation, perhaps surreptitiously, into the doctrinal debates, of spurious and incoherent philosophical positions. Hooker does not here explicitly commit himself to the philosophical position that is to be

favoured, but it can hardly be denied that the choice of the system is not a matter entirely indifferent.

nor Calvinistic. He clearly follows Luther because justification is imputed, but he follows Catholic teaching since he required good works." C.F. Dirksen, A Critical Analysis of Richard Hooker's Theory of the Relation of Church and State (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1947), 63. Quoted Gunnar Hillerdal, Reason and Revelation in Richard Hooker (Lund, 1962), 33, note I. It is doubtful whether this comment does justice to either Luther or Calvinism, let alone Hooker.

90. III, viii, 7 (i, 367f). The Platonism of Hooker -347-

Hooker has recently been identified as adopting a philosophy that combines elements from Aristotle with those of the Stoics.9 1 Among those who recognize that Hooker depends on Thomas are those who insist that this means a revived Aristotelianism. 92 More recently, Hooker has been recognized as both Aristotelian and Platonist: Aristotelian explanations in terms of cause are not incompatible with Platonist accounts in terms of participation. 93 Sometimes, even when the

Thomistic dependence has been recognized, it has been at the expense of recognizing Hooker's Thomistic Platonism. 94 Lionel Thornton correctly, but briefly, pointed out that Hooker was primarily a "Christian

91. Donald W. Hansen, From Kingdom to Commonwealth (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1970). Hansen's precise account involves the combining of Aristotelian teleology with the Stoic view of the eternal law. Hansen seems to ignore the Thomistic and Neoplatonic background.

92. Gunnar Hillerdal, Reason and Revelation, 4lf. Hillerdal argues that Hooker's "Platonizing view" is more apparent that real. "Upon the whole, Hooker is an Aristotelian, or more correct, a Thomist, in his categories of thought." That is, since he is Thomist, he is an Aristotelian; since he is an Aristotelian, he is not really a Platonist.

93. Olivier Loyer, L'Anglicanisme de Richard Hooker i, 374ff; ii, 684.

94. Peter Munz, The Place of Hooker in the history of Thought (London, 1952), 171 f. Munz held that Hooker developed Thomistic rationalism to combat Calvinist Augustinianism, but that he adopted Thomism instead of Renaissance Platonism, which would have been more effective. Munz was misled by Hooker's criticisms of the theory of ideas, by a failure to distinguish between Plato and middle and Neoplatonism, and by an inadequate grasp of Thomas' Platonism: "To Hooker, living in a thoroughly medieval world, Platonism only meant what it had meant to St. Thomas in the thirteenth century: an erroneous doctrine of ideas with a consequent tendency to extol in Christian philosophy the divine at the expense of the natural and the human." The Platonism of Hooker -348-

Platonist." 95

A more recent attempt to describe the underlying unity of Hooker's theology has noted the significance for him of the Incarnation, as understood in classical Christian orthodoxy, for instance in the account of John of Damascus: for this study Richard Hooker's system is "bound together by the organic principle of Godmanhood." 96 This view is not wrong, but fails to see that this principle relies in part on the more basic principle of "participation."

Since Cargill Thompson's influential essay was published in 1972, there has been some interest in the questions of Hooker's "eclecticism" and the compromises he might have been thought to make in apologizing for the Elizabethan establishment. One recent work has shown that

Hooker was not, in fact, a slavish apologist of the status quo.97

95. L.S. Thornton, Richard Hooker (London, 1924), 50.

96. G.W. Morrel, The Systematic Theology of Richard Hooker, 159. "All these motifs of Hooker's architectonic thought revolve around the centre of Godmanhood, which appears in sharp and undistorted focus in the mystery of our Saviour Christ, both God and Man, who took our nature upon himself in order that he might bestow his nature on us, making us the children of God and exalting us to everlasting life." (p. 163) Morre! seems to be imitating the "motif" school that included Nygren and Auten.

97. Robert K. Faulkner, Richard Hooker and the Politics of a Christian England (Berkeley, 1981). Reviewed by Brendan Bradshaw, Journal of Ecclesiastical History 34 (1985), 438-444. This treatment goes some way toward tempering Cargill Thompson's treatment of Hooker as "consistent but marginal." Faulkner argues that Hooker combines the apparently incongruous doctrines of a "human right" royal supremacy and a "divine right" episcopacy. On the question of the royal supremacy, The Platonism of Hooker -349-

Our study has suggested that Hooker is indeed a Neoplatonist, although that gives him a certain scope, and his use of his sources is as cautious as it is undisclosed. The older view of his position in the development of political theory undoubtedly made him too much a prophet of what was to come: apparently claimed Hooker's influence to justify his real novelty, and Hobbes may have been less indebted to

Hooker than used to be supposed. It is now clearer, since the work of

D'Entreves and others, that Hooker's "originality", if that is the right word, involved a retrieval of medieval views.

The same is true in theology: Hooker's real "originality" is a revival of "theology" as a self-conscious accompaniment of the teaching of doctrine, the "science of things divine," in the knowledge of which, since its object is God, "standeth our eternal life." This revival he clearly accomplished by a fresh and penetrating look at Thomas, and by a thorough reading of older writers, including the Pseudo-Dionysius himself. In this sense, Hooker was not "original" in theology; but he was a novelty in the English Reformation, and a relief.

The English Reformation before Hooker had made few explicit philosophical commitments; it had relied on the false philosophical accompaniment of common sense, which, in that age as much as ours, would have been the popular "Nominalism" that treated sensible things as self- this may have put him at variance with the official party and with the Queen. The Platonism of Hooker -350- sufficient objects and symbolism as an arbitrary and conventional relationship. But science, then as now, made different assumptions. In reviving a Platonic account, Hooker did not introduce a novelty into

Christian theology. Platonism of one form or another had been present during most of the Christian period and it was distinctively "avant garde" and scientific in sixteenth century England. And Platonism, in its capacity to acknowledge real relationships that are not physical or conventional ones, provided some "rational" support for the real and significant relations that must be implied by Christian doctrines of creation, covenants, the providence of God, the life of the human being in history under God's grace, Christ the Redeemer, the church, and its sacraments.

Hooker dealt with his sources critically. In one particular and significant case, he actually altered one source in terms of that source's source: Thomas' account of law was amplified by the addition of "the second eternal law" to Thomas' "first law eternal". At one level, this is simply a grouping of the other laws Thomas describes: natural, rational, and human. But, viewed from the perspective of

Neoplatonic theology, this is a re-assertion of one of the emanations of the One, intermediate between the One and the many, although not, of course, "outside" the mind of God. 98 Likewise, the inclusion of

98. Paul E. Forte, "Richard Hooker's theory of Law," Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 12 (1982), 140ff. The Platonism of Hooker -351-

Celestial Law, which is not in Thomas' treatise on law in the prima secundae, is useful both as illustrating a law for non-human voluntary

agents and as reviving a Neoplatonist sense of the significance of the

"heavenly hierarchies." The material depends largely on Thomas'

treatise on Creation in the prima, where Thomas deals with angels, but

the order is close to the Neoplatonic sources.

Although Hooker asserts that human reason can still identify the

"logic" of the return to God through "reward, he is abundantly clear

that the return of the creature qua creature, through nature simply elevated by elevating grace does not actually now occur, and could not have occurred ever without God's elevating grace; but it remains the model of salvation as a reward that alone makes sense of return of the fallen creature by means of the "divine law" of salvation through faith, even though revelation is required for the human being to know this, the only means now available. Thus a Platonic model, of exitus and reditus in both Thomas and Hooker, is made to exhibit a Christian doctrine it might not otherwise have displayed, for the return in pagan

Neoplatonism had little room for the work of divine grace, and implied

that the God "at the centre" was literally indifferent to the whole procedure. But the real centre, for Hooker, as for Thomas in his expansion of the theological structure of the Sentences of Peter Lombard

by the addition of the whole secunda pars, is the study of "man in grace.'' The Platonism of Hooker -352-

The retrieval of a Platonist sense of signification -- of the

"participation" of one being in another, in creation, in redemption, and, in particular, in the sacraments -- allowed Hooker to express a new and accurate sense of Augustine's "symbolic" account of the eucharistic presence, without adopting the transubstantiation Thomas had held along with it, that is, without abandoning the "Sacramentarian" consensus of the Elizabethan church. 99 But Hooker, as we have seen in chapters II and III, made a bold and novel addition to the pattern: having developed the Thomistic pattern of the double human need for grace, he identified the "divine law," -- that which the human being could not know without revelation, and that which the human being needed to know because the original way of salvation by works and reward was closed to him, -- with the Reformation principle: salvation is by faith. Thus

Protestant orthodoxy was grafted boldly as a branch onto a Thomistic theological tree. 1OO

99. For a discussion of the issue of the "revival" of Augustine's symbolic account of the sacraments to oppose the later "realist" account (as in Dugmore's thesis), see T.M. Parker, review of C.W. Dugmore, The Mass and the English Reformers, in Journal of Theological Studies, n.s. xii (1961), 132-146. Parker argued effectively that Dugmore's opposition of "symbolist" and "realist" was faulty; for Augustine, precisely because of his Platonism, the sacramental signs were involved in a real relation with that of which they were signs. This was the opposite assumption from that of the English Reformation on the "logic" of symbolism.

100. Hillerdal laments that there is no real dialectic between in Hooker. Reason and Revelation, 41. The reason is clear: a part of the second eternal law, for Hooker, that is, the "divine law," which must be revealed in order for the human being to be given the The Platonism of Hooker -353-

When this is all said, the conclusions may seem a little disappointing: this study of Hooker's account of grace has confirmed the conclusions of some others on other topics: Hooker's theology is a

Neoplatonist one, particularly in the mould of Proclus as interpreted by

Thomas and others. That theology's structure involves the recognition of the over-riding pattern of the coming to be of all things and the return of the rational creature to God. It had been the structure adopted by the obscure Syrian monk writing under the pseudonym of Paul's convert Dionysius in order to provide Christianity with its most enduring theological structure. It had been the structure of the later, somewhat more historically established figure Erigena, who took over

Dionysius' writings and added to them. It had been, in another world, that pattern of John of Damascus. Thomas had retrieved it, in the midst of the Aristotelian revival of the thirteenth century, and had made it the structure which bore his enthusiastic Aristotelian domestications.

To this structure, Hooker returned in the sixteenth century, allowing an enduring "family resemblance" in Anglican theology with this venerable pattern.

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------. A Speciall Treatise of Gods Prouidence, and of the comforts against all kinde of crosses & calamities to be fetched from the same. With an exposition of the 107. Psalme. Heerunto is added an appendix of certaine Sermons & Questions, (conteining sweet and comfortable doctrine) as they were uttered and disputed ad Clerum in Cambridge. By P. Baro, D. in Diui. Englished by I[ohn] L[udham] Vicar of Wethers-fielde. Imprinted by John Wolfe. [London: 1588]

------. A Special Treatise of Gods prouidence and of comforts against all kinde of crosses and calamities to be drawne from the same. With an exposition of the 107. Psalme. Written in Latine by Andreas Hyperius (pseudonym], and Englished by I[ohn] L[udham] Vicar of Wethers-fielde. Printed at London by John Wolfe, 1602. [2nd edition]

------. Summa Trium de Praedestinatione Sententiarum. [First published, 1613] Reprinted in, Praestantium ac Eruditorum Virorum Epistolae Ecclesiasticae et Theologicae, Quarum longe major pars scripta est a Jae. Arminio, Joan. Uytenbogardo, Conr. Vorstio, Ger. Joann. Vossio, Hug. Grotio, Sim. Episcopio, Casp. Barlaeo. Editio secunda, ab innumeris mendis repurgata, et altera parte auctior. Amstelaedami: apud Henricum Wetstenium, mdclxxxiv. [First published, 1660]

Becon, Thomas. The Catechism of Thomas Becon with other pieces written by him in the reign of King Edward the Sixth. ed. John Ayre. (Parker Society) Cambridge: University Press, 1844.

------. Prayers and other Pieces of Thomas Becon. ed. John Ayre. (Parker Society) Cambridge: University Press, 1844.

Bradford, John. The Writings of John Bradford, MA., Fellow of Pembroke Hall, Cambridge, and Prebendary of St Paul's, Martyr 1555, containing Letters, Treatises, Remains [vol. ii] ed. Aubrey Townsend. (Parker Society) Cambridge: University Press, 1853. Bibliography -358-

------. The Writings of John Bradford, M.A., Fellow of Pembroke Hall, Cambridge, and Prebendary of St Paul's, Martyr 1555, containing Sermons, Meditations, Examinations, &c. [vol. i] ed. Aubrey Townsend. (Parker Society) Cambridge: University Press, 1848.

Bucer, Martin. Common Places of Martin Bucer. trans. and ed. D.F. Wright {The Courtenay Library of Reformation Classics, 4) Appleford, Berkshire: The Sutton Courtenay Press, 1972.

Bullinger, Henry. The Decades of Henry Bullinger. 4 vols. Translated by H.I. [1577 etc.] ed. Thomas Harding. (Parker Society) Cambridge: University Press, 1849-1852.

Calvin, John. Calvin: Institutes of the Christian Religion. 2 vols. ed. John T. McNeill; trans. Ford Lewis Battles. (Library of Christian Classics, vols. xx and xxi) Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960.

------. Joannis Calvini Instituto Christianae Religionis. ed. A. Tholuck. 2 vols. Berlin: Wm Thome, 1846.

Cardwell, Edward (ed.) The Reformation of the Ecclesiastical Laws as attempted in the reigns of King Henry VIII, King Edward VI, and Queen Elizabeth. Oxford: University Press, 1850.

Certain Sermons or Homilies appointed to be read in Churches in the time of Queen Elizabeth of famous memory. London: S.P.C.K., 1908.

Certain Sermons appointed by the Queen's Majesty to be declared and read by all parsons, vicars, and curates, every Sunday and Holiday in their churches; and by Her Grace's advice perused and overseen for the better understanding of the simple people. Newly imprinted in parts according as is mentioned in the Book of Common Prayers, 1574. [ed. G.E. Corrie.] Cambridge: John W. Parker, 1851.

Certaine Sermons or Homilies appoynted to be read in Churches, In the time of the late Queen Elizabeth of famous memory. And now thought fit to be reprinted by Authority from the King's most Excellent Majesty. London: John Norton, 1633.

Certain Sermons or Homilies (1547) and A Homily against Disobedience and Wylfull Rebellion (1570): a critical edition. ed. Ronald B. Bond. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987.

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I. Two Speeches of the late Lord Ushers, The one of the Kings Supremacy, the Other of the Duty of Subjects to supply the Kings Necessities. II. His Judgment and Practice in Point of Loyalty, Episcopacy, Liturgy and Constitutions of the Church of England, III. Mr. Hookers Judgment of the Kings Power in matters of Religion, advancement of Bishops &c. IV. Bishop Andrews of Church-Government &c. both confirmed and enlarged by the said Primate. V. A Letter of Dr Hadrianus Saravia of the like Subjects. Unto which is added a Sermon of Regal Power, and the Novelty of the Doctrine of Resistance, Also a Preface by the Right Reverend Father in God, the Lord Bishop of Lincoln. London: R. Hodgkinson, 1661.

Colet, John. An exposition of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, delivered as lectures in the University of Oxford about the year 1497. trans. J.H. Lupton. London, 1873. [Republished Ridgewood, N.J.: Gregg Press, 1965]

------. Letters to Radulphus on the Mosaic Account of Creation, together with Other Treatises. trans. J.H. Lupton. London: 1876. [Republished Ridgewood, N.J.: Gregg Press, 1966]

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Cooper, Thomas. An Answer in Defence of the Truth against the Apology of Private Mass. By T. Cooper, afterwards Bishop, First of London, and then of Winchester. Published in 1562. To which is prefixed (as in the original edition) the work mentioned, entitled An Apology of Private Mass, an anonymous popish treatise against Bishop Jewel. ed. William Goode. (Parker Society) Cambridge: University Press, 1850.

Corpus et Syntagmata Conf essionum Fidei quae in diversis regnis et nationibus, ecclesiarum nomine fuerunt authentice editae: in celeberrimus conuentibus exhibitae, publicaque auctoritate comprobatae, etc. Genevae: Sumptibus Petri Chouet, 1654.

Corro, Antonio de. A Theological Dialogue. Wherin the Epistle of S. to the Romanes is expounded. Gathered and set together out of the Readings of Antonie Corranus of Siville, Professor of Divinitie. Imprinted at London by Thomas Purfoote, dwelling in Paules Churchyarde at the signe of the Lucrece, 1575.

Covel, William. A Just and Temperate Defence of the Five Books of Ecclesiastical Policie, written by M Richard Hooker Against an uncharitable Letter of certain English Protestants (as they terme Bibliography -360-

themselves) craving resolution, in some matters of doctrine, which seeme to overthrow the foundation of religion, and the Church amongst us. London: P. Short for Clement Knight, 1603.

Cranmer, Thomas. The Remains of Thomas Cranmer. ed. Henry Jenkyns. 4 vols. Oxford: University Press, 1833.

------. The Works of Thomas Cranmer. intro. J.I. Packer. ed. G.E. Duffield. (The Courtenay Library of Reformation Classics, 2) Appleford, Berkshire, England: The Sutton Courtenay Press, 1964.

------. Writings and Disputations of Thomas Cranmer, , Martyr, 1556, Relative to the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper. ed. John Edmund Cox. (Parker Society) Cambridge: University Press, 1844.

------. Miscellaneous Writings and Letters of Thomas Cranmer, Archbishop of Canterbury, Martyr, 1556. ed. John Edmund Cox. (Parker Society) Cambridge: University Press, 1846.

Formularies of the Faith put forth by authority during the reign of Henry VIII viz. Articles about Religion, 1536, The Institution of a Christian Man, 1537, A Necessary Doctrine and Erudition for Any Christian Man, 1543. [ed. Charles Lloyd] Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1825.

Foxe, John. The Acts and Monuments of John Foxe. 4th ed. 6 vols. London: The Religious Tract Society, n.d.

Fulke, William. A Defence of the Sincere and True Translations of the Holy Scriptures into the English Tongue, against the Cavils of Gregory Martin by William Fulke, D.D., Master of Pembroke Hall, Cambridge. ed. Charles Henry Hartshorne. (Parker Society) Cambridge: University Press, 1843.

Gardiner, Stephen. The Letters of . ed. James Arthur Muller. Cambridge: University Press, 1933.

[Geneva Bible] The Bible, that is, The holy Scriptures conteined in the Olde and Newe Testament, translated according to the Ebrew and Greeke, and conferred with the best translations in divers languages. With most profitable Annotations upon all the hard places, and other things of great importance. London: Christopher Barker, 1599.

Harsnett, Samuel. "A sermon Preached at S. Pauls Cross in London, the 27. day of October, Anno Reginae Elizabethae 26. by Samuel Harsnet Bibliography -361-

then Fellow of Pembroke Hall in Cambridg, but afterwards Lord Arch­ Bishop of Yorke." Printed in Three Sermons Preached by the Reverend Richard Stuart, Dean of St. Pauls, afterwards Dean of Westminster, and Clerk of the Closet to the late King Charles. To which is added A fourth Sermon, Preached by the Right Reverend Father in God Samuel Harsnett Lord Arch-bishop of York. The second edition corrected and amended. London: Printed for G. Bedel and T. Collins, and are to be sold at their shop in Middle-Temple Gate in Fleet-street, 1658

Henry VIII. Assertio Septem Sacramentorum. ed. Louis O'Donovan. New York: Benziger, 1908.

Heylyn, Peter. The Historical and Miscellaneous Tracts of the Reverend Peter Heylyn, D.D. now collected into one volume. London: M. Clarke, 1681.

Hooker, Richard. Book I of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity. Edited by R.W. Church. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1882.

------. The Answere of Mr. Richard Hooker to a Supplication preferred by Mr Walter Travers to the HH. Lords of the Privy Councell. Oxford: Joseph Barnes, 1612. (The English Experience, number 807.) Facsimile reprinted 1976 by Walter J. Johnson.

------. The ecclesiastical polity and other works of Richard Hooker; with his life by Izaak Walton, and Strype's interpolations; to which are now first added, the "Christian Letter" to Mr. Hooker, and Dr. Covel's "Just & temperate defence" in reply to it; accompanied by an introduction, a life of Thomas Cartwright, B.D. and numerous notes, by Benjamin Hanbury. 3 vols. London: Holdsworth and Ball, 1830.

------. A sermon of Richard Hooker author of those learned books of Ecclesiastical Politie, Found in the Study of the late Learned Bishop Andrews. London: Printed for Richard Marriott, 1678. [Bound with Isaac Walton. The life of Dr. Sanderson, later Bishop of Lincoln, to which is added some short tracts or cases of conscience, written by the said Bishop. London: R. Marriott, 1678.]

------. Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity, Book VIII, With an introduction by Raymond Aaron Houk. New York: Columbia University Press, 1931.

Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie. Eyght Books. [Books I-VJ London: John Windet, [1594]. (The English Experience number 390) Facsimile printed 1971 by Da Capo Press. Bibliography -362-

------. Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie. Eight Books. [Books I-V] London: William Stanbye, [1622].

------. Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie. Eight Books. [Books I-V] London: Richard Bishop, [1639].

------. Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, The Fifth Book. A new edition with prolegomena and appendices by Ronald Bayne, M.A. London: Macmillan, 1902.

------. Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity. 2 vols. Introduction by Christopher Morris. (Everyman's Library) London: Dent, 1907.

------. Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity. An abridged edition. ed. A.S. McGrade and Brian Vickers. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975.

------. Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Preface, Books I to IV. Edited by Georges Edelen. {The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker, volume one) Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press, 1977.

------. Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Book V. Edited by W. Speed Hill. (The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker, volume two) Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press, I 977.

------. Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Books VI, VII, VIII. Edited by P.G. Stanwood. (The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker, volume three) Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press, 1981.

------. Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Attack and Response. Edited by John E. Booty. (The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker, volume four) Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press, 1982.

------. The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity. Books I-IV. Introduction by Henry Morley. London: George Routledge and Sons, 1888.

------. The Works of Mr. Richard Hooker (that Learned, Godly, Judicious, and Elequent Divine) vindicating the Church of England as truly Christian, and duly Reformed: In Eight Books of Ecclesiastical Polity. Now Compleated, As with the Sixth and Eighth, so with the Seventh, (touching Episcopacy, as the Primitive, Catholick and Apostolick Governance of the Church) out Bibliography -363-

of his own Manuscripts, never before Published. With an account of his Holy Life, and Happy Death, Written by Dr. John Gauden, now Bishop of Exeter. The entire Edition Dedicated to the Kings Most Excellent Majestie, Charis the II. By whose Royal Father (near His Martyrdom) the former Five Books (the onely extant) were commended to his dear Children, as an excellent means to satisfy Private Scruples, and settle the Publique Peace of this Church and Kingdom. London: J. Best for Andrew Cook, 1662.

------. The Works of that Learned and Judicious Divine Mr. Richard Hooker with an account of his life and death by Isaac Walton, edited by John Keble, revised by R.W. Church and F. Paget. Seventh edition. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1888.

------. Two Sermons upon Part of S. Judes Epistle. Oxford: Joseph Barnes, 1614. (The English Experience, number 195.) Facsimile reprinted 1969 by Da Capo Press.

Hooper, John. Early Writings of John Hooper, Comprising The Declaration of Christ and His Office, Answer to Bishop Gardiner, , Sermons on Jonas, Funeral Sermon. ed. Samuel Carr. (Parker Society) Cambridge: University Press, 1843.

------. Later Works of Bishop Hooper, together with his Letters and other Pieces. ed. Charles Nevinson. (Parker Society) Cambridge: University Press, 1852.

The Institution of a Christen Man, Conteyninge the Exposition of Interpretation of the Commune Crede, of the Seven Sacramentes, of the x. Commandements, & of the Pater Noster, and the Ave Maria, Justification and Purgatorie. ["The Bishops' Book"] London: 1537.

Jewel, John. The Works of . 4 vols. ed. John Ayre. (Parker Society) Cambridge: University Press, 1845-1850.

The King's Book, or A Necessary Doctrine and Erudition for any Christian Man, 1543. [ed. Charles Lloyd, 1825, photographically printed] intro. T.A. Lacey. London: S.P.C.K., 1932.

Latimer, Hugh. Sermons of Hugh Latimer, sometime Bishop of Worcester, Martyr 1555. ed. George Elwes Corrie. (Parker Society) Cambridge: University Press, 1844.

------. Sermons and Remains of Hugh Latimer, sometime Bishop of Worcester, Martyr 1555. ed. George Elwes Corrie. (Parker Society) Cambridge: University Press, 1855. Bibliography -364-

Laud, William. A Relation of the Conference between William Laud, late Lord Archbishop of Canterbury, and Mr Fisher the Jesuit, by the Command of King James, of ever blessed memory, with An Answer to such exceptions as A.C. takes to it. 6th ed. (Library of Anglo­ Catholic Theology) Oxford: John , 1849.

Liturgies and Occasional Forms of Prayer set forth in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth. ed. William Keatinge Clay. (Parker Society) Cambridge: University Press, 1847.

Luther, Martin. The Babylonian Captivity of the Church. In Luther's Works, vol. 36, ed. Abdel Ross Wentz. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1959.

------. Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and Salvation. trans. & ed. Philip S. Watson. (Library of Christian Classics, xvii) Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1969.

------. Luther: Lectures on Romans. trans. & ed. Wilhelm Pauck. (Library of Christian Classics, xv) Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1961.

------. Works. 6 vols. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1932.

Melanchthon, Philipp. Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine: Loci Communes 1555. Trans. Clyde L. Manschrek. New York: , 1965.

Montagu, Richard. A Gagg for the New Gospell? No: A New Gagg For an Old Goose. Who would needes undertake to stop all Protestants mouths for ever with 276 places out of their owne English Bibles. Or An Answere to a late Abridger of Controversies, and Belyar of the Protestants Doctrine. London: 1624.

------. Apello Caesarem. A Just Appeale From Two Unjust Informers. London: I 625.

Nowell, Alexander. A Catechism written in Latin by Alexander Nowell, Dean of St Paul's, together with the same catechism translated into English by Thomas Norton. ed. G.E. Corrie. (Parker Society) Cambridge: University Press, 1853.

Original Letters Relative to the English Reformation Written During the Reigns of King Henry VIII, King Edward VI, and Queen Mary: Chiefly from the Archives of Zurich. trans. and ed. Hastings Robinson. 1 vol. in 2. (Parker Society) Cambridge: University Press, 1846-7. Bibliography -365-

A parte of a register, contayninge sundrie memorable matters, written by divers godly and learned in our time, which stande for, and desire the reformation of our Church, in Discipline and Ceremonies, accordinge to the pure worde of God, and the La we of our Lande. [Middleburg: R. Schilders, 1593]

Perkins, William. A Golden Chaine, or The Description of Theologie, Containing the Order of the Causes of Salvation and Damnation, According to Gods Word. A Viewe whereof is to be seene in the Table Annexed. Written in Latine, and Translated by R.H. Herunto is adjoined the Order which M Used in Comforting Afflicted Consciences. The Second Edition, much enlarged. A Table at the End. Cambridge: John Legate, 1597.

------. The Work of William Perkins. Introduced and Edited by Ian Breward. (The Courtenay Library of Reformation Classics, Volume 3) Abingdon: The Sutton Courtenay Press, 1970.

Philpot, John. The Examinations and Writings of John Philpot, B.C.L., Archdeacon of Westminster, Martyr, 1555. ed. Robert Eden. (Parker Society) Cambridge: University Press, 1842.

Pilkington, James. The Works of James Pilkington. ed. James Scholefield. (Parker Society) Cambridge: University Press, 1842.

Private Prayers Put Forth By Authority During the Reign of Queen Elizabeth. The Primer of 1559. The Orarium of 1560. The Preces Privatae of 1564. The Book of Christian Prayers of 1578. With an appendix, containing The Litany of 1544. ed. William Keatinge Clay. (Parker Society) Cambridge: University Press, 1851.

Proclus. The Elements of Theology. A Revised Text, with Translation, Introduction and Commentary by E.R. Dodds. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963.

Prosper of Aquitaine. S. Prosperi Aquitani, S. Augustini Discipuli, S. Leonis Papae Notarii, Opera Omnia juxta mss., codices, necnon editiones antiquiores et castigatiores, accurate recognita, secundum ordinem temporum disposita, et chronico integro ejusdem, ab ortu rerum usque ad obitum Valentiniani III et Romam a Vandalis captam pertinente, locupletata. Accedunt Idatii et Marcellini Comitis Chronica ad exquisitam sirmondi editionem recensita. Accurante et Denuo recognoscente J.-P. Migne, Bibliothecae Cieri Universae sive Cursum Completorum in Singulos Scientiae Ecclesiasticae Ramos Editore. [vol. 51] Paris: 1861. [Abbreviated PL] Bibliography -366-

------. The Call of All Nations. Translated and annotated by P. de Letter. (Ancient Christian Writers, no. 14) Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1952.

------. Defence of St Augustine. Translated and annotated by P. de Letter. (Ancient Christian Writers, no. 32) Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1963.

Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite. The Divine Names and Mystical Theology. Trans. John D. Jones. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980.

Puritan Manifestoes. A Study of the Origin of the Puritan Revolt. With a reprint of the Admonition to the Parliament and kindred documents, 1572. ed. W.H. Frere and C.E. Douglas. London: S.P.C.K., 1907.

Ridley, Nicholas. The Works of Nicholas Ridley, D.D., sometime Lord Bishop of London, Martyr, 1555. ed. Henry Christmas. (Parker Society) Cambridge: University Press, 1841.

Rogers, Thomas. The Catholic Doctrine of the Church of England: an exposition of the thirty-nine articles. ed. J.J.S. Perowne. (Parker Society) Cambridge: University Press, 1854.

Sanderson, Robert. The Works of Robert Sanderson, D.D., sometime Bishop of Lincoln, now first collected by William Jacobson. 6 vols. Oxford: University Press, 1854.

Sandys, Edwin. The Sermons of Edwin Sandys to which are added Some Miscellaneous Pieces by the same author. ed. John Ayre. (Parker Society) Cambridge: University Press, 1841.

The Sarum Missal done into English. Translated by A. Harford Pearson. 2nd ed. London: The Church Printing Company, 1884.

Schaff, Philip. (ed.) The Creeds of Christendom, with a History and Critical Notes. 3 vols. Sixth edition. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 1983.

Strype, John. Annals of the Reformation and Establishment of Religion, and other various occurences in the Church of England, during Queen Elizabeth's happy reign; together with an appendix of original papers of state, records and letters. 4 vols. in 7. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1824.

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------. Memorials of the Most Reverend Father in God Thomas Cranmer. 2 vols. London: George Routledge, 1853.

The Two Liturgies A.D. 1549, and A.D. 1552: with other Documents set forth by Authority in the Reign of King Edward VI. viz. The Order of Communion, 1548. The Primer, 1553. The Catechism and Articles, 1553. Catechismus Brevis, 1553. ed. Joseph Ketley. (Parker Society) Cambridge: University Press, 1844.

Travers, Walter. A Supplication made to the Privy Counsel. Oxford: Joseph Barnes, 1612. (The English Experience, number 833.) Facsimile reprinted Walter J. Johnson, 1976.

Tyndale, William. Doctrinal Treatises and Introductions to Different Portions of the Holy Scriptures, by William Tyndale, Martyr, 1536. ed. Henry Walter. (Parker Society) Cambridge: University Press, 1848.

------. Expositions and Notes on Sundry Portions of the Holy Scriptures, together with the Practice of Prelates, by William Tyndale, Martyr, 1536. ed. Henry Walter. (Parker Society) Cambridge: University Press, 1849.

------. An Answer to Sir 's Dialogue, The Supper of the Lord after the true Meaning of John VI and I Cor. XI, and Wm Tracy's Testament expounded. By William Tyndale, Martyr, 1536. ed. Henry Walter. (Parker Society) Cambridge: University Press, 1850.

Vermigli, Pietro Martire [Peter Martyr]. The Common Places of the most famous and renowmed Divine Doctor Peter Martyr, divided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the Sewers of her Majesties most Honourable Chamber. [London: 1583]

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Whitgift, John. The Works of John Whitgift. 3 vols. ed. John Ayre. (Parker Society) Cambridge: University Press, 1851-1853.

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The Zurich Letters, Comprising the Correspondence of Several English Bishops and Others with some of the Helvetian Reformers, During the Reign of Queen Elizabeth. trans. and ed. Hastings Robinson. 2 vols. (Parker Society) Cambridge: University Press, 1842-5.

Zwingli, Ulrdrych. Luther's and Zwingli's Propositions for Debate. The Ninety-five Theses of 31 October 1517 and The Sixty-seven Articles of 19 January 1523. ed. and trans. Carl S. Meyer. Leiden: Brill, 1963.

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Allen, J.W. A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century. London: Methuen & Co., 1928.

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------. "Richard Hooker's Book VI: A Reconstruction," The Huntington Library Quarterly 42 (1978), 117-139.

Atchley, E.G. Cuthbert. On the of the Eucharistic Liturgy and in the Consecration of the Font. (Alcuin Club Collections, 31) London: Oxford University Press, 1935.

Backhuizen van den Brink, J.N. "Ratramn's Eucharistic Doctrine and its influence in Sixteenth Century England," in G.J. Cuming (ed.), Studies in Church History. vol. ii. London: Thomas Nelson, 1965.

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Bennett, G.V. and J.D. Walsh. (eds) Essays in Modern Church History, in Memory of Norman Sykes. London: Adam & Charles Black, 1966.

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Brooks, Peter. Thomas Cranmer's Doctrine of the Eucharist: An Essay in Historical Development. New York: Seabury Press, 1965.

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Chenu, M.-D. Towards Understanding Saint Thomas. Trans. A.M. Landry and D. Hughes. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1964.

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