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USNATO READER TABLE OF CONTENTS Michael Newlin 1963-1967 Political-Military Officer, US Mission to Regional Organizations, Paris, rance Thomas W. Wilson 1964-1968 Political Advisor, US Mission to NATO, Brussels ,arlan Cleveland 196.-1969 U.S. Permanent Representative, Paris 0 Brussels 1onald A. 2ruse 196.-1968 Political Military Advisor, NATO, Paris 1968-1970 Assistant to NATO Security 4eneral, Paris Charles Anthony 4illespie 1967-1968 Administrative and Security Officer, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Robert A. Martin 1967-1969 Arms Control and 1isarmament Officer, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Marten 6an ,euven 1967-1970 7egal Advisor, US Mission to NATO, Brussels 8oseph . 1onelan, 8r. 1968-1969 Comptroller, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Raymond 7. 4arthoff 1968-1970 Counselor for Political-Military Affairs, US Mission to NATO, Brussels 8ohn W. 2imball 1968-1969 E:ecutive Assistant, US Mission to NATO, Brussels 1969-1971 Political Military Affairs, US Mission to NATO, Brussels 4erald B. ,elman 1968-1973 Political Officer, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Ralph Earle, II 1969-1972 1efense Advisor, US Mission to NATO, Brussels 7ucian ,eichler 1970-1971 Senior Officer Training, NATO 1efense College, Rome, Italy Perry W. 7inder 1970-1973 1eputy Administrative Officer, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Theodore Wilkinson 1970-1974 Political-Military Officer, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Thomas M. T. Niles 1971-1973 1eputy Chief of Mission, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Mark C. 7issfelt 1973-1976 Assistant 1irector, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Bruce W. Clark 1973-1977 Special Assistant to Ambassador, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Stephen 8. 7edogar 1973-1976 Political Officer, Brussels 1981-1987 1eputy Chief of Mission, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Pierre Shostal 1974-1977 Political Officer, US Mission to NATO, Brussels rank ,. Perez 1974-1977 Political Advisor, US Mission to NATO, Brussels 1avid T. 8ones 1974-1976 NATO 1esk Officer, European Bureau, Washington, 1C 1976-1980 Political Military Officer, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Miles S. Pendleton, 8r. 1976-1979 Political Officer, US Mission to NATO, Brussels 8ack Mendelsohn 1977-1979 Political-Military Officer, US Mission to NATO, Brussels 7ucian ,eichler 1977-1980 1eputy Assistant Secretary 4eneral for Political Affairs, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Maynard Wayne 4litman 1977-1981 1eputy Chief of Mission, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Reuben 7ev 1980-1983 International Administrative Officer, Brussels 8ohn M. Evans 1983-1986 U.S. Mission to NATO, Brussels Rudolf 6. Perina 198.-1987 Political Officer, US Mission to NATO, Brussels R. Barry ulton 1987-1991 Public Affairs Officer, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Phillip Merrill 1990-1992 Assistant Secretary 4eneral, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Robert M. Beecroft 1991-1994 Political Officer, US Mission to NATO, Brussels MICHAEL NEWLIN Political-Military Officer, US Mi ion to Regional Organization Pari , France (1963-1967) Ambassador Michael Newlin was born in North Carolina in 1929. He received both his bachelor‘s degree and master‘s degree from Harvard University in 19 9 and 1951, respectively. His career has included positions in Frankfort, Oslo, Paris, Brussels, Leopoldville/,inshasa, Jerusalem, .ienna, and an ambassadorship to Algeria. Ambassador Newlin was interviewed by Thomas 0unnigan in 1991 and by Charles 2tuart Kennedy in 2004. 56 7ou left UNP in 1948 and moved to U2RO. :hat do those initials stand for; NEW7IN: United States Mission to Regional Organizations. That was supposed to cover a variety of organizations, but basically it was the U.S. Mission to NATO. 56 The head of it at that time was Tom Finletter; NEW7IN: Thomas 2. inletter of the liberal wing of the 1emocratic Party of Stevenson, Eleanor Roosevelt. A former Secretary of the Air orce and New York lawyer. 56 Did he take on a strong hands-on approach or did he let his staff run things; NEW7IN: inletter's great goal was the Multilateral orce--the M7 --which was to put strategic nuclear weapons on cargo ships and then to have the 4ermans and others on board with us. And this was his great--like the ancient mariner preoccupation. A7aughter) As far as the 1emocratic Party was concerned, 7B8 and inletter were opposites. In one of his first visits to Washington after 2ennedy's death inletter managed to have a small meeting with 7B8 at which he made a strong pitch for the multilateral force. Not all concerned agencies were present. 7B8 told inletter to go full steam ahead. As we know, not even a meeting with the President can guarantee the shelf life of a controversial policy. One needs constant broad-based support in Washington which was lacking. In spite of the green light, the administration did not push the M7 proCect but it was not formally dropped. After ,arlan Cleveland angered 7B8 over leaking a story on UN finances, he was sent to replace inletter thereby dooming the M7 . Cleveland's De:ileD to NATO was a great boon to the Alliance. inletter told a story about a meeting he had with President Truman while he was serving as Secretary of the Air orce. An important policy decision had come up in which there were compelling arguments on both sides. inletter, the good attorney he was, laid out the pros and cons dispassionately. Truman asked, DWhat is the right thing to doED inletter repeated his presentation after which Truman repeated his Fuestion. Cornered, inletter then said what he would do if he were President. Truman said, DAlways do the right thingG it will please your friends and annoy your enemies.D H: :hat was your position on the NATO delegation; NEW7IN: I started out as head of the PoliticalIMilitary unit which had sort of languished because the idea of a oreign Service Officer working on PoliticalIMilitary affairs was not popular with the military side of the house. There were three of us in that office, officers more brilliant than I. We worked on the Multilateral orce and we worked on NATO infrastructure, and on the whole series of problems relating to de 4aulle's decision to make the military leave. I did a great deal of work during the time I was there on moving NATO from Paris to Brussels. 56 :hat about NATO nuclear forces; :e were quite concerned at the time that the Germans not get their hands on any nuclear weapons. NEW7IN: Yes. That was the rationale for the M7 --that we blunt any desire on the part of the 4ermans to develop their own nuclear capabilities. That you associate them getting close to nuclear weapons but keep actual usage in U.S. hands. Also, I was involved in setting up something that has become a permanent thing--the NATO Nuclear Planning 4roup. That was started while I was there and I was the 4roup's first secretary. That was an initiative of McNamara. McNamara wanted, among other things, to educate the Europeans as to the realities of nuclear weapons. ,e used the 4roup to show what even tactical nuclear weapons would do to the population. I think that was useful. Everybody had to have special clearances. McNamara and other 1efense Ministers would come. There were Cust a few people there. I had to take my turn taking notes. I think that was a useful thing to have done. 56 :hat were your relations with the 2upreme Allied Commander there, General Lemnitzer at the time, and his staff; NEW7IN: inletter was a strong believer in the absolute supremacy of the North Atlantic Council--that you were the personal representative of the head of government and the chief of state and that he should be supreme. When 4eneral Norstad, SACEUR, left, he said, DOne down, one to go.D The other one was the NATO Secretary 4eneral, Stikker. There were no problems really with 7emnitzer other than once we got an instruction that I had to deliver in the middle of the night. The telegram instructed SACEUR to get involved with the Cyprus dispute. 7emnitzer read the instructions and said, DThese are the damndest things I've ever seen.D It was where the State 1epartment wanted the Supreme Allied Commander to get involved in one of the intractable problems no one else had been able to solve. 7emnitzer successfully avoided the assignment. 56 Of course, you probably maintained close relations with the 2ACEUR political advisor on it, too. NEW7IN: Yes. That was 8ohn Burns. We had very good relations with him. 56 2ome of the political issues that came up at that time was U.2. troop withdrawal from Europe. 0id you get involved in that at all; NEW7IN: Well, certainly the mission as I recall, we strongly advised against anything like that. 56 7es. And what about the French nuclear force; NEW7IN: Well, the rench of course, went their own way. There was really very little that we could do. I guess we watched with restrained amusement when critics asked, DWho is your enemyE Why are you building thisED 1e 4aulle didn't want to say, of course, DI'm building it just out of national pride.D ,e said, DIt will be aimed a tout azimuths.D A7aughter) I said to my rench colleagues, DI hope for your sake that you don't accidentally fire one of those things towards the United StatesJD 56 :ere you involved in the question of the fleAible response, which was then the big issue in NATO; NEW7IN: Yes. 6ery, very much so. In the PoliticalIMilitary Section we certainly were involved. Rather than massive retaliation, fle:ible response. 56 That again, played in with what became to McNamara and the new Administration the NATO Nuclear Planning Group. That was a part of that, you didnBt just sit back and say, D:ell, the American nuclear deterrent will take care of any problems.D There were always wrangles.

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