Strategic Dilemmas, Clashing Identities, and Free Trade
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CHINA- KOREA RELATIONS STRATEGIC DILEMMAS, CLASHING IDENTITIES, AND FREE TRADE SCOTT SNYDER, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS SEE-WON BYUN, SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY PRC State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s November visit to Seoul produced limited substantive results while signaling Beijing’s deeper strategic intentions toward the United States’ Asian allies. China’s commemorations of the Korean War’s 70th anniversary in October provided reassurances to North Korea while triggering a war of words with South Koreans, ranging from the foreign ministry to the K-pop group BTS. On social media, the history controversy was a prelude to wider cultural clashes on a host of issues. While the repercussions of COVID-19 and US-China trade tensions challenge China and South Korea’s economic agenda, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership’s signing in November raised prospects for regional multilateralism. Meanwhile, North Korea’s self-imposed quarantine resulted in a precipitous drop in North Korean imports from China according to China’s official trade statistics. UN Panel of Experts-led monitoring of North Korean off-the-books exports of coal and sand to China drew harsh US criticisms and catalyzed the announcement of a US Treasury- administered rewards program for reporting on primarily Chinese entities engaged in illicit trade with North Korea. Coupled with the incoming Biden administration’s envisioned regional architecture and the campaign’s declared reliance on multilateral approaches to North Korea, Asia’s multilateral initiatives may heighten Seoul’s US-China dilemma. This article is extracted from Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal of Bilateral Relations in the Indo-Pacific, Vol. 22, No. 3, January 2021. Preferred citation: See-Won Byun, “China-Korea Relations: Strategic Dilemmas, Clashing Identities, and Free Trade,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp 105-114. CHINA- KOREA RELATIONS | JANU ARY 2021 105 Wang Yi’s Visit to Seoul: ‘Shared Aspirations’ or diplomatic and security affairs. A Korea Herald ‘Unanswered Courtship?’ editorial on China’s “unanswered courtship” argued that Wang “was lavish in his rhetoric … Wang Yi’s Nov. 25-27 visit to Seoul included but failed to commit to substantial measures.” meetings with President Moon Jae-in, Foreign The Dong-A Ilbo noted “no progress” in Minister Kang Kyung-wha, National Assembly Beijing’s THAAD demands and restrictions on Speaker Park Byeong-seug, Special Presidential Korean cultural content. While Korean Advisor for Foreign and Security Affairs Moon observers largely dismissed the “consensus” for Chung-in, and ruling party leaders. Paired with lacking substance, even liberal outlets like Wang’s Tokyo visit, it was widely perceived as Hankyoreh appeared wary of Beijing’s deeper an effort to consolidate ties with US allies ahead intentions of “recruiting Seoul to its side.” As of the Biden administration’s inauguration. The Kim Heung-kyu at Ajou University argued, the visit fell short of South Korean expectations for most important reason for Wang’s visit was a Xi-Moon summit in Seoul by the end of 2020. “US-China strategic competition.” A Korea Wang conveyed Xi’s message of “personal Times editorial concluded that “Wang Yi’s visit friendship and mutual trust” to Moon, and raises both hope and anxiety,” requiring reminded his counterpart Kang that “the US is “flexible diplomacy” that can “strike a balance not the only country in this world." To Park, between Beijing and Washington.” Wang expressed support for an inter-Korean peace process without external interference, PRC and ROK officials discussed a range of stating, “the fate of the peninsula should be issues reaffirming the Xi-Moon agreements given to the two countries.” He championed from December 2019. Telephone talks were held multilateralism over “neo-Cold War” during on Sept. 10 between nuclear envoys Luo Zhaohui talks with Moon Chung-in. According to and Lee Do-hoon, and on Oct. 21 between China’s state media, Wang’s Northeast Asia tour defense ministers Wei Fenghe and Suh Wook. demonstrated “regional cohesion” and Fisheries officials on Nov. 6 and Dec. 17 agreed “resilience against outside pressure.” His Seoul to reduce fishing boat quotas in exclusive visit in particular forged a “model for practical economic zones (EEZs) and strengthen diplomacy” signifying “shared aspirations” of responses to illegal fishing. According to Korean “strategic partners.” As Wang claimed, “My lawmakers, the number of reported cases of visit to South Korea … is intended to show the China’s illegal fishing in ROK waters more than importance we attach to China-South Korea doubled in 2017-2019, and PRC warships relations through actual action.” crossing the EEZ median line represented almost 80% of cases in 2019. In video talks with PRC counterpart Le Yucheng on Dec. 23, Vice Foreign Minister Choi Jong-kun also raised concern over China’s entry into South Korea’s KADIZ during China-Russia air exercises. In more positive developments, foreign ministry officials held video talks on Nov. 9 ahead of ASEAN summits marking RCEP’s signing. Environment ministers Huang Runqiu and Cho Myung-rae held virtual talks on Nov. 11, citing Xi and Moon’s recently announced plans to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050 and 2060 respectively. Figure 1 Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi meets South As seen during Wang Yi’s visit, recent bilateral Korean President Moon Jae-in in Seoul. Photo: Yonhap meetings received Korean media attacks on China’s “arrogance” and Moon’s “submissive” China’s foreign ministry released a 10-point leadership. As a Korea Herald editorial argued consensus between Wang and Kang on Nov. 26, after the apparent suspension of Samsung- pledging cooperation on COVID-19, cultural chartered flights to China in November: exchanges, development and trade, peninsula “China’s arrogance toward Korea is a problem, peace and stability, and dialogue mechanisms. but as problematic is the submissive attitude of Seoul’s version of the meeting outcome did not the Moon administration.” A Dong-A Ilbo include Beijing’s envisioned “2+2” dialogue on article on ultrafine dust pollution from China 106 JANUARY 202 1 | CHINA- KOREA RELATIONS similarly urged Seoul to “abandon its greeting ceremony” signaling that China will submissive attitude.” “fight hegemony till end.” As Li Jingxian at the Ministry of Veterans Affairs emphasized, the Commemorating the War to Resist US PLA aircraft used to repatriate the remains Aggression ... embodied China’s stronger “national image.” According to Lyu Chao at the Liaoning Academy The Korean War’s 70th anniversary, sixth in of Sciences, the latest exchange reflected Xinhua’s top 10 China news events in 2020, China’s “friendly and peaceful settlement” with appeared to draw more attention from Beijing South Korea and “undeniably stronger” ties than did the 70th anniversary events of World with North Korea. Xi’s history discourse War II in 2015. Commemorations reflected what prompted the ROK Foreign Ministry to issue a Zhao Ma at Washington University in St. Louis statement on Oct. 24 reaffirming Seoul’s described as the Korean War’s evolution “from position: “That the Korean War broke out due to a socialist crusade to a nationalist mission” in North Korea’s invasion is an undeniable China’s national memory. After a six-year historical fact.” The Communist Youth League closure, China’s only Memorial Hall centered on of China’s Weibo comments a day later the war reopened on Sept. 18 in Dandong, prompted the ministry to reiterate this position displaying: “On June 25, 1950, the Korean civil on Oct. 28. A Korea Times editorial on Oct. 26 war broke out.” During a visit to a Korean War responded to Seoul’s “lukewarm reaction,” exhibition at the Beijing Military Museum of the arguing, “Xi deserves criticism … we urge Xi to Chinese People’s Revolution on Oct. 19, face up to history and respect South Korea.” President Xi remembered the war as “a victory South Korea’s backlash came a month after of justice, a victory of peace and a victory of the Moon proposed an end-of-war declaration in a people.” Vice President Wang Qishan and all speech at the UN General Assembly, reviving CPC Politburo Standing Committee members debate over China’s role. PRC Ambassador Xing accompanied him. In his Oct. 23 address in Haiming told JoongAng Daily on Oct. 14, “China Beijing, Xi stated that “China will not cannot be left out of the process.” compromise on its national sovereignty, security and interests,” noting current China’s state and popular platforms “challenges of unilateralism, protectionism and disseminated official narratives of the Korean hegemonism.” As Global Times reported, Xi’s War throughout October. The Foreign speech “delivered a clear message that the Languages Press and Military Science attempt by the US and any other forces to Publishing House released the English edition of contain China will never succeed.” The War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, “a Chinese interpretation and justification of the war” according to a Global Times review. In a Global Times article on Oct. 1, China’s National Day, PLA Lt. Gen. He Lei argued, “revisiting the essence of China’s strategic decision-making … is of great significance to the continuous victory.” CGTN featured interviews of war veterans claiming, “our army isn’t like the one before.” A Global Times editorial on Oct. 22 concluded: “When China was very poor, it didn't surrender to US pressure and stood out to resist and finally defeat the US on the Korean Peninsula. Today, China has grown to be a Figure 2 Memorial Hall of the War to Resist US Aggression strong country, so there is no reason for China and Aid Korea reopens in Dandong. Photo: Xinhua to fear the US threats and suppression.” Popular In South Korea’s seventh return since 2014, the commemorations included CCTV documentaries remains of 117 Chinese soldiers of the Korean and TV series, plays and dance shows, an War arrived on Sept.