ACADEMY LIBRARY UNSy AT ADFA
431991
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE
UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES
MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES SUB THESIS
'CRAMPED COCKPITS AND SWIVEL CHAIRS'
Air Vice marshal Bostock and the problems of RAAF Command and
Operations In New Guinea 1942-43
By
Roger Reading
A SUB THESIS SUBMITTED TO ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR JOHN MCCARTHY,
THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES, AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE STUDIES
CENTRE, AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE ACADEMY, IN FULFILMENT OF THE
ACADEMIC REQUIREMENT.
PO BOX 680, KUNUNURRA, WESTERN AUSTRALIA 6743
SEPTEMBER 1993 AVM W.D. Bostock, CB, DSO, OBE 2
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
CHAPTER 1 - COMMAND AND LEADERSHIP
Air Vice Marshal Bostock
Changes in US Leadership
The RAAF Command Scandal
RAAF Organisational Difficulties
CHAPTER 2 - ALLIED COOPERATION
Strategic and Operational Events
RAAF Responsibilities
CHAPTER 3 - RAAF OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
Operational Groups in New Guinea
Conditions in New Guinea
CHAPTER 4 - ASSESSMENT OF BOSTOCK
CONCLUSION
Bibliography
Interviews
Official Records
Private Records
Newspapers 3
'CRAMPED COCKPITS AND SWIVEL CHAIRS'^
AIR VICE MARSHAL BOSTOCK AND THE PROBLEMS OF RAAF OPERATIONAL COMMAND IN NEW GUINEA 1942/43
INTRODUCTION
There can be no greater tragedy for a fighting service than divided leadership and loyalty in war. Unchecked, such tragedy weakens important relationships and isolates decision making,
With the very survival of a nation at stake unity of leadership is vital to safeguard national aims. Unity of effort from a diversity of means is required for success in battle.^ If unity characterises a winning contribution, the task of post-war reconstruction is eased.
The dominant concept of operational priority must emerge.
The concept must be appropriate to the mission and to all the circumstances that are unique to that time and place and that paradigm. This must be propagated through the minds of the whole hierarchy of subordinate leaders to animate the entire command structure to concentrate its actions.
^This phrase was used in The Herald newspaper by Air Vice- Marshal Bostock to describe the unreliable administrative arrangements in the RAAF.
^Gen. William E.DePuy, US Army retired, quoted from ARMY, August 1988, p.28. 4
Command is the exercise of authority. Within a military organisation the process of command is critical to success especially in a time of conflict. To facilitate unambiguous command, military forces are structured in carefully designed hierarchical relationships which gradually add value to the organisation and the instructions given. This top-down structure allows senior commanders to exploit the expertise of subordinates and to carry out the assigned tasks within the context of combined effort. In this way, military force can be applied expediently without waste and unnecessary effort. Thus for command to be effective it must be unambiguous and authoritative. Divided command creates divisions of loyalty which can in turn reduce effectiveness and diffuse effort.
Having a great and powerful friend protecting your vital national interests might increase security but may in turn compromise your own command and control. Friends have their own aims which may not at first be apparent. All the more reason then to have a totally unified approach. Unity of command creates loyalty which in turn promotes your interests. Given that you are only a junior partner, this cohesion is vital to achieving national aims. 5
BACKGROUND
Military resources are always limited in conflict, no more so than they were for Australia in general and for the RAAF in particular from 1942 to 1943. Australia felt alone. In 1942 the
Japanese invasions of colonies in the Pacific threatened the security of the Allied and Australian interests. Britain, already stretched to the limit fighting the Germans and Italians in Europe and the Middle East was incapable of providing the necessary help. The fall of Singapore in February 1942 destroyed all hope of a British-led repulse of the Japanese. America was the only western nation with the resources to stem the Japanese invasions. But America was not well prepared either. Until the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, America had still to commit herself to the Pacific theatre and even then it was to be sometime later that American ground and air forces could be assembled in sufficient numbers in the Australian theatre to counter the relentless Japanese advances. During this twilight period between Britain's incapacity and America's poor preparedness 'no country faced a greater danger with less resources than Australia'
The RAAF was given a divided role and from this stemmed the roots of the her divided leadership. Australia was committed to providing manpower to Britain. For the RAAF, this meant that a major effort was given over to providing aircrew for the RAF
^See comments by Prime Minister Curtin as quoted in Power Plus Attitude, by Alan Stephens, AGPS, Canberra, p58. 6
Empire Air Training Scheme (EATS) / The Prime Minister of
Australia from 8 October 1942 was John Curtin who ordered the return of Australian troops to defend their homeland, despite
Churchill's view that they should go to Burma. Curtin believed
Australia now needed to look to the USA instead of Britain for protection. The return of a small number of aircrew bolstered the RAAF but created additional command problems; namely, how best to assimilate these forces into the defence of Australia at the same time as handing over virtual autonomy to the US forces led by General MacArthur for the offensive against the Japanese?
The defence of Australia did not begin on the battlefields of Europe or south-east Asia. The coast of Australia was
Australia's forward defence line, and that coast could be defended only by an effective air force.
A decision was taken to divide the RAAF along functional lines; namely, operational and support. The RAAF operational or fighting elements under command of Air Vice Marshal (AVM) Bostock as Air Officer Commanding (AOC) RAAF COMMAND was placed within the American Fifth Air Force under the overall command of General
Brett and later, in early August 1942 under Major General Kenney and was given prime carriage of the defence of Australia and New
Guinea. The support, training and administrative elements
(including the EATS) were placed under the command of AVM Jones as Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) of the RAAF. 'This was not an
^McCarthy, John, A Last Call of Empire. Australian aircrew, Britain and the Empire Air Training Scheme, Australian War Memorial, 1988. 7 ideal arrangement, but with two men of goodwill prepared to put their Service's interests first, it could have worked'^. What is more, although AVM Bostock answered to the US command he also answered to the Australian Government as well and that authority was his CAS AVM Jones.
Destiny was to place Bostock and Jones at the head of the
RAAF in its various roles. Each man had known the other since their time together as young soldiers prior to the formation of the RAAF. Their understanding of each other was deeply based.
However, they were very different personalities from very different backgrounds. Bostock from a well established farming family, Jones from a poorer urban upbringing. Jones was quieter and more vulnerable by nature. Bostock was masterly and more forceful. Both men were dedicated and loyal to their respective positions. Unfortunately, the two men were not of one mind. They worked against rather than with each other and in the process damaged the Air Force as the RAAF tended to split into 'Bostock' and 'Jones' camps.
To what extent then did the chain of command in the RAAF contribute to operational effectiveness? If it did not, then why not? The only rationale for command is to provide a platform for the effective conduct of operations, but what of the support aspects? Were the aims of the RAAF to be subordinated to the combined US/Australian operations or to a wider aim?
'IBID, Power Plus Attitude. pp64-65. 8
This paper seeks to address these questions as they apply- to RAAF command and control of air operations in the South West Pacific during 1942 and 1943 and to argue that the most important priority for the RAAF during these years was unity of command to enable operational success. The significance of these years was that the RAAF had to go it alone or find another umbrella under which to shelter. In December 1941, the Japanese sank the two British capital ships, the Prince of Wales and the Repulse off the coast of Malaya. 'Faith in the British navy was, as it were, lying at the bottom of the sea'For Australia to survive, leadership had to be exemplary. Instead, however, for the RAAF this crucial period was to be marked by division and disloyalty.
The achievement of post-war political objectives was diffused by this struggle. Immediate operational needs were eclipsed by disunity and disloyalty. The immediate result being to hand the Americans total freedom to pursue their own political objectives in the South West Pacific Area (SWPA) and to relegate the RAAF to a secondary role."^ This is not to say that there was not individual gallantry and success but that this effect was compromised by inept and harmful divisions within the RAAF command structure. Divisions which were to be deeply felt for many years to come.
^See Bombardments of Belief, by Manning Clark, as published in The Australian Way, Special World War 2 Anniversary Issue. POL Publishing Company, NSW, September 1989, pl8.
''See Yern Haugland, The AAF Against Japan. pl44 and pl65. 9
AVM Bostock was the RAAF senior operational commander so ^ this paper necessarily focuses on him, on command and control and his relationship with the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) AVM Jones.
Australia's relationship with the US forces is pivotal as is the effectiveness of military operations. The crisis of leadership in the RAAF in part stemmed from the ambiguous aspirations of the
Australian government. 10
CHAPTER 1 - COMMAND AND LEADERSHIP
Before examining the operations carried out in the SWPA by both the US and Australian forces, the life of AVM Bostock and the circumstances surrounding his appointment as AOC RAAF Command are pivotal as are the changes made in US leadership. Understanding the subsequent leadership crisis in the RAAF is predicated on this background. AVM Bostock had an outstanding RAAF career until a rejection by the Minister for Air dramatically halted his career ambitions. He could be forgiven for believing that he was born to lead the RAAF.
Air Vice Marshal Bostock
William Bowling Bostock was born on 5 February 1892 and was educated at Homebuck Grammar School, a Sydney private school. In 1911 he became a ship's radio operator, a highly respected trade at the time and akin to being a computer expert today. On 23 November 1914, with a sense of pride and loyalty he enlisted in the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) as a signaller in the Light Horse, 2nd Signal Troop (Engineers). He served at Gallipoli from April to August 1915 and was promoted sergeant on 14 March 1916. In November after being removed from Anzac suffering gastric illness as many did, he was discharged from the AIF and applied to join the Royal Flying Corps (RFC). He was commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant in the RFC to become a pilot. 11
He went to England for training and then France to join No
48 Squadron RFC. He was in France for 6 months during which time he was mentioned in despatches and awarded the Belgian Croix de
Guerre. After Armistice in November, he was repatriated back to
Australia where he joined the newly formed RAAF on 14 September
1921. No doubt these early experiences left an indelible mark
on him. In July 1921, he received the 1914/15 Star, British War
Medal, The General Service Medal and The Victory Medal. Later
on in his career as AOC RAAF Command, he was to receive the
United States Medal of Freedom (Silver Palm) for his 'brilliant
leadership and broad knowledge of all phases of aerial warfare'^.
His early RAAF career was very successful. From September
1921, as a flying officer, he quickly distinguished himself as
a man of determination with an ambition to succeed. At RAAF
Flying Training School (FTS) at Point Cook he achieved A1 grades
in his flying instructors courses^ and was promoted to Flight
Lieutenant on 31 March 1923. No doubt one of the more trusted
officers, he completed two appointments as Temporary Commanding
Officer during this period.
He went to RAF Staff College, Andover, England in March
1926. During this period he became known for his Australian
^These words are taken from the Citation for the Medal of Freedom (Silver Palm) , Australian Archives A/067/1, IC46/35/1/23 .
^Taken from personal records held in Service Personnel Records Office Queenbeyan, NSW. A copy of relevant page is attached. 12 personality and way of life. The Commandant wrote to Bostock
complaining that he was doing his own gardening and was sending
his daughter to the wrong school. The RAF Staff College was
proud of its role in setting the 'highest' standards as befitting
British society. Bostock returned the letter to the Commandant
with the notation "Noted and ignored".^® He was not prepared to
become a replica of an English gentleman. He was his own man.
He was Australian not British.
On completing his staff course successfully, he was promoted
Squadron Leader on 31 March 1927. He stayed on in England to
complete the RAF Central Flying School flying instructors course
where he flew eight types of aircraft in a total of 9 8 hours
flying, and received the highest award, an A1 Instructor
Category. He 'mastered the methods of instruction very
rapidlyOn his return to Australia in June 1928 he was
appointed Commanding Officer, Flying Squadron, No 1 FTS.
He became Director of Training at RAAF Headquarters on 2
December 1929 after having flown a further 90 hours, and on 24
November 1931 was posted to command No 3 Squadron at Richmond,
Sydney. At this particular time Sydney was witness to the rise / of i^o-Fascist 'New Guard' organisation opposed to the State
Labor government, which was itself in conflict with the
Commonwealth over its policy towards payment of overseas debt.
10'C.D.Coulthard-Clark , The Third Brother. Sydney, 1991, p.90,
^^See RAF Report Form 3 64 dated 5.12.27, Remarks by Commandant of the RAF Central Flying School. 13
Bostock ordered all leave stopped and put the station in a state of readiness. He organised an armed column to march to Sydney to 'guard specific buildings' if required.^^
He was ADC to the Governor General from January 1932-33 and was then appointed Commanding Officer RAAF Richmond and promoted
Wing Commander on 1 July 1934. As squadron CO from 1931 until
March 1933, when he assumed the addition authority of station commander until 193 6, Bostock exercised 'a considerable influence over the character of Richmond' . He was responsible for setting up the RAAF Band^^. In 193 6 he was posted to UK for exchange duties with the RAF, having been awarded the OBE on 3 June
1935.^^
From 1936 to 1937, he was attached to No.l (B) Group RAF
Abingdon, during which time he flew light bombers. His
Confidential Report of 19 July 193 7 when he was half way through his tour shows that he was above the average in staff work and professional knowledge. The remarks by his RAF air commodore described him as a 'zealous and efficient staff officer who is thorough in all his undertakings'. Furthermore, he was known
'not to be frightened of hard work', and interestingly, was assessed as 'above the average' in his tact in the handling of
^^See The Third Brother, by Chris Coulthard-Clark, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, ppl3 6-137.
^^Loc.cit.
^^London Gazette. No. 34166, 3/6/35. 14 men.^^ His staff work was of a high standard, too, and the Group
commander further commented that Bostock 'was of the greatest assistance on the air staff of this group'.
Upon his return to Australia in August 193 8, he was
appointed Director of Operations and Intelligence at RAAF
Headquarters and promoted to Group Captain on 1 September,
Exactly one year later on the eve of the outbreak of war in
Europe, he was appointed to serve as Deputy Chief of the Air
Staff (DCAS) . As a member of the Australian mission to the
London Defence Conference in November 1939 he recommended the
establishment of Australian Base depot for operational support. ^^
His keen eye for the importance of command and control of support
elements was already manifest.
Over the next two years, he was promoted to Air Commodore
on 1 June 1940, Air Vice-Marshal on 1 October 1941 and appointed
deputy Chief of the Air Staff (DCAS) . As DCAS he was contribute
to the debate surrounding 'the subordination of Australia's
national interests on the alter of the presumed benefits of
imperial defence.'^'' This was a period when Australian defence policy was torn between the providing resources for Britain's
^^See Royal Air Force Confidential Report (Officers), Form 367, Dated 15 July 1937 by Group Captain W T Guilfoyle, and 19 July 193 7 by Air Commodore S I Smid.
^^See An Air War Against Germany and Italy 1939-1943. Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1954, p.108.
^"^See The Third Brother. The Royal Australian Air Force 1921- 39, by Chris Coulthard-Clark, Allen and Unwin, NSW, 1991, pp.457- 464. 15
defence and Australia's own needs, Bostock was part of an
administrative muddle over sending ill-equipped RAAF squadrons
to the Middle East.^^ This was a damaging preview of problems
to come when Britain no longer provided the leadership and the
RAAF had to fend for itself.
Allied Air Forces Headquarters, SWPA, was established at
Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, on 20 April 1942. AVM Bostock was
given operational control of all RAAF service squadrons assigned
to this new command. Lieutenant General George H. Brett was
commander of the AAF, SWPA at that time. AVM Bostock was
appointed his Chief of Staff.^^
Changes in US Leadership
The US command and control of Allied air power was critical
to the success of RAAF operations and had the potential to
contribute to the aspirations of greater RAAF independence. The
Americans were to show that they could be quite ruthless in the
selections of their senior airmen. US national aims would not
be subordinated to any personal ambitions.
MacArthur appointed Major General Lewis H Brereton, a naval
academy graduate, as his air chief in October 1941 with the
formation of the US Far East Air Force (FEAF) . General Brereton
^^Ibid, pp. 120-123.
^^See Royal Australian Air Force 1939-1942, Canberra, 1962, pp 473-477. 16 had an unhappy time losing almost half his aircraft on the first day of his command, with defeat and retreat the hallmark of US operations at that time. By March the few remaining US aircraft had retired to Australia and were operating alongside the RAA.F as one. MacArthur had a lively understanding of and respect for air power. He wrote on 7 November 1941, that the Army Air Force was 'the most powerful striking element available' His later commitment to the use of air power in support of surface forces was to reflect this belief.
Major General George H Brett was appointed commander of all US forces in Australia. He arrived in Australia from the Middle East via India and Java on 1 January 1942. At that time, US forces in the Pacific were under extreme pressure but building up in Australia after the disastrous defeats in the Philippines and Netherlands East Indies. General Brett commanded the US Army Air Force (AAF) in Australia at the time the Japanese bombed Darwin. A short time later, the Japanese bombed Broome killing over 2 00 persons mainly Dutch civilians evacuated from Java. These were desperate times for the Allies, with US, Dutch and Australian forces coming under continual attacks from the advancing Japanese in and around the islands of New Guinea.
The RAAF was charged with the defence of the Australian continent. New Guinea and New Britain. At this stage, the RAAF possessed only 43 operational aircraft - 29 Hudsons and 14
Catalinas. On March 17, this number had grown to include 136
20'Se e The AAF Against J^p^n, by Yern Haugland, pp.30-31. 17 fighters. The fighters were mainly the Wirraway; a slow an inferior type to the Japanese Zero. The production and supply of the necessary aircraft from the US had yet to become effective.
On 18 April 1942, General MacArthur formally became Supreme Allied Commander of the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), Australia and New Guinea, with Headquarters in Melbourne. General Brett was appointed commander Allied air forces. Early in August 1942, Major General George C Kenney became commander of Allied air forces in the Southwest Pacific, 'replacing hard-working, conservative General Brett, who later transferred to the Caribbean Defense (sic) Command'. ^^ Kenney was appointed 'to instil a spirit of aggressiveness and ingenuity' in the minds of the Allied airmen after months of 'recurrent retreat before the overpowering Japanese assault
The Air Forces comprising all American Air Corps and RAAF Forces were placed under the command of Major General Kenney who decided that the RAAF component of the Allied Air Forces should constitute a separate Australian Command. Kenney decided to establish separate control systems for the USAAF and the RAAF.^^ The principles of unified command were observed through the authority of the Headquarters AAF. The American fighter, bomber and air-base units became the 5th US Air Force. Stephens
^^Ibid. The AAF Against J^pan ^ p.153. ^^Loc Cit. 23Se, e Power Plus Attitur^P^ by Alan Stephens, p. 62. 18
coitiments that 'personal relationships between senior air force
commanders were going to be critical'.^
Kenney was to become renowned for his aggressive use of low-
level air attacks and his direction of air transport in a hop-
skip advance up the New Guinea coast. However, 'there is no
reason to believe that Kenney, and through him MacArthur, would
not have been responsive to well-argued, unified expressions of
the RAAF's wartime ambitions'. ^^
The changes in US command arrangements and commanders during
1941 and 1942 until the appointment of Major General Kenney also may have contributed to ambiguous command and control
arrangements within the RAAF. Indeed, the RAAF command problem may not have been so acute had it not been for these changes.
Moreover, until Kenney formed the Fifth Air Force, command of
operations was clearly a US matter and the RAAF elements were
subordinated to the US requirements. However, once Kenney was appointed and the two air forces separated, US and Australian ambitions were clearer and the opportunity to forge a RAAF
identity was then clearly available. The leadership crisis within the RAAF at this point was even more damaging, therefore, since this vital opportunity became a crisis of identity instead of the realisation of a separate RAAF doctrine and character.
^Loc Cit.
2^LOC Cit. 19
The RAAF Command Scandal
Leadership itself has to do with certain types of relationships in which people work together in order to get things done. Under optimum conditions they will share the desire and the aspirations to achieve common goals. At the very least conditions ought to provide for the their moving along together, willingly and enthusiastically. This is what the discharge of leadership accountability is all about.
Many situations provide far from optimum conditions for encouraging, or even allowing people to act together cooperatively. One of these is hierarchical confusion and dissent over rightful authority. The manifestation of confusion and dissent over role relationships can range from passable to abysmal. The cost is greatly reduced organisational effectiveness, human morale and wasted effort.
The motivation for executive military leadership in war comes from a deep sense of belief in one's individual level of competence; that is to say, a level of competence well above that required by the level of work required in lesser roles. From this stems a desire to achieve success in the ultimate military test of strength, war. Given a deep sense of mutual trust and friendship, there is no reason why two of the RAAF's most senior officers could not have effectively discharged their respective responsibilities. However, given the atrocious circumstances surrounding the way the appointments were reached and the fertile 20 ground of both men from such different backgrounds to disagree,
the dye was for disloyalty and division from the start.
So it was for William Bostock and George Jones. Both were
highly competent in their respective roles but neither was given
to conforming to the other's wishes as to how to achieve success.
Although, they were long time colleagues in Gallipoli and
acquaintances for 20 years afterwards until Jones was appointed
CAS ahead of Bostock in May 1942, they opposed each other
thereafter.
The detailed circumstances surrounding this appointment are
quite bizarre. Early in 1942, Air Chief Marshal Burnett, an RAF
officer was due to retire. Air Marshal Williams was the RAAF's
most experienced leader but he had been sent overseas after a
critical report had been published by Sir Edward Ellington
concerning the high and unacceptable number of flying accidents
which had occurred. Jones, who was at that time Bostock's junior
and five years younger, a temporary group captain and acting air
commodore, was appointed and promoted three ranks higher to air
vice-marshal^^ and on 2 May 1942 appointed CAS. The
confidential Air Force List dated February 1942, only 12 weeks
before the promotion of Jones, shows that there were eight
Australian officers senior to him, with Bostock third in
seniority and Jones ninth.Moreover, even though Bostock had
^^Stephens, Alan, Power Plus Attitude. AGPS, Canberra, 1992, p 64.
^"^Stephens, Loc Cit, and Note 58. 21
the operational background at a critical time in the RAAF's
history, Jones not Bostock was acceptable to Prime Minister
Curtin and Minister for Air Arthur Drakeford. Thus, the RAAF
ended up with two officers of equal rank at its head. This
arrangement was to cause a crisis in command.
Anecdotal evidence from the time may indicate that what
occurred in private discussions between Prime Minister Curtin and
others was that Bostock was simply unacceptable to the Government
for any number of reasons such as his politics, his loyalty,
ambition and his force of character. Bostock was by all accounts
a very forceful man to argue with about matters of RAAF
operations, command and control. He seems to have been groomed
by an RAF officer. Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Burnett.
Burnett had arrived in Australia in February 1940 to take
up post as the most senior air force officer responsible for the
EATS. Burnett and Bostock were good friends. Described by
contemporaries as 'among the Air Forces's best brainsBostock
was a man who had every reason to expect to be CAS. After all,
there was no doubt that this was his life's ambition. This was
not to be. Moreover, whether the decision to appoint Jones and
not Bostock was the result of negligence by the government ^^ or
2^Ibid, p.446.
29,Se e Horner, Hicrh Command, pp. 352-3. Horner refers to cabinet consulting 'the organisation chart provided by Brett' which was a list of RAAF officers for the proposed integrated AAF HQ and not The Air Force List. 22 the result of a mistake will probably always remain an enigma. Whichever, this arrangement was to be the basis of the crisis in command which subsequently became known as 'The RAAF
Command Scandal
Bostock was also a Liberal by political affiliation as most military officers probably were at that time. For example, he was to become the Liberal member for Indi in the House of
Representatives in 1949 and certainly would have followed Burnett in his conservative outlook. More credible, therefore, than the option that the Government was guilty of 'the most disgraceful negligence'is the suggestion that Bostock as the RAAF's most experienced operational commander at that time was politically unsuitable to a Prime Minister rethinking Australia's position in the world and seeking to end dependence on the British,
All this played right into the hands of the United States.
A weakened RAAF command and control structure was vulnerable to manipulation. The appointment of General MacArthur as the
Supreme Commander SWPA in April 1942 was the manifestation of this dominance of the military 'high ground'. He commanded all the RAAF's operational squadrons and units. General MacArthur
Power Plus Attitude. By Alan Stephens, AGPS, 1992, p. 64. 'The Williams line that the appointment was a mistake is perhaps the more palatable of the two possibilities'.
^^This title was used to describe the events surrounding the corrosive atmosphere in the RAAF that existed between Bostock and Jones. See Power Plus Attitude, pp 62-68. Also, document of like name AWM 54(81/2/17).
32 Stephens, Op.Cit. p.64. 23 was a man of wisdom and strength but naturally he placed the needs of his own country above any other. The division and disloyalty created by the RAAF crisis of leadership merely emphasised an already ambiguous relationship between the USAAF and the RAAF and exploited the insecurities of the Australian government leadership.
Whatever advantage MacArthur may have seen for himself and the US in the deteriorating leadership struggle he did at least attempt to solve the RAAF crisis of command between Jones and
Bostock. By March-April 1943 MacArthur was urging Curtin to resolve the matter 'at the earliest possible date', as an 'acute and dangerous situation [was] developing'Several weeks later he described the 'RAAF situation [as] still somewhat in a turmoil'. Prime Minister Curtin acknowledged the problem.
However, after an extraordinary amount of procrastination by the
Australians (which included an unsuccessful attempt to get another RAF officer as CAS) sadly nothing was ever done. Later on the 4 November 1944, this led to Sir Frederick Shedden,
Secretary, Department of Defence commenting that 'the Americans do not wish to have a senior RAF officer in the Southwest Pacific
Area, and prefer the divided arrangement, because they can play one side off against the other, whereas a senior officer with unified control would be in a position to assert the views of the
RAAF.'^^ Be this as it may, the fact remains that the rift at the top of the RAAF command structure brought adverse comment
^^See Power Plus Attitude by Alan Stephens, p.65.
^"^See Australian Archives A5954/1, Item 238/2. 24 from our strongest ally and allowed the suggestion of US exploitation to grow, further undermining Australian interests and authority.
Matters were to steadily deteriorate throughout 1943 and culminate with AVM Bostock writing to General MacArthur, the
Commander-in-Chief, SWPA on 5 February 1944 to resign his position. This in turn caused General MacArthur to write to the
Prime Minister and say: 'I recommend that the Prime Minister personally review the situation as a matter of urgency. I shall take no action on Bostock's application until I know his views.'
The resignation was never followed through. No wonder then that in spite of considerable difficulties, US command and control of air power was to become the mainstay of the Allied defence against the Japanese in the Pacific.
The bitter rivalry between Jones and Bostock is described in many as yet unpublished documents^^ one of which is held in the Australian War Memorial became known as The RAAF Command
Scandal. This dismal episode in the history of the RAAF, however, is not the prime focus of this paper. Consideration will be given to how the Allies cooperated together and how successful were the RAAF operations performed.
Known colloquially as The Bostock Papers, these documents were donated by the Bostock family to the Australian War Memorial and subsequently loaned to Air Commodore A Garrison for research purposes. They contain startling evidence about the feud including that marked 'Most Sensitive'. AWM File Number 419/36/30 received July 1984. Private Records List No. 84/127. 25
RAAF Organisational Difficulties
The RAAF organisational difficulties were quite different
to those of the US in that operational and administrative
direction were divided between two separate command structures.
The RAAF command was initially called 'RAAF Coastal
Commandafter the delegation to protect only the Australian
coastline and sea approaches. The designation was later altered
to 'RAAF COMMANDto describe a more comprehensive commitment
but this still did not include administration. A chart issued
by Allied Air Force Headquarters shows the higher organisation
adopted. Under agreement between the Prime Minister and the
Commander-in-Chief, the Commander Allied Air Forces exercised
operational control over RAAF units and formations assigned to
the Allied Air Forces but RAAF Headquarters remained responsible
to the Australian Minister for Air for all phases of Australian
administration. As an Australian officer, AVM Bostock, was
appointed as Air Officer Commanding RAAF COMMAND, with AVM Jones
CAS responsible for RAAF administration. This arrangement meant
that while Bostock received his operational directives from the
Commander Allied Air Forces he submitted his administrative
requirements, to enable him to carry out such directives, to AVM
Jones at Air Force Headquarters for approval. Overlaying the
Allied Air Forces General Order No. 47 constituted this Australian Command and designating it the 'Coastal Command'. See Australian Archives Series A5954/1, Item 238/1.
^^ Loc Cit, Allied Air Force General Order No. 53. 26 necessity for confidentiality, the potential for misunderstanding and failure in communication was high.
In early 1942, subsequent to the issue of the Allied Air
Force Order constituting RAAF COMMAND, no organisational action
was taken by RAAF Headquarters to form the Command Headquarters
as a RAAF unit. Moreover, no personnel establishment tables for
the Command Headquarters were issued and the functions of RAAF
COMMAND and the responsibilities of the AOC were not promulgated
throughout the RAAF. After some procrastination, AVM Bostock
sent a memorandum requesting that this should be done to the
Secretary, Air Board, on 7th November 1942. In this memo he
said:
' ... it is my view that a commander cannot exercise
efficient operational control and direction unless he is
accorded a voice in the determination of policies and major
matters concerning the organisation, administration,
equipment supply and technical maintenance of his
command.
In reply. Chief of the Air Staff, AVM Jones said that RAAF
Headquarters did not intend to recognise RAAF COMMAND. He stated
that he proposed to organise the staff required by the Allied Air
Commander to exercise operational control of RAAF units, as a
portion of RAAF Headquarters, under the title of Director of
^^This memo is taken from The RAAF Command Scandal, unpublished papers compiled by Group Captain Grant, available under reference AWM 54 (81/2/17), Appendix E. 27
Operations Communications and Intelligence. Furthermore, on 5th
December 1942, AVM Jones issued Air Force Confidential order No.
391 which confirmed the intention not to establish RAAF COMMAMD
Headquarters as an Air Force unit.
The divided responsibility within the RAAF for operations and administration and the failure to manage this well had now come to the notice of both General Kenney and the Prime Minister.
The situation had reached such an impasse that Bostock decided to write to the Air Board calling for arbitration. In a letter dated 3 January 1942, Bostock appealed for a single unified command structure and thus one authority to deal with all the
RAAF components of the Allied air forces. He believed that the
Air Officer Commanding, RAAF COMMAND, had to have the means of obtaining the administrative, maintenance, supply and works services which may be necessary to carry out operational directives. Bostock had no authority to order administrative action of any sort, even that of the most minor or trivial nature, but had to submit his requirements in the forms of requests to RAAF Headquarters. Whereas, accepted military doctrine promoted the principle of command of all relevant forces with delegated control of external units, unity of command of the supporting elements was denied to Bostock.^^
Bostock was kept in ignorance of whether or not a request was agreed by RAAF Headquarters until either the time expired for
^^See AAPIOOO. RAAF Air Power Manual. Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1990, paras 2.24; 2.54-2.58. 28 action to be taken or other orders were received. Prime Minister
Curtin appeared not to want to compromise control of Australia's support infrastructure. If so, this was not conducive to effective and efficient operational planning and again contradicted accepted military doctrine and practice for unified command and control. Delegated control with unified command under one air commander was accepted air power precedent and the most successful opt ion. As Bostock had been trained in the doctrine of unity of command he was unlikely ever to accept
Jones' compromises.
AVM Bostock felt he was in an untenable position in that he was deprived of means to ensure that the administrative arrangements of his command were suitable for the execution of his operational commitments in conformity with directives issued to him by the Commander Allied Air Forces. His view was that no commander could possibly exercise efficient operational control and direction of a fighting force unless he was in a position also to direct within the framework of the broad policies of superior authority, all matters concerning the organisation, administration, equipment, supply and technical maintenance relating to his Command. He recommended, therefore, that the Air
Board should:
'Establish RAAF command Headquarters as a RAAF unit'.4 1 and;
The RAAF Air Power Manual AAPIOOO. para 2.57, p.36
'^^Ibid, The RAAF Command Scandal. Chapter V, p.46-47 29
'Delegate to the Air Officer Commanding RAAF Command such
administrative authority as was necessary to enable the Air
Officer Commanding to exercise effective command in all
respects and to develop the maximum fighting efficiency of
the Command.
If AVM Bostock had both command and control over all the elements of support and operations which air power doctrine advised, the opportunity then existed to establish a true RAAF identity in the Pacific theatre. As it was, the division of command between RAAF Headquarters and RAAF COMMAND and the breakdown of the relationship between Bostock and Jones contributed to weakened effectiveness.
RAAF COMMAND was formed without control of administrative functions and relations between the two headquarters steadily deteriorated. Directors in RAAF Headquarters who may have disagreed with the attitudes of either the CAS or AOC RAAF
COMMAND nevertheless found themselves obliged to carry out the policies of their particular organisations in their own several interests.
Matters were not to rest there. On the 19 March 1943, as a result of an apparent non-cooperation by AVM Jones, his refusal to provide adequate staff officers to AVM Bostock in Brisbane and his denial of direct access to Air Force Headquarters and to his subordinate formations on administrative matters affecting his
42 Loc.cit. p.47. 30
operations, AVM Bostock decided to approach Major General Kenney
re-iterating these difficulties. The receipt of a new direction
from AVM Jones to channel all supply and administrative matters
through his staff for approval first, prompted AVM Bostock to
comment the 'supply and maintenance information requested from
RAAF Headquarters, is often delayed, out of date, inaccurate and
incomplete'. In his opinion, this new order by the CAS,
therefore is dangerous as it 'makes it impossible for me to plan
current operations of RAAF Command thoroughly, or indeed with
reasonable hope of success,He concluded that the his
appointment 'is rapidly becoming impracticable and untenable.'"^
General Kenney reported this serious state to General
MacArthur immediately saying that in his view this would result
in administrative action interfering seriously with future
operations by units of RAAF COMMAND, He added; 'To effect the
efficiency of control, it is essential that the Commander Allied
Air Forces must rely on the Air Officer Commanding, RAAF COMMAND
as one responsible officer who represents the RAAF in all matters
affecting the operations of the RAAF component of Allied Air
Forces. Such matters must necessarily include administration and
supply. '
On the 10 March, MacArthur contacted Curtin. Prime Minister
Curtin saw the matter relevant to the whole of the RAAF 'which
^^RAAF Command Scandal, unpublished paper, p.62
^Loc Cit.
^^LOC CIT. 31 has been the subject of previous discussions with you and is now before the GovernmentHe outlined 'interim measures to ensure the efficient and smooth working of the RAAF COMMAND that have been agreed upon by the Defence Committee and the Air
Officer Commanding RAAF COMMAND' He pointed out that in his letter of 11th January, the object was to ensure 'the efficient and smooth working of the RAAF under the existing organisation.'
He concluded: 'I shall communicate with you in regard to the future organisation of the RAAF, as soon as I am in a position to do so.'
Although the Prime Minister had recognised the harm being caused by the ambiguity of command he did not respond to
MacArthur's request. For reasons which may now never be known
Curtin failed to implement any changes.
On the 21st March 1943, General MacArthur again wrote to the
Prime Minister leaving no doubt that he wanted a proper organisation set up. 'I feel that the recognition, by the RAAF, of the RAAF COMMAND as a tactical formation and the establishment of RAAF COMMAND Headquarters as a Unit, may tend to facilitate co-ordination of the administrative services with operational requirements, to meet tactical needs'.'^® In other words, improve the chances of military success. He added, 'I would again stress the vital importance of concluding your deliberations.
^^Loc Cit, p. 64.
^^LOC CIT, p. 63.
48 Loc Cit, p.67. 32 concerning the future organisation of the RAAF, at the earliest possible date.'"^^
These comments are particularly important. One wonders why
the Prime Minister, who was so clearly offering all possible aid and co-operation to General MacArthur, should have left the position of the RAAF in such an unsatisfactory state of poor
organisation right to the end of the war. In all of his letters
to General MacArthur his tone was of cooperation even
subservience. So much so, that one finds it difficult to
reconcile the omission of so many valuable opportunities to
exploit public opinion favourably towards the RAAF and air power with the expressions and actions of full assistance expressed in
discussions and papers^®. The existence of some other motive is
the only conclusion left. Meantime, the deleterious nature of
RAAF command and control was set to deteriorate further. The US
contribution to the war in the SWPA was to become all the more
important as a result.
"^^Loc Cit.p.67, sub para 4.
^°Refer to the series of Minutes of Prime minister's War Conference, Australian Archives A816/1. 33
CHAPTER 2 - ALLIED COOPERATION
The career of AVM Bostock, the leadership struggle in the
RAAF and the US command arrangements which led to the appointment of Major General George C Kenney as commander of Allied air
forces in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) all influenced the
effectiveness of the US and Australian air forces in the SWPA.
Just as unity of command was vital to success, so to was the way
the US and Australian air forces cooperated together. Allied unity of effort was also vital.
Strategic and Operational Events
From 18 April 1942, General MacArthur commanded all
Australian forces in the SWPA which for the RAAF 'effectively
amounted to its entire operational strength outside Europe', ^^
In February 1942, the War Cabinet decided on a plan to equip 73
squadrons of various types of aircraft. The plan was formed to
resist invasion by forming a reconnaissance screen across the
islands of the north of Australia from New Caledonia to New
Guinea. Also, the screen would be supported by striking forces
split between the islands and reserves held in Australia in geographical areas which 'corresponded to the vulnerable areas of the country' . Lastly, each of the areas was to contain a well balanced force capable of delaying an invading force."
^^See Power Plus Attitude, p.60
"ibid, p.74. 34
Aircraft allocation and production was largely dependent upon the US and Britain who both had their own strategic needs. Australia's requirements had to be submitted to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff by Air Marshal Williams in Washington for their approval. In this regard Australia ended up competing with the RAF for US resources. The situation emphasised the importance of a junior partner such as Australia remaining close to senior allies to 'facilitate the promotion of local interests' Australia's failure to produce its own aircraft until later in the war was in part to blame. Notwithstanding, by January 1944, the RAAF was to grow remarkably to include 39 RAAF operational base units and 36 RAAF squadrons and five area headquarters.
At the operational and tactical levels, cooperation between the US and Australia was not without difficulties but generally good. As Kenney remarked: 'The system of cooperation reaches from the battle areas back to the bases in the rear'^^. Kenney respected the RAAF generally and had a 'good working relationship with a number of senior Australian commanders, including Bostock'. ^^ Although, the relationship at the working levels was problematical from time to time, matters were resolved quickly.
^^Ibid, p. 76.
^"^Loc Cit and notes 134-140. This included a substantial design and production of military aircraft in Australia by The Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation.
^^General Kenney on 3AR Radio on 2 7 February 1944, as reported in The Age, on 28 February 1944.
^^See Power Plus Attitude, p. 62. 35
However, seen through American eyes there were irritating factors at play. Australia was seen as 'a continent of vast distances, broad desert regions and inadequate transportation and communications facilities'.^^ The radio and telephone systems were 'bogged down with wartime traffic' and the railways were
' incapable of meeting the full transportation need of the Allied forces'. 'Highway construction was 20 years behind American standards'Construction of new facilities was problematical.
'Building material was difficult to obtain, but the problem of labor proved even more difficult'. 'A few Australian civilians were available, but these were subject to union rules and local custom, which, on occasion, considerably annoyed the
Americans'The US developed bases at Townsville as a headquarters and storage depot and later in Port Moresby.
American units were deployed for the most part in areas remote from the main centres of Australian population.
US and Australian airmen cooperated well together, however, at the operational and tactical levels RAAF commanders were largely left to their own devices to conduct operations often with little or no guidance from headquarters staff. 'Wing and even squadron commanders in turn were often given broad directives and left to do their job which might involve target selection and liaison with other air, land and sea force
^'Ibid, p. 63.
^^Loc Cit.
59 See The Army Air Force in World War II. p.104. 36 commanders to develop a coordinated plan' For example, the stemming of the Japanese advance toward Port Moresby in September 'had reset the stage for an Allied offensive looking immediately towards the occupation of Buna', ^^ Credit for this belonged to both the Australian infantry and air forces around K^^koda during October. ^After the wari. Major General Kenney said: 'When it suits the needs of battle, Australians take orders from Americans, and Americans take orders from Australians.' ^^ General MacArthur also paid tribute to the airmen saying: 'To the American Fifth Air Force and the Royal Australian Air Force no commendation could be too great' . 'They have set up new horizons for air conduct of the war' . ^^
The cooperation between the RAAF airmen and those of the USAAF did little to ameliorate the divisions within the RAAF and the poor morale it caused. Some also blamed the US for ignoring Australia's needs. Commenting on the command arrangements in the SWPA 40 years later on, AM Jones^ stated that the Allies' Supreme Commander in the theatre, MacArthur, 'sidestepped' Australia out of the final victory over Japan, wanting all the
^°See Power Plus Attitude, p. 70. ^^Ibid, p. 108.
62^Radii o broadcast on 27 February 1944. ^^Ibid, p. 128.
^CAS from 5-5-42 to 13-1-52. qv Jones' autobiography. From Private to Air Marshal. Greenhouse Publications Pty Ltd, Victoria, 1988. 37 glory for himself^^ In Jones' opinion, the RAAF 'could have handled the air war on their own'.
A number of senior RAA-F officers also believed their service was relegated to the position of a 'Second XI'However, this contrasted with the widely held view that Australia would not survive without US assistance since the RAAF was devoid of aircraft and airfields from which to operate in the northern part of Australia. For example, when General Lewis Brereton from the
USA arrived in Australia to survey the sparse facilities for the
US forces and their operations, he is reported to have had $US
5 million with which to build airfields in Australia The apparent relegation of the Australian forces to second place may have been more to do with a military sense of inferiority from a lack of resources and money. In point of fact, 'a man compelled to function at a higher or lower level than his capacities and understanding permit is almost always less happy or creative than the man who makes the best use of his endowments. ' ^^
Initially, General MacArthur had little trust in what he saw as an Australian military depleted of all experienced fighting
^^Sunday Press. 20-1-85.
^^Stephens, Power Plus Attitude, p 84, note 20 to Chapter 3.
^^This statement was also recorded at interview with Air Commodore 'Bull' Garing. He was the host officer for General Brereton during his visit to Australia.
^^See The Great Australian Stupor - An Interpretation of the Australian Way of Life. Ronald Conway, Sun Books, Melbourne, p.4. 38 forces, poorly equipped and with a divided RAAF leadership up against the ruthless brutality and efficiency of the highly organised Imperial Japanese. Later, he was to respect the Australians airmen for the way they fought if not the RAAF leadership for its squabbling. America had been poorly prepared for the Japanese assaults in the Pacific but they were now the only nation with the power to break up the Japanese aggression. Initially, Australia and the RAAF was no match for the Japanese, although a cohesive and united force had the potential to outclass the Japanese. Thus, the Pacific theatre was to remain an area of US strategic responsibility and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff were to determine operational strategy and maintain direct control of the Pacific commands. In contrast, RAAF command of operations in the SWPA was not cohesive.
RAAF Responsibilities
In May 1942, the position of the RAAF was that the administration was under an inexperienced Minister for Air, whilst AVM Bostock was the operational commander of the RAAF under the control of Major General Kenney, and AVM Jones was Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) responsible for the support elements of the RAAF and the Empire Air Training Scheme. The operations and administration of the RAAF were under the command of two separate officers, one responsible to the Commander, Allied Air Forces for his work and to the Prime Minister for his appointment; the other being responsible to the Minister for Air. 39
The Operational formations and units of the RAAF were within the SWPA formation entrusted to the US. The CAS, the Air Board,
RAAF Headquarters and the training and maintenance formations were outside this organisation. The Australian Government War
Cabinet had strategic command of all three Services. The practice had been for the Chiefs of the three Services to offer advice and answer questions as required. Often operational questions were discussed by all the cabinet members but whereas the Chiefs of both the Army and the Navy were within the operational organisation of SWPA, the CAS had no knowledge of operations, had no operational responsibility and since he was outside the operational organisation, had no ready access to that information for War Cabinet advice. Thus, AVM Jones was in no position to answer questions in relation to his Service as were his opposite numbers in the Army and Navy. This was provided by
MacCarthur directly to Curtin. Undoubtedly this placed Jones in an awkward position.
Between January and March 1942, the air defence of Australia consisted of 16 heavy bombers, 16 medium bombers and 13 6 fighters. The base commander at Darwin reported on 15 March that if an enemy attack were made in force, "the Darwin area would be lost within six days".^^ Allied Air Forces SWPA, consisted of a few American squadrons and slightly more Australian squadrons completely amalgamated. This amalgamation took the form of a composite staff in Allied Air Force Headquarters, comprised of an American commander and an Australian Chief of Staff. The
69 See The AAF Against Japan, p.62. 40
Directors were two senior RAAF officers (Signals and
Intelligence) with an American Director of Operations and an
Australian Assistant Director. Formations at the next lower level (previously designated RAAF Areas) were also similarly- organised, with certain area commanders Australian and some
American.
Squadrons were intended to be separate but, for the first three or four months the position was so desperate that aircraft were sent into action (American and Australian together) as they became available. In the earlier phases, the American aircraft arrived without their full personnel. They had been flown out in a hurry to help stem the Japanese advance so that in at least two American Groups, Australian pilots, second pilots, gunners and navigators were supplied.
This was the most acute period in the air war. The Japanese had not only full air superiority but also full control of the air over New Guinea and Darwin and were only just being challenged by 75 Squadron (RAAF) in Port Moresby and by American fighters in the Darwin area. Desperate measures were taken to stop the all-sweeping success of the Japanese and until July the
Allied air force organisation threw in squadrons and even aircraft in all sorts of organisations without any differentiation whatever between Australian and American units.
The Allied bomber bases during this period were Longreach,
Cloncurry, Charters Towers and Townsville in the North-East, and 41
Batchelor and other bases further south in the North-West.
Noteworthy is that the bombers had to be based a long way from the north to ensure their comparative safety on the ground, and this, in itself, gives some idea of the precarious position of the Allied air forces in the SWPA at this time.
American air forces were retreating into Australia from the
Southwest Pacific but MacArthur's appointment as Supreme
Commander in April 1942, the movement of air units from the US accelerated. As the American strength built up it surpassed the
Australian, although the RAAF was continuing its development programme and was producing new squadrons as fast as possible.
Once the Japanese had been defeated at the Battle of the Bismarck
Sea and at Milne Bay the initiative changed hands so the need for
reorganisation became apparent. About this time General Brett was relieved by General Kenney who is reported to have called the
organisation he found 'a dog's breakfast' General Kenney wanted a new organisation which arose partly from the increased
American strength in Allied air forces SWPA, and partly because
of the obvious differences in training, technique and
organisation of the American air units and the differences in
temperament between the personnel of the two nations. Therefore,
he formed all American units into the Fifth Air Force. He
"^^By 1944 the RAAF had nine Groups and 34 thirty four squadrons, including those elements of the Royal New Zealand Air Force. See attached charts. The build up over these years was nothing short of remarkable.
''^From notes of interview with Air Commodore Garrisson at RAAF Fairbairn on 27 February 1992. 42 adopted the American title in this latter appointment of
Commanding General, Allied Air Forces.
At the same time, he loosened the Allied integration
throughout other levels. He allotted definite areas to RAAF
responsibility and other areas to Fifth Air Force responsibility.
In his own headquarters, he retained the Allied Directorate of
Operations and the Allied Directorate of Intelligence, and
although the Allied elements in the other departments were
separated, they were instructed to work in the closest
cooperation with each other although they were not now integrated
(see attached).
The position, then, at the beginning of July 1942 was that
General Kenney had organised all American units into a composite
and properly organised air force with unified command and a
balanced approach to operational tasking. The Fifth Air Force
was commanded by him with his deputy commander in the field.
General Whitehead. The appointment of this deputy commander
allowed the freedom to Major General Kenney to supervise the
Allied Air Forces and to be readily at hand to advise the
Commander-in-Chief. On the other hand, he had an unorganised mass of Australian squadrons thrown up from the loosening of the
amalgamated Allied air forces and he also had his ex Chief of
Staff, AVM Bostock, as the AOC RAAF COMMAMD responsible only for
the fighting arm of the RAAF and not for the administrative
support of the RAAF or the body of RAAF policy. 43
General Kenney had operational command and control of all
US air forces but also, was given operational control of RAAF.
Bostock was concerned that the RAAF should not be confined to
garrison duties at a crucial stage of the war. In January 1943,
AVM Bostock set up RAAF COMMAND in Brisbane and took with him
from RAAF Headquarters in Melbourne all the operational staffs
leaving only administrative elements. To facilitate the link
between the two organisations, CAS AM Jones established a Forward
Echelon within RAAF COMMAND to provide administrative support and
liaison with RAAF Headquarters in Melbourne.''^
General Kenney sought some method of organising the
Australian elements into a formation of the same nature as the
Fifth Air Force. It was his intention that Allied Air Force
Headquarters should command two separate air forces on the
national basis which would work in the closest manner with each
other under his direction to achieve the desired end; the defeat
of the Japanese Air Forces. However, the divisions within the
RAAF and the difficulties it caused were to linger on and were
not dealt with quickly. The effect this had on US operations was
insulated by the separate command structure but the effect on the
RAAF manifested itself in a poor operational appreciation.
''^Letter Drakeford to Curtin, 12 January 1943, CRS A 816, item 31/301/300A. 44
CHAPTER 3 - RAAF OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
US operations were largely unaffected by the split within the RAAF at the highest level but the effectiveness of RAAF operations was. Support to the operational effort also suffered. Morale, training and logistics support were major casualties of divisions within the RAAF and subordination to US strategic aims. The RAAF was not given sufficient public credit for its successes and a major opportunity to repair the damage was missed.
Operational Groups in New Guinea
The first RAAF elements to be located in New Guinea in 1941, spearheaded by No 75 Squadron, were formed into No 9 Operational Group (OG) under the command of Group Captain W Garing in October 1942. In 1943 when RAAF forces expanded further, No 10 Operational Group was also formed. No 9 OG in effect was the RAAF Field Force. Interestingly, unlike the formation of RAAF COMMAND in Brisbane, No 9 OG also included No 1 Administrative Wing to provide all administrative support needed.
Divided loyalties within the RAAF created a climate of obstruction and unnecessary bureaucracy which had a deleterious a effect on operations. Command and control of all RAAF logistics and training had the potential to affect the outcome of operations. In training, for example, the lack of realistic facilities or exercising was to directly affect operational readiness. Unresponsive logistics support in the provision of 45 aircraft, weapons and essential equipment was to impede progress. The decision not to allow RAAF COMMAND control of these resources meant that often the true picture was not well understood by the support staffs in Melbourne. The erosion of operational efficiency and effectiveness was the first casualty of this lack of unity.
In 1943, unpleasant reports began to filter back alleging the state of morale and discipline in No 9 Operational Group. At first came reports of rapid displacement of various wing and squadron commanders. Then came the news that one of the senior staff officers had submitted an adverse report on AVM Bostock. The position was very difficult from the point of view of the RAAF for although No 9 OG was assigned by Allied Air Forces General Orders to RAAF COMMAND, for operational control it had been placed under Major General Kenney, Fifth Air Force. This meant that AVM Bostock had very few points of contact with No 9 OG and these were limited to such things as war training and procedures. On the other hand some of the commanders and personnel within the Group may have resented what they may have seen as interference in their affairs by AVM Bostock. The matter of discipline being the prime concern of the Air Member for Personnel, RAAF Headquarters.
"^^The RAAF Command Scandal. these reports included ' insubordination and truculence' , uncertainty, confusion and lack of information. Bostock's remoteness was symptomatic. See AWM54 (81/2/17) p.73. 46
Units within No 9 OG were answerable to AVM Jones at RAAF
Headquarters and units outside the Group answered to AVM Bostock at RAAF COMMAND. Morale and discipline is alleged to have suffered as each officer and airman decided between the two commanders. If true, this was symptomatic of the general uncertainty and confusion throughout the RAAF at this time and the reported confused organisation at the higher levels.'''^
On one occasion this situation came to the notice of Major
General Kenney."^^ After AVM Jones had encroached upon operational matters, Kenney signalled RAAF Headquarters and asked them to 'obtain information on operations from RAAF COMiyiAND,
AAF. 'and not his USAAF staff This spoke volumes for the lack of unity within the RAAF and did the members a great disservice in the eyes of an Alliance partner.
A further illustration of this command and control fiasco is the reported delay in replies from RAAF Headquarters to communications from AVM Bostock on administrative matters of importance to his operationsOn 19 November 1942, a request was made for an airstrip to be prepared in North-Western
Australia by the 16 January 1943 to take a fighter squadron.''^
Six days before the deadline, a message was sent indicating that
'^'^See Power Plus Attitude, pp. 62-67.
"^^Ibid, p. 74.
"^^Loc Cit.
''''IJOC Cit, p. 75.
78 Loc cit. 47 the strip had not been prepared. As a result of this, the proposed move failed and another had to be substituted.
Another important example was recorded in March 1943 during a critical phase of operations against the Japanese. An account of the incident states that Air Force Headquarters was
asked to leave a detachment of a Mobile Works Unit at Horn Island
in case the only bomber strip in the Torres Strait area was bombed by the Japanese and put out of action. A reply was
received on 10 March stating that Allied Works Council men were
at Horn Island for just such an emergency. However, the AOC
North-Eastern Area signalled positively, having confirmed it
himself by checking personally that there were; 'no Allied Works
Council men at Horn Island' If this is a true report, this
dangerous inaccuracy could have led to a very difficult position
at that stage in the Pacific war. The loss of the only bomber
base might have affected the course of the whole campaign.
Throughout the rest of 1943, the operational tasks by RAAF
COMMAND were increasing. The Catalina flying boat wing was
conducting a vigorous mining campaign against enemy held ports
and enemy shipping. At one stage as a result of Catalina mining
operations, every major port in the Dutch East Indies was closed
to Japanese shipping for 10 days. Ships were unable to leave or
enter port. Advantage was taken to strike the vessels with the
79 Loc Cit, p.75.
®°Loc Cit. The importance of this incident is that it occurred in March 1943 at a critical phase for the RAAF. 48
RAAF COMMAND heavy unit, the 3 60th Bombardment Group (US) and the medium bomber (Australian and Dutch) . Much damage was inflicted on the Japanese in this period and these raids caused much disorganisation to Japanese lines of communication in the Dutch
East Indies.
The peak had not yet been reached. RAAF COMMAND was gradually expanded as new squadrons were being formed. The performance of the Catalina Wing which was based in Cairns and
Karumba was outstanding. Aerial mining operations were carried out as far away as Balikpapan and ports even further north.
In September 1943, seeing that No 9 OG was no longer in a position to continue in the advance towards Japan without major reorganisation, AVM Bostock suggested to Major General Kenney that a new RAAF operational group be formed. This group would be called No 10 Operational Group, and would be placed under the operational control of the Fifth Air Force to ensure that there was a continued RAAF participation in the offensive aspects of the campaign. No 10 OG would be equipped with both a dive bomber wing and fighter wing.^^ Major General Kenney accepted the proposal because, by this account, he was as anxious as AVM
Bostock to see that the RAAF should take a full part in the forward movement.^^ Moreover, General Kenney realised that forward of the most advanced Allied base at Nadzab there were many excellent targets.
^^Ibid, p. 80.
^^ibid p. 81. 49 RAAF Headquarters was asked to constitute the Group with all haste, the intention being that it should proceed to New Guinea in December. Agreement was obtained that the new Group should be formed but the speed of implementation following this agreement was such that the target date would not be met. With only 5 weeks remaining before the new Group was to be constituted, however, neither the commander nor his senior staff officers had been nominated. The combat units were already- formed or were forming, all that remained was to establish the ancillary units and the Group Headquarters. At this crucial time it seemed difficult for the RAAF Headquarters to show any sense of urgency.
On 14 October 1943, AVM Bostock wrote to Major General
Kenney outlining what he saw as the main cause of the delay.^^
He wrote that he was 'completely without authority of any kind over the units and services which he is required to operate.'^
In an astounding admission by one senior air force officer to another of an Allied force he believed that 'unless the RAAF is reorganised basically on sound military principles, it is inevitable that it will fail as a fighting force, under the stress of intensive operations^^ He concluded that, 'In my opinion, while the RAAF is required to function under a system which is contrary to the fundamental principles of military
^^Ibid p. 81-82.
^Loc Cit contained in para 3 of the letter.
85 Loc Cit. 50 organisation, there can be no satisfactory solution to the innumerable resultant minor problems
By the end of 1943, the morale and discipline were reported to be so low in No 9 OG that AVM Jones signalled Major General
Kenney and AVM Bostock that he intended to replace the AOC No 9
OG in the interests of morale and discipline of that formation.
The degrading situation was to continue. Quite clearly, Bostock blamed Jones for all the shortcomings of RAAF operational effectiveness.
Conditions in New Guinea
Accounts of the conditions, the fighting, the atrocities and executions committed in New Guinea are well documented in recent books^''. The men of the RAAF also had to contend with the knowledge that some of their best airmen were in Europe fighting the Germans^^ their own high command was bitterly divided and loyalties throughout the middle ranking officers were split around the Bostock and Jones allegiances.
Conditions in New Guinea included the hottest and most uncomfortable situation that can be imagined. Fifty years later,
^^Loc Cit, para 3.
^"^See Hall, T., New Guinea 1942-44. Methuen Australia Pty Ltd, Sydney, Australia, 1981, and Wilson,D., The Decisive Factor. Banner Books, Melbourne, Victoria, 1991.
^^McCarthy, John, A last call of empire. Australian aircrew, Britain and the Empire Air Training Scheme, Australian War Memorial, 19 88. 51 and with modern amenities so much part of everyday life, living and fighting in mud and filth is difficult to appreciate. For the Australian airmen sent to this theatre of operations the shock must have been traumatic. Stories were common of vehicles driven off the roads only to be lost from sight by morning in the mud. Rainfall averaged 6 inches every night. Fatigue of the airmen, mosquitoes and the danger of being encircled by the enemy and attacked from behind at any time.
The manifestation of command confusion and low morale soon became apparent in inefficient and ineffective procedures.
Problems existed with the lack of essential supplies and the unnecessarily bureaucratic systems particularly in resupply of
essential equipment and spares. On one occasion, an issue
request for mosquito repellent was refused because the forms were
incorrectly completed. A nonsense given the operational
implications of airmen catching malaria and the like.^^
Difficult RAAF stores and accounting procedures and
difficult messing and catering arrangements conspired to
complicate already desperate circumstances. Pilots were trying
to refuel and rearm and provide for themselves at the same
time.^° All the personnel in theatre ran their own barter in products often trading in each others possessions. Whenever a
''AS told by Air Commodore 'Bull' Garing in interview.
^°See Darwin's Air War. 1942-1945. Aviation Historical Society of the Northern Territory, and Scramble. The Story of Australia's Few, by Harry Robinson, published in The Australian Magazine. April 25-26 1992, pp 8-15. 52 pilot failed to return home the first concern for his colleagues was who inherited his kit, so desperate were they to survive the awful risks of disease and fighting the Japanese.^^
Flights from mainland Australia replenished most consumable
items so the space available for high priority freight on these
flights was very limited indeed. Also, equipment procedures were
responsible for many unnecessary shortages. Air Commodore 'Bull'
Garing commander of No 9 OG tells how on one occasion the RAAF
requested purchase of a new US bombsight to aid accuracy. The
RAAF bombsights were found to be inferior. RAAF Headquarters in
Melbourne refused the request on the grounds of cost. Such
difficulties had the potential to halt RAAF operations had it not
been for the determination of the men in New Guinea to rise above
these problems and carry on regardless
Cooperation between the Australian Army and the RAAF was
superb. At Milne Bay the Japanese had complete air superiority
until the RAAF challenged them. Without the RAAF, 'the Japanese
would have won at Milne Bay'^^. There were problems, however,
such as the issuing of orders for air strike tasks directly to
the aircrews themselves without recourse to coordination by a
^^Loc Cit, Their Fighting Spirits Remain, on ABC TV at 9.3 0pm on April 25 1992, by Geoffrey Robertson. "They had no proper food, no health or hygiene precautions".
^^The above is taken from anecdotal evidence in interviews given by retired senior RAAF officers. Air Commodores Garing, Garrisson and Steege.
^^This opinion was expressed by Air Commodore Garing in interview on 12 March 1992. 53
RAAF local area headquarters. No 9 OG headquarters was established under the command of Garing, and began at once to exercise a much greater degree of control on the use of the valuable and scarce air resources. General Clowes and 'Bull'
Garing cooperated together to ensure that the air assets were tasked in order to achieve the overall objective of the campaign.
' I knew where his troops were and he knew what my aircraft could do.'^^
Unfortunately, the fight between Bostock and Jones trickled down to the operational airmen. Morale of the operational personnel was affected by rumours about the disagreements between
Bostock and Jones. Inevitably, people took sides and senior officers especially became more circumspect in their opinions.
Integrity and commitment suffered in this climate of suspicion and intrigue. Later in April 1945, the effect of such poor leadership was to result in the so called 'Morotai Mutiny' by eight prominent fighter pilots, ^^ Major General Kenney's description of the affair makes depressing reading. ^^
Major General Kenney favoured Bostock to Jones, viewing him as a better fighting man. The in-fighting reduced the fighting potential of the RAAF. One damning conclusion was that Bostock and Jones were so preoccupied with their struggle that they had
^"^Cited by Air Commodore Garing at interview on 12 Mar 92.
^^See Power Plus AttitudP, by Alan Stephens, pp. 71-72.
^^See Kenney Papers, Volume 10, 26-4-45. 54 no time to seek to develop an air power doctrine for the RAA.F'
Moreover, RAAF personnel in Melbourne and Brisbane never knew who had the authority. The fear of being wrong most likely meant
that decisions were not made. The damage went to the root of all
RAAF operations and activities. Postings of senior officers were
'inept and seemingly capricious'^^ Speculation went so far as
to suggest that even MacArthur and Kenney could sit on the
sidelines and add fuel to the Jones/Bostock feud once their own military command and control processes were in place.
One incident in New Guinea highlighted another disturbing
aspect of the leadership struggle and the toll it was having on
the behaviour of RAAF operational personnel. Namely, the lack
of information about what was really going on. This was
demonstrated by an incident involving AVM Bostock and illustrated his lack of appreciation about the profession of flying in the
New Guinea environment so preoccupied was he with the feud.
One account of Bostock's lack of up to date knowledge was given by Air Commodore Garing.^^ This account tells how AVM
Bostock sent Wing Commander Sam Balmer to New Guinea with a number of torpedo bombers to carry out a raid on Buka Bay, some
SOOkms distance from Milne Bay. The aircraft had the range in
^^Robertson, J., cited in Power Plus Attitude, by Alan Stevens, AGPS, Canberra, 1992, p.65.
^^loc.cit.
This account was reported by Air Commodore Garing in interview at his home in Sydney on 12 March 1992. A similar account was given in ABC TV story of No 75 Squadron, on 25 April 1992. ^ 55 temperate climates to carry out the operation but unknown to AVM
Bostock the extreme humidity and high temperatures in New Guinea were severely limiting this capability. Air Commodore Garing, the commander of No 9 OG, discovered that all the planning had been done in the South East of Australia and that the extremes of climate had not been taken into account. Effectively local conditions caused a major loss in performance by 12% or one eighth. Air Commodore Garing told Balmer to fly 3 aircraft to
Gasmata on New Britain and back to check how much fuel would be used. In so doing, he proved that if the operation had gone ahead, the whole squadron would have been lost in the sea with no fuel. On his own authority 'Bull' Garing cancelled the operation and when Bostock found out he was furious. He flew up to Milne Bay to interview both Garing and Balmer, 'Bull' Garing recounts how Bostock would only ask Balmer for an explanation, and once this had been given he departed and never returned again to Milne Bay. 56
CHAPTER 4 - ASSESSMENT OF BOSTOCK
'Air Vice-Marshal Bostock made an outstanding and major
contribution to the final success of Allied arms in the war
against the Japanese. He has rendered truly distinguished
service not only to his own but also to the Allied
nations.'
George C Kenney,
General,
United States Army, Commanding
In planning, directing and coordinating the operations of air units of Australia, New Zealand and the Netherlands, and, from time to time certain American units as well, AVM Bostock showed himself to be a professional executive and according to
Kenney an outstanding commander. However, Kenney may have had a stake in keeping Australia's command arrangements in place to exploit the weakness for US purposes. Why else would MacArthur have blocked the appointment of a British CAS? An officer of the calibre of Keith Park would surely have made a difference.
Charged with the air defence of Australia during the most critical stage of the war in the Pacific, Bostock played a key part in those operations. However, his authority and effectiveness were either constrained by his lack of command and control or by his lack of detailed knowledge of all the aspects
^°®Office of the Commanding General letter reference AG 2 01- BOSTOCK, William D. (0)-GA, dated 17 November 1945. 57 of RAAF operations; namely administration and support. His conservative leanings also made him a political liability especially after the war. He was retired six years early as the
RAAF was being reduced in size which led to speculation that his political views were assessed to be an unacceptable liability.
Early in April 1943 an attempt was made to remove Bostock from his appointment signalling the low point in the RAAF's command relationships. A telegraph message announced that AVM
Bostock was to command North Western area with effect from 15
April, and that Air Commodore Hewitt was to be the new AOC RAAF
COMMAND.At the same time a signal was also sent to Major
General Kenney informing him of the proposed changes.
Major General Kenney reacted to this by signalling the Air
Board saying: 'Such a drastic and important step should have been discussed with this Headquarters before being put into effect.
I suggest that your order be recalled.' This was denied meaning that the matter was out of Kenney's hands. By posting AVM
Bostock to command one of his own subordinate formations, and by bringing Air Commodore Hewitt, from No 9 OG to command RAAF
COMMAND, the effect would have been that AVM Bostock would have been called upon to occupy an appointment subordinate to an officer much junior to him and who was from one of his subordinate formations.
Signal PZ 513 of 6 April 1943, referred to in RAAF Command Scandal, p 69. 58
The matter was brought to the notice of both the Prime
Minister and General MacArthur. It was obvious to all that the
Prime Minister was very angry at what seemed a vindictive action.
An officer of the RAAF Headquarters described the reaction to the
Prime Minister's anger in disparaging terms saying that few
senior officers and high officials within the Department were
prepared to admit they had anything to do with the matter. If
true, such comments on the working ethos within the RAAF
Headquarters at that time serve as an remarkable indictment on
the character of the relationships that existed.
Why such an action was taken in the first place is hard to
assess, other than to speculate that perhaps the Air Board
members felt that such a removal of Bostock would meet the
approval of the Americans. In his autobiographyKenney
remarks that the suggestion came as a complete surprise since AVM
Bostock was meeting all Allied operational requirements. This
would indicate a most shameful lack of understanding of RAAF
operations and their part within the overall Allied effort at a
critical time in the RAAF's history or duplicity on the part of
Kenney and MacArthur.
^^See General Kenney Reports, edited by Kohn and Harahan, US Warrior Studies, Washington, 19 87. 59
After the War, AVM Bostock was retired from the RAAF in circumstances which gave rise to much conj ecture^®^, The RAAF was being reduced in numbers ^^ but the circumstances of Bostock's compulsory retirement were to reinforce the theory that old scores were being settled. Alan Stephens comments that Bostock was criticised by the Air Board for his 'inability to work in harmony with others' and was said to have demonstrated a 'lack of balance and appreciation of responsibility', which made his continued employment 'undesirable'. Stephens also comments that this was an extraordinary accusation against an officer who had been left in command of RAAF operations for three years. Moreover, Bostock was the RAAF's senior operational commander and would surely have had a great deal to contribute to the post-war RAAF organisation as it was formed. At the age of 53, seven years below the nominal retirement age for his rank, AVM Bostock had become the victim of 'old scores
AVM Bostock became a special aviation correspondent for The Herald newspaper and wrote a series of scathing articles about the crisis of command which had taken place during the War. The series of articles in June 1946 identified many examples of RAAF command and control problems including those years 1942-43 which directly affected the operational capability of the RAAF. The
^^See for example The Argus newspaper. Sat Feb 23, 1946. Article Compulsorily Retired from the RAAF. attached list of RAAF operational units in 1945. Power Plus Attitude, pp. 92-93.
^^JJOC Cit p. 94. 60 articles even included the call for an inquiry into the 'RAAF's
Unhappy Story'which was being articulated in the Federal
Parliament at the time.
The Minister for Air, Drakeford, replied to these serious criticisms. He accused Bostock of 'labouring under a definite misconception (which he appears to have fostered to the point of obsession) of the real functions of his Command, and that misconception was, to a large extent, responsible for the difficulties that arose between him and the Air Board.'
Drakeford seems to have completely ignored the separate requirement for unambiguous and authoritative military command.
Whilst Bostock should have accepted his inferior position as AOC
RAAF COMMAND to Jones as CAS, dividing loyalties around operational efficiency demonstrated ignorance or worse, political exploitation. Drakeford went on further to identify that the difficulties which AVM Bostock had identified related more to his poor leadership and command qualities that to the RAAF or the support given by the Australian Government. In Drakeford's opinion, the problem lay with AVM Bostock himself and his 'lack of operational opportunity' which was not the responsibility of
RAAF Headquarters. He concluded with the remarks:
'I ask Parliament and the public to treat anything further
which flows from his facile pen, as the outpourings of a
^^See The Herald, dated 22 June 1946, article, "RAAF's Unhappy Story" Government Indicted on Eight Points. 61
person who, having frustrated his ambition in the service
by his own actions, finds satisfaction in belittling a
Force which has a proud record of service for Australia and
the Allied cause.
Clearly these matters do emphasise Bostock's detached personal style of leadership and his remoteness as a commander.
Moreover, throughout this post-war debate AVM Jones was unable to comment because he remained a serving RAAF officer until 1952.
His autobiography published in 1988 says little of substance on the matter. ^^ Paradoxically, many retired airmen publicly stated that they knew nothing of the scandalous relationships which prevailed although divided loyalties affected RAAF operations. Moreover, the matter had the potential to bring down the post-war Labor Government and RAAF personnel ignorant of the scandal were more often those in the more junior roles.
Only those senior RAAF officers serving out of the region are likely not to have known about the problems of RAAF command and control.
Clearly though the rift between Bostock and Jones caused
MacArthur some concern although why he never approved of a
British CAS prompts other suspicions. In a private meeting in
^°^Australian Archives A816/1 2/301/438A.
^^See From Private to Air Marshal, Autobiography. Greenhouse Publications, Victoria, 1988.
selection of articles from The Sydney Morning Herald at the time of Bostock's early retirement show that many senior officers were very aware of the harm done by the Jones/Bostock feud. 62
Brisbane between General MacArthur and the Prime Minister Curtin on 29 November 1943, MacArthur repeated the views that the Jones and Bostock situation was unsatisfactory in so far as the operational efficiency of the RAAF was concerned. He went on to conclude that since no change had been made in the organisation, he had been content to make the best of a bad job and much preferred it to the introduction of a British officer to command the RAAF^^^
The subtle point easily missed here is that whilst MacArthur may have appeared to be calling for executive action he recognised that a British CAS would have wanted full command and control of all air operations. This would have been unacceptable to the US. A weakened Australian leadership, however, allowed for unhindered independent US policy action and only affected
RAAF operational effectiveness. Kenney made sure that the separate command organisation quarantined the dispute within the
Australian operational delegated areas. This suited MacArthur very well indeed.
At the operational and tactical levels, assessing the effectiveness of AVM Bostock depends upon which side loyalty lay.
Anecdotal evidence indicates that Bostock was a very fair, well respected commander and a very professional staff officer but he remained remote from the battle area itself and was isolated from policy making of administrative support and from the operations
^^^Australian Archives A 816/1, 66/301/162A, Notes of Discussions with The Commander-in-Chief. Southwest Pacific Area. 63 of No 9 and 10 OG. Often these were the most contentious affecting operations. Defending Australia was a huge task given inadequate resources but Bostock's detached operational management and leadership style created additional difficulties.
He delegated most of his operational and tactical tasks to the commanders which endeared him to some but upset others. No doubt, his leadership struggle with AVM Jones affected his judgement and certainly preoccupied his mind unnecessarily. In summary, Bostock may well have been promoted above the level of his competence but he was undoubtedly served poorly by political compromise. 64
CONCLUSION
No study of AVM Bostock and the problems of RAAF command and operations in Southwest Pacific can escape the pervasiveness and corrosiveness of the relationship which existed between the
RAAF's two most senior commanders. The RAAF had two leaders and
Bostock was the other one. Moreover, the effect this had on all areas of RAAF operations, and most important of all, the Allied relationship, is fundamental to understanding how the RAAF performed in 1942-43.
Australia's survival was threatened, only the Americans could save Australia from certain invasion. The RAAF was the only force capable of fighting the Japanese remote from
Australian shores, buying vital time for the planners to assemble the forces necessary for the defence of Australia. The defence began as meagre coastal tasks in small selected areas and gradually expanded to include the air defence of Australia and the combat air support operations in New Guinea.
The arrival of the US forces in strength and the subsequent reversal of the Japanese advances which began with the air battle of the Coral Sea established the US hold over the region and heralded the 'turning point in the making of modern
Australia'^^^ The Americans supplied the equipment, money and leadership for Australia to join in the fight back. Prime
"^Hawke, The Honourable R.J.L., AC, Australia's Perilous Year, Defence Force Journal, No.72, September/October, 1988, Foreword. 65
Minister Curtin had said in 1941: 'Without inhibitions of any- kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs of our traditional links of kinship with the United
Kingdom. . .The United States will give our country some confidence of being able to hold out until the battle swings against the enemy' No wonder then that Australia was vulnerable to comments that the Australian/American relationship was very one- sided.
Operations in the SWPA against a significant Japanese threat were fraught with difficulties enough without the added complications of government indifference and RAAF naivety, AVM
Bostock had only command not control of No 9 OG in New Guinea whereas, AVM Jones as CAS had command of all support elements.
In New Guinea, the RAAF squadrons had to put up with appalling conditions and poor response from their own service support systems often caused by these different structures.
However, Bostock's operational experience was all gained in
Europe and not the Pacific, a point not lost on Sir Frederick
Shedden, Secretary, Department of Defence. Later, on 4 November
1944 he was to comment;
'Some day there will be an outcry about the relatively poor
RAAF effort in the Southwest Pacific Area in relation to
the resources allotted to the air effort. It is not the
fault of the personnel in the squadrons, who are
113 Ibid. Bombardments of Belief, by Manning Clark, pl8-19. 66
magnificent, but it is due to the set up, under which it
has also been necessary to send senior officers to Europe
to get operational experience which should be provided in
the Southwest Pacific Area.'^^"^
Morale, suffered from the Jones/Bostock feud and found discontent in the poor operational conditions which prevailed.
In 1942-43 the doctrine of unity of command within the RAAF was subordinated to achieving post-war independence. The failure was to allow a rift to open between the RAAF most senior commanders at the expense of operational effectiveness. One wonders how well the RAAF might have performed had these serious impediments not existed?
What then of the future? The Australian/American relations, formed in the crucible of war in the Pacific grew to the ANZUS arrangement; the cornerstone of the western defence relationships in the Southwest Pacific. Australia was given a seat at 'the largest table in historyand has managed to keep America engaged in the region ever since. However, as good as that relationship is, the legacy of the past for the RAAF is that the period marks a lost period in terms of development and that ANZUS does not provide watertight guarantees. Trade is problematical.
The relationship is unequal. US policy-making is remote.
^^"^From a paper by Sir Frederick G Shedden, KCMG OBE, Secretary, Department of Defence, called Higher organisation of RAAF, Australian Archives A5954/1.
^^^Quoted for radio interview by The Prime Minister Paul Keating referring to the US/Australian relationship in 1993. 67
The Australian Government still pushes the RAAF towards divided support and operational elements. Government indifference to the past and RAAF naivety to the dangers are still apparent in modern force structure reviews. Surely, the events of 1942-43 clearly show the dangers of divided responsibilities. They gave the wartime commanders the basis on which to confront each other in the first place, not to mention the catastrophic effects of divided loyalty on operational effectiveness. These sober lessons of RAAF history will not be lost on students of air power, particularly those with a knowledge of operational logistics and how it is intertwined with the success of air operations in war.
In 1945, AVM Bostock referred to the RAAF as being 'cramped cockpits and swivel chairs' in an article in The Herald. Most disturbing is that the gap which existed then between the support and operations in the RAAF in 1942-43 still remains today in many elements. The dangers in splitting operational needs from sustainment and support aspects are still not widely appreciated. Given goodwill between commanders difficulties can always be overcome but history may repeat itself if the doctrine is flawed in the first place.
For the sake of the future of Australia, the RAAF must never again allow the differences between those who occupy swivel chairs and those who occupy cramped cockpits to erode operational effectiveness. After all, next time there may not be a great and powerful friend controlling the outcome. 68
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NEWSPAPERS
The Age The Argus The Sydney Morning Herald
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Routine GRADUATION. EXAMINATIONS PASSED. Gazette No. ORDERS, DECOR.\TIONS, MEDALS, Rank. Date. Branch. Orders Date. Authority. and Date. inclu'iing mention in despatches? r.esult. Author^, and Date. Date. Authority. Nature. ij Air Cadet 5.1917. liT If-.li.
Pilot Officer ISU ft E^ .JL. j Flying Officer lV-0.21. Cr.D. 37/iZ/. HQ. f?o/3/i-. X'o./.SU. . i j Flight Lieutenant iq3. Hq.ixo/uk'i i: Squadron Leader 3J. 3-2T ^'Mlu
Wing Comnrrancler | | nq.RQlu: [\cl i" PERIODT Unit or Service. Nature of .Appointment. App)ointment. I From. To. Remarks. From. To. B.!. F. 2 3. !/. n. ; ^^.k-Jh- . cA4. I. "i'. S>. f^-F.e- I -^.ir I. 3-fY. . . iO.b.^b. . —• 3.1T. ; IX. : . — 27.^.17. 27./^. rr. I ; : ui. 30. 5". IT. ; K.n.nr. a. U-O O.C.I r. '-'S-HVist. (L 17. S.S.I7. 123.11.5/. HQ. f?o/7??. fc/j^C. it-S- r-C . 12. S.17. ifi'f [n.D.t. i 7- /. . H.E TL '•^J/J-'J^i 10. t. iq. (f r POSTINGS. SCMOOLS OF INSTRUCTION.—Sp al Courses. &c. EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS, CERTIFICATES, ETC. Posted to. Date. Authority. Nature. To. Authority. Result. li^-.Q.i?/. ^vU^- Sycl i ' 1- IJl : - 93. iiN.Q-. R.F.e. ; I.Y.S9. 1 .(i o-V M.H. ni>ouki^r. i^^Yf' 1 S'.l./7. : 3/././7- . jiHQ.-xXt. L.o. jp.t^.G)- L,lU- Q r (^C o). . /M . S. VU - 1 tlr-'^-Ar RECORD OF SPECIAL LE.AVE. SERVICE-TOWARDS LONG i - c'jrr. j; k-^^vC^vVAr^-f e. i I.IX.3S j 1 LL4VE TO COUNT FROM- j LEAVE WITHOUT PAY. LONG LEAVE. i -J i 1 ! ; \ 1 To. Authority. ! rrom, j To. ; Authority. Dc .. fc, n I' C t>o A. 1 1 1 -H./.- Authority. i 1 • y^ii-. 'H.I- : 1 1 i IC'I. "n.l" i • I j 1 Co.TjlM. ; it.v.^/. 1 •• -7 7/. ikc^ r "'•"^•[ii. ROYAL AIR FORCE. I'OK USI! AT Alii MINISTUY. Form 3®7. . f ]ixn minod. Noted in Uix;nriis. Annual Confidential Report (Officers) for 193 (To be rendered 'n uccordanco with K.R. & A.G.I. Para. 1097). 1. Surname 2. IMv-^i^.P^^nder • 3. Christian Names (in full) 4. (a) Date of Birth.... (h) Married or Single. (c) Next of Kin (relationship and address)...¥?:s Bo stock NJP.'...3. Off i9ers \, Married_ _^uart©r,,A._ _Stat ion, _ ^Ab in.Rdon. 5. Unit with which serving..Heada\-^arters.,. 6. Date of joining unit 27tli. 7. Duties upon wMoh engaged .Duties.. 8. Branch of Sorvice R9J.a.l..Aus:bralian. Ai^ 9. Type of Commission Permanent., CONDUCT. 10. Has liis personal conduct been in all respects satisfactory ? If not, state nature of failure 11. Is he in all respects of temperate habits ? 12. If of rank of Squadron Leader or above, does he at all times furnish a correct example to his juniors 13. Is his tact in the handling of men— (a) Exceptional. /I / y—z^ (b) Above the average. (c) Avera,ge. (d) BCIOAV the average. 14. Is his zeal iji the performance of his duties — (a) Exceptional. oJ^ (b) Above the average. / (c) Average. (d) Below the average. (•259s—ii!7) Wt. 31730—2036 12,000 2/37 T.S. 667 ABILITY. Whether recommended for any special enipIo:7ment, other than that on wliich (To be assessed as Exeeptiona], Above the Average, Avei\ago, or Belov/ the Averc engaged - Items upon wliich no experience of oiRcer has been obtamed are to be ticked td»"^ough.) 28. fjre of any special 15. In duties upon wliich now engaged.. .. ' qualifications... 16. In flying duties.. 29. Nature of any special non-prof essionalk^wlcdge, e.g.y Foreign Languages, Dramng, If the officer repojt'ted on is of the rank of Group Captain or below, the Music, etc following information is to be extracted from Pilot's log books by the reporting officer. 30. Li the case of an officer seconded from the Army, state whether recommended for :—• (a) accelerated Army promotion .Irrrr . 17. Total number of hours flown as j)ilot prior to current twelve months {b) Ai'my promotion in ordinary comse <^.'.7. [see 17A) C^R^ (c) Army promotion to be delaj^od fr7A. Total number of hours tlovm during the twelve months ended 31st May. ^ N.B.—In the case of a seconded officer, tliis Form is to be rendered in duplicate. (a) as pilot 31. Special remarks by C.O. of Unit (including information required under clause 13A (5) as passenger of para. 1097, Iving's Regulations and Air Council Instructions, if app^able)—-/n IS. (a) ^pwice tj^pes of ahwii^ proficient (b) If the officer has CJ[ualified as first pilot durhig the year under review, the date of qualification should be stated....i-rrrrr. *19. In technical knowledge, stating nature ^^ of any special knowledge .^rrrT. 20. In administrative knowledge, stating ^^ nature of any special Imowled^ez:-^. JL +21. In Staff work (statmg Branc §22. As a Fl^dng Instructor ^ / y ^tr 23. Power of command 24. Power to imx^art Imowledge 25. General standard of Professional knowledge^-; Date. ../. .tt:'^. . Signature 26. Present Medical Category (Special Medical Examination E.42 - Signature to be reproduced in block capitals. Previous Permanent Category (last assessed on Eorm dated ). {i.e. Medical Board if recorded) Liitials of officer Simature of Medical Officer. .Q O A. reported upon Date.../..?/..^/. jA report is to be attached where the officer has not completed the requisite number of flying hours (seej K.R. and A.C.I., para. 695). N.B.—Whatever be the nature of the annual report made by the Q.O., it is to be •Not to be completed unless the officer reported on is qualified E, E(T), E*, S, S*, A, A*,JPh, N, C or X, and is m employment within his qualification or is a commissioned engineer, signals or armament officer. shown to the officer reported on and the fact noted hereon. See K.R. JNot to be completed unless the officer reported on is in employment in a staff post. and A.C.I., para. 1097, clauses 10 and 11, as to communication of remarks §Not to bo completed unless the officer reported on is categorised and employed aia a fiyiiig instructor. of superior officers. [P.T.O. 32. Remarks hy Wing or Station Commander— Date Signature. 33. Remarks by Group Commander- Date Signature 34. Remarks of Air or other Officer Comrcanding- L iiu L u^^Cz/i^, A L^ ^ chr^ A /C^ rhrC ei S/MJ^/^-t W) f'/- DateSignature —Wo. t (?.) GKOU? R.A.F4 A;;L-J/J^I.U .;A'oi( ok. .'I,yii:G TI],,]-::;. (R.A,A.,P. ) V/cii' oft]-vi ce/j?!!yir;/' to ow-i ol' l';2i:. o^.^ „ qq v/i^; K./v. :'.iy26/7/8. 9S - 40 '.Vi tl; li.A.A.y. , 1929. 90 - 00 To v2 - Vj ROYAL Am FORCE. Form 364 ..ZPORT on Officer or Airman Pilot on passing out from or on leaving a Flying Instructors' Course at the Central Flying School. {'See Jji-slriicliona orcr.) 'diMim Towlirir, Surname CJiristian Nitme^ (IN 1!I,(U;I; capitai.S.) No Rank : Unit -to ij.lb.lj?. 1. Duration of Course 2. Flying— -YINC! NHTJUJCTION. I'V I 'ryjx.' of Aci'0])lano for Flyiiif,' Tiiruw. wliidb rocomnionikil as Typo of Aorojilaiio. In.sli'nclor. B.F. .45 .35. Moth. All typos» Snipe • 20. Siskin, 1.25' .20. Gomocoolc • OjpeT^o ,25. Total lloujis .. 16'. 40. 20. a), very fooO. pij.(>t vrith cxcfiin.nnt juc^fonorst. Knorr^ 3. ]lcma.rk.s o)i ilyiiig :—, thf> OF -JLNRITA-UCTLON THOROUF;-]'.:!.-,'^ r--.no ••ILL"' .-.r-C.N-JJIT.lonp 1 It rooc inr^wwa tov » 4. Gboukd Bin'.JEUTs- f!round .suljjct-.ls. % ^iurl;,'! ohuiincd in uach si.lijoct-. '.UOTAL 5. Suitability as an Instructor apai't from Flying, erefti';11'!r,j. X'-r roor :J,r\.itrlu;to?"* •xhiH t^vino ^'nrv-••foil ov. tbc Cournc pr 6. Remarks by Commandant.. h^^c Rasiim-eti the ne^-oda of innbrviotxo- "or'^ ri^-picl^ Siynaiurc.. i-'orc nr. Dale. Rank Commanding Central Mying School. r.8fi,I) (2()81SU) Wt.2is-l/2;u Gi).127 luoo 5-27 W & S Ltd I R.A.A.F. COliiUAlTO, A.A.F., S-W.P.A. ORGAIJISATIW FOR OPERATIONS. R.A.A.F. HEADQUARTERS (Administrative) pac/ech rWD/EClI S.W.P.A. H.Z. AIR DEPT. WELLINGTCN (Administrative) ALLIED NAVAL FORCES ALLIED AIR FORCES ALLIED LAND FORCES F.K.A.F. (U.S) RAAF COUMAiro 5 A.F. 13 A.F. IJORTHERN NO. 11 G51P. A'TH.EAST. I'lTll.lffiST V/ESTKRN EASTERN SOUTHERI^ ISLANDS ARiSA AREA ARiSA AREA AREA AREA ! ARZA V R.N.Z.A.T.F. 91 (an/n> 7Q Qofln IK O- WING 115 ASRF 36 Sq. (TT' WING "•S"6"sqdn 32 sqdn 85 Sqdn 38 Sq.(T) (14 (FTR) Sq. ! 114 ASRF I A 76(C3l/FB) 63 Sqdn 15 ( ) sq. Sqdns /v WING (1)200 Fit. IV ( ) sq. t A I 18 ( ) Sq. 6 Sqdn 85 (H/B) 19 ( " ) Sq. 15 Sqdn WING 20 ( ) sq. 33 Sq.(T) 23 ( ) Sq. 120 Sqdn i 25 ( ) Sq. 111 ASRF Sqdns (FTR) (B/R) Sq. 40 Sqdn 2 87 Sq'd-. 4 ( " ) Sq. A 201 Fit 2 ASR Dets.) 84 (ARMY CO-OP) WING (RAAF) y'v bdns _ Admin. Control Operational Control NOTES: (1) No. 200 Fit. under direct operational Control of RAAF Command. For full list of units within the Formations comprising RAAF Command : See Pages 7 and 8. PAGE 2. I I NO. LOCATICN !! CCNTROL CO»AI. OINCZR NO.LOCATICN CCHTRGO:. CCHM. OTTLCM NO.. LOCATICN CORRHDL COM. OFFICIA -F- 1 MALLACOOTA I SOOTBERN AREA 7/L STUOMS 43 CUENEY NORIHERT AREA T/L CRR.FEALLH 74 TANRET AREA T/L H. GCTEQ m [ 14 LOWOOD SASTISIN AREA F/L A. BBOUCARAI NCBTH.SAST.ARSA a/t 0. UP*ABD 75 NOCMANBAH T/L C. COOTZ 44 MERADKE I 16 ST.GECRGES BASIN TI 7/L W. SAAIH 45 MCRE5BT NORTBBEM AHEA sA. C. NICHONS 76 LSFTAJCNTH 3/L D. TINCSRR 21 R0CKHA1£PTCN N0KIHJLAST.AR3A F/L K. EURTOOD 46 MHIDLZBIEC; P/O J. SAIISAI 77 GONUFCED I/L E. COLLINS 24 MAPT:BA IT RA- F. LEHAMS 47 LABOAN 81 (RCBL W.HQ BA J. TOCEIT 78 PT.ESIILAIN) F/L J, UAGSS N 25 CAIMTS SA- W. AHSABN 48 FIIFSC2FFLAFJN NCEMEN ARSA 1/0 X. CDHTTI.T, 79 BEDQMK T/L R. EBNT 1 • • is »'. 27 COOKTOTM FA. D. BIRCH 49 HOLLANDIA T/L G. rsps 80 DISBT F/0 P. HAIILXT 1 I1 m 30 CLA^CURKT N. FA J. CAPS 53 BATCHZLCR NORTH.KSST.ARSA T/L N. HARD 82 CRAKLET FA D. DC.CASTLLUL 33 HIOGINS > I S/L N. CJDOCH N0BTH,13ST.AHEA r/L 5. COR 83 BAT.TTT, PAPAN 79 (CE/B) -.HQ TA ASTK* 1 55 GORRIS 1 I I 34 K'XRMIBA T 56 00V3 y/L G. MARTIN 84 LABUAN 86 (ATT) TT.HQ FA R. MCONZH 1 F/L N. BMTCN 1I 37 TADJI 1 71 (GR/B) W.HQ 57 AUC3 SPRINGS T/L A. DATIRSCN 85 BALU: PAPAN 82 (E/B) FFJIQ, FA H. PATILKSCK F/L H. JACKSai; 38 BALIK FAPAN ; 79 (C3I/B) W.HCI 58 TOBCOTT S/L R. RATHCN 86 CUTOSTDIN VTKBTISA? AREA t/l L. HNI 1 F/L W. RNAICNINR 39 A I 84 (ARMT CO-CF) NO. 11-. GROUP S/L S. HAHPHAM 87 I GERALDTM S/L E. SH2AJN TORCON i( J S/L W. TDHRM i 60 MCBOTAI 40 LAE 1 NCETHEK; AREA I 61 TARAKAII 77 (ATT W.HQ S/L C. TOBIN JSE BUNDAEERG SASTSRII ARSA SA D. SHIIH F/L L. TAYLCR I 41 ii DQBCDURA 1 7/L C. 1£II33LETCN VSSISRN AREA T/L F. RILSR 1 89 BIAK NO. 11 GRODP 1 1 ' 71 CARIlARVOi; 42 JMADANG I F/L C. MOIH 73 CCRMWA DMS. T/L H. CREACS 1 90 KIN GAR OR EASTERN AREA AIR SSA R5SCUS FLIGCT3. 1 WDTG HEADQUARTERS. I M NO. LOCATION CONTROL COIA:. OMCZH AIRCRAFT U.S. ESTAB. NO. LYIRE LOCATION CCJTTOOL COtSi. OJFICSH 111 ! N0RTHE2N ARSA F/L C. MILLER I CATAUNA 4 1 :1 FTR. DARFL-NR CIVIL ' N0RRA.^-2STJIJ?SA • G/C B. TJAIXSR 112 I DARWIN 76 (OL/FB) W.HQ F/L L. CAIZT.'.V " 4 i N 4 113 I MCROTAI FIRST TAG.AIR F0RC3 S/L W. VIHITS 71 1 CA/B TADJT ! NCR'JHEHN AREA 1 G/C 7. HA>JCOGK; 114 I CAIRL^JS NORTH.2AST.AR2A. S/L G. JDASCN ; " 4 115 : VIOROTAI NO. 11 CRONP F/L G. CSIEGZRSON " 4 76 GR/FB DARWIN 1 NCSTE.TSSTJL^ J G/C S. CAMPBELL V I ROYAL NG? ZEALAND AIR TASK FORCE, 77 ATT. TARAKAN j 1ST TA.F. 1 W/C C. READ N NO. LOCATION CCFLTROL COU:. OFFICSR AMCRAFT U.S. ESTAB. 78 FTR. TARAKAN I W/C A* RASLDTSCN 1 1 N 1. ; JACQUINOT BAT ISLANDS ARZA S/L E. FICKSON F CATAUNA 4. 79 GR/B RAT.NC PAPAN I G/C R. HTLAND 2. ! K/VNUS FA J- ALLKEN " 2 LABTWN I » 81 ITR. I ! G/C I. MCLACHLWF HTFAL ZIYTLAIRO AIR TASK FORCE FIELD HEADQUARTERS (EGULV. RAAF O.B.U.) ] N 82 H/B BALIX PAPAN W/C R. BELL LOCATION CONRAOL CCMD. OHFICER N 1 83 ARLCR CO-OP LABUAN 1 G/C J. FLEIONC 1 ISLAJDS AREA 'II/G T/. KOFCED 1 BOUGAINVILLS 84 ! » TCRMTTMA NCRIEEEK AREA G/C D. CEAFMAH TN'/C M. TFTLKZS j LOS NECSOS 85 H/B DARWDJ NUHIM.ISST.AREA G/C P. PAWR?K JACqpiNOT BAT W/C P. UATHIS3CN 86 ATT. LABUAN 1ST T.A,F. G/C J. HHTTJS I 0RD3R OP BATTLE - TkCE: 9. ft J n AJl.F.S.U. Aust. Air Formation Signals S.A. Eastern Area Jr. Junior R.AJ^.7. Royal Australian Air Force, Unit Ech. Echelon R.A.A.F. Royal Australian Air Force A.A.F. Allied Air Forces B/R En route Comnand A JV.U. Air Ambulance Unit Estab. Establishment R.A.F. Royal Air Force A.C.S. Airfield Construction Squadron RAFDSL Royal Air Force Delegation A.D. Aircraft Depot. RAFLO Royal Air Force Liaison Officer A.D.H.Q. Air Defence Headquarters L.A.S.U. Local Air Supply Unit R.C. Repleniahing Centre Admin. Administrative, Administration L.H.Q. Ia.nd Headquarters Radio Devolopraecit and Install- RDAIU A.D.S. Airfield Defence Squadron Lt. Lioutonant ation unit Adv. Advanced Lt. col. Lioutonant Colonel Radio Installation and Mainten- R.I.M .U. A.F. Air Force ance Unit -i.C.K. Australian General Hospita] Ro>'al Navy F.B.M.U, Flyirg Boat Maintenance Unit R.N. A-I.F. Australiein Imperial Forces F.B.R.D. Flying BCLit Repair Depot P. - Royal Ner Zreclenl Air Tasr : A.C.C. rvir Officer Coramanding RcN.Z.A. Reserve Per ecru-.31 ?oc'' R.F.F. A.O.P.F. Air Observation Post Flight FcC/J. Fightar Cntrol Unit U.A.S.T.U. Modlcal rtJr Evacuation Ropair and Sar^^icing Unit R.S.U. A.r . aircraft park F2AF -Castor.1 Air Force. Transport Uaii AJ'.U. Aircraft porfcrmanc: Unit F/L Flight Lioutonant Ma Int. Jacintonan: cj aircraft Repair Depot F/0 Flying Officer M/B Imodium For-ber amy Co-op, .'•Lmy Co-oporation Fighter LI.C.S. iiodical cr.-aring station A.S.F. ^ir Stores Park Fv/d- Zch. For-.vai-d Eaholon K.C.U. Malari-d ^out-:--! Ur?:-. A.S.?..FC nir Scd Rescue flight FHQ. FiJld H-:f.:\quait3rs OEU) M.F,C D U.E, Unit Equipnant U.S. United Stat:s E/B Divo Bomber I/F Intcrcepter Fighter P " USAAJ United Statas Ar::iy Air lorce Dot, Dot.ach:.iant IS .A. Islands Area Dir. Director P & w Pratt and TVhitnoy " - - P/R Photographic Roconnaissance D/R Double Row P.U. Postal unit '..'estern Area 2/SSQA Deputy Senior Staff Offic>?r Pac.Ech. Pacific Echelon •,V/c" •.'ing Ccrz.snder -ri-ii -11 ct.r^.tl vo T- • • . . ^ . ^ _ PC. AL austp/:llwj air force. LIST or UNITS, BY AR2AS ATTO CPOUPS, SliOWING WITS FORMED AS AT 30 AUG. M5. PAGE: 7. SASTKRN ARiA V-rSTSHN AREA I,'OCT! K'.TTMii; ARJA 1h/q. , Eaatorn Area, SYENiCY. H/q. , Western "ren,PSTJTH.lDeto.ONSLOW k. ALBANY H/Q. , Nci-th Western Area, 57-MILE. Ir.A.A.7. Stn., CAMDEN. R.AiA.r. stn,, IE/J5CE. (Dets. A'.lSTIiN: & MILLINGIMDI). RJL.A.r. Stn., CANBERRA. No. 14 Sqdn., Pf/wXE. R.A.A.F. Rtn,, D.'iRKrN.(Det.DOCTCRS C R.A.A.F. Stn., RICHMOND.(Dot.CQFFS HBR.) No. 25 Sqdn., CUITOEIJDIN. No. 87 Sqdn., COOKALIE. R.A.A.r. Stn., NARRDMINE. NO. 85 SqdJi. , No. 53 O.B.U.: MTCH15L0R,(Det. F2^TQ No. 11 Sqdn., RATHUINES. No. 71 G.E .U, , CATJ^ARVON. No. 55 0,1* .U. , GORRIE. No. 19 Sqdii.(NEl), ARCHERTIKLD. No. 73 O.B.U, , nojjrr^'A downs No. 55 O.D.U., r-ovj:. (Dot. CROOTE EY NO. 32 Sqdn., LOV«OD. No. 74 O.B.U. NO. 57 O.B, U,; mcL r.reiNGS. No. 38 Sqdn., ARCHERFIBID. No. 75 O.B.U. . NOji NORHURN 11 CROJ? FIRST TACTICAL AIR ii/Q. , •Jovthcrn • " MADANG. ll/w., No., 11 croup, r:OXTAI. H/Q., 1st T.A,F. L.J3U/Jj.(Com.Po I'Dotd. FT. MORESBY & blAK). (Dot. T.JUJCAN). No . 79 Scidn . , I/IORCTAI. No. 13 Sqdn., LiBU.JJ (Det. GOVS Stn., VT. l-ORiiSBY. N0.115 A.S.a.F., hlOROTAI, No. 34 Sqdn., MOROTAI. ;.'0,. C .""Jqc^n., DOBODUR/.. A.D.H.Q. , MOROTAI. No.452 ijqdn., T^ulAFJJJ. (Dat. Bju fjo 15 Jqdn, 1-iLDLEBUHG,(ll Grp). Radtir Gtns.: Noa. IGl, 162, 302, 310,315, No .457 Sqdn.-, L/lBU/iN . 330, 343, 350-35::,. No. n.I,t:.U„, L-'^BUhN. (Dots.. r!u , 40 Lcjc*ii. Fr. I^OxUSDY. No. IIOM.F.C.U., MOP.OTAI.(Dot.BALIK PAPAIJ.; &. iJORor;.!). Uo.ltJO Sqdn., BI>iK. (11 Grp). No. 60 O.B.U., MonarAi. No. 5 K.C.; :.;cijOT;j:. NO. 40 O.B.U., Lvli. (Del. a/aiJ.lAUA). No. 89 O.B.U, f BlvvK. No. 9 R.C., (Dot). LZ:YTE. Ho, 41 O.B.U., DOBODUIU. No. 22 A.s.r., MOROTaI. No. 10 R.C., LJiUAN. (Det. TAa'U. ifo , 4" O.B.U'., ILJUNG (Dat. C^'J^OKA). No. 7 li.R.S. , No. 10 K,o,U., (Det) liOROTAI. NO . 43 O.B.U., GURl^ZY (Dot. KIIA). No. 11 Con:ii„U. No, 7G Icn/rB) V;/Hq (Det) LEYTE. iln . r.'j O.B.U., IT. UORESBY. No. 11 Or'j.TtilcsUiUL. I.'OIiOTAI. Ho. 1 LABUUJ. (Dot. LO. 46 O.B.U., UlDDL.-.BUnG. Ho. 6 MO'^x:(rAT . No. 2L:.C.U., .LtVDUA'I. (.Det. B': :Jo, 4U i;.B.U., FIlISCHJiAFM. No. 5 ?..,S.U. , No. 1 A.A,:. •^U., nCROTAI. (Dot i:o, 4'J O.B.U., K0LL,"J^D1A (11 fjrp). Wo. 0 7£.S.'(.. , JAI3T;;J3. & B'PAPAN ), Wo..112 H.F„C,.U., TOjOKDJA. (Du'LCr L../jI. T.TvAlO.iJ &. B/iLlK P^tPAlJ.) No. 5 jyU3UAN. iDoLa., J.\C(iUUOT & iUIRAU IS.) No, .14 2 .n .11.. K'lOlOTAl - No. 11 iUiit. Unit, LABUAN. (Detb Kadar Stiis:- llos, 311, 313, 320, 335, No. 12 :-or.t.i'f'lt, ;.:.liOVAL.(To form.) y.OclvTAT, JJJZON, LZYTE 4: 33V. 34:; 347- Ho. 3 ,; ^;•J^.•)JVl]., No, o ,U. (Dc;t), L.'OBU.'J'. A.I>,11.Q. iJiDj^JU. (Ddts, MOI^OTIS & TADJI). No. 4 M.u.a,,, (To rcnn.) No. W.J.. LUZaJ (Dut. LABUAN. Hailur Stns:- Nos, 1J32, 153, 301, 331, No. 10 T.M.O,, - (ai routo.) No„ 5 .U. ; M/J^ILA. (Det. LUZON.) 334, 340, 3'iO, 349. No, 6 V;.U„, lUZOJ. Dat. L2YT2) rr. M0R2SHY. (Dot. MIME BAY) 11 P.7l\ I'.r/L'-jjpnnra. (Contd.) NOv 9 T-'LC.j MOROTfil. (Dets. L RQ(!:ir Stns:- Uos. T , 37, 138, 303, 333, 336, 339, I;^..-. JL^.. A'/^l . MTJK PAPAN. Nooll3 A.3...V(..J.\; l^a^OT/J. (Dots. :« 3 li^.DANG. & ;. I ] tl > n .; c; n . I ki. To lo, Ua i t, MADaNG . No. 21 Sqdn., BALIK PAPAN.(Dot.KOROTAI.) No. 2A,D.S., L ^xxL oLCj? -tuPia ! 3ecp«.tary. • I S.A.S.O. C.3.0. S.1,0. S.S.O.A. 3.0. PLAilS. C.3.0. (A.F.S.) D/S.I.O. = 1 ' . Adm. 1 D/S.S,O.A,i. ^dm. 2 Adnd. 3 Adm. 4 Adm, 5 Adm. 6 G.i/c Reg, O.i/c Coll. 0. i/c Photo C.C. (Dep. to (Fwd. Secti) (Pers. & (Works) (Equip.) (Eng.) (tfed. ) Sec. [ 5.0. CrZHATIONS. D/G. A/S.'I. 0. 5. 5. O.A. ) Org.) Adm. ^ 4A Adm.' 5A (Movements (Arm.) '&. logistics) A/3. A. 5.0. (ADM.) A'.l A. 2 A! 3 A. 4 A. 5 A. 6 A. 8 G.H.q^ QEGAiMlS-AT'IOHS (A.A.I.C) (ExiA) (PDiT) (EVAL) (TAIU) (CI'J & (liaison) A.'9 A.IO A. 11 A. 12 (MIS-X) (ATIS) (AGS) (AIB) (CB) A/C.S.O. A/C.S.O. O.i/c W/T H. q,.- 'a.a.f. G.H.'^ QRGAlJl SAT IONS (rels) (Hadar) Station SIGS. STaST (SEC.22) (C'.B.) (A. i.B. ) (SIGS) EOl. . RC4. H05. SAD 1 HAD'3 RAD 3A WaAAP Adm. Off. Equip. Off. .ice.' Off. Barr.' Off. Mess.' Off. Med. Off. Tels. 1 •Tels. 3 Tels. 9 Tels. 10 Tels. 11 (E.O.) (A.O.) (Barracks 0) (Moss, 0) (M.O.) I Tela. lA Tels'^ 3A Tels. IOA Tels . lOB Tels. IOC Ops. 1 Ops.^ 2 Ops. 3 Ops'. 4 OP^., 5 Ops I 6 Opsl 7 Opsi 8 Ops. 9 Ops. 10 Scientific (Air Fighting) (Rec. <5: Striking) (Armanent) (Defence) (Met.) (Tac/H & Air (War Trng) (Photo. ) (NAV) (/J.r Sea Adviser Support) Rescue) RaaB' COM.iAj£D (S.A.R. 0. ) Ops. 9A (Nav) Operational Ops. lA bps. IB Ops.'SA Ops. 3B Ops, 30 Research Sec. Uir (Hadar (Gunnery (Bombing (Chemical tactics) filtering) Leader) Leader) Warfare) ^ps: 2A Ops . 23 Ops: 2C Opis. 4A Ops.' 4B (Mining & (Groxind " (A/A.L.O. ) Torpedo Ops. ) Defence) CliAPTEn Gec.ora.1 Ovxiejm) 18 April, 1942. I Ho.. 1> 1. BjflLgr-^ement aaon g tha Govejm:3snt:j! of Australia, th« cnltad Kingdom, tti© ^^othusrlunds and the United States thora ha^a been conBtltutod, ftffacti^o 1400 -Jr^, 18 A.prll 42, the 3out>i Paciric Aroa, with boundaries as dejTined in Annex 1. By virtue of the aaaa authority, the underalgnod hereby assuma comaauad. The folla*ln^ coatsasinda aro bereby crr««.tod with coan3and«r« as Indlcatod, coaposjod of forcsa aasl^ed to the South W^sfc Pacific Area by the respectlv® Govomiaenta,. and assigned to specific coinsianda by this headcuartara, InltlaXly as provided in Annex 1* Allied r>and Porcoa, Southwest Pacific Area. CoL-^mander: uanoriil 51r TH0!;6\3 HiLAl^EI, iC.C.^'., D.3.O., Australian Ar^o'- Allied Air -orces, Southwaot Pacific Ar^a. CocL-sander: I>loutenant 0«n9ral 0)10?li. ^BI-.^T, United itatoa kxr:ry „ Alllod IJaval ^'orcea, 3outhwost Pacific Area. CoziisannQr: Vice Adralr^l JiOrirJUT L7 Air^', jnlted States I^avy. d. United States Forces in the Philippines. Coiscuinder: Lieutenant General ^AI^'iTRIGoT, I'nltod States -^rr.y. e^. United otaces Amy Forces in Australia* Cortniaader: f^ajor -^enoral JCLIAIi BAHISI'S, United States Army. /s/ Douglas :iacArthm , I^CCGLAS iieneral, United States Arajy,. CiO' Annex 1 not circulated) Cocaandar-in-Chief . \ ALLIED AIR FORCE S.W.RA. COMMANDING GENERAL Lt. Gen. Geori e C. >':enney AIDE :apt. C. h. Chase CHIEF OF STAFF Brig. Gen. Donald VV'-'.lson DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR OF AIR TRANSPORT DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS Air Commodore, Joseph E. Hewitt Group Capt. Harold Gatty Colonel P.. E. Beebe ASST. DIRECTOR OF IflTELLIGENCi ASST. DIRECTOR OF OriP.ATIONS Sq. Leader f. VcErlde Price Lt. Col. B. B. Cain RAAF CO.yf.'AND FIFTH AIR FORCE Allied Air Force. AIR OFFICER C0>'VAND:NG (AOC) COMMANDING GENERAL 5TH A. F. Air Vice Marshal 'S. D. Eostock Lt. Gen. Oeorfie C. K.enney CHIEF OF STAFF SENIOR AIR STAFF OFF (SASO) SENIOR INTELL OFF (510) Brig. Gen. Donald Wilson "iVlng CotTOTander "tV. Gibson Air Cdre Joseph E. Hewitt CHIEF SIGNALS OFFICER (CSC) SENIOR ADM STAFF OFF (SOA) ASST. CHIEF OF STAFF A-1 ASST. CHIEF OF STAFF A-2 Group Capt. C. S. V.lggins Sqd. Leader C. A. Brewster Lt. Col. R. T. Nichols, Jr. Lt. Col. B. B. Cain ASST. CHIEF OF STAFF A-3 ASST. CHIEF OF STAFF A-4 Colonel R. E. Beebe ) Colonel Donald W. Banner I^—.• • • • • • ' SI] a B i9 Cs - A - A • U-' OFFJtN'CE 1 AT IDE FENCE 0 'nW (fiUJINEA • , iJOM'MAJ^"® NEW GUINE/X N° 10 OPERATIONAL GROUP NORTHERM COMMAND FOR-CE N°73(FjWlNG N°7i (GR./B}YVIN6 53 &Q 4(TAC/R)SQ (BEAUTOR.T) (C-47) (BOOMERANG) 1 1 ^BSQ. 77SQ SA&O 79 sq 8 SQ lOOeq (— KITTYHAWKS (SHTFIR-E^} BEAUFORT 78(F) WING N°7r (attack) WING /5SQ. 78 SQ 80SO ZZSQ 50 so ' KITTY H AWK —h (BOSTON) (BHAUFIGHTER) Cb> AUSTJW-IA DEFENCE ^ I N,W. AREA N.E. AREA E.AHEA 5. AREA W.AREA I 1 ^ 54-s, "^SQ N"I(F)WING SOSQ 1^0 Sq 7sq • 9SQ ISSQ 5(R^CR)SQ (C4-7) (c^-r) I • (CATALINA) (KITTYHAWK) (^EAUFOR.T) I T (v/ALR.us) (YENTURA) (BOOM RA^a) 54-SQ 548 S 4-2 SQ 45 sq ^AR-MINO UREFV-TORS) - OFFENCE a FTI^OFO^ED JDEFENVE l-^ 0FTP OFT (s^ AJ-H-Qj) mw (jUJlNEA. •p^-A-r diOMIvlANB H.C^, ^sTTACTlc^L A-F-(RAAF) NORTHERN AREA NEW GUINEA FORCE N°6I(F)WING N^YICGR/BIIVING esq , 156c 44 (G R/F B)5CI 55 sq 4 (TAC/J^ SQ I 1 I BEAUFORT F- (CATAL/NA) (BOOMERANO) 765q . 7750 82.SQ, 7sc) )005A KITTY HAV/K, >- •< BEAURDRT or- MITCHELL N" TS(F)WJN6 \ N I TSSQ • 60sq •• - - r, 50sq -F- KITTYH^^R^«. -<-o.eAUFioHrJER. or roc-^uiro AHJ^TIR^IA • OFFENCE \A-A-F COMMATO H.Q. i AU5T C0RS5 2"°TAaiCAL Af-(flAAF) N-W-AREA f.AREA 5, AREA W.AR.EA N E AREA (TAC/R)&Q N°79(C.R./B)WING •• 107sq(Res) 67(R«)<;q 14 sq a5s<^ 9(f/c)s(3 X>M5RANC.J (SI KOR^KYJ (CATAUNA) (ANSON) (BEAUFORT} (sP)TFlRe-V^ (WALRUS} N°8O(F)W1NG 1 sq S, sq I'S iq SXiQ 54-sq 548sq ___ 549 sq TSEAUFORT MITCHELL >• < 5P1TE1KE vni > 79 5Q S3 3C, 45AI<,4 575R ; SPlTf=IRE "TTTI y N°?(,HB)WING I ' 1 1 TR-ANSPOR.T 5Q.UADRONS N°75 ^(f) wing N°? (ATTACK) WING )a5q lOlso 99 5.3! LIBERATOR, •> I i I 1 I 1 345q 35sc! 56sq 38 SQ 40SQ ^-IT-Q • 845A 8&5q 1^0 id 31 sq 92sq 93SQ •< KITTYHAWK- -f-tJEAUFIOHTER or MOSquiTO —^ N° ? (H,B)WING C 47 > (SUNOERLANO) (MAMNER) I ^-T- 1 1 2,169 so 2.4SQ Z-5 sa I PR.U LIBEN.ATOR- >- (MoiquiTo) Fi KPFOSEB 0TATW$ N" ? (GR./FB) WING AUTHORISED • ss OPER-ATIONAL SONS r^ ^ 1 z RESERVE EOSQ 42 43 SQ 5 RAF H.e.l. GATALINA > TOTAL 60 5Q.UADR.ONS I8(GR/B)