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2004 David's Quest to Outmaneuever Goliath — Clandestine Christians in the USSR, 1953-1985 Julie Behling

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THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

DAVID'S QUEST TO OUTMANEUEVER GOLIATH – CLANDESTINE CHRISTIANS

IN THE USSR, 1953-1985

By

JULIE BEHLING

A Thesis submitted to the Interdisciplinary Program of Russian & East European Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts

Degree Awarded: Summer Semester, 2004

Copyright@2004 Julie Behling All Rights Reserved

The members of the Committee approve the thesis of Julie Behling defended on 29 April 2004.

______Jonathan Grant Professor Directing Thesis

______Michael Launer Committee Member

______Larry Isaac Committee Member

Approved:

______Ljubisa S. Adamovich, Chair, Russian & East European Studies

______David W. Rasmussen, Dean, College of Social Sciences

The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above named committee members.

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Dedicated to those Soviet believers who lost their lives for their faith. - Matthew 10: 39

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank a number of people without whom this project would have neither been possible nor as successful. Firstly, I would like to acknowledge my patient committee members for their much-needed assistance: Jonathan Grant for giving crucial advice on finding source material and helping me discover a viable format for my chapters; Michael Launer for editing my translations and offering stylistic critiques; and Larry Isaac for helping me understand the basics of social movement dynamics. Thanks to all of them for their unfailing support. I am indebted to Brandy Berry, Karin Tarbet, Kristin Jensen, Stephanie Frassrand, and Travis Hyer who critiqued portions of my drafts and encouraged me to not give up, and to Malcom Walker of the Keston Institute for guiding me to important sources. Many thanks to Lylith Douglass-Barnes for her last minute assistance. I would like to especially thank Andrew Okhotin for allowing me to interview him, for editing translations, and introducing me to Mr. Kryuchkov; to Yuri Kryuchkov for talking with me and sending me books he had written containing information important to this study; and to Yura Rodimenkov for sitting next to me at the Bolshoi Theater and inviting me to church with him when I was in Moscow in 2002. Also, I would like to thank Dina and Avgustina Vashchenko for agreeing to talk with me over the phone about their family’s experiences. I must particularly thank my parents for supporting me during my long journey to completing this project. Also, I must thank a friend who, when I was in the process of deciding whether or not to undertake this projet, reassured me that "no one has ever regretted writing a thesis." Finally, I am grateful to the Lord and his wisdom in all things.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ...... vii

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

1. A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND SOCIO-POLITICAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE CHURCHES' SUCCESSES ...... 7 Historical Background ...... 7 The Churches and Shifts in Political Opportunity Structure, 1953 to early 70's .. 13 Soviet Human Rights Movement - A Brief History ...... 21 The Churches and Shifts in Political Opportunity Structure, 1976 to 1985 ...... 25 Conclusions ...... 30

2. REFORM BAPTISTS ...... 32 Historiography ...... 34 Factors Possibly Contributing to Church's Successes and Failures ...... 36 Baptist History in Russia/USSR ...... 36 Components of the Church ...... 42 Religious Activities, and Tactics to Continue Them ...... 49 Protest ...... 55 Conclusions ...... 65

3. CHRISTIANS OF THE EVANGELICAL FAITH (UNREGISTERED PENTECOSTALISTS) ...... 67 Historiography ...... 69 Factors Possibly Contributing to Church's Successes and Failures ...... 70 Pentecostal History in Russia/USSR ...... 70 Components of the Church ...... 72 Religious Activities, and Tactics to Continue Them ...... 79

v Protest ...... 82 Conclusions ...... 93

4. TRUE AND FREE SEVENTH DAY ADVENTISTS ...... 95 Historiography ...... 96 Factors Possibly Contributing to Church's Successes and Failures ...... 98 Adventist History in Russia/USSR ...... 98 Components of the Church ...... 100 Religious Activities, and Tactics to Continue Them ...... 105 Protest ...... 108 Conclusions ...... 116

CONCLUSION ...... 119

APPENDICES:

A - Timeline – Religion and Major Events in Russia/USSR ...... 124 B - Timeline – Reform Baptists in Russia/USSR ...... 126 C - Appeal to AUCECB ...... 130 D - First Appeal...... 133 E - Timeline – Pentecostalists in Russia/USSR ...... 137 F - Timeline – True Adventists in Russia/USSR ...... 140 G - Table of Factors Contributing to Successes and Failures ...... 143 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 145

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ...... 150

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ABSTRACT

The Soviet Union was an aggressively atheistic state that sought to contain and eradicate religion from its society, but in the process of persecuting religious believers, some underground religious movements were born that engaged in vigorous activity in spite of the state’s policies. This study examines factors contributing to the successes and failures of three such religious organizations – the Reform Baptists, unregistered Pentecostalists, and True & Free Adventists – from Stalin’s death in 1953 to 1985 when Gorbachev came into power. Chapter One considers socio-political trends during that period of time as well as state anti-religious tactics, and their effect on the churches’ successes and failures. Chapters Two through Four discuss denomination-specific factors at play in the churches’ successes to 1985 divided into the following four broad categories: the movement’s history on Russian/Soviet territory; components of the church including theology, hierarchy, and level of organization; the churches’ religious activities and tactics to continue to engage in them, including the holding of worship services and proselytizing; and finally attitude toward and engagement in protest. This study is a groundbreaking attempt not only in identifying those factors most associated with the religious movements’ successes and failures, but also in compiling information on them. In addition to various books and articles that address some aspect of the churches, the current study utilizes primary sources such as memoirs from and interviews with church leaders and adherents that both provide an insider’s perspective into the operation of the three religious movements and offer essential insights that lead to an understanding of the ideal composition of a religious organization operating in a hostile environment.

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INTRODUCTION

Through the seventy plus years of the Soviet Union’s existence, the crusade against religion and religious ideology spawned the development of religious organizations determined to endure in spite of stringent, and even brutal governmental measures implemented against them. The Soviet Baptist, Pentecostal, and Seventh Day Adventist organizations all underwent schism as some adherents sought to follow the law and worship within governmentally sanctioned bounds, while others were not satisfied without autonomy from the state and the full exercise of the rights granted them in their Constitution. Those unwilling to sacrifice unadulterated religious freedom for the safety of state-sanctioned worship were compelled to go underground. The Soviet Reform Baptists, Christians of the Evangelical Faith (Pentecostalists), and True & Free Seventh Day Adventists were illegal religious organizations that operated clandestinely during the Soviet period and found a way to not only survive, but, at times even thrive. The Reform Baptist movement, the Christians of the Evangelical Faith, and the True & Free Seventh Day Adventist organizations were chosen for this study because of several shared characteristics. They were "foreign" churches new to Russia, who arrived on Russian/Soviet soil from the latter part of the 19th century to the early 20th century before the onset of the Civil War in 1917. Thus, their adherents experienced the calamitous events of both World Wars, as well as the Civil War and Stalin's purges. Further, these three churches were religious organizations deemed illegal by the State, and who all engaged in widespread religious activity during the existence of the Soviet Union. They also, to varying degrees, joined hands with the Soviet dissident movement to petition the West in pressuring their government’s adherence to human rights treaties. In spite of their many similarities, though, a range of variety is observed in how they sought to subsist and flourish in a hostile environment. It is this diversity of factors and

1 tactics that are scrutinized in this work in order to determine which are most associated with success, and which may be linked with the churches' failures. In this introductory study I examine factors affecting the successes and defeats of the Reform Baptists, unregistered Pentecostalists, and True & Free Adventists from the death of Stalin in 1953, to 1985 when Gorbachev came into power and well before he introduced his liberalizing policies of glasnost and perestroika. I will piece together elements of the churches’ history, structure, worship and protest activities, as well as tactical repertoire, and compare these factors across the three denominations. From this study, some factors are clearly determined to be associated with either success or failure. Others will require future studies most likely involving more organizations, either religious or non-religious, in order to ascertain the viability of certain tactics, organizational elements, or characteristics. For simplicity's sake, elements that define success are: 1) continued operation; 2) the numerical growth and maintenance of adherents; 3) freedom from state interference; 4) the gaining of concessions from the state; and 5) high morale. Of a necessity, the determination of success is subjective to some extent, as information available on each of the churches is incomplete, and the type of information differs for each of the sects and does not lend itself well to statistical analysis. Some factors affecting the churches' successes were well beyond their control; some were even beyond the direct control of their major adversary, the state. Therefore, state tactics toward the underground churches are also examined, as well as changes in the political scenery that affected the three religious organizations. Which tactics implemented by the Soviet state were the most paralyzing to the Reform Baptists, unregistered Pentecostalists, and True and Free Adventists, and which were more innocuous? What socio-political trends caused the churches to withdraw further into clandestine existence, and which resulted in the opening up of opportunities for the churches to engage in more bold measures such as protest? Sociologists Piven and Cloward attribute the emergence of any protest movement to the development of "exceptional conditions"1 in the political climate; only when some great event takes place can the masses rally themselves to protest. Such windows of opportunity for repressed sectors of society

1 Frances Piven and Richard Cloward. "The Structuring of Protest." Pp. 326-342 in Social Movements: Perspectives and Issues, edited by Steven M. Buechler and J. Kurt Cylke, Jr. Mayfield Publishing Company: Mountain View, California, 328.

2 to give voice to their cause represent a shift in what is known as the political opportunity structure. Distinct periods of persecution and relative freedom arose for the churches in the Soviet Union that, to a large extent, determined which tactics the churches could successfully employ. Chapter One provides some context for understanding religion in post-Stalin USSR by presenting a brief history of Christianity in Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union. A synopsis of the Soviet dissident movement is also provided as it intersects with the churches to some extent especially from the mid-70's and onward. Chapter One’s primary focus, however, is the effect of key trends, or political opportunity structure, in Soviet history and policy from the death of Stalin in 1953 until 1985 on the dissident churches as a whole. It also gives a description of the general responses of the churches to major shifts in the social and political climate that occurred over that time period, and addresses how state tactics implemented against religion impacted the three churches. Chapters Two through Four, divided by denomination, investigate those church- dependent factors that may have contributed to or detracted from their successes. While all three churches under consideration in this study exhibited remarkable resilience in the face of an onslaught of repression, the variation in their overall success to 1985 as previously defined is significant. This analysis therefore focuses on the following factors and their impact, evident or supposed, on the churches' successes and defeats: 1) dynamics of church history on Russian/Soviet soil; 2) components of the church, including hierarchy, theology, level of organization and exceptional traits of both church leaders and members; 3) religious activities the churches engaged in, such as worship, proselytizing, and the printing and circulation of religious literature, as well as tactics to continue these activities; and 4) efforts to protest their treatment, and seek liberties guaranteed them by law as well as redress for governmental offenses carried out against them by means of written protest, demonstrations, and involvement with Soviet human rights workers, and foreign religious bodies, organizations and governments. This is an intuitive and practically exhaustive list of church-dependent factors that may have affected their successes and/or defeats. This work utilizes primary sources never before included in a study of these churches that add further dimension to their stories. Also, this author had the luxury of conducting telephone interviews with some members the Reform Baptist and unregistered Pentecostal movements who

3 now reside in the United States, and becoming acquainted with the Christians of the Evangelical Faith in Russia during a visit to Moscow in 2002. Further insights on the factors at play in their churches' successes and defeats came to light in this manner, as well as the accessing of vital primary source material never before used in a scholarly work. Lastly, this study employs the now classic Chronicle of Current Events, an underground periodical both edited and duplicated in the USSR in the 1960's, 70's, and early 80's. The Chronicle is a collection of reports on the various dissident movements in the Soviet Union, and a veritable goldmine of stories on the repression of both individuals and groups belonging to all three churches in this study. While by no means a complete record of these churches' repressions, it offers a "slice of life" of the persecutions they encountered in the Soviet Union. Reports on the three churches began to appear regularly in the mid-70's, and tapered off in the early 80's. Regrettably, those involved in editing the Chronicle were themselves highly persecuted by the government, and the periodical was forcibly shut down by 1983. The Radio Liberty Research Bulletin provides essential information on each of the churches beginning in the mid-70's and through the period under consideration in this study. Of course, the Reform Baptist organization, Pentecostal “Christians of the Evangelical Faith”, and True & Free Seventh Day Adventists were not the only clandestine churches that maintained operation during the period from 1953 to 1985. The Jehovah's Witnesses were especially active in the USSR, worshipping in an illegal religious organization that defied the authorities to no small degree. They didn't arrive in the Soviet Union until after World War II, however, as they were annexed into the USSR or imported in by former prisoners of war in German installations. Thus, they escaped the catastrophic events of the Civil War and Stalin's purges that claimed the lives of countless Baptists, Pentecostalists, and Seventh Day Adventists, making a comparison between the Jehovah's Witnesses and the churches in this study problematic. A handful of Orthodox priests disinclined to concede to the state on moral and religious matters broke off from the main body of Orthodoxy during the Soviet period, and collectively became known as the True Orthodox. Though some of these priests conducted "subversive" religious activity and/or protest, the movement was scattered and did not include any significant following of adherents. For these reasons the True Orthodox are not evaluated in this study.

4 Further, some adherents of the Catholic Church especially in the Baltic States, the Greek Catholic Church in the Ukraine and Belorus, the Georgian Church, Armenian Church, and National Orthodox Churches engaged in some organized underground operations and dissent during the Soviet period. These activities were so closely linked with their corresponding national movements, however, that they are usually considered to be part of the movements of national dissent. Muslim dissidents in the Soviet Union followed a similar pattern. The Crimean Tatar movement, for example, was a national movement with religious overtones rather than a movement for religious freedoms. The Jewish Emigration movement that gained astounding momentum in the 1960's and 70's was a campaign of ethnic Jews wishing to emigrate to Israel or the United States, and most often for a mixture of both cultural and religious reasons. Other Christian denominations present in the USSR did not carry out organized activity on a large scale, and did not engage in any type of activity the state deemed political in nature. By the 1950's, those Mennonites and Lutherans2 who had not immigrated to such places as Canada had been quietly absorbed into a state-sanctioned religious body formed in 1945 formed primarily for the Baptists.3 Native Russian schismatic churches including the Old Believers may have continued to operate to a degree during the Soviet period, but were insignificant as viable foes to the state -- they neither engaged in large-scale religious activity nor religious dissent. It has been somewhat challenging to assign coherent titles to the three religious movements under examination in this study. The group of Baptists responsible for the first move for reform within the state-sanctioned Baptist body (AUCECB) in 1961 was the Initiative Group (Initsiativnaya grupa), and its participants became known in the USSR as Initsiativniki. A few years later in 1962 they regrouped into the Organizing Committee (Orgkomitet), then finally in 1965 full schism was achieved and the reformers created their own body to govern the Baptist congregations who supported them. This body was called the Council of Churches of Evangelical Christians - Baptists (CCECB). For the sake of cohesiveness, I will follow scholar Walter Sawatsky's precedent of referring to these Baptists as Reform Baptists, and at times I will call them dissident Baptists. I intend no distinction between the two titles.

2 These denominations first came to Russian in the 18th century after Catherine invited Germans to immigrate and settle in such areas as the Volga regions 3 The All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians - Baptists (AUCECB)

5 The unregistered Pentecostalists are most often referred to as such in this work. While this study focuses on those who were part of the church called the "Christians of the Evangelical Faith" and the unregistered Pentecostalists sometimes called themselves such, the church's organizations was so loose during most of years under consideration in this study that the term unregistered Pentecostalists seems to suit them more closely. The True Adventists broke off from the main body of Adventist believers in the 1920's, and went through a series of name changes until 1970 when the church's official name became the All-Union Church of True and Free Seventh Day Adventists. Prior to that they had several changes in name, including the All-Union Church of True Seventh Day Adventists. In this study they are referred to as True Adventists before 1967, and interchangeably as True & Free Adventists or dissident Adventists after that time.

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CHAPTER ONE

A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND SOCIO-POLITICAL FACTORS

AFFECTING THE CHURCHES' SUCCESSES

This chapter highlights points in Russian and Soviet history that affected the Reform Baptists, unregistered Pentecostalists, and True Adventists. The bulk of the chapter will discuss changes in the USSR's political landscape from 1953-1985 that may account for the boldness of these sectarians in engaging in organized illegal religious activity as well as protest. Considered are the broad effects of these pivotal changes in policy, both real and perceived, on church successes. In addition to drawing out the political climate in which the churches operated, this chapter examines state tactics designed to demobilize, contain, and destroy the renegade Protestant sects and discusses their general effects on the churches' successes. Specific incidents of the implementation of state anti-religious tactics, however, as well as the successes of particular religious organizations will be discussed primarily in subsequent chapters. A short history of Christianity in late Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union through Stalin’s leadership, and a summary of the Soviet dissident movement are included to frame the socio-political trends affecting the churches in period of time considered in this work.

Historical Background It is no secret that church and state in Tsarist Russia were closely linked in a union that elevated the Russian Orthodox Church to a position infinitely superior to the smaller Christian churches and sects that were scattered throughout the Russian Empire. Adherents of Orthodox offshoots such as the Old Believers, Molokans (milk-drinkers), Dukhobors (spirit-wrestlers), Khlysti (flagellants), and Skoptsy (castrators) as well as Eastern-Rite Catholic (Uniate), Roman Catholic, Mennonite, Lutheran, and Baptist believers all suffered persecution at the hands of the

7 Tsarist regime from the time of their inception on Russian soil. The breaking up of meetings, arrest, exile, and other forms of persecution were commonplace. Conversion from the Orthodox faith to any other was prohibited by law as the government sought to curtail the spread of these supposed heretical and "foreign" churches.1 Other tsarist legislations aimed at non-Orthodox sects include an 1892 order passed by Russian Procurator General Pobedonostev to end all Baptist meetings. This led to a campaign against the movement that only escalated as Baptist believers resisted the repressive measures as well as contributing to the gathering momentum of the movement.2 The social reforms of 1905 heralded a new era for the previously repressed denominations, including the Baptists and Evangelical Christians, which took advantage of the lifting of stiff restrictions on their activities. Included in the liberalizing legislation of the time affecting the churches was the 1905 Edict of Toleration granting freedom of press and the organization of associations.3 The newer churches of non-Russian origin embraced their new freedoms, taking advantage of opportunities to openly proselytize and increase in both number and influence. The Edict of Toleration further called for the separation of Church and State and allowed people to leave the Orthodox Church with, at least officially, no social or political consequences.4 Both the Pentecostal and Seventh Day Adventist faiths first took root on Russian soil during this time of emerging opportunities. Further changes were soon to follow as the Bolsheviks claimed authority over the old regime in 1917 and sought to topple both the Tsarist government and its primary advocate, the Russian Orthodox Church. On 10 July 1918 Lenin declared “freedom of religious and anti- religious propaganda”5 in what became Article 13 of the Constitution of the Russian Soviet Federation, giving added reign to the evangelizing activities of the newer faiths. Additionally, Article 13 called for a further separation of church and state, as churches were denied the right to hold property and the right of juridical persons, privileges previously enjoyed only by the Orthodox Church. Orthodox priests and clerics who had once benefited from the protection of the state now experienced fierce persecution and were thrust into a position of social and

1 Paul Steeves. The Russian Baptist Union, 1917-1935: Evangelical Awakening in Russia. University of Kansas, Ph.D., 1976, 32 2 Ibid., 35-41 3 Steve Durasoff. The Russian Protestants. Cranbury: Associated University Presses, Inc. 1969., p. 51 4 Steeves, 53 5 G. S. Gurvich, 79-80 in Robert Conquest, ed. Religion in the U.S.S.R. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., Publishers. 1968, 13

8 political inferiority.6 Religious instruction in schools, once mandatory in Tsarist times, was outlawed, and in 1921 the law was revised to prohibit any group from conducting the religious instruction of youths under the age of 18. The government ordered the liquidation of monasteries, and those “necessary measures of a repressive character”7 climaxed in 1922 when church treasures were forcibly confiscated, with high casualties among the Orthodox clergy. While the Bolsheviks were fully engaged in the dismantling of the Orthodox Church, from 1917 until the late 1920's the Evangelical faiths experienced a period of unprecedented liberty and growth. The new churches of foreign origin including the Baptists and Evangelical Christians, Pentecostalists, and Seventh Day Adventists experienced their greatest season of prosperity during the 1920's. The busy churches found a base of converts among German immigrants who were Lutherans and Mennonites, the various sects of Russian Orthodox origin, as well as from each other. While the government's policy toward the sects at this time was one of toleration rather than support, Baptists enjoyed enough political clout to establish religious collective farms.8 One Baptist preacher even nearly succeeded in founding an entire city for Baptists in Siberia, Evangelsk.9 Although Lenin's policy toward the newer sects was more liberal than that of the Tsars, Marxist-Leninist philosophy contained an underlying "ideological hostility"10 toward religion. Lenin claimed that "discrimination among citizens on account of their religious convictions is wholly impermissible,"11 at the same time as he explained that "religion is one of the forms of spiritual oppression, which everywhere is weighing heavily upon the popular masses . . ."12 Further, Lenin proclaimed: "Every religious idea, every idea of God, even flirting with the idea of God, is unutterable vileness . . . Every defence [sic] or justification of the idea of God, even the most refined, the best intentioned, is a justification of reaction."13

The antagonism established under Lenin between the ideological thrust to eradicate religion and the political need for concessions to religious elements of society in order to rally support for the

6 Conquest, 14 7B.S.E., 1st edn., Vol. on USSR, 1778; in Conquest, 15 8 Walter Kolarz. Religion in the Soviet Union. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 1961, 289-291 9 Ibid., 289 10 Trevor Beeson. Discretion and Valour. Philadelphia: Fortress Press. 1982, 33 11 Vladimir Il'ich Lenin. Socialism and Religion. Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House. 1955, 7 12 Ibid., 5 13 Lenin, Sochineniya, Vol. 35, 89-90 & 93, in Conquest, 7

9 regime continued throughout the Soviet Union's existence.14 Lenin set the stage for Soviet policies toward the churches through the entire Soviet period that vacillated between concessions and repressions. Stalin’s changeable stances toward the churches were the most remarkable of all Soviet leaders. During the period of his power from the 1920's until his death in 1953, escalating state hostility toward religion that peaked in the 30's combined with large-scale concessions especially toward the Orthodox Church during the years of World War II characterized his fluctuating policies toward the churches. A wide range of possibilities on the treatment of religion and the religious were made manifest in the decrees of the 'Man of Steel'. With the transfer of power away from Lenin and the appointment of Stalin to the post of General Secretary in 1922, at this time the state began to introduce a more vigorous campaign of anti-religious propaganda, though the sects continued to prosper. By 1929, however, the period of prosperity for the non-Orthodox Christian churches was coming to a close. Upon securing his position of leadership in the late 20’s, Stalin's passed the 1929 "Law on Religious Associations" that effectively removed the religious liberties granted to the sectarians during the first third of the 20th century. Among the restrictions imposed were: the requiring of at least 20 individuals to register with the authorities; mandatory registration with the state before engaging in activity of any kind; the explicit prohibition against special organizations and meetings for women, adolescents, and children; and the limiting of clergymen's field of labor to the vicinity of their church building and in areas already populated by adherents.15 The 1930’s became the darkest hour thus far for the Soviet sectarians as they experienced not only the retraction of liberties previously enjoyed, but also harsh persecution combined with the terror experienced by Soviet society in general at this time. Anti-religious organizations including "The League of the Militant Godless" were given the charge to "re-educate" those elements of society with religious leanings. “Scientific” literature and atheistic leaflets demonstrating the backwardness of a belief in God were widely distributed in the combat against religion. Anti-religious lectures led by Party members were held across the empire to convince a stubborn population of the obsolescence of religion. In 1927, Stalin remarked that “the Party

14 Beeson, 33 15 Ibid., 38-39

10 cannot be neutral toward religion,”16 presumably not only because of the fundamental tenet of atheism inherent in Marxism, but because the “church” in its many variants served as the single biggest ideological obstacle to the building of the “new society” envisioned by the Party. In the midst of the crisis accompanying World War II, the Soviet State adopted a two- pronged policy towards the churches, particularly the Orthodox Church, which had grown substantially in strength over the course of the war. While clergymen and religious believers of all denominations had fallen among the countless victims of the purges at their height between 1937 and 1941, Stalin welcomed the support of religious believers for the Fatherland upon the Nazi invasion of the USSR. The Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church was to give its official blessing to Soviet anti-Nazi operations as a show of goodwill at the start of the state’s détente with religion.17 An overhaul of the governmental bodies overseeing religion and the churches ensued during Stalin’s concordant with religion that, on the surface, appeared to indicate a change of heart on the part of the state. Legislative concessions for the Orthodox Church came on September 4, 1943, as Stalin and V. Molotov18 met with the Orthodox Metropolitans at the Kremlin.19 Soon thereafter the atheist government formed the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church to serve “consultative”20 functions and as a further show of goodwill toward the majority church. In July of 1944, the Soviet Government formed the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults to perform a similar function for the rest of the religious organizations found in the empire. The most significant development for Baptists and Pentecostalists at this time was the 1944 formation of the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians and Baptists (AUCECB), to which various Christian denominations including the Soviet Mennonites were encouraged and even pressured to associate in order to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the State as well as strength in numbers. Indeed, those who did not affiliate with the AUCECB were subject to severe reprimand from the state. A similar body in existence for the Seventh Day Adventists was given state approval at this time. It encompassed all those but the Church of True Adventists whose

16 Conquest, 19 17 Ibid., 34-35 18 Foreign Minister of the USSR under Stalin 19 Conquest, 35 20 Ibid., 36

11 operation was considered illegal from the time of their schism from the main church body in the 1920’s. The creation of these state associations appears to have benefited the state in a two-fold way. For one, the atheist state gained the support of the majority of believers in the official recognition of the various faiths. Secondly, these official government appendages allowed for the more effective monitoring and control of religious activity by the state, as well as the introduction of policy that would potentially "prepare[] the Church . . . for its own demise."21 While free members of the churches joined the newly formed All-Union Councils created for them, those in imprisonment were busy engaging in activities of their own. There are accounts of religious prisoners engaging in missionary activity, organizing clandestine worship services, and even performing the baptisms of new converts found among fellow prisoners. Thus, from the inception of the USSR through the end of Stalin's rule the churches had already experienced both the breath of freedom as well as the cruel hand of repression that were to continue to ebb and flow as Soviet religious policy persisted in its vacillation from the death of Stalin and on. The continued alternation of state policy between repression and concession from 1953 to1985 was to have a number of effects on the development of the churches under scrutiny in this study. For one, it was to breed a deep distrust of the Soviet authorities on the part of a significant number of religious believers. Though the authorities did allow worship and religious expression as the USSR claimed to value freedom of religion and conscience, such worship was permissible only within government-sanctioned bodies that upheld laws forbidding activities considered by many to be fundamental to Christian expression. Suspicions that such legalized and registered churches were run by the state, as well as the determination to worship and preach unimpeded by the constraints imposed by these bodies, led to the further development of the underground sects. Periods of relative freedom became times of great religious activity for the clandestine churches that helped build a foundation against the inevitable waves of repression that would follow. Years of intensified state anti-religious policy did claim their share of victims – believers were imprisoned, killed, and intimidated into worshipping with legal religious bodies or ceasing religious practices all together. However, by all indications this recurring pattern had effects unintended by the State – the triggering of large- scale religious dissent and even open protest.

21 Michael Bourdeaux. Faith on Trial in Russia. New York: Harper & Row Publishers. 1971, 63

12 The reforms accompanying the 1905 Revolutions, the ascent of the Bolsheviks to power, and the implementation of the repressive 1929 Law on Religious Associations, and Stalin’s concordant with religion in the 1940’s are all examples of shifts in political opportunity structure that signaled change and opportunity to the sectarians. Several more changes in the political opportunity structure were on the horizon for the Baptists/Evangelical Christians, Pentecostalists, and True Seventh Day Adventists in the decades to come.

The Churches and Shifts in Political Opportunity Structure – 1953 to Early 1970’s On 5 March 5 1953 Joseph Stalin, the leader of the pivotal previous 25 years, died – sending shock waves throughout the vast Soviet Empire. Initially, the USSR experienced a period of uncertainty as no strong leader immediately arose to take the place of the deified dictator. Governmental authorities wavered in the uncertain atmosphere, and while the eventual successor Nikita Khrushchev scrambled to assert his authority, the majority of the vast populace deeply mourned the loss. During this chaotic time the sectarians as well as believers of all persuasions experienced a violent propaganda attack during the so-called 100-day campaign. Beginning in the summer of 1954, anti-religious articles “reminiscent of the virulent anti-religious propaganda of the 1930’s”22 flourished in the void left by Stalin’s “cult of personality.” By November 1954 Khrushchev put an end to the assault and signed a resolution that “emphasized a need for an increase in the ideological struggle with religion” at the same time as it “condemned administrative interference with religious organizations” that had occurred during the short campaign.23 Once Khrushchev secured the post of General Secretary he enacted a series of policies largely in opposition to those of his predecessor and even dared to condemn both Stalin and his efforts to build Socialism. Khrushchev's "Thaw" and the subsequent "de-Stalinization" initiated by his secret speech denunciating Stalin that was delivered during the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956 indeed led to the relaxing of the societal constraints that characterized Stalin's administration. Such a cataclysmic change in the political opportunity structure of the

22 Walter Sawatsky. .Soviet Evangelicals Since World War II. Scottsdale, Pennsylvania: Herald Press. 1981, 64 23 Ibid.

13 proceeding half-decade led to the development and revival of social movements of various types, including religious organizations. Religious believers were among those who took full advantage of the liberalization of their society. In 1956 the state even allowed the first publication of the Bible since the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917.24 A period of significant growth of the churches ensued, as both the registered and unregistered bodies of Baptist, Pentecostal, and Adventist believers blossomed in this period of intense religious revival. Existing communities of the churches were strengthened both numerically and in quality as persons previously alien to religion embraced a new faith and seasoned believers renewed their commitment to the cause. New congregations were formed as traveling evangelists spread the good word from home to home in various places throughout the country. According to historian William Fletcher, three major factors appear to have created the atmosphere in which this regrouping of the churches could take place. First of all, it is likely that the state anti-religious apparatus was in no different condition than that of the local and state organs following Stalin’s death – that of disarray. The authorities had been accustomed to act only when commanded from above, and when instructions ceased for a time it appears that most anti-religious activity did as well. Thus, the activities of religious believers were probably more liable to go unpunished during this time of confusion. Additionally, the rupture in the fabric of Soviet ideology triggered by Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin significantly contributed to widespread disenchantment with Communism. The disappointment with what they had experienced, observed, and now heard even from the lips of their leader led many to seek an alternative ideology, among which religion was foremost. Finally, as Fletcher has concluded, the mass emancipation of political prisoners from the vast system of Soviet prisons and labor camps during this period was the single most significant factor contributing to the invigoration of the sects. Fletcher notes that key leaders in the 1950's Soviet religious revival have consistently been found to be beneficiaries of this amnesty afforded to prisoners.25 Indeed, it appears that the very individuals leading the renewal and breathing vigor into the congregations of the various denominations were those recently released from the camps, their faith having been refined and

24 Michael Bourdeaux. "Religion." In The Soviet Union Since the Fall of Khrushchev, Archie Brown and Michael Kaser, eds. New York: The Free Press. 1975, 158 25 William Fletcher. Soviet Charismatics. New York: Peter Lang. 1985, 51-52

14 their tactics in clandestine religious activity having been developed in Stalin's brutal labor camps. The five or six years following Stalin's death, therefore, were indisputably a time of intensified religious growth and fervor for the churches. The denominations under consideration in this study were successful in nearly every way as they not only continued operation, but also grew both numerically and geographically. The KGB estimated the membership of “illegal sectarian formations” at about 100,00026 in the late fifties. Reform Baptists and Pentecostalists were especially prolific at this time.27 By all accounts, morale among the churches was high, and all of the Soviet churches experienced a relatively high degree of freedom from state interference. The greatest problems the churches in this study faced during the post-Stalin religious revival were inter-denominational conflicts, and for Baptists and Pentecostalists, the predicament of whether or not to join and remain with the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians and Baptists (AUCECB). Pentecostalists especially struggled with the dilemma of either joining a religious body that forbade the full expression of their faith, as pressured by both the AUCECB and state authorities, or facing the consequences that autonomous, yet illegal worship entailed.28 The formation of small, independent Baptist organizations during the revival attests to the fact that some Baptists were also alienated by the AUCECB even before the occurrence of the Baptist schism in 1961.29 In spite of Nikita Khrushchev's general policy of liberalization during his leadership from 1955 until 1964, this First Secretary's stance and policy toward religion were anything but liberal after his leadership position was secure. The 100-days crusade of 1954 to disable the churches served to foreshadow the most extensive anti-religious campaign enacted since the first two decades of Stalin's leadership. Beginning with the illegal, unregistered sects in 1957 and spreading to religion in general by 1960,30 Khrushchev launched a massive attack against religion in opposition to his earlier policy of toleration. There can be little doubt that the Party authorities were alarmed by the religious revival resulting from the "Thaw" and de-Stalinization,

26 The 1959 Soviet census estimated the nation's population at 208,827,000 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_the_Soviet_Union), so "sectarians" represented approximately 0.05% of Soviet society 27 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin. The Sword and the Shield. New York: Basic Books. 1999, 503 28 Fletcher, Charismatics, 95-96 29 Michael Bourdeaux. Religious Ferment in Russia. London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd. 1968, 9-11 30 Sawatsky, 3

15 which, from their perspective necessitated a harsher stance toward the churches.31 While the largely atheist Soviet populace continued to enjoy their relative freedom, Khrushchev personally spearheaded this renewed anti-religious campaign and decried the "spiritual and moral mutilation"32 inflicted by religious believers on innocent and unknowing Soviet citizens, the believers' own children. Further, Khrushchev taught: "It is necessary to fight for every young man and woman who has fallen under the influence of religion."33 If Communism was to be achieved in the Soviet Union, then the nation must muster all its strength in the war to eradicate from the populace at large the "pleasant, sweet, sleep-lulling drug"34 of religion. Religion and religious beliefs in all their forms were disparaged in the press, while all the Soviet churches suffered so shortly after their post-Stalin regrouping. In the course of Khrushchev's anti-religious campaign, the state applied a number of the repressive measures that had been utilized during the 1920's and 30's, and with the intent of overthrowing both religious ideology and practice. While churches, seminaries, and meeting houses of officially recognized denominations such as the Orthodox Church and the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians and Baptists were summarily shut down,35 clandestine religious organizations were otherwise pummeled. The arrest, imprisonment, and exile of church leaders, most of whom belonged to the underground sects, became commonplace once again, as did the interrogation and harassment of believers in general.36 Religious believers also suffered demotion or dismissal from their places of employment, and those pursuing a higher education and found to deviate from the state ideology of atheism were summarily expelled or not even admitted for study.37 In addition to withdrawing concessions made to believers during the first years of the "Thaw," state authorities were instructed to enforce the repressive Statutes on Religious

31 Ibid., 2 32 N.H. Mager & Jacques Katel (eds.). Conquest Without War. New York: Simon and Schuster. 1961, 360 33 "The law on cults must be strictly followed", 8; in Yuri Kryuchkov. Vnetritserkovnoye dvizheniye EKhB v byvshev sovetskom soyuze (The inner-church movement of the ECB[Evangelical Christians - Baptists] in the former soviet union). Sacramento. 2001, 9 34 Maurice Hindus. The Kremlin's Human Dilemma - Russia After Half a Century of Revolution. New York: Doubleday. 1967, 295 35 William Fletcher. "Religious Dissent in the USSR in the 1960's." Slavic Review. Vol. 30, Issue 2, (June 1971): 298-316, 299 36 Ibid. 37 Sawatsky, 3-4

16 Organizations passed in 1929 in a secret piece of legislation38 that, in particular, outlawed the religious education of minors as well as their participation in all aspects of worship services.39 The prayer meetings and religious activities of Soviet believers became subject to both open and covert surveillance as well as disruption at the hands of local authorities and citizens recruited for that purpose. Weddings and funerals of religious adherents were not immune to violent dispersal. Just as observed in Stalin's crusade against religion, in this campaign, authorities enforced the criminalization of activities fundamental to many of the churches. An addendum was made to the criminal code – Article 227 – which called for a penalty of up to five years for the conducting of activities "under the appearance of preaching religious beliefs and performing religious ceremonies" that "cause[] harm to citizens' health."40 Some of the religious practices routinely determined to harm one's health include baptism and fasting.41 Another anti-religious tactic recycled by Khrushchev and his associates was the introduction of new holidays and rituals intended to replace those of a religious nature.42 It was during the 1960's that "Wedding Palaces" and the corresponding Soviet wedding ceremony came into existence, clearly in competition with the pomp and legitimization of the Orthodox wedding mass. Additionally, starting in the 60’s, Soviet citizens who wished to have a baptism, marriage, or funeral performed in a church had to register with the proper authorities and identity themselves by name.43 A major component of Khrushchev's crusade against religion was the renewed and widespread broadcasting of anti-religious propaganda. A few characteristics of Khrushchev's anti-religious propaganda that distinguish it from those of the early decades of Soviet rule were its de-centralized implementation,44 its inclusion of more media, the near-universal inclusion of atheism into the curriculum of education at all levels,45 the conducting of propaganda meetings, and the employment of atheistic propagandists to engage in one-on-one discourse with

38 Philip Walters. "A Survey of Soviet Religious Policy" in Religious Policy in the Soviet Union, Sabrina Ramet (ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1993, 20 39 Sawatsky, 3 40 Article 227, in Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR: Their Treatment and Conditions. 2nd Edition. London: Amnesty International Publications. 1980, 37 41 Beeson, 41 42 Hindus, 298 43 Walters, 21 44 David Powell. Antireligious Propaganda in the Soviet Union: A Study of Mass Persuasion. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 1975, 47 45 Ibid., 51-57

17 believers.46 Radio, television, and film became important avenues for the expression of atheistic and anti-religious sentiments and stories,47 while newspapers, journals, pamphlets, and books served vital functions in the propaganda machine just as they had in previous times.48 The atheistic journal Nauka i religia (Science and Religion) came into existence in 1959 toward the beginning of the state-sponsored drive for anti-religious propaganda.49 In the drive to "educate" the Soviet populace on the dangers of sectarianism, religious adherents of various illegal sects were portrayed as mentally disturbed fanatics in works of both fiction and alleged non-fiction. Another aspect of Khrushchev’s anti-religious campaign was state interference in the internal matters of the churches. For example, the various denominations were pressured to modify their internal legislation.50 It is presumed, for example, that the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians – Baptists (AUCECB) introduced its so-called New Statutes, forbidding such practices as the teaching of religion to one’s children, in response to state coercion. Further, the state went to great lengths to persuade Baptist, Pentecostalist, and Mennonite congregations register with the state “as a means whereby conditions could be imposed on a congregation" in the state’s favor.51 While such state tactics may have succeeded with some, they also greatly contributed the development of the Reform Baptist movement covered in Chapter Two, and the development of a distinct Pentecostal identity as discussed in Chapter Three. In 1961, Khrushchev also passed secret legislation against the most "radical" sectarians that forbade the registration of the Pentecostalists unaffiliated with the AUCECB and the True Adventists.52 It is certain that this policy applied to the Reform Baptists for several years after their formation. Finally, while drawing on tactics and practices successful in previous anti-religious drives in the USSR, Khrushchev's campaign against the churches nevertheless differed from those of the past in three basic ways: 1) the omission of some of the most blatantly sadistic tactics of coercion frequently utilized in previous eras; 2) the implementation of tactics not yet utilized in the Soviet Union; and 3) the results ultimately achieved. Though the terrorizing and inhumane treatment of the sectarians in particular occurred with relative frequency during the 1960's

46 Fletcher, Dissent, 299 47 Powell, 93-103 48 Ibid., 85-93 49 Ibid., 46 50 Walters, 21 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid., 36

18 campaign, such intimidating features as nighttime interrogations, the disappearance of individuals, and widespread bloodshed, which had characterized Stalin's purges, were specifically proscribed at this juncture.53 In their stead, the authorities revamped a few novel tactics that proved successful in varying degrees. Persons found to be in violation of the 1929 Statutes by training their children in a religious spirit could be denied their parental rights. The children of an unknown number of families were, in actuality, forcibly removed from their families and placed in state boarding schools until they either escaped or reached the age of 16. Another frequently-utilized state tactic at this time was the recruiting of informants within religious communities, as well as the infiltration of congregations by KGB agents posing as would-be converts, and becoming church members and even church leaders when possible. Thus the state sought to cut off the religious organizations from every possible angle – leaders were incarcerated and incapacitated; children of parents belonging to the sects were prevented from being raised in the faith, at least openly; potential converts were subject to an onslaught of negative publicity against the various denominations in an attempt to curb church growth by conversion; churches were infiltrated to allow the state to both spy on and disperse religious services; and adherents were heavily penalized for their participation in church activities. In spite of the widespread anti-religious propaganda in the 60’s, however, Soviet citizens did not respond to it as they had in previous times. According to Powell, by this time most citizens of the USSR had become indifferent to the State’s largely unintelligent attempts at discrediting the sectarians found in the propaganda. Whereas during the establishment of Bolshevik leadership the public displayed a collective hostility toward the churches, the wave of anti-religious propaganda in the 60's utterly failed to mobilize the masses against religion.54 Khrushchev’s countermovement against religion took its toll on the churches in this study. Schism threatened to break down the momentum gained during de-Stalinization as tensions ran high in the ranks of the sects. Differing ideas on how to respond to the onslaught of repression drove deeper wedges between parties that had been struggling to find common ground even before the campaign. In spite of the extreme policies adopted by Khrushchev and implemented by local authorities, which succeeded on an individual basis, I submit that the 1960's campaign against

53 Powell, 40 54 Ibid., 91-92

19 religion ultimately served to strengthen the underground religious movements. The dramatic and well-documented Baptist schism led to the Reform Baptist movement under investigation in Chapter Two. Despite the unraveling of ties within the churches, or perhaps because of it, the persecutions inflicted under Khrushchev contributed significantly to the uniting of like-minded individuals within the sects. The polarization and schism of the churches caused those individuals most determined to continue their criminalized activities to band together and develop a tactical repertoire capable of contending with the repressive policies and practices of the state. Significantly, this era saw the emergence of active dissent of religious believers. For the first time ever, religious organizations in the USSR were motivated to actively protest their treatment and seek redress for harms committed. An era of Soviet "Church Power"55 was born that even Soviet authorities were compelled to recognize. An August 1965 article in the newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda stated: "Insults, violence and the forcible closing down of churches not only fail to reduce the number of believers, but they actually tend to increase their number, to make clandestine religious groups more widespread and to antagonize believers against the state."56

The first decade of Brezhnev's leadership of the Soviet state was characterized by a leveling off of persecution of the churches and a burgeoning of religious dissent. For a time, anti-religious propaganda took a back seat to a more liberal policy toward religion. For example, by the mid-60’s the only anti-religious journal still in publication was Nauka i religia, and by then its tone of militant atheism had become “distinctly milder.”57 A study of the clandestine religious organizations under question reveals the double jeopardy they experienced during the last two decades or so of Soviet power – not only did they suffer because of the State's hostile policies toward the churches, but they came to hold the status of "dissident" organizations. They were penalized along with other dissident movements while their legalized counterparts enjoyed a measure of protection from the state. A brief summary of Soviet dissent in post-Stalinist society will provide further historical context with which to better understand the underground churches.

55 Bourdeaux, Faith on Trial, 16 56 in Michael Bourdeaux (ed.). Religious Minorities in the Soviet Union. 1984. Minority Rights Group, 3 57 Bourdeaux, Ferment, 95

20 Soviet Human Rights Movement - A Brief History Dissent in the USSR was by no means limited to religious believers; both Khrushchev's "Thaw" and the subsequent tightening of most societal controls following his ouster contributed to the expansion of active protest among other groups, and one significant result was the birth and development of a human rights movement. Soviet writers including Boris Pasternak and Alexander Solzhenitsyn were among the first who sought to publish works that did not conform to the national policy of glorifying Socialism in the arts. Others participated in "subversive" poetry readings, and the unofficial and illegal publication of poetry flourished in samizdat literary journals. Samizdat literature is a term meaning literally "self-published". Such works were reproduced by hand, on personal typewriters producing up to 7 copies per typing using carbon paper, and later even printed on homemade printing presses. In hindsight, the renowned Soviet human rights activist Ludmila Alexeyeva commented that without the proliferation of samizdat at this time, the human rights movement in the USSR never would have prospered.58 After Khrushchev's ouster and upon the implementation of stricter policies toward dissent, Soviet citizens soon detected the renewed chill, and some began to fear a return to Stalinism. The September 1965 arrests of writers Yuli Daniel and Andrei Sinyavsky prompted dissidents to stage a demonstration on December 5 of that year in Moscow’s Pushkin Square. Participants chanted the slogan: "Respect the Constitution"59 on that crucial Constitution Day60 in protest of Daniel's and Sinyavsky's arrest and treatment, and thus the Soviet human rights movement was born.61 The Moscow mathematician Aleksandr Yesenin-Volpin was dubbed the father of the movement due to his idea of appealing to Soviet law to defend Daniel and Sinyavsky at the demonstration at Pushkin Square as well as at their trial in February 1966.62 As the Soviet human rights movement continued to win supporters through the late 60's and early 70's, protest activities increased accordingly. In August 1968, a mass demonstration was held on Red Square in protest of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. That year distinguished physicist and developer of the first Soviet hydrogen bomb, Andrei Sakharov, began

58 Ludmila Alexeyeva. Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press. 1985, 15 59 On paper, the Soviet Constitution granted rights that were not allowed in practice, and the protesters were using irony to protest this discrepancy. 60 A Soviet holiday 61 Joshua Rubenstein. Soviet Dissidents - Their Struggle for Human Rights. 2nd ed. Boston: Beacon Press. 1985, 35-37 62 Ibid.

21 open participation in the movement.63 Documents and literature published in samizdat boomed, and in 1968 Natalya Gorbanevskaya began the production of the influential samizdat journal A Chronicle of Current Events.64 Those involved with the Chronicle collected information on various dissident groups, and reported on their persecution in a concerned yet composed manner. The interests of nationalist activists including Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans, Jews, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians as well as a range of religious groups and fellow human rights activists were represented in the Chronicle. Issues would fall into the hands of persons sympathetic to the causes, who would themselves type a few copies to pass along to friends and interested associates. In this manner not only did the Chronicle reach an audience impossible for the authorities to completely identify, but it also came to be distributed in as the West where additional approval was cultivated. The May 1969 formation of the first Soviet human rights organization, the Initiative Group to Defend Human Rights in the USSR, constituted a further development in the movement. It was this organization that began to send letters of appeal to such bodies as the United Nations.65 As could be expected, state persecution interfered with the movement's progress. Surveillance, intimidation, termination from employment, difficulty finding employment, interrogation, arrest, and imprisonment in labor camps were among the authorities' standard weapons. These tactics were used unsparingly. It is also well established that some mentally healthy human rights activists and other dissidents were forcibly confined in psychiatric institutions. Such diagnoses as "paranoid delusions of reforming society"66 and "schizophrenia with religious delirium"67 would lead to extended periods of incarceration among the genuinely insane, with some healthy inmates undergoing "treatment" with heavy doses of neuroleptic drugs.68 By 1972 the authorities were intent on wrecking the human rights movement and cutting off the Chronicle of Current Events, which temporarily ceased publication that year.69 In August 1973, prominent dissidents Pyotr Yakir and Viktor Krasin dealt a devastating blow to the movement for human rights as they pleaded guilty to charges of "anti-Soviet agitation and

63 Ibid., 81-86 64 Alexeyeva, 147 65 Alexeyeva, 16 66 Rubenstein, 137 67 Prisoners of Conscience, 184 68 Rubenstein, 136 69 Ibid., 146

22 propaganda", exposed the activities of some of their former colleagues, and expressed regret for their “seditious” activities.70 The deaths of two other important dissidents,71 and the emigration of still others further shook the already reeling human rights movement.72 In spite of the negative developments, however, the Soviet human rights movement soon showed signs of regrouping. In May 1974 the publication of the Chronicle resumed,73 the determination of die- hard activists stood firm, and the involvement of new blood in the movement all contributed to the movement's rebirth in conjunction with another important development in 1975-76. In August of 1975 the USSR, along with 34 other nations including the U.S. and Great Britain, ratified the Final Act of the Helsinki Accords, a set of agreements that indirectly catalyzed the regrouping of the Soviet human rights movement, with significant ramifications for the illegal churches. The Kremlin had long pressed for the convening of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in order to receive official recognition of territories gained by the USSR at the close of World War II.74 Western governments at long last consented to the agreements, but arranged for the attachment of a package of humanitarian clauses to the agreements. The Helsinki Accords signatories thus pledged to "recognize and respect the freedom of the individual to profess and practise [sic], alone or in community with others, religion or belief acting in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience,"75 as well as work for the reunification of families split by the Iron Curtain and promote the freedom of communication.76 Involved nations also promised to "promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political . . . cultural and other rights," to grant minority ethnic groups "equality before the law,"77 and to otherwise adhere to international human rights standards.78 Soviet observance of the humanitarian addendums, however, was neither foreseen nor expected by any involved.79 Perhaps if the Soviet state had not seen to the publication of the agreements in their

70 Ibid., 147 71 Yuri Galanskov who died while imprisoned in a labor camp, and Ilya Gabai who committed suicide 72 Rubenstein, 147-48 73 Ibid., 148 74 Ibid., 213 75 Basket Three of Helsinki Agreements; in Bourdeaux, Religious Minorities, 2 76 Rubenstein, 213-14 77 Basket Three of Helsinki Agreements; in Rubenstein, 214 78 Rubenstein, 214 79 Ibid., 213

23 entirety in the prominent newspaper Pravda,80 none from the Soviet populace would have expected state compliance to the international legislation either. In the course of the next few years, a small group of Soviet dissidents would use the Helsinki Accords in an unprecedented move to revitalize the nation's fledgling human rights movement, and breathe life and hope into dissident organizations of all types including the persecuted churches. Yuri Orlov, a physicist and dissident new to the scene, initiated the formation of the Public Group of Assistance to Implementation of the Helsinki Agreements in the USSR, which consisted initially of 11 members including Andrei Sakharov and several other prominent dissidents. The group's tactical ingenuity lay in its use of an international agreement as a lever for stimulating Western governments to facilitate the Soviet Union’s adherence to the humanitarian clauses of the Accords.81 Unlike the human rights movement in previous years, Yuri Orlov decided that this group would act openly instead of anonymously. In an unprecedented move for Soviet human rights activists, Watch Group members would sign their names to documents produced and would not attempt to conceal their activities from the authorities. In addition, they would send appeals not only to Soviet leaders and international organizations as had been done in the past, but to all the signatory nations of the Helsinki Accords. Thirdly, the Watch Group would work in behalf of any Soviet citizen with grievances that could be appealed by referring to the Helsinki Accords.82 It sought to "use the Helsinki Accords as a bridge to Western governments and public opinion,"83 something for which the Agreements were never intended, but for which they have become almost exclusively remembered. Thus, Orlov and his colleagues found themselves defending the rights of ethnic minorities, nationalists of the various Soviet Republics, participants in emigration movements, individual citizens seeking civil or political rights, as well as those protesting the denial of religious freedoms. Within a short time, additional Watch Groups were formed in the Ukraine, Lithuania, Armenia, and Georgia as the volume of work became overwhelming for the original eleven Watch Group members.84 The so-called Belgrade and Madrid Conferences in 1977 and 1980 respectively were held by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe to

80 Ibid., 221-222 81 Ibid., 217 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid., 220 84 Alexeyeva, 16

24 ensure the implementation of the Agreements' various clauses and were attended by representatives of Helsinki signatory states. Soviet dissidents prepared copious documentation for both of these important hearings to confirm their nation's breach of the covenant.

The Churches and Shifts in Political Opportunity Structure – 1976 to 1985 For the churches, as well as most other dissident movements within the USSR, the formation of a citizens' organization to monitor the implementation of the Agreements served as the single most significant consequence of the State ratification of the Final Act. From 1976, the protest campaigns of the various churches gained in both scope and momentum. Though scholar Michael Bourdeaux has linked the signing of the Helsinki Accords to an increase in activity among religious activists in the Soviet Union,85 it seems unlikely that the amplified efforts of the unregistered sects were a direct consequence of the Final Act. Much more likely is the following scenario: having found an advocate willing and able to work in their behalf, the persecuted churches were further empowered in protesting their treatment and demanding the freedom to worship as granted them now not only by law at home, but abroad as well. Much of the protest activity the churches engaged in was independent of the Watch Groups. The True & Free Adventists, Reform Baptists, and unregistered Pentecostalists did collaborate with the Helsinki Watch Groups to varying degrees. The underground sectarians had long been accustomed to the denial of rights granted them on paper, but in the Watch Group the churches had found an avenue through which they could appeal for their rights, and furthermore to a Western audience they believed would be prepared to take action in their behalf. Existing ties to the human rights movement were strengthened at this time, as the underground Baptists and Adventists more earnestly pursued the course of international protest alongside other dissident groups. The Pentecostalists made their first contacts with both Soviet dissidents and the West upon the formation of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group, and the campaign to emigrate previously initiated by a few disgruntled Pentecostal believers grew to epic proportions as their collective momentum to engage in active protest rapidly increased. In the last few months of 1979 the Soviet State launched yet another intensive campaign against the churches, but this time not all the churches were affected. State-sanctioned religious bodies not venturing beyond the limitations imposed upon them from above continued to enjoy

85 Bourdeaux, Religious Minorities, 4

25 peaceful worship as they had since Khrushchev's fall from power. However, those engaging in protest or in unauthorized religious activities, including all three movements in this study, began to suffer a renewal of severe persecution. The state sought to eliminate top church leaders, those involved in protest activities, believers involved in the clandestine printing of religious materials, as well as young men refusing to take the military oath and in some cases individuals who played minor roles in the churches in this final wave of Soviet religious persecution. Significantly, by this time the courses of the Reform Baptists, Pentecostalists, and True & Free Adventists had broken from that of their legalized variants, and had almost coalesced with that of the Soviet human rights movement. The actions taken against the underground Protestant sects from 1979 until the institution of Gorbachev's radical changes were not associated with an anti-religious campaign as during the late 1950's and 1960's, but rather one part of a massive crackdown on dissent. While measures had already been taken to disable the dissident movements as evidenced by the arrests, trials, and imprisonments of Orlov and two of his associates,86 87 a full attack on dissidents commenced in the latter part of 1979. Scholars have postulated that the State countermovement against dissent gained momentum in 1979 partially in preparation for the 1980 Summer Olympics to be held in Moscow.88 The surge in arrests and imprisonment of all brands of dissidents especially in Moscow, as well as their banishment from the capital city, has been deemed by historians to be part of a campaign to sweep the streets clean of those who would otherwise defame the Soviet Union at a sensitive time. Others have considered the upcoming international Madrid Conference on the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords involving all the signatory states as a causal factor since it too was to be held in 1980. The Reform Baptists, unregistered Pentecostalists, and True & Free Adventists suffered tremendously beginning in 1979. House searches, arrests, harsh sentences to labor camps and exile, and threats of incarceration in psychiatric hospitals made against religious believers and others involved in the fight for human rights increased markedly.89 Though the number of arrests of religious believers was small compared to what it would be in subsequent years, the arrest and confinement, and even demise of key church leaders dealt a major blow to the sects.

86 Aleksandr Ginzburg and Anatoly Shcharansky 87 Rubenstein, 233-35 88 Ibid., 257 89 RL 105/79, p. 1

26 The Keston Institute knew of the arrests of only 10 members of the underground churches in 1978-1980,90 but two of these were church leaders among the most vocal activists in all of the country, and two others were leaders as well.91 In 1979 Nikolai Goretoi, pastor of a Pentecostal congregation in the Far East and leader of the 30,000-strong Pentecostal Emigration Movement, was sentenced to 7 years in a "strict regime" labor camp and 5 years of internal exile,92 a stiff sentence considering that labor camp terms had decreased on average since Stalin's death. Over 50 Soviet activists were arrested or placed on trial between fall of 1979 and May of 1980, and countless others endured interrogation or some other form of harassment as the state clamped down on the ideologically subversive and politically vocal component of its populace.93 Those willing to risk the grave consequences of activism were becoming increasingly few in number as the cost for defying the state continued to increase.94 In January 1980, the highly esteemed Andrei Sakharov was stripped of all of his State decorations and awards, and later exiled to the industrial city Gorky where his every action was under surveillance, and his respected voice of dissent could be more or less contained.95 While limited written information is available on the effects of this intense crusade on the churches in question, it is apparent that all three of them suffered significant losses in 1981-82, and local leaders as well those participating in the activities most sharply condemned by the state were singled out by the authorities. Of the 19 religious believers known to have been arrested and sentenced to imprisonment in those years, 7 of them were leaders of congregations and all others did not hold titled positions in their congregations.96 One Baptist man arrested in 1982 after he had distributed leaflets in Moscow and another Soviet city was determined by the authorities to be unaccountable for his actions. He was, therefore, sentenced to treatment in a psychiatric institution.97 In 1982, another Baptist believer was sentenced to 5 years in an ordinary regime camp after Uzbek authorities uncovered religious literature at his place of

90 Michael Bourdeaux, ed. Religious Prisoners in the USSR. 1987. 91 Statistics from the Keston Institute on the imprisonment of Soviet believers were incomplete at this time, and are included here only to provide a schematic. Statistics reflecting the actual number of believers arrested are still unavailable. 92 Bourdeaux, Religious Minorities, 21-22 93 RL 184/80, 1 94 Ibid. 95 Rubenstein, 251-54 96 Bourdeaux, Religious Prisoners 97 Ibid, 106

27 residence.98 Religious believers, mostly from the sects represented in this work, were the single largest group of dissidents of which Amnesty International learned were in imprisonment by 1981, including 75 Baptists, 20 Adventists, and 2 leading Pentecostalists.99 1982 was a particularly difficult year for the Soviet human rights movement as the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group announced its dissolution on September 8; at that time only 3 of its 20 members had escaped imprisonment or exile abroad, and its most elderly member was threatened at that time with arrest and a labor camp sentence she would not likely survive.100 Also, 47 members of the various Helsinki Watch Groups formed in the USSR were then imprisoned.101 The Chronicle of Current Events underwent a permanent demise. Such trends the Solidarity Movement in Poland in 1981 must have prompted Soviet leaders to continue the pressure on dissent at home.102 Spring 1981 saw a media campaign to "reinforce ideological orthodoxy"103 within the Soviet Union. The one concession of releasing prominent imprisoned Soviet dissidents to exile in the West in exchange for Soviet spies held by the U.S.104 did little to boost the dissident movement in the USSR. The unyielding countermovement against dissent was brought to a new height in 1982 as Leonid Brezhnev passed away that year and Yuri Andropov, former head of the KGB and expert Soviet ideologue, inherited the vacant post. Arrests of dissidents rose in his first months of office, including some "previously thought to be of so little danger to the regime that they were safe from prosecution."105 In 1983 at least 21 members of the illegal Protestant churches were sent to the camps, half of whom were not known to have been guilty of anything besides their affiliation with the "anti-Soviet" organizations. While some were arrested for such activities as writing poetry included in a religious journal, deserting the army, and participation in the campaign to emigrate,106 others including Baptist choir leader Nikolai Popov received sentences particularly out of proportion to their level of activity. Popov was sentenced to 5 years in a strict-regime camp for his involvement in conducting the choir in the Ryazan’ Reform Baptist

98 Ibid., 89 99 Amnesty International Yearly Report - 1982, 298-299 100 RL 362/82, 1 101 Ibid., 2 102 RL 92/83, 11 103 Ibid. 104 Reform Baptist leader Georgi Vins as well as Moscow Helsinki Watch Group member Aleksandr Ginzburg were exchanged in 1979 105 RL 92/83, 2 106 Bourdeaux, Religious Prisoners

28 congregation, leaving his wife and 8 children to cope with their poverty without him.107 Amnesty International reported the imprisonment of over 100 individuals for peaceful religious activities illegal in the eyes of the state, most of which were Baptists, as well as several Pentecostalists.108 Persecutions under Chernenko109 appeared to have abated slightly, but the basic anti-dissident policy adopted by his immediate forbears remained unchanged to his death in 1985. By this time active dissent among the churches, as well as within the general dissident movement, had all but been extinguished. It is almost unthinkable that within such a short time the momentum of the clandestine Protestant sects gained in earlier periods could not only be brought to a halt, but also dramatically reversed. Nevertheless, it is appears that the anti-dissident campaign begun in earnest in 1979 was more effective in destroying the highly-adapted and resourceful underground sects than Khrushchev's campaign in the 60's. The ties between sympathetic persons in the West and members of the churches were practically severed. The most active church leaders and members were languishing in the labor camps, many for the second, third, or fourth time; their valuable allies of the human rights movement shared their dismal fate. It had become clear to the churches that the West was not committed to their cause. Morale was terribly low, protest had effectively ceased, and there were no reports of successes in attracting fellow Soviet citizens to nearly leaderless denominations, which, for joining, potential converts could expect highly unpleasant consequences. The costs of membership in these sects far outweighed benefits that could be found elsewhere, in churches sanctioned by the state for example. The All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians and Baptists as well as the All-Union Council of Seventh Day Adventists enjoyed a particularly privileged status unlike any but the Orthodox Church. While scores of believers associated with the Reform Baptist, unregistered Pentecostal, and True & Free Adventist movements endured the intense persecution reserved for dissidents, their counterparts worshipping in these state-sanctioned bodies began to enjoy increasing freedoms. In the late 70’s, head of Soviet Religious Affairs Vladimir Kuroyedov and puppet head of the AUCECB

107 Ibid., 98 108 Amnesty International Yearly Report - 1984, 313 109 General Secretary of the Supreme Soviet upon Andropov’s death in 1983

29 Aleksei Bychkov intensified their rhetoric lauding the religious freedom enjoyed in the USSR,110 and the West maintained its largely "hands-off" approach in dealing with the religious dissidents.

Conclusions In scrutinizing the socio-political landscape of the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1985 with regard to the successes of dissident Protestant churches in this study, a few major points rise to the surface. First of all, during these 32 years the Soviet state continued to vacillate in its policies toward the dissident churches just as it had under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin. Not only was this fluctuation the cause of much upheaval on the part of the churches, but it also served to foster the further development of dissent on their part. The churches took the opportunity to regroup during times of lesser persecution, allowing them to survive periods of repression to follow. After the fruitful years of religious revival following Stalin's death, the churches handily survived Khrushchev's anti-religious campaign instigated only a few years later. Brezhnev's first decade of leadership was marked by a leveling off of persecution, allowing the churches another period of time to modify and accelerate their activities before the pressure of the anti-dissident campaign in 1979, to which the renegade churches did not immediately succumb. In spite of their bold efforts, the anti-dissident campaign had a markedly different affect on the churches' overall successes than previous crusades against them. This is the case for at least two main reasons. First of all, the dissenting religious movements had largely cast their bets with the methods of Soviet human rights workers, investing their resources in the hopes that Western pressure on the USSR to comply with human rights clauses of the Helsinki Accords would liberate them from their deplorable situation. Tactics of broadcasting their grievances to the West proved to be overwhelmingly inept, as governments of Western nations did not respond to the requests of the churches as planned. Secondly, the churches examined in this study had by then earned the designation of "dissident," and were engaged by the state in a full-flung warfare while other religious believers in the nation enjoyed unprecedented freedoms. This most effective state tactic implemented at this time proved especially debilitating to the unregistered

110 See Vladimir Kuroyedov. Church and Religion in the USSR. Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House. 1979.

30 churches with a legal alternative for worship. Had the pendulum not swung in their favor with the implementation of Perestroika and Glasnost' later in the 80's and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, dissident churches in the USSR may have collapsed themselves.

31

CHAPTER TWO

REFORM BAPTISTS

In April19611 in the small provincial town of Uzlovaya South of Moscow, a group of Baptist men met in utmost secrecy to discuss corruption in the state-sanctioned leadership body of Soviet Baptists, the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians – Baptists (AUCECB), and the possibility of enacting reform within the organization. This small group of men spearheaded the formation of the Initiative Group2 that would develop into one of the most widespread movements of dissent in the USSR and certainly the most consequential movement of religious dissent in the nation. At it strongest point numerically in the mid-60's some 250,000 baptized adults,3 roughly half of all Soviet Baptists, participated in this movement of Baptist reform4 that would open the first underground printing press of religious material, sponsor the first advocacy group for Soviet prisoners of conscience, and suffer the most in terms of number of believers persecuted, arrested, imprisoned, and brutalized in the USSR. Participants in the Reform Baptist movement also engaged in more acts of protest than those of any other religious organization. The movement also appeared to have the most net involvement with Soviet human rights activists of any of the movements of religious dissent, and was also by far the best publicized abroad. In spite of, or perhaps because of these successes, Reform Baptists drew the attention of the Soviet authorities, and by the mid-80's they found themselves in an unenviable position. Remarkably, through the first half of the 80’s Reform Baptist adherents continued to hold

1 Bratskii listok, no. 7-8, 1971; in Yuri Kryuchkov. Vnetritserkovnoye dvizheniye EKhB v byvshev sovetskom soyuze (The inner-church movement of the ECB in the former soviet union). Sacramento. 2001, 18-19 2 Initsiativnaya grupa 3 this statistic does not include adolescents and children, of which there were many, because they were not baptized until adulthood 4 Alexeyeva, 213-214

32 worship services,5 printing activities continued to function,6 and the church was still in existence while the state interfered with and curtailed its activities. In nearly every other respect, however, the Reform Baptist organization was in dire straits. First of all, it had significantly diminished in size from the 1960's. Alexeyeva reports that in 1985 there were only 2,000 Reform Baptist congregations with approximately 70,000 adult members.7 The legally functioning AUCECB, on the other hand, had grown from 250,000 adherents in 1963 to about 350,000 by 1980.8 Whole Reform Baptist communities had succumbed to governmental pressure to register with the AUCECB and drop their official ties with the CCECB, accounting for most of the loss.9 Further, by 1985 the authorities had succeeded in rendering the Reform Baptists practically leaderless. Having lived in hiding since a prison release in 1971,10 only top church leader Gennadi Kryuchkov remained both in the USSR and out of its system of prisons and labor camps in the mid-80’s.11 Rank and file Reform Baptists feared the effects of new legislation passed in 1983 that allowed for Soviet prisoners to be rearrested to additional terms while still in imprisonment, and were concerned that they might not see their loved ones and church leaders again.12 Sawatsky comments that by the early 80's "the CCECB ha[d] . . . lost much of its prophetic influence on the larger union"13 and its voice seemed to be "diminishing."14 The hopes that Reform Baptists had pinned on Western intervention to pressure the USSR into complying with human rights clauses of the Helsinki Accords had been regrettably misplaced. Said Reform Baptist activist Lidia Vins in an article: "Counting on the apathy and indifference of the West . . ." Soviet authorities "are directing an assault on the Christian faith."15 This chapter expands upon the various denomination-specific factors at play affecting the overall successes of the Reform Baptists to 1985. As noted in the Introduction, the following factors are examined and discussed in regards to their impact on the movement's success: Baptist history in Russia/USSR, components of the church, Reform Baptist religious activities

5 telephone converstaion with Okhotin, 16 October 2003 6 RL 360/85, 5 7 Alexeyeva, 213-214 8 Sawatsky, 442 9 Alexeyeva, 213-214 10 Ibid., 207 11 Ibid. 12 Okhotin, 16 October 2003 13 Sawatsky, 443 14 Ibid., 447 15 Russkaya Mysl', 8 March 1984; in RL 146, 2

33 and tactics to continue them, and tactics they used to protest their treatment and work for their freedoms. I have found that, relative to the other religious movements in this study, the successes of the Reform Baptists to 1985 can be attributed primarily to their large size and therefore ability to better absorb state repressions, as well as to their rather moderate theology. I also have reason to hypothesize that the comparative autonomy of members in making decisions whether or not to engage in certain activities, and in assisting their pastors in religious duties also contributed to the movement's overall successes to 1985. A multitude of other dynamics led to the movement's short-term successes, but contributed to more defeats by the mid-80's. These features will be discussed below, and compared with those of the Pentecostalists and True Adventists in Chapters Three and Four.

Historiography Both the approach and scope of this work differ markedly from past studies; though much has been written on the Baptists in the Soviet Union, and even on the Reform Baptists themselves, most of these works consist of either short chapters in different books that provide an utterly incomplete history, or entire books written on one narrow facet of the movement. A veritable throng of books and papers discussing various aspects of the Reform Baptists were published in the late 1960's and early 70's. The idea of the operation of a Soviet Baptist organization in opposition to the monolithic Soviet state in the midst of the Cold War must have resonated well with those in Western democratic nations. The fact that so much was published on the dissident Baptists during the Cold War also reflects the relatively large amount of information available on the subject through newspaper and journal articles published in the USSR as well as the leakage of Reform Baptist documents, including appeals, to the West. Religion in the Soviet Union by Walter Kolarz and published in 1961 gives a comprehensive rendering of Baptism in the USSR to that time, and prophetically closes the section on the Baptists with a foretelling of schism within the church. Walter Sawatsky's book Soviet Evangelicals gives a spotty history of all Evangelical Christian religions in the USSR, including the Reform Baptists. Though he gives a detailed coverage of such important topics as Baptist worship, Sawatsky neglects several other topics essential to the current study.

34 Michael Bourdeaux, head of the Keston Institute in England that closely followed the repudiation of religious freedoms in Communist nations, authored or edited several books on the Reform Baptists that have been useful to the current study. Bourdeaux’s Religious Ferment in Russia published in 1968 tells the story of schism among the Soviet Baptists and is based primarily on articles in Soviet newspapers and journals. His book Faith on Trial in Russia published just three years later in 1971 and written in a narrative style discusses the 1966 trial of Reform Baptist leaders Georgi Vins and Gennadi Kryuchkov and provides key information on the church, including a detailed account of a large demonstration the Baptists staged in 1966 that led to Vins' and Kryuchkov's arrests. Bourdeaux edited Religious Minorities in the Soviet Union, published in 1984, that includes a fruitful chapter on the Baptists, and wrote the book 10 Growing Soviet Churches along with his wife Lorna, which includes a narrative account of the Reform Baptists of Ukraine. A few other minor contributions of Bourdeaux to the Reform Baptist scholarship are cited in this chapter. The most comprehensive coverage of the Reform Baptists in the established literature is provided by Ludmila Alexeyeva. In her monumental work Soviet Dissent published in 1985, Alexeyeva traces the movement from its origins in the 1960's and treats it as a dissident organization, as opposed to lumping it together with all the churches in the Soviet Union. The Chronicle of Current Events is her major primary source, and she succinctly tells the dissident Baptists’ story. Another source important to this study is William Fletcher's paper entitled "Religious Dissent in the USSR in the 1960's", published in 1971 in the Slavic Review that gives a good treatment of Reform Baptist protest in comparison with the protest of other religious organizations. A chapter on religious dissent in Rudolf Tokes’ book Dissent in the USSR: Politics, Ideology, and People discusses Baptist samizdat to 1973 in depth. The most important contribution the current work has to offer is the inclusion of the short and highly informative book Vnutritserkovnoye dvizheniye EKhB v byvshev sovetskom soyuze (The Inner-Church Movement of the ECB in the Former Soviet Union) written by Yuri Kryuchkov, brother of Reform Baptist forefather and leader, published in 2001. Yuri Kryuchkov offers an "insider's" perspective on the formation of the Initiative Group and development of the church, which is lacking in other works. Though admittedly subjective at times, Yu. Kryuchkov sheds much-needed light on the mechanics of the movement, especially in the early years. He also includes the full text of some key documents that are important to understanding the

35 movement’s origins, the translations of which may be found in Appendices C and D. Interviews over the telephone with Yuri Kryuchkov and Reform Baptist Andrew Okhotin conducted by the author also proved vital to clarifying a few points.

Factors Possibly Contributing to Church's Successes and Failures Baptist History in Russia/USSR Elements of Russian and Soviet Baptist history created some conditions that significantly contributed to the successes of the Reform Baptist movement. First of all, the Reform Baptists had a large base of adherents due to their relatively early arrival in the Russian Empire and the conversion of sizable groups of people with beliefs compatible with their own. Baptists were the first religious organization included in this study to take hold in Russia, and began to spread in the latter half of the 19th century in territories that would become part of the Soviet Union.16 The movement actually consisted of three separate and independent groups that took root in different pockets of the Russian Empire primarily among people of a Lutheran, Mennonite, or Molokan heritage.17 In addition to the large number of converts that eventually joined one of these three movements, some early Baptist/Evangelical leaders received formal training,18 feeding the movement and undoubtedly contributing to its early successes. By 1923 there was reported to be a stunning 1,000,000 Baptists and Evangelical Christians in the USSR, 19 united in key doctrines though not yet in organization. The sheer numbers of Baptists provided a large base of individuals that would cushion the blows of the State soon to come. Thus, though the purges of the 1930’s had a considerable impact on this population as pastors and rank-and-file adherents by the tens of thousands were imprisoned and perished, many congregations and individuals were successful in surviving the storm. Further, the post-Stalin religious revival led to the increasing of Baptist ranks in the Soviet Union and at least partially compensated for the losses of earlier years. By 1954, the AUCECB reported an

16 Kolarz, 283-84 17 From 1858-1862 the Stundist movement got underway in the Ukraine as Lutheran and Mennonite pastors conducted Bible lessons and the arrival of a German Baptist preacher in 1869 catalyzed both a mass number of adult baptisms and the denoting of the movement as “Baptist.” In the Caucasus, many early Baptist converts came from among the Molokan sect largely due to the efforts of Russian merchant and Molokan Nikita Voronin baptized on September 1, 1867 near Tiflis, Georgia. In St. Petersburg, the movement of Evangelical Christianity first found it's place among the aristocracy due to the influence of the Englishman Lord Radstock during his visits to Russia's northern capital in 1874 and 1877-78. 18 Sawatsky, 51 19 Kolarz, 286 (Soviet sources admitted only 250,000 Baptist adherents by 1928)

36 adult membership of 512,000 worshipping in 5,400 congregations. Of these, 12,000 were baptized in 1954 alone.20 By 1957 the AUCECB declared a membership of 545,000 adults,21 and a mass of 3,000,000 adherents including un-baptized children and adolescents.22 Though the schism led to a Reform Church with fewer members than the AUCECB at its peak, the reformers themselves succeeded in attracting a sizable number of adherents, as mentioned previously in this chapter. The triumphs of the Reform Baptist movement during its inception in 1961 to its official schism in 1965 were indeed impressive. In these few years the movement's leaders effectively broadcasted their objectives to the vast Baptist populace of their nation, and attracted hundreds of thousands of followers. One may point out a few reasons for the reformers’ success in drawing away such a significant portion of the nation's Baptists. The catalyzing elements that sparked the formation of the Initiative Group in 1961 were the simultaneous pressure placed on Baptist communities to register with the AUCECB and the perception of many that legal registration with the AUCECB constituted submission to the state by allegiance to its “government-appointed senior church officials.”23 Further, the stern repressions of Khrushchev’s era including the en masse closing of Baptist churches and dissolution of congregations caused some to fear that if they did not take action, the authorities would soon succeed in dissolving the church altogether.24 In spite of the threat of repression that they would surely face, multitudes of Baptist believers chose to repudiate the AUCECB, join the reform movement, and face those risks head on. On a practical level, connections had among Soviet Baptists by Initiative Group members undoubtedly contributed to the movement's success. Initiative Group founder Gennadi Kryuchkov had been schooled in the problems of the AUCECB by his own father, Konstantine A. Kryuchkov. After a prison release in the 1930's that made it difficult for him to find a legal residence in Moscow and many other places, Konstantine Andreevich and his family traveled from city to city for a number of years in search of a new home. In the course of his travels, Mr. Kryuchkov made many acquaintances among Baptists in various areas, and during his visits with

20 Sawatsky, 67 21 Michael Bourdeaux. Opium of the People. London: Faber and Faber LTD. 1966, 153 22 Kolarz, 286 (The statistics given for Baptists in the 50’s account only for those officially registered with the AUCECB, and do not include independent congregations or organizations.) 23 Alexeyeva, 202 24 300 registered and unregistered Baptists congregations had been closed by the first half of 1961. The Reform Baptist leadership estimated that at such a tempo, all Baptist congregations would be shut down by the end of 1964. See Bratskii listok, no. 7-8, 1971; in Kryuchkov, 18-19.

37 various friends spent a considerable amount of time discussing the persecution they were experiencing and other topics concerning the church. After the formation of the AUCECB, a common complaint expressed during these visits was concerning its corruption.25 Surely these friendships forged by Gennadi Kryuchkov's father that were based on a common dissatisfaction with events in the church played a role in the movement's early successes. Not only was Konstantine Kryuchkov able to assess the discontent of Baptists in several locales and make this known to his son Gennadi, but when Gennadi Kryuchkov’s name appeared on documents authored by the reform movement, this must have resounded well with his father’s many associates. Initiative Group members chose to instigate what they hoped would turn into a widespread movement for reform within the AUCECB by penning a letter of appeal addressed to Baptists the nation wide, and relating to all Soviet Baptists the need to work for purification within the church. This 'First Appeal'26 condemned the "satanic statutes"27 introduced by the AUCECB in 1960 as well as the AUCECB leadership itself, and pleaded with all Soviet Baptists to petition the authorities to allow the holding of a Baptist congress. From the reformers’ vantage, this would permit the church's course to be dictated by its adherents rather than the State. Initiative Group members were fortunate to acquire a means of duplicating the appeal in large quantities through a friend28 of Initiative Group member Aleksei Prokofiev. They also managed to somehow circulate the 'First Appeal' far and wide throughout the USSR, asking its readers to "consider it their duty to pass this along to those who could teach it to still others, for the building of God's work." Apparently, their request was honored. Further facilitating the development of the Reform movement was the formation of small, independent Baptist groups after the 1944 establishment of the AUCECB, which set a precedent for schism. Though little is known about these groups, it is documented that future Reform Baptist leader Aleksei Prokofiev directed an independent Baptist organization called the 'Pure Baptists' in the 1950's that opposed unification with the AUCECB due to its contamination by the State.29 Soviet researchers hypothesized that some Baptists who eventually joined the reform

25 Kryuchkov, 16-17 26 A full translation of the 'First Appeal' of the Initiative Group may be found in Appendix C 27 Referring to the New Statutes 28 Boris Zdorovets 29 Bourdeaux, Ferment, 9-11

38 campaign had been involved with the so-called Prokofievites.30 Further, the early Reform leaders may have been influenced by these earlier independent Baptist movements. In retrospect, Gennadi Kryuchkov stated that "basic features of the gathering movement within the church were already coming together by 1958.31 Certainly, the formation of a large-scale reform movement of some type within the Soviet Baptist Church was inevitable. Another aspect of Russian/Soviet Baptist history that contributed to general Baptist success in the USSR, and more particularly to the Reform movement, was a legacy of persecution and sacrifice. Those who had survived earlier eras of repression and remained with the church undoubtedly would have nurtured an attitude of stoicism, and those whose forebears had endured church-state conflicts in earlier times likely benefited from their examples. During the Tsarist times, Baptists suffered greatly for their faith. Though they gained legality in Russia in 1879, those associated with the branch in the Ukraine experienced especially extreme persecution in the late Tsarist period.32 As if to foreshadow their treatment during times of Soviet repression of the sects, one Baptist man recalls events of his boyhood in 1892 as follows: "This was a time of horrible persecutions. Exiles, arrests, fines, and beatings of believers rained down abundantly upon the audacious followers of the Gospel. Under continual fear of being caught by the police, the brothers nevertheless did not cease their meetings, holding them in basements, across the Dnepr, in the woods, in the cemetery, in ravines, and in the apartments of the more well-to-do brothers."33

As previously mentioned, the 1930's were a time of great suffering for the religiously inclined, and the Baptists did not escape the terror of Stalin’s purges. In 1980 Reform Baptist leader Georgi Vins stated that between 1929 and 1941, 25,000 Soviet Baptists were arrested. Most of those arrested were pastors and preachers, and of those arrested, approximately 22,000 of them perished in the prisons and labor camps.34 Though the purges led to a significant decline in the number of believers, Kolarz ascertains that in spite of this damage the tribulations of these dark years bore the fruit of unity between Baptists and Evangelical Christians.35 It also must have served to build fortitude among those who survived. This legacy certainly played in to the

30 Ibid., 9-10 31 Vestnik istiny, no. 3-4, 1981; in Kryuchkov, 18 32 Sawatsky, 32-35 33 Ibid., 37 34 Georgi Vins' testimony; in RL 101/81, 2-3 35 Kolarz, 303

39 large number of people willing to join and subsequently remain with the reform movement from 1961 to 1985 in spite of the perils. Indeed, some of the Reform Baptists who bore the most persecution during these trying years had seen their fathers and mothers suffer or die for their faith in earlier eras. Central Reform Baptist leader Georgi Vins was such a person, and an account of his family's trials may be found in the book Three Generations of Suffering. Another dynamic of the Soviet Baptist/Evangelical Christians that had a possible effect on success was their efforts to organize themselves. Early in their history, both movements sought to create bodies of central leadership. By 1884 the Union of Russian Baptists had been illegally formed, and by 1909 the Union of Evangelical Christians had come into being.36 Though both unions were disbanded during the 1930's, the threats of World War II prompted Soviet leaders to initiate the formation of the AUCECB in October 1944,37 another well- organized Baptist entity. Finally, from its inception the reform movement was exceptionally well organized. This topic will be covered later in the chapter. Not everything in the Reform Baptists' history would provide for their successes throughout the period under investigation in this study, however. The mere existence of a legally sanctioned group of Baptist worshippers in the embodiment of the AUCECB detracted from the successes of the Reform Baptist movement. The AUCECB blight on Reform Baptist progress became especially apparent after the authorities began to pressure the dissident Baptists to register, which began in 1975. Registration was offered to congregations with the condition that they not recognize the CCECB as their leadership body on the registration papers.38 Some congregations, including Georgi Vins’ native Baptist community, registered at that time though Bourdeaux remarks that “the great majority regarded this, probably with justification, as a manoeuvre [sic] to alienate them from their chosen leadership.”39 Several Reform Baptist congregations attempted to register with the state while indicating their allegiance to the CCECB on the paperwork, but such efforts were in vain.40 Legal registration with the state meant an official disregard for the Reform Baptist leadership. By 1977, the AUCECB alleged that 50 Reform Baptist congregations had successfully registered with the government, and others continued to register after that time. By 1983 after

36 Ibid., 285 37 Ibid., 303 38 Bourdeaux, Religious Minorities, 13 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid.

40 the Reform movement had all but been broken, the state ceased pressuring Reform Baptist communities to register.41 The results of the registration drive were definitive, and not in the dissident Baptists' favor. The costs of remaining loyal to the CCECB began to outweigh the benefits for many Baptists. From the mid-1970’s through the mid-80’s Soviet Reform Baptists were among the most persecuted religious groups in the USSR, while their State-legitimized counterpart in the body of the All-Union Council were concurrently the “most favored.”42 Only the Baptists affiliated with the AUCECB were allowed the right to hold regular national congresses.43 Other indulgences granted the AUCECB were the annulment of a repressive series of decrees controlling the “internal life of the church”44 imposed on the All-Union Council in 1960, the permission to print Bibles and hymnals, albeit in small quantities, and official theological training for the church's ministry.45 Ironically, these concessions given to the AUCECB were “a direct result of continuous pressure from the reformers.”46 As the dissident Baptists engaged in various types of protest to push for autonomy from the state, they felt the strong hand of the authorities bear down against them, while the AUCECB only benefited. Indeed, though "interdependence"47 with the AUCECB was a costly business for the Reform Baptists, who paid for AUCECB freedoms essentially in full, it was an ideal arrangement for the AUCECB. Head Reform Baptist leader Gennadi Kryuchkov recognized this trend with a surprising lack of bitterness in the 1990's: "When glancing back at the past 35 years of persecution, the brethren of the CCECB rejoiced in behalf of those who remained in the registered congregations. They were able to take full advantage of that freedom that came to them on account of the sufferings experienced by the persecuted portion of our brotherhood!"48

This tendency for the AUCECB to reap the benefits of Reform Baptist activity and protest was not the only dynamic that occurred as a function of the two churches' interdependence. Bourdeaux comments that in the mid-80's "individuals and churches seem to

41 Ibid. 42 Ibid., 14 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Alexeyeva, 207 48 Kryuchkov, 62

41 change sides periodically,"49 and there was a bi-directional drift of individuals between legal and illegal worship. Okhotin remarked that during the first half of the 1980's amidst great persecution, there was no decline in numbers among his congregation in Krasnodar,50 though Alexeyeva indicates that this was not the case for other Reform Baptist communities.51 On the other hand, Sawatsky remarks that during the early 80's, the AUCECB was concerned that a significant portion of its young adherents were crossing over to worship with the CCECB.52 In spite of the difficulties in fully exploring the relationship between the AUCECB and Reform Baptists, and the effect of the very existence of the AUCECB on Reform Baptist successes to 1985, the verdict seems clear: had there been no legal alternative of worship for the Reform Baptists upon which the authorities could capitalize to draw them away from their status as dissidents, it is probable that significantly fewer individuals and congregations would have abandoned the Reform movement during the crushing years of the late 70's and early 80's.

Components of the Church The Reform Baptist organization was a well-organized, unified movement that encapsulated hundreds of thousands of adherents, and was led by scores of dedicated individuals. Reform Baptist theology, though typical by Western standards, was viewed as backward and treated as a threat by Soviet authorities, and its ideology differed enough from that of the AUCECB so as to warrant a schism in 1965. Georgi Vins explained the seven fundamental principles of the Evangelical Christians and Baptists in his autobiography. For the Reform Baptists, the Bible was the only “rule and guidance.”53 Religious believers, as everyone else, should be granted an “absolute freedom of conscience.”54 Because church members were imperfect individuals seeking sanctification, they were baptized. Reform Baptists believed not only in the separation of Church and State, but also in the independence of each congregation and the “priesthood of all believers.”55 Proselytizing was also of paramount importance to Reform Baptists, who viewed it as their responsibility to spread the Gospel. The early

49 Bourdeaux, Religious Minorities, 14 50 Okhotin, 16 October 2003 51 Alexeyeva, 213-14 52 Sawatsky, 441 53 Georgi Vins, with Jane Ellis (trans.). Three Generations of Suffering. Toronto: Hodder and Stoughton. 1976, 103 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid.

42 constitutions of both Baptist and Evangelical Christian organizations highlighted the prominent position proselytizing held in the church’s ideology. The Evangelical Christian constitution clarified that “The Union of Evangelical Christians ha[d] as its aim the task of spreading the gospel . . .”56 Similarly, the constitution of the Baptist Union “strive[d] to fulfil [sic] the tasks laid by the Lord upon his disciples, namely taking the gospel ‘to the whole of creation’ – that is, to all people, regardless of their nationality, sex and age.” (Mark 16: 16)57 In fact, the doctrine of proselytizing was one of the key points of contention between the AUCECB and the Reform Baptists. Some aspects of Reform Baptist ideology could be viewed as restrictive in nature, and account at least partially for a withdrawal of these Christians from an oftentimes hostile Soviet society. Pacifism was embraced at the “grass-roots level,”58 but not strictly imposed upon adherents. There are many accounts of young Baptist men refusing to bear arms or swear the military oath, and this gave cause for a multitude of arrests. Additionally, Soviet Baptists generally abstained from alcohol, tobacco, television, and the theater, and were markedly apolitical.59 These features of their beliefs were lambasted in Soviet anti-religious propaganda from time to time. Overall, however, the Reform Baptist theology was more moderate than that of the unregistered Pentecostalists and True Adventists, allowing them to escape some of the problems the other two religious organizations faced due to their theology. The Reform Baptists were governed by the Council of Churches of Evangelical Christians – Baptists (CCECB), initially created in September 196560 and consisting at first of 11 men.61 Later, the Council was made up of 15 men, then 17,62 and eventually 20.63 At some point 30 to 35 co-leaders64 were chosen to assist the Council members to provide backup leadership in the case of the incapacitation of those in the CCECB.65 Pastors led Reform Baptist congregations, though others in the congregation participated in giving sermons as well.66 67

56 Ibid. 57 from Bratsky Listok, Nos. 2-3, 1965; in Bourdeaux, Ferment, 74 58 Sawatsky, 120 59 Sawatsky, 112 60 Kryuchkov, 50-51 61 Alexeyeva, 206 62 Ibid. 63 Okhotin, 16 October 2003 64 sotrudniki 65 Okhotin, 16 October 2003 66 telephone conversation with Okhotin, 29 April 2004

43 Choirmasters appear to have played an important role in Baptist communities as well, as evidenced by their arrests during the anti-dissident campaign beginning in the late 70's. From its inception, the Reform Baptist movement was led by a centralized party of individuals, the Initiative Group, though one of their main goals was to reach out to the vast body of believers to join the movement, as well as to recruit additional leaders. Indeed, Gennadi Kryuchkov had inadvertently escaped arrest in the mid-60's while on a trip to the Black Sea region for the purpose of enlisting a certain man to lead the movement. 68 The early reformers further demonstrated their desire to decentralize the movement by their decision to allow congregations from all regions of the USSR to elect representatives to serve on the Organizing Committee. This decision was made at an underground conference held in February 1962.69 Additionally, after the underground congress held in 1965 during which the CCECB was created, central Reform Baptist leaders emphasized the importance of local leaders in the church. In his book, Yuri Kryuchkov referred to the deleterious effects of the highly centralized leadership of the reform movement and the lack of organized structure for the functioning of the unregistered congregations affiliated with the movement in its early years. One of the main reasons the 1965 congress was held was for the express purpose of developing a system of selecting and ordaining local clergy. Before this conference, there were few ordained reform Baptist clergymen, and few who could ordain.70 Thus, from 1965 both central and local leaders played important roles in the functioning of the church. After the creation of the CCECB, the Reform Baptist functioned in a more systematized manner across the USSR. The organization of their ranks may have been a boon to the Reform Baptist movement in several respects. First of all, members were kept informed of events happening church-wide, and even engaged in activities that involved congregations from various locales such as regional youth worship services. Adherents from diverse places across the country engaged in protest operations, including a large, high profile demonstration that necessitated the cooperation of individuals and groups beyond the level of the local congregation. The carrying out of such activities must also have led to a high morale among the Reform Baptists while presenting a strong front to their adversary, the State.

67 Okhotin stated that this system developed due to the frequency of the arrest and imprisonment of pastors 68 Kryuchkov, 43-44 69 Ibid., 48-49 70 Ibid., 51

44 While this high level of organization certainly cultivated connectivity between Reform Baptist adherents across the Soviet Union, there can be little doubt that this high level of organization was a double-edged sword, drawing the attention and countermeasures of the authorities. Reform Baptist events were notoriously cursed with surveillance and dispersion at the hands of the State. Those found engaging in demonstrations, worship services, weddings, and even small personal gatherings were frequently subject to harassment, the levying of stiff fines, as well as arrest and imprisonment. It may be that these active Christians would have found more overall success by keeping a lower profile and, at the very least, appearing less organized to the Soviet organs. Another important component of the Reform Baptist organization influencing its successes was its leaders and their traits. Reform Baptist leaders were exceptionally dedicated individuals willing to make monumental sacrifices for their faith, as were leaders of the Pentecostalists and True Adventists. For example, Gennadi Kryuchkov lived out 19 years of his life in secret locations and away from his family. In this way he hoped to preserve the reform movement from dissolution by maintaining at least his own position at the helm. He managed to serve only one 3-year sentence in jail during almost a 25-year period while some of his colleagues would serve multiple sentences.71 Scores of others were no less dedicated in their service, though Kryuchkov, the "apostle in a bunker"72 was the only one who lived so long in hiding in order to avoid arrest. Most paid for their ministry through serving terms of imprisonment. From 1960 until 1963 roughly 200 reformers were arrested73, about 150 of which were in captivity by October 1963.74 In a statement marking the 20th Anniversary75 of the formation of the Action Group, Gennadi Kryuchkov wrote: "In twenty years there has not been a day when some member of the Council of Churches was not sitting in prison. In the past twenty years, about 2,000 Baptists believers have spent time in prison."76

Mikhail I. Khorev, was one of the first to actively join the cause upon receiving the epistle penned by the Initiative Group. He recalled:

71 Ibid,43-45 72 V. Siryachenko, "Provakatory v roli prorokiv," Robitnychna Hazeta, 23 September 1984; in RL 406/84, 4 73 Alexeyeva, 204 74 Bourdeaux, Ferment, 67 75 This statement was made in 1981 76 Russkaya mysl', 18 February 1982; in RL 162/82, 5

45 "That appeal hit a responsive chord in my heart . . . There was much of the Lord's labor [to be accomplished], and I could not indifferently remain apart from this large and blessed work that the Lord Himself performed among his people. At that time I already had my own family. Entrusting it to God's grace, in the beginning of 1962 I joined the labor, completely consecrating myself to the service of the Lord . . ."77

Aware of the extreme difficulties they must encounter, men and women such as Khorev were willing to sacrifice their lives to work for what they believed was God's will for their church. Indeed, the members of the CCECB paid a dear price for their involvement in this illegal organization. According to Alexeyeva, however, "their arrests did not weaken, but rather strengthened the movement,"78 at least initially. By the early 80's, the status of the CCECB was grim indeed. Though Gennadi Kryuchkov still led the church from hiding, eight CCECB members had been arrested and were in imprisonment, including Mikhail Khorev who was arrested in November 1979. 79 Three others were arrested in 1981,80 counting N. Khrapov who had already spent at least 34 years in Soviet labor camps.81 Before his in-camp death in November 1982, two of Khrapov’s children visited him at his labor camp and reported that his health had deteriorated to the extent that he did not even recognize them.82 In 1979 Vins was exchanged for a Soviet spy held in US custody and resettled in the United States83 where his influence in the church was all but suppressed.84 A further threat to the Church was the1983 adoption of a new law criminalizing the failure to obey authorities in Soviet corrective/labor institution,85 which gave Reform Baptists the greatest cause for fear during the difficult years of the State’s dissident countermovement. Not only had this particularly cruel method of persecution been banned since Stalin's death, but by April 1984 ten Baptists had already been re-sentenced in prison. After his third arrest in 1979, Khorev, by this time almost blind, was sentenced to five years in a strict-regime camp

77 Vestnik istiny, no. 1, 1984, p. 34; in Kryuchkov, 40-41 78 Alexeyeva, 204 79 Sawatsky, 436 80 RL 101/81, 2 81 Alexeyeva, 207 82 RL 472/82, 2 83 Basket Three, Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Hearings before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, ninety-sixth Congress, first session on implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Volume XI, 1979. 84 Sawatsky, 435 85 RL 73/85, 1

46 during which he was subject to beatings to severe that he spent part of his sentence hospitalized.86 On 22 November 1984 Mikhail Khorev was rearrested in camp and put in a punishment cell. On 28 January 1985, the day he was to have been released, he was sentenced to an additional term of two years in a strict regime camp.87 Thus, in spite of the emphasis on local leadership and the importance of the central leaders in initiating the movement and overseeing successful church functions and operations through the 60’s and 70’s, I propose that the high level of centralization of the Reform Baptist contributed to the movement's decline in the first half of the 80's. Members of the Council of Churches became prime targets for the state anti-religious apparatus, and during the campaign against dissidents that commenced in the late 70's, nearly every CCECB leader found himself either imprisoned, dead, or incapacitated in some other sense. When comparing the centralization of leadership of all three religious movements in this study, it becomes even more apparent that greater centralization of authority is associated with the churches' defeats. Notwithstanding the importance of leaders in both initiating the reform movement and running the church throughout the period under consideration, the Reform Baptist organization was not a fundamentally leader-driven church. The average Reform Baptist adherent could have a significant impact both within and outside the church if he so chose, and the number and caliber of individual Baptists who joined the reform movement despite the difficult circumstances they would experience stands as a testament to the remarkable success of the Reform Baptist Church. A considerable number of young people, considered the lifeblood of the church, became enthusiastic supporters of the movement early on,88 and many who were seasoned in the faith and had suffered in previous eras saw fit to abandon the AUCECB and campaign for religious freedom as well. As previously noted, the reform movement encapsulated around 250,000 participants at its peak in the 60's.89 Next is an examination of the characteristics of Reform Baptist adherents, and their impact on the movement's successes. Most Baptists in the Soviet Union were of a peasant heritage, and many were not Russian in their ethnicity, largely a factor of their Lutheran and Mennonite heritage mentioned previously. The denial of a higher education to Reform Baptists

86 Ibid., 1-2 87 Ibid., 1 88 Ibid, 41 89 Alexeyeva, 213-214

47 and other openly religious believers was endemic to Soviet society, 90 and because of this most Reform Baptists held jobs with meager wages, some so small that mere subsistence was challenging. In spite of their material difficulties, however, Reform Baptists exhibited a high degree of legal understanding and organizational skills as shown in both the religious and "political" activities they engaged in. They found a way to educate themselves in matters of civil and human rights, and to survive materially in a system designed to weed them out. The social life of the typical Reform Baptist centered around the church and its activities due to the hostilities they faced in mainstream society.91 Many reared large families because of their refusal to undergo abortion, the only real means of contraception in the Soviet Union. It was not unusual for a Reform Baptist family to live in absolute poverty with 10 or more children to provide for, and the breadwinner in imprisonment. Children were routinely subject to beatings in schools where their beliefs were derided. Reform Baptist parents were aware of one of the risks of teaching religion to their children – the denial of their parental rights. An unknown number of Reform Baptist families suffered this cruel punishment from the 60's through the 80's. In spite of the multitude of restrictions Reform Baptists were caused to endure in Soviet society, they still succeeded in attracting new converts. Yevgeni Pushkov converted to the faith in 1967 at age 26 after graduating from a music conservatory. Though raised by Christian parents, Yevgeni was skeptical of religion until a friend and fellow student committed suicide and he began to search the Bible for answers to life's questions. He became a pastor of a Reform Baptist congregation and especially enjoyed working with young people, using music in his ministry. Thus was his situation when he was arrested in May 1980 for refusing to register his congregation. His wife and seven children were left to fend for themselves after his arrest.92 Reform Baptist adherents were remarkably empowered to engage in activities, especially protest, of their own accord. Numerous were the letters and appeals to Soviet leaders as well as foreign governments and organizations written by individuals and small groups of Reform Baptists. It appears they were free to campaign for a cause even if it was not part of the agenda of the CCECB. Though this aspect of Reform Baptist activity carried out by individuals will be discussed later in the chapter, it too demonstrates the relatively high level of member autonomy.

90 Chr 36, 201 91 Sawatsky, 111 92 Philip Walters and Jane Balengarth, comp. Light Through the Curtain. Kent: Keston College. 1985, 50-54

48 It is likely that this member self-sufficiency was what kept the movement alive during the first half of the 80's when so many leaders were incapacitated.

Religious Activities, and Tactics to Continue Them Reform Baptists engaged in a wide variety of activities designed to strengthen and build the church. Such activities consisted of worship services – including Bible study, inter- congregational activities for youth and children, religious weddings and funerals, as well as baptismal services – proselytizing, and the duplication of religious literature. The dissident Baptists did not cease these activities simply because they were forbidden by Soviet legislation and policy. They, as well as Pentecostalists and True Adventists, demonstrated resourcefulness and determination in their efforts to persist in carrying out activities deemed essential to the expression of their faith. The following section examines these religious activities, the Reform Baptists' tactics to engage in them, and how this affected the movement's successes and defeats to 1985. Reform Baptists engaged in a wide variety of worship and fellowship activities held in various locations, and with a particular style of their own. The sermon was the central component of a worship service,93 and the singing of hymns was almost equally as important.94 Reform Baptists would meet at least twice on Sundays, and up to three times during the week. At least one meeting per week would be devoted to Bible Study. Members involved in the choir would meet once a week for choir practice.95 Events such as babies’ births, weddings, and funerals were usually viewed as an opportunity for sermonizing, singing, as well as fellowship with other Baptists.96 Worship services were characterized by an emotional fervor.97 For regular worship services, Reform Baptists typically would meet in private homes during the winter, and often somewhere in the outdoors during the summer. Large gatherings could only be held in the warm summer months, and would take place in the woods, the mountains, or a field.98 Sometimes Baptists would gather by the thousands in remote locations for special holidays and

93 Sawatsky, 107 94 Ibid., 110 95 Ibid., 109 96 Ibid., 110 97 Bourdeaux, 10 Churches, 121 98 Bourdeaux, Faith, 14-15

49 celebrations. For example, May Day celebrations in the Ukraine were large-scale events that would encompass up to 2,000 participants and take place in the "cathedral of the forest."99 Reform Baptist worship was held in such locations as to allow them the most freedom to escape surveillance of the authorities, however, services for baptisms and holidays would sometimes be held in public places almost in the face of the authorities. Over 1,800 people arrived at the Reform Baptist May Day celebration of 1973 before the authorities dispersed the event.100 On 14 August 1977 Reform Baptists in the Ukraine held a large public baptism on a lake. As if to taunt the authorities, a brass band played hymns from a location that would be hard for policemen to reach – a homemade raft floating in the middle of the lake. 105 individuals were baptized that day in spite of the risks such a bold event entailed.101 Baptist counter-tactics to state persecution for worshipping showed ingenuity and dedication to their ideals. As in 1961 the authorities began to enforce the 1929 law forbidding children and teenagers to attend worship services, Baptists simply taught their children religion at home.102 A “carefully planned system of birthday parties” 103 became the substitute for the children’s Sunday Schools, and choir practices doubled as prayer meetings for teenagers. The policy forbidding pastors from preaching to any but their own congregation was also sidestepped as pastors visiting other Baptist communities would be asked to share a greeting, and “as he continue[d] with his greeting he also add[ed] greetings from Paul or Peter or Jesus.”104 Weddings and funerals also became popular venues for the delivery of sermons. In addition to serving as a means for the strengthening members, sermons given at weddings and funerals served to expose non-believers in attendance to the Gospel.105 Other methods of circumventing restrictive Soviet policies were to disregard them altogether. Pastors, usually of unregistered Baptist communities, would sometimes conveniently forget to submit the names of those who were to be baptized.106 Children and young people regularly attended worship services, and

99 Bourdeaux, 10 Churches, 119-120 100 Ibid., 122 101 Ibid., 123 102 Sawatsky, 68 103 Ibid., 70 104 Ibid., 69-70 105 Ibid., 70-71 106 Ibid., 72

50 baptisms held in secret were not uncommon.107 Finally, Baptists were urged to exhibit exemplary conduct at work in order to counter the negative images in the press.108 Overall, Reform Baptist worship activities were successful in that they led to the strengthening and expansion of the ranks, and exemplified the organization's strength in the face of state persecution. However, the forcible dispersion of such services was a common occurrence in the Soviet Union, especially from the late 70's and onward, and those who persisted in organizing and participating in such activities were punished, sometimes very severely. In Odessa, Ukraine, KGB agents, policemen, and another local authority from the Council of Religious Affairs warned local Baptists to limit their worship meetings to no longer than two hours. During services held on 2 May 1979, these authorities “constantly shouted through a megaphone how much time was left,” 109 and dispersed the services at their conclusion with a fire truck and pressured water hose standing by to assist them. Several Baptists were arrested at this time.110 Young Baptists from the Omsk, Kokchetav and Tselinograd regions had planned a joint service to take place Sunday, 4 June 1978 in a forest in the Isilkul district. Their hopes for peaceful Sunday worship with their cohorts were dashed as local Soviet authorities interceded: “The day before, the traffic police had already blocked all approaches to the place where the service was to be held and were stopping and turning back cars, checking the documents of all drivers, taking their numbers and fining them. Those who managed to reach the place held a service for about two hours in relative peace, but then the clearing in the forest was surrounded and tractors were brought up, which began to tear up the ground, trying to run people over and drowning the prayers with their powerful engines. In the end police and vigilantes began to provoke a fight. Despite the fact that the believers did not physically resist, they filled the Black Marias [cars used by the KGB to transport prisoners] with those arrested and drove them to a police station, where they were detained until the evening. The rest were dispersed with insults and violence: rough wrestling methods were used – they were dragged along by the hair, beaten with sticks, threatened with fire-arms [sic]. The food, dishes and other things which had been prepared for supper were confiscated and taken away. The tractors broke down shrubs and saplings while chasing through the wood after the Baptists. Many of the vigilantes were drunk."111

107 Ibid., 73 108 Ibid, 68 109 Chr 53, 139 110 Ibid. 111 Chr 51, 142

51 Moreover, a couple days later the Gamm family was notified by the authorities that they were responsible for paying for the damages incurred – 1,800 rubles for the damaging of pastureland belonging to the government. Unwilling to concede to such measures, 572 Baptists signed a petition addressed to Soviet officials and demanded the return of items confiscated during the raid, and the refunding of fines they were compelled to pay to drivers of the cars transporting them from the site of the event against their will. They also requested that charges be dropped against the Gamms.112 In addition to their multitude of worship activities, Reform Baptists engaged in successful proselytizing activities in both remote and urban regions of the USSR. Baptist congregations sprouted and prospered especially in such places as Kolyma, Kamchatka, Chukotka, and Sakhalin in the Far East as well as Siberia, areas abandoned by the besieged Orthodox Church113 and populated by persons in exile, including Reform Baptist leaders and activists. Massive numbers of Baptist converts were won by newly released Baptist prisoners in areas in such locations especially during the religious revival following Stalin's death.114 Baptist proselytizing was also hugely effective in urban areas including Rostov and Odessa, where so many converts got baptized so that they “fill[ed] up Baptist communities faster than they [were] emptied by arrests.”115 Leading dissident Orthodox priest Father Gleb Yakunin praised Reform Baptist successes, and attributed at least some of it to their interdependence with legal registered congregations to which converts could cross over if overwhelmed by the persecution entailed in worshiping with Reform Baptist communities.116 Reform Baptist missionary successes can further be attributed to the attractiveness of their ideology to those who had become disenchanted with Marxist-Leninist Communism, a common phenomenon beginning in the 60's.117 As previously indicated, Reform Baptists were copious producers of samizdat literature. With the movement's inception in 1961, dissident Baptists began publishing literature of different types that were essential to the development and continuation of the reform movement, and were directed to those within the church. At the start, they circulated appeals concerning their grievances with the AUCECB leadership. This grew into the Fraternal Pamphlet, which

112 Ibid., 143 113 Alexeyeva, 206 114 Kolarz, 320 115 Alexeyeva, 206 116 Ibid. 117 Kowalewski, Renaissance, 281-82

52 was released on a monthly basis from1965.118 The Herald of Salvation (later the Herald of Truth) came out in print in 1963 as a means to broadcast a spiritual message to still more members of the church. In 1971 the Council of Relatives of Baptist Prisoners began publishing its Bulletin first every two months, then on a monthly basis.119 The Bulletin served to inform the Soviet Baptist populace of the fate of arrested and imprisoned Baptist believers, provide detailed information on specific incidents of acts of repression committed against Reform Baptist adherents, and connect and unify the church through the education of its ranks.120 Later, the Bulletin would also inform Soviet Human Rights activists and interested citizens of the world on the plight of Soviet dissident Baptists.121 Another significant development occurred in the Reform Baptist organization in 1971 that further transformed the movement. That year the CCECB wrote an open letter addressed to N. Kosygin in which they announced that they had acquired a printing press for the purpose of printing Bibles and other religious literature.122 This initial press was located in a small town in Latvia,123 and subsequent printing presses of the Khristianin (The Christian) publishing house would supply the church members and congregations with at least a bare minimum of literature through 1985. Both the printing and distribution activities of the Reform Baptist press and the activities of the Council of Prisoners’ Relatives played vital roles in the successes of the Reform group124 in that they united the congregations scattered across the vast country and provided materials essential for church growth and maintenance. The Khristianin press had more printing presses125 and printed more religious literature than that of any of the dissident churches.126 Soviet authorities discovered a number of printing presses in locations from Latvia to Kazakhstan.127

118 Alexeyeva, 210 119 Ibid., 210-11 120 Barbara Wolfe Jancar. Religious Dissent in the Soviet Union. in Tokes, Rudolf L, ed. Dissent in the USSR: Politics, Ideology, and People. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1975, 211 121 The Bulletin of the Council of ECB Prisoners' Relatives became the basis for articles on Reform Baptists included in the Chronicle of Current Events 122 RL 55/77, 3 123 Ibid. 124 Bourdeaux, Religious Minorities, 15 125 There can be little doubt that the Khristianin had more printing presses than the True Witness press established by the True and Free Adventists, who had a few thousand adherents. Further, the authorities enacted far more raids on the Khristianin press than on that of the True Witness. 126 Jancar, 201 127 RL 360/85

53 The press printed Bibles, and the two Baptist journals the Herald of Truth and the Fraternal Leaflet. In spite of the remarkable efforts at printing religious literature, however, the large amount of literature published was not enough – the congregations still experienced a severe shortage. Further, Baptist printing activities played a causal role in the state’s campaign to put down the movement. Thus, as with several of the factors already discussed in this chapter, the existence of an underground Baptist printing press contributed both to successes and defeats for the overall movement. When evaluating the tactic of establishing a printing press across the three churches in this study, it becomes obvious that the mere existence of an underground printing network is associated with an escalation in the church's persecution, and therefore some major defeats. The printers, binders, and distributors who worked for the Khristianin press not only contributed to the development of the Reform movement, then, but also fed the massive state campaign to disable the church in the 70's and 80's. In 1974 seven Baptists were arrested in Latvia in conjunction with their work for the Khristianin press, the press dismantled and confiscated by the authorities.128 Between March 1977 and November 1984 Soviet authorities staged 10 successful raids on the Khristianin press and bindery operations. State authorities discovered and arrested three individuals involved in printing at Ivangorod, Leningrad Region in March 1977 and confiscated three tons of paper and as all printing equipment during the raid.129 In November 1977 Baptists I. I. Leven, D. I. Koop, and sisters Larisa and Lyudmila Zaitseva were arrested and sentenced to between 3 ½ and 5 years for their involvement with the press.130 11 Baptists were arrested in Glivenki, Krasnodar region in June 1980, including four people who were supplying the print workers with food and printing materials.131 Thus, the Khristianin press came only with a steep price tag. In examining Reform Baptist worship, proselytizing, and printing activities, and comparing them to that of the other churches, it becomes clear that the Reform Baptist movement was the least secretive in its religious operations, or the least successful at secretiveness. Worship services including weddings and funeral were raided and dispersed with

128 Chr 34, 53 129 RL 80/80, 2 130 Chr 48, 123 131 RL 360/85, 3-4

54 clockwork regularity. The organization of large-scale services sometimes even in full view of the authorities indicates that the Reform Baptists were more than willing to risk the raids of authorities in order to carry out their religious services. The dissident Baptists even officially announced the establishment of their publishing house to the authorities. Had they refrained from organizing events designed for the attendance of thousands, taken more extreme precautions to worship in secret, and kept their printing activities from the knowledge of the authorities, it is quite possible that they may have avoided at least some of the raids routinely carried out against them. There relative openness did not at all improve their chances for survival in the atheistic state, but simply aided their adversaries in their duties to search and destroy the renegade church.

Protest Undoubtedly the most sensational aspect of Cold War Soviet Reform Baptist activity from the perspective of those in the West was their massive campaign to protest their treatment in the USSR and petition Western nations for aid, defying their regime in the process. In America, for example, Baptists have generally been perceived as bulwarks of conservatism. Thus, stories of Soviet Baptists engaging in demonstrations and other acts of protest that found their way to the West inspired a relatively voluminous collection of literature on the matter. Though most of this literature was written in the late 60's or early 70's before widespread Reform Baptist involvement with Soviet human rights activists began, these works are still valuable to the present study. As the amount of literature suggests, the Reform Baptist struggle for religious freedom through protest was indeed remarkable. Early Reform Baptist protest activity demonstrates their willingness to speak out even when few others were similarly inclined. Their involvement with human rights workers from the mid-70's and on, though not initiated by the church's central leaders, illustrates their ability to adapt to the changing political opportunity structure. It also shows their determination to achieve their objective of gaining the freedom to worship and live according to their consciences without state interference. As previously mentioned in this chapter, Reform Baptists engaged in more protest than any religious organization in the Soviet Union, and had a broad base of leader and member support to circulate written protest in various forms and addressed to a wide range of personages. They also organized their ranks to stage

55 some impressive demonstrations in protest of their treatment. As an organization built on the protest of those early leaders, the Initsiativniki, the proliferation of protest beyond the years of the movement’s emergence is not surprising. The attitude of Reform Baptist leaders toward protest was indisputable – it was their duty to take a stand against the anti-religious policies and practices of the state – and it is apparent from a number of factors that the CCECB supported protest, at least when it was carried out by the Council of ECB Prisoners’ Relatives. This organization was created on 23 February 1964 by a handful of women to gather information on Baptist prisoners, their trials, sentences, and conditions of imprisonment and to broadcast these facts to the church at large. It also assumed the role of an advocacy group for prisoners and their families as it petitioned Soviet leaders for an amelioration in the prisoners' treatment, and requested help from fellow believers for some of the families of prisoners who had been rendered destitute by their husbands' and fathers' imprisonment.132 The formation of the Council of Prisoners' Relatives is generally seen by historians to have formed in response to a watershed event in 1964 – the arrest, trial and subsequent death of Reform Baptist Nikolai Khmara.133 Nikolai Khmara and his wife Maria of Kalunda in the Siberian Altai Region had converted to the Baptist faith the previous year and had associated themselves with the reformers. Khmara, his brother, and two other associates in the faith were arrested, tried, and sentenced to terms in labor camps, accused of "bringing up minors in isolation from social life," "calling on believers to reject their responsibilities as citizens," and "inciting citizens to disobey the auxiliary police, to refuse to join trade unions."134 In addition, they were condemned for "[holding] illegal prayer-meetings at night, in insanitary [sic] conditions and with minors present", and for the "reactionary" nature of their activities since 1961 after they broke with the AUCECB.135 Significantly, the indictment for these individuals stated that they were guilty of actions carried out in opposition to the "officially valid Statutes of the AUCECB."136 In other words, the local court became an open arbiter between the AUCECB and the unregistered Kulunda Baptist congregation in affairs of a religious nature,137 further indicating to the

132 Fletcher, Dissent, p. 309 & Jancar, 211 133 Jancar, 211 134 Ibid, 78 135 Ibid 136 Ibid, 87 137 Ibid, 83

56 reformers that the separation of church and state as called for in the Soviet Constitution was not followed. An even more outrageous happening was short in coming. After only two weeks of imprisonment, Nikolai Khmara's wife Maria received word of her husband's death. When his body was recovered shortly thereafter, signs of gross physical abuse revealed the nature of his death: "On his hands was the evidence of handcuffs; the palms of his hands were burned, as were his toes and the soles of his feet. The lower part of his abdomen showed marks of deep wounds made by the insertion of a sharp jagged object; his right leg was swollen; the ankles of both legs seemed to have been beaten; on his body were black and blue bruises."138

In addition, his family and friends were horrified to discover that his tongue had been cut out.139 Understandably, the Reform Baptist community in Kalunda was shocked by both the brutal death to which Khmara had been subject as well as the renewed insight of AUCECB cooperation with the State in return for protection by the law. The Council of ECB Prisoners’ Relatives consisted entirely of women throughout its existence – the mothers, wives, and daughters of prisoners – and functioned until the fall of the Soviet Union.140 Lidia Vins, mother of Georgi Vins, was the first president of the organization, and headed it for 13 consecutive years not including a 1970-73 sentence in a labor camp due to her active leadership on the Council.141 Largely thanks to the efforts of women such as L. Vins, the plight of Baptist prisoners of conscience was eventually broadcast not only to Baptists throughout the USSR, but also to Soviet human rights activists, human rights groups throughout the world, Worldwide Christian organizations, and governments.142 It appears that official Church resources were used to print the Council’s Bulletin,143 which would provide further evidence of CCECB approval of the organization’s activities. The net effects of the activities of this body on the Reform Baptist cause, the fate of Soviet Baptists in general, religion and state policy toward religion as a whole in the USSR, as well as on Soviet dissent has yet to be explored sufficiently.

138 RCDA, Vol. III, 16, pp. 122-5; in Ferment, 79-80 139 Christian Appeals from Russia, 80; in Bourdeaux, Faith, 96 140 phone conversation with Yuri Kryuchkov, 16 April 2004 141 Alexeyeva, 210 142 Bourdeaux, Ferment, 83-85 143 RL 360/85, 3-4

57 Individual Baptists participated in protest activities not only through involvement with the Council of Prisoners' Relatives, but as a result of their participation in a Pentecostal- dominated campaign to emigrate from the USSR, or of their own initiative. Individuals executed demonstrations independent of central Church officials, and produced a volumes of samizdat protests and appeals. It is likely that there were few Reform Baptist adherents who did not regard protest as a viable means to combat the repressions of the authorities. Indeed, those Baptists disinclined to at least support protest would be more likely to affiliate with the AUCECB rather than the Reform Baptist movement. Reform Baptists undeniably considered the pen to be a potentially effective weapon in the struggle for their rights; they were engaged in a massive samizdat protest effort from the time of Khrushchev’s anti-religious campaign and their own inception in 1961, and produced more samizdat documents of protest than any other religious organization in the USSR. They were the first to use illegally published materials for the purpose of religious protest,144 and in a study carried out by Barbara Wolfe Jancar, Reform Baptists were found to have produced 48% of all religious samizdat to 1973.145 Jancar also found that of Baptist samizdat to 1973 consisted of the following: 21.8% – accounts of persecution; 18.9% – petitions; and 10% of the samizdat was designated to be sent abroad,146 though it is certain that much more of it found its way into Western hands. Further, Jancar found that just under 70% of Baptist samizdat literature was produced by three or more individuals. Nearly a third of Baptist samizdat to 1973, then, was both produced and distributed by individuals.147 Further, Jancar observed that Baptists produced the following 10 types of samizdat to 1973: monographs including poetry; trial records; accounts of arrests, trials and sentences; accounts of persecution; documents describing prison conditions; prisoner lists; documents dealing with civil rights including religious freedom; church publications; documents dealing with internal church affairs; and documents detailing the treatment of children.148 If a study were to be conducted on all Baptist samizdat produced through the mid-80's, it is certain that even more categories would be discovered. Also, it is interesting to note that the Khristianin press

144 Fletcher, Charismatics, 137 145 Jancar's base of data is the Samizdat Archive 146 Jancar, 201 147 Ibid. 148 Ibid., 198

58 was not founded until 1971, and that much of the samizdat Jancar considered must have pre- dated the establishment of the printing house. Reform Baptist samizdat documents of protest that were products of individual efforts to voice their grievances include the following sampling of cases. One particularly zealous believer, Konstantin Vladuanu of Moldavia, was responsible for writing three open statements concerning his petition to emigrate for religious reasons. In 1976-77, he addressed Leonid Brezhnev, Roman Rudenko,149 Kurt Waldheim,150 the Committee in Defense of Human Rights in the USSR, and Christians worldwide concerning his desire to emigrate from the USSR and his rationale for so doing.151 Anna Vibe of Pavlodar addressed a declaration to the Head of Soviet Internal Affairs complaining that on 13 March 1978 her 13-year-old daughter Lena was coerced into a car by a policeman and interrogated by five policemen for three hours. The officers of law were questioning the young girl on “who did what in the congregation”152 among other things. Groups of Reform Baptists as well as the CCECB did not withhold their grievances from their own government. In a letter dated 14 April 1965 the Reform Baptist leadership pleaded with Leonid Brezhnev and other officials working to draft a new constitution for the USSR to include in it an article guaranteeing the freedom of conscience, and asked that the article be upheld in practice as well. 153 Eleven appeals addressed to Soviet leaders and written by Reform Baptists are mentioned in the Chronicle of Current Events between 1976 and mid-1977 alone, significantly most often addressed to Aleksei Kosygin and Nikolai Podgorny – the Soviet officials who signed the Helsinki Accords. Five of the letters were written by large groups of Baptist. For example, 536 Baptists from the Kharkov Region sent a declaration to the Soviet procurator-general on 9 February 1976 concerning the imprisonment of veteran Reform Baptist Boris Zdorovets.154 As an active church leader in the Ukraine and one of the original leaders of the Initiative Group, Zdorovets enjoyed little over one year of freedom from his early thirties to his mid-fifties.155 Several items of petition and protest were also penned by the Council for ECB Prisoners' Relatives, who were not shy in broadcasting their complaints and opinions to any audience

149 Procurator General of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR 150 General Secretary of the United Nations 151 Chr. 46, 53-54 152 Chr 51, 144 153 Bourdeaux, Ferment, 105-113 154 Chr 39, 202 155 Bourdeaux, 10 Churches, 126-128

59 willing to listen. For example, on 29 May 1976 the Council sent a letter to Kosygin and Podgorny in which they boldly stated that state persecution against them would not deter them in their activities, but in the event of their arrests, others would rise up and take their places on the Council.156 No shortage of Baptist samizdat fell into the hands of the West during commencement of the anti-dissident campaign, as much of it was directed overseas for the purpose of petitioning the outside world for assistance. Even the CCECB composed appeals intended for a Western audience during this turbulent time. In a letter dated 19 March 1978, the Council wrote an open letter to heads of governments, the UN, and Christians all over the world stating that the persecution of Soviet believers had increased since the adoption of the new Constitution in the USSR. The letter cited several concrete examples of repressions, and made several demands including the following: the abolition of legislation directed against religious believers; the immediate release of all Christian prisoners; the cessation of state interference in church affairs; the guaranteeing of freedom to CCECB head G. Kryuchkov; the prosecution of the Council of Religious Affairs for its gross failure to secure buildings for the use of religious congregations; the abolition of confiscating church buildings and the return of all fines charged to believers for attending worship services; an end to bugging believers’ homes; and the allowing emigration for religious reasons to those so desirous.157 The best-publicized Soviet Reform Baptist samizdat cause to gain an audience abroad was the mid-late 70's campaign to free Georgi Vins from his a term of imprisonment. In March of 1974 Georgi Vins was arrested for the second time and sentenced to 5 years in a labor camp plus 5 years of exile.158 As Vins' health had significantly deteriorated after his first period of captivity,159 Baptists initiated a letter-writing campaign addressed to Soviet government authorities and international organizations to call for his release. Prominent dissident Andrei Sakharov participated in this protest as well.160 Rank-and-file adherents, the majority of which were likely from his native Ukraine, appear to have initiated this campaign. Incidentally, an account of Vins' trial was included in No. 34 and 35 of the Chronicle of Current Events, further evidence of the human rights activities of the Kiev Baptists.

156 Chr 41, 132 157 Chr 49, 69 158 RL 55/77, 2 159 RL 108/77 160 RL 55/77, 2

60 Westerners responded to the Reform Baptist call en masse as scores of organizations including the U.S. Senate as well as thousands of citizens of Western nations became involved in the campaign to free Vins. In effect, Vins became the poster-child of Soviet dissident religion to the Western world. In May 1976, Christian Prisoners Release International drew up a petition signed by 600,000 persons in an effort to demand that the Soviet government release Vins.161 The U.S. Senate wrote several pleas that specifically appealed to the Helsinki Agreements with the purpose of pressuring the Soviet government to abide by its human rights clauses and demonstrate an adherence to the agreements by releasing Vins.162 Due to the high visibility of Vins' case that came as a result of highly active campaigning, in 1979 the Soviet Union exchanged Mr. Vins for Soviet spies held in U.S. custody.163 This certainly constituted a major victory for the Vins family, for those concerned with his health and well being, and for Westerners interested in religious freedom in the USSR. However, this token concession was the exception, and certainly not the rule. Further, Vins' release to the U.S. could do little to bolster the movement in the USSR. Though he became the spokesperson for Reform Baptists in the United States, Western resolve to address the Soviet state's disregard for human rights was waning. The burgeoning of Reform Baptist samizdat that occurred in the 70's illustrates that these religious dissenters invested much in this form of protest, and hoped it would bring change to their situation in the Soviet Union. Regrettably, Reform Baptist samizdat did change their situation, but not in the way they had hoped. Instead of reaping the rewards of their risks, labor, and resources poured into the multitude of appeals, Reform Baptists experienced still more of the state's repressive force during the State’s countermovement against dissent rather than an abating of the persecution, while enjoying no more success than the release of one prominent prisoner. This failure should not be blamed on the Reform Baptists lack of determination and skill, however, but on the West's muted response to the calls for help. Had Western governments and agencies been more proactive in defending the dissident Christians' cause, it seems intuitive that the USSR would have meted out more concessions. Reform Baptists protested their treatment not only in the form of appeals and letters, but also through demonstrations, the most spectacular of which were staged early on in the

161 RL 55/77, 2 162 RL 108/77 163 Alexeyeva, 212

61 movement. Just one year from the time of the creation of the CCECB in 1966, the dissident Baptists experienced an explosive year. CCECB sympathizers were reported to have organized mass baptisms in public parks, and to have staged a "sing-in" on a subway car in Kiev164 in acts to draw attention to their cause. Unarguably, however, an event occurring in May of that year involving Baptists from all parts of the Soviet Union became the largest and best planned act of religious protest ever orchestrated in that land. On 16 May, 500 dissident Baptists elected as delegates by their coreligionists and who had traveled from over 130 locales gathered at Moscow's Old Square in a demonstration. They requested a dialogue with Brezhnev, and to show both fellow Soviet citizens and a worldwide audience that religion in the Soviet Union was not only still in existence, but flourishing. On day two of the demonstration protesters sang hymns while policemen beat participants with "truncheons, bottles, and any other handy weapons"165 and violently dragged them onto buses to be transported to police stations for interrogation.166 In order to discover what had become of the protesters, Georgi Vins and another CCECB central leader went to office of the Communist Party Central Committee on 19 May. After a two short conversations with officials, they were detained outside the building by a group of men,167 presumably KGB agents. Both Baptist leaders were arrested, this being Vins' first arrest.168 Once again, Reform Baptists were not content to stand by as their requests were disregarded, and on 22 May another group of protesters stationed themselves at the Old Square demanding to talk with Brezhnev. With foreign reporters and the Moscow populace aware of the standoff between the dissenting Baptists and the State, this time the police used much less force to break up the demonstration. However, Vins' congregation in Kiev bore the brunt of the authorities' disapproval – that very day, worship services of the 400-strong Kiev congregation formerly led by Vins were forcibly dispersed by "hundreds of police, State Security men and civilian auxiliaries,"169 resulting in the arrest of about 30 church members. The following day about 70 Kiev Baptists complained in person to their local authorities about the previous day's incident, and they were all summarily arrested. Though many were released within a couple

164 Bourdeaux, Faith, 10 165 Ibid., 11 166 Ibid., 9-14 167 Trial of Georgi Vins; in Bourdeaux, Faith, 13-14 168 Bourdeaux, Faith, 14 169 Ibid., 15

62 days after they paid stiff fines, some underwent torture during their interrogations, or were kept in police custody to later be charged with violating the law in some respect.170 Demonstrations of a smaller scale were also not uncommon among the Reform Baptists. In a study carried out by Kowalevski in 1980, he examined 99 cases of religious protest between 1965-1978,171 172 and found that the unregistered Baptists were the single largest group engaging in these demonstrations. Reform Baptists carried out 40.4% of the total number of demonstrations.173 Though Kowalevski does not specify what percentage of Reform Baptist demonstrations were carried out by large groups, he found that 36.3 % of the 99 demonstrations considered were conducted by less than 50 religious believers. Almost two-thirds (63.7%) of these demonstrations, on the other hand, were carried out by 50 or more individuals, and almost one-fourth were held by at least 500 protestors (26.3%).174 Indeed, the sources utilized in this study show that most demonstrations, including those carried out by the Reform Baptists, were large-scale affairs. One may conclude, then, that a large degree of organization went in to most of these demonstrations, though their affects on the church's overall success are questionable. While the attitude of Reform Baptist leaders toward protest was unquestionably positive, the CCECB position toward involvement with the Soviet human rights movement in Baptist protest efforts, however, is markedly ambivalent. Georgi Vins was positively inclined to interact with dissidents as demonstrated by both his presence and remarks at the Madrid Conference,175 even as Gennadi Kryuchkov and others preferred to avoid association with any organization of a political nature.176 Church leaders felt the necessity of protesting their ill treatment, yet most appear to have hesitated to associate with a "worldly"177 group. In spite of their central leadership's hesitation to forge alliances with human rights workers, some Reform Baptists clearly supported collaboration with human rights activists as evidenced by their participation with them in written protest. Indeed, certain individuals acted as links between their church and the human rights movement, and facilitated the inclusion of

170 Ibid., 15-16 171 20% of the total number of demonstrations that took place during that time 172 David Kowalevski. "Religious Belief in the Brezhnev Era: Renaissance, Resistance and Realpolitik." Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion. 1980, 19(3): 280-292, 283 173 Kowalevski, Renaissance, 284 174 David Kowalevski. "Protest for Religious Rights in the USSR: Characteristics and Consequences." Russian Review. 1980, 39(4): 426-441, 436-47 175 Basket Three, second session on implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Volume XIV, 1980. 176 interview with Yuri Kryuchkov, 16 April 2004 177 Ibid.

63 information on the church in the Chronicle of Current Events.178 The Kiev Reform Baptists seem to have been the most active group as the earliest reports on Reform Baptists in the Chronicle originated from them.179 Pyotr Vins, son of Georgi Vins and grandson of Lidia Vins actually joined the Ukrainian Helsinki Watch Group in February1977, though his activity with the group was curtailed upon his arrest just a year later.180 It is not known to what extent the average Reform Baptist supported collaboration with human rights activists. It is likely, however, that most neither personally engaged in official human rights activities nor censured those who did.181 Regardless if there was widespread support among Reform Baptists for involvement with dissidents, they were definitively the first to utilize ties with Soviet human rights workers in order to voice grievances and disseminate information. Though it is unclear exactly how this initial contact came about, it seems reasonable to assume that the Baptists of Kiev were responsible. In 1969 the first item on Reform Baptists was published in No. 5 of the Chronicle of Current Events. It was a letter dated Feb 28, 1968 in defense of Georgi Vins, and was written by fellow believers of the church at Kiev and signed by nearly half of the Kiev Baptist congregation.182 Pieces on the dissenting Baptists didn’t appear regularly in the Chronicle until 1974 after which nearly every issue contained some information concerning them. Much of Reform Baptist protest was processed through the channels of the Moscow and Ukrainian Helsinki Watch Groups, and it is almost certain that it was primarily carried out by individuals and groups within the church as opposed to the church leadership. Immediately following the creation of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group, the dissident group published a piece "On the Persecution of Religious Families," featuring the stories of some Baptist families denied their parental rights.183 After the organization of the Helsinki Watch Group and others that branched off from it, these organizations came to the Reform Baptists’ defense on a number of occasions. In 1978 The Moscow Helsinki Group and Andrei Sakharov jointly spoke out against the state’s treatment of a Baptist family who had borne particularly intense

178 Statement of Peter Reddaway, Basket Three, ninety-fifth congress, first session on implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Volume II, 1977, 6 179 These early items consisted of petitions protesting the arrest of their leader, Georgi Vins 180 Chr 44, 9-10 181 I have found no evidence of strife within the church over the issue of involvement with non-religious dissidents 182 Reddaway, 330 183 Alexeyeva, 213

64 persecution.184 In 1979 the Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers’ Rights in the USSR appealed to the head of the Council of Religious Affairs, Vladimir Kuroyedov, complaining about the unjust imprisonment of Baptist A. V. Nikitov, presbyter of the congregation at Ryazan.185 On behalf of Reform Baptists, the Ukrainian Helsinki Group sent an appeal to Helsinki signatory states, international groups, and Christians around the world. The appeal listed persecutions borne by these Baptists between November 1978 and January 1979, including arrests, trials, house searches, and confiscations of religious literature, and condemned these repressive measures saying that they were in opposition to the Helsinki Accords.186 In spite of the Reform Baptists' high-profile campaign to garner support from every possible source beginning in the mid-70's, these efforts died down by the early 80's and resulted in little success for the church. Rather, these actions served to feed the Soviet authorities' drive to demolish the CCECB. Therefore, the apprehension among at least the Reform Baptist central leadership to fully associate themselves with the dissident movement at large may have been wise. Closer ties with the dissident movement may have made their situation in the first half of the 80's even worse.

Conclusions From Stalin's death to 1985 the Reform Baptists suffered more than the other religious organizations in this study and indeed more than any other religious movement in the USSR in terms of arrest, imprisonment, and persecution of its members. Though complete statistics are not available, in June 1977 Georgi Vins testified that "from 1945-73, 20,000 Evangelical Christians and Baptists were arrested and sentenced to lengthy terms of imprisonment."187 Amnesty International Reports on the Soviet Union from the mid-70’s to the mid-80’s consistently attest to the large number of Reform Baptists undergoing arrest and persecution.188 After his release and exile to the U.S. in 1980, Georgi Vins estimated CCECB church membership at 100,000, with roughly 1,500 congregations throughout the Soviet Union,189 a decline of over 50% from the movement's numerical climax in the 60's. The existence of and

184 Chr 48, 127 185 Chr 53, 138 186 RL 162/82, 2 187 Georgi Vins' testimony; in RL 101/81, 2-3 188 Amnesty International Reports 189 RL 72/80, 1

65 proposed crossover to the AUCECB, the legally sanctioned Baptist body, during the state's countermovement against dissidents, contributed to Reform Baptist defeats. The centralization of leadership embodied in the CCECB made the movement susceptible to decapitation, as the removal of central leaders through arrest and imprisonment weakened morale and hampered the development of the church in the 80's. Further, Reform Baptists operated with relatively minimal attention to secrecy that exposed them to the harsh measures implemented by the state, including the forcible dispersion of worship services, and thus contributed to defeat. In spite of its successes, the establishment of the 'Khristianin' publishing house gave the authorities further impetus to pummel the movement, utilized much of the church's resources, and led to the arrest and imprisonment of many adherents and leaders during the 70's and 80's. The proliferation of Reform Baptist samizdat documents of protest, both official and unofficial, further contributed to Soviet authorities' drive to shut down the movement while leading to minimal Western aid and Soviet concessions. Finally, Reform Baptist involvement with Soviet dissidents sealed their status as a dissident religion, did not lead to an improvement in their situation, but rather gave further cause for the state to include them in their campaign to eliminate dissidence.

66

CHAPTER THREE

CHRISTIANS OF THE EVANGELICAL FAITH – UNREGISTERED

PENTECOSTALISTS

A few decades after the establishment of the Baptist movement in Tsarist Russia, Pentecostalism, its Evangelical cousin, came to the Ukraine in the liberal years of the early twentieth century and built upon Baptist growth. The Pentecostal organization "Christians of the Evangelical Faith," adherents of which were informally known as Voronaevtsy,1 was officially founded in 1926.2 They experienced just a few years of organized activity before Stalin's repressive policies were introduced, Pentecostal worship became illegal, and the purges would claim the lives of countless church leaders. With the creation of the AUCECB in 1944 and an invitation extended to Pentecostalists to join this state-legitimized worship body, it appeared that the tide had turned for Pentecostal believers in the USSR. Soon, however, many who had joined the AUCECB withdrew their registration, and the Soviet Union witnessed a revival of unregistered Pentecostalists, albeit a clandestine revival carried out discretely so as to not attract attention.3 During the course of the three plus decades following Stalin's death, the "Christians of the Evangelical Faith" was the largest unregistered body of Pentecostalists in the USSR4 and endured most of the same types of persecutions the Reform Baptists experienced during those years – arrests, imprisonments, and other persecutions – though Pentecostalists were persecuted less severely. Soviet Pentecostalists chose two broad avenues of reaction in response to these repressions: some sought emigration to nations where they would be granted the freedom of

1 Fletcher, Charismatics, 41 2 Kolarz, 332 3 Fletcher, Charismatics, 53 4 In 1977 there were between 200,000 and 250,000 unregistered Pentecostalists in the Soviet Union; RL 46/77, 1

67 religion, while others simply continued their worship activities, engaging in little to no protest at all. Beginning in the early 60's and gaining momentum in the mid 70's, a sizeable segment of the unregistered Pentecostalists staged what would become a massive campaign to emigrate from the USSR for the purpose of seeking asylum in nations that would allow them to practice their religion. At the campaign's peak in 1979, 30,000 Pentecostalists had renounced their Soviet citizenship and applied for emigration.5 Documents of appeal and protest proliferated among the would-be emigrants, ties with the Helsinki Watch Groups were forged, and a church Council to document grievances and organize congregations and individuals was formed in 1979 by those involved in the emigration campaign.6 From the available sources, successes for the two Pentecostalist factions to 1985 differ markedly. While there is evidence that those who chose to disregard prospects for challenging their regime in the "political" arena were increasing in numbers,7 those who pushed their regime's limits in the emigration movement not only utterly failed to gain their goal of emigration, but suffered more casualties during the state's countermovement against dissidents than those Pentecostalists not engaging in active protest. This decision of whether or not to participate in protest in an emigration campaign within the body of unregistered Pentecostalists, then, proves valuable to this study in that it helps to uncover the effect of protest on the success of an underground religious movement in the USSR. Overall, however, Pentecostalists in general were in a much more tolerable position in the mid-80's when compared with the Reform Baptists. The leadership of this Pentecostal body was much less centralized than that of the Reform Baptists, with individual congregations and adherents given much more autonomy to function according to their own will.8 The Pentecostalists engaged in no official printing operations at all during the life of the USSR, and only those seeking emigration engaged in any protest activities to speak of. It is these three factors that may explain why the Christians of the Evangelical Faith fared better during the State’s repressive countermovement against dissent in the 1970's-80's.

5 Alexeyeva, 224-25 6 RL 274/79, 1 7 Fletcher, Charismatics, 160-162 8 Ibid., 153-154

68 This chapter accounts for the relative successes and failures of the Pentecostalists in comparison to the Reform Baptists, and the successes of the non-protesting Pentecostalists in relation to those who participated in the emigration movement. Though a distinction between these two "branches" of Pentecostalism in somewhat artificial,9 it is the best means of determining which factors are associated with the underground churches' successes and failures.10

Historiography As with the study of the Reform Baptists, Ludmila Alexyeva's Soviet Dissent and Walter Kolarz' Religion in the Soviet Union provide essential information and commentary on the unregistered Pentecostalists. Kolarz' study provides a detailed history of the Soviet Pentecostal movements to 1960, while Alexeyeva presents a comprehensive overview of the emigration movement and Pentecostal involvement with Soviet human rights activists. Soviet Evangelicals by Walter Sawatsky provides information Pentecostal worship, though he rarely distinguishes between Baptist and Pentecostal, registered or unregistered activities. One of the most important works to this study is Soviet Charismatics by William Fletcher, aptly published in 1985. In his book, Fletcher provides valuable facts on Pentecostalists in the USSR, and important insights on the movement and religion in the Soviet Union in an interesting format. The Radio Liberty Research Bulletin supplies essential information on select events during the anti-dissident campaign. The most important primary source utilized in the current study is short work In Christ's Footstep's – Memoirs, the autobiographical account of Viktor Belykh, one of the movement's top leaders. Belykh's memoirs provide the only insight into the mind of a Pentecostal leader not involved with the emigration movement, and the only account of any central leader of the Christians of the Evangelical Faith. Two books written on a group of Pentecostalists that engaged in some dramatic episodes of protest served as important references to this chapter – The Siberian Seven, a narrative work based largely from interviews with the "seven," and The Last Christian: The Release of the Siberian Seven written by Timofei Chmykhalov, himself one of the "seven". Further, this study offers new primary material in telephone conversations with

9 It is not known if they themselves made this distinction 10 The Chronicle of Current Events even began to separate items on the persecution of Pentecostalists based on involvement with the emigration movement in 1977 (no. 44)

69 Avgustina11 and Dina Vashchenko,12 Pentecostal émigrés from the USSR, shed further light on areas ignored by the literature.

Factors Possibly Contributing to Church's Successes and Failures Pentecostal History in Russia/USSR Several trends in Russian/Soviet Pentecostal history contributed to Pentecostal successes from the death of Stalin to the mid-80’s. Though Pentecostalism made its first appearance in Russia decades after the Baptists, Pentecostalists too were successful in quickly attaining a critical mass of adherents.13 Around 1911 the first Pentecostal missionary traveled to Tsarist Russia via Helsinki,14 though considerable missionary successes were not seen until the arrival of Ivan Voronaev in the Ukraine in 1922. Recently converted to Pentecostalism in the United States, Voronaev felt compelled to return to his homeland and preach the Gospel there.15 His arrival coincided with the first revival period for non-Orthodox religions, when religious freedoms and the possibilities for growth were at the highest they had yet been and the highest they would be for decades to come.16 Thus, the Soviet Pentecostalists, as a group, escaped the cruelties of Tsarist repression that the Baptists were called upon to endure, which may account for at least a portion of their early successes. Pentecostalists in the Soviet Union achieved a startlingly rapid growth during the 1920's. Voronaev and some of his early, zealous converts began their ministry by worshipping within Baptist congregations and teaching those already converted to the Baptist faith. A significant number of Pentecostal believers was attained rather quickly as Pentecostalism drew away a considerable number of Baptists, whose theology was nearly identical to their own. The key difference between Baptist and Pentecostal theology, baptism by the Spirit made manifest by the speaking in tongues, or glossalalia, was apparently enough to cause many to choose Pentecostalism over Baptism. By 1926 Pentecostal successes in the Soviet Union were indeed impressive – there were already 17,000 Pentecostalists worshipping in 350 congregations, and the Church was officially organized with the formation of the "All-Ukrainian Council of

11 Another one of the “Siberian Seven” 12 One of Avgustina’s younger daughters who was not directly involved in the Embassy sit-in 13 William Fletcher points this out in Charismatics, 155-56 14 Kolarz, 332 15 Ibid. 16 Fletcher, Charismatics, 155-56

70 Christians of the Evangelical Faith" headquartered in Odessa, Ukraine.17 A further boost to the movement was the 1939 annexation of a portion of Eastern Poland into the USSR and a sizable population of Pentecostalists along with it.18 The other significant element in Soviet Pentecostal history that led to the movement’s successes was the development of a unique “Pentecostal” identity. The state-sanctioned All- Union Council of Evangelical Christians – Baptists was formed in 1944, and all Pentecostalists in the USSR were subsequently invited to join. This unification with the AUCECB, however, placed restrictions on a fundamental aspect of Pentecostal worship – the speaking in tongues during prayer meetings.19 Central Pentecostal leader Viktor Belykh compared a Pentecostal union with the AUCECB with an attempt to mix oil and water; it was an impractical coalition that could not last long.20 In spite of the forbiddance of glossalalia, however, in 1944 alone around 400 Pentecostal congregations made up of a total of 1,000 believers joined with the AUCECB,21 though many chose to withdraw from their AUCECB affiliation after a short time. A significant number of Pentecostalists, therefore, came to prefer the costs of autonomous worship with its associated risks of an unregistered and illegal status to the regulated and constrained services of the AUCECB. It was after the joining and successive withdrawal from the AUCECB that the Soviet Pentecostal movement of the “Christians of the Evangelical Faith” gained post-Stalin momentum.22 By 1958, Pentecostal congregations were withdrawing from the AUCECB en masse, and new unregistered Pentecostal congregations concurrently sprung up in various places.23 Early and continued antagonism with the Baptists almost certainly led to the development of a distinct Pentecostal identity, which may have prevented more Pentecostalists from unification with the AUCECB, and ultimately contributed to a stronger independent Pentecostal movement. Some aspects of Soviet Pentecostal history that had a deleterious effect on the movement include Stalin’s purges and the problem of disunity as a product of the issue of registration with the AUCECB. Just as the Baptists, Soviet Pentecostalists struggled to survive as nearly an entire

17 Kolarz, 332 18 Ibid. 19 Fletcher, Charismatics, 92-93 20 Belykh, 13 21 Beeson, 112 22 It is estimated that half of all Soviet Pentecostalists worshipped within the bounds of the AUCECB. 23 Fletcher, Charismatics, 94

71 generation of Pentecostal leaders perished in the camps during Stalin’s purges of the 30’s. Even the movement's founder, Voronaev, was arrested in 1930 and presumably met his death there.24 During these years, many were executed without even a trial, and the sect remained officially banned from the 30's to the 50's.25 Again, the number of Soviet Pentecostalists willing to endure the severity of an illegal status was less than the actual number of Pentecostalists in the USSR, so in this respect the state partially succeeded in its tactic to “divide and conquer” those of the Pentecostal faith in their nation.

Components of the Church Elements of the Soviet Pentecostal church, including its theology, church structure, leaders, members, and level of organization affected the movement's success in different ways. Despite their similarities with the Reform Baptists, the ecclesiastical paradigm of the Soviet Pentecostalists developed rather differently from that of their Evangelical cohorts. If the Reform Baptist organization could be described as organized and systematized, the Soviet Pentecostal structure was decidedly loose and de-centralized. Firstly, Fletcher mentions that there was no single Soviet Pentecostal theology, but that local congregations and even individuals played a role in determining certain points of doctrine due to an "emphasis on individualism."26 27 In spite of the diversity of beliefs and practices exhibited by these believers, four basic principles were ostensibly embraced by the majority of unregistered Soviet Pentecostalists, namely: salvation, baptism by the Holy Spirit manifested by speaking in tongues, eschatology or the idea that mankind today is living in the last days, and healing.28 Other important points of doctrine for Soviet Pentecostalists were sanctification, the doctrine of the power and gifts of the Holy Spirit.29 Just as the Baptists, Pentecostalists in the Soviet Union considered the Bible to be the foremost authority concerning questions of doctrine. Church founding father Ivan Voronaev stated that "the Bible is the court which decides disputes

24 A few accounts of Voronaev's "recantation" from the faith appeared in newspaper articles in the 1960's anti- religious campaign, but are considered both by his wife and the movement's adherents as falsified (Fletcher, Charismatics, 45-47). 25 Chr 44, 158 26 Fletcher, Charismatics, 55 27 Ibid., 61 28 Ibid., 65 29 Ibid., 60-61

72 where human judgment and intelligence are powerless."30 Fletcher maintains that the emphasis on speaking in other tongues as a sign of being baptized of the Holy Spirit, or glossalalia, is the "single doctrine on which all Pentecostals in the USSR agree."31 The rite of foot washing was common among Soviet Pentecostalists, as was fasting.32 One's private spiritual life was of the utmost importance, and prayer constituted its central feature.33 Another shared belief with the Baptists was the "priesthood of the believer," in which each person was responsible before God and no outside authority could dictate to one what is correct or incorrect. Thus, beliefs could vary widely not only from congregation to congregation, but from person to person.34 Pentecostal theology, though similar to that of the other Evangelicals, differed enough so as to affect the movement’s successes relative to that of the Reform Baptists. Soviet ideologues seem to have found even more inspiration for anti-religious propaganda in the Pentecostalists than in the Baptists. Pieces of anti-religious literature such as novels and short stories starring deranged Pentecostalists were not uncommon, likely due to glossalalia.35 A play entitled "The Dead God" condemned the Pentecostalists and their strange Diety.36 Further, somehow Soviet propagandists made a leap from accusing Pentecostalists of insanity and naïveté to condemning them of gross acts of violence. Film was exploited as a means of warning the public against the alleged murderous rituals of Pentecostals. The climax of the film "Clouds over Borsk" occurred as a girl recently converted to the Pentecostal faith was crucified and nearly killed,37 and the supposed documentary "This Alarms Everyone" depicted the suicides and murder of children allegedly perpetrated by Pentecostalists.38 Pentecostalists in the USSR exhibited an even greater alienation from Soviet society than the Baptists. Fletcher explains this trend of “introverted withdrawal” from a secular society as a Pentecostal coping mechanism to guard against the onslaught of hostility they so frequently encountered outside their circles within the church.39 Soviet Pentecostalists refrained from participating in important Soviet holidays such as May 1 and the October Revolution

30 "Evangelist", no. 6-7 [1928], 14; in Fletcher, Charismatics, 57 31 Fletcher, Charismatics, 61 32 Ibid., 72 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid., 55 35 Ibid., 121 36 Kolarz, 337 37 Fletcher, Charismatics, 126 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid., 130

73 Anniversary Day,40 and generally forbade their children from becoming Young Pioneers or members of the Komsomol (The Young Communist League).41 Many supported pacifism, though it was not forced upon the congregations.42 Abstinence from alcohol, tobacco, television, and other “worldly” media was also encouraged.43 In some cases, parents even withdrew their children from school in order to protect them not only from a curriculum designed to ingrain atheism into every child, but also from beatings and the mockery of children and teachers alike.44 The Pentecostal movement “Christians of the Evangelical Faith” was by far the least centralized religious body under consideration in this study. In response to state restrictions on the movement’s unification, central leaders appear to have preferred the comparative isolation of their congregations to the harsh persecution they would certainly encounter through a top-down leadership.45 Further, Pentecostalists in general were known for their emphasis on the near- autonomy of individual congregations. By all accounts, the most important leadership role in the Pentecostal faith was played by pastors, who led individual congregations. Pentecostal pastors were ordained at the hands of other pastors, and were responsible for "teaching . . .reading and interpreting the Scriptures, and exhorting [] followers to increased devotion."46 Apparently almost as important to a congregation’s function were those who officiated in a myriad of other positions. During his discussion on leadership of unregistered Pentecostalists in the USSR, Fletcher names the callings of deacons and deaconesses, choirmasters,47 prophets and prophetesses, healers, and those with the gift of discernment.48 Women’s councils were not uncommon in the more populous congregations.49 In spite of the essential role of local leaders in the functioning of the Christians of the Evangelical Faith, the Church did have central governing body, though it is unclear how it operated, and how many individuals participated in it. Significantly, between 1953-1985 unregistered Pentecostalists appeared to exhibit a level of organization beyond the echelon of the

40 Kolarz, 336 41 Chr 44, 159 42 Fletcher, Charismatics, 114-15 43 Ibid., 111 44 Consider the case of the Khailo family, whose children were not only mocked and beaten, but some of them were forced to attend schools for the mentally retarded simply because of their religious faith (Chr 36, 201; Chr 48, 124- 127) 45 Fletcher, Charismatics, 55 46 Ibid., 68 47 Moskalenko, p. 179 in Fletcher, Charismatics, p. 68 48 Fletcher, Charismatics, 68 49 Ibid.

74 congregation only during the religious revival following Stalin's death. At this time, the church's central leadership did much to facilitate church growth and success during such a vital period in its development. Secret Pentecostal congresses were held in Kharkov in 1956, and again in Tbilisi in 1960 provide evidence for vigorous centralized activity during these years.50 After release from exile in 1956, Belykh and other leaders traveled to visit many of the churches51 in order to preach to them and assess their situation.52 After Belykh was ordained into the top church leadership by two existing central church leaders,53 the three of them continued their travels to Moldova and Odessa to strengthen the congregations there.54 It seems likely, then, that without the impressive efforts of church leaders in ministering to the scattered congregations at this key time, the Christians of the Evangelical Faith may have had little, if any enduring unity. Significantly, however, neither Belykh's memoirs nor any of the other accessible sources refers to the titles of top church leaders. This leads one to believe that their functions were not seen as vitally important. When compared with the large amount of printed material on the leadership of the Soviet Reform Baptist movement as well as the AUCECB leadership, it becomes clear that these Pentecostalists were relatively less concerned with both the identity and pursuits of their central leaders. Contrary to logic, it appears that such a de-emphasis on ecclesiology may have contributed to the overall success of the Pentecostal movement in the Soviet Union from the death of Stalin through the mid-1980's as a decentralized movement is more difficult to disable with tactics designed to paralyze the central leaders. The disabling of a few central leaders would have a much less-pronounced effect on the functioning of Soviet Pentecostal congregations, and therefore the church at large. Though Pentecostal leaders became primary targets during Khrushchev's campaign against religion, as did the Reform Baptist leaders, the loss of church-wide leaders to the vast system of labor camps and prisons was far less devastating to the operation of a church that had never emphasized their role. Because of the relative emphasis on both individual and congregational autonomy, the Christians of the Evangelical Faith were organized into a loose church structure where

50 Ibid., 52-53 51 They went to such places as Kajerom, Moscow, Saratov, Novouzensk, the Donbass, Pyatikhat, Zolotonosh, Kiev, the Zhitomirskii region, and L'vov 52 Belykh, 9 53 Bidash and Gorobets 54 Belykh, 29

75 individuals and congregations organized themselves in whatever manner they saw fit. Lacking the strong central leadership of the Reform Baptists, the unregistered Pentecostalists rarely sought to engage in inter-congregational activities, and church-wide samizdat or protest that so incensed the authorities. Therefore, it appears that not only did the free structure of the Soviet Pentecostal Church contribute to its success by "permit[ing] the movement to capitalize upon whatever organizational approaches were best suited to local conditions,"55 but it allowed the Church avoid some of the harsh state measures taken against the Reform Baptists. Though the unregistered Pentecostalists were highly persecuted for their religious activities in the Soviet Union, the Chronicle of Current Events, for example, includes far more accounts of repression against the Reform Baptists. It seems unlikely that the marked disparity in coverage in the Chronicle is completely a result of greater Reform Baptist population and/or communication with human rights activists. In examining those Pentecostalists who joined the emigration movement and therefore participated in some sort of protest activities, it is apparent that those engaging in protest exhibited a greater degree of organization than those who did not. On 16 June 1979, 20 Pentecostal delegates from the Baltic republics, the Ukraine, Belarus, Central Russia, and Siberia gathered in a forest on the outskirts of Moscow to organize the Fraternal Council of Christians of the Evangelical Pentecostal Faith. It was their goal to unite the congregations in resisting the state's anti-religious legislation, and to support those Pentecostalists desiring emigration.56 The formation of the Fraternal Council marks the first known intra-denominational event to take place among the unregistered Pentecostalists since the underground congress held in 1960. This is only one of many examples illustrating a greater church-wide organization of Pentecostal emigration activists relative to the rest of unregistered Pentecostal adherents. Soviet Pentecostal and Baptist adherents were rather similar in their characteristics, which is not surprising given their related origin. Just as the Reform Baptists, unregistered Pentecostalists had to be prepared to endure great hardship and persecution for their faith, held low-paying jobs because of the lack of opportunity for them to receive a higher education, and generally had large families who were forced to subsist on little income. Children and adolescents were plentiful in the unregistered Pentecostal ranks not only due to the size of these

55 Fletcher, Charismatics, 153-154 56 RL 274/79, 1

76 Christians’ families, but because many young individuals joined the church in the 60's, much to the dismay of the authorities. Further, parents persisted in providing religious instruction to their children. Consider the Vashchenko family of Chernogorsk (Siberia), who had 13 children and suffered immensely because of their beliefs. Pyotr and Avgustina Vashchenko were two of the earliest Pentecostalists in their town, and helped found the congregation during the 50's revival.57 One of their uncles, Andrei, was killed in a labor camp in 1966, presumably because of his faith.58 Pyotr was incarcerated in a psychiatric hospital in 1968 after attempting to gain an audience with American officials at the American Embassy in Moscow concerning his family's desire to emigrate from the USSR.59 Avgustina was arrested and imprisoned for 2 years from 1968-70, leaving the children to be raised by extended family and church members for a time.60 Of the Vashchenko children, born from 1951 to 1974, each of the four oldest girls spent a few years in state boarding schools after being abducted from their family by state officials. Three of them escaped at different points, but were summarily returned to the state institutions.61 The oldest son, Sasha, was imprisoned for refusing military duty in 1977.62 All were routinely subject to beatings at school, and harassment and persecution at the hands of government officials. None in the family was able to make a good living. Pyotr worked in the coal mines,63 while Lidia, the oldest daughter, had the unenviable job of working at a hospital crematory.64 The Vashchenko's became active in the emigration campaign very early on, and participated in the most incredible and high profile Pentecostal demonstrations carried out during the Soviet period, discussed later in this chapter. Pentecostalists suffered more as a result of their beliefs than the Reform Baptists. From accounts in the Chronicle of Current Events, Soviet Pentecostalists were subject to punitive incarceration in psychiatric hospitals more often than those of other denominations, presumably because it was easy for the authorities to pin the singularity of glossalalia on insanity. In one

57 Pollock, 265 58 Ibid., 266 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid., 265-66 62 Ibid., 267 63 Ibid., 265 64 Ibid., 144

77 extreme case, Pentecostalists Anna V. Chertkova spent at least five years65 imprisoned in a psychiatric hospital. Chertkova had spent years seeking a legal residence in Alma-Ata, even attempting to find shelter in hostels and hotels, but to no avail. She twice resorted to building a house of her own on the outskirts of town, but both times the construction was demolished by State bulldozers. Chertkova subsequently spent two winters living in a crude hut,66 but was threatened by city officials with internment in a psychiatric hospital if she didn't abandon residence in Alma-Ata, which threats turned to reality.67 Another common charge levied against unregistered Pentecostalists was for refusing to swear the military oath and bear arms. Kolarz states that most Pentecostalists sought to avoid army service by "cunning"68 as opposed to open protest, though there were also cases of the latter. In May 1977 160 individuals from the Rovno region collectively refused military service.69 Because of both their loose organization and a belief in the “priesthood of the believers,” the Pentecostalists in the USSR were the most free to engage in the activities of their choice. With little input from central leaders on the operation of the church after the 50's revival, it follows that Pentecostal pastors had the freedom to direct their congregations in the manner they thought best. Individual families and believers, too, took liberties not observed as obviously among Reform Baptist and True Adventist adherents. For example, the Vashchenko family previously portrayed and some others in their town of Chernogorsk made the early decision to campaign for their right to emigrate from the USSR for religious reasons. As early as 1963 these Pentecostalists began to participate in demonstrations in Moscow, which were carried out both independently and against the wishes of their pastor. In fact, the pastor in Chernogorsk, Pyotr Vashchenko’s uncle, labeled them as troublemakers and in the 60's advised them not to worship with the Chernogorsk congregation anymore. Thus, the Vashchenko's and a couple other Chernogorsk Pentecostalists were obliged to form their own congregation.70 In other locales in subsequent years, Pentecostal pastors would embrace emigration as a viable means of gaining their religious freedoms, and even rally their congregations to participate in the emigration movement.

65 from 1973 to 1978 66 The climate in Alma-Ata (southern Kazakhstan) is not nearly as severe as it is in Russia. 67 Chr 48, 119-20 68 Kolarz, 336 69 Chr 46, 46 70 telephone conversation with Dina Vashchenko, 30 April 2004

78

Church Activities and Tactics to Continue Them Unregistered Pentecostalists in the Soviet Union went to great lengths to participate in activities of an Evangelical nature. They had repudiated registration with the AUCECB precisely in order that they might fully express their faith through worship services and proselytizing, and their tactics of secrecy lent themselves relatively well to the continuation of these activities. Besides the speaking in tongues, Pentecostal worship resembled Baptist worship in most respects. Both the giving of sermons and the employment of religious music were essential to any worship service.71 The emotional, often intense nature of Pentecostal worship, as well as the frequency of worship with other church members must have provided a safe haven for these persecuted believers. In the mid-1960's anti-religious work Questions of Scientific Atheism, the author notes that many Pentecostalists would meet for 2-3 hours of worship "daily or at least three times a week", while others would congregate two times a day, "before work, usually 5-6 a.m., and after work, 8-10 p.m."72 Though this may be an exaggeration of reality, it is apparent from other sources that frequent services were the norm for unregistered Pentecostalists. According to Belykh, exiled believers in the couple years following Stalin's death held church services daily.73 Sawatsky, who provides a detailed description of Evangelical tactics to continue worship beginning during Khrushchev’s anti-religious campaign, does not distinguish between Reform Baptist and Pentecostal tactics. The only tactic that the Pentecostalists appear to have employed to a greater degree than Reform Baptists was secrecy in worship. In addition to holding services in remote outdoors locations such as the woods or in the apartment of members, Pentecostalists held meetings at unusual hours as well.74 In an attempt to discredit Pentecostal meetings, one champion of atheism described their secrecy as the following: "Three times a week the Pentecostals gathered in the Salapev apartment. The largest meetings were on Sunday, when sectarians from other districts of the region came. They met in strict secrecy. The leaders did not wish even that the rank and file sectarians knew much about each other. They were prohibited from conversing among themselves, on

71 Sawatsky, 94-110 72 Beeson, 113 73 Belykh, 27 74 Kolarz, 336

79 grounds that 'much speaking is a sin before God.' They were prohibited from calling each other by given or family names, but only 'spiritual brother' and 'spiritual sister.'"75

Another common motif found in anti-Pentecostal literature concerning their worship practices was that of "Pentecostalists . . . praying on a desolate beach . . . waiting for an ark filled with American dollars," though the ideologues neglect to mention that remote places were usually the only locations available for peaceful worship.76 Another important Pentecostal tactic to insulate themselves from outside interference was the exercise of caution in opening their church services to unknown persons. Interested parties were obliged to study the scriptures and talk with church members for a period of time before they were permitted to attend prayer meetings.77 In this way, worship services were more effectively shielded from interference at the hands of the authorities. A final Pentecostal tactic to continue religious activities was worship with those of other denominations. Fletcher mentions the possibility that Reform Baptists, Christians of the Evangelical Faith, as well as Baptists and Pentecostalists worshipping within the legally sanctioned AUCECB may have been sympathetic to and possibly even involved with each other's plights, though the extent of their co- involvement was not known.78 The net result of Soviet Pentecostalists' secrecy tactics was less intrusion on the part of the state. Though unregistered Pentecostalists experienced their share of raids on worship services, accounts from the Chronicle indicate that they underwent the dispersion of significantly less religious services than did the Reform Baptists. Unregistered Soviet Pentecostalists engaged in no less proselytizing than did the Reform Baptists, and also experienced impressive successes in this arena. Indeed, Kolarz attributes the continuation of the church through Khrushchev’s anti-religious campaign to two key factors – missionary work carried out in Stalin’s labor camps that led many prisoners to convert to Pentecostalism, and the “deliberate migration”79 of Pentecostalists from place to place for the express purpose of exposing a greater number of Soviet citizens to the movement’s members and Gospel message.80 Belykh reaffirms that during the "Thaw," the church grew in places of exile,

75 Golubovich, 142; in Fletcher, Charismatics, 130 76 Alexeyeva, 218 77 Fletcher, Charismatics, 69 78 Ibid., 95, 99 79 Kolarz, 334 80 Ibid.

80 and the harsh conditions didn't prevent converts from joining. Baptisms were known to take place even in the frigid waters of ice holes.81 Further, Fletcher describes the success of Pentecostal “unobtrusive[]”82 proselytizing techniques that undoubtedly had been refined by Pentecostal leaders in the Stalinist camps.83 Lithuanian Catholic activists lauded Pentecostal missionary efforts,84 as they fostered "the apostolic spirit, which fears neither suffering nor death."85 Though the Pentecostals placed a great emphasis on missionary efforts, they practiced caution in opening church membership to interested parties. Potential converts passed through a lengthy preparation period before they could be baptized.86 In this way, not only were converts more likely to adhere to their new faith, but the congregations were better protected from KGB infiltration. Those working to infiltrate had to work long and hard before they were granted access to the church network. In spite of this, however, infiltration was not uncommon. Also relatively frequent was state propaganda directed against Pentecostal missionary efforts. For example, the defamatory work Piatidesiatniki featured the repentant words of several former Pentecostalists, including F. N. Miachin, who bemoaned his previous religious activity and the effects it had on others: "My conscience troubles me when I think of the young men and girls whom I myself brought into the congregation. Where are you now, blue-eyed Lida Guliuk? Do you still pay attention to sermons and seek consolation in them? And where are you, Vanie Rybak and Tolia Kiseled? As before, do you sing psalms like: 'I would leave this world without regret; In it I have seen only lying and suffering.' Or have you already awakened from the deep sleep, and do you gaily work on the new constructions of Siberia or the virgin lands of Kazakhstan?"87

Indeed, Alexeyeva attributes the unregistered Pentecostalists' persecution primarily to their dedication to proselytizing.88 For instance, Latvian Pentecostal Teofil Kuma was arrested and sentenced to a labor camp in 1980 for distributing hundreds of religious leaflets at a school, a bus

81 Belykh, 27 82 Fletcher, Charismatics, 53 83 Ibid. 84 Also praised are the missionary efforts of the Jehovah's Witnesses and Seventh Day Adventists 85 CCChL, 1978, no. 28, 13; in Alexeyeva, 219 86 Fletcher, Charismatics, 69 87 Miachin, 56; in Fletcher, Charismatics, 123 88 Alexeyeva, 215

81 stop, and a park. He was later transferred to the Leningrad Psychiatric Hospital for his "seditious" activity.89 Like some other factors, then, missionary operations played a role both in church successes and defeats throughout the period between 1953 and 1985 and cannot be considered to significantly impact the churches' status either way. The Christians of the Evangelical Faith did not carry out any official printing operations. To be sure, Fletcher has described the church's publication of samizdat literature at this time as "almost totally lacking" and their supply of religious literature "far from adequate."90 The only known method of obtaining Bibles was to collaborate with the Reform Baptist Khristianin publishing house – in exchange for Bibles, Pentecostalists supplied Baptist printers with supplies such as paper and material provisions.91 Though this deficiency in religious literature may initially appear to negatively impact the church's successes, the opposite may actually be true. Reform Baptists suffered great casualties due to their underground printing operations – not only did tremendous resources go into the functioning of the Khristianin press, but those discovered to be associated with Baptist printing activities were duly punished. The Christians of the Evangelical Faith, on the other hand, were free from state raids on printing presses they didn't even possess.

Protest The attitude of unregistered Soviet Pentecostal leaders toward protest was incohesive both through the period of time under consideration and throughout the church at large. Though central church leaders once traveled to Moscow to converse with state officials on their unenviable position in the wake of Khrushchev’s anti-religious campaign,92 there is no other episode in the available literature depicting central leaders’ support of protest. Certainly, the central Pentecostal leadership did not stir up the movement’s adherents to participate in any acts of protest as the Reform Baptist leadership did. Conversely, there were some Pentecostal pastors who engaged in protest on a large-scale beginning in the 60’s, and with increasing regularity through the 70’s. Pastor Nikolai Goretoi was one of the movement's leading advocates for emigration, and participated in the formation of

89 Bourdeaux, Religious Minorities, 21 90 Fletcher, Charismatics, 56 91 interview with Okhotin, 16 October 2003 92 Belykh, 29

82 the Fraternal Council to work in behalf of would-be emigrants. Rank-and-file Pentecostal emigration participants were no less dedicated to the cause than leaders of the emigration movement. Pentecostalist Vasily Patrushev explained the reasoning behind emigration activists’ protest in the following statement: "We have no choice here: either we become criminals in the eyes of the government by refusing to submit to the Regulations on Registration and thereby observe the teachings of Christ, or we become criminals in the sight of God by submitting to the demands of the government. For us, believers living according to our conscience, the higher law is the law of God. We cannot become criminals before God."93

Thus, Pentecostalists, as the Reform Baptists, viewed their protest not as political in any sense, but born of profoundly spiritual motives. Many, however, found it more prudent not to participate in protest activities. In the domain of protest and "political" activity, the Soviet Pentecostalists will always be known for the massive emigration movement they engaged in. The movement had its origin in small pockets of believers like the Vashchenko family and others in Chernogorsk, and eventually included others in a myriad of locations throughout the empire, though it is not known if the Vashchenko's inspired the massive movement or if the Jewish emigration movement served as a motivation.94 The Pentecostal movement to emigrate gained impetus with the Soviet State’s signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975, and subsequent formation of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group that devoted significant resources to helping those Pentecostalists desirous to emigrate.95 In February of 1977, 1,000 Pentecostals joined the small movement, and by May of that year 1,700 believers including some Baptists had aligned themselves with the campaign to emigrate. By June the movement had grown to 3,500 persons, and by December of 1977, 10,000 believers had applied for exit visas in hopes of emigrating from the Soviet Union! The emigration movement continued to expand until there were 30,000 participants in 1979.96 97 Sometimes entire Pentecostal congregations applied to emigrate together.98

93 Reports of Helsinki Accord Monitors, 1979, 22; in Alexeyeva, 216 94 In a telephone conversation with Avgustina Vashchenko on 1 May 2004, she stated that she and other emigration activists from Chernogorsk acted independent of any other Pentecostalists in the USSR. She had heard of Nikolai Goretoi, for example, but had never had any contact with him. 95 RL 274/79, 2 96 Alexeyeva, 224-25 97 Though the number of believers applying for emigration reached such an astounding proportion, it appears that only about 10% of Pentecostals were ever involved in the campaign (Bourdeaux, Religious Minorities, 22). 98 RL 274/79, 2

83 The great majority of Pentecostal acts of protest and written appeals dealt with the emigration issue. While those not participating in the campaign to emigrate quietly persisted in worshiping and raising their children according to their conscience, in the mid to late-70’s waves of protest activity carried out by would-be Pentecostal emigrants grew increasingly audible both to the Soviet authorities and to the West. Pentecostalists in the Soviet Union staged some demonstrations between 1953 and 1985, and they were always the result of the initiative of individuals or groups rather than the church as a whole. Some were small, local disturbances, and unrelated to the emigration movement. For instance, in March 1957 a group of Pentecostalists in the city of Kherson arrived at an anti- religious lecture with the intent of wrecking the meeting as the Pentecostal group's spokesman openly debated with the lecturer and began to speak in tongues in the middle of the meeting.99 Other demonstrations were more dramatic affairs that captured the attention of larger groups of people. All such demonstrations described in the sources for this work were carried out by those desirous to emigrate. Undoubtedly one of the most spectacular incidents of protest staged by Soviet Pentecostalists occurred in January 1963 as 32 Chernogorsk Pentecostals stormed the American Embassy in Moscow, having traveled for days from Siberia. They presented American officials with a stack of petitions delineating their grievances against Soviet religious policy, and desperately pleaded for asylum.100 They urgently protested the loss of their children to the state, their children having been forcibly removed from their custody and sent to Soviet boarding schools. They presented letters written by these children, including letters from three children of the Vashchenko family –101 Valya (12 years), Tanya (8 years), and Petya (7 years), in which the children told of the persecution they were enduring for their faith, and Valya asked her parents to tell Khrushchev: "I don't want to live anymore in the Soviet Union. I tell you I won't study in a Godless school."102 In spite of the mounting evidence to the U.S. government that gross incidents of religious repression were indeed occurring in the Soviet Union, these 32 individuals were not granted political asylum, but rather brusquely loaded onto buses by the Communist

99 Kolarz, 337-38 100 Bourdeaux, Ferment, 17 101 these were the children of Gregory Vashchenko, brother of Pyotr Vashchenko 102 Newsweek, 28 January 1963, 45; in Fletcher, Charismatics, 131-32

84 authorities and removed from the Embassy grounds.103 The persecution of these particular families increased significantly as a result of their participation in this demonstration. Years later in 1978 eight individuals from the same town104 returned to Moscow to finish the business they had been prevented from completing in 1963. Members of the Vashchenko and Chmykhalov families, consisting of Pyotr and Avgustina Vashchenko and three of their children, Lilya,105 Lyubov',106 and Lidya,107 and two members of the Chmykhalov family, Maria and her youngest son Timofei,108 rushed past the guards and took refuge in the American Embassy armed with stacks of grievances.109 The eighth member of the party, Ioann Vashchenko, was detained by guards and was seen by the others in custody of Soviet policemen who were assaulting him outside the gates of the embassy. As the seven were not granted active assistance from American officials and refused to leave the embassy until they received exit visas for fear of Soviet reprisal,110 these determined Pentecostalists began a residence in the American Embassy in a small basement room that was to last nearly five years. Though the "Siberian Seven" were eventually allowed to emigrate to the United States in 1983 due to U.S. diplomatic intervention,111 this victory did not spread to the vast populace of Pentecostal adherents awaiting such an opportunity. Pentecostal demonstrations, just as those of the Reform Baptists, did not significantly impact the successes and defeats of the movement at large. Another protest tactic commonly used among the Pentecostalists was the hunger strike.112 From imprisoned individuals to entire congregations, untold numbers of unregistered Pentecostalists staged hunger strikes in efforts to gain the authorities' attention. In 1977 a group of potential emigrants became infuriated when the authorities withheld from them their invitations to emigrate113 after they had arrived from the United States. They organized a hunger

103 Fletcher, Charismatics, 131 104 From two of the same families that participated in the above demonstration 105 21 years of age at the time 106 25 years 107 27 years 108 16 years 109 RL 233/80, 1 110 Ibid. 111 In 1983 U.S. diplomats assured the emigration of the Vashchenko’s as “one of the unwritten conditions for signing the Concluding Document of the Madrid Conference" (Alexeyeva, 231) 112 This was a common tactic for general dissidents in the USSR 113 Official invitations from individuals or organizations in receiving nations were documents required for emigration.

85 strike, and after ten days the invitations were in their possession.114 115 On 11 November 1980, days before the start of the Madrid conference, a group of Pentecostalists 1,300 strong initiated a five-day hunger strike to draw even more attention to their desperate situation.116 Further, the Vashchenko's may attribute their eventual emigration to the United States at least in part to a hunger strike held by Lidia and her mother Avgustina in the final weeks of their residence at the American Embassy.117 While the hunger strike contributed to occasional individual successes, just as with demonstrations, it did not drastically impact the Soviet Pentecostal cause. Doubtless the most prolific type of Pentecostal protest was found in written form, and was, of course, authored by Pentecostalists involved in the emigration movement. The appeals, letters, and petitions that resulted from the intrepid emigration campaigners were many, and were addressed to Soviet government officials as well as foreign governments and institutions. In most cases, groups of potential emigrants wrote appeals in collective efforts to gain the concession to emigrate to any number of countries for religious reasons. Others drew up samizdat literature documenting their repression in an effort to nurture foreign sympathy for their cause. For example, in July 1980 the Fraternal Council of Christians of the Evangelical Faith published an almanac entitled The Red and the Black detailing the attempts of Pentecostalists to attain emigration, and the persecution they bore as a result of their efforts.118 Participants in the Pentecostal emigration movement made some attempts to appeal to their own government. In June 1977, 3,500 Pentecostalists vying for emigration, along with a few Baptists, petitioned Brezhnev and requested that he simplify emigration procedures, allow groups and congregations to emigrate together, cease the conscription of emigration applicants into the military and their early deployment into active duty, lower emigration fees for poor families, and lastly, that they be allowed to utilize funds donated by believers abroad.119 A delegation of five led by Nikolai Goretoi filed a petition with the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1977 requesting that all 520 members of the Starotitarovskaya congregation be allowed to emigrate.120

114 Alexeyeva, 223 115 Alexeyeva is quick to point out that this hunger strike was particularly well timed, as it occurred in the days before the Belgrade Conference of the Helsinki Accords in 1977, therefore the state was likely to have been especially sensitive to any potentially negative publicity at this time (Alexeyeva, 223). 116 Alekseyeva, 230 117 RL 56/82, 1 118 Chr 57, 66 119 Chr 46, 54-55 120 RL 46/77, 1

86 In May 1978 a group of Pentecostalists including Nikolai Goretoi signed an appeal to Brezhnev "in the name of all those who want to emigrate but have been refused exit visas" in which they elucidated their persecutions and their firm understanding that the refusal of their requests to emigrate was illegal.121 Further, upon the arrest of emigration activist and Fraternal Council leader Boris Perchatkin in August 1980, the remaining Fraternal Council members sent an appeal to Brezhnev questioning him concerning the future of their faith in the USSR. 122 Regrettably, the Pentecostalists did not receive replies to any of their appeals and inquiries to Soviet officials. Relatively early in the emigration movement, Pentecostalists began to look to the West for help. In May 1974, nearly 200 Pentecostalists sent an appeal to President Richard Nixon pleading for help to emigrate.123 On 1 December 1 1976, the Helsinki Group introduced members of Pentecostal emigration councils to the Western press, to whom the lengthy volume of documents and an appeal to the Helsinki Accord signatories were summarily presented. The appeal requested permission to immigrate to their various nations.124 Ludmila Alexeyeva comments that many Pentecostalists were convinced that if they could communicate their persecutions and desires to emigrate to the West, sympathizers would surface and force the Soviet government to concede to their requests for emigration.125 The contacts formed with the Western media, as well as the significant attention their story received in the West appeared to encourage them in their efforts.126 Alexeyeva also remarks that the 1976 election of Jimmy Carter, a devout Baptist, as President of the United States was yet another indication to them that their efforts to emigrate would not remain fruitless, as "they hoped that under a Baptist president they would receive the kind of support from the United States that the Jewish emigration movement had received for many years."127 In 1977 members of the Starotitarovskaya congregation signed an appeal to U.S. President Jimmy Carter requesting help to emigrate.128 In the summer of 1979 Boris Perchatkin and Timofei Prokopchik of the Pentecostal Fraternal Council met with several U.S. Congressmen, including Senator Robert Dornen, urging them to work with the Soviet

121 RL 380/79, 1 122 Alexeyeva, 229-230 123 RL 46/77, 2 124 Alexeyeva, 222 125 Ibid. 126 RL 46/77, 3 127 Alexeyeva, 224 128 RL 46/77, 1

87 government on their behalf.129 Fraternal Council members appealed to President Carter in August 1980 and sent him a collective letter signed by 1,310 in which they asked him to intervene on their behalf and broadcast their plight,130 and gave their support of the U.S. Olympic Games boycott.131 The contacting of foreign institutions and governments did not begin with Carter's election, however. In 1976 Nikolai Goretoi petitioned the World Council of Churches for their assistance in the emigration of his congregation of around 200 individuals.132 Pentecostalists appealed to both the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the Belgrade Conference for assistance in 1977.133 In June 1978 Goretoi coauthored a document sent to the UN Human Rights Council asking for their support against the repressions plaguing Soviet Pentecostals.134 In late 1983 when their situation was truly desperate, 70 Pentecostals from 17 families in Eastern Siberia involved in the emigration campaign penned a letter to parties in the West protesting the persecutions levied against them, and in which they threatened to start a graduated fast if conditions did not improve.135 Soviet Pentecostal efforts to petition Westerners for support did not go unheeded; beginning in the late 70’s foreign groups demonstrated their backing for the persecuted believers in a number of ways. Some answered the call to issue official invitations for emigration to Soviet Pentecostalists, so that several hundred potential emigrants received invitations by the mid-80’s.136 Foreign Pentecostalists began to give their support by writing letters, sending care packages with such items as clothing, and some Pentecostal tourists to the USSR even smuggled in literature. Other items illegally brought into the Soviet Union by tourists for the Pentecostalists were equipment for duplicating religious literature, religious films, and projectors with which to view them.137 In 1977 Swedish Pentecostalists Bengt-Gunnar Soreld and Nils- Erik Engstroem, representing an organization called the Slavic Mission, came to the Soviet Union by car as tourists and transported Bibles to their Soviet counterparts. They were detained

129 Alexeyeva, 229 130 Ibid., 230 131 Fletcher, Charismatics, 137-38 132 Bourdeaux, Religious Minorities, 22 133 Chr 48, 138-39 134 RL 380/79, 1 135 Fletcher, Charismatics, 136 136 Alexeyeva, 227 137 Ibid.

88 by the authorities on their way out of the country, however, and a large stash of appeals penned by Pentecostalists working for emigration were found in their vehicle.138 In May 1980 foreign Pentecostalists founded a "Rights Protection Group" as well as a "Fund to Aid the Evangelical Christian Pentecostals of Russia."139 Other groups such as Christian Solidarity International based in Switzerland, the Society of Americans for Vashchenko Emigration (SAVE), as well as protestors in the UK worked specifically on behalf of the safe emigration of the "Siberian Seven."140 While the support from Western governments and Christians in giving aid and defending the rights of potential Pentecostal emigrants certainly was of benefit to some individuals, it was far less than hoped for and needed. In a letter written to U.S. President Carter, over 1,300 Soviet Pentecostalists expressed the concern that “either we do not hear [the West] or they believe the slander and attacks on us."141 In the early 80’s statements made by the Vashchenko family expressed a developing disillusionment with the West as it was “indifferent to the fate of Protestants persecuted in the USSR."142 Indeed, in spite of the support given by those in the West, Alexeyeva comments that the overall dismal Western response to the Pentecostal plight “made it easy [for the Soviet state] to terrorize the Pentecostalists,”143 as Western intervention “represented their only chance of success."144 After the formation of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group in 1976, Pentecostalists desiring to emigrate were quick in initiating contact with the dissidents in an effort to step up their campaign. In 1976, the emigration councils at Starotitarovskaya and Nakhodka appealed to the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group for help in broadcasting their plight abroad. The Helsinki Group rapidly obliged, assisting the Pentecostals in compiling a 500-page collection of documents entitled "My People, Let Us Leave This Country."145 On 1 December 1 1976, the Helsinki Group introduced members of Pentecostal emigration councils to the Western press and was instrumental in getting Pentecostal appeals into Western hands. Further, Moscow Helsinki Group member Lidia Voronina visited Pentecostal congregations in Nakhodka and

138 Ibid. 139 RL 56/82, 4 140 Fletcher, Charismatics, 135 141 Alexeyeva, 230 142 Ibid., 231 143 Ibid., 230 144 Ibid., 228 145 Ibid., 221

89 Starotitarovskaya in 1976 to assess their situation by interviewing numerous individuals and families, and by attending their meetings.146 Pentecostalists involved in the emigration movement expounded upon their precarious situation through a letter addressed to the Belgrade Conference of the Helsinki Accords, facilitated by their human rights connections. In the letter, Pentecostalists blamed the state authorities for inciting the public to beat up religious believers such as Ivan Durov, who after a severe beating by policemen was rendered "a cripple for the rest of his life" as "his skull was broken and his kidneys were crushed. In the hospital he was intimidated with threats that if he did not leave the hospital he would be killed."147 In 1980, just three years after the Belgrade Conference, Pentecostalists sent numerous letters to the Madrid conference of the implementation of the Helsinki Accords in protest of their treatment in the Soviet Union and petitioning the Helsinki signatory states to appeal to Soviet leaders in their behalf.148 Soviet Pentecostal emigrant Arkadi Polishchuk attended the Madrid conference in person to further facilitate their publicity.149 A spokesman of the Pentecostal emigration campaign delineated on 33 types of persecution to which they had been subject in a "Statement Requesting Help" that was included in the material Helsinki Watch Group members compiled for the Madrid Conference.150 Even during the repressive years of the early 80’s when dissidents of all persuasions were put down, Soviet human rights organizations did not abandon the Pentecostalists, and included them in a document on the freedom to emigrate for religious reasons.151 Some Pentecostalists, for their part, signed the appeals of the Christian Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Religious Believers in the USSR, as well as appeals of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group. A few Pentecostalists signed letters defending arrested members of the Moscow Group, namely Orlov, Ginzburg, and Shcheransky. Bishop Nikolai Goretoi wrote a letter exhorting Christians everywhere to pray for those Moscow Helsinki Watch Group in custody of the Soviet State.152 Pentecostal leaders including Viktor Belykh, on the other hand, condemned collaboration with

146 RL 274/79, 2 147 Chr 47, 88-90 148 Alexeyeva, 230 149 Ibid., 227 150 RL 56/82, 3 151 Ibid. 152 Alexeyeva, 225

90 human rights activists, and urged church members to seek help from God rather than from "leftist forces."153 The unregistered Pentecostalists provide the most valuable insights into the effects of engaging in protest on the overall success of a religious movement in the Soviet Union. In spite of a few individual success stories, the Pentecostal emigration movement was largely a failure to 1985, though during the 70’s it appeared to many as a promising venture. In 1976 as the authorities saw that the movement was gaining support among a greater number of Pentecostalists, reprisals against these believers, especially emigration activists,154 waned. Alexeyeva comments that no unregistered Pentecostalists were arrested, deprived of their parental rights, fined for participating in worship services, or interrogated by the KGB that year. In addition, there was a reduction in raids on their worship services.155 In 1976, Soviet authorities began to offer registration more freely to unregistered Pentecostal congregations as a concession, albeit a false concession, and many took advantage of this newfound opportunity to legally worship. Though 15 Pentecostal congregations were reportedly autonomously registered by 1970,156 by 1976, 55 congregations had taken advantage of the opportunity to register.157 The government also campaigned to register Pentecostal congregations under the premise of creating a "union of autonomous Pentecostalists" as a concession to mollify emigration activists,158 though the Soviet authorities began to force registration, and most congregations began to see it as a measure to subject them to the state, and refused.159 The harassment and persecution of those refusing to register became commonplace after 1976. For example, in 1982 Ivan Kovalenko, pastor of a congregations in the Donestk region, Ukraine, was sentenced to 5 years in labor camps plus 5 years of exile for refusing to register his congregation.160 By 1983, roughly 200 Pentecostal congregations were autonomously registered with the state, though the Soviet authorities interfered with their services by forbidding both glossalalia and the rite of foot washing.161

153 Ibid., 223 154 After the commencement of the Pentecostal emigration campaign, the persecution of Pentecostalists in Nakhodka, where the largest body of potential emigrants resided, declined significantly (Chr 44, 159). 155 Alexeyeva, 224 156 Bourdeaux, Religious Minorities, 21 157 Basket Three, Vol. XIV, 65 158 Alexeyeva, 224 159 Bourdeaux, Religious Minorities, 21 160 Ibid. 161 Ibid.

91 In addition to the deleterious effects of registering with the State on the greater Pentecostal movement brought on at least partially by the campaign to emigrate, by 1977 the persecution of Pentecostal emigration activists began to increase.162 In the winter of 1979 alone, seven leaders of the emigration movement including Nikolai Goretoi were arrested.163 In 1981, Goretoi was subject to imprisoned in a psychiatric hospital "treatment" with drugs for the insane.164 An article published in the newspaper Sovetskaya Kuban’ on 18 April 1978 and entitled 'Bitter is the Bread of Foreign Lands' accused Nikolai Goretoi of "repeatedly [going] to Moscow with the purpose of passing slanderous information to foreign representatives" and "incit[ing] believers to send slanderous statements to various departments."165 Only those of the Vashchenko and Chmykhalov families who remained in Chernogorsk while their relatives staged the sit-in at the American Embassy, it appears, escaped the onslaught of persecution the emigration activists experienced during the state's countermovement against dissidents.166 By 1980 the state was the sure winner in the tactical battle with Pentecostalists participating in the emigration movement, who expressed the hopelessness of their situation in a 1981 letter to U.S. President Ronald Reagan: "Our appeals to international organizations has only succeeded in bringing the wrath of our own government down on our heads . . . They promise to settle the score with us once and for all as soon as the Madrid Conference has ended . . ."167

Thus, while demonstrating their determination to publicize their quandary, the protest of Pentecostalists in the campaign to emigrate did not lead to successes, and this not only because of their State’s determination to stifle dissent, but also to a lack of overarching Western support for the cause.

162 Chr 44, 158 163 Alexeyeva, 229 164 Bourdeaux, Religious Minorities, 22 165 Chr 49, 79 166 D. Vashchenko 167 Arkhiv samizdata, 6; in Alexeyeva, 230

92 Conclusions In spite of the harsh persecution of emigration activists, the unregistered Pentecostal movement generally had a hopeful future ahead of them in the mid-80's, presumably due to the fact that at any time, at least 90% of church adherents were not involved in the emigration campaign. Fletcher concludes that Pentecostalism had proven itself to be a permanent fixture in Soviet society by 1985, as it had demonstrated itself to be compatible with the "emerging technological society"168 that was the Soviet Union. He claims that "there [was] no evidence that any measures, up to and including widespread executions [would] prove sufficient to eliminate Pentecostalism completely from the USSR."169 Finally, Fletcher states that if the State would opt to ease its policy toward the sect at any point, "there [was] every reason to believe that the movement could begin an explosive expansion."170 Alexeyeva, too, provides a positive outlook for unregistered Pentecostalists in the mid-80's – in spite of the failure of the emigration movement, most were refusing registration, retaining their independence from the state, and continuing to proselytize.171 The unregistered Pentecostalists defeats resulted not only in their status as an illegal religion, however, but due to a handful of denomination-specific factors. Pentecostal theology lent itself well to the ridicule of Soviet anti-religious propagandists, which likely hampered their proselytizing efforts and church growth that may have otherwise resulted. Those engaged in the Pentecostal emigration campaign experienced significant defeats in that they not only failed to achieve their goal of emigrating to nations where they could freely worship, but they also incurred the state's wrath against them. Factors that led to their persecution above that of those not involved in the emigration movement were: a positive attitude of both leader and member toward protest and involvement with human rights workers, and the production of samizdat documents of protest. It is not known how the state persecution associated with the Pentecostal emigration movement affected the successes of the unregistered Pentecostal movement at large. It is possible that the "misbehavior" of the emigration activists prompted the state to be more lenient on the rest of the unregistered Pentecostalists. If this is the case, the failure of the emigration

168 Fletcher, Charismatics, 160 169 Ibid., 161 170 Ibid. 171 Alexeyeva, 231

93 movement fostered the success of the overall Pentecostal movement to 1985 and should not be considered a failure at all.

94

CHAPTER FOUR

TRUE AND FREE SEVENTH DAY ADVENTISTS

In 1928 a group of Seventh Day Adventists in the Soviet Union officially ended their association with the main body of the Soviet branch of the Church and, risking persecution, formed their own Adventist church that was completely independent of the Soviet State, as well as completely illegal. This organization, eventually known as the All-Union Church of True and Free Seventh Day Adventists, became one of the most consequential religious organizations in the Soviet Union in spite of its relatively small size. Operating with more secrecy than either the Reform Baptists or Christians of the Evangelical Faith, and with far fewer members, the True and Free Adventists engaged in large-scale human rights activities that reached even the West in their attempt to pressure the Soviet government to grant them civil rights. This small church, probably composed of no more than 3,000 adherents at any given time,1 had a higher percentage of its members endure arrest and other persecution than the other churches in this study. The harsh anti-dissident campaign begun in the late 1970's took an unequivocally greater toll on the True and Free Adventists than on the Reform Baptists or unregistered Pentecostalists. True Adventists paid a dear price for their crusade against human rights violations in the USSR and their valiant efforts to survive the repressive decades. 1978 can be seen as the beginning of staunch repressions meted against the True Adventists as a wave of arrests that year signaled the Soviet State's intentions toward the sect. This upsurge in persecution coincides with the betrayal of top Church leader and his collaboration with the KGB.2 On 14 March 1978 at 6:00 AM, 40 Adventist homes throughout the USSR were concurrently searched, and among those arrested during the raids was 82-year-

1 "Ot redaktora" in N. Mitrokhin. Dokumenti po istorii vsyesoyuznoi tserkvi vernykh i svobodnykh adventistov sed'mogo dnya (Documents on the history of the all-union church of true and free seventh day adventists). Moscow. 1995, 2 2 "K istorii VTs VSASD" in Mitrokhin, 15

95 old Church Council Chairman Vladimir Shelkov.3 Shelkov was tried and sentenced to 5 years in a strict-regime camp, his fourth term of imprisonment, which he did not survive.4 After Shelkov's in-camp death in 1980, the All-Union Council of True and Free Seventh Day Adventists experienced internal conflict and schism. The arrest of remaining central church leaders, Adventist human rights activists, and participants in church printing operations served to make matters even worse. Indeed, though the Church continued in name to 1985, its influence had been expunged, and its significance as an opponent to Soviet ideology effectively neutralized. This chapter discusses those trends and factors that led to the virtual ruin of the True and Free Adventist Church by 1983, as well as factors contributing to its successes beginning in 1953. Several factors kindled the state’s drive to destroy the church and allowed this devastation to be realized. First of all, The True Adventists were the product of a schism that drew away only a small percentage of church members, and thus they had the smallest body of adherents of any of the churches in this study. True Adventist theology and ideology was the strictest of the three churches and caused them the most difficulties from both Soviet authorities and the Soviet citizenry. They had the most highly centralized leadership body of all the churches – though these leaders were amply guarded from infiltration, once penetrated, the church could not recover without another strong, charismatic leader. Central True Adventist leaders, at the charge of V. Shelkov, were the only top leaders in this study who not only approved of involvement with Soviet human rights workers, but wholeheartedly led the church in a human rights campaign beginning even before the formation of the Helsinki Watch Group. With so many marks against them from the vantage of the Soviet state, then, the question that remains is not why this church was effectively demolished by the mid-80’s, but how it survived as long as it did.

Historiography Information available on the All-Union Church of True and Free Seventh Day Adventists is and was quite limited, and this shortage is reflected in the available literature. Marite Sapiets's book True Witness published in 1990 is the only scholarly work focused on this illegal branch of

3 Ibid. 4 Ibid.

96 Adventism to date. Sapiets gives a comprehensive history of Adventism in Russia, a short treatment of the officially sanctioned Adventist body, and extensive attention particularly to True and Free Adventist leader Vladimir Shelkov and his high profile trial in 1979. Her sources on the True and Free Adventists come primarily from the vast store of Adventist samizdat held at the Keston Institute in England, as well as from the samizdat archive to which I was not able to gain access. She also cites the Chronicle of Current Events in this work that covers the True and Free Adventists primarily from an outsider's perspective. Though Sapiets’ study is essential and impressive considering the general lack of information on True and Free Adventists, it leaves many questions on the church unanswered, and paints an incomplete picture of these believers. Ludmila Alexeyeva's significant book Soviet Dissent, goes one step further in portraying the church as a dissident organization from the perspective of a dissident, as with the Reform Baptists and Pentecostalists. She, too, frequently cites the Chronicle of Current Events, which she fills in with a few citations of press releases as well as her personal knowledge on the religious organization. A few other secondary sources in addition to Sapiets' and Alexeyeva's works are also occasionally cited, though they present little information not found in the main sources. Both Sapiets and Alexeyeva present the most complete picture of the True and Free Adventists possible given the body of sources available, but a collection of interviews, memoirs, and documents compiled by one N. Mitrokhin, apparently himself once a True and Free Adventist, was released in 1995 as a part in a series of volumes on various dissident organizations in the USSR. The compilation is entitled Dokumenti po istorii vsyesoyuznoi tserkvi vernykh i svobodnykh adventistov sed'mogo dnya (Documents on the history of the all- union church of true and free seventh day adventists), and presents the church's history from an insider's vantage. Particularly valuable for the current study is Mitrokhin's inclusive summary of the church's history from the schism in the 1920's to significant happenings in 1983, with some remarks on the fate of these Adventists to 1994. Also included in Mitrokhin's compilation are the transcribed memoirs of the late Vera Shelkova recorded on tape in 1978, and interviews with prominent church leader Aleksei Murkin and former church member Oleg Kovalyov. Shelkova's memoirs represent a deeply personal account of she and her husband Vladimir Shelkov’s lives, as well as happenings in the church most outstanding to her. The interviews of A. Murkin and O. Kovalyov provide further details on the operation of the church, and also reveal a more

97 subjective rendering of events that adds further dimension to the big picture. Mitrokhin's collection also includes short biographies of prominent church members, letters from V. Shelkov to family members while in imprisonment, and a Church Declaration outlining the organization’s dogma and goals.

Factors Possibly Contributing to Church's Successes and Failures Elements of Adventist History in Russia/USSR Adventist teachings came to Russia and other regions of future Soviet territory in the late 1870's first through religious literature outlining the sect's teachings, then a few years later by way of missionary efforts of some few re-emigrants from the Ukraine who had been converted in the United States.5 As with the other new, "foreign" religions in Russia, the early converts were drawn primarily from the newly literate peasantry and artisans, many of which were of German descent,6 though only a few decades later converts of Ukrainian and Russian descent began to predominate.7 Adventists in the Russian Empire organized themselves early on in a General Meeting attended by 100 delegates in 1890, and as with the Baptists and Pentecostalists, state- enforced exile of active proselytizers eventually led to the establishment of congregations in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Siberia.8 By 1900, Adventists in the Russian Empire could boast 1,037 members in 28 congregations,9 a number that was to dramatically increase upon the enactment of the Edict of Toleration in 1905. In 1906 the Tsarist state officially recognized the Seventh Day Adventist Church,10 and by 1914 there were 5,880 church members in 240 congregations as restrictions and repressions eased and missionary efforts could be carried out on a larger scale.11 As of 1924 the church had practically doubled in size, and there were 11,000 Adventists in the USSR worshipping in 430 congregations. 24 congregational unions, 5 regional unions, and 1 All-Union body had flourished to this point, with adherents scattered over the expanse of the vast nation.12

5 Marite Sapiets. True Witnesses: The Story of the Seventh Day Adventists in the Soviet Union. Keston, England: Keston College. 1990, 25-26 6 Ibid., 24 7 Ibid., 29 8 Ibid., 34 9 Ibid., 35 10 Ibid., 36 11 Ibid., 38 12 "Deklaratsiya" in Mitrokhin, 96

98 Not all was well in the Russian Seventh Day Adventist Church on the eve of World War I, however. Along with the war came a debate over the issue of bearing arms. Adventist doctrine had always stressed obedience to the sixth commandment, "thou shalt not kill", and in 1914 this issue divided the Russian church.13 14 The disputation was amplified with the onset of the Civil War after the Bolshevik takeover of Russia in 1917. The internal debate in the church subsided somewhat only after Lenin issued a decree in 1919 making allowances for religious conscientious objectors of warfare to serve in non-combat capacities. The dispute was to resurface upon the decree's dissolution in 1926, only two years after Lenin's death.15 In 1924, the Soviet Adventist Church modified its strict stance against participation in combat16 and relegated the choice of whether or not to bear arms to the individual.17 The alteration of the official Soviet Adventist stance on combat didn't end in 1924, however, and at the fated Sixth Congress in 1928, church leaders affirmed that: "Seventh Day Adventists are bound to 'render to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's', accepting state civil and military service in all forms, on the same basis as all other citizens. Anyone who teaches otherwise and incites others to avoid state duties will be regarded by the congress as a false teacher . . . breaking the unity of God's Church and placing himself outside the Seventh Day Adventist organisation [sic]."18

This resolution presented a problem to those Adventists unwilling to compromise their beliefs in the name of cooperation with an atheistic regime, and the Russian Union of the Field of True Seventh Day Adventists19 was born. It was an illegal organization from the start, and was persecuted by the authorities from its inception.20 No doubt had the Soviet Adventists remained united on the issue of bearing arms, the church would have been better able to weather the storms to come. The problem of unity consistently plagued the True Adventist Church throughout its existence. Though relations with the official Adventist body remained cold from the 1920's and onward, other schismatic Adventist groups continued to form from the state sanctioned group.

13 Alexeyeva, 232 14 The Adventist Church in Germany experienced a similar division over the issue of bearing arms at this time (Sapiets, 54) 15 Sapiets, 52-54 16 following the example of the General Conference of the Seventh Day Adventists who liberalized their policy toward combat after WWI 17 "Deklaratsiya" in Mitrokhin, 96-97 18 Sapiets, 55-56 19 "K istorii VTs VSASD" in Mitrokhin, 7 20 Alexeyeva, 233

99 True Adventist Chairman Vladimir Shelkov always discouraged open collaboration with these groups, though there is some evidence that some church members made contacts with them. Further, excommunication was used unsparingly by True Adventist leaders, which became problematic for the church in the early 80's when top leaders were excommunicating each other.

Church Components The True Adventist Church was a small organization with a strict theology and relatively rigid structure that likely facilitated the church’s continued existence until the 80's. This inflexibility, however, contributed to some of the church's defeats as, unlike the unregistered Pentecostalists in particular, it was unable to adapt to and recover from state policies enacted against it. Much of True and Free Adventist theology and ideology was closely related to that of the other churches in this study. Just as most Christian religious organizations, the True and Free Adventist doctrine found its nucleus in the Bible, in both the Old and New Testaments. Faith in Jesus Christ was of paramount importance, as was the strict keeping of the 10 Commandments. The keeping of the fourth commandment, "Thou shalt not kill"21 and the sixth, "Remember the Sabbath to keep it holy" were especially important to True and Free Adventists who promoted abstaining from bearing arms, and stressed the importance of consecrating the Sabbath Day completely to the Lord.22 A strong work ethic was essential in both weathering the storms of life and in giving of oneself to the church.23 As the Reform Baptists and Pentecostalists, True and Free Adventists strongly believed in the separation of church and state.24 In spite of their similarities, True and Free Adventist doctrine differed from that of their fellow Christians in a number of significant ways. While Adventists shared a respect for the Sabbath Day with other Christian bodies, Adventists the world around consider Saturday, not Sunday, to be the Lord's Day. In the USSR this presented a problem none too rarely, as Saturday was a work or school day just like any other. Adventists who chose to not send their children to school on Saturdays, or to not go to work could subject themselves to reprimand from the authorities, and could face losing their job, or even losing custody of their children. Soviet

21 Alexeyeva, 232 22 Ibid. 23 "Deklaratsiya" in Mitrokhin, 95 24 Alexeyeva, 233

100 Adventists celebrated no holidays besides the Sabbath, including Christmas and Easter, as they considered them to have their roots in paganism.25 Another Adventist doctrine was a health code to be followed "according to personal convictions,"26 which prescribed abstinence not only from alcohol and tobacco, but pork, coffee, black tea, and other narcotic substances. Some Adventists even chose to be completely vegetarian, which was extolled as the ideal way of living.27 Adventist prisoners in Soviet labor camps sometimes risked near starvation in order to avoid broths prepared with pork.28 Further, church members were tithed a full 20% of their income – 10% was set aside to support church leaders rendered unable to work in their travel and basic living expenses, about 6.6% was used "for various needs for church meetings and activities,"29 and the remaining approximate 3.3% was consecrated to help the poor. In addition, members gave "Sabbath offerings" each Saturday at church services in a show of selflessness.30 Though such practices surely constituted a sacrifice on the members' part, they must have also served to create a tight- knit organization of only those wholly committed and sincere.31 Thus, True and Free Adventist theology and ideology probably contributed to both successes in the church as well as some of its obstacles to success. The strict way of life and unique convictions probably served to unite the small church. However, the Adventist Saturday Sabbath in particular appears to have made them an easier target for the state in anti-religious propaganda. When True Adventist Oleg Kovalyov was a child, he was the first in his town to refuse school attendance on Saturdays, and was showcased as a neglected child from a backward family in a local newspaper: ". . . I was the first schoolchild in Fergana who openly proclaimed to be Adventist. Then in 1963 an untrue article came out in the newspaper. The plot is as follows - 'A boy was standing on a garbage (heap) and was crying. He was approached and asked: "Why are you crying?" "Mama doesn't let me go to the movies." As it later turned out, his last name was Kovalyov, and he is brought up in a religious spirit'."32

25 "Deklaratsiya" in Mitrokhin, 95 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 "Interv'yu s Alekseyem Ivanovichem Murkinom" in Mitrokhin, 68 29 "K istorii VTs VSASD" in Mitrokhin, 8-9 30 Ibid., 9 31 See Lawrence R. Iannoccone. "Why Strict Churches are Strong." American Journal of Sociology. 99(5): 1180- 1211, for a discussion on the benefits of strictness in churches. 32 "Interv'yu s Olegom Iosifovichem Kovalyovym" in Mitrokhin, 81

101 In addition, the issue of Sabbath observance in labor camps became the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back after Shelkov's death and caused a rift between two factions as a feud erupted on the matter between two top church leaders.33 During the years between Stalin's death and the implementation of Khrushchev's campaign against religion, the True Adventists underwent an overhaul of church structure and leadership. Shelkov presided over the training and organization of new preachers,34 and in 1956 the True Seventh Day Adventists organized the Church Council consisting of Vladimir Shelkov, Aleksei Murkin, and Vera Shelkova,35 with Shelkov acting as the Council’s Chairman. Council members subsequently organized a system of local unions, of which there were five, to govern pockets of congregations.36 Other titles and offices held by church members were as follows: apostle, preacher,37 evangelist,38 pastor, teacher, and Bible worker.39 Available sources do not clarify how individuals were chosen to hold these titles, or what responsibilities were allocated to whom. In the early 70’s after release from another term of imprisonment, Shelkov broadened the Church Council of the True Adventists, and two other men were appointed to the Council40 while Shelkov’s wife and daughter41 were selected to be advisors to the Council.42 It is apparent that Shelkov sought to minimize the chance of Soviet infiltration by only appointing very trusted individuals to lead the church "at the top". Besides himself, the only others on the Council or acting as advisors were his wife, son-in-law, daughter, close friend Aleksei Murkin who had shunned military service to join the “True” Adventist movement upon Shelkov’s personal advisement,43 A. Murkin’s brother,44 and one who had been on the Council since the 50’s.45 This tactic appears to have served the Church well until a Regional Council leader was eventually

33 Aleksei Murkin and Ilya Lepshin 34 "K istorii VTs VSASD" in Mitrokhin, 8 35 "Interv'yu s Alekseyem Ivanovichem Murkinom" in Mitrokhin, 70 36 "K istorii VTs VSASD" in Mitrokhin, 8 37 propovednik 38 blagovestnik 39 "Interv'yu s Alekseyem Ivanovichem Murkinom" in Mitrokhin, 67 40 Ilya Lepshin and Ivan Kuz 41 Dina Lepshina 42 "K istorii VTs VSASD" in Mitrokhin, 11 43 "Interv'yu s Alekseyem Ivanovichem Murkinom" in Mitrokhin, 66 44 Mikhail 45 Ivan Kuz

102 recruited as an informer for the KGB sometime in the late 70's,46 after which the church’s hierarchy and status in general were severely compromised. The All-Union Church of True and Free Seventh Day Adventists was a tightly organized church. Though information is lacking, it would not be surprising to find if they were just as organized as the Reform Baptists. Certainly, the True and Free Adventists gave more credence to official organization than did the Christians of the Evangelical Faith. This high level of organization was likely a double-edged sword – without it they may never have remained a cohesive body and surely could not have carried out such successful printing and human rights operations. On the other hand, once the authorities broke into the upper level of leadership, the church failed to recover from the blow. The two initial leaders of the Russian Field of True Seventh Day Adventists47 perished in Stalin’s camps, but not before Shelkov could be ordained as deputy head of the church and put in a position to take over church leadership if circumstances so necessitated.48 Throughout his leadership of the church from 194949 to his death in 1980, Vladimir Shelkov exerted a huge influence over the church’s course, as well as on its success. As one of the few original participants in the schism of the 1920’s to survive the brutally repressive years of Stalin’s leadership,50 Shelkov must have brought with him a legitimacy that no one could question. Further, he was a charismatic figure who had a great deal of influence over many with whom he came into contact. Kovalyov refers to him as a "legend,"51 and Mitrokhin refers to him as the "grandfather."52 His personal influence also carried over into other spheres of influence – not only were most of the human rights ideas published by the church from his own pen, but his acquaintance with Soviet dissident Aleksandr Ginzburg while in imprisonment was mutually invigorating for the two men, and this contact would later serve to forge strong ties between the True Adventist Church and the Helsinki Watch Group. Shelkov’s authority in the Church was almost absolute. According to accounts, he maintained tight control over certain aspects of the church, such as the selection of Church

46 "Interv'yu s Olegom Iosifovichem Kovalyovym" in Mitrokhin, 89 47 Gregory Ostvald and Pyotr Manzhura 48 Alexeyeva, 233 49 "Biografia - Shelkov Vladimir Andreevich (Dedushka Volodya)" in Mitrokhin, 282 50 Shelkov was arrested in 1945, and sentenced to execution. This was shortly repealed to a 10-year term of imprisonment (Chr 49, 58-59) 51 "Interv'yu s Olegom Iosifovichem Kovalyovym" in Mitrokhin, 85 52 "K istorii VTs VSASD" in Mitrokhin, 10

103 Council members. Family members, those who had spent years of imprisonment with him, and those whom he had long known were the only ones entrusted with positions of central authority in the church. In other respects, however, Shelkov delegated responsibilities to others.53 Upon pondering Vladimir Shelkov and his influence in the church, I must conclude that the fate of the True and Free Adventists would likely have followed a drastically different path without his leadership. It seems plausible to consider that the church may not have lasted so long without him at the helm; his ability to inspire and shape the movement, as well as devise survival tactics, was doubtless essential. Yet it is also possible that the church may have boasted a longer lifespan with a leader less willing to pour so much of the church's precious resources into the defense of human rights. Much was required of members of the True and Free Adventist church. Not only did they adhere to a strict set of beliefs and practices, but many were called upon to sacrifice more than most Reform Baptists and Penecostalists. All church members had to be ready to allow their homes and apartments to be used for worship services, and anyone could be asked to open their home as a "safe house" where families and individuals could live away from the government's view in order to escape arrest and other actions. In spite of these restrictions, Mitrokhin notes that during the “Thaw”, the church began to consist largely of "comparatively young people"54 whose fresh resolve must have strengthened the church as a whole. This must have served to boost the morale of those already seasoned in the faith – not only was the church growing, but hopes were sustained that the faith would continue through the generations. In an interview with Oleg Kovalyov, he expresses resentment toward the tight hold Shelkov and other leaders held over the Church. It may be surmised that he was not alone, as True and Free Adventist leaders seem to have had the firmest control over church operations of all the churches examined in this study. If an activity of some type was to take place, it appears that the leadership first authorized it. Further, Adventist doctrine did not stress individual autonomy as did Baptist and Pentecostal ideology.

53 The duties associated with the church’s printing activities were given to others to handle. 54 "K istorii VTs VSASD" in Mitrokhin, 9

104 Church Activities, and Tactics to Continue Them Not only did the True and Free Adventists take advantage of the relative freedom of the “Thaw” to grow and regroup structurally, but they also developed and implemented a variety of tactics to protect themselves from state repression and infiltration. They set up a network of small private homes, which they had purchased for the purpose of secreting those church members most vulnerable to arrest. The home of any member could be used to hide refugees as well as to store illegal religious literature.55 The Adventists called this web the "sarepta" after the Biblical Zarapheth,56 57 and those housed in it most often were hunted preachers, young men avoiding conscription into the army, and families threatened with the deprivation of their parental rights.58 One member describes the conditions there of those in hiding: "A person in the 'sarepta' did not necessarily sit somewhere in a quiet bunker. Such were few. The larger part of them lived completely openly, but with forged documents. They settled in homes belonging to the church, supported themselves by working at the Workers' Cooperatives doing odd jobs . . . , and continued to function in society."59

Without such a proactive tactic implemented at this crucial time, the True and Free Seventh Day Adventists may never have survived the anti-religious campaign shortly to follow. Because of the state's new policy of removing Adventist children from homes where they were given a religious education, many parents attempted to hide their children from the state and not send them to school, preferring illegal existence to the risk of their children being taken by the state to be raised in an atheistic boarding school.60 In addition, Adventists often worked in menial occupations such as a janitor61 or a photographer. With such a job, one was not compelled to work on Saturdays.62 Also, cars were purchased for church use, presumably to prevent Shelkov’s arrest. There were two cars in use in Central Asia. Shelkov traveled between safe houses in a car for the handicapped by a chauffer who was himself handicapped.63 Because of governmental raids on church meetings during Khrushchev anti-religious campaign, True Adventists used the private homes of church members for worship services. In

55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 The place where the Biblical prophet Elijah found refuge and material assistance from a poor widow (1 Kings 17: 9-16) 58 "K istorii VTs VSASD" in Mitrokhin, 9 59 Ibid. 60 "Interv'yu s Olegom Iosifovichem Kovalyovym" in Mitrokhin, 81 61 dvornik 62 "Interv'yu s Olegom Iosifovichem Kovalyovym" in Mitrokhin, 81 63 Ibid., 84, 87

105 Tashkent, the Adventists utilized more than ten places for worship; in the Fergana Valley there were two. They rarely met in large numbers as the Reform Baptists did.64 However, those from different cities would sometimes gather en masse65 in the countryside away from the spectatorship of the authorities for special occasions.66 Adventist tactics to continue worship by meeting in small numbers at private homes, oftentimes at night, appear to have been largely successful. In the Chronicle of Current Events, there are far fewer stories of busts on Adventist worship services than on those of the Reform Baptists, for example, whose prayer meetings were plagued with raids. Further, the network of safe houses appears to have served the Adventists well. It was not until 1978 after the infiltration of the Church Council that the locations of such houses were made known to the authorities, and they could be searched. True Adventist missionary efforts were most successful during the period immediately following Stalin's death, but seem to have dwindled after that time. Little mention is made of Adventist proselytizing in the sources and there is no documentation of their views on missionary work. However there is a sporadic mention of converts and baptisms during the period under consideration. Alexeyeva cites the praise of Catholic priests in the USSR for Adventist proselytizing successes.67 True Adventists had been engaged in the duplication of religious literature by hand at least since the 1950's,68 but with the establishment of the 'True Witness' publishing house in the early 70's, religious literature of various types began to be printed in abundance.69 Shelkov's 1967 return from prison heralded a boost in both the "quality and quantity"70 of Adventist religious literature and catalyzed the formation of a committee of individuals to oversee editing and printing operations.71 The printing ventures of the True and Free Adventists were indeed impressive, as enough Bibles and other religious literature were printed to supply the entire church from the early 70's and on. Per capita, the Adventists engaged in the printing and distribution of more religious

64 Ibid., 81 65 from 300 individuals and higher 66 "Interv'yu s Olegom Iosifovichem Kovalyovym" in Mitrokhin, 81 67 Alexeyeva, 243 68 "K istorii VTs VSASD" in Mitrokhin, 10 69 "Interv'yu s Alekseyem Ivanovichem Murkinom" in Mitrokhin, 75 70 "K istorii VTs VSASD" in Mitrokhin, 10 71 Ibid., 11

106 literature than any of the other religious organizations under investigation in the current study. Four types of religious literature were printed en masse: the Bible; Bible commentaries, the bulk of which were likely written by Shelkov;72 collections of sermons given by True Adventist leaders; and books written by American church founders such as Ellen White that had been translated into Russian.73 Religious poetry penned mostly by contemporary church members was also popular among the dissident Adventists.74 In a document prepared by the prosecution in a suit against a church member75 in the early 80's, Soviet experts analyzed 247 Adventist documents confiscated during their searches of Adventists involved in samizdat production and circulation. They found that of the 247 documents, 167 of them (67.6%) were of a purely religious nature, 73 touched on both religion and human rights (29.5%), and only two documents were "mainstream dissident" in nature (0.8%).76 77 The 'True Witness' publishing house certainly contributed to the dissident Adventists' successes in the 70's – with no shortage of religious literature, the church was freer to operate, and adherents likely benefited from the bounty. The press was also essentially successful as an illegal enterprise as it, for the most part, avoided the raids that beleaguered Reform Baptist printing operations. These successes notwithstanding, the Soviet authorities soon made it their goal to shut down the press and punish those at all associated with its operation. In January 1977 the Chronicle reports the searches of five Adventist homes in three villages near Krasnodar for "illegally sold objects."78 The authorities subsequently found and confiscated a large stash of religious books published by the True Witness publishing house along with some other "contraband" items.79 In June 1977 a series of raids were enacted against the True and Free Adventists in the Kabardino-Balkar Autonomous Republic in the Northern Caucasus allegedly with the goal of discovering the 'True Witness' printing press, as search warrants indicated a search for paper and binding equipment that “could have been stolen” from a local state-run publishing house. The search was partially successful as pieces of an old printing press were

72 Alexeyeva, 234 73 "K istorii VTs VSASD" in Mitrokhin, 10 74 Ibid., 13 75 Gennadi Bedarev 76 5 were unestablished in content (2.1%) 77 from "The conclusions of experts on the sectarians, case no. 25sl106"; in "K istorii VTs VSASD" in Mitrokhin, 17 78 Chr 44, 157-58 79 Ibid.

107 found in the home of one True Adventist, who was later sentenced to three years' imprisonment in spite of his ill health.80 Several individuals suffered arrest and imprisonment for refusing to either cooperate with the KGB in its search for the 'True Witness' press or become informants, and two such individuals who were healthy before their imprisonment shortly died in camp of "unexplained illnesses."81 Detailed reports circulated in samizdat regarding the detention of True Adventist Yakov Dolgotyor on 29 January 1978 in Stavropol territory in the south of the Russian Federation. 19- year-old Dolgotyor was questioned by KGB officers about the origins of publications of 'The True Witness Publishing House' found on his person. Upon his refusal to cooperate, Dolgotyor alleged that his interrogators beat him and applied "some sort of chemical preparation" to his hand, causing it to become inflamed and swollen. According to Dolgotyor's account, he was moved to a psychiatric hospital where he was again questioned about the religious literature. He was held there for around three weeks before being transferred to a jail and then released on 1 March 1978. Dolgotyor was arrested again in August 1978, and later tried and sentenced to 4 years' imprisonment."82

Protest True Adventist protest activities were impressive, and accounts of their protest were almost as prolific in the Chronicle as that of the Reform Baptists and unregistered Pentecostalists in spite of the church's small size. The True and Free Seventh Day Adventists were the only religious organization in this study that, from the top, advocated both protest against the state and involvement with Soviet human rights workers. Indeed, Shelkov was a strong proponent of civil rights and even personally directed his coreligionists in the human rights struggle from the beginning of his church leadership. After his 1967 release from imprisonment, Shelkov emerged from the squalor of the camps determined to pursue an active campaign for human rights. Thus, in 1970 the church was renamed the All-Union Church of True and Free Seventh Day Adventists.83

80 Sapiets, 84 81 Alexeyeva, 238 82 Prisoners of Conscience -1980, 44-45 83 "K istorii VTs VSASD" in Mitrokhin, 11 (italics added)

108 Further, throughout his leadership of the church, Shelkov himself authored an impressive collection of human rights essays, articles and books. He resumed his writing after his second 10-year stint in imprisonment. One of Shelkov's brochures entitled "A Unified Ideal" outlined his thoughts on civil rights, and was published and distributed copiously.84 In 1972-73 the 'True Witness' publishing house printed the first five books of Shelkov's standard work The Struggle for Freedom of Conscience Against the Dictator of State Atheism, a work 1,000 pages long in its entirety. These books were to be found in every Adventist household.85 The general themes covered in Shelkov's human rights works were the relationship between Church and State, and in particular how religious believers should relate to secular authority. Shelkov argued that religious believers should both recognize and be subject to governments, but that governments should be neutral toward all religions and ideologies. As the Soviet State was clearly subjective in its treatment of churches and religions, Shelkov sharply denounced the Soviet system with its “state atheism”86 and legally existing churches restricted to subservience to the state.87 The All-Union Church of True and Free Seventh Day Adventists more closely resembled a dissident organization than did the other churches in this study. Indeed, tape recordings of not only sermons and psalms were produced and distributed to church members, but contraband recordings of radio programs including “The Voice of America”, “Freedom”, and “The German War” were also had in abundance by the True Adventists for purposes of education.88 With Shelkov as their leader, there was no clear-cut line between the practicing of one's religion and the struggle for human rights. Collaboration with official members of the dissident movement, however, did not come about until 197689 in spite of Shelkov's previous prison acquaintance with Aleksandr Ginzburg. Notwithstanding the readiness of many True Adventists to participate in the church's protest and human rights operations, not everyone in the church was always thrilled to be engaged in a struggle for human rights, especially after Shelkov's death. In retrospect, Oleg Kovolyov remarks:

84 Chr 38, 140 85 "K istorii VTs VSASD" in Mitrokhin, 12 86 Shelkov regularly referred to “state atheism”, or gosateism, in his works. 87 Alexeyeva, 234 88 "K istorii VTs VSASD" in Mitrokhin, 14 89 Alexeyeva, 236

109 "In 1980 Shelkov died in imprisonment. . . . And the [Adventist] struggle [for human rights] weakened immediately. Many, for example, had been against the circulation of 'Open Letters'. Many were already in imprisonment, there were many orphans, widows, and families of prisoners . . . I became quite disenchanted because a KGB informant was found in the immediate circle around Shelkov. This person had been an apostle and led one of the local Church Councils."90

He continues:

"After this, I understood the futility of my activities. After all, the KGB had all of us in the palm of their hands. I stopped working for human rights and then decided to live a legal life."91

Despite his withdrawal from dissident activities, Kovalyov was arrested in 1980, held in state custody for a time without any formal accusations, then accused of distributing open letters. He was sentenced to two years' imprisonment,92 after which he abandoned his activity in the church altogether.93 As a rule, the True and Free Adventists did not engage in demonstrations like the Reform Baptists and the Pentecostal emigration activists. The only demonstration mentioned in all the available literature is a small gathering of some True Adventists in Kharkov protesting the arrest of one of their members. The Kharkov Adventists had been experiencing especially difficult episodes with the authorities, exemplified by the following incident recorded in the Chronicle: "On the morning of 23 July 1977 the house of Kharkov Adventist I. A. Konev was besieged by an operations-group of eight people. Amongst them were KGB and MVD officials, police and voluntary militia. Captain N. M. Fomin was in command. In the house, besides Konev, were his children and sick mother. The raiders climbed over the fence and demanded to be let in to the house. The owners did not open the door. For three-and-a-half hours the raiders drummed on the windows and doors, swore at the owners and threatened them with reprisals. Then they caused a short-circuit, cutting off the electricity supply to the house. This very nearly caused a fire. The guardians of law and order trampled beds of tomatoes near the house, picked cherries and apples in the garden, and, getting into the hen-house, sucked eggs."94

This was repeated on 17 December 1977, only this time there were 15 officials engaged in the activity in which "they tried to break down the doors, broke a window and wanted to climb

90 "Interv'yu s Olegom Iosifovichem Kovalyovym" in Mitrokhin, 88 91 Ibid., 89 92 Ibid., 89-91 93 Ibid., 93 94 Chr 48, 119

110 through it into the house, but stopped when they saw that the owners were photographing them."95 It is unknown what affect the demonstrators had on the tense situation in Kharkov. From the mid-70's through the early 80's the primary mode of domestic protest for the True and Free Adventists was the printing and circulation of samizdat letters, brochures, and open letters, most of which were addressed to foreign government officials. It appears that this "anti-Soviet" samizdat worked less in the Adventists' favor than they might have hoped, as no known concessions were made to the church, but rather the state all the more diligently sought its demise. 20 people were arrested in conjunction with one True Adventist open letter alone.96 Though not the primary audience sought in their appeals and petitions, some True and Free Adventist samizdat was directed toward their own government. Shelkov led the church in a campaign protesting the new Soviet Constitution that was to go into effect in October 1977. While the Adventists were by no means the only religious group to protest this Constitution,97 Sapiets observes that they were the "most outspoken"98 in their rejection of the document they viewed as biased toward the "autocratic rule of atheism."99 Apparently, the dissident Adventists harbored little hope that the Soviet government would give heed to their grievances. True and Free Adventists invested much more in broadcasting their situation to foreign governments and organizations, and appealing to them for an alleviation of their persecution. Just as Reform Baptists and Pentecostalists who chose to become involved in the dissident movement, True and Free Adventists under the leadership of Shelkov had great hopes that foreign governments would facilitate the alteration of Soviet policy toward religious believers through the leverage offered by the human rights clauses in the Helsinki Agreements.100 Just as their Evangelical counterparts, True Adventists anticipated the particular assistance of U.S. President Jimmy Carter in the pressuring of the Soviet state to implement the Helsinki Agreement's human rights clauses.101 Shelkov personally penned several letters to Carter during 1976-77 alone in which he appealed to the "Christian President of such a great country"102 for aid. In a letter dated 18 February 1977, Shelkov wrote:

95 Ibid. 96 Amnesty International Yearly Report - 1981, 330 97 the Reform Baptists and the Christian Committee led by Gleb Yakunin protested as well 98 Sapiets, 84 99 Ibid., 85 100 Ibid., 80 101 Ibid. 102 Ibid.

111 "I ask you in the name of Christ, who in righteousness doth judge and make war (Revelation 19: 11) against all lies and injustice – do not treat the problem of human rights only as the internal affair of each country, not subject to protest from outside if such rights are violated. All true believers in our country are expecting and hoping that you . . . will turn your attention to this problem and not be led astray by false policies of appeasement, that you will use the power God has given you, as is written, 'for good', 'for the Lord' (Romans 13: 4, 1 Peter 2: 13)."103

When support was dim and assistance slow in coming, Shelkov minced no words in his castigating remarks directed toward informed and idle individuals in the West: "While the dictatorship of state atheism is committing such acts of violence against the conscience and persons of religious believers, we find incomprehensible the indifference and lighthearted unconcern of western state leaders who are Christians and know of our suffering – when we are Christians just like them! How can such leaders calmly sit at one table with unjust persecutors of innocent Christians? How can they, politely smiling and abasing their human and Christian dignity, shaming the image of God in themselves, diplomatically listen to the innocent lies of state atheist diplomats – that in the USSR there is no persecution for religious faith?"104

On 12 January 1979 Dina Lepshina, daughter of Vladimir Shelkov and advisor to the Church Council, sent an open letter to Amnesty International in which she described her father's unfair trial and requested that those conducting the case be placed on trial themselves.105 Unfortunately for the True Adventists, the West would never come to their defense in a significant manner, and Adventist appeals directed to them primarily served to intensify State measures taken against them. The True and Free Adventists appear to have made contact with Soviet human rights activists earlier than any of the other religious movements under consideration in this study, but that contact may have been purely happenstance. Certainly, it was sporadic until after the formation of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group. The first known contact between a True Adventist and a Soviet dissident took place within the confines of a Soviet labor camp sometime between 1957-67. Dissident Aleksandr Ginzburg describes his acquaintance with Shelkov in imprisonment as "play[ing] a decisive role in [his] own moral education as a human being."106 Due to Shelkov's strength in character even after serving years in imprisonment and his firm resolve to crusade for his beliefs no matter the

103 Ibid. 104 Ibid., 81 105 Chr 52, 105 106 A. Ginzburg in La Sierra Today, winter 1979, 3; in Sapiets, 72-73

112 consequences, Ginzburg remarks that he later decided to specifically address the persecution of dissident believers as a member of the Helsinki Watch Group.107 The first mention of the True and Free Adventists in the Chronicle of Current Events was in its June 1970 issue,108 though Alexeyeva comments that this was not based on personal contacts.109 A further advance in the Adventist human rights struggle was exemplified in Shelkov's June 1975 signing of an appeal in conjunction with other Soviet religious organizations. The appeal was addressed to the Soviet government concerning the state of religion in the USSR, and was the first documented collective action taken by Soviet churches. It demonstrates the desire for the persecuted churches to band together and take advantage of international law as a tool for reform, and also serves to foreshadow the collective measures of various dissidents that would characterize the next few years of Adventist human rights work.110 With the formation of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group in 1976 and the resulting amalgamation of the Soviet Christian Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Religious Believers in December 1976, the human rights activities of the All-Union Church of True and Free Seventh Day Adventists were intensified as much of the church's resources were dedicated to this cause and as support from the Helsinki Group quickly materialized. Official interchange between the True Adventists and Watch Group members was established via prominent Crimean Tatar activist Mustafu Dzhemileva who happened to reside in close proximity to True Adventist headquarters in Tashkent.111 Soon Shelkov appointed Rostislav Galetsky to represent the church to the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group, sign human rights documents on behalf of the church, and discuss the church's human rights position with foreign journalists in Moscow.112 Mutual assistance of True Adventists and the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group affords further evidence of strong ties between the church and the newly formed dissident advocacy group. In document 5 of the Helsinki Watch Group dated 5 July 1976 and entitled "Repression Against Families of Believers", the group delineated upon instances of children being taken away from parents, including a case of an Adventist family reported in detail.113 In 1976 the Adventists, for their part, published early drafts of forms for the use of the Moscow Helsinki

107 Ibid., 73 108 No. 14 109 Alexeyeva, 235 110 Ibid., 257 111 "K istorii VTs VSASD" in Mitrokhin, 14 112 Ibid. 113 Alexeyeva, 236

113 Group on the 'True Witness' press. Adventist assistance to the Working Commission for the Investigation of the Use of Psychiatry for Political Purposes, an organization that developed directly from the Helsinki Group, followed as the True and Free Adventists again allowed their press to be used in the general struggle for human rights occurring during this period.114 By 1977,115 the Chronicle of Current Events began carrying regular reports on the True and Free Adventists and specific accounts of persecution borne by Adventist adherents. It is unclear whether this indicates an increase in state persecution of Adventists or merely better communication of information between human rights activists and the Adventists, or both. The True and Free Seventh Day Adventists were exceptionally active in preparing documents to be sent to those states participating in the Belgrade Conference, and such documentation provided the opportunity for the commencement of their dialogue with the West.116 In November 1977 a joint appeal of the Christian Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Religious Believers in the USSR, the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group, the Working Commission to Investigate the Use of Psychiatry for Political Purposes, and the representatives of the True and Free Adventists was addressed to Belgrade Conference participants. Helsinki signatory states were petitioned to consider the state of human rights in the USSR, utilize the mass of information on human rights violations had at their disposal, and protest violations such as the holding of prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, especially of those whose health had been compromised by the severe conditions in the camps.117 In the two year period prior to the Belgrade Conference, True and Free Adventists assisted Reform Baptists and Pentecostalists in addressing 33 letters to signatory states as a means of educating the nations on the plight of religious believers in independent churches worshipping in the USSR. The longest and most explicit of these letters was 68 pages long, written by Shelkov, and entitled: "Facts on the flouting and violation of the Helsinki Agreement and all just laws by the dictatorship of state atheism."118 Ties between the True Adventists and Helsinki Watch Group were further illustrated in the statements they made of each other. Shelkov clearly expressed his admiration for Soviet

114 "K istorii VTs VSASD" in Mitrokhin, 14 115 No. 44 116 Sapiets, 3 117 Alexeyeva, 257 118 Sapiets, 3-4

114 dissidents in such documents as this letter addressed to Sigmund Gutknecht, President of the World Conference of Reform Adventists living in Germany: " . . . the Lord God has raised up from among people outside our number [ . . .] decisive, courageous fighters for freedom of conscience and other universal human rights and freedoms, which are God-given and implanted in man's nature. These various fighters for human rights and freedoms, by their active participation, have created the prophetically- foretold 'noise of many waters', as a manifestation of Christ the Logos, the Word of God outside the Church."119

Shelkov was also quick to appeal in behalf of Helsinki Watch Group members who had fallen prey to the state. In February 1977 when arrested Moscow Helsinki Watch Group founder Yuri Orlov and member Aleksandr Ginzburg faced a mock trial for their "anti-Soviet" activities, Shelkov was the only central church leader of the movements in this study who openly came to their defense.120 The Literature Committee of the True and Free Adventists prepared an appeal for the Belgrade Conference entitled "The Documents Tell" in which they petitioned conference participants to support Soviet human rights activists including Ginzburg, Orlov, and Sakharov.121 For their part, Helsinki Watch Group members and other dissidents in the USSR came to the defense of the imprisoned Shelkov in 1978. The Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers' Right led by Orthodox dissident Gleb Yakunin released an "Appeal to World Christianity" in defense of Shelkov. The appeal expressed admiration for his stalwart devotion to the struggle for religious freedom and civil rights, attributed the arrest to Shelkov’s opposition to the new Soviet Constitution, and placed some of the blame on Western apathy to the "death sentence" of imprisonment for one at such an advanced age.122 The Moscow Helsinki Watch Group, itself reeling from the arrest of key members, was not slow in rendering what support it could to Shelkov's loved ones as Watch Group member Tatyana Osipova visited Shelkov’s family in Tashkent, and the group issued a document123 in accusation of the Soviet state's targeting of members of the True and Free Adventist church.124 Further press was devoted to Shelkov's arrest in issue 49 of the Chronicle of Current Events.125 On 25 September 1978 the

119 Ibid., 82 120 Ibid. 121 "K istorii VTs VSASD" in Mitrokhin, 14 122 Sapiets, 94-95 123 document no. 45 124 Sapiets, 95-96 125 Ibid., 96

115 Moscow Helsinki Group published a report called "The Persecution of the Church of True and Free Adventists" in which they stated:126 " . . . we express our great concern and sympathy for the hunted and persecuted True and Free Adventists. We have a great respect for the self-sacrificing and successful activity of their publishing house 'True Witness', which has developed over many years in seemingly quite impossible circumstances."127

Though the church's human rights activities had largely failed them to this point, Mitrokhin states that "the Church answered the repressions with an intensification of their struggle for human rights"128 in what would be a last-ditch effort to survive the gathering storm. On 11 May 1978, Adventist human rights spokesman Rostislav Galetsky announced the formation of the "Group of the All-Union Church of True and Free Seventh Day Adventists for Legal Struggle and Investigation of the Facts of Persecution of Believers in the USSR", composed of himself and six other Adventists. The group's main goal was to broadcast the church's plight to human rights bodies and foreign journalists. During the two years it operated, the group drew up five documents on the repression of Soviet Adventists, which Galetsky distributed to Western journalists. The second goal of the group was to publish and circulate open letters on Shelkov's unjust and inhumane imprisonment.129 Galetsky's 1980 arrest, however, put an end to the True Adventists' human rights activities,130 and it appears that the human rights activities helped put an end to the church.

Conclusions In considering the small size of the church, accounts of True Adventist persecution documented in the Chronicle of Current Events indicate that a greater percentage of True and Free Adventists suffered persecution such as arrest and imprisonment for their faith than any other group of religious believers. In fact, in comparing statistics of the persecution of Reform Baptists and True Adventists, Alexeyeva estimated the True Adventist membership at 50,000.131 In other words, the dissident Adventists underwent approximately 17 times more persecution per member than did the Reform Baptists. Indeed the state exerted a disproportionate amount of its

126 Document 64 127 Chr 51, 146-47 128 "K istorii VTs VSASD" in Mitrokhin, 16 129 Ibid. 130 Chr 57, 70 131 Alexeyeva, 243

116 resources to the shutting down of the True and Free Adventist church, which certainly triggered the church's internal crisis and subsequent organizational rupture. There were many denomination-specific factors working against the True and Free Adventists that made this church more susceptible to collapse during the State countermovement against dissent than either of the other two religious organizations in this study. First of all, the True Adventists had by far fewer elements of history working in their favor. The church had formed during a schism in the 1920's that succeeded in attracting only a fraction of the adherents of the overall Soviet Adventist movement. Only a few years after this schism, Stalin introduced his ruinous policies toward the non-Orthodox churches, and eventually the entire nation that led to the imprisonment and death of the first two early True Adventist leaders, and indeed almost claimed the life of Vladimir Shelkov. The church, therefore, did not experience a period of relaxed state policy toward it until nearly 30 years after its inception during the "Thaw" of the 50's. For these reasons the True Adventist church never succeeded in attaining a significant number of adherents, which contributed to the devastation it met in the 80's. Another factor leading to the relative failure of the True Adventists was the existence of a legal worship alternative in the embodiment of the All-Union Council of Seventh Day Adventists. Admittedly, there are few accounts of crossover to this body, it appears that these "defections" did not occur until the 80's, and there is no mention of a State campaign to register True Adventist congregations. However, there are many questions in the literature left un- addressed, and the dynamics of interchange between the two Adventist bodies may simply be one of them. Certainly, the strictness and relative peculiarity of True Adventist theology led to the church's defeats, both ultimately and throughout the period of time under consideration. Saturday Sabbath observance and prisoner abstinence from pork drew negative state and media attention to the church. It also placed an additional burden on church members that Reform Baptist and Pentecostal adherents were not obliged to cope with to the same degree. The average True Adventist had to be willing to make even more sacrifices for his or her faith than the typical adherent of the other two churches. The high level of centralization within the True Adventist hierarchy, though beneficial in earlier times, was one of the biggest factors leading to the church's near dissolution in the early 80's. The True Adventist church proved unequipped to cope with the ramifications of the 1978

117 imprisonment of Shelkov and his death in 1980. Though, overall, Shelkov's strong leadership arguably led the church to prosper and even survive to 1978, the effective "one-man show" of the True Adventists was far too easy for the Soviet state to dismantle once they succeeded in infiltrating the church's top leadership. In the domain of religious activity, the successful establishment of the 'True Witness' press by the True Adventists was a great source of embarrassment to the authorities, and gave them additional cause to launch a full attack against the sect. True Adventists' vigorous protest and human rights activities gave Soviet authorities added impetus to search and destroy the church. While their efforts in broadcasting their human rights stance and grievances against the state, as well as their participation with Soviet dissidents in the cause, were remarkable given the size of the organization, the state's response to True Adventist protest was far keener than that of the West, and the church suffered accordingly. Just as the Reform Baptists and Pentecostalists who participated in protest activities, True Adventists gained little in terms of immediate concessions. Rather, the state's tactics to arrest key leaders and feed division among the already struggling church132 proved effective in breaking up the bold organization.

132 "K istorii VTs VSASD" in Mitrokhin, 18

118

CONCLUSIONS

Members of the Soviet Reform Baptist, unregistered Pentecostalist, and True and Free Adventist movements should be revered for their perseverance and resourcefulness in the face of the severe restrictions and repressions they faced not only from 1953 to 1985, but throughout the entire Soviet era. Adherents from these churches made significant sacrifices and suffered serious losses in the pursuit of living according to their faith in the USSR. All three religious organizations must be commended for the successes they won, no matter how minute these successes may appear, as even their very survival during this brutal epoch stands as a testament to victory against their opponents. Chapter One expounded upon the barrage of state anti-religious policies and tactics designed to undermine the churches, that claimed victims from among the Reform Baptists, unregistered Pentecostalists, and True Adventists. It also showed, however, that the Soviet state’s cycle of harsh repression followed by periods of lesser persecution and the granting of concessions contributed significantly to the development of movements of religious dissent in the USSR. The “Thaw” following Stalin’s death in 1953 with its corresponding mass amnesty of prisoners, many of which were pastors and active adherents of the three churches, gave rise to a period of religious revival. During the mid-50’s all three religious movements in this study engaged in massive proselytizing operations, and regrouped to a significant degree. This period allowed them to fortify themselves and thus prepare for the renewed persecution shortly to come. Khrushchev’s campaign against religion that came in full sway in 1959 and its injurious policies claimed countless casualties among those worshipping in the churches. However, the unwillingness of the state to initiate a bloodbath and fully annihilate the churches led to the burgeoning of religious dissent beginning in the early 1960’s – in 1961 the Reform Baptist movement commenced its activities, the Pentecostal emigration movement began to take root in

119 1963, and upon the release of True Adventist leader Vladimir Shelkov from imprisonment in 1967, the protest activities of the True and Free Adventist Church blossomed. Through the course of Brezhnev’s first decade of leadership (1964-1974), persecution against the churches persisted, but ceased intensification. This allowed the dissenting churches to develop additional tactics to outwit their adversary and not only continue activity, but in some cases expand their operations. Both the Reform Baptist and True Adventist movements established underground publishing houses in the early 70’s, and illegally printed religious literature. Also, the True Adventists printed a significant amount of samizdat protest from this time forward, and the central leadership rallied the church in a struggle for human rights that involved collaboration with Soviet human rights workers. In addition, some Reform Baptist adherents began to voice complaints on their unjust treatment to human rights activists at this time. With the signing of the Helsinki Agreements in 1975 and subsequent formation of the Helsinki Watch Groups by Soviet dissidents, the protest activities of all three religious movements increased markedly. Along with other dissident groups, the illegal churches now had at their disposal an international document signed by the Soviet state that included human rights clauses, which could be used as a means to appeal to foreign governments to enforce Soviet human rights compliance. The True and Free Adventists as well as those unregistered Pentecostalists campaigning to emigrate made official connections with the Helsinki Watch Group, and some Reform Baptist adherents worked with them as well in an effort to publicize their situation to the West and appeal for their aid in gaining human and civil rights. Protest from the dissident churches reached a peak in the late 70’s, but were largely ineffective. Had Western governments taken more measures in their behalf, the protest efforts of the dissident churches might not have been so fruitless. The upsurge in active protest in the USSR led to a state countermovement against dissent of all types, including the dissident churches in this study, beginning in 1977 and leveling off in 1983-84. This final state campaign against the dissenting churches during the Soviet period proved to be the most threatening of all to the churches’ existence, as the state fully utilized its most effective tactical repertoire since the days of Stalin. Church leaders and activists were arrested and imprisoned on a massive scale, and uncooperative church members were terrorized in almost every possible way. In addition to this, the state employed the highly effective tactic of

120 pressuring Reform Baptist and Pentecostal congregations to register with the AUCECB or with the state as “autonomously registered” units at the same time as it granted registered congregations a number of concessions. Retaining official ties with the dissident churches in the early 80's must have seemed suicidal to many adherents. Thus while the condition to register was incumbent upon adhering to the state’s guidelines, limiting the full expression of faith for these dissident believers, the Reform Baptists in particular lost many congregations to registration that weakened the movement. A number of Pentecostal congregations registered with the state at this time as well. The state made no such efforts to persuade True and Free Adventists to register – with the removal of Vladimir Shelkov from his position of leadership through arrest, imprisonment, and his in-camp death in 1980, the church disintegrated so that by 1983 it fell into schism and out of the dissident scene. Of the three churches, the Pentecostal Christians of the Evangelical Faith were the most successful religious organization to 1985. They had a sizeable population of adherents even before Khrushchev's Thaw, had the most de-centralized governing body, had no true alternative body with which to worship, and engaged in no known printing activities. The segment of the unregistered Pentecostalists not participating in the campaign for emigration appears to be the most successful group of all, as they did not even engage in protest and had no ties to the Soviet human rights movement. The Reform Baptists fared worse than the Pentecostalists, but managed to survive the difficult years of the anti-dissident campaign in spite of their grave losses. The factors that allowed this movement to endure the state repressions were its impressively large base of adherents due to strong roots dating back even to Tsarist times, as well as its more traditional theology that helped it avoid some of the problems the other two churches encountered. The only denomination-specific factors associated with success that allowed the True and Free Adventists to maintain their existence so long were their elegant tactics of secrecy. All the other factors that played a role in their survival also contributed to their demise. Based on a cross-comparison of church successes and defeats, then, the factors most conclusively associated with the successes of the underground churches in this study are: 1) beneficial elements of history, especially the development of a large number of adherents; 2) a de-centralized leadership body; 3) the relative autonomy of church members from their leaders;

121 4) the absence of a legal worship alternative; 5) the absence of printing operations; 6) a high level of secretiveness in the running of church activities; and 7) a more customary theology. Though not every factor was found to be decisively associated with either success or failure, the following factors revealed themselves to be detrimental to the underground religious movements examined: 1) the positive attitude of leaders toward protest and/or involvement with Soviet human rights activists; 2) involvement in protest and human rights activities with or without assistance from human rights workers; and 3) the crossover to a state-sanctioned body of worship. Also implicated in church defeats were the following: 4) the existence of a legal body of worship; 5) the existence of an underground printing press; 6) the engagement in printing operations; 7) the centralization of authority; 8) strictness and/or peculiarity of theology; and 9) the relative inability of members to make choices autonomously from their leaders. Though the situation of religious believers in Russia and the CIS today is much more advantageous for them than it was during the Soviet era, the non-Orthodox Christian religions still face legal and societal difficulties in the 21st century. As of the time of the writing of this work, the Pentecostal “Christians of the Evangelical Faith” in the CIS still refuse registration with the state and practice underground worship for fear of state interference in their activities. The Reform Baptists, even now led by the movement’s initiator Gennadi Kryuchkov, allegedly experience reprisals from Orthodox priests for their successful operations that, in many places, supercede that of the Orthodox Church.1 Little can be said about the True and Free Seventh Day Adventists except that their activities are carried out so clandestinely that not even those sympathetic to the movement know the whereabouts and goings-on of its adherents.2 The fears of religious believers in the CIS3 are not entirely unfounded or based on past experience, as, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, religious freedoms have come under attack in these nations. Though Russian President Boris Yeltsin passed a “Religious Freedom Act” in 1990 even before the USSR’s collapse, in 1993 he pledged to the Russian Orthodox Patriarch to limit the freedoms of foreign missionaries who began to sweep the nation in 1991. In 1997 the Russian Duma and Yeltsin nearly succeeded in passing legislation that would have banned all religions not officially recognized by the Soviet Union, and managed to pass a new law "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Association" that limited religious freedoms for

1 telephone conversation with Yuri Kryuchkov, 29 April 2004 2 "K istorii VTs VSASD" in Mitrokhin, 19 3 Commonwealth of Independent States (former Soviet republics)

122 many churches.4 In November 2002 the government of Belarus passed legislation alarmingly oppressive to religious believers. The new law outlawed all unregistered religious activity, required the censorship of all religious literature, banned foreigners from leadership positions in religious organizations, restricted religious education to faiths that had at least one registered congregation in 1982,5 and banned all religious communities with fewer than 20 participants.6 The Jehovah’s Witnesses of Russia were engaged in a legal battle for their religious freedom in which, as of April 2004, they were prohibited from activity in Moscow because the organization's adherents allegedly endanger public health and "inflame religious divisions."7 The fate of a myriad of other churches in the CIS is currently on uncertain ground as those nations search for their own religious paradigms at the expense of the religious freedom of the minorities. The conclusions of this work may prove useful to religious organizations in Russia and the CIS today who face a restriction on their activities. This study, however, serves only as a preliminary analysis to determine the factors that lead to a dissident religious movement's (or even a non-religious dissident organization's) successes and defeats in a hostile environment. There is no shortage of dissident organizations in the world at large that, if examined, may provide a greater understanding of the ideal operation of a social movement in an antagonistic setting. It is the hope of this author that these factors may be further studied and better understood, for not every worthy cause has the luxury of existing in an ideal environment.

4 Serhii Plokhy. “State Politics and Religious Pluralism in Russia and Ukraine: A Comparative Perspective.” Pp. 297-315 in Protecting the Human Rights of Religious Minorities in Eastern Europe, edited by Peter G. Danchin and Elizabeth A. Cole. Columbia University Press: New York. 2002, 297 5 “Belarus: Repressive Religion Law Gets President’s Signature.” Keston News Service Summary, 28 October – 1 November 2002. 31 October 2002. 6 "New Belarus Religion Law 'Repressive', Watchdog Group says." CNSNews.com. 18 November 2002. 7 "Jehovah's Witnesses Banned in Moscow." NPR.org. 23 April 2004.

123

APPENDIX A

TIMELINE - RELIGION AND MAJOR EVENTS IN RUSSIA/USSR

1818 – New Testament translated into Russian from Church Slavonic 1880’s – Translation of entire Bible into Russian completed 1905 – Revolutions of 1905, passing of Edict of Toleration allowing conversion from Orthodoxy to another faith 1914 – WWI, Orthodox Church supports Tsarist government 1917 – Bolshevik Revolution/Civil War, Lenin declares freedom of religious and anti-religious propaganda 1918 – Decree issued declaring the separation of church and state – Bloody campaign against Orthodox clergy ensues with widespread destruction of churches, monasteries, and religious relics over the next few years 1923 – Formation of the "League of the Militant Godless," heyday of militant atheism begins 1924 – Death of Lenin 1929 – Stalin passes restrictive legislation against the Protestant sects, beginning of a brutal era for them 1942 – During WWII German invasion of the Soviet Union, Stalin allows concordance with churches to boost morale 1944 – Formation of governmentally sanctioned bodies of worship for the Baptists – the All- Union Council of Evangelical Christians-Baptists (AUCECB) 1953 – Death of Stalin, release of political prisoners, many of whom were Christians, beginning of religious revival in USSR July - November 1954 – "100-days" propaganda campaign against religion 1959 – Beginning of Khrushchev's campaign against religion 1964 – Khrushchev ousted from office, Brezhnev replaces him – repression of the churches levels off

124 1975 – The signing of the Helsinki Agreements 1976 – Formation of Moscow Helsinki Watch Group by a few Soviet citizens to "monitor" Soviet compliance with the agreements 1977 – Holding of Belgrade Conference of Helsinki Agreements – Beginning of state countermovement against dissidents, including the dissident churches 1980 – Holding of Madrid Conference of Helsinki Agreements 1982 – Brezhnev dies, Andropov takes office 1983 – Andropov dies, Chernenko takes office March 1985 – Chernenko dies, Gorbachev takes office 1987 – Perestroika in full force

125

APPENDIX B

TIMELINE - REFORM BAPTISTS IN RUSSIA/USSR

1858-1862 – Stundist movement in the Ukraine gets underway 1867 – Lithuanian Baptist Martin Kalveit baptizes Nikita Voronin, a Russian merchant, on 1 September 1867 near Tiflis, Georgia, and the faith begins to propagate in that region 1869 – The arrival of German Baptist leader Johan Gerhard Oncken in the Ukraine catalyzes mass numbers of adult baptisms from among the Stundists, influences the movement to call itself "Baptist" 1874 – Evangelical Christian movement first finds place among the St. Petersburg aristocracy due to the influence of the Englishman Lord Radstock 1879 – Baptists gain right to worship in Russia 1884 – Illegal formation of the Union of Russian Baptists 1892 – Procurator General Pobedonostsev executes a ban on all Stundist meetings that leads to their severe treatment 1909 – Organization of the Union of Evangelical Christians 1923 – 1,000,000 Baptists and Evangelical Christians reported in the USSR; Soviet sources declare only 250,000 Baptist adherents by 1928 1930's – Baptist and Evangelical Christian leaders perish in labor camps by the tens of thousands 1944 – Formation of All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians - Baptists (AUCECB) 1945-1948 – About 1/3 of Baptist and Evangelical Christian congregations register with the AUCECB 1953 – Stalin dies, amnesty of many Baptist/Evangelical Christian adherents and leaders 1953-1957 – Revival among Baptists and Evangelical Christians both within and outside the AUCECB 1950's – Formation of independent Baptist bodies such as the "Pure Baptists" in opposition to AUCECB

126 1957-1964 – Khrushchev's campaign against religion against Baptists/Evangelical Christians, both registered and unregistered. By 1964 the number of Baptist congregations in the USSR had declined by about 50%, leaving only 2,000-3,000 of an initial 5,000 1960 – AUCECB issues its New Statutes and sends out a Letter of Instruction for their implementation 1961 – Secret Soviet legislation is passed that targets Baptists 1961 – Formation of Initiative Group (Initsiativnaya grupa) to enact reform within the AUCECB 13 August 1961 – Members of the Initiative Group hand deliver an accusatory appeal to the AUCECB, insisting on the holding of a Baptist Congress to discuss the New Statutes 23 August 1961 – A second epistle addressed to the general body of ECB believers is distributed to the congregations, exposing the AUCECB as collaborators with the State and asking church members to petition Soviet leaders for a Baptist Congress 1962 – Formation of Organizational Committee (OrgKomitet) to work for "internal church freedom, purification and the unity of all God's people," to push for a congress in an intensified manner, and to draft a document proposing changes to the New Statutes 1962 – Early reform leader and signer of the First Appeal, Aleksei Prokofiev, arrested and sentenced to five years' imprisonment followed by five years of exile 1963 – By October of this year about 150 Reform Baptists are in captivity – AUCECB Conference held in Moscow with no known reformers present; amending of the Statutes 1964 – Torture and killing of Reform Baptist Nikolai Khmara while in imprisonment 23 February 1964 – Council of Prisoners' Relatives formed to gather information on Baptist prisoners, their trials, sentences, and conditions of imprisonment and to broadcast these findings to the church at large 1964 – Reform leaders publish a manual to provide counsel to Baptist parents on raising their children as Christians amidst the Communist morality and ideology of the USSR 1965 – Fraternal Pamphlet, or Bratskii listok, begins monthly publication and contains information on the movement's activities as well as appeals addressed to church members concerning social and religious issues 14 April 1965 – Reform Baptist leadership writes a letter to Brezhnev and other officials working on the new constitution and plead with them to guarantee the freedom of conscience

127 2 September 1965 – A delegation of five Reform Baptists travel to Moscow to meet with Anastas I. Mikoyan, then president of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, with no results 18-19 September 1965 – Underground Reform Baptist conference is held, during which the reformers create a new leadership body of ECB churches, namely the Council of Churches of the Evangelical Christians-Baptists (CCECB) 16-17 May 1966 – Demonstration of 500 Reform Baptists held at Moscow's Pushkin Square, in which they request dialogue with Brezhnev; protesters forcibly dispersed by Soviet authorities 19 May 1966 – CCECB leaders Georgi Vins and Nikolai Baturin visit the Communist Party Central Committee; after two short conversations with officials they are detained outside the building by a group of men ; both men arrested at this time 22 May 1966 – Another group of protesters station themselves at the Old Square demanding to talk with Brezhnev; no results 1966 – Gennadi Kryuchkov arrested December 1969 – State-sanctioned Reform Baptist conference in Tula 1969 – First item on Reform Baptists appears in Chronicle of Current Events, protesting the arrest of Georgi Vins 1970 – Arrests of church leaders begins to increase again 1971 – Establishment of Khritianin printing press, with the initial press located in a small town in Latvia – Founding of Bulletin of Council of ECB Prisoners 1974 – Pieces on the dissenting Baptists begin to appear regularly in the Chronicle of Current Events March 1974 – Georgi Vins is arrested for the second time and sentenced to 5 years in a labor camp plus 5 years of exile; Baptists initiate a letter-writing campaign addressed to Soviet government authorities and international organizations to call for his release 1974 – State raids on the Khristianin press begin; seven Baptists arrested in Latvia in conjunction with their work for the press 1975 – The authorities begin a campaign to register Reform Baptists under the condition that they not recognize the CCECB as their leadership body on the registration papers 1977 – Repression of Reform Baptists increases, while concessions granted to Baptists in the

128 AUCECB increases – AUCECB leaders and spokesmen Zhidkov and Bychkov travel to America and laud the accomplishments of Soviet Baptists achieved to that point in time 1979 – Eight CCECB members arrested and in imprisonment by this time: Antonov – arrested summer 1979, Georgi Vins, Schmidt, Skorniakov, Rytikov, P. Peters, M. Khorev – arrested November 1979, N. Baturin – arrested November 1979 and later sentenced to his fifth term in a labor camp January 1980 – 49 known Baptists prisoners 21 January 1981 – CCECB leader Minyakov’s arrested and imprisoned for the third time 1981 – CCECB leaders P. Rumachik and N. Khrapov arrested May 1982 – At least 150 Baptists are imprisoned – half of all known persons known to be imprisoned for their faith 1983 – The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet adopted a new law criminalizing the failure to obey authorities in Soviet corrective/labor institution 1984 – More than 200 Reform Baptists known to be prisoners of the state

129

APPENDIX C

Appeal to the Presidium of the AUCECB

. . . If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me. Matt. 16: 24

Grace be to you and peace from God the Father and our Lord Jesus Christ, who gave himself for our sins to save us from this cunning age, this according to the will of God and our Father. Glory be to him for all eternity! Amen. Brethren, clergy of the AUCECB! Now the ECB church is experiencing a difficult time, a time when the man's dominion has been established in her, a time of division, error and sufferings not only spiritual but physical. At this time it is a crime before God and His people to cast the Lord's servants aside and render them powerless. Ezek. 9: 10. Therefore having taken hold of the prompting of the Holy Spirit, we deemed it imprudent to consult with flesh and blood. But rather having confirmed our resolve through fasting and prayer, we have decided to correct the situation that has arisen by determining and removing the source of the disastrous consequences that have befallen our church. Joel 2: 12-18. Each time we ask ourselves the question "what is the main reason for the church's failings, who played and still plays the major role in all of this?", -- we unanimously declare: - you, to whom we now turn; you, who at one time with great joy gave your hearts to God through the atonement wrought by Christ Jesus; - you, who held the highest position in the church; - you, who now criminally stand as an obstacle to a restoration of godly order in [the church]. Ezek. 34: 1-10. Therefore it is you whom we unanimously expose, and we declare: 1. You destroyed the godly principle in which all the vitally important issues of the church were resolved by the church itself on the basis of the Word of God. This was a

130 fundamental evil, since the church and only the church is the pillar and confirmation of truth. 1 Tim. 3: 15. 2. You placed clergymen in power who were unacceptable to God and the church and who often had as their goal the destruction of God's work. 3. Grossly denying the Word of God, you distributed the Statutes and the Instructions, which were implemented in the congregations by force. These documents met with protest everywhere, and provoked a painful reaction. Isa. 28: 13-14. 4. With these acts you exerted a negative influence even on the unregistered congregations as your worldly decrees were accepted as the norm by those who wished ill to the Church. The faith and behavior of those in disagreement with you were declared to be questionable, and they were subjected to repression. 5. You outwardly presented yourself in a positive manner even in the eyes of worldwide Christianity, and held a certain position [in the World Christian Organization]. But not having the courage or desire to present the reality that would compromise you, you led the Christian society of the entire world into error and have become guilty before it. These anti-Evangelical measures played the foremost role in the withdrawal of individual believers and entire groups from the church, and in their formation of independent congregations. It also led to a growing influence of various errors on the church. The above-mentioned agenda was not carried out spontaneously, but was painstakingly developed and diligently implemented for the overthrow of the church through the church, an agenda leading to the destruction of the church. Thus, the ECB church in our country today presents the following picture: though largely united in teachings and spirit, it is artificially divided into two camps: the unregistered and registered churches. And if the former experiences a lack of a united central leadership, then the latter, having a central leadership, is assiduously being disrupted by that leadership. In light of the foregoing, we deem that: 1. All ECB congregations in our country, whether they are registered or unregistered, comprise one ECB church in the USSR and should in all ways carry an equal status. 2. It is essential to choose a united central leadership based on the Word of God for both the registered and the unregistered congregations of the ECB church.

131 3. The existing central leadership (the AUCECB) of the registered ECB congregations was not the body chosen by the whole church, does not lead the whole church, and except in part, does not act in the best interests of the church and God’s work. The AUCECB has demonstrated its infidelity before God during its many years of service. Therefore, we propose that: 1. In the interest of the God’s work, we move to correct the current situation through the gentle path of God's wisdom, and not through contention. 2. We all agree on the convening and holding of an Emergency All-Union Congress of the ECB church in the USSR.

We remind all that this auspicious beginning will have far-reaching consequences. In the event of a refusal on your part and also in the event of fraudulent maneuvers and delays, we retain for ourselves the right to act independently according to the direction of the Word of God, and in the interests of the church in accordance with the demands of the present time.

With respect to you, brethren in Christ and clergy of the church, composing the Initiative Group for the convening of the All-Union congress of the ECB church in the USSR.

KRYUCHKOV G. K. PROKOVIEV A. F. Sunday, 13 August 1961

132

APPENDIX D

The First Appeal of the Initiative Group for the Convening of an All-Union Congress of the ECB Church

It is time for thee, Lord, to work: for they have made void thy law. Ps. 118: 126

. . . choose you this day whom ye will serve . . . Josh. 24: 15

"Grace be unto you, and peace, from God our Father . . . Who shall also confirm you unto the end, that ye may be blameless in the day of our Lord Jesus Christ" (I Cor.1: 3, 8).

Beloved in the Lord! You know when and under what conditions the Lord's Church arose in Russia. At that time the Church was "radiant as the morning, fair as the moon, clear as the sun, and terrible as an army with banners" (Song 6: 10). Moved by the Holy Spirit, the clergy of the Church at that time performed their service to Him and the Church selflessly, with hearts sincere and devoted to the Lord. They did this in fetters and prisons, in privation, and in life's manifold conditions, being true till death. Christians were persecuted from without. But seeing their inner sanctity, the Lord could not withhold from them his blessings. Such is the relationship of the Lord to his people yesterday, today and forever (Heb. 13: 8). In the 1920's the Church found itself in a different situation -- the Lord opened wide the door for the preaching of the Gospel. And instead of thanking the Lord, opening the door, and being true to Him, the Church fell into temptation, not having learned from the transgressions of the Christians during the Pergamsk period (Rev. 2: 24).

133 We will now turn to the history of the Church. In the Smirnsk period when Satan was unable to injure the Lord's Church through the world's persecution (Rev. 2: 10) since, within, the Church was pure before the Lord, Satan then changed his tactic. He went from a roaring lion to a cunning serpent. In place of persecution, the secular world began to protect Christians in the days of the Emperor Constantine, and the Church submitted itself to worldly authority. In this cunning manner, Satan and the secular world penetrated the Church during the Pergatsk period. And that which Satan was unable to accomplish through the world's persecution of the Church he accomplished by penetrating into it. As a result, he gradually led it to the point of terrible corruption in the Fiamirsk period. We agree with Sperdzhen in that a thousand demons outside the Church are less dangerous than one who has taken on the appearance of a minister of righteousness and has infiltrated the Church (2 Cor. 11: 13-15). Something similar occurred among us in the 20's when Satan gradually began to subjugate Church leaders and, through them, influence the Church. But, as the saying goes: "if you give a man an inch, he'll take a yard". Satan slowly and artfully carried them away into his traps. Subjugating itself to the decrees of man, the Church lost the Lord's blessing. In the 30's, the Church was devastated. Almost no congregation remained intact in the Soviet Union, and the Church was in a state of disarray. In our day, Satan dictates [the Church's course] through the clergymen of the AUCECB, and the Church adopts all sorts of regulations that blatantly go against God's commandments (Isa. 28: 13-14), which is causing the spiritual corruption of the Church. Which is why it is essential to understand that the AUCECB is not only the Moscow brethren, but the entire staff of republic and regional presbyters, and even many local presbyters who zealously introduce satanic statutes. We are approaching the rapture of the Church, and we will not forget that the Lord will deliver from great afflictions only those who keep his teachings (Rev. 3: 8-10). Because the AUCECB leadership has subjected itself to the provisions of man, the Church has turned from the Lord's teachings, been contaminated by unsuitable persons, and because of this divisions have taken place in our congregations. Thus Satan, through the AUCECB, has brought the Church to weakened, ruined state. In light of all this, the Holy Spirit prompts us to the following: above all else it is imperative to unite all the Lord's true servants, brothers and sisters of the registered and

134 unregistered congregations that make up the Church of the Evangelical Christians-Baptists in our country. It is also crucial to heal the Church and to bring it to a proper state before the Lord according to His teachings, as led by the Holy Spirit. We know that in the 20's, the holding of congresses was common practice. Church leaders gave an account of their dealings, and problems of the building up of the Church were discussed at these congresses. It has been a few decades since the last congress was held. During this time we witnessed a deviation of the AUCECB leadership from the Lord's teachings, and became convinced that the AUCECB does not serve the interests of the Church, but is leading it to its final destruction. And until we purify ourselves and become worthy before the Lord, He will not be able to bless us and we will not be able to stand firm against the intrigues of the devil (Josh. 7: 11-13). Satan knows this and has sought to lead God's people to sin in all centuries, for this is his only means of contending with us. And in the presence of sin, the Lord cannot step in and bless his people (Isa. 59: 1-2). Thus the need for holding a congress has become imminent for all of us. At the congress the ECB Church will select a leadership organ from among the Lord's clergymen who are "tried, and full of the Holy Spirit and wisdom". Measures to provide for the cleansing and sanctification of the ECB Church will be drawn up for to labor and live henceforth consecrated to the glory of the Lord, and so that the Church will be ready for a glorious reunion with Him in the heavens (1 Cor. 15: 51-52; 1 Thes. 4: 15-18). Just as the apostle Paul, we live in a time where we may take advantage of our civil rights (Acts 16: 37; 22: 25). And we have already notified not only the AUCECB, but also the government about the necessity of holding an All-Union Congress of the ECB Church. But in order for our demand for a congress to not appear unilateral, we ask the brothers and sisters of the registered and unregistered congregations and ECB groups to send statements on the need for holding an All-Union ECB congress, and address them to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and to the Council of Ministries of the USSR. If we meet with obstacles on the path to this congress, we will not be confounded, for we are acting according to the will of the Lord, and so He is with us (2 Chr.15: 2; Matt. 16: 18). He

135 will fight for us and will gain victory over all the intrigues of the devil (2 Kings 10: 12; 2 Chr. 14: 11). No threats or dangers will cause us to fear. With great joy we are doing the work of the Lord (Acts 20: 24) knowing that the Lord will soon answer (Luke 18: 1-2), that He will destroy the work of the devil (1 John 3: 8), and that the gates of hell will not overcome the Church (Matt. 16: 18). And so, begin the preparatory work with yourself. It would be good if the entire Church came before the Lord in fasting and prayer (Matt. 17: 21; Joel 2: 12-18) and sanctified themselves (1 John 1: 9; James 5: 16; 1 Cor. 11: 37). Bring your own life to an appropriate state. If this work doesn't succeed across the entire congregation, do this within your own families or by yourself. In order to be successful in one's spiritual life and to be ready for the rapture of the Church, this work is essential for each individual as the Lord blesses only the pure in heart (2 Tim. 2: 18-21; Heb. 1: 9). His Church must be without stain or vice (Esth. 5: 27). To all of you we express our common wishes (1 Cor. 16: 13-14). With the Lord's love, this epistle urges all who shall read it to consider it their duty to pass this along to those who could teach it to still others, for the building of God's work (2 Tim. 2: 2; 4: 14-15). With this letter we also send an epistle that was delivered to the Presidium of the AUCECB. Greet every saint in Jesus Christ. We and all those in society with us who have loved the wonder of the Lord greet you. The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, the love of God the Father, and the companionship of the Holy Spirit be with all of you and with us. Amen. Your brothers and servants in Christ, composing the Initiative Group for the convening of the ECB congress in the USSR. 23 August 1961

136

APPENDIX E

TIMELINE - PENTECOSTALISTS IN RUSSIA/USSR

1911 – Pentecostalism arrives in Russia via a missionary of the American Pentecostal branch "The Church of God" traveling to Tsarist Russia by way of Helsinki 1922 – Ivan Efimovich Voronaev, a Pentecostal missionary of Ukrainian heritage, returns to labor among the people in his native land; Voronaev and his followers begin their ministry by worshipping within Baptist congregations and teaching those already converted to the Baptist faith 1926 – 17,000 Pentecostals worshipping in 350 congregations; the church officially organizes with the formation of the "All-Ukrainian Council of Christians of the Evangelical Faith", headquartered in Odessa, Ukraine 1930's – Repressive era of Stalin's purges 1939 – Several pockets of active Pentecostals was annexed into the USSR from Eastern Poland 1944 – The formation of the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians – Baptists; around 400 Pentecostal congregations consisting of a total of 1,000 believers join with the Union 1948 – The National Council of the Christians of Evangelical Faith secretly held in Dneprodzerzhinsk, in which the Church Council was reestablished early 1950's – Revival May 1955 – Church leader Viktor Belykh released from imprisonment 1958 –Pentecostal congregations withdraw from AUCECB en masse; new unregistered Pentecostal congregations concurrently spring up in various places January 1958 – Arrests of Pentecostalists resume as the anti-religious campaign got underway November 1958 – Belykh arrested for continuing his ministry after an official KGB warns him to cease his activities; Belykh's sentenced to ten years imprisonment plus five years of internal exile

137 1961 – Secret legislation designates the unregistered Pentecostalists as a banned sect; Soviet authorities begin to offer and even encourage the autonomous registration of unregistered Pentecostal congregations 3 January 1963 – 32 Pentecostalists of Chernogorsk storm the American Embassy in Moscow, present American officials with petitions delineating their complaints against Soviet religious policy, and plead for asylum 1975 – Evgenii Bresenden of Nakhodka permitted to emigrate along with his family – Starotitarovskaya congregation, located in the Krasnodar Region of Russia and consisting of roughly 100 persons not including children, joins the emigration campaign – formation of emigration councils in Starotitarovskaya, Nakhodka, Chernogorsk, and a handful of other cities 1976 – emigration councils at Starotitarovskaya and Nakhodka appeal to the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group for help in broadcasting their plight abroad; Helsinki Group assists the Pentecostalists in compiling a 500-page collection of documents entitled "My People, Let Us Leave This Country" – Sharp reduction in persecution of unregistered Pentecostalists – Soviet state pushes registration more intensely 1 December 1976 – Helsinki Group introduces members of Pentecostal emigration councils to the Western press 1976 – Representing the Moscow Helsinki Group, Lidiya Voronina visits the Pentecostal congregations in Nakhodka and Starotitarovskaya 1977 – Snowballing of emigration movement; by December of 1977, 10,000 believers had applied for exit visas in hopes of emigrating from the Soviet Union – Increase in petitions and appeals of would-be emigrants to Soviet and foreign governments and organizations – 10-day hunger strike of some emigration movement participants in the days before the Belgrade Conference – Increase in State repressive measures against Pentecostal emigration activists – Summer 1977 – Swedish Pentecostalists Nils Engstroem and Bengt Sareld arrested and charged with smuggling anti-Soviet literature

138 June 1978 – Storming of the American Embassy in Moscow by 8 individuals of the Vashchenko and Chmykhalov families 16 June 1979 – 20 Pentecostal delegates from the Baltic republics, the Ukraine, Belarus, Central Russia, and Siberia gathered in a forest on the outskirts of Moscow to organize the Fraternal Council of Christians of the Evangelical Pentecostal Faith 1979 – Emigration movement peaks at 30,000 participants – Boris Perchatkin and Timofei Prokopchik of the Fraternal Council meet with several U.S. Congressmen, including Senator Robert Dornen, urging them to work with the Soviet government on their behalf – State campaign against Pentecostal emigration activists intensifies; very few exist visas granted; other unregistered Pentecostalists suffer increased persecution as well December 1979 – Nikolai Goretoi arrested and sentenced to 7 years in a strict regime camp plus 5 years of exile; during his imprisonment he spends time in psychiatric hospitals and is drugged – Seven other emigration activists, including Pavel Matyash, Fyodor Sidenko, and Nikolai Babrykin, arrested at this time – Unregistered Pentecostal congregations under increased pressure to register; by the end of the year the number of autonomously registered Pentecostal communities had increased from 55 in 1977 to 90 August 1980 – Arrest of emigration activist and Fraternal Council leader Boris Perchatkin 1980 – Founding of a "Rights Protection Group", and a "Fund to Aid the Evangelical Christian Pentecostals of Russia" by Western Pentecostalists – Emigration movement losing momentum; morale low 1981 – Another wave of arrests ensues against unregistered Pentecostalists 1983 – By this time, about 200 Pentecostal congregations had autonomously registered with the state in spite of restrictions imposed on such communities

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APPENDIX F

TIMELINE - TRUE SEVENTH DAY ADVENTISTS IN RUSSIA/USSR

Late 1870’s – Adventist teachings come to Russia and other future Soviet territory through religious literature outlining the sect's teachings 1880’s – Adventist missionaries, Ukrainian émigrés recently converted to the faith, arrive from the United States to the Russian Empire 1890 – First ever Seventh Day Adventist General Meeting in Russia attended by 100 delegates 1900 – 5,880 church members in 240 congregations 1914 – Debate over the issue of bearing arms among Russian Adventists 1917 – Dispute over warfare among Russian Adventists amplified with onset of Civil War 1919 – Lenin signs decree exempting religious conscientious objectors from bearing arms 1923 – 18-year old Vladimir Shelkov ordained as a Bible worker 1924 – Fifth All-Union Congress of the Soviet Adventists, adoption of viewpoint that individual Adventists should decide for themselves whether or not to engage in – 11,000 Adventists in the USSR worshipping in 430 congregations with 24 congregational unions, 5 regional unions, and 1 All-Union body 1927 – Shelkov ordained as a preacher, and presides over Adventist congregations in Siberia 1928 – Sixth Congress of the Soviet Adventists, the central church leaders declare that Adventist adherents in their nation are obliged to bear arms when called upon by the government, and that anyone who taught otherwise was a “false teacher”; At Gregory Ostvald and Pyotr Manzhura lead those against bearing arms and form the Russian Union of the Field of True Seventh Day Adventists 1931 – Congress held for top leaders of the True Adventists; Shelkov ordained as deputy head of the church 1937 – Ostvald perishes in a Soviet labor camp

140 1945 – Shelkov arrested and sentenced to execution by a firing squad; after 55 days his sentence is repealed to 10 years of imprisonment 1949 – Manzhura dies in imprisonment, Shelkov becomes the Chairman and Elder Apostle of the All-Union Church of True Seventh Day Adventists while in imprisonment; at this time there are roughly 1,000 True Adventists in the USSR 1954 – Vladimir Shelkov released from imprisonment six months early; Vera Shelkova released from imprisonment three years early 1954–1957 – Prosperity ensues for the True Adventists as they regroup, proselytize, and grow in numbers and strength 1956 – True and Free Seventh Day Adventists organize the Church Council consisting of Vladimir Shelkov, Aleksei Murkin, and Vera Shelkova; they organize a system of leadership bodies for geographical areas unions 1957 – 50 True Adventist homes in Dzhambul alone searched, resulting in arrest of Shelkov and his future son-in-law Oleg Tsvetkov; Shelkov sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment, Tsvetkov to eight; during this sentence Shelkov became personally acquainted with renowned Soviet dissident Aleksandr Ginzburg 1967 – Upon Shelkov’s release from imprisonment, he organized the Literature Committee to oversee editing and printing operations for the church Late 1960’s – Literature Committee renamed the True Witness publishing house; a printing press established 1970 – Church renamed the All-Union Church of True and Free Seventh Day Adventists June 1970 – First mention of True and Free Adventists in Chronicle of Current Events (no. 14) Early 1970’s – Church Council broadens as Ilya Lepshin and Ivan Kuz join Shelkov and the Murkin brothers as Council members; Vera Shelkova and Dina Lepshina, Shelkov's wife and daughter, appointed as advisors to the Council June 1975 – Shelkov signs appeal in conjunction with other Soviet religious organizations that addressed to the Soviet government concerning the state of religion in the USSR 1976 – True Adventist human rights activities intensify upon formation of Helsinki Watch Group, and contact is made with the group through Crimean Tatar activist Mustafa Dzhemileva 1977 – The Chronicle began carrying regular articles on the True Adventists.

141 21 January 1977 – Searches of five Adventist homes in three villages near Krasnodar; authorities confiscate a large stockpile of religious literature published by the True Witness press 14 March 1978 – At 6:00 AM, 40 Adventist homes throughout the USSR are searched concurrently, and underground bunkers and hidden rooms discovered along with church members and leaders, literature, and other supplies; this results in Shelkov’s fourth arrest and the arrests of several others 11 May 1978 – Adventist human rights spokesman Rostislav Galetsky announced the formation of the "Group of the All-Union Church of True and Free Seventh Day Adventists for Legal Struggle and Investigation of the Facts of Persecution of Believers in the USSR" 1978-1983 – KGB conducts over 350 searches in the homes of True Adventists, and more than 70 from numerous regions of the Soviet Union are arrested at this time 1980 – Shelkov dies in camp; schism in church; Aleksei Murkin leads the church – 22 arrested in connection with 'Open Letter No. 12' – Excommunication of Aleksei Murkin by followers of Ilya Lepshin, Shelkov’s son-in-law 1981 – Arrests of Rostislav Galetsky, Aleksei Murkin, and Ilya Lepshin 1987 – Ilya Lepshin released from imprisonment, he and his followers go deeply underground

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APPENDIX H

FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO CHURCHES' SUCCESSES & FAILURES

Terms in bold - associated with successes Terms in italics - associated with defeats Factors with an *italic - inconclusive findings Factors Reform Pentecostalists Pentecostalists True Baptists Campaigning Adventists to Emigrate Historical Dynamics - beneficial Highest High High Lowest elements of history - existence of legal Yes No No Yes worship body - crossover rate to High -- -- High legal worship body The Church and its Components - strictness of Lowest High High Highest theology - centralization of High Lowest Low Highest hierarchy - level of official High Lowest Low High organization - autonomy of Middle Highest Highest Lowest members Church Activities and Tactics to Continue Them

*- engagement in High High High Lowest proselytizing

- level of secretiveness in Lowest Middle Middle Highest worship

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- established Yes No No Yes printing house *- printing and Highest Lowest Lowest High distribution of religious literature Protest - positive attitude High Low High High (?) of central leadership toward protest *- positive member Highest Lowest High Ambivalent attitude toward protest - officially- High Lowest Low High sanctioned samizdat protest - unofficial Highest Low High Lowest samizdat protest - gross - unofficial High Low High Low samizdat protest - per capita - demonstrations Highest Low Middle Lowest - positive attitude Ambivalent Lowest High Highest of leadership toward involvement with human rights activists *- positive member Ambivalent Ambivalent High Ambivalent attitude toward involvement with human rights activists *- involvement High Lowest High High with other dissident groups Level of Persecution - gross number of Highest Middle High Lowest members persecuted/arrested - per capita number Lowest Middle *High Highest of members persecuted/arrested

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Julie Behling received her undergraduate education in Biological Sciences at Florida State University, during which time she began to study Russian. From June 1997 to December 1998 she served a mission for The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints in the Russia Samara Mission. In the course of her mission she encountered people who, during the Soviet period, had been active as Seventh Day Adventists, Pentecostalists, and a number of other religious organizations. In the midst of pursuing her graduate education also at Florida State University, Julie began to study Russian history and became interested in examining how a religious organization could possibly have operated during the Soviet years. She began to research the matter, and never resurfaced until the completion of this work. During a study abroad in Moscow in the summer of 2002, she had the opportunity to get to know several members of the Pentecostal church "Christians of the Evangelical Faith" and attend their worship services after meeting one of their adherents by chance at the Bolshoi Theater. Julie Behling graduated with a dual Master's in Slavic Languages & Literature and Russian & East European Studies in the summer of 2004. In the course of researching and writing her thesis, she became interested in pursuing a career in the field of human rights in Russia, and received an internship through the Florida State University Center for the Advancement of Human Rights to work in connection with the anti-human trafficking initiative of a non-governmental organization operating in Latvia and Estonia.

150