Steven E. Smith Oral History Interview – RFK#2, 07/23/70 Administrative Information

Creator: Steven E. Smith Interviewer: Larry J. Hackman Date of Interview: July 23, 1970 Place of Interview: New York, New York Length: 14 pages

Biographical Note Steven E. Smith was former Chief Administrative Officer of the California State Assembly and served as the Southern California manager of the Robert F. Kennedy [RFK] presidential campaign in 1968. In this interview, Smith discusses Jesse M. Unruh’s involvement in RFK’s campaign, polling in California, and funding the campaign effort in California.

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Suggested Citation Steven E. Smith, recorded interview by Larry J. Hackman, July 23, 1970, (page number), Robert F. Kennedy Oral History Program of the John F. Kennedy Library

Oral History Interview

Of

Steven E. Smith

Although a legal agreement was not signed during the lifetime of Steven E. Smith, upon his death, ownership of the recording and transcript of his interview for the Oral History Program passed to the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library.

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Steven E. Smith – RFK #2

Table of Contents

Page Topic 1, 5 Discussion about Jesse M. Unruh’s involvement in Robert F. Kennedy’s campaign for president in 1968 4 Polling in California for the 1968 election 9 Funding the campaign in California 14 Appealing to minority groups during the campaign in California

-F-i:-rs-t Oral History Interview

with

STEPHEN E. SMITH

July 23, 1970 New York, New York

By Larry J. Hackman

For the Robert F. Kennedy Oral History Program of the Kennedy Library

HACKMAN: Did 1960 or a possible race in 1 64, or anything that you remember, give you a basis to judge Unruh [Jesse M. Unruh], his talent and motives.

SMITH: I'm trying to think what the hell he was when I went out there in '59. I guess he was the (unintelligible)

HACKMAN: Yes, he wasn't even majority leader then.

SMITH: The majority . . Okay. What do I do? Start on Unruh. You got it on or what?

HACKMAN: Yes, it's on already.

SMITH: Oh, it's going.

HACKMAN: I'm pretty tricky, see. The speaker's in here.

SMITH: Well, I don't remember exactly when the trip was in '59. It was John Kennedy, and O'Brien [Lawrence F. O'Brien], myself. I don't know who else was in the party. And we visited Sacramento. There were two fellows that made impressions. One was Fred Dutton [Frederick G. Dutton] who was the, I guess, administrative assistant to Brown [Edmund G. "Pat" Brown] and who had some style and class and seemed to be smart. And the other, when we went over to visit the legislature, Larry O'Brien had-­ just in the course of the morning--he talked with a number of legislators. And O'Brien said there's one fellow that he was particularly impressed with, seemed to have a better feel of the state, the situation, more than anyone else he had talked to. He was not particularly well known. I don't know how long he'd been in the legislature; I don't think all that long. 2

HACKMAN: No, about four years.

SMITH: Yeah. And so we started . . . . That was the first and I think the . . . . Larry had more contact with him [Unruh] initially. His advice and judgment on the state, on the relationship with Pat Brown. The reading on Brown was good. The judgment was right. He [Unruh] was a smart, tough fellow.

HACKMAN: Any negative aspects to Unruh?

SMITH: Well, I suppose Unruh's limitations have been, you know, pretty well discussed. But he's kind of a paradox. The press on him is, you know . . . . He had a poor childhood, (unintelligible) , and overcame all that, so there was a terrific strain, but at the same time there was a very obvious other side of the coin. And I suppose still in some areas a certain insecurity was involved that I think ends up being called toughness but really isn't. I think he's a very smart, astute fellow with a truly good, liberal social consciousness. And in '64, he really had kind of all sorts of frustrations in politics generally, his own situation, the state of the country and so forth, and a real sense of conviction and belief about Robert Kennedy. And he came to him as a very pragmatic fellow in a very realistic (unintelligible) really realizing how minimal the chances were in 1 68 for Bobbie to run.

HACKMAN: You mean in '68?

SMITH: '68 rather. Urged him to just out of this sense of disappointment and concern with the state of things. And then he was, as far as the 1 68 campaign was concerned, it all happened very quickly so that the initial formation of the campaign structure and personnel and headquarters and all of that initial construction was done by Jesse and his people. And it was done very well. He obviously brought with him all of his enemies and so forth and kind of a picayune back-biting, a reluctance on the part of a good many people that were willing to support Robert Kennedy but were reluctant to come into it because they were concerned with what their role would or wouldn't be in view of the fact that Unruh's people seemed to have the machinery of it. So there was an awful lot of time spent, in fairness to Unruh and to his people, the criticism was not justified and was unfair in that the fellow who had been picked to manage it was a very straight, practical mechanic willing to take any and all help from all quarters. There was a whole range of personalities which were extremely difficult in terms of their own personal worry about what they were going to do and about past sentiment about Unruh. So there was an apparent period that was all nonsense. And finally, once we got out there and 3

there was a presence from the Kennedy campaign itself in the form of Frank Mankiewicz and (unintelligible) well we were over that in a matter of a few days. And it then worked as a reasonably effective organization. And Jesse was concerned that he not appear to be out front pushing himself and he didn't. Obviously we couldn't have won like that, and he was smart enough to realize that so that he had the proper low visibility, not too--you know, it was a good effort.

HACKMAN: In late 1 67 when he was talking to you or Robert Kennedy or when any of his people were talking to the two of you, was he clearly arguing for Robert Kennedy to run in '68?

SMITH: Yes, he said he thought he had to run, he ought to. He thought it was very important and that the chances of it were very difficult and all of that. But despite that he felt that it was terribly important and Kennedy ought to run.

HACKMAN: Who else do you talk to you on. . . SMITH: He didn't think that Gene McCarthy [Eugene J. McCarthy)--wasn't impressed either with the fiber of the fellow himself or with his chances. He didn't think there was any chance in that. But he did think that the combination of Kennedy's effort added to that would perhaps take enough of the. . . The only fellow that was right about 1968 was Kenny O'Donnell [Kenneth P. O'Donnell], and it was his judgment that Lyndon Johnson would take himself out because if Lyndon Johnson hadn't taken himself out he would have been renominated.

HACKMAN: O'Donnell's the only guy saying that?

SMITH: The only one that clearly stated that that was his judgment as to what would happen.

HACKMAN: Did anyone from within the administration, the Johnson administration, come to Robert Kennedy and say Johnson won't run?

SMITH: No.

HACKMAN: You don't remember McNamara [Robert S. McNamara) ever saying that?

SMITH: Yes. I'm sorry. I don't remember the exact--you know, whether he put it "my judgment is he won't" or had information that he won't, but yes he did. I think at the minimum he said, "My judgment is that he won't run." Now I don't know what his basis of the whole thing was, 4 whether it was his own intuition or whether it was something specific that Johnson had told him of ....

HACKMAN: Looking back at Unruh in 1960, was your impression and Robert Kennedy's impression, and maybe the president's impression, that Unruh was the only guy out there who did a good job in 1 60? Was that a strong feeling with you?

SMITH: Well, I think of any one individual, he was the most effective. But I think there were others that were very helpful and good.

HACKMAN: How did the polling come about in California that John Kraft did in early 1 68?

SMITH: Early '68? You mean after Kennedy had announced, after Senator announced?

HACKMAN: No. There's a meeting I think when Unruh and Frank Burns come back and talk to you and they bring back the results of a John Kraft poll. Maybe they and Kraft met with you up here.

SMITH: I'm trying to think. I guess Unruh had the poll taken. I don't know what it was taken in connection with. I suppose just that race. I don't remember it that precisely.

HACKMAN: There was also some polling on Unruh on what he should do.

SMITH: Yes. I think it was Unruh's poll and I guess they had a rating, a job rating and a comparison on Kennedy and Johnson and McCarthy. I don't remember the figures, to tell you the truth. They were encouraged by it, but I mean I don't remember the exact figures. And their impression was that he [Johnson] was in some trouble and Robert was strong and could beat him in California. And I guess that was the opening ...• you see I haven't thought about it so I don't have the dates straight.

HACKMAN: I think the poll was February 4, and on January 31 Robert Kennedy made the statement, "I will not run under any foreseeable circumstances." And then Kraft comes up with this poll. Some people say that began to turn him around.

SMITH: Well, I think, Unruh, he came with Burns and ...

HACKMAN: Croce? 5

SMITH: Yes. And another fellow named Jack Croce. And they were very strong. And I spoke with Jesse and then he had a talk with the Senator. And I guess he had spoken to Kenny O'Donnell. And then they took it on themselves to come out to McLean and spend a whole morning through lunch and were very persistent, dogmatic about their­ -you know, pressed it quite hard almost to the point of downright (unintelligible) . But to say that that was a turning--I mean it was very significant. And what I can't remember is at one point . . . It was before New Hampshire and I suppose before his meeting with McCarthy. Now, how much before--where he tells him he thinks he's going to run.

HACKMAN: When he tells Unruh?

SMITH: No, McCarthy. Your impression is that because of that it was in February?

HACKMAN: Well, no, I'm saying that Unruh and Kraft and those people come to you up here, I believe, in February fairly early.

SMITH: Well, I think he said, "John Kraft's got a poll. I'll have him bring it over to you."

HACKMAN: The meeting at Hickory Hill that you're talking about, the long one, is January 19 or 20. How were you people looking at Unruh's feelings about his own political future? You know he's considering running for the Senate in that period--at least there's some discussion. How did that effect .

SMITH: Well, he was then at a very low ebb and he was frank to admit that--I mean he was discouraged with his own situation and he was discouraged with the situation in California, and more than that, he was just generally discouraged. And he was--you know, whether in fact it was true or not--he said, "If you're not in it, I don't know whether I'll stay in politics." That was at least the frame of mind that he purported to be in personally. I think that everyone felt that--and I don't think he indicated otherwise that perhaps it would be an involvement and a way back in to the enthusiasm and possibly something for himself. But I don't think that was ... you know that was a factor because certainly nobody ever thought that that was the prime motivating .

HACKMAN: Never discussed in terms of specifics, what might happen?

SMITH: No. No, he just said that if you do it he would help. And they did all of that. I suppose we had 6

some hope that there would be more help on the fund raising part of it. And I just think (intelligible)

HACKMAN: Who else were you paying attention to on California in that period? What was Dutton saying about Unruh?

SMITH: Well, Dutton, of course, had .... What was he saying about what?

HACKMAN: What was Dutton saying about Unruh's advice? What did he think about Unruh and his understanding of California politics, I guess?

SMITH: Well, I think that Fred had a healthy respect for Unruh. You know, they hadn't been aligned and I don't remember, frankly, being a part of any conversation where Fred, you know, said how to use or not or what role should Jesse have or not. I'm perhaps (unintelligible). And I don't remember that there was ever any question that we would go about it any differently. In terms of the way it unfolded as I say it all went very quickly and one day you weren't and the next day you were in it and were faced with the decision as to which primaries to go into. And California was obviously one of them. There was a whole list ahead of it. Unruh was there and it was just more or less left to him and he took ahold of the ball and I don't know that there was much uncertainty on it or the alternative to be considered. The challenge to get--as to what the problem would be we were all aware of. And I went to Indiana first and spent ten days or so there just in an effort to get sort of the mechanics of it organized, get somebody into the headquarters, all that. And the Senator, Edward [Edward M. Kennedy] came in the last two or three days I was in Indiana and started on some of the contact business, seeing people. Then, at that point there was a good deal of talk--Indiana was going to be tough for the McCarthy people but they were very confident about Nebraska. So I went on to Nebraska, and I was concerned. It seemed to me Nebraska was a place where they could have been--through the threat of a great student influx and what not split into the two communities, that the people behind the doors really lent themselves to a student canvas. These two areas would have the bulk of the vote: Omaha and Lincoln. I think there was 60 odd percent of the vote in those two places. Well it never materialized but at any rate I was there. Well, that period, Robert, I didn't talk to him frequently, but when I did see him he said I should get out to California. He was very worried about it. And I think some of that immediate feel for it may have come by virtue of Fred's [Fred Dutton) contacts. Because all the reports I got that were not Jesse's were this song to the effect that Unruh's group's approach was to keep it closed. So he [Robert 7 F. Kennedy] was very worried about it on the basis that it obviously (unintelligible) . So I went very--through Oregon, I only spent one day.

HACKMAN: Who was up there then?

SMITH: Vanden Heuvel [William J. Vanden Heuvel]. But it was a misjudgment on Oregon. I kind of went up, though we were very careful about it. Assumed that Edith Greene was the same figure that she had been in 1960. Of course, she wasn't. The labor situation had changed, and that was a significant difference. And the arrangements there weren't particularly good and never did get pulled together. And I went to California and, or course, surveyed the difficulties and spent some time there and then about ten days before the Oregon--but as I say, it was all noise more than substance. And an awful lot of time was spent with these people and, you know, all the semantics about "Well, what's our role going to be and what's the structure?" All that kind of nonsense. So we spent an awful lot of time with people before we get them into headquarters and they finally got going. Once they got in there and got work to do­ -because always there was more than enough work to do once it gets under way and then stuff goes.

HACKMAN: But you had to spend time with those people.

SMITH: Yeah.

HACKMAN: They wouldn't just go through Dutton? They'd try to get to you?

SMITH: Well Dutton, of course, was with the Senator and they were not in California, you know. I mean for a couple of days but he didn't have the time to ..

HACKMAN: Had there been any discussions before the campaign with Unruh or his people or between you and Robert Kennedy about how things would work in terms of who would go into the state, who would be taken into the organization, about how Unruh's organization should or would work?

SMITH: No. Again, there wasn't any time. The earlier conversations were not in the context of the fellow who was going to become a candidate so they were all But then the decision, you know, was suddenly, "Are you going to run?" Well the first thing was to get some sort of headquarters in Washington, to get those people 8

involved, and assemble that, and then consider which primaries you were going to run in--and there was a whole that came before, whose urgency came before . . • . So I mean the immediate discussions all centered around the structure of the Washington business and the next, which was Indiana, and Nebraska after that, and getting somebody into place in each state. And there was a question of who was going to go to California and Sarge (Sargent Shriver] who was in the difficult posture of having indicated he would go to Europe, and he spent a week or so struggling with that, whether or not, and finally decided he really couldn't backtrack on his commitment to go to Paris. So that there was vanden Heuvel in Oregon and Doherty (Gerald F. Doherty] being initially in Indiana and then myself and then everybody, you know, it all came into Indiana. And Sorensen [Philip C. Sorensen], Phil Sorensen, in Nebraska, and then we decided on, to stay with, I can't think of the Irishman's name in Dakota, South Dakota. And finally, a very good fellow from Iowa who was in Nebraska, whose name at the moment .

HACKMAN: Dave Harrison (David Harrison] in South Dakota?

SMITH: Yeah, you're right. Dave Harrison did go to South Dakota. And then another fellow that was in Nebraska spent some time in South Dakota. And there wasn't anybody kind of in California ended up .... It waited until I got there. In the meantime, Unruh had gotten a Los Angeles headquarters and had taken on a staff, with his own people plus some others that were not necessarily his own people, and he made the arrangements up in San Francisco that was very weak. So after I was out there a few days or something and talked to Robert as to whether there was any chance of Seigenthaler (John Seigenthaler], he said, "Why don't you call him?'' So I called John and he came up and took over in San Francisco. (intelligible). But the thing was more so in Los Angeles; less in San Francisco which was very little because Jesse didn't know San Francisco. (unintelligible) was a good fellow but didn't have real political base himself and until Seigenthaler got there and got Burton [Phillip Burton] involved . . . But in Los Angeles a lot took place. (unintelligible) reasonably well. They programmed a campaign, a budget, and set up various sub . . . They picked legislators who were around and picked districts that they had worked with and used their influence and so forth. So all of that was pretty well done. And the only thing that we did in addition was the press operation and some coordinators which we then put around in the different districts in the state and then some people in special projects and so forth.

HACKMAN: Did Unruh resist that at all? Did he ever feel that he had a commitment? 9

SMITH: Well, yeah, they always believe that bringing so many people in, you don't need these fellows, it's just duplication. So you go through that but then finally just shake your head and (unintelligible) . To some extent there is some truth in it. Some of them were very effective; others aren't. It got a little out of hand towards the end when they were coming from all over. Everybody wanted to be where the action was and so it got to--it was hard to do anything about it and so it got sloppy. But they thought it was unnecessary, and some of it was, some of it wasn't.

HACKMAN: Someone said that Unruh felt he had a commitment of some kind from O'Donnell that outsiders wouldn't be coming in. Was that ever mentioned by Unruh.

SMITH: Yeah. I think ... But hell, (unintelligible). Once it gets moving, well ... I don't know, we laughed about it some times. I never had any difficulty once we sat down and talked about it with Jesse. There were a couple of instances where he lost face, where the press had a story, but I mean we got over that and he was all right about it. It talked about, "Unruh was being moved out", and so forth. But it was much exaggerated and after a week or so of it why that was the end of it.

HACKMAN: In March, even before Robert Kennedy announced, he sent Nolan [John E. Nolan] out there for a couple of days on the selection of delegates and every­ thing. Can you remember conversations with him at the time? What kinds of problems he was having.

SMITH: Yeah, he had a problem. You know, that's always a tough selection and he was new to the state and he has some friends that were good fellows that thought other than Jesse did. They did very well with it. That was a pretty good group they ended up selecting, to give balance toward the young and mix the (unintelligible) and so forth that was good. And John was very concerned at that point, that early into it, he was listening to all the same stuff . . . (Telephone interruption)

HACKMAN: What kinds of discussions were there, if any, before the campaign on money and how it would work? Where the funds would come from within and without California?

SMITH: The real struggle . . . I mean it sounds so incredible, but we never really got much of the nitty-gritty in this. I mean we knew it would be difficult. But there was nothing--well, literally no detailed 10 discussions, plans, or organizational thing drawn up. Not that you had--I mean once it was underway it wasn't hard to figure out who you wanted to help and then where they help and what kind of time schedule. And once you decided which primary you put in the first and best available people into those and continued along the road. And money, well, with all the other problems, we just started to struggle with once we were under way. And we had those two galas; and then when I got out there we picked a date for San Francisco or, you know, a date around which you'd make an effort to raise some money. We had various people involved.

HACKMAN: What happened on the San Francisco thing? That was something of a problem, wasn't it?

SMITH: Well, they both were. They were disappointing in terms of the funds that they raised. I mean, they didn't do as well as we'd hoped. And San Francisco, was not a "big" money community. There were a few individuals and it's traditionally ... Ben Swig (Benjamin H. Swig] and .

HACKMAN: Heller [Elinor H. Heller] and Malone [William M. Malone] and those groups?

SMITH: Yeah. Bill Malone is less active these days. Heller, Mrs. Heller who was forceful in that family, less involved than she used to be. I mean that was .... Malone--! don't know how far back--but he's not as active. And Heller, Mrs. Heller I think was most active in the Stevenson (Adlai E. Stevenson] thing, and helpful (to John Kennedy) in 1960. And I don't know exactly. You know, spent (or had) a lot of money, or at least to my knowledge in the Kennedy campaign. Whether they did in the Stevenson one or not I don't know. But, I mean, the whole Stevenson campaign was run on five million dollars nationally. And the National Committee (Democratic National Committee) , they had a lot of trouble, they had a lot of trouble in San Francisco too. It breaks down into kind of a personality thing. Ben (Swig) is always ... And the other fellows, like (unintelligible) Shorenstein at the (unintelligible) . So there may be a dozen different fellows that give some--five or ten or a dozen, I don't know--and the rest of it is small money.

HACKMAN: Did you go to those people individually in 1 68?

SMITH: Well, I, I think I only spent a day or so in San Francisco and decided it was a disaster (laughter) and I got Seigenthaler and said you better get up there. And within a week or ten days John got there. And then of course we did (unintelligible] (some discussion here 11 of the gala or other fund raising in San Francisco). I've forgotten the exact figures, $2,000 after expenses. The Los Angeles one was a better success than that, but it was far from any kind of major fund raising. In addition to the fund aspect of it, there was a certain excitement involved in people working on it, so they were useful. And there was money, with that as a target, not actually attributed . . . But there was money that came into the campaign directly that wasn't put through the gala books that was really helped get it in, the fact that you had a date (for the gala) was something you could talk about when you (unintelligible) so that on balance they were both all right.

HACKMAN: This money usually comes directly to you, or is it presented to Robert Kennedy directly, or how does that work?

SMITH: No, most of it was, I mean you know we, three or four fellows in Los Angeles that were most active in terms of the fund raising, you know, I started with them and they'd come and visit but I can't think of one instance where ... And, you know, nobody would insist that they give it to the candidate. I was going to say I can't think of one instance where the contribution was made directly to Robert. I'm sure that's not true perhaps along the way. But most cases I'd make the request and then I'd see to it that, in the instance of large contributions, he (RFK) was aware of it. And they'd get a letter directly from his staff which hopefully he had signed. So that he was aware of it.

HACKMAN: Did Chuck Spalding (Charles Spalding] raise any money in California?

SMITH: Yeah, he did.

HACKMAN: Did Nolan take out any money when he went out like in March, or any power to commit any money?

SMITH: Yes, we made some sort of initial deposit out there which they got through with to the period when I came out. And up to that, we spent about $100,000 or in that neighborhood. And that had gone out in a couple of pieces. But I think it was about $100,000 which took them up to the period when I came out.

HACKMAN: Was Unruh, or were his people, bitching at you constantly in the early days because there wasn't enough money.

SMITH: Not constantly. But they were, you know, anxious for more funds. But on the whole, not difficult. It's sad, we could have had money. We 12 (unintelligible) this as the budget (unintelligible) . So they sent me the projected which looked reasonably to be all right. The media they left to me. But on the rest of it ... I mean it's awfully hard to know precisely. "We have to have more", and those kinds of discussions. But in the main everything made sense. So there wasn't any great argument over what it is they suggested be done. And it was all set up pretty well and, you know, had a computer, and reasonable safeguards, and a good accounting system. It was well organized in terms of accountability.

HACKMAN: Did Unruh raise any money or contribute any money through his own organization?

SMITH: Well there were some people ... I mean it's always difficult to know. He made no major effort and (unintelligible) . I suppose there was some that it didn't hurt that Jesse was involved. But in the main they did not make any effort at fundraising.

HACKMAN: Were there things that you were asking Unruh to do during the campaign that he wasn't able to give time to, or anything ...

SMITH: No. As I say, they were very cooperative and then there was Jesse's feeling that he shouldn't (unintelligible) everything. It was a great concern of some (unintelligible) that he was on just the surface of it too much. But he wasn't.

HACKMAN: How much of a problem was it in 1 68 compared to '60, I guess in terms of just controlling spending?

SMITH: Oh, very difficult because it was moving so quickly and there was so little opportunity to organize any of it. (unintelligible). The whole thing was nine weeks.

HACKMAN: In terms of control in spending by various people?

SMITH: It was more difficult than ever. Because it was just too quick. And the time: everybody was on the run all the time and were in one place for only a few days. And I'd be in California screaming about the money being spent in Indiana. (unintelligible). And it was all just moving so quickly that it was a problem. And I mean we were all travelling but that was the budget.

HACKMAN: How does spending work, through Helen Keyes? How do the lines of authority run and what kind of things do you have to approve, and she approve? 13

SMITH: Well, the initial effort is to put a budget on the Washington headquarters operation: the payroll, obviously; an estimate on phones--so you draw up that estimate; and then to budget each state campaign, (each primary); and then to budget expenses for the balance of the country. And it's a very imprecise effort. And then put them into general guidelines. Each state I went into you would look at the state and decide what tools you were going to use and how much media and how much mail and how much telephone and so forth. So by the time I left I had a budget for that state. And then, I'd go over it with the fellow in charge and he'd try to do the best he could. Keyes would have a copy of it and we'd all at least have a point of departure and general guidelines. And we'd made a decision on what county, where the vote was, what we were going to do in those counties; and the ones we were going to get to less where we'd do mail. And so we could arrive at approximately how much mail we were going to do and how much telephoning and how many weeks of television we were going to have and a guess at how many newspaper ads. (unintelligible) was 50% of it and the other 50% would be in headquarters for travelling, hotel, car rental, and so forth. So that's very imprecise but if you take a rule of 50-50 you won't be far off. So then the fellow that was trying to run it would do the best he could. But the business of who was going where and, you know, who has credit cards, travel .... I mean it was just horrendous!

HACKMAN: That's a lot different from 1960?

SMITH: Well, in 1 60, yeah, yeah! You had a whole year of preparation and could elect primary (unintelligible). You know, each one (unintelligible) it's interesting. You know, the least expensive primary in '60 was Oregon because there simply wasn't time to get in there and do a lot of things. So Hy Raskin went out to Oregon and Edith Greene respected it, a very low key thing. (unintelligible) and they were all worried about it. And Hy or I said, "Well, I think it's all right." After West Virginia, Oregon ... Everyone was so exhausted after Wisconsin and West Virginia that it was just agreed it was too late to effect it. It worked out all right. So, I mean what's the point? That (unintelligible) about 50% of the vote (unintelligible) that he supposedly reached 50%. I mean it's the most difficult side of this business. Nobody's ever sat down and figured out exactly what it is that does get the votes. And you can do everything. Rockefeller (Nelson A. Rockefeller] is the extreme end of it, and spent to get himself elected governor 60% of what Hubert 14 Humphrey spent to run for president last time. And his (Rockefeller) progression is that it's doubled each time he's run. (unintelligible) thousand the first time he ran. Over two million the second, and five the third, and expected to go over ten the fourth. So it's endless what you can do. I mean there is no end to what you can do! At what point is the return such that, and it might come fairly early in the game because in this state I don't think there is any doubt that if you spent two million dollars you wouldn't lose to Rockefeller for five. (unintelligible) . And the difference between two and ten is considerable. And what margin of return you are getting for it is a damn small margin. But it's, when you think of it, if one only lost by 100,000 votes or something, (unintelligible) people go with that (unintelligible) stuff to the extent that they have it. And nobody's lost because they've spent too much money.

HACKMAN: Do you recall discussions in California in 1 68 with Robert Kennedy--supposedly there is this whole disagreement on what groups you appeal to: do you appeal to the liberals, do you concentrate on the black and Mexican-Americans. Did you get involved in this kind of discussion?

SMITH: Yeah! There was a strong feeling on the part, all throughout, on the part of some of the younger people in the campaign that there was too much emphasis on the minority community, that there wasn't enough emphasis on sort of Orange County. And, so that was an ongoing thing. (a bit more that is unintelligible until sound goes completely) Something about the argument about the meaning of Oregon, other factors.