Norman A Darwin Hartnett’s – Passion or Folly? Abstract

When Laurence J Hartnett arrived at GM-H in March 1934 as Managing Director he gave little thought to making his own car. This rapidly changed as ’s fortunes improved to the point where GM-H, under Hartnett’s leadership, would begin planning an all-Australian car for a 1943 introduction. The war was a diversion until the end of 1944 when Hartnett directed his engineers back to designing and building a new vehicle, one that would carry the name Holden.

Hartnett’s car – Passion or Folly explores Hartnett’s dream to produce an automobile he could rightly claim as his own. Sadly, for Hartnett, the Holden’s success happened after his resignation and Hartnett’s dream faltered, then turned into a passion following the formation of the Hartnett Motor Company Ltd, a firm that ended in tatters. The story of the Hartnett car has often been told with rumour, inuendo, myth, conspiracy and malpractice. Hartnett’s Car will examine these factors to determine if “The Passion” was in reality a “Folly”.

Was the Hartnett car worth the effort and agony? Was the design right for ? No doubt Hartnett would argue, yes but there are dissenters. These questions are raised, explored and answered considering the competition and market of the era. Sir Laurence, as time has revealed, was a brilliant entrepreneur, an innovator, a motivator who has been described as a technocratic brigand, a man who did not give up his dream without a fight. His contribution to the Australian Automobile Industry is significant and the exact circumstances surrounding the Hartnett car’s failure are long overdue. Hartnett’s Car – Passion or Folly aims to address this oversight.

Sir Laurence Hartnett

Sir Laurence Hartnett is Australia’s best-known automobile entrepreneur, described as the “Father of the Holden” and a “Technocratic Brigand” he held a passion for creating his own car. This paper will examine Hartnett’s dream and reality, discussing the suitability of his design for Australia, the problems encountered and consequence. Hartnett arrived in Australia as Managing Director of General Motors-Holden in March 1934 with a simple brief, “Make Holden profitable or shut it down”.1 The story of Hartnett’s career is well documented, and that by the close of 1935 he believed an Australian car was inevitable.2 A few years later in 1939 plans were well under way at GM-H for a local car to be released in 1943. The move to munitions production occupied Hartnett and Holden fully until 1944 when Holden’s engineers returned to an Australian car. Hartnett’s collision course with General Motors over design and approach resulted in his resignation and the 1948 automobile he thought represented his “ideal Australian car” was Americanised.3

Undeterred Hartnett began his own car, seeking a suitable design he ventured to France in 1947 discovering Jean-Albert Grégoire’s radical light passenger car using aluminium, front wheel drive and 2-cylinder engine. By mid-1948 a draft three-page summary of Hartnett’s intentions was developed setting out how a low-cost economical car could be produced in Australia. By adopting the Grégoire design Hartnett believed he had a proven concept that was already in production. The design was first used by Grégoire in 1934 when he built, with support from L’Aluminium Français, an aluminium chassis for a 1932 Adler Trumpf. French automaker, Hotchkiss was impressed with the design and adopted the principal for their 1939 Amilcar Compound. While war raged further developments were made and by 1942 a small 4-seater, later called the Aluminium Français-Grégoire (AFG) prototype was ready. The AFG weighed just 398 kilos and was capable of 90km/h with a fuel consumption of 4 litres /100 ks. It was this car Hartnett saw when he visited Grégoire in 1947. Citroën, Renault and Peugeot had rejected the design in 1946 but Simca, under Grégoire’s direction, adapted the design for production only to have it scrapped when Simca Director Enrico Pigozzi returned from exile in Italy.4

At the time of Hartnett’s visit two other manufactures had considered the Grégoire design, Panhard went on the produce the Dyna X and Grantham Productions, backed by British MP Denis Kendall had started production in the UK.5 As Kendall’s company had failed in November 1946 with about 12 produced Hartnett was able to purchase the tooling for £25,000 saving £33,000 and several months of tooling manufacture.6 This was a fire sale by the liquidator and Hartnett’s agent in the UK, E.C.H. Shillaker, the former GM UK Managing Director, established a boxing effort in the former Kendall works.7 In addition to the tooling Shillaker was able to secure the Kendall AFG prototype (one of four built by Grégoire) and some production parts from FN Aspin & Company of Bury, Lancashire, who were also contracted in May 1950 to supply production engines and axle parts to Hartnett as well as provide office services to Shillaker all at cost plus 50%.8 The arrangement with Aspin suited both parties as Aspin would have been out of pocket when the Kendal ceased production. The only significant difference between engines was the Kendall (and other Grégoire 2- cylinders) used two fans whereas Hartnett used one. The final ingredient required was finance. Hartnett first put up £50,000 to pay Kendall, purchase an initial supply of aluminium alloy castings from Rolls-Royce and Alain Ltd and obtained an option from Grégoire for the selling rights to his design, Hartnett was confident he could also secure exclusive rights for the British Empire.9 The second stage was to raise £700,000 through a share issue. In August 1949 a proposal to float the Hartnett Motor Company Limited was raised to fund £250,000, an amount that would prove to be grossly inadequate to build a motorcar.

The Grégoire AFG design In the mid-1920s Paris Ecole Polytecnique graduates, J A Grégoire and Pierre Fenaille embarked on a project to build a light racing car, the result was the 1926 “Tracta” a revolutionary front wheel drive (FWD) vehicle that proved its competitiveness. Grégoire then set about designing the Tracta FWD using cast aluminium. The resulting cast alloy frame comprised six parts that bolted together, eliminating welding and providing both the chassis and cowl.10 The system was not without drawbacks, the moulds were destroyed with each metal pour and the surface was difficult to paint.11 Then followed the 1937 Amilcar Compound, a vehicle that manufacturer Hotchkiss wanted as a small car. Around 100 were sold pre-war, these were later described as a disaster as the Alpax castings broke down from vibration leading to cracks that were near impossible to fix.12

Fiat engineer, Dante Giacosa, rejected the design for Simca, replacing the alloy castings with steel and modifying the suspension, in the end the design was dropped.13 Kaiser-Frazer in America also considered Grégoire’s AFG car taking up an option to manufacture, it too was discarded. Only French company Panhard proceeded with the AFG design post war producing the Dyna X and derivatives to 1967. To Grégoire’s chagrin it was substantially modified including the cast alloy frame that was replaced with steel. Grégoire’s original concept was clearly diluted. The Dyna X has been described as, “the most expensive economy car of all time” and is said to have led to Panhard’s demise.14 Simca even restyled the AFG prototype in their possession, this was the prototype Hartnett brought back to Australia and is now located in the Birdwood Museum.

Figure 1 Panhard Dyna X. University of Archives, Hartnett Collection

Figure 2 Restyled AFG prototype brought to Australia by Hartnett. University of Melbourne Archives, Hartnett Collection

In June 1951 a larger version of the AFG was produced, known as the Hotchkiss- Grégoire it featured a 4-cylinder engine and was far better styled with a low Cd of 0.26. The problem was its cost of production and within three months had been killed off. It was described as a “mechanical catastrophe” with buyers either “miserable or rabid”.15 On the positive side Mark Hughes in a 1992 drive of one of the few surviving Hotchkiss-Grégoire’s described it as “the most advanced family saloon in the world in 1951”. Hughes went on to extoll the cars passenger comfort, performance, crisp steering, strong brakes and cruising ability but did criticise the “clumsy” gear change.16 Hartnett’s directors believed this model could also be made in Australia.17 It is evident that Grégoire believed his design created an ideal small car and he was able to sell it to Hartnett, others however, with more experience, were not convinced. Grégoire’s ideas were advanced, he led design in front wheel drive, weight saving, alloy structures, variable-rate suspension and electric propulsion but ran afoul of company engineers and managers who both undermined him and did not want to pay royalties.18

Hartnett’s Car Initially orders for 1,000 Hartnetts were received by the distributors, most on a £5 deposit. A volume of 9,600 per annum was included in the original proposal, assuming this was achievable then a market share of 8.2% was attainable.19 By early 1951 the volume was revised to 2,400 (2.0%) Compared with the Austin A40 at 12.5%, Ford Anglia/Prefect at 8.4%, and Hillman Minx at 3.3% it was realistic.20 By comparison the 48-215 Holden held 17.2% of the market in 1951.21 Buyers were attracted to the Hartnett for two main reasons, Hartnett’s high standing as a procurer of munitions and price. Hartnett set an introductory price of £592 (Tourer) this was then the cheapest car in the market with the Anglia Tourer costing £618, Morris Minor £676 (Tourer), Austin A40 £691 (Tourer) and Hillman Minx £840 (Saloon).22

The Hartnett Motor Company was run on a shoestring with Hartnett acting as managing director, designer, salesman, and manufacturing manager. Two specialists were employed, Errol Coote, a well-known author, handled the promotion and W R Rowell, a former GM-H production engineer joined Hartnett in November 1949 and was given the task of “getting cars onto the road.”23 Rowell would later be cited by The Commonwealth Engineering Company (Comeng) lawyers as one reason for delays. Hartnett employed design firm March & Furey who prepared a series of styling sketches of the various models including a panel van, utility, tourer and .24 Hartnett obviously did not like March and Furey's effort as the front was restyled by Owen Ashton Foulkes, a graphic designer. Foulkes prepared three sketches of the tourer and sedan, and these were used by Comeng to mock-up a prototype using a set of castings ex Kendall.25

Here was the crux of Hartnett’s failure, to adequately plan and execute his design. Drawings of the Kendall body were modified for Hartnett by Motor Panels (Coventry) Ltd in May 1949, these show the Kendall styling. A short time later we have the March & Furey sketches based on Fiat styling then finally the Foulkes sketches.26

Figure 3 March & Furey, presentation drawing of Hartnett Utility © Jon Furey University of Melbourne Archives, Hartnett Collection

Figure 4 Owen Foulkes, presentation drawings of Hartnett Tourer © Suzanne Foulkes University of Melbourne Archives, Hartnett Collection

Hartnett wrongly believed his flat-sided "box" design was modern; he had failed to convince the GM stylists that the Holden should follow this idea and so applied his styling ideas on his own car. By contrast Raymond Loewy in 1947 led the way to future car styling with the Studebaker Starlight coupé and Champion sedan, described by Penny Sparke as "stunningly different".27

Hartnett planned to have the state distributors assemble the car thus saving the expense of a larger assembly plant. The cost of production was estimated at £430 providing a gross profit of £162.28 The Victorian distributor, Kenneth Wright Pty Ltd, operated a motor body works at 64 Yarra Bank Road South Melbourne and in March 1950 renewed a lease at 79 Yarra Bank Road. Wright advertised for spray painters and wet rubbers suggesting the former South Wharf shed they rented would assemble the first Hartnetts.29 On 27 July 1950 Aspin & Co began shipping engines, Meadows transmissions and chassis as Mostly Knocked Down (MKD) sets. The first 13 arrived in Australia on 21 September 1950, then followed 538 sets by 16 May 1951.30 By May 1951 the first prototype was completed using hand-made panels, it took another 12 months for Comeng to provide a further eight sets of panels, meanwhile around 125 chassis had been assembled and now sat waiting for panels.31 On 14 March 1952 the first two production Hartnett convertibles went on show at Kenneth Wright’s Melbourne showroom at 242 Latrobe Street.32 Wright also built “Estate Car” versions using simple construction methods. By September 1952 all the hand-made panels, at considerable cost, had been assembled into cars.33

Figure 5 Sir Laurence Hartnett with an AFG prototype sourced from Kendall Courtesy Ivan Hoffman

Figure 6 Estate Hartnett produced by Kenneth Wright University of Melbourne Archives, Hartnett Collection

Publicity for the new car flowed quickly with road tests appearing from January 1950, this, however, was done on the restyled AFG prototype, the first production Hartnett road test was April 1951 that concluded by stating the car would “provide Australian families new car motoring at a price they can afford to pay.”34 Wheels magazine tested what appears to be a Hartnett roadster in June 1954, well after the company’s failure but indicating the dealers still held unsold stocks. Wheels found the car a surprise, with amazing performance for a small car, good braking and excellent vision.35 The Age did criticize a poorly located starter button, inadequate facia lighting and agreed with other road testers that there was poor sealing of the side curtains.36 By December 1954 the price had increased to £775 making the Hartnett more expensive than a Morris Minor (£694).37

In frustration over the non-appearance of production parts Hartnett had agreed to accepting hand-made panels then took Comeng to arbitration expecting to win a quick resolution in his favour.38 Effectively this was the end of the Hartnett car. In September 1952 The Hartnett Motor Company was given permission to delay creditor payments pending the result of the Comeng claim. At the time just 341 orders were at hand and liabilities totalled £65,779.39 Registrations commenced in 1951 with just one ,40 the following year 11 vehicles were registered, 24 in 1952 and four in 1953. Total reported sales range between 70 and 140 but given the number of mechanical packs landed (538) it is clear many of the packs were dumped as it was too expensive to provide bodywork. As the 1954 registrations do not separate “Hartnett” I estimate that between 65 - 70 Hartnett cars were sold. 41 (Two sedans, 21 wagons, one roadster and the balance tourers.)

COMENG Of all the mistakes Hartnett made, the selection of Comeng as the body tooling designer and manufacturer, was to have the greatest impact on the ability to get the Hartnett into successful production. Comeng grew out of the motor body building firm Smith & Waddington prior to WWII when the Australian Government sought engineering firms capable of munitions production.42 By the time Hartnett was looking for motor body panels the company was firmly entrenched in heavy engineering, particularly in the manufacture and design on railway rolling stock. In retrospect the choice was odd, Comeng were based in NSW adding the complication of distance whereas closer to home Hartnett had access to Martin & King, Autocraft and Ruskin motor body works. Martin & King were fully occupied but the Autocraft factory at Fishermans Bend was largely idle.43

Comeng historian John Dunn suggests the Comeng-Hartnett project was a "fiasco,.....a sorry tale of political vacillation, poor management, inadequate engineering and insufficient quality control."44 Despite this description Dunn was circumspect when it came to laying all the blame at directly Comeng's feet.

Figure 7 Hartnett mock-up at the Comeng plant, University of Melbourne Archives, Hartnett Collection. Dunn accused Rolls Royce and Alain Ltd for large tolerances of the alloy castings, claiming Comeng tools could not cope with the variances. This is misguided criticism as neither Kendall or Panhard experienced the problem, Rolls and Alain made precision aircraft parts and in any case Comeng only appear to have had two sets of castings, an insufficient number to make this judgement.

Politics aside, both parties were at fault. Inadequate engineering was clearly a Comeng shortcoming. The Grégoire design was a proven vehicle, that Hartnett changed the external shape should not have altered the way the car came together. The first issue for Comeng was they had no light panel press tool design capacity. The chief designer, Edward Clifton and draftsman William Davies had no motor body experience and Clifton hired Ron McNaughon from W C Stevens Pty Ltd to manage the press shop and provide some press expertise.45 W C Stevens were an old body building firm who had turned to exhaust muffler manufacture thus McNaughton's knowledge of motor body panel production was possibly limited.

Comeng underestimated the time it would take to produce press tools believing they could do it in 6-12 months, in reality this task normally took well over 12 months. Design drawings from Grégoire were of little use as the material Grégoire specified was aluminium and Hartnett wanted steel which pressed differently. Hartnett did have Motor Panels (Coventry) Ltd redraw the Kendall car body drawings with imperial dimensions, the problem was the shape, it was Kendall styling not Hartnett’s, suggesting that perhaps he initially thought they would not make changes.46 Additional delays occurred when panel steel became difficult to procure. Hartnett did secure some and then accused Comeng of using it on their bus projects.

Comeng had purchased a Johns 500-ton hydraulic press and Clifton believed it would press the Hartnett's panels. It was the wrong type, not a double-acting deep draw press that would have pinned the panel blank and stopped it moving during the press stroke. In desperation Clifton subcontracted the tooling to Rubery, Owen and Kempsley Pty Ltd of Adelaide, wheel manufacturers. The tooling they delivered was well past the delivery date and Hartnett then rejected the proof panels as inferior.47 Hand-made panels were also sub-contracted, Martin & King in Melbourne produced the front and rear fenders, quarter panels, back panel and door skins, Rubery, Owen and Kempsley pressed the bonnet and grill and Francis Skehan of Skehan and Hall the floor panels.48 Clearly Comeng were the wrong company and if Hartnett believed they would rectify the issues in a timely manner he was wrong, if he believed he could get political pressure brought to bear on what was essentially a government enterprise, he was wrong there as well.

It was not all Comeng's fault, a non-performance claim was made by the Comeng lawyers in a counter claim and related to some imported tooling being held up by customs as Hartnett had failed to lodge import papers on time. Hartnett appealed to the Prime Minister who said he would speak to the Controller of Customs, two months elapsed, nothing happened.49 A further problem for Comeng was poor written documentation on design changes.

Figure 8 Hartnett prototype built by Comeng at the Comeng factory University of Melbourne Archives, Hartnett Collection.

Politics Both Federal and State Governments would derail Hartnett’s funding plans. Hartnett initially received a commitment from the Federal Government that they would support his proposal, as they had done with GM-H, by supporting a bank loan.50 Bank Governor, H C Coombes refused any loan, stating Hartnett’s meagreness of resources and a lack of an organisation. The Victorian Liberal Premier, T T Hollway then offered a guarantee of 50% of any Commonwealth Bank Loan. Still Coombes refused.51 Hollway, went it alone offering a £500,000 loan for land, buildings and materials near Frankston, Victoria.52 Then followed a rather inflammatory report in the Tribune suggesting the “Peoples car” was being funded by the “people” without them knowing it.53 They also suggested the Federal Government backed away from Hartnett because of “pressure from the American Embassy on behalf of GM-H.” The matter, after Victorian Parliamentary debate, forced Hollway to say opposition parties had effectively sabotaged the Hartnett project in Victoria and government help would cease.54

The question of the Menzies Government’s refusal to interfere in the dispute between Hartnett and Comeng is well documented by Joe Rich and is best summed up in a March 1953 Interdepartmental Motor Advisory Committee report that indicated “some rationalisation in the motor vehicle manufacture was required.”55 The Ministry of National Development had already noted that Ford and Chrysler intended to increase their content of local manufacture and that they, the ministry, believed that the demand for post-war cars had passed. By December 1951 GM-H had sold 47,669 , Ford 36,769 and Chrysler 25,450 post war cars and 1951 sales were down compared to 1950 (123,076 versus 137,308).56 Thus it can be seen that the failure of Hartnett’s small enterprise of little consequence to the government.

Hartnett had appealed to the Federal government as he believed as they owned Comeng and appointed three of the four directors they had a moral obligation.57 Hartnett’s appeal was denied without an official reason although Rich suggests two grounds were put by bureaucrats after the event, the first was that the government was not party to the dispute and they cited B J Rank of the Department of National Development who wrote that the matter was sub judice.58 Both reasons can be dismissed, as the government controlled Comeng through the directors and the dispute was in arbitration not a court of law.

The Labor opposition were quick to condemn the Menzies government, “Hartnett Car Crucified” cried the Newcastle Morning Herald following an interview with NSW MP David Watkins MHR who claimed Comeng had deliberately crucified the output of the Hartnett factory, “the more Hartnett complained the more Comeng delayed.”59 Watkins also asserted that the Comeng managing director had sent Hartnett an offensive letter over accusations of Hartnett’s non-performance. This letter remains a mystery and is not filed with Hartnett’s papers or mentioned by Dunn.

While Hartnett believed he had the ear of Prime Minister Menzies he had not endured himself to the bureaucrats. Hartnett assumed the Federal government would loan him £300,000 and that the public would subscribe the rest. He quickly found government support would be the same as had been given to GM-H in 1946, in other words an introduction to the Commonwealth Bank and no guarantees. Making matters worse his stockbroker advised Australians would not subscribe to a project based on “conjectural costs and profits.”60

H P Green, Director of the Division of Industry Development while sympathetic to the idea of a light cheap car made of aluminium wrote that the major problem was Hartnett’s tendency to be carried away with enthusiasm and optimism. Green cites Hartnett’s use of the Victorian Governor’s endorsement, “On the face of it, I think your scheme is a good one” was reworded by Hartnett to, “he is a very great enthusiast of our car project.” In respect to the English company Lucas, Hartnett suggested the company’s involvement in the project was an indication of the lengths to which people in England were going to help the Hartnett car whereas all Lucas were doing was trying to sell him electrical components not providing an endorsement of the car.61

Rich notes that Hartnett had developed an “egocentric intensity of temperament” which was partly responsible for Hartnett’s inability to provide the Hartnett Motor Company with the type of organisational backing that would satisfy banks and shareholders.62 It is clear the Menzies government were not concerned that Hartnett should fail and while no evidence exists that there was any move to force failure it remains clear nothing was done to save the venture. The Tribune suggested Menzies had turned to General Motors in America, as this was where the dollars lay. In other words, every Holden sold generated far more tax dollars than any Hartnett.63 Without either federal or state funding Hartnett went it alone incorporating The Hartnett Company on 30 August 1949 with a capital of £250,000 of which £100,000 was paid up. This amount was grossly inadequate to see the company through the Comeng disaster, particularly when Comeng directors by March 1952 believed he was short of cash and they could wait him out.64

Figure 9 Chasing publicity Hartnett entered a Estate car in the 1952 Sun reliability trial winning the class. University of Melbourne Archives, Hartnett Collection.

Arbitration

Matters came to a head when Hartnett returned from an overseas trip in early 1952, he found Comeng had not delivered any panels.65 As cash was running low Hartnett sought relief from Comeng by claiming a bank guarantee of £14,000 for non- performance. Comeng responded with a demand for £8,000 for work performed to date and an injunction restraining Hartnett from claiming the guarantee. Rather than sit down and negotiate Hartnett naively agreed to arbitration, “In all innocence I agreed. We had legal opinion it would only take a couple of months”.66 Comeng Board member M W O’Donnell, one of the Commonwealths appointees, wrote to Treasury in Canberra, concerned with the actions of Comeng, “There appears to have been some imprudence on the part of some of the Comeng executives in handling this matter”.67 With an arbitrator appointed lawyers became involved and for Hartnett time stood still. It was not until April 1953 that Comeng’s solicitors Dibbs, Crother & Osborne wrote seeking discovery documents. From correspondence between Comeng’s solicitors and Mathew McFadden & Co who acted for Hartnett, little progress was made, a degree of frustration is evident, Dibbs, Crother & Osborne write “When courtesies such as we have extended to you in these matters have been extended to us then the necessary action will be taken.”68 McFadden responded expressing dismay over four months of inaction and then what was provided was, “so vague as to be meaningless”.69 One point raised by Dibbs, Crowther & Osborne were “oral and partly written instructions”, this referred to attempts by Rowell (Hartnett) & McCruden’ (Comeng) in 1950 to mutually agree on the prototype design on site.70 The matter first came before the arbitrator Stanley West, on 24 July 1953 and it was not until 10 December 1955 that the Commonwealth Engineering Co Ltd was ordered to pay The Hartnett Motor Co Ltd £19,978 damages and £17,250 costs.71 This was well short of Hartnett’s expectation of £170,000 damages and ensured the Hartnett car was dead.

Figure 10 The Hartnett assembly factory in South Melbourne, Vic with partially finished cars 1953. University of Melbourne Archives, Hartnett Collection.

Not dead yet Hartnett was down but not out. In 1958 he negotiated with Carl Borgward to assemble the Lloyd 600 in Queensland under the name Lloyd-Hartnett, there were few changes to the design except for local production. Again, Hartnett picked the wrong company as Borgward closed Lloyd down in 1961.72

Among the papers in the University of Melbourne Hartnett archive are two further attempts to resurrect the Hartnett car. In late 1952 he embarked on a plan to sell the rights of the Hartnett car to the Japanese without success.73 Then in 1977 Hartnett attempted to interest the Chinese in producing his car. Using the services of Professor H F Simon, University of Melbourne, contact was made with Mr Wang Wen of the Revolutionary Committee. Hartnett had suggested in 1973 that the design “is so good that somebody may come forward to manufacture the car”.74 Professor Simon added that a re-design of the Hartnett using the services of Alan (Bob) Chamberlain and Phil Irving could be undertaken.75 At this time Chamberlain was 69 and Irving 74, both still very capable of doing the job but one wonders at the prospect of working with a foreign country, one that at the time was only making trucks, based on a 40-year-old design. Conclusion Laurence Hartnett was optimistic when he embarked on a plan to produce his own Australian car. Using currency he had earned during his time as Director of Ordinance Production where the urgency of war fast tracked design and manufacture and money had never seemed to be a consideration I propose this led Hartnett to believe all obstacles would be overcome.

The obstacles became insurmountable, insufficient capital, an unrealistic timeframe, the wrong contractor and perhaps an unorthodox design all contributed to failure. Blaming the government, as Hartnett and others have done, is not the answer. Even if the car had been successful and sales of 2,500 per annum were achieved the Hartnett would not have had an impact on the Australian market and then what. The design had no room for development, it was constricted by expensive alloy castings and a small engine, by 1955 it would have been very outdated and the small returns would not have paid for re-engineering.

Warning signs were evident before Hartnett committed to the AFG design, it was being shunned by experienced manufacturers and the Kendal had failed. Was Hartnett blinded by Grégoire handing him the rights to the design so cheaply?

I believe it was folly on Hartnett’s part, he failed to apply appropriate design, planning or supervision. This together with insufficient capital, manufacturing problems and inexperience led to the Hartnett car’s failure. Hartnett’s folly is represented by very few five surviving examples.76

1 GM’S Export Company President, William Sullivan was blunt in his assessment of Holden telling Hartnett, “Australia was a kettle of fish, wind it up, the god-damned place, with £110 of duty on a body and we’re expected to buy local bodies – to hell with it.” Ian A Roberts, A Case Study of General Motors Holdens 1934-37 turnaround, University of Tasmania, 1976. Copy held in University of Melbourne Archives, Hartnett Collection 1986.0129 Unit 2. 2 Laurence Hartnett, Big Wheels and Little Wheels, (Hawthorn Vic: Goldstar, 1973), 178. 3 Hartnett, Big Wheels and Little Wheels, 196.

4 Sophie Pehlivanian, "Aluminium, a solution for the automobile", https://www.cairn.info/revue-cahiers-d- histoire-de-l-aluminium-2009-1-page-6.htm, 2009. 5 Grantham Productions Ltd. Kendall - UK 1945-1946, http://classiccarmag.net/vanished-vehicles-part-10/, April 2017. 6 Joe Rich, Hartnett A Technocratic Brigand (Sydney: Turton & Armstrong 1996), 498. 7 Louis Fourie, On a Global Mission (Victoria, Canada: Friesen Press, 2016), 1507. 8 Correspondence ECH Shillaker Hartnett Motor Company to FN Aspin & Co Ltd Bury Lanchester UK 23 August 1950, University of Melbourne Archives, Hartnett Collection 1986.0129 Unit 17. 9 L J Hartnett, Manufacture of Low-cost, economical car in Australia, unpublished, Melbourne, 1949. 10 Pehlivanian, "Aluminium". 11 Casting technique which employs single-use moulds, made from sand, a refractory substance which enables the creation of complex parts. The sand moulds are destroyed by the removal of the casting. The quality of parts made from this process is very fine, but the manufacturing time is longer as each sand mould can only be used once and a new one must be made after each casting. 12 Jon Pressnell, “Honour without profit?,” Classic and Sportscar, Haymarket Media Group, London, June 1992, 102; Alpax Alloy is described as having a base of Aluminium consisting up to 10% Silicon. Its specific gravity is lower than that of aluminium but its strength is about double the same. It is used for casting and has good resistance to corrosion. 13 Pressnell, "Honour without profit?", 105. 14 Griffith Borgeson, “Monsieur Traction Avant", Automobile Quarterly, Vol. XIV 1976, 46. 15 Borgeson, “Monsieur Traction Avant", 47. 16 Mark Hughes, “ ‘Kiss – and tell…,” Classic and Sportscar, Haymarket Media Group, London, June 1992, 100. 17 “To produce heavier Austin Car,” `Examiner (Launceston), 7 Jan 1950, 6; Director, JS McCullum suggested it would appear in 1952. 18 See Borgeson, “Monsieur Traction Avant", 45, that tells the story of Citroën refusing to use Grégoire’s revised Tracta joint when he learnt of its shortcomings; Pressnell, "Honour without profit?", 103. 19 L.J. Hartnett, Manufacture of Low-cost, economical car in Australia, 1949. 20 Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Motor Vehicle registrations, 1948-1952. 21 “Holden Sales Growth 1948-1951,” GM-H, based on motor registration data held by N A Darwin. 22 "The Lowest priced cars of To-day," Australian Monthly Motor Manual, May 1951, 113. 23 “Mr W R Rowell joins Hartnett Motor Company,” Argus (Melbourne), 12 November 1949, 7; W R Rowell was later the General Manager of Singapore’s largest motor assembly plant (1967). 24 Harriet Edquist and David Hurlston, 2015, Shifting gear. Design, innovation and the Australian car (Melbourne: National Gallery of Victoria, 2015) 17. 25 Sketches located in University of Melbourne Archives, Hartnett Collection 1986.0129. 26 See Drawing BSK 1811 by Motor Panels (Coventry) Ltd 23/5/1949 held in the University of Melbourne Archives, Hartnett Collection 1986.0129 Unit 17. 27 Penny Sparke, A Century of Car Design, (London: Barrons 2002), 137. 28 L. J. Hartnett, Manufacture of Low-cost, economical car in Australia. 29 L. J. Hartnett, 230; Advert, “Kenneth Wright Pty Ltd,” The Age (Melbourne), 28 March 1950, 9. 30 The Hartnett Motor Company Master Schedule, May 1952, University of Melbourne Archives, Hartnett Collection, 1986.0129; “Engines for Peoples’ car coming,” Argus (Melbourne), 22 May 1950, 6; While engines and axle assemblies were made by Aspin & Co the transmissions were produced by Henry Meadows Ltd. 31 Interview with Rod Fulton, Hartnett owner and restorer, 30 April 2019. 32 “First Hartnett cars displayed,” Advertiser (Adelaide), 15 March 1952, 3. 33 “First Hartnett cars on the road,” Illawarra Daily Mercury, 23 April 1952, 7. 34 “An Australian Minicar,” Road Patrol, Royal Automobile Club of WA, February 1950; “The Hartnett”, Australian Motor Sports, April 1951, 4. 35 “The 600cc Hartnett”, Wheels, June 1954, 12. 36 “Hartnett Dispels Any “Toy Car” Ideals,” The Age, January 1954, 36. 37 “New Hartnett roadster is lively”, The Argus, 9 December 1953, 10. 38 L.J. Hartnett, Manufacture of Low-cost, economical car in Australia, 228. 39 “Car firms claims,” Sydney Morning Herald, 11 September 1952, 5. 40 The first registration was the restyled AFG prototype in Tasmania. This car was flown to several states to promote the Hartnett. 41 Registrations see, “New Motor Car Registrations in Australia 1950-1953,” The Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders Ltd; Laurence Hartnett, correspondence to Rev A Griffiths, 2 August 1976 copy held by N A Darwin (140 sales), Rich, 144 (70 sales); Pedr Davis, Aussie cars (Sydney: Marque

Publishing Co, 1987), 65 (120 sales) and Trevor Poulson, “1950 Hartnett Pacific HG,” Restored Cars, No. 50, 24 (140 sales). 42 Norm Darwin, Early Australian Automotive Design. The first fifty years, (Mt Rowan Vic: H@nd Publishing 2018), 145. 43 Norm Darwin, “The Automobile and Fishermans Bend", Paper presented at the Automotive Historians Australia Inc., 3rd Annual Conference, University of Melbourne, 11-12 August 2018; Both Autocraft and Ruskin came under Lord Nuffield’s control and it has been suggested by the Tribune (1949) that he blocked Hartnett’s approach to have bodies made in those facilities. 44 John Dunn, "A lost venture, new goals", Chapter 13, Comeng: A History of Commonwealth Engineering Vol 1: 1921-1955 (Sydney: Rosenberg), 207. 45 Dunn, "A lost venture, new goals", 209. 46 See Motor Panels (Cov) Ltd drawing of Hartnett Motor Co body, University of Melbourne Archives, Hartnett Collection,1986.0129. 47 Comeng later sued Rubery, Owen and Kempsley for £50,000 over the poor tooling. 48 Dunn, "A lost venture, new goals", 209; Sources of supply panels, Hartnett Motor Co, University of Melbourne Archives, Hartnett Collection, 1986.0129, 31 May 1951. 49 Dunn, "A lost venture, new goals", 210. 50 Rich, Hartnett A Technocratic Brigand ,121 points out that it was GM who guaranteed the GM-H loan not the Australian Government 51 Rich, Hartnett A Technocratic Brigand, 140. 52 “Hartnett car factory not for Victoria,” Canberra Times, 8 June 1949, 2. 53 “State offer to back car venture,” Argus (Melbourne), 29 April 1949, 6. 54 “Role in 750,000 Car Deal May Smash Hollway Govt: Probe Urged,” Tribune (Sydney), 4 June 1949, 7. 55 Rich, Hartnett A Technocratic Brigand, 143. 56 GM-H, Australian market position for Holden and competitive units, Section H sheet 2, 26 March 1952, held by N A Darwin. 57 Rich, Hartnett A Technocratic Brigand, 142. 58 Rich, Hartnett A Technocratic Brigand, 142. 59 “Hartnett Motor Car Co. ‘Crucified’,” Newcastle Morning Herald, 26 October 1952, 3. 60 Dunn, "A lost venture, new goals", 210. 61 Rich, Hartnett A Technocratic Brigand, 139. 62 Rich, Hartnett A Technocratic Brigand, 139. 63 “How Menzies killed the Hartnett car,” Tribune (Sydney), 27 June 1956, 5. 64 Dunn, "A lost venture, new goals", 210. 65 Hartnett, Manufacture of Low-cost, economical car in Australia, 216. 66 Hartnett, Manufacture of Low-cost, economical car in Australia, 228. 67 M W O’Donnell letter to P W Nette 23 April 1952 National Archives File SP481/3 box 6. 68 Dibbs, Crowther & Osborn to Matthew McFadden & Co 17/6/53, University of Melbourne Archives, Hartnett collection, 1986.0129. 69 Matthew McFadden & Co to Dibbs, Crowther & Osborne 24/6/53, University of Melbourne Archives, Hartnett collection 1986.0129. 70 Dibbs, Crowther to McFadden 4/6/1953 p2, University of Melbourne Archives, Hartnett collection 1986.0129. 71 “£19,978 damages awarded to Hartnett Motors,” Canberra Times, 10/12/55 p1. 72 Peda Davis, The Australian Dictionary of Motoring (Sydney: Peda Davis Pty Ltd, 2002), 179. 73 Grégorie-Hartnett Design of Motorcar, 1952, University of Melbourne Archives, Hartnett collection Unit 17. 74 Hartnett, Manufacture of Low-cost, economical car in Australia, 231. 75 Prof H F Simon letter to Wang Wen, Vol. M. Unit 17 19/5/1977, University of Melbourne Archives, Hartnett collection 1986.0129. 76 Examples survive at Melbourne Museum, National Museum (Canberra) National Motor Museum (Birdwood SA), Brisbane Museum, a private museum and a Estate car is currently being privately restored.