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RFA Case Study Unit Train Derailment Incident Details Unit Train Derailment Site Case Study: Emergency Response Tactics Incident Details Published by: Renewable Fuels Association Authored by: International Association of Fire Chiefs March 2015 This document was prepared by the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) for the Renewable Fuels Association (RFA). The information, though believed to be accurate at the time of publication, should not be considered asPREFACE legal advice or as a substitute for developing specific company operating guidelines. IAFC or RFA makes no warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or applicability of the information presented in this document. 1 Handling Instructions Hazardous Material - Unit Train Related Transportation Incidents Case Study The information gathered in this CASE STUDY is classified as open source and should be used as a reference in reviewing the potential hazards of your community. At a minimum, the attached materials will be disseminated through the Renewable Fuels Association (RFA). Points of Contact: Renewable Fuels Association: Kristin Moore Vice President, Technical Services 425 Third St. SW, Suite1150 Washington, DC 20024 International Association of Fire Chiefs: James Rist Program Specialist 4025 Fair Ridge Dr. Fairfax, VA 22033 Richard Miller Program Manager John Woulfe Assistant Director Programs and Technology 2 Table of Contents Case Study #1……………………………………………………………………………….4 Case Study #2………………………………………………………………………………15 Case Study #3………………………………………………………………………………24 Case Study #4………………………………………………………………………………34 Case Study #5………………………………………………………………………………39 Appendix: Events Summary Table………………………………………………………47 3 Case Study #1 Title: Lynchburg Derailment Incident Background and Locality Contact: Conference Call Interview – Conducted on Wednesday, 4 June 2014 Lynchburg Fire Department, Fire Chief Steven B. Ferguson ([email protected]) 800 Madison Street Lynchburg, VA 24504-2545 Rail Line: CSX Transportation / CSX Corporation (CSX) Date: Monday, 30 April 2014 Location: Lynchburg, Virginia Narrative: Written by James Rist and Richard Miller Weather: Source – Weather Underground (www.wunderground.com) Photos: Various Sources Emergency Plan/ Fire Pre-Plan: Yes Supporting Documentation: Lynchburg Narrative Lynchburg is an independent city in the Commonwealth of Virginia. As of the 2010 census, the population was 75,568. Located in the foothills of the Blue Ridge Mountains along the banks of the James River, Lynchburg is approximately 120 miles west of Richmond. Other nearby cities include: Roanoke (southwest), Charlottesville (northeast), and Danville (south). The Lynchburg Fire Department, established in April of 1883, provides fire suppression and prevention services, emergency medical services, technical rescue, hazardous materials response, and confined space emergency response for approximately 76,000 Lynchburg residents, as well as the thousands who enter the area daily to work and shop. The department is staffed with 192 personnel, including civilians, firefighters and emergency medical personnel operating with eight stations, an administrative office, a specialized repair shop, and a fire training facility. The City of Lynchburg uses the Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Fire Programs for fire service certifications. All Lynchburg personnel are Hazardous Materials Level Awareness and Operations certified, with many certified at the Technician-Level. HazMat Team The Lynchburg Fire Department's HazMat Team provides the citizens of Lynchburg with an innovative approach for resolution of life safety situations involving hazardous materials. Fire department employees provide advanced planning and management services for chemical releases in the Lynchburg area. By developing partnerships and enacting written mutual aid agreements with other localities, the hazmat team provides the ability to take an 4 offensive approach to unplanned releases of hazardous materials. Some incidents may require the response of the regional hazmat team; however, Lynchburg’s team effectively decreases critical time delays before more aggressive actions can be taken. This will favorably change the outcome of a chemical release in the Lynchburg area. HazMat Team Capabilities Ability to: Control a hazardous substance spill or leak. Assess and manage container damage. Detect and monitor hazardous atmospheres. Work at transportation or fixed facility emergencies. Use advanced chemical protective clothing. Decontaminate personnel during exposures. Perform advanced hazmat life support medical services. The hazmat team operates in compliance with governmental regulations and professional standards. Members of the hazmat team offer additional hazmat related training for other Lynchburg public safety departments. HazMat Team Profile The Lynchburg HazMat Team was developed in 1999 and operates a Level III self-contained response unit from Lakeside Drive Fire Station #7. The team consists of 30 technicians and specialists who perform these special operations in addition to their firefighting and EMS duties with the Lynchburg Fire Department. Rail Background Lynchburg has pre-plans for the railways in their area, as both CSX and Norfolk Southern have rail yards. Lynchburg also sees passenger rail as Amtrak shares rail time with freight rail. In addition to the normal freight and passenger rail train traffic, Lynchburg experiences a unit train of either Bakken crude oil or ethanol daily. These trains, operated by CSX, transport these products through Lynchburg southeast to Yorktown, VA to the Plains All American Pipeline LP. At that location these products are transloaded (Transloading is the process of transferring a shipment from one mode of transportation to another) into either pipeline or aboard barges or ships moored on the York River. Besides crude oil and ethanol, products such as butane, biodiesel components and other petroleum products, will also come and go by rail and water; therefore some of these products may pass through Lynchburg heading 5 westward. Free access mapping system: http://www.mapsofworld.com/usa/states/virginia/virginia-railway-map.html Incident On Wednesday afternoon, 30 April 2014, at 1400 hours a CSX Bakken crude oil unit train was transiting through downtown Lynchburg when it derailed. The 105-car train had 17 of its DOT- 111 rail cars derail. Three cars landed in the James River where one leaked product into the river, but another car breeched and burned. A local business called 9-1-1 reporting a vehicle fire. Initial fire department response consisted of three engines, truck (ladder), a Battalion Chief and EMS. Upon arrival after initial determination of a rail incident, an additional two engines and truck were dispatched to the assignment. Incident command post was established at a nearby intersection and a defensive posture to protect exposures was initially established. Regional Mutual Aid called to provide backfill coverage. A Lynchburg Fire Department recall was activated for off-duty staff to report (overtime) for backfill to maintain adequate emergency service protection. The incident command post location was relocated in the first hour to a parking lot that allowed the incident command post to safely continue operations. The command post operation was unified with police and city management. According to Lynchburg EMS, there was no CSX representation at the command post until the end of the incident and command was never able to meet or talk with the train crew. A second fire department Command Battalion Chief had to be dispatched to the CSX rail yard within the city of Lynchburg to acquire the train’s consist, which was attained and brought back to the command post. Product identification: Incident command identified the products involved by the DOT placards (DOT 1267) and utilizing the DOT 2012 Emergency Response Guide (ERG), command 6 made efforts to verify that information with the train’s consist. Incident command established a staging area a few blocks from the second command post. No additional fire department resource units were required for the incident as command decided to conduct a nonintervention mode of operation. Therefore, fire department resources never totaled more than six engines, two trucks, hazmat, and additional command staff on the scene. Command established a James River water operations boat crew to gain an assessment of the rail cars in the water and deploy containment booms. A half mile evacuation of the downtown area was established as outlined in Public Safety Section of the 2012 DOT ERG Guide 128. Command continued to monitor the situation and allowed the product involved to burn off before deciding to transition into offensive operations. An Initial foam fire attack was used to extinguish the remaining product. Complete extinguishment and overhaul operations continued with assistance from the CSX rail operators until termination of the incident. Utilizing a tag or passport accountability system with a Rescue Intervention Team format, all personnel wore their structural gear with self-contained breathing apparatuses except hazmat at who wore Level-B suits while performing air sampling. Key Factors of Operations: The City of Lynchburg municipal water supply adequately met the needs of the incident. Foam concentrate and foam supply was adequate for this incident. Lynchburg Fire Chief Ferguson assessed that the fire department resources met the need for this incident. Lynchburg’s
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