Why the Boer Delegates at Vereeniging Accepted a Humiliating Peace to End the South African War, 31 May 1902

Home , Christiaan de Wet, January 1902, June 1900, Koos de la Rey, Louis Botha, May 1902

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONFRONTED WITH THE FACTS: WHY THE BOER DELEGATES AT VEREENIGING ACCEPTED A HUMILIATING PEACE TO END THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR, 31 MAY 1902

Fransjohan Pretorius

Th e peace treaty of Vereeniging, signed 31 May 1902 by representatives of the two Boer Republics and Great Britain, ended the South African War (Anglo-Boer War) that had been waging over the veldt for two years and eight months. At the meetings of the Free State commandos—who gathered at the end of April and early May to choose delegates for the impending deliberations—“a voice as of thunder” was given for retaining independence.1 Th e same sentiment was echoed at similar meetings that occurred in the Transvaal.2 In addition, at the fi rst Vereeniging meeting on 15 May, President M. T. Steyn and Generals C. R. de Wet (Free State) and J. H. de la Rey (Transvaal) argued that defi nite instructions had been given to the delegates stating the Republics’ independence was not open for negotiation.3 Why then did the delegates on 31 May decide with fi ft y-four votes to six to accept the British peace proposals, costing the Republics their independence? A missive from Prime Minister Abraham Kuyper to the British government on 25 January 1902 off ered the Dutch government’s services as mediator and initiated the peace negotiations. Th e correspondence was forwarded to Lord Kitchener, the British Commander-in-Chief in South Africa; in turn on 4 March he sent a copy to Acting President of the Transvaal, Schalk Burger.4 No copy of the correspondence, how- ever, was sent to the Free State President, M. T. Steyn. Steyn was of the

1 J. D. Kestell and D. E. van Velden, Th e Peace Negotiations between the Governments of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State, and the Representatives of the British Government, which Terminated in the Peace Concluded at Vereeniging on the 31st May, 1902 (London: Richard Clay, 1912), 90. 2 W. J. de Kock, “Die Vrede van Vereeniging,” in Gedenkalbum van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, ed. J. H. Breytenbach, 316 (Cape Town: Nasionale Pers, 1949), 316. 3 Kestell and van Velden, Peace Negotiations, 49. 4 Ibid., 1–6. 196 fransjohan pretorius opinion that Kitchener deliberately kept him out of the loop, preferring rather to liaison with the leaders who in the past had been prepared to consider peace, such as occurred in June 1900 prior to the battle of Diamond Hill, and again at Middelburg in February and March 1901. He was also indignant that Burger had broken the agreement that Steyn had concluded with Paul Kruger (then Transvaal president) at the beginning of the war, stipulating that neither Republic should negotiate separately with the British.5 Dr. W. J. Leyds, Minister Plenipotentiary of the Transvaal in Europe, later declared from a pro-Afrikaner national- ist point of view that Kitchener knew very well with whom peace talks had to be opened: Schalk Burger, “the most vacillating of the leaders, and not with Steyn, the man who stood fi rmly.”6 Despite the exclusion of Steyn from the initial dialogue, Kuyper’s missive took its course. On 27 March 1902 Steyn received a report from Burger on the issue and the possibility of peace. Th e Boer governments, assisted by Generals Louis Botha, Christiaan de Wet, and Koos de la Rey, would meet at Klerksdorp in the Western Transvaal to discuss the Dutch off er and the larger issue of peace. Th is meeting took place between 9 and 11 April under Burger’s chairmanship. Although the participants were deeply divided about initiating negotiations for peace, it appears they supported the preservation of the independence of the Republics.7 From the reports by Botha, de Wet, and de la Rey, it is clear that the blockhouse lines—erected in a crisscross pattern over the entire operational area and linked by barbed wire fences due to the constant rail disruptions and Boer attacks on trains—were an obstacle to the military operations of the commandos.8 Th ere was also a general shortage of grain, livestock, and horses. Despite these condi-

5 N. J. van der Merwe, Marthinus Th eunis Steyn, ‘n Lewensbeskrywing, II (Cape Town: Nasionale Pers, 1921), 71, 82–83; de Kock, “Die Vrede van Vereeniging,” 308–309. 6 W. J. Leyds, Vierde Verzameling (Correspondentie 1900–1902) Deel I, Eerste Band (Dordrecht: Geuze, 1934), xlix, translation. 7 de Kock, “Die Vrede van Vereeniging,” 309–10. 8 When Lord Kitchener took over command from Lord Roberts in November 1900, safeguarding the railway lines had become an urgent necessity because of the need to send supplies to the front by train, despite constant rail disruptions and Boer attacks on trains. Kitchener decided on a system whereby stations and train bridges were to be safeguarded by blockhouse structures. Th ese blockhouses were to be linked by barbed wire fences in a crisscross pattern over the entire operational area. Th e fi rst were erected in January 1901. By the end of the war there were about eight thousand blockhouses over a distance of 3,700 miles, erected at an estimated cost of £1 million.