Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies State, Society and Governance in Melanesia State Society and in Governance Melanesia

DISCUSSION PAPER

Discussion Paper 2008/2

THE LONELINESS OF THE PRO-GOVERNMENT BACKBENCHER AND THE PRECARIOUSNESS OF SIMPLE MAJORITY RULE IN

INTRODUCTION has sparked strengthening popular hostility PAULSON and growing cynicism about parliamentary PANAPA processes. At the 2006 election, all the The Pacific Island microstate of Tuvalu has incumbent ministers lost their seats, with and acquired a reputation for having a ‘high the exception of the Prime and the degree of political stability’ (Somoza 2001, p. Speaker, and the turnover of MPs was higher JON 832), and has a top Freedom House ranking than at any previous election in Tuvalu’s 1 for civil rights and political liberties (Freedom history. In response to long-run government FRAENKEL House 2007). Yet, despite regular elections instability, the new government introduced a and the absence of severe social crises, in 2007 increasing there has been - since 1993 - an increasing the size of by two, aiming to bring to frequency of ‘no confidence’ challenges an end an era where government majorities in parliament and resulting defeats of depended on sustaining a single pro- governments. Following an early post- government backbencher. independence phase of relative stability, Prime Ministers proved much less In some situations, frequency of change able to sustain majorities in parliament. in government may not be damaging. Seven different governments took office Indeed, regular turnover of governments is between 1998 and 2006, and none lasted often deemed a sign of robust democracy more than two years. One analysis of the (Huntington 1991, p. 266-67). Where there is 2004 parliament found that all but two little difference in policy between government of the then incumbent MPs had defected and opposition, or where incoming from one group to another at some point governments simply continue where their during their tenures (Taafaki 2004, p. 17). predecessors left off, ostensible instability ‘Political stability’ was a principle concern may disguise substantive continuity. In encountered during the deliberations Tuvalu, however, this is not the case. Regular of the 2000 Constitutional Review government changes have imposed high 2 Committee (CRC). Its absence, linked costs, for example due to the associated delay to the manoeuvres of aspiring politicians and modification of national budgets. Once a and defecting government backbenchers, The Loneliness of the Pro-Government Backbencher and the Precariousness of Simple Majority Rule in Tuvalu

Table 1: Tuvalu Population by Home Island and by Island of 2 Residence, 2002 Population by Population by Island of Residence Home Island 664 1,560 Nanumaga 589 1,063 663 1,453 548 835 1,591 1,694 586 1,149 4,492 1,004 393 461 35 2 Total 9,561 9,221

Source: Tuvalu Population Census, 2002, available http://www.spc.int/prism/country/tv/stats/

confidence motion is carried in parliament, in accordance with classical liberal theories, public service gridlock commences and there has been little in the way of scrutiny endures until a new government is formed. of alternative forms of representation and In addition, to sustain Prime Ministerial accountability, even where – as in Tuvalu – majorities, incumbents have politicized key these are already functioning locally. appointments, both at Governor General, Speaker and ministerial level. Parliamentary In this paper, we analyse the twists and sittings have been curtailed to avoid no turns of Tuvalu central government politics, confidence challenges. As a result, according particularly since the two elections of 1993, to the Report of the National Workshop and consider an alternative framework which on Accountability for Leaders of Tuvalu, entails the abandonment of the unhappy 1999, parliament had ‘failed miserably’, and institutionalisation of the opposition as a was unable to ‘effectively legislate’ or hold government-in-waiting, the introduction of ‘officials and public institutions to account an eight member executive representing for the use of public resources in a timely all the islands, and the adoption of manner’.3 a stronger oversight role for the island- based .5 In the first part of Conventional responses to weak the paper, we outline the institutional and parliamentary oversight in Tuvalu have political framework established in Tuvalu tended to focus on promoting reforms at independence, and the way this has intended to ‘strengthen institutions’ so that developed in the period thereafter. In the these resemble more closely the Westminster second part, we review the succession of ideal, despite the notable absence of political governments, why each fell and how each parties. Opposition oversight of the executive sought to engineer for itself a longer term in is to be enhanced by expanded usage of office. In the final part, we review the 1997 parliamentary committees, and by challenging Falekaupule Act and the operation of local ‘the misconception that Parliament is the arm of level assemblies, and set out our alternative the government-of-the-day’ (Clements 2000).4 framework, asking whether this might better The familiar framework of a Leadership Code, fit the local customary framework as well as Ombudsman and non-partisan Office of the improving the quality of central government Speaker of Parliament has been proposed performance. to reinforce checks and balances, in ways that have been replicated across the Pacific POLITICAL BACKGROUND Islands - promoted by the United Nations Development Programme, the and the Commonwealth. Despite Tuvalu means literally ‘cluster of eight’ or ‘eight recognition that parliaments have not worked standing together’, a terminology that perhaps The Loneliness of the Pro-Government Backbencher and the Precariousness of Simple Majority Rule in Tuvalu

says as much about preferred institutional framework). The constitution was revised, arrangements as about geography. The eight first still strongly inspired by British officials in 3 islands are located close to the equator in the 1982, and then again - with greater Tuvaluan central Pacific. It currently has a population input - in 1986, but with ‘few substantive of around 10,000, spread across a land area changes’ to electoral and political institutions of 26 square kilometres. The country has a aside from the introduction of procedures sea area of 900,000 square kilometres, and for the recall of non-performing members of is potentially threatened by global warming parliament (Levine 1992, p. 493-94, 506). and rising sea levels. Colonised by the The original post-independence parliament British as part of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands had twelve members, but this was raised , Tuvalu peacefully broke away to fifteen in May 2000, making the retention from in 1975 to become independent of government majorities more difficult than on 1 October 1978, after a 92% vote in previously.7 Tuvalu currently has seven favour of separation (Macdonald 1982, p. two-member constituencies and one single- 256). Tuvalu nevertheless remained part of member constituency, all of which return the Commonwealth, and the Head of State is members by (see map).8 the British monarch, represented within the General elections are held every four years, country by a Governor General appointed with the result that there have been eight on the advice of the Prime Minister after parliaments since independence. consultations with members of parliament.6 The Prime Minister heads the government Like many of the former British colonies, and is elected at a closed meeting of MPs by Tuvalu inherited a Westminster-style a secret ballot, after either a general election, system, although with certain important the death of an incumbent, or the fall of a modifications (not least, having a constitution previous government due to a confidence in place of the classically convention-based motion.9 Confidence motions normally Westminster framework and a unicameral require two days notice, but with the consent

Map designed by Michael Govorov The Loneliness of the Pro-Government Backbencher and the Precariousness of Simple Majority Rule in Tuvalu

of the Speaker can be moved without notice, Both members from each of the seven 4 by way of a suspension of the ‘Rules of dual-member constituencies tend to align Procedure’.10 When a no confidence vote is themselves on the same side during Prime passed, parliament is prorogued immediately Ministerial elections. In most cases, a member until the Governor General (GG) calls the vying for the Prime Minister’s position is likely meeting to elect a new Prime Minister.11 The to be supported by his colleague from the Constitution permits the GG to exercise his same island. For example, the Prime Ministers ‘deliberate judgment’ in regard to the timing (1977-1980), of such election meetings12, sometimes (1981-1988), Ionatana Ionatana (1999- controversially enabling politically aligned 2000), Koloa Talake (2001-2002), Maatia Governor Generals to allow incumbent Toafa (2004-2006) and Apisai Ielemia (2006- governments to limp on in a caretaker role or today) all had aligned island running mates. providing them time to re-establish majorities Having dual tickets ensured that acquisition in parliament. Besides the Prime Minister, of the prestigious political power associated there were, until 2007, five other ministers in with the Prime Ministership consolidated cabinet who were also appointed from within island influence. However, there have been parliament.13 The Speaker is elected from exceptions. Prime Ministers Kamuta Latasi amongst the members of the House.14 He (1993-1996), Faimalaga Luka (2001) and serves as the Head of Parliament, draws (2002-2004) faced island the equivalent of a ministerial salary and colleagues who sat on the opposite side of entitlements, and is normally also a Prime the House.16 Ministerial ally. More generally, there is absence of any Although close to a third of Tuvalu’s population durable basis for the emergence of regional live on Funafuti, where the capital is located, factions in Tuvalu politics. Occasional citizens are obliged to register and vote on relationships emerge between two or more their islands-of-origin, unless they also own islands, such as that which prevails between land or have resided for five-years on another the traditionally close Funafuti and Vaitupu, island. Even with land ownership or residence but such arrangements tend to prove a qualifications, migrant voters are required to counter-productive basis for securing a show evidence that they ‘actively participate’15 majority in Parliament, simply because in island activities, such as meetings, project these alienate members from other islands. works and church meetings, and that they The significance of the south in Tuvalu also contribute monthly Falekaupule dues. politics may, at times, have triggered some resentment amongst northern members.17

Figure 1: Cabinet Ministers by Island Group, 1977-2006

Notes: for the purposes of this chart, we have included the Speakers amongst cabinet ministers (since they secure the same salary), but excluded Special Ministerial Advisors (since they do not). Figures are one short for 1993 September because Naama Latasi lost her seat, and no replacement minister was appointed to what was a caretaker government. The Loneliness of the Pro-Government Backbencher and the Precariousness of Simple Majority Rule in Tuvalu

TABLE 2: Tuvalu Governments, 1977-2006 5 Election Period in Precursor of Parliaments Prime Ministers Year offi ce Change 1977 First Lauti (Funafuti) 1977-1980 National elections 1981 Second Puapua (Vaitupu) 1981-1984 National elections 1985 Third Puapua (Vaitupu) 1985-1988 National elections 1989 Fourth Paeniu (Nukulaelae) 1989-1992 National elections 1993 Fifth Latasi (Funafuti) 1993-1996 National elections - Fifth Paeniu (Nukulaelae) 1997 No confidence vote 1998 Sixth Paeniu (Nukulaelae) 1998 National elections - Sixth Ionatana (Funafuti) 1999-2000 No confidence vote - Sixth Luka (Nukufetau) 2001 Death of Ionatana - Sixth Talake (Vaitupu) 2001-2002 No confidence vote 2002 Seventh Sopoanga (Nukufetau) 2002-2004 National elections - Seventh Toafa (Nanumea) 2005 No confidence vote 2006 Eighth Ielemia (Vaitupu) 2006- National elections

Source: Hansard (Tuvalu)

The only Prime Minister to have come from Tuvalu’s parliament has often been finely the north since independence was Maatia balanced between pro-government and Toafa. The other nine were all from the south. opposition MPs, leaving Prime Ministers Nevertheless, despite some efforts, northern reliant on wafer-thin majorities. Constitutional members have been unsuccessful in forging restrictions limiting the number of cabinet a homogeneous bloc. Efforts at constructing ministers, aside from the Prime Minister, regionalist alliances have tended to be to one third of the house have determined undermined by personal bids for ministerial the requirement for a majority. From 2000 portfolios or differences between close until 2007, in addition to relying on the neighbours. Politics in Tuvalu remains deeply votes of the Prime Minister himself, the island-centric, and neither broader location Speaker, and the five Cabinet Ministers, it nor ideology has provided sufficient support proved indispensable to somehow retain for the emergence of political parties.18 the support of at least one pro-government backbencher.20 Majorities were frequently As a result, no island has predominated so slim that the single pro-government either at the Prime Ministerial level or in backbencher potentially wielded considerable cabinet more broadly, and no island has been political leverage. Owing to lack of access kept persistently out of government. Figure 1 to the rewards associated with being in shows the composition of governments from cabinet, government backbenchers regularly 1977 to 2006, with the shift from six to seven defected and backed the opposition in no office holders in 2000 reflecting the increased confidence votes, bringing about changes in size of parliament. Nanumea and Niutao have government. There were four successful ‘no been the most usually represented in cabinet, confidence’ votes from 1993 to 2007 (Table and Nukufetau, Nukulaelae and Nanumaga 2), and another fifteen unsuccessful efforts have been the most usually excluded. But to vote governments out of office (Table 3). there is no island, or island grouping, that In the absence of political parties and without has been consistently marginalized. Niutao clear ideological issues holding members on and Vaitupu and, back in 1977, Funafuti, one or the other side of the house, there is have had two MPs simultaneously in cabinet little restraint on such side switching. - but again each has also witnessed periods when they held no portfolios. Funafuti, the To retain office, Prime Ministers resorted to capital, has had three Prime Ministers, as tactics which occasionally put them at odds has Vaitupu; but Nukulaelae, despite being with the courts. For example, parliamentary somewhat under-represented in cabinet,19 sessions were frequently cancelled or had Tuvalu’s second longest serving Prime curtailed to avoid the threat of ‘no confidence’ Minister, (for the home challenges.21 On average, parliaments sat islands of Prime Ministers, see Table 2). The Loneliness of the Pro-Government Backbencher and the Precariousness of Simple Majority Rule in Tuvalu

for only 25 days per year during 2002- One reason is the closer operation under 6 2006. Aside from the perennial need to lure customary norms, which indeed inspired opposition members to cross the floor with the initial framing of the 1997 Falekaupule offers of ministerial portfolios, appointments Act. The British colonial government, in to the positions of Governor General and the late 1960s, established island councils Speaker were used to break up potential (or Fonopule), which worked reasonably opposition majorities. The appointment of effectively (Campbell 1977). The downside ‘Special Ministerial Advisors’ was also used was that these were primarily linked upwards to complement cabinet portfolio holders, to the colonial administration, to whom they although this was subsequently declared were dependent for local grants and to unlawful by the High Court. Some stabilisation whom they delivered development plans. techniques used in other Pacific Island In the post-colonial years, the absence countries were not applicable in Tuvalu. For of grass roots control over these councils example, in Melanesia, pro-government MPs became increasingly vexatious, and the 1997 are regularly offered positions on the boards Act inverted the relationship, making the of state-owned enterprises to encourage councils (now Kaupule) more responsive loyalty to government. In Tuvalu, this is to the Falekaupule, rather than central impossible owing to constitutional provisions government. This was widely greeted as a preventing dual office holding.22 success and regarded as having resulted in more effective development coordination. This characteristic style of exercise of political The 1997 reforms were further built upon by power in Tuvalu stands in striking contrast to the 1999 establishment of the Falekaupule the experiences in the eight island councils. Trust Fund, which further extended island The Falekaupule resemble Parliament in independence from central government.26 having an executive arm - the Kaupule - but, unlike the parliament, the Falekaupule bring A second reason is that the Falekaupule together all those aged 18 years or over.23 Act does not establish or elevate some Falekaupule are local assemblies which exist alternative government-in-waiting alongside in all eight of the islands and are normally the Kaupule, but rather sets the voting age convened at three-monthly intervals. They population to perform the role of scrutinizing tend to be dominated by elders and chiefs Kaupule budgets, development plans and and sometimes by church pastors, although conduct over the preceding three months. women have come to play an increasingly prominent role in the Kaupule committees In common with many Pacific states, Tuvalu (Kofe & Taomia 2006).24 Owing to the 1997 is marked by an idealization of consensual Falekaupule Act, these local assemblies harmony and stability as stipulated in the have full jurisdiction over island affairs, and Constitution, but with an actuality of elite have thus acquired many of the powers tension and individualism. Principle 3 of the of the national government. Decisions are Constitution emphasises the importance of normally made through consensus, although culture and tradition in Tuvaluan society, and putting matters to the vote has become extols the virtues of communal solidarity and increasingly frequently used as a method for island-level co-operation: resolving differences. Kaupule members are elected for four year terms, and the entire ‘…the people of Tuvalu recognize Falekaupule also gather to select a Chief and affirm, with gratitude to God, Executive - the Pule o Kaupule - who in turn that the stability of Tuvaluan society selects a deputy (Tokolua Pule o Kaupule). and the happiness and welfare of The Pule o Kaupule may be removed from the people of Tuvalu, both present office by two thirds of Falekaupule members, and future, depend very largely on which has occurred, for example on Vaitupu the maintenance of Tuvaluan values, in 2005. The six-member Kaupule also culture and tradition, including the usually operates on a consensual basis, vitality and the sense of identity despite the Act providing for majority voting.25 of island communities and attitudes Most importantly for the purposes of this of co-operation, self-help and discussion, the Falekaupule have no history unity within and amongst those of repeated efforts to dislodge the executive, communities.’ or opposition scheming, such as which animates the national parliament. The Loneliness of the Pro-Government Backbencher and the Precariousness of Simple Majority Rule in Tuvalu

TABLE 3: Motions of ‘no confidence’, 1977-2006 7 Prime Period Minister Motions Results Outcome 1977-1980 Lauti 0 - - 1981-1984 Puapua 0 - - Gov. 7, Opp. 5 Defeated 1985-1988 Puapua 2 Gov. 7, Opp. 5 Defeated Gov. 7, Opp. 5 Defeated 1989-1992 Paeniu 3 Gov. 7, Opp. 5 Defeated Gov. 7, Opp. 5 Defeated Gov. 7, Opp. 5 Defeated 1993-1996 Latasi 2 Gov. 5, Opp. 7 Carried Gov. 7, Opp. 5 Defeated 1996-1997 Paeniu 2 Gov. 7, Opp. 5 Defeated Gov. 10, Opp. 2 Defeated 1998-1999 Paeniu 2 Gov. 4. Opp. 8 Carried Gov. 8, Opp. 4 Defeated 1999-2000 Ionatana 2 Gov. 11, Opp. 4 Defeated 2000-2001 Luka 1 Gov. 7, Opp. 8 Carried 2001-2002 Talake 1 Gov. 8, Opp. 7 Defeated 2002-2004 Sopoanga 1 Gov. 6, Opp. 9 Carried Gov. 8, Opp. 7 Defeated 2004-2005 Toafa 2 Gov. 10, Opp. 5 Defeated 2006-present Ielemia 1 Gov. 8, Opp. 7 Defeated 15 defeats & Total 19 4 carried Notes: Gov. = government, Opp. = opposition Source: Hansard (Tuvalu)

Principle 5 of the Constitution favourably their terms in office. There were threats of contrasts the search for consensus with social crises, for example owing to landowners confrontational methods of handling on Funafuti objecting to those from other government affairs: islands migrating to live and work on their island (Howard 1976). At the political level, ‘In government and in social affairs scandals already threatened governments. generally the guiding principles of For example, Prime Minister Toaripi Lauti Tuvalu are - agreement, courtesy failed to secure the re-election of his 1977-80 and the search for consensus, in government after being persuaded by shady accordance with traditional Tuvaluan American real estate agents into buying procedures, rather than alien ideas of desert land branded as ‘Green Valley Acres’ confrontation and divisiveness…’27 for over the going rate (Finin 2001, p. 6-7 and Cocombe 2001, p. 502, 647). No confidence In practice, as we now turn to consider, challenges did occur, but all were defeated, ‘confrontation and divisiveness’, and lack of in each case with the government retaining ‘cooperation’, have been defining features of its majority by 7 votes to 5 (see Table 3). Tuvalu’s political order, at least at the central The pre-1993 period also saw the first ever government level.28 usage of floor-crossing tactics. After the 1989 election, Bikenibeu Paeniu broke away from THE SUCCESSION OF the Puapua government, crossed the floor and became Prime Minister at the head of GOVERNMENTS, 1977-2006 the opposition group.

Prior to 1993, Tuvalu’s governments were The September 1993 general election proved reasonably stable. The initial four post- a watershed in Tuvalu’s political history. independence governments all completed Three members lost their seats, including – The Loneliness of the Pro-Government Backbencher and the Precariousness of Simple Majority Rule in Tuvalu

on the government side – Naama Latasi, the camp, including his re-elected wife, Naama 8 country’s first and only ever woman MP. The Latasi. Parliament was thus split into three victor in her Nanumea constituency, Vavae groups, each with four members. On the eve Katalake, joined the opposition, depriving the of the election of the new Prime Minister, Paeniu government of its majority. The result the Latasi and Puapua factions formed a was a 6 versus 6 deadlock. At three meetings coalition, and Kamuta Latasi became Prime called by the Governor General to elect a Minister, with his wife, Naama Latasi, on Prime Minister, members proved unable to the government backbench. Unlike the form a government. To handle the impasse, pattern in later ‘confidence’ votes, marital ties the Governor General dissolved parliament, ensured the loyalty of the solitary government in accordance with the constitution.29 In a backbencher.31 petulant response, the Paeniu government – now serving in a caretaker role – appointed The Fifth Parliament (1993-1997) proved a Tomu Sione as Governor General to replace period of mounting political instability. The the incumbent, who was approaching the new government was dogged by controversy. retirement age of 65 (Taafaki 1996, p. 6). The post of Governor General, for example, Sione’s appointment generated strong became increasingly politicized, with the resistance from the Opposition side, who Paeniu government-supported candidate, unsuccessfully demanded the deferment of Tomu Sione, being removed on 21 June the appointment until after the second election 1994. Sione had been part of the group and the formation of a new government. This that had sacked Latasi, and vengeance was a sign of the politicisation of key public seemed the obvious motive for his removal. appointments, and the usage of these to Conversely, the consolidation of opposition consolidate government majorities was to to Latasi was influenced by the reaction become increasingly apparent over the years on Sione’s home island of Niutao. Two key ahead. issues served to undermine confidence in the Latasi government. In the wake of the November 1993 polls a realignment occurred. Kamuta Latasi First, whether or not Tuvalu should become had previously been a backbencher in a republic, severing ties with the British Paeniu’s government. He was a successful monarch, became a topical issue. A Bill entrepreneur, who operated the local BP to introduce a new national flag in 1995, station and was exclusive importer of removing the small Union Jack from one petrol into the country. He was jettisoned corner, was hastily passed through parliament from the ruling faction for criticizing his without being sent to the Island Councils for colleagues. Latasi had been dissatisfied with comments, as required by the Constitution. his colleagues in government.30 He claimed, Hostility to the intended new symbol of firstly, that Ministers had spent too much statehood was particularly marked on Niutao time overseas. Secondly, he highlighted the Island, the home island of sacked Governor inexperience and immaturity of the Paeniu General Sione. There, the flag was cut government and associated leadership off at the mast while it was being raised weaknesses. Thirdly, he claimed, there had on a flagpole by a police officer during been a lack of focus on development needs independence celebrations (Taafaki 1996, for Tuvalu. Conversely, Latasi was blamed p. 16). Tensions ran high and the police had by his former colleagues for masterminding to withdraw from the island. The reaction the deadlock that led to the second election by the Niutao people was a clear indication in November 1993. He was widely seen of resentment about the sacking of one as having undermined the government’s of their distinguished leaders. When the majority by successfully lobbying for a second Latasi government eventually fell, after a no election that enabled the re-election of his confidence vote in 1997, the new flag was wife, Naama Latasi, and hence the defeat of scrapped owing to other islands endorsing the former Speaker Kokea Malua. Niutao’s preference for a reversion to the former flag. Despite severing ties with the Paeniu group, Kamuta Latasi did not join the opposition. Land rentals proved a second controversial Instead, he remained more or less independent issue, which undermined support for the and drew three other members into a new Latasi government. Land in Tuvalu is owned The Loneliness of the Pro-Government Backbencher and the Precariousness of Simple Majority Rule in Tuvalu

by descent groups and families, but with Latasi government and bringing Paeniu back growth in the size of kin groups, problems of to power. According to one commentator, 9 distributing and sharing lease revenues had an ‘obsessive personalism’ was increasingly become increasingly acute, particularly on characterising Tuvalu politics.32 Funafuti. Following separation from Kiribati in 1975, the government had acquired land on In the wake of the 1998 general election, Funafuti to set up its headquarters, including Paeniu returned as Prime Minister, drawing offices and civil servant houses. In 1995, five- on the support of nine other members. Only yearly land rentals were increased by more two members were left in the opposition. than tenfold, from A$120 per acre to A$1,300 Former Prime Minister Latasi lost his seat, per acre. This was a decision that mainly as did three of his opposition allies. Paeniu’s affected the capital, as government-leased government was further consolidated by the lands on outer islands are few. Prime Minister introduction of Special Ministerial Advisors Latasi’s constituency was Funafuti, where he (SMAs), ensuring the support of the extra was himself a significant landowner. That he government backbenchers. At $13,000 had an eye to both political and commercial per annum, the SMAs secured a 57% advantages was suggested by the fact that salary increase over and above ordinary the decision was made despite opposition backbenchers and opposition MPs, and other from the then Minister of Natural Resources, perks of office comparable to Ministers. This Otinielu T. Tausi, who was subsequently was a considerable burden on taxpayers sacked after he protested. Tausi later defected (see Table 4). Five years later, this method of along with Speaker Puapua, toppling the strengthening cabinet majorities was halted.

TABLE 4: Salaries of Top Government Officials & Comparison with Civil Service salaries

Offices Salary Other Entitlements

1981 1985 1990 1992 1998- 2002- 2001 2006

Governor House, gas, electricity, 10,560 11,064 12,374 14,625 17,300 23,768 phone, car & fuel; 3 General housemaids

Prime House, gas, electricity, 10,680 12,204 13,873 17,244 19,700 26,660 phone, car & fuel; 3 Minister housemaids House, gas, electricity, Speaker 7,920 10,980 11,912 14,772 16,718 22,395 & car House, gas, electricity, Minister 7,920 10,980 11,912 14,772 16,718 22,395 & car House, gas, electricity, & SMA N/a N/a N/a N/a 13,000 (N/a) motorbike

MP 2,640 2,912 3,836 6,000 8,300 15,393 Motorbike 1

Sec to 7,620 8,184 9,216 13,000 18,098 21,743 Nil Gov’t AG 7,380 7,932 8,916 17,507 21,743 Nil Auditor 6,504 7,008 8,112 9,960 16,561 20,070 Nil General Permanent 6,900 7,416 8,388 12,000 16,915 20,070 Nil Secretary

Clerk to 3,528 3,876 4,476 7,000 12,141 13,719 Nil Parliament

Source: Privileges Committee Reports 1998 & 2006; National Budgets 2001 & 2006. 1Plus additional allowances, including $60 for telephone rental and charges, free postage and fax, subsistence allowance of $25 per day when on official business, free internal and overseas travel on official business. The Loneliness of the Pro-Government Backbencher and the Precariousness of Simple Majority Rule in Tuvalu

In 2003, Special Ministerial Advisors were After the 2002 elections, it was Sopoanga 10 declared illegal in the Tuvalu High Court.33 who was elected as Prime Minister, but this government proved just as precarious Despite this consolidation of the pro- as its predecessors – both owing to High government faction, the second Paeniu Court rulings and threats of no confidence government soon found itself under threat. challenges. A 5 May 2003 by-election in Government had approved changes to Niutao, occasioned by the death of the ministers’ transport entitlements from Speaker Saloa Tauia, resulted in victory motorcycles to cars, relying on donor support for Tavau Teii, who joined the opposition from the government of the Republic of instead of joining the government. This tilted Korea. Arrangements had also been made the majority in favour of the opposition. In for shipment of six Toyota RAV4 cars.34 the subsequent vote for a new speaker, the In April 1999, Leader of the Opposition opposition candidate Faimalaga Luka won Koloa Talake moved a no-confidence by eight to seven against the government motion, alleging growing dissatisfaction candidate, Otinielu T. Tausi. Were parliament with Paeniu’s leadership and raising other to have been convened, the Sopoanga highly personalized charges. One of Paeniu’s government would have been toppled. Ministers, Ionatana Ionatana, and the four As a result, the Prime Minister delayed SMAs defected to join the two members convening parliament, as had the Latasi-led in the opposition. The government was minority government back in 1996.37 In the defeated by 8 votes to 4, and Ionatana intervening period, Sopoanga sought to lure became Prime Minister on 27 April 1999. The an opposition member to cross the floor and introduction of SMAs had clearly failed to halt to use control over prestigious positions in the threat of breakaway by junior members of Tuvalu to restore the government’s majority. government, who still saw benefits attached The successful tactic was to appoint the to realignments that would give them top speaker, Faimalaga Luka, who was on the ministerial portfolios. opposition side, as Governor General, thus reducing the opposition to seven members.38 In December 1999, an amendment to the It was nevertheless a dangerous approach, Electoral Act increased the total membership potentially reliant on the consequent of Parliament to fifteen, thus shifting the Nukufetau by-election resulting in victory number required for a parliamentary majority for a candidate prepared to support the to eight.35 The three new members all joined government. Instead, in the intervening the Ionatana government, a consolidation period, the government lured opposition on the government side that was handled member, Leti Pelesala, to cross the floor by a reshuffle of ministerial portfolio holders. to take up the spare portfolio vacated by The June 2000 government was carefully Tausi upon his election to replace Luka organised to ensure broader Tuvalu-wide as Speaker. As a result, the Nukufetau representation in Cabinet, with one minister by-election dwindled in political significance.39 coming from each of seven of the eight The Sopoanga government typified the way islands. Again, the government proved short- in which dexterous handling of the distribution lived, although this time due to Ionatana’s of ministerial and other top office-holding death after a cardiac arrest. One of the positions had become the lynchpin of central government ministers, Faimalaga Luka, government politics in Tuvalu. became replacement Prime Minister in February 2001. But his government was A year later, Sopoanga’s government fell, ousted in a confidence vote on 3 December after Speaker Tausi and new backbencher 2001, held while the Prime Minister was sided with the six opposition away overseas receiving medical attention. members to oust Sopoanga. One reason The rebels were all SMAs, one of whom, was a visit by Sopoanga to Beijing, after his Saufatu Sopoanga, claimed that the Luka having indicated disapproval about Taiwan’s government had failed to implement motions representative having too greatly associated passed in parliament.36 The fall of the Luka himself with the opposition members (Taafaki government came only six months ahead of 2007, p. 278-79). This was controversial, scheduled general elections, and another of according to one of Sopoanga’s ministers, the SMA rebels, Koloa Talake, took charge because Taiwan had just commissioned an briefly, before losing his seat at the 2002 A$3 million 3-storey building housing the polls. The Loneliness of the Pro-Government Backbencher and the Precariousness of Simple Majority Rule in Tuvalu

government’s headquarters in Funafuti, and A year after the election, parliament because Tuvalu had long-standing links acted to eliminate the precariousness of 11 with Taipei, rather than Beijing.40 Despite cabinet’s control over parliament owing to defeat, Sopoanga fought on. He resigned its constituting just short of a numerical his seat, precipitating a by-election, and thus majority. In August 2007, a constitutional by constitutional means delayed the election amendment raised the number of ministers of a new Prime Minister41, again buying from five to seven, despite opposition from time. At the resulting by-election, Sopoanga the islands.44 In addition to the votes of the was re-elected. Yet instead of returning Speaker and Prime Minister, this made it Sopoanga as Prime Minister, the government likely that cabinet would be able to command caucus chose to back his ministerial nine votes in the 15-member parliament, colleague, , for the position. sufficient, if ministers remain solid, to defeat That realignment was sufficient to bring any confidence challenge. In the following Tausi back from the opposition, favourably section, we consider whether this, or an altering the balance back to the government alternative reformist framework, best benefits side.42 The result was that precisely the same Tuvalu’s people. ministerial line-up remained in office, barring the switch in portfolios between Maatia Toafa DISCUSSION and Sopoanga.

Table 5: Number of New Members, Why did political instability in Tuvalu occur General Elections 1981-2006 predominantly during 1993-2006 rather Year Number Percent than 1977-1993? Was the earlier stability due to political or cultural characteristics of 1981 5 41 older members and absence of these traits 1985 3 25 amongst the new, post-1993, political gen- 1989 5 41 eration? There were no major changes to the 1993 (Sept) 3 25 legal framework or to parliamentary standing orders across these two periods, aside from 1993 (Nov) 3 25 the increase of parliamentary membership 1998 5 41 from twelve to fi fteen by 1999, which brought 2002 5 33 about the perpetual need to retain a single pro-government backbencher. Yet the latter 2006 8 53 change occurred well after the onset of gov- Notes: Total membership of parliament increased ernmental instability in 1993-94. It would thus from 12 to 15 in 1999 seem unfair to blame institutional changes for the transition from stability to instability. At the August 2006 general election, there was an extraordinary turnover of sitting MPs. All There are several potential explanations five Cabinet Ministers lost their seats, as did for the post-1993 shift in Tuvalu’s political the three pro-government backbenchers, in environment. a high turnout election.43 On the government side, only the Prime Minister and the Speaker First, independence was widely seen as retained their seats. On the other side of a valuable achievement for the people of the House, the five opposition members Tuvalu, given Britain’s reluctance to concede were re-elected. The resulting government partition from Kiribati.45 Despite the absence came under the leadership of Apisai Ielemia, of resources delivered to the newly partitioned reliant on the normal majority of eight to part of the former Gilbert and Ellice Islands seven, as usual hanging upon the retention colony and the, in any case, resource-poor of the loyalty of a single pro-government character of the atoll economy, people backbencher. To consolidate that loyalty, the from Tuvalu became strongly united and a lone government backbencher, Tomu Sione, nationwide fund raising program was carried served as an acting minister whenever one out to establish a new Reserve Fund.46 of his colleagues was absent overseas or ill, The creation of the in and as a result received a government house, 1987 also enhanced this sense of unity and a ministerial salary for the days on which he nationhood. acted, and other entitlements similar to those received by a minister. The Loneliness of the Pro-Government Backbencher and the Precariousness of Simple Majority Rule in Tuvalu

When independence came, the Tuvalu people budget. Though small compared to packages 12 retained a close sense of unity and cooperation received by their counterparts in the larger in order to strengthen their nascent state. Pacific states such as Fiji and Papua New Latent tensions thus remained subdued and Guinea, ministerial portfolios are nevertheless subordinate to a broader emphasis on nation the most highly paid positions in Tuvalu.47 As building. Early Prime Ministers, such as Lauti a result, they are greatly cherished, and and Puapua, were mild-mannored politicians perhaps have drawn ambitious public figures with strong roots in their communities, unlike to contest election and to align themselves many of their successors. As the colonial in such a way as to increase opportunities influence withered, however, the earlier post- to join the government, rather than the colonial unity dissipated, bringing to the opposition. Yet the data do not support fore a less externally influenced style of such a conclusion. As Table 4 indicates, the politics. The newer generation emerging in salaries of backbench MPs have increased the political arena, less attached to the over 1981-2006 more rapidly than those of politics of post-colonial transition, began to ministers. Permanent Secretaries’ salaries master their bequeathed institutions in a have increased at a similar rate to those of manner quite different to their predecessors. ministers.48 Thus, growing political rivalry This interpretation accords with the broader cannot be attributed to the direct rewards Pacific experience, as in western Melanesia associated with holding a cabinet portfolio. and , where a post-colonial phase of government stability was also followed by an There have been three major ostensible era of mounting instability. reasons for the destabilisation of Tuvalu’s governments – (i) straying from caucus A second plausible hypothesis focuses on principles and policies, (ii) accusations of increased educational levels amongst later inefficiency and ineffectiveness, and (iii) generations of politicians, as compared to accusations of corruption. the previous generation. With increased education, MPs acquired greater knowledge (i) Straying from caucus principles and policies about how to manipulate the Westminster proved an important factor contributing to the system to their advantage. According to downfall of governments of Latasi (1996), this view, the first floor-crossing incident in Paeniu (1999), and Sopoanga (2004). When 1989 and the political crisis of 1993 may Prime Ministers strayed from caucus principles have served as the catalyst for continuing or policies, or embarked on unilateral policy instability, in the sense of revealing easily shifts, they regularly triggered dissent from exploitable aspects of the political system. colleagues and instability of allegiances. Thereafter, governments learned new tactics for consolidating political power, while The in Tuvalu has opposition MPs recognized, pragmatically, developed in such a way that governments that severe institutional weaknesses yielded assuming power, to the extent that they a continuing potential for attracting allies remain temporarily stable, rule as a collective in perennial efforts to dislodge incumbent authority, via the caucus. The caucus thus governments. If so, the 1993 crisis opened becomes the core power base for each the floodgates to political disorder, and Prime Minister, and the key vehicle for the exposed the poor fit between imported retention of the loyalty of ministers, the colonial institutions and characteristic Pacific Speaker and the solitary pro-government styles of leadership struggle. This second backbencher. Once prime ministers become hypothesis is not necessarily inconsistent distracted from reliance on caucus, they tend with the first, and both are consistent with the to erode support, resulting in various forms of broader western Pacific experience. political crises. This fundamentally collective character of central government politics in A third credible reason is based on increasing Tuvalu accords with the basic principles set competition for lucrative portfolios in out in the constitution and with the practice at government such as those of Prime Minister, the Falekaupule level. Cabinet Minister and Speaker. The stakes in competition for government have been greatly (ii) Challenges predicated upon accusations raised since independence by continual regarding inefficient and ineffective increases in the size of the government government were used against many post- The Loneliness of the Pro-Government Backbencher and the Precariousness of Simple Majority Rule in Tuvalu

independence governments, and proved responsive fashion. Yet, under the present politically potent in dislodging several prime set-up, restrictions on civil servants giving 13 ministers. any information to opposition members ensure that their criticisms of government (iii) Governments have also regularly been are rarely robust. Even highly critical threatened and defeated by accusations Auditor General reports usually get the nod of ‘corruption’. The accuracy or otherwise through parliament, and the Public Accounts of these allegations is not discussed in Committee seldom sits. When the Public this paper.49 Whether or not corruption is Accounts committee does sit, no action is a matter best handled within parliament likely to be taken subsequently, even where or by the law courts, or other specifically procedures suggest that legal action should designed apolitical institutions, is a regular be taken by the Attorney General.50 Pivotal source of contention, particularly on the to the strategy of beefing up the checks and part of those members who lose portfolios balances of parliament is that the Office as a result of such accusations. Raised of the Speaker become reasonably neutral under conditions of parliamentary privilege, and independent, and this seems unlikely ‘corruption’ allegations need not necessarily as long as the Speaker is elected together be proven before a government falls. Some with the Prime Minister by a simple majority institutions are undoubtedly required to in parliament. Without that independence, tackle incidences of official corruption, and the oversight functions of parliament are generate disincentives to such actions within inevitably likely to remain weak. the political arena, but these matters may best be handled outside parliament. Given these long-run difficulties in national level politics, and the strengths identified in the More fundamentally, Tuvalu’s governments local-level organisation of the Falekaupule, have usually been toppled due to power we might reasonably seek out arrangements struggles, and the emergence of alternative at the national level which both resemble coalitions bringing together opposition those at the Falekaupule level and articulate members with dissident government ministers, national-local linkages more strongly. One or – more usually – with the solitary pro- option is an eight-member executive, government backbencher. The August 2007 comprising one member from each island, response, designating additional portfolios so that caucus and parliament would become to cater for the aspirations of backbenchers one and the same.51 This would have the and thus consolidate governments, may advantage of reducing central government serve to diminish political instability. But past costs, while simultaneously removing the experience, as shown in the SMA debacle, institutionalisation of the opposition as a shows that personal aspirations for political government-in-waiting. Instead of a formalised power are not necessarily stilled by such opposition within parliament, the oversight devices. At root, Tuvalu’s difficulty centres on role of the island-based Falekaupule in the opposition not playing its constitutionally reviewing and initiating legislation would be enshrined role as a check or balance strengthened. Falekaupule would acquire agency scrutinizing government legislation veto powers over legislation and tougher or executive actions, but instead merely recall powers would enable them to dislodge serving as a fluid government-in-waiting that non-performing ministers.52 continually seeks opportunities, individually or collectively, to enter government. Such an empowerment of the Falekaupule would entail a continuation of the devolution- The often preferred response, at least in oriented reforms, as initiated by the 1997 regard to accountability, is to strengthen Act and the 1999 decision to establish a parliamentary oversight agencies by building Falekaupule Trust Fund. During negotiations up the offices of the Speaker and Clerk, beefing over the passage of these laws, there was an up parliamentary committees (particularly understanding that Kaupule members would Public Accounts), reinforcing Leadership eventually receive salaries as they came to Codes or ensuring the implementation of play an ever greater role in controlling island actions recommended in the annual reports affairs. Central government would still be of the Auditor General and, generally, to required to play a coordinating and foreign appeal to the executive to function in a more policy role, but the burden of responsibility The Loneliness of the Pro-Government Backbencher and the Precariousness of Simple Majority Rule in Tuvalu

would be radically shifted to the local level. 5. The Falekaupule refers to the traditional/ 14 customary meeting-house, which consists There are dangers with such an approach. of the Chiefs, the elders and all the island/ First, simply making the executive smaller village members, which serves as the core unit of Tuvalu’s local government. would not necessarily eliminate caucus 6. According to Section 55(1) of the Constitution competition for the Prime Minister’s portfolio of Tuvalu (1990). The Governor General’s or ‘no confidence votes’, unless the Prime term in offi ce is four years, although this can Minister/President were simultaneously to be extended as long as the incumbent is become directly elected. Second, devolution under 65 years of age. of powers may eliminate central government 7. Amendment to Electoral Provisions rivalry in favour of a consensus-driven (Parliament) Act, December 1999. The new local politics that stifles opportunities for members took their seats in parliament in dissent (Besnier 1996). At the Falekaupule May 2000. The change made retention of government majorities more diffi cult because level, church influences or authoritarian of the constitutional provision that limits pressures may diminish responsiveness or cabinet to one third of the size of parliament. 53 accountability, or capture policy-making. With 12 MPs, cabinet was composed of The proposals here offer no panacea to deal four ministers, who with the addition of the with such issues. All they seek to do is balance votes of the Prime Minister and the Speaker, more suitably local and national governance comprised 50 percent of parliamentary votes. and eradicate institutional pressures that With an expanded cabinet of fi fteen, the have encouraged merely intrigue-based number of ministers rose to fi ve, but together changes of government. with the votes of the Prime Minister and the Speaker, this left the government below the majority threshold. AUTHORS NOTE 8. i.e., the block vote in the two-member dis- tricts, or fi rst-past-the-post in the one single member district. Constituencies with more Paulson Panapa was Clerk of the Tuvalu than 500 voters are entitled to two members, parliament from 1995-2004, and Assistant a threshold all except one have reached. Clerk from 1991 to 1995. Jon Fraenkel is 9. Section 63(2)(f) of the . 10. , ‘Rules of Procedure’, a Research Fellow with the SSGM Project 1994, Rules 36 and 54. Such methods were at ANU and was previously employed in used to secure the passage of three of the the Pacific Institute of Advanced Studies in four successful post-independence ‘no Development & Governance at the University confi dence’ votes. of the South Pacific in Fiji. 11. Importantly, such prime ministerial elections do not necessarily, or even usually, occur during a sitting of parliament, but rather during ENDNOTES specially convened meetings summoned by the Governor General under Section 63(1) and Section 2(1)(b) of Schedule 2 of the 1. We are indebted to Niko Besnier, Mose Constitution (1990). Saitala, Ron Duncan, Bikenibeu Paeniu, 12. Schedule 2 of the Constitution. Michael Goldsmith and Stephen Levine for 13. Section 62(3) of the Constitution provides their comments on an earlier draft of this that Cabinet should be not more than one- paper. third of the total membership of parliament. 2. Parliament of Tuvalu (2000), Report of the (There were four Ministers then when total Constitutional Review Committee, Parliament membership was twelve). of Tuvalu. The CRC was established by 14. Section 104(1) Constitution. Parliament and comprised of 10 members 15. Section5(3) of the Electoral Provisions Act out of the 12 Members of Parliament 1993. 3. ‘National Workshop on Accountability 16. Prime Minister Bikenibeu Paeniu (1989-1992; for Leaders in Tuvalu’, cited in Quinton 1996-1997; 1998-1999) was an exception Clements, UNDP, ‘Tuvalu Legislative Needs since he represented the single-member con- Assessment’, mission report, December stituency of Nukulaelae. 2000, p3. 17. For a contrast between cultural differences in 4. See also Morgan, M (2005), Cultures the north and south, see Luem, B., ‘A New of Dominance: Institutional and Cultural King for Nanumaga: Changing Demands for Infl uences on Parliamentary Politics in Leadership and Authority in a Polynesian Melanesia, State, Society & Governance in Atoll Society’, in Leadership and Change Melanesia Discussion Paper, 2005/2, p17, ftn in the Western Pacifi c; Essays Presented 54. The Loneliness of the Pro-Government Backbencher and the Precariousness of Simple Majority Rule in Tuvalu

to Sir Raymond Firth on the Occasion of and allowing greater autonomy for island his Ninetieth birthday, (eds) Feinberg, R., economic policy. 15 & Watson-Gegeo, K.A., London & Atlantic 27. Principle 5 of the Constitution of Tuvalu, Highlands, New Jersey, 1996, p130-1. 1990. 18. For example, no member of parliament 28. That this contrast is not unique to central elected from one constituency has ever been government is suggested by Besnier, N subsequently elected for another constituency, (1996), ‘Authority and Egalitarianism: indicating the strength of islandism. Former Discourses of Leadership on Nukulaelae school or workplace connections have, occa- Atoll’, in R Feinberg, K Watson-Gegeo (eds.), sionally, underpinned coalition arrangements Leadership and Change in the Western or, in other circumstances, hostility against Pacifi c, the Althone Press, London and ministers has sparked public servants to seek Atlantic Highlands, New Jersy. political careers. 29. Section 118(3)(b) of the Constitution of Tuvalu 19. Another senior Nukulaelau politician, Henry (1990) stipulates, ‘If no person has been Faati Naisali, exerted considerable infl uence elected to that offi ce (Prime Minister) within in the fi rst decade after independence, such period as the Head of State, acting in his effectively running the government under own deliberate judgment, thinks reasonable, Puapua (we are indebted to Niko Besnier for the Head of State, acting in his own deliberate this point). judgment, may dissolve Parliament’. 20. Eight members were needed to secure 30. Islands Business Pacifi c, March 1994:33. the simplest majority, leaving seven on 31. Although when parliament had a membership the opposition side. When parliament’s of twelve, the government could theoretically membership was twelve, the simplest majority survive no confi dence challenges by securing was seven to fi ve. a 6 Vs 6 tie, this required the Speaker to vote 21. ‘GG holds key to Tuvalu’s Constitutional with government. Since, on other matters, the Dilemma’, Islands Business, September Speaker was not entitled to cast a vote, for 2003, p 46. ordinary business the government needed a 22. Section 95(1)(f) of the Constitution prohibits single pro-government backbencher. MPs from contesting elections if they ‘hold 32. See Taafaki, T (1998), ‘Tuvalu’, The or act in any offi ce or position in a State Contemporary Pacifi c, 10, (1), 1998, p243, Service’. p241-2. 23. Voting rights vary between islands, and are 33. Latasi v R, ex parte Attorney General [2003] determined by customary decision-making TVHC 24; HC Civil Case No 03 of 2002 (30 (Aganu). In many cases, all those over 18 September 2003). years of age have entitlement to vote for the 34. In the event, these were received by ministers Kaupule members, but not all necessarily par- of the incoming Ionatana government, rather ticipate in decisions taken by the Falekaupule. than those in the Paeniu government. On Vaitupu, one has to be 40 years of age or 35. See footnote 7 above. older to be eligible to vote. In other Falekau- 36. Islands Business, September 2002. pule only the ‘family head’ may be entitled to 37. Section 116 of the Constitution provides that vote. Parliament can only be convened when the 24. See also the table, drawn up by Susie Kofe & Prime Minister provides such an advice to the Fakavae Taomia, appearing in Jon Fraenkel Governor General. ‘The Impact of Electoral Systems on Women’s 38. ‘PM Sopoanga pulls off a stunner: Opposition Political Representation in Pacifi c Parliaments’ loses seat as Luka becomes GG’, Islands in the same volume, p95. Business, October 2003. 25. Falekaupule Act, 1997, section 23. Kaupule 39. On being elected in the Nukufetau by-election, members receive sitting allowances, but no Elisala Pita also joined the government as a salaries. Kaupule staff, including secretary backbencher, bringing their number to nine. and treasurer, do receive salaries. For those 40. Islands Business October 2004:32-33. vol. migrants in Funafuti, separate Falekaupule 30, no.10 also exist that cater for the different island 41. In accordance with Section 63(1) of the populations and sustain linkages back to the Constitution. home island Falekaupule. The views of urban 42. The opposition was later further diminished migrants living in the capital are often greatly by the resignation of Namoto Kelisiano and valued by their kinsfolk on ther home islands, the untimely death of Amasone Kilei in the owing to knowledge and skills acquired in same year. Their replacements Halo Tuavai education and employment. and Toma Tanukale joined the government 26. The Falekaupule Trust Fund was set up by benches hence decreasing opposition num- the government, with assistance from the bers to fi ve. Asian Development Bank and contributions 43. Dr. Seluka retired from politics and did not from the eight islands, and is aimed at contest. funding development projects on the islands The Loneliness of the Pro-Government Backbencher and the Precariousness of Simple Majority Rule in Tuvalu

44. The constitutional amendment was passed this would logically entail the abolition of 16 despite only two of the eight islands (Niutao Westminster conventions about ‘cabinet and Funafuti) having endorsed the proposals. confi dentiality’. The other six did not. 52. The Tuvalu Constitution includes a provision 45. There was considerable British reluctance to for the review of all bills, after the fi rst reading, allow Tuvalu’s separation from Kiribati, owing by the ‘local governments’ (now ‘island to the remoteness of both island groups. Some councils’), except those that have received Tuvalu politicians also felt some disquiet a ‘certifi cate of urgency’ (Constitution of about unequal distribution of the former Tuvalu, section 111 (2), ‘Rules of Procedure’, Gilbert & Ellice Islands resources, with Tuvalu S. 31 (A)). Of the Pacifi c Island countries, only securing only one second hand ship and writes Crocombe, ‘Tuvalu may have the no funds from the colony’s reserve funds, and most extensive articulation between the local with the uninhabited Line and Pheonix Islands communities and the central government becoming part of Kiribati, rather than Tuvalu. (Crocombe, The South Pacifi c, p554); ‘Tuvalu 46. The Fund was called ‘Fakavae Tupe o Tuvalu’ is best seen as a collection of eight or more or ‘Tupe-a-Toeaina’, which was administered local states, with central government acting as by parliamentarians at the time, and author a coordinating device’, (Goldsmith, Theories was a former Treasurer/Secretariat. The Fund of Governance’, p108). was invested in Australia but has now been 53. For details of some of the pressures at the local returned to the individual islands, which had level, see Taafaki & Oh (1995), ‘Governance contributed in the beginning. in the Pacifi c; Politics and Policy Success 47. Since 1978, ministers salaries (leaving out of in Tuvalu’, NCDS, ANU, Canberra, p,11; consideration the worth of other entitlements Paeniu, B (1995), Traditional Governance such as government housing) have averaged & Sustainable Development in the Pacifi c, three times higher than the salaries of ordinary Economics Division Working Paper 95/6, government members. Canberra, Australian National University, 48. This is despite the fact that the Prescriptions Research School of Asian an Pacifi c Studies, of Salaries Act and Rule 48 of the Rules of p16. Procedure provide for members themselves to determine their own salaries and entitlements rather than having a separate and independent REFERENCES body to do this. 49. One of the authors is a Tuvalu civil servant. General Administrative Orders (GAO) 5.3.5 Besnier, N (1996), ‘Authority and Egalitarianism: prevents public servants from publicly Discourses of Leadership on Nukulaelae Atoll’, discussing corruption allegations leveled in R Feinberg and K Watson-Gegeo (eds.), against ministers. In any case, many of Leadership and Change in the Western Pacifi c, the allegations raised in parliament were the Althone Press, London and Atantic Highlands, raised under conditions of ‘parliamentary New Jersey. privilege’ (as provided for in Section 114 of the Constitution). Were these to be Besnier, N (2000), ‘The Politics of Representation raised, outside the parliamentary context, on a Polynesian Atoll’, in S Jaarsma & M the authors could potentially be subject to Rohatynskyj (eds.), Ethnographic Artefacts: litigation. It is worth noting that the Freedom Challenges to a Refl exive Anthropology, Honolulu, House surveys record that ‘Tuvalu is one of University of Hawaii Press. the few places in the Pacifi c Islands where corruption is not a serious problem’ (http:// Campbell, MJ (1977), Report on the Local Gov- www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page= ernment System in Tuvalu and its Suitability for 22&country=7293&year=2007). ‘Corruption in Independence, Canberra College for Advanced Tuvalu seems to be minor in comparison to Education, Canberra (unpublished). that found in the Melanesian states and the larger Polynesian states, such as Tonga and Clements, Q (2000), Tuvalu Legislative Needs Samoa’ (Goldsmith, ‘Theories of Governance Assessment, UNDP mission report, December and Pacifi c Microstates’, p109). 2000. 50. There is no Director of Public Prosecutions in Tuvalu, but the Attorney General sits in Crocombe, R (2001), The South Pacifi c, Institute parliament as an ex-offi cio member. The of Pacifi c Studies. Attorney General is responsible for cases in the High Court, whereas those in the lower Finin, GA (2002), Small is Viable: The Global Ebbs courts are handled by the police. and Flows of a Pacifi c Atoll Nation, East-West 51. The executive would thus function as Center Working Papers. parliament, as well as government, and Freedom House 2007 survey, http://www. The Loneliness of the Pro-Government Backbencher and the Precariousness of Simple Majority Rule in Tuvalu

freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&countr The Dismissal of Tuvalu’s Governor General, y=7293&year=2007. Economics Division, Research School of Pacifi c 17 and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Howard, D (1976), Problems of Social Deviance Canberra, p6. in Tuvalu, London, Overseas Development Assistance. Taafaki and Oh (1995), Governance in the Pacifi c; Politics and Policy Success in Tuvalu, NCDS, Huntington, S (1991), The Third Wave; ANU, Canberra. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, University of Oklahoma Press.

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Taafaki, T (1996), Governance in the Pacific: The Loneliness of the Pro-Government Backbencher and the Precariousness of Simple Majority Rule in Tuvalu

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SSGM Discussion Paper Series

2004/1: Phillip Gibbs, Nicole Haley and Abby McLeod, Politicking and Voting in the Highlands: The 2002 National Elections 2004/2: David Hegarty, Ron May, Anthony Regan, Sinclair Dinnen, Hank Nelson and Ron Duncan, Rebuilding State and Nation in Solomon Islands: Policy Options for the Regional Assistance Mission 2004/3: Michael Goddard, Women in Papua New Guinea’s Village Courts 2004/4: Sarah Garap, Kup Women for Peace: Women Taking Action to Build Peace and Infl uence Com- munity Decision-Making 2004/5: Sinclair Dinnen, Lending a Fist? Australia’s New Interventionism in the Southwest Pacifi c 2004/6: Colin Filer, Horses for Courses: Special Purpose Authorities and Local-Level Governance in Papua New Guinea 2004/7: Robert Muggah, Diagnosing Demand: Assessing the Motivations and Means for Firearms Acquisition in the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea 2004/8: Sinclair Dinnen and Edwina Thompson, Gender and Small Arms Violence in Papua New Guinea 2005/1: Nic Maclellan, Confl ict and Reconciliation in New Caledonia: Building the Mwâ Kâ 2005/2: Michael Morgan, Cultures of Dominance: Institutional and Cultural Infl uences on Parliamentary Politics in Melanesia 2005/3: Hank Nelson, Fighting for her Gates and Waterways: Changing Perceptions of New Guinea in Austalian Defence 2005/4: Allan Patience, The ECP and Australia’s Middle Power Ambitions 2005/5: Jerry Singirok, The Use of Illegal Guns: Security Implications for Papua New Guinea 2005/6: Jaap Timmer, Decentralisation and Elite Politics in Papua 2005/7: Donovan Storey, Urban Governance in Pacifi c Island Countries: Advancing an Overdue Agenda 2005/8: Jon Fraenkel, Political Consequences of Pacifi c Island Electoral Laws 2006/1: Hank Nelson, Governments, States and Labels 2007/1: Peter Larmour, Evaluating International Action Against Corruption in the Pacifi c Islands 2007/2: Brij V. Lal, ‘This Process of Political Readjustment’: Aftermath of the 2006 Fiji Coup 2007/3: Hank Nelson, The Chinese in Papua New Guinea 2007/4: Paul D’Arcy, China in the Pacifi c: Some Policy Considerations for Australia and New Zealand 2007/5: Geoffrey White, Indigenous Governance in Melanesia 2008/1: Brij V. Lal, One Hand Clapping: Refl ections on the First Anniversary of Fiji’s December 2006 Coup

ISSN: 1328-7854 ANU COLLEGE OF ASIA AND THE PACIFIC Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies

State, Society and Governance in Melanesia (SSGM) is a Program of the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University. SSGM’s key objectives are to encourage scholarship on governance and state-society relations; generate dialogue throughout Melanesia and the Pacific Islands on these issues; and assist in bridging policy and research. The Program’s research and outreach focuses on:

* Island Melanesia - Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, New Caledonia and Fiji; * the culturally-related region to the west including Papua/Irian Jaya and Timor; and * the countries of the Pacific Islands region to the north and east.

The contribution of AusAID to this series is acknowledged with appreciation.

State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies ANU College of Asia and the Pacific Australian National University

Contact: Telephone: +61 2 6125 8394 Fax: +61 2 6125 5525 Email: [email protected] http://rspas.anu.edu.au/melanesia