Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies State, Society and Governance in Melanesia State Society and in Governance Melanesia DISCUSSION PAPER Discussion Paper 2008/2 THE LONELINESS OF THE PRO-GOVERNMENT BACKBENCHER AND THE PRECARIOUSNESS OF SIMPLE MAJORITY RULE IN TUVALU INTRODUCTION has sparked strengthening popular hostility PAULSON and growing cynicism about parliamentary PANAPA processes. At the 2006 election, all the The Pacific Island microstate of Tuvalu has incumbent ministers lost their seats, with and acquired a reputation for having a ‘high the exception of the Prime Minister and the degree of political stability’ (Somoza 2001, p. Speaker, and the turnover of MPs was higher JON 832), and has a top Freedom House ranking than at any previous election in Tuvalu’s 1 for civil rights and political liberties (Freedom history. In response to long-run government FRAENKEL House 2007). Yet, despite regular elections instability, the new government introduced a and the absence of severe social crises, constitutional amendment in 2007 increasing there has been - since 1993 - an increasing the size of cabinet by two, aiming to bring to frequency of ‘no confidence’ challenges an end an era where government majorities in parliament and resulting defeats of depended on sustaining a single pro- governments. Following an early post- government backbencher. independence phase of relative executive stability, Prime Ministers proved much less In some situations, frequency of change able to sustain majorities in parliament. in government may not be damaging. Seven different governments took office Indeed, regular turnover of governments is between 1998 and 2006, and none lasted often deemed a sign of robust democracy more than two years. One analysis of the (Huntington 1991, p. 266-67). Where there is 2004 parliament found that all but two little difference in policy between government of the then incumbent MPs had defected and opposition, or where incoming from one group to another at some point governments simply continue where their during their tenures (Taafaki 2004, p. 17). predecessors left off, ostensible instability ‘Political stability’ was a principle concern may disguise substantive continuity. In encountered during the deliberations Tuvalu, however, this is not the case. Regular of the 2000 Constitutional Review government changes have imposed high 2 Committee (CRC). Its absence, linked costs, for example due to the associated delay to the manoeuvres of aspiring politicians and modification of national budgets. Once a and defecting government backbenchers, The Loneliness of the Pro-Government Backbencher and the Precariousness of Simple Majority Rule in Tuvalu Table 1: Tuvalu Population by Home Island and by Island of 2 Residence, 2002 Population by Population by Island of Residence Home Island Nanumea 664 1,560 Nanumaga 589 1,063 Niutao 663 1,453 Nui 548 835 Vaitupu 1,591 1,694 Nukufetau 586 1,149 Funafuti 4,492 1,004 Nukulaelae 393 461 Niulakita 35 2 Total 9,561 9,221 Source: Tuvalu Population Census, 2002, available http://www.spc.int/prism/country/tv/stats/ confidence motion is carried in parliament, in accordance with classical liberal theories, public service gridlock commences and there has been little in the way of scrutiny endures until a new government is formed. of alternative forms of representation and In addition, to sustain Prime Ministerial accountability, even where – as in Tuvalu – majorities, incumbents have politicized key these are already functioning locally. appointments, both at Governor General, Speaker and ministerial level. Parliamentary In this paper, we analyse the twists and sittings have been curtailed to avoid no turns of Tuvalu central government politics, confidence challenges. As a result, according particularly since the two elections of 1993, to the Report of the National Workshop and consider an alternative framework which on Accountability for Leaders of Tuvalu, entails the abandonment of the unhappy 1999, parliament had ‘failed miserably’, and institutionalisation of the opposition as a was unable to ‘effectively legislate’ or hold government-in-waiting, the introduction of ‘officials and public institutions to account an eight member executive representing for the use of public resources in a timely all the islands, and the adoption of manner’.3 a stronger oversight role for the island- based Falekaupule.5 In the first part of Conventional responses to weak the paper, we outline the institutional and parliamentary oversight in Tuvalu have political framework established in Tuvalu tended to focus on promoting reforms at independence, and the way this has intended to ‘strengthen institutions’ so that developed in the period thereafter. In the these resemble more closely the Westminster second part, we review the succession of ideal, despite the notable absence of political governments, why each fell and how each parties. Opposition oversight of the executive sought to engineer for itself a longer term in is to be enhanced by expanded usage of office. In the final part, we review the 1997 parliamentary committees, and by challenging Falekaupule Act and the operation of local ‘the misconception that Parliament is the arm of level assemblies, and set out our alternative the government-of-the-day’ (Clements 2000).4 framework, asking whether this might better The familiar framework of a Leadership Code, fit the local customary framework as well as Ombudsman and non-partisan Office of the improving the quality of central government Speaker of Parliament has been proposed performance. to reinforce checks and balances, in ways that have been replicated across the Pacific POLITICAL BACKGROUND Islands - promoted by the United Nations Development Programme, the Pacific Islands Forum and the Commonwealth. Despite Tuvalu means literally ‘cluster of eight’ or ‘eight recognition that parliaments have not worked standing together’, a terminology that perhaps The Loneliness of the Pro-Government Backbencher and the Precariousness of Simple Majority Rule in Tuvalu says as much about preferred institutional framework). The constitution was revised, arrangements as about geography. The eight first still strongly inspired by British officials in 3 islands are located close to the equator in the 1982, and then again - with greater Tuvaluan central Pacific. It currently has a population input - in 1986, but with ‘few substantive of around 10,000, spread across a land area changes’ to electoral and political institutions of 26 square kilometres. The country has a aside from the introduction of procedures sea area of 900,000 square kilometres, and for the recall of non-performing members of is potentially threatened by global warming parliament (Levine 1992, p. 493-94, 506). and rising sea levels. Colonised by the The original post-independence parliament British as part of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands had twelve members, but this was raised Protectorate, Tuvalu peacefully broke away to fifteen in May 2000, making the retention from Kiribati in 1975 to become independent of government majorities more difficult than on 1 October 1978, after a 92% vote in previously.7 Tuvalu currently has seven favour of separation (Macdonald 1982, p. two-member constituencies and one single- 256). Tuvalu nevertheless remained part of member constituency, all of which return the Commonwealth, and the Head of State is members by plurality voting (see map).8 the British monarch, represented within the General elections are held every four years, country by a Governor General appointed with the result that there have been eight on the advice of the Prime Minister after parliaments since independence. consultations with members of parliament.6 The Prime Minister heads the government Like many of the former British colonies, and is elected at a closed meeting of MPs by Tuvalu inherited a Westminster-style a secret ballot, after either a general election, system, although with certain important the death of an incumbent, or the fall of a modifications (not least, having a constitution previous government due to a confidence in place of the classically convention-based motion.9 Confidence motions normally Westminster framework and a unicameral require two days notice, but with the consent Map designed by Michael Govorov The Loneliness of the Pro-Government Backbencher and the Precariousness of Simple Majority Rule in Tuvalu of the Speaker can be moved without notice, Both members from each of the seven 4 by way of a suspension of the ‘Rules of dual-member constituencies tend to align Procedure’.10 When a no confidence vote is themselves on the same side during Prime passed, parliament is prorogued immediately Ministerial elections. In most cases, a member until the Governor General (GG) calls the vying for the Prime Minister’s position is likely meeting to elect a new Prime Minister.11 The to be supported by his colleague from the Constitution permits the GG to exercise his same island. For example, the Prime Ministers ‘deliberate judgment’ in regard to the timing Toaripi Lauti (1977-1980), Tomasi Puapua of such election meetings12, sometimes (1981-1988), Ionatana Ionatana (1999- controversially enabling politically aligned 2000), Koloa Talake (2001-2002), Maatia Governor Generals to allow incumbent Toafa (2004-2006) and Apisai Ielemia (2006- governments to limp on in a caretaker role or today) all had aligned island running mates. providing them time to re-establish majorities Having dual tickets ensured that acquisition