Supplement to the London Gazette, 5 June, 1946
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2726 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 JUNE, 1946 to the meagre resources available in the Middle These entailed thirteen detachments to Berbera East to meet its very wide responsibilities. It each of about three days' duration. During was necessary to keep the commitment in this time our casualties were two officers British Somaliland to a minimum, hoping to wounded, one aircraft lost and one damaged. the last that the French would continue the struggle at Jibuti, of which I had had repeated From $th August to igth August. assurances from General Legentilhomme. The 6. The following was carried out:— poverty of Berbera as a port made landing slow (a) Twelve separate reconnaissances. and difficult when reinforcements did arrive. (b) 'Nineteen bombing-reconnaissances employing thirty-two aircraft. VI. APPRECIATION OF SERVICES. (c) Twenty-six bombing attacks on enemy 49. I wish especially to bring to notice the troop concentrations, and transport employ- work of Brigadier A. R. Chater, D.S.O., ing seventy-two aircraft. O.B.E. Throughout a most difficult and trying (d) Standing fighter patrols were main- period his work and spirit have been admir- tained over Berbera for thirteen days employ- able. His disposition of his slender resources ing 36 sorties. has always been made with sound judgment; In addition to the above, No. 223 Squadron his appreciations of the situation have been well carried out six long distance raids on enemy founded; and the way in which he has inspired bases in the back areas, including Addis Abeba. and led the forces under his command has been The intention was to draw the enemy fighters admirable. I consider that his services in away from British Somaliland. The total num- Somalilafid deserve special recognition. ber of sorties for these operations was 50. Major-General A. R. Godwin Austen thirty-two. showed great skill in his handling of operations 7. During these operations approximately during the short period he was in command. sixty tons of bombs were dropped and the total He took over while a battle was in progress, number of sorties was 184. grasped the situation rapidly, and by his per- sonal energy and spirit did much to inspire Casualties. the resistance. It was due to his well thought 8. Our casualties were as follows: — out arrangements that the evacuation was (a) Seven aircraft lost. carried out with so little loss. (b) Ten severely damaged and a number slightly damaged by enemy action. APPENDIX " A " (c) Twelve killed. Air Headquarters, Steamer Point, Aden. (d) Three wounded. 9. During the period under review the follow- 22nd August, 1940. ing enemy aircraft were shot down or THE SOMALILAND CAMPAIGN. damaged:— INTRODUCTION. (a) By fighters—One shot down and one heavily hit. On 6th July, 1940, G.H.Q. Middle East (b) By bombers—Two shot down in asked O.C. Somaliforces whether, if the French flames. at Jibuti accepted the terms of the armistice, he considered, that British Somaliland was un- Achievements. tenable and that troops should be gradually 10. Long range fighters were used in stand- withdrawn. O.C. Somaliforces replied that ing patrols for the protection of Berbera against with certain additional military forces he did air attack during the evacuation. It will be not consider the position in Somaliland unten- noted that this port was reasonably immune able provided he could rely on his Naval re- from air bombardment during this critical quirements and on air support from Aden. period. Had this not been so the evacuation 2. In forwarding Somaliforce signal to might have been badly held up with unfor- G.H.Q., A.O.C. Aden stated that " a measure tunate consequences. of air support could be provided but air forces 11. In co-operation with the Royal Navy our here (in Aden) are small and have prior com- air forces effectively delayed and finally stopped mitment with convoys and in defence of Aden." the Italian advance along the coast road 3. The role of the air forces in Aden has from Zeilah to Berbera. been clearly defined:— (a) Protection of convoys. DIFFICULTIES UNDER WHICH THE ROYAL Am (b) Neutralisation of enemy air forces as FORCE WAS WORKING. far as possible to achieve (a) above and to 12. Although the maximum air effort pos- protect shipping at Aden. sible was afforded in support of the Army in 4. Permission was, however, obtained from Somaliland it may not have appeared impres- H.Q. R.A.F. Middle East for a flight of air- sive from the ground. The difficulties under craft to give close support in Somaliland to the which we were working were as follows:— best of their ability. It was never intended (a) There was no protected aerodrome by Higher Command to use any more than from which either our fighters or bombers this flight in close support of the Army except could operate in Somaliland. The two in the case of emergency. aerodromes—one at Berbera and one at OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT BY THE ROYAL Laferug—were quickly made untenable by AIR FORCE. enemy bombardment which was practically unopposed by ground defences. Two of our From outbreak of War with Italy up to Start fighters were destroyed in the initial stages on of Advance on Somaliland. the ground owing to lack of protection nor- 5. Forty-four reconnaissances were carried mally afforded by the Army. Fighter air- out on the Somaliland-Abyssinian frontier. craft therefore had to be withdrawn..