BRGÖ 2019 Beiträge zur Rechtsgeschichte Österreichs B.J.C. MCKERCHER, Victoria The Other German Treaty Lloyd George and St. Germain 1919–1920 British policy concerning the Treaty of St Germain devolved from Prime Minister David Lloyd George. In developing war aims during the Great War, the British looked to maintain Austria-Hungary as a post-war Great Power, admit- tedly diminished, to balance between Germany and Russia. This goal evaporated by October 1918 as the Habsburg Monarchy collapsed and successor states arose in Central-Eastern Europe. The Allies handled Germany’s settlement, the Treaty of Versailles, first at the Paris Peace Conference. Its three-part focus – territorial adjustments, reparations, and disarmament – provided the model for British policy towards Austria. A key to Lloyd George’s ideas – his prag- matism obviated clear strategy – was to avoid future British military commitments for European security. Arthur Balfour, the foreign secretary, and Eyre Crowe, a Foreign Office mandarin, received responsibility for negotiating St. Germain; they played a major role in giving new Austria sensible borders and reasonable security. Doing so, however, they followed Lloyd George’s dictates about military commitments. The British subsequently used effective economic diplomacy to assist Austria’s financial reconstruction that allowed influence over its shape and democratic – that is capitalist – structure. Keywords: 1914–1920 – Austria – Arthur BALFOUR – Eyre CROWE – Great Britain Foreign Policy – David LLOYD GEORGE – Treaty of St. Germain – Treaty of Versailles British policy concerning the Treaty of St. Ger- When the peacemakers fashioned the German main came from David Lloyd George, the prime settlement, the small successor states, including minister after December 1916, who dominated all Austria, competed for territory, population, and dimensions of the country’s statecraft. His efforts Great Power support. towards Austria had three dimensions: develop- As prime minister, Lloyd George kept foreign ing war aims, intra-Allied negotiation of Ger- policymaking at Downing Street, not the Foreign many’s peace settlement, the Versailles Treaty, Office.1 After 1914, the Foreign Office dealt and, with Versailles as a model, policy towards largely with neutral Powers and managed the Austria at the Paris Peace Conference. Austria’s economic-naval blockade against them. Though settlement saw British reluctance to commit mili- the main Cabinet existed, Lloyd George created a tarily to post-war Central-Eastern Europe. For five man War Cabinet to run the war: the foreign Lloyd George, the German question at Paris had secretary, Arthur Balfour, was not a member. utmost importance; St. Germain was secondary. Needing speedy decisions, this body and the Because of military defeat and the rise of nation- ministries dealing with finance, trade, munitions, alism in Central-Eastern Europe, the Habsburg and the fighting services directly dealt with the Empire splintered in October 1918 when its sub- Allies without the Foreign Office. With Lloyd ject peoples proclaimed liberation from Vienna. 1 CASSAR, Lloyd George at War; FRENCH, Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition, especially Chapter 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.1553/BRGOE2019-2s320 The Other German Treaty 321 George and his deputies in control after Decem- peace, France was seriously considering its objec- ber 1916, policy emerged largely at the govern- tives, and the war looked to favor the Allies – the ment’s apex and decisions passed down. Always Russians briefly broke through in the East, and pragmatic in domestic and foreign policy, Lloyd Romania joined the Allies. Asquith called for George rose to political prominence by making peace terms. deals with allies and adversaries. For instance, Thus, on the eve that Lloyd George rose to Down- domestically in 1910, as Chancellor of the Ex- ing Street, London began considering what its chequer in Herbert Asquith’s Liberal ministry, he fighting should achieve; the Admiralty, Imperial helped work with the party to end aristocratic General Staff [IGS], and Foreign Office produced control of the House of Lords.2 In December 1916, assessments for the Cabinet, and for the first time, conversely, he led dissident Liberal-Conserva- postwar Austria-Hungary received serious atten- tives to overthrow Asquith and energize Britain’s tion.5 Balfour, then first lord of the Admiralty, ac- war effort.3 Foreign policy saw the same pragma- cepted “the principle of nationality” respecting tism. An opportunist, Lloyd George thought the desires of Central Power subject peoples to rarely in strategic terms – like supporting Brit- break from Berlin and Vienna. The IGS reckoned ain’s tradition of maintaining the continental bal- both Central Powers were needed to contain “the ance of power. The deal was most important. So power of Russia and the Slav States”. Still, each it was with British policy concerning St. Germain. wanted a smaller Austria-Hungary to continue as Lloyd George’s attitudes varied about Austria- major Power. The Foreign Office supported “the Hungary and, after October 1918, postwar Aus- principle of nationality” in Central-Eastern Eu- tria. During the war, British war aims looked for rope but sanctioned Habsburg demise, the strate- Austria-Hungary with some changes to remain a gic objective to enfeeble Germany by removing Great Power; after Habsburg Central Europe its chief ally and, with smaller states from Habs- shattered, Lloyd George saw Austria as simply burg lands, better safeguard Europe’s future bal- another successor state. It had lost importance – ance. Although unduly optimistic – ignoring na- although not for some other ministers and the tionalist antagonisms in Central-Eastern Europe Foreign Office.4 It was not that Lloyd George ig- – a voice now existed in London for sundering nored the intra-Allied negotiation of St. Germain, the Dual Monarchy. but he let the professional diplomats shape it After early 1917, following Karl I taking the based on the model he established at Versailles. Habsburg throne and despite Foreign Office, IGS, So, British policy towards Austria-Hungary de- and other advice, Lloyd George believed the Al- veloped initially in shaping war aims. Entering lies could separate Berlin and Vienna, crucial to the war, Britain looked to avert German continen- bettering British war making.6 For him, secret tal hegemony to give Britain influence in postwar peace initiatives in 1917 engineered by Karl Europe. But when the war bogged down into through his brother-in-law, Prince Sixtus, sug- bloody attrition, other aims gained importance, gested possibly removing the Monarchy from the but articulating them proved desultory. Only in war. The initiative proved futile, as did one by summer 1916 did serious consideration first oc- cur: neutral America pushed for a negotiated 2 POWELL, Edwardian Crisis 39–67. memorandum, 31 8. 1916, CAB 42/18/10; Foreign Of- 3 RUBINSTEIN, Twentieth-Century Britain 85–87. fice memorandum, “Suggested Basis for a Territorial 4 Still valuable is CALDER, Britain and the Origins. Settlement in Europe”, 7. 8. 1916, CAB 42/17/4. 5 Balfour memorandum, “The Peace Settlement in Eu- 6 FRY, Fortune Fled 119–25. rope”, 4. 10. 1916, CAB 37/157/7; Robertson [IGS] 322 B.J.C. MCKERCHER Pope Benedict XV.7 The IGS cautioned the War Austria, Turkey, and even Germany, that our ob- Cabinet “Our arrangements with Rumania and ject was not to destroy the enemy nations”.10 Italy whereby all Transylvania and a large part of While enfeebled Germany was primary, for the Hungary are to be ceded to the former, while Is- Dual Monarchy, “Some reference ought to be tria, Dalmatia and parts of other Austro-Hungar- made in our statement to such races as the Ital- ian provinces fall to the latter, make any arrange- ians, Croats, Slovaks, Czechs, &c, who are under ment with Austria impossible.”8 Austrian rule, and who seek some form of auton- Continued fighting on every front, the March omy”. To his audience and a wider one in Britain 1917 Russian revolution, and coordinating Allied and abroad, he outlined general aims: support for strategy with America once it entered the war in a multilateral organization to resolve interna- April delayed consideration of war aims. Then, tional disputes, the inviolability of treaties, and a after the Bolshevik coup d’état, Lloyd George’s just peace built partially on the principle of na- government was forced publicly to articulate tionality. Respecting Habsburg domains, he de- British objectives. Moscow published secret tsar- clared, “though we agree with President Wilson ist treaties, notably the April 1915 London Treaty that the break-up of Austria-Hungary is no part bringing Italy into the Allied alliance: it promised of our war aims, we feel that unless genuine self- Rome the Austrian Tyrol and western Balkans government on true democratic principles is lands and, perhaps, portions of the Ottoman Em- granted to those Austro-Hungarian nationalities pire.9 This treaty constituted ‘old diplomacy’ – se- who have long desired it, it is impossible to hope cret commitments – that ran counter to Woodrow for the removal of those causes of unrest in that Wilson’s ‘new diplomacy’: open diplomacy, arbi- part of Europe which have so long threatened its trating international disputes, and collective se- general peace.”11 curity through a yet to be created League of Na- His problem was that three days later, Wilson an- tions. The London Treaty indicated amorality – nounced specific war aims – the “Fourteen even immorality – and Lloyd George had to re- Points”. In Central-Eastern Europe, Poland spond to show its American ally and British vot- would be re-born, and “the people of Austria- ers burdened by total war that his government Hungary, whose place among the nations we had moral ambitions. wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be Lloyd George spoke publicly on 5 January 1918 accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous on why Britain was fighting, outlining general ra- development”.12 The Anglo-Americans now pub- ther than specific aims – the better to do a deal at licly advocated a peace based solely on their an eventual peace conference.