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The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness This page intentionally left blank P1: KAE 0521857430pre CUFX049/Zelazo 0 521 85743 0 printer: cupusbw March 3, 2007 16:33 The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness is the (CFI), focuses on the mechanisms underly- first of its kind in the field, and its appearance ing typical and atypical development of exec- marks a unique time in the history of intellectual utive function – the conscious self-regulation inquiry on the topic. After decades during which of thought, action, and emotion. In September consciousness was considered beyond the scope 2007, he will assume the Nancy M. and John of legitimate scientific investigation, conscious- L. Lindhal Professorship at the Institute of Child ness re-emerged as a popular focus of research Development, University of Minnesota. toward the end of the last century, and it has remained so for nearly 20 years. There are now Morris Moscovitch is the Max and Gianna Glass- so many different lines of investigation on con- man Chair in Neuropsychology and Aging in sciousness that the time has come when the field the Department of Psychology at the University may finally benefit from a book that pulls them of Toronto. He is also a Senior Scientist at the together and, by juxtaposing them, provides a Rotman Research Institute of Baycrest Centre comprehensive survey of this exciting field. for Geriatric Care. His research focuses on the neuropsychology of memory in humans but also Philip David Zelazo is Professor of Psychology addresses attention, face recognition, and hemi- at the University of Toronto, where he holds spheric specialization in young and older adults, a Canada Research Chair in Developmental and in people with brain damage. Neuroscience. He is also Co-Director of the Sino-Canadian Centre for Research in Child Evan Thompson is Professor of Philosophy at the Development, Southwest University, China. He University of Toronto. He is the author of Mind was Founding Editor of the Journal of Cogni- in Life: Biology, Phenomenoloy, and the Sciences of tion and Development. His research, which is Mind and Colour Vision: A Study in Cognitive Sci- funded by the Natural Sciences and Engineer- ence and the Philosophy of Perception. He is also ing Research Council (NSERC) of Canada, the the co-author of The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR), Science and Human Experience. He is a former and the Canadian Foundation for Innovation holder of a Canada Research Chair. i P1: KAE 0521857430pre CUFX049/Zelazo 0 521 85743 0 printer: cupusbw March 3, 2007 16:33 ii P1: KAE 0521857430pre CUFX049/Zelazo 0 521 85743 0 printer: cupusbw March 3, 2007 16:33 The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness Edited by Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch and Evan Thompson University of Toronto iii CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521857437 © Cambridge University Press 2007 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published in print format 2007 ISBN-13 978-0-511-28923-1 eBook (EBL) ISBN-10 0-511-28923-5 eBook (EBL) ISBN-13 978-0-521-85743-7 hardback ISBN-10 0-521-85743-0 hardback ISBN-13 978-0-521-67412-6 paperback ISBN-10 0-521-67412-3 paperback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. P1: KAE 0521857430pre CUFX049/Zelazo 0 521 85743 0 printer: cupusbw March 3, 2007 16:33 To the memory of Francisco J. Varela (7 September 1946–28 May 2001) –ET To my growing family: Jill, Elana, David, Leora, and Ezra Meir –MM For Sam, and the next iteration – PDZ And a special dedication to Joseph E. Bogen (13 July 1926–22 April 2005) v P1: KAE 0521857430pre CUFX049/Zelazo 0 521 85743 0 printer: cupusbw March 3, 2007 16:33 vi P1: KAE 0521857430pre CUFX049/Zelazo 0 521 85743 0 printer: cupusbw March 3, 2007 16:33 Contents List of Contributors page xi b. computational approaches to consciousness 1. Introduction 1 6. Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness 117 part i Drew McDermott THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 7. Computational Models of Consciousness: A Taxonomy a. philosophy and Some Examples 151 2 . A Brief History of the Philosophical Ron Sun and Stan Franklin Problem of Consciousness 9 William Seager c. cognitive psychology 3. Philosophical Theories of 8. Cognitive Theories of Consciousness: Contemporary Consciousness 177 Western Perspectives 35 Katharine McGovern and Uriah Kriegel Bernard J. Baars 4. Philosophical Issues: 9 Phenomenology 67 . Behavioral, Neuroimaging, and Neuropsychological Approaches to Evan Thompson and Dan Zahavi Implicit Perception 207 5 . Asian Perspectives: Indian Theories Daniel J. Simons, Deborah E. of Mind 89 Hannula, David E. Warren, and Georges Dreyfus and Evan Thompson Steven W. Day vii P1: KAE 0521857430pre CUFX049/Zelazo 0 521 85743 0 printer: cupusbw March 3, 2007 16:33 viii contents 10. Three Forms of Consciousness in g. anthropology/social Retrieving Memories 251 psychology of consciousness Henry L. Roediger III, Suparna 20. Social Psychological Approaches Rajaram, and Lisa Geraci to Consciousness 555 11. Metacognition and Consciousness 289 John A. Bargh Asher Koriat 21. The Evolution of Consciousness 571 12. Consciousness and Control Michael C. Corballis of Action 327 22. The Serpent’s Gift: Evolutionary Carlo Umilt`a Psychology and Consciousness 597 Jesse M. Bering and David F. d. linguistic considerations Bjorklund 13. Language and Consciousness 355 23. Anthropology of Consciousness 631 Wallace Chafe C. Jason Throop and Charles D. Laughlin 14. Narrative Modes of Consciousness h. psychodynamic approaches to and Selfhood 375 consciousness Keith Oatley 24. Motivation, Decision Making, and e. developmental psychology Consciousness: From Psychodynamics to Subliminal 15 . The Development Priming and Emotional Constraint 405 of Consciousness Satisfaction 673 Philip David Zelazo, Helena Hong Drew Westen, Joel Weinberger, and Gao, and Rebecca Todd Rebekah Bradley f. alternative states of part ii consciousness THE NEUROSCIENCE OF 16. States of Consciousness: Normal CONSCIOUSNESS and Abnormal Variation 435 a. neurophysiological mechanisms J. Allan Hobson of consciousness 17. Consciousness in Hypnosis 445 25. Hunting the Ghost: Toward a John F. Kihlstrom Neuroscience of Consciousness 707 Petra Stoerig 18. Can We Study Subjective Experiences Objectively? 26. Neurodynamical Approaches to First-Person Perspective Consciousness 731 Approaches and Impaired Diego Cosmelli, Jean-Philippe Subjective States of Awareness Lachaux, and Evan Thompson in Schizophrenia 481 Jean-Marie Danion and Caroline b. neuropsychological aspects of Huron consciousness: disorders and neuroimaging 19. Meditation and the Neuroscience of Consciousness: An Introduction 499 27. The Thalamic Intralaminar Nuclei 775 Antoine Lutz, John D. Dunne, and and the Property of Consciousness Richard J. Davidson Joseph E. Bogen P1: KAE 0521857430pre CUFX049/Zelazo 0 521 85743 0 printer: cupusbw March 3, 2007 16:33 contents ix 28. The Cognitive Neuroscience of d. social neuroscience of Memory and Consciousness 809 consciousness Scott D. Slotnick and Daniel 30. Consciousness: Situated and Social 863 L. Schachter Ralph Adolphs c.affectiveneuroscience part iii of consciousness QUANTUM APPROACHES TO 29. The Affective Neuroscience CONSCIOUSNESS of Consciousness: Higher- 31. Quantum Approaches to Order Syntactic Thoughts, Consciousness 881 Dual Routes to Emotion Henry Stapp and Action, and Consciousness 831 Author Index 909 Edmund T. Rolls Subject Index 939 P1: KAE 0521857430pre CUFX049/Zelazo 0 521 85743 0 printer: cupusbw March 3, 2007 16:33 x P1: KAE 0521857430pre CUFX049/Zelazo 0 521 85743 0 printer: cupusbw March 3, 2007 16:33 List of Contributors Ralph Adolphs, PhD Joseph E. Bogen, MD (Deceased) Department of Psychology Formerly of University of Southern California California Institute of Technology and the University of California, Los Angeles HSS 228-77 Pasadena, CA 91125 USA Rebekah Bradley E-mail: [email protected] Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Bernard J. Baars, PhD Sciences Emory University The Neurosciences Institute 1462 Clifton Road 10640 John Jay Hopkins Drive Atlanta, GA 30322 USA San Diego, CA 92121 USA E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] John A. Bargh, PhD Wallace Chafe, PhD Department of Psychology Department of Linguistics Yale University University of California, Santa Barbara 2 Hillhouse Avenue Santa Barbara, CA 93106 USA P.O. Box 208205 E-mail: [email protected] New Haven, CT 06520-8205 USA E-mail: [email protected] Michael C. Corballis, PhD Jesse M. Bering, PhD Department of Psychology University of Auckland Institute of Cognition and Culture Private Bag 92019 Queen’s University, Belfast Auckland 1020 NEW ZEALAND 4 Fitzwilliam Street E-mail: [email protected] Belfast, Northern Ireland BT71NN E-mail: [email protected] Diego Cosmelli, PhD David F. Bjorklund, PhD Centro de Estudios Neurobiologicos´ Department of Psychology Departomento de Psiquiatroa´ Florida Atlantic University P. Universidad Catolica´ de Chile Boca Raton, FL 33431-0091 USA Marcoleto 387, 2 ◦ piso E-mail: [email protected] Santiago, Chile xi P1: KAE 0521857430pre CUFX049/Zelazo 0 521 85743 0 printer: cupusbw March 3, 2007 16:33 xii list of contributors (Also: Laboratoire de neurosciences Cognitives Campus Box 1125 et Imagerie Cer´ ebrale´ (LENA) St. Louis, MO 63130-4899 USA 47 Bd de l’Hopital,ˆ 75651 Paris FRANCE) E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Deborah E. Hannula Jean-Marie Danion, MD Psychology Department 405 INSERM Unite´ University of Illinois Hopitalˆ Civil de Strasbourg – Clinique 603 E.
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