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Another If the Activities *Carried on Within It Are More Autotelic nOCIF04RNT 1111:811MR ED 030 174 24 CG 004 233 By-Moore, Omar K.:.Anderson, Alan Ross Some Principles for the Design Of Clarifying EducationalEnvironments. PrepriGt. 32. Pittsburgh Univ., Pa. Learning Research and Development Center. Spons Agency -Carnegie ,Corp. of New York, N.Y.;Office of Nayal Research, 14shington, D.C. Bureau No -BR -5 -0253 . Pub Date (681 Note-65p.; Preprint .of a Chapt,er to appear in David CoSlin (Ed.).HandbOok of Socialization Theory and Research. Chicago: Rand McNally, 19.68 EDRS Price MF-$050 HC..-S3.35 Descriptors -Audiovisual Instruction, *Computational Linguistics,*Instructional Aids, *Instructional Materials. *Learning, *LearningTheOries,.*Per:ceptual Motor LeaFning,Social Sciences The author'S purp4e !in .this paper is to explain andillustrate four principles for designing learning environments within which even youngchildren can acquire complex symbolic skills with*.relatiye:ease. After discussingthe principles themselves and the theoretical systeM out of which they emerged, the authorconsiders an illustrative application of these :principles to the problemof designing an actual' learning environment.Four. ptinciplesfordesigningclarifyingenvironmentsare.(1) Perspectives Principlero*environment is more conducive to.learning than another if it both permits .and facilitat.e.taking of more perspectives tOwardwhatever is to be learned: (2) Autotelit Principite,-one environment is moreconducive to learning than another if the activities *carried on withinit are more autotelic;(3) Productive Principle- one environmeh.t is. more conducive to learningthaa another if what is to be learned within it is more* productive: (4)Personalization Principle- one enVironment is more conducive to learning'than another if it is more resp9nsive to learneractivities and permits and facilitates the, learner's taking a morereflexive view of himself as a learner. As an illuStrative ekample of a clarifyingenvironment, the .author discusses the talking typewriter. (Author/C,I) UNIVERSITY OFP1TSURGH -LEARNING R &DCENTER PREPRINT 32 SOME PRINCIPLESOMAR K. MOOREFOREDUCATIONAL ANDTHE DESIGNALAN ROSS ENVIRONMENTSOF CLARIFYING ANDERSON EDO30174' SOME PRINCIPLES FOR THE DESIGN OF CLARIFYING EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS Omar K. Moore Learning Research and Development Center and Alan Ross Anderson Department of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh Preprint of a chapter to appear in David Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research.Chicago: Rand McNally,T7-- (in press) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE OFFICE OF EDUCATION THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON CR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT.POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL OFFICE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY. Contents 3 Theoretical Background 3 Folk Models Personality 9 Information Processing * 12 Information Processing forHuman Beings 14 Order of Mastering Perspective 15 Complications ConcerningKind-Heartedness 15 17 Interlude 20 Principles for DesigningClarifying Environments Perspectives Principle 21 Autotelic Principle 24 Productive Principle 26 Personalization Principle 28 An Application of the FourPrinciples 31 Perspectives Principle--Application 32 Autotelic Principle--Applications Ito Productive Principle--Application 45 Personalization Principle--Application 47 56 Conclusion References 58 SOME PRINCIPLES FOR THEDESIGN OF CLARIFYING EDUCATIONALENVIRONMENTS* by Omar Khayyam Moore Alan Ross Anderson When the ordinary typewriter was anexciting novelty, MarkTwain, who was an early typewriterbuff, called it a"curiosity-breeding little joker"--and so it was, then. The tallinELtypewriter,invented by Moore and Kobler (Moore, Kobler(1963), Kobler, Moore(1966)], is a contemporary novelty which also elicits agood deal of curiosity. There have been with numerous populararticles about it, and mostof those who have played generated by this it find it fascinating. Unfortunately, the interest machine does not carry over,necessarily, to the theoreticalideas which The machine itself lie behind it. We say "unfortunately" forgood reason. The is less important than theprinciples which guided itsconstruction. talking typewriter is merely oneof a large number of possibleinventions which can be made, we think,using this same theoreticalcontext as a guide. Our main purpose in this paperis to explain and toillustrate a set of principles, fourin number, for designinglearning environments within which even very youngchildren can acquire complexsymbolic skills along, that these prin- with relative ease. We intend to show, as we go ciples for designing clarifyingeducational environments(where by a "clarifying educational environment" we mean aneducational environment aimed to make the student(subject? victimfl clear about what heis related doing, and more generally, whatis going on) are systematically interpretation of to both a theoretical analysisof human culture and an human infant, the socialization process,i.e., that process whereby a Most of the theoretical workreported here was supported by the Office of Naval Research,Group Psychology Branch,Contract #SAR/Nonr-609 the major source of supporthas been (16). With respect to applications, "talking the Carnegie Corporationof New York. The cost of developing the typewriter" (Edison ResponsiveEnvironment) was borne exclusively by the McGraw-Edison Company of Elgin,Illinois. 2 beginning life as a biological individual, becomes a person--and whose infantile behavior is gradually transformed into adult conduct. In order to understand the "design principles" alluded to above, we must first explain the theoretical system out of which they emerged. We will then go on to a statement of the principles themselves, and final- ly we will consider, in some detail, an illustrative application of these principles to the problem of designing an actual learning environment.At this point, we will have come full circle--the talking typewriter will appear in a meaningful context as one part of a learning environment. It will also be obvious that the talking typewriter is itself fundamentally a "social science invention." Because it is a social science invention, it is difficult to use it or similar devices intelligently with- out an appreciation of the social scientific ideas on which it is based. Finally, before turning to our first task, that of sketching out the theoretical system upon which the zet of principles is founded, we wish to acknowledge the contributions to our thinking of George Herbert Mead (1932, 1934, 1936,1938)51the father of the Symbolic interactionist position in social psychology, and Georg Simmel [English translation (1959)], the originator of the school of Formal Sociology. We regard these men as central figures in the creation of the kind of sociology which can yield applications both at the level of mechanical inventions and social inventions. It may seem strange to some that we believe that Mead and Simmel have ideas which lend themselves to applications.Mead and his followers often have been criticized.for spawning ideas which lacked testable consequences--to say nothing of applications; and to the best of our knowledge we are the only ones who have seriously entertained the thought that Simmel was within a light year of a practical applica- tion. We hope to show here that leading ideas taken from these two men can be reshaped into working principles for designing educational environments. 1 From time to time we will try to acknowledge our indebtedness to various authors, but a complete list of those authors to whom we feel indebted would be impossible for either of us to make out. 3 Theoretical Backgroune Folk Models We think that it is amistake to regard the ordinaryhuman being as an atheoretical or anontheoretical or even anantitheoretical creature. ordinary Some contemporary behavioralscientists seem to assume that the man, a citizen ingood standing in whatevercommunity he lives, is woefully He lacking in intellectual resourcesto guide him in managing hisaffairs. is credited only with somefolk sayings and proverbs, somepractical know- ledge, some skill atrule-of-thumb reasoning, sometradition-based explan- ations--and that is about it. In a contrary vein, wesuggest a different view of"man."We think that early in human history,probably at about the time mendeveloped natural languages, they alsocreated models of the most importantfeatures 3 of their relations with theenvironment. These were relatively abstract models which collectivelycovered relations holding between(1) man and nature--insofar as nature is not randam,(2) man and the random or chancy elements in experience,(3) man in his interactional relations withothers Cul- like himself, and(4) man and the normative aspects of groupliving. tural structures falling withinthese four classes of models werecreated (perhaps it would in early history by many unsungEdisons and Einsteins be more appropriate to saythat they were createdby the unsung Meads exist a society and Simmels ofprehistory). Consequently, there does not /NMI 2Sincethis section is mainly a summaryof our own ideas, some free to paraphrase our worked out jointly, someseparately, we have felt However, anyone who wishesto go own paperswithout specific references. (1959, 1962, more deeply intothese ideas should read(A.R. Anderson, Moore A.R. Anderson 1966), Moore (1957, 1958,1961, 1964, 19659 1968), Moore, (1960a, 1960b, 1960c,1962a, 1962b, 1968)]. acquire a certain 3In common with manycontemporary philosophers, we When one sick
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