Belgium to May 10, 1940

210 Chapter 8

Chapter 8 Belgium to May 10, 1940

In addition to strictly military concerns, Belgian defense policy between 1936 and 1940 was shaped by relations with Belgium’s neighbors and information from its intelligence service. The Belgian commanders accommodated the Allies as much as they could while fending off nearly incessant Allied demands for staff talks and attempts to bring Belgium in on their side. At the same time, the Belgians were trying for greater cooperation with the Dutch than the latter were ready to provide. As the crisis over Danzig seemed increasingly likely to lead to war, the Belgians began mobilization. Belgian deployments varied over the ‘drôle de paix’ (‘Funny Peace’)1 according to which neighbor seemed more likely to try to use Belgium as a thoroughfare. The Belgian army had several alerts triggered by intelligence from Germany, one of which, the infamous ‘Mechelen Incident’ of January 1940, not only embittered relations between the Belgians and the Allies but also forced the Germans to discard their previ- ous campaign plan and adopt the ‘Manstein Plan’ or ‘Sickle Cut’ that was so successful in 1940. The chapter begins with a look at the complicated relations between the Belgians and the Allies during the policy of ‘independence’ and then at the interestingly similar relations between the Belgians and the Dutch. It then describes the mobilization and the difficulties the Belgian army experienced with discipline and morale, especially the issue of leaves. It ends with an exam- ination of the information the Belgians were getting from Germany and the alerts that resulted.

Diplomacy

Theoretically, under Belgian ‘independence,’ the Belgians could not have any relations with the Allies that they refused to the Germans. This meant that the Belgian General Staff could not share military secrets with the Allies and not with the Germans. Nevertheless, the rules were bent somewhat and the Bel- gian military still showed favoritism towards the Allies. This is illustrated by a 1937 report regarding “the attitude of the Belgian General Staff towards the

1 Known in France as the ‘Drôle de Guerre’ or ‘Funny War’ and in Britain and the U.S. as the ‘Phony War.’

French Military Attaché, Colonel Laurent, and myself … ” from British military attaché Lieutenant Colonel Paris to Sir Noël Charles, the chargé d’affaires at the embassy. Belgian chief of staff General Van den Bergen

agreed that Colonel Laurent should do a tour of the Eastern and Northern defensive systems and smilingly concurred that the visit should take place in September, as this would be before the arrival of the new resi- dent German military attaché in October … . I conclude from the forego- ing incidents that the Belgian General Staff, while still holding to their avowed policy of strict equality of treatment to foreign Military Attachés, have reverted to their former methods and are treating my French col- league and myself in a distinctly favoured manner.2

Earlier that year, Major (as he was then) Paris reported receiving from the Bel- gian General Staff two “questionnaires” addressed to their military attaché in London “with the request that I should beg the War Office to give full replies … .” The interpretation by the British diplomats and soldier in Brussels was that the Belgians were essentially still conducting staff talks, only in a new fashion. Sir Esmond Ovey, the ambassador, believed the Belgians were acting thus to give the lie to Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak’s declaration that the era of staff talks was over. The Belgians were indicating that they wished to maintain the old contacts while keeping them secret from other parties. In fact, at the king’s instigation, clandestine exchanges of military information between France and Belgium via the French military attaché in Brussels had been going on from October 1936 and would continue until the German invasion (when relations became overt), intensifying after the January 1940 alert. The Belgians, for their part, passed documents to the French, including information on the Ant- werp and Liège fortifications, on the Antwerp-Namur (K-W) line, maps of the Belgian deployment on the Meuse and Albert Canal, and information on usable Belgian roads. French military attaché Colonel Laurent was allowed to visit military works under a false identity. A January 1937 British document regarding Belgian requests for munitions from the United Kingdom indicates that the Cabinet “authorize[d] conversations between the Belgian Military Attaché and the War Office in order to ascertain exactly what the Belgian request amounted to” and try to fulfil it.3

2 D.K. Paris to Sir Noël Charles, Brussels, August 20, 1937, in MRA-AMB 80/3/XIII, #228-229. 3 Sir Esmond Ovey to Anthony Eden, Brussels, May 4, 1937, in MRA-AMB 80/3/XIII, #190; D.K. Paris to Sir Esmond Ovey, Brussels, May 4, 1937, in MRA-AMB 80/3/XIII, #191; Keyes, p. 115; Belgian Military Archives (SGRS-S/A), p. 87; ECNRS, p. 35; “Extract from Cabinet Conclusions 1(37) of January 13th, 1937” in MRA-AMB 80/3/XIII, #20.