OVERVIEW OF PARTY DEVELOPMENT IN

Compiled November 2004 by Carter Center Intern Simona Foltyn

This brief overview is based on a complication of selected sources and serves as an introduction to party development in Mozambique. For extended analysis and background, please read Emerging Pluralist Politics in Mozambique by Giovanni M. Carbone in the next section of this briefing book.

Frelimo

Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (Frelimo) was established in 1962 as an anti- colonial movement against the Portuguese. Backed by and , the liberation front was essentially a combination of cadres in the south of the country and guerrilla operations in what is today the northernmost province Cabo Delgado. When Mozambique gained independence in 1975, Frelimo enjoyed widespread support as the unchallenged leader in the liberation struggle. In 1977, Frelimo adopted a Marxist-Leninist ideology, including the Leninist notion of a vanguard party, which substantially influenced the structural development of the party. After its triumph, Frelimo set out to transform the country. Systematic privilege was accorded to the urban and industrialized areas, while the rural communities were neglected and exposed to compulsory modernization, including forced resettlement and destruction of traditional structures. Frelimo’s exclusive policies alienated the rural population and created fertile grounds for anti- Frelimo sentiments. For about two decades, Mozambique was a singe-party-state and Frelimo was able to develop its organizational structure and effectively established itself at the national and local level. Party and state structures overlapped and opposition parties were successfully kept out of the political system1. took over the leadership over the state in 1986, after the first president was killed in a plane crash.

With the end of the , Frelimo abandoned its socialist ideology. As Chissano began peace talks with Renamo to end the civil war, Frelimo passed the 1990 Constitution, which provided for a multi-party system. The civil war ended in October 1992 with the Rome General Peace Accords and Frelimo faced new challenges in the light of the upcoming 1994 elections2. The previously urban and elite based party had to rethink it strategy to address certain regions of the country as well as sections of the population it had previously neglected. Frelimo’s effort to expand its supporter base represented a certain shift in the party’s identity and was not welcomed by ideologically more conservative members.3

The authority of former combatants of the anti-colonial struggle continues to remain significant at the core units of the party until today, and the decision making process is

1 Giovanni M. Carbone. Emerging pluralist politics in Mozambique: The Frelimo-Renamo party system. 2 Weinstein, Jeremy. Mozambique: A fading UN success story. Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, Jan. 1 2002. 3 Manning, Carrie. Post-Conflict Democracy: The Case of Mozambique. Democratization, Vol. 8 N. 2, pp. 140-168 2004 MOZAMBIQUE E LECTION M ISSION B RIEFING B OOK conducted in a top-down fashion. Nonetheless, the recent years have been marked by the emergence of new technocrats in government and of an influential parliamentary wing. The newer leadership figures seem much more pragmatic than the old guard, and are more open to cooperation with other organizations4. The party also has a quota system to integrate younger generations of outsiders and a 30% quota for women on the party lists, but yet ensures the dominance of conservative majority in all party organs. Thus it is not surprising that 10 of 11 candidate lists in the provincial constituencies of the 2004 elections are headed by members of the Political Commission, the most powerful organ within the party. The only exception is Prime Minister , who heads the central province of Zambezia and who is considered one of the party’s rising stars.

After President Joaquim Chissano announced he would not stand in the 2004 elections, the leadership question has been one of the most important issues on the party agenda. There has been a noticeable increase in activity among ministers and senior government and party officials concerning service delivery and fighting corruption. Party officials have also made an effort to increase their presence at the local level to fight the negative image that surprised them in previous elections.

At the 2002 Party Congress, , an important historic leader and chief of the party’s parliamentary wing, was selected as Frelimo’s new secretary general and candidate for the 2004 elections. A short list of candidates was chosen by the Political Commission and later approved by the Central Committee and Party Congress. Although the selection process followed certain institutional procedures, it nevertheless demonstrated that Frelimo’s political culture continues to be centralized and influenced by its previous single-party status. Chissano will remain president of the party, but his decision to leave the presidential candidacy to a new was welcomed by many party members.

The 1999 elections were much closer than Frelimo had expected, and the party recognized that improvements and modernization in the party apparatus as well as increased activity at the grassroots level were necessary to ensure its survival in a multi- party system. The party has further invested in research and new technology to analyze voting patterns and public opinion to gain votes from the opposition.

Frelimo enjoys support among different ethnicities located in the very northern and southern provinces. The country is divided in three broad cultural and linguistic bands composed by different ethnic groups. This regional division was reinforced by socioeconomic differences between the three areas and, consequently, largely overlapped with the political division between Frelimo and Renamo. The 1994 and 1999 elections were marked by ethnic rivalries within Frelimo, and the Fifth and Sixth Party Congress attempted to make the party more representative in terms of ethnicity and region.5 It seems in the 2004 pre-elections period, however, Frelimo has made an effort to acquire a

4 Wood, Geoffrey. Democratization in Mozambique. Democratization, Vol.6, N.2, Summer 1999, pp. 156- 170

5 Manning, Carrie. Post-Conflict Democracy: The Case of Mozambique. Democratization, Vol. 8 N. 2, pp. 140-168

2004 MOZAMBIQUE E LECTION M ISSION B RIEFING B OOK more national rather than regional character. None of its top candidates for the 2004 elections are natives of the province they run for, apparently an attempt to counter allegations of tribalism and regionalism.

Renamo

The Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) first emerged as a Rhodesian effort to undermine Frelimo and independent Mozambique by recruiting discontented Mozambicans who had been antagonized by the ruling party’s policies. With ’s independence in1980, took over as the main financial sponsor of the movement. The 1984 officially ended South Africa’s support and led towards Renamo developing into its own organization under the leadership of .

The guerrilla movement was able to operate effectively in the central provinces of the country, where it filled the political vacuum left by Frelimo, and managed to establish its supporter base among the local rural communities. After its disconnection from South Africa, Renamo initiated a coercive recruitment campaign to increase its territorial control. Many people, including many high-level officials, who were absorbed into the party through this method, remained part of the movement even after the end of the war, mostly because they were promised benefits for their services.

During the civil war, Renamo’s tactics were based on terror and intimidation and the movement had no particular ideology, besides being the exact opposite of Frelimo. When the Peace Accords were signed in 1992, Renamo’s starting conditions to transform into a political party were all but ideal. Renamo’s guerrillas had military background and lacked the necessary education and experience to fill the newly arising administrative positions. By the early 1990s, the rebel movement had a very skeletal administrative and political wing and little ideological content that could serve as the basis for the party’s development. These factors made it hard for Renamo to operate within the new democratic institutions established after the peace agreement.

Although Renamo has made some improvements in its party apparatus since 1992, its transformation into a well-organized political party is incomplete. One factor that complicated Renamo’s effective transition was Dhlakama’s unchallenged and personalistic control of the party and his effort to undermine the development of a more democratic party structure. Many of the militant leaders remained in power and Dhlakama has been rewarding loyalty and allegiance instead of supporting the rise of a new, motivated political elite that would bring in new ideas to contribute to the party’s transformation. Foreign donors have provided funds for educational programs, but they complain that Dhlakama refuses to send people with potential to higher-level courses. Consequently, the party continues to lack a layer of competent people below the top who could rise to become potential future leaders.

Since the creation of the Renamo parliamentary wing, it has been an alternative source of internal power, especially since Dhlakama has run for the presidency, but not for a parliamentary seat. Raul Domingos emerged as an influential and visible figure between

2004 MOZAMBIQUE E LECTION M ISSION B RIEFING B OOK 1994 and 2000 during his time as the head of the parliamentary group, but was expelled by Dhlakama in late 2000. It was widely believed that Dhlakama viewed Domingos as a threat in the competition for leadership in the light of the upcoming 2001 Party Congress. There were several other similar cases of marginalization of prominent figures that followed Domingos’ expulsion. Domingos went on to form the Party for Peace, Democracy and Development (PDD) and is standing is his party’s presidential candidate in 2004. The systematic pattern of undermining prominent Renamo figures culminated in mid-2002, when Dhlakama took over as secretary general and dismissed the Political Commission on the ground of “unpatriotic and undemocratic behavior”, only to elect a new one after purging some moderate members. 6

At the party’s first post-war congress in 2001, changes were introduced that gave the party more of a mature organizational structure and laid the foundation for a more broadly based decision making process. A 10 member, -based Political Committee was established, which will mostly consist of former secretary-generals and is meant to create an advisory body that will reduce Dhlakama’s isolation. The Party Congress decided the Committee would meet on a weekly basis and would be attended by the secretary general and the head of the parliamentary group. Moreover, a 60 member National Council was elected and appointed to restructure the party at local levels and to improve party organization. The Congress also agreed to set up councils at district and provincial levels as well as a National Judicial Council that would be charged with internal party regulation.7 Dhlakama was re-elected as the party leader and presidential candidate for 2004 without any real competition.

The Congress confirmed that preparing for the 2003 local elections would be one of the top party priorities in 2002. After boycotting the 1998 municipal elections, the former rebel movement recognized that its nonparticipation was a major mistake. Renamo obviously underestimated the patronage and power at the local level, especially as the economic power of local authorities had substantially increased. The Renamo Electoral Union won five elections for municipal president and the majority of seats in four municipal assemblies.

Donors and others have urged Renamo to adopt a more constructive role as an opposition and the present alternative programs instead of just criticizing Frelimo policies8. However, this suggestion has been rejected by Renamo-leadership, and the party tends to fall back to its pre-1992 strategy of occasional war threats, intimidation and lack of constructive political arguments that are in accordance with a consistent party ideology.

6 Mozambique Political Process Bulletin. December 2001 7 Mozambique Political Process Bulletin. December 2001 8 Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin. April 2001 2004 MOZAMBIQUE E LECTION M ISSION B RIEFING B OOK