COMPLETING EUROPE BY DAMON WILSON Georgia’s Path to NATO FEBRUARY 2014 Six years after the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, unprecedented turmoil and violence in Ukraine is Becoming NATO’s Ally reinforcing doubts about the future trajectory of Europe’s East. In 2008, many Western leaders series analyzing the future of NATO enlargement This issue brief is the first in an Atlantic Council concluded that the Kremlin would work to prevent and those nations that aspire to membership. The NATO enlargement to other post-Soviet states. Russia’s series is part of the Council’s programming on more recent strong-arm tactics to dissuade Ukraine and other Eastern Partnership states from pursuing Completing Europe, which seeks to reinvigorate integration with the European Union (EU) indicate the policy debate in North America and Europe that Moscow is just as committed to obstructing on advancing Euro-Atlantic integration and further progress toward a Europe whole and free and democratic reforms in Southeast Europe and preventing any more of its neighbors from joining the Europe’s East. West.

Against this backdrop, many European and American the area that remained consistent and worked best, in policymakers are ambivalent about, if not cool to, the large part thanks to Defense Minister Irakli Alasania’s idea of further enlargement of either NATO or the EU effective leadership. As Saakashvili’s term came to an as they grapple with challenges at home and see only end, Georgian Dream also won presidential elections problems among the aspirants. in October 2013, after which Ivanishvili left government replacing himself with Irakli Garibashvili, Yet if security in Europe’s East becomes premised on Georgia’s current prime minister. Moscow’s ability to dominate and intimidate its neighbors, Western allies are in store for a shockingly Since the 2008 war, Georgia has been an “A+” NATO disruptive set of security challenges on their borders student. It has implemented serious defense reforms, in the coming decade. Rather ensuring inevitable, even continues to ensure its armed forces are interoperable if slow, progress toward greater integration is the best with NATO, is developing its defensive capabilities, and course to provide predictable neighbors and borders in Europe’s East. To restore a sense of stability and deployment in NATO’s post-International Security security on the continent’s frontiers, NATO allies Assistancehas recommitted Force (ISAF)to a significant Afghanistan caveat-free mission. At the should begin with a concerted effort to ensure the same time, under both recent governments, Georgia credibility of their commitment to Georgia that it will has managed to calm its relationship with Russia. This become a member. has been despite continued Russian provocations, most notably the erection of fences along the Georgia Today administrative boundary lines of the territories occupied in the 2008 war, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, power through the ballot box in October 2012 when and the gradual encroachment onto territory businessGeorgia experienced leader Bidzina its Ivanishvili’sfirst democratic Georgian transfer Dream of controlled by the state of Georgia. defeated President Mikheil Saakashvili’s United National Movement (UNM) decisively in parliamentary Against this backdrop, Alasania came to Washington elections. While governing priorities differed dramatically during the twelve month cohabitation invasion of Georgia, and delivered a clear message: between then-Prime Minister Ivanishvili and then- NATOin August enlargement 2013, exactly will fivenot continueyears after without the Russian US President Saakashvili, defense and security policy was leadership. He’s right.

Damon Wilson is the executive vice president of the Atlantic Council. Occupation and Enlargement It is understandable that, today, many allies remain ambivalent about future enlargement. The current If allied leaders aim to make aspirants—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, any progress on the occupied Macedonia, and Montenegro—all face serious challenges. But disturbingly from Tbilisi’s perspective territories over the long term, is that most policymakers within the Alliance accept they need progress on the the inevitability of states of the Western Balkans joining the Alliance. However, despite the commitment enlargement agenda in the at the 2008 NATO Bucharest summit that Georgia will near term to change current become a member, many allied capitals harbor deep suspicions about whether this statement is credible. calculations.

To their credit, leaders such as President Barack But to turn this veneer into fundamentals, Georgia Obama and NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh must do more. The Garibashvili government must not 1 Rasmussen have stood by the Alliance commitment. become a hostage of the past by prosecuting former Yet many believe that Georgia’s membership in NATO is simply not viable as long as Russian forces occupy an opposition force. There continue to be signs of Georgian territory. officials as a means to eliminate Saakashvili’s UNM as Georgia, so the argument goes, cannot possibly with UNM, including at the local levels in advance of politically-motivated pressure on officials associated become a NATO member until Russia’s occupation of bellwether local elections this spring. Challenging Abkhazia and South Ossetia ends. Otherwise, the UNM as a legitimate political force will undermine the government’s ability to advance a positive agenda for the future and complicate consideration of how to Alliance would be importing an inevitable conflict. bring Georgia closer to the Alliance or the EU. Moscow the ability to determine Georgia’s future with theThat Alliance. logic is fundamentallyThis only incentivizes flawed inMoscow that it tocedes to On the other hand, competitive local elections this maintain the status quo. Indeed, Russia’s successful June, in which UNM as well as other parties effort to marginalize the Geneva talks on Abkhazia represented in parliament compete, can pave the way and South Ossetia (diplomatic talks begun in 2008 to for a genuine debate on the future of enlargement address the disputed regions as part of the when NATO foreign ministers assess the aspirants that same month and then NATO leaders convene in Wales underscores Moscow is pursuing this approach. for the September 2014 NATO summit. international agreement to end the fighting in Georgia) If allied leaders aim to make any progress on the To be a viable NATO candidate, Georgia must continue occupied territories over the long term, they need to build credible democratic institutions and practices, progress on the enlargement agenda in the near term a vibrant civil society, and an independent press. It to change current calculations. must also continue to implement all the reforms necessary to meet Alliance standards and act as if it is A Viable Candidate already an ally. Of course, there can be no viable strategy to welcome Furthermore, by managing relations with Moscow Georgia into NATO without a credible democracy emerging in the Caucasus. Georgia has the allies that it can be a reliable security partner. This fundamentals of democracy now: the current meansresponsibly, continuing Georgia to restrainis building the confidence rhetoric, avoid among being government was elected democratically with a strong provoked, and seek to normalize commercial and public mandate; the political opposition is credible and cultural relations. But it also means not allowing vibrant; the judiciary is less pliant than in the past; Russian security services and their proxies free reign and the media environment is lively. within Georgia.

1 As President Barack Obama said on Jan 30, 2012, when he hosted Georgia is also facing the reality that Berlin has been Saakashvili at the White House, “The United States will continue to most hesitant about its NATO aspirations and support Georgia’s aspirations to ultimately become a member of NATO.” therefore is planning to embed Georgian forces in White House, “Remarks by President Obama and President Saakashvili of German units in future deployments to help build trust Georgia after Bilateral Meeting,” January 30, 2012, http://www. among the nations and their armed forces.

and-president-saakashvili-georgia-after-bilatera. whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/30/remarks-president-obama-

2 ATLANTIC COUNCIL Envisioning Membership Other overseas French departments which enjoyed Against this backdrop, NATO leaders should invite the comparable status to Algeria were also excluded. The leaders of the candidate countries to participate in the Wales summit. Such a move would underscore the geography of where the treaty applies. point is that there is a precedent in defining the tough reforms. NATO leaders also face a decision of whetherviability ofto continuedwelcome Georgia enlargement into the and Membership the benefits of To be a viable NATO Action Plan, or MAP, NATO’s program to help prepare candidate, Georgia must nations for membership. continue to build credible MAP is not membership. MAP neither leads to democratic institutions and membership on any time frame (Albania participated in MAP for ten years before joining the Alliance), nor practices, a vibrant civil does it guarantee the inevitability of membership (see society, and an independent the case of Macedonia). press. Nonetheless, the lesson of the 2008 Bucharest summit is that NATO leaders must be able to imagine Georgia Similarly, from NATO’s inception, only part of a divided as an ally at some point in the future if they are to Germany enjoyed NATO protection. The zones of green light Georgia into the process to prepare it to Germany formerly occupied by American, British, and become an ally. The core question therefore is: even if French forces became the Federal Republic of Germany Georgia gets the reform fundamentals right and meets and a founding member of the Alliance. Despite this NATO standards, how can NATO extend its security division, leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany guarantee to a nation which has 20 percent of its territory occupied? commitment to a united Germany.4 Furthermore, allies madelike Konrad clear at Adenauer the time didof Turkey’s not sacrifice accession the in 1952 NATO’s 1995 study on enlargement notes that that the security commitment also extended to the resolution of ethnic or territorial disputes “would be a bulk of Turkish territory considered to be in Asia. factor in determining whether to invite a state to join the Alliance.” Notably, however, the Alliance’s study These examples are not strictly parallel to Georgia’s did not adopt this or any other factors as rigid criteria situation of course. Nonetheless, they provide

“enlargement will be decided on a case-by-case basis.”2 Georgia today. A democratic Georgia that otherwise to join the Alliance. Rather, it affirms that meetshistorical the precedentsstandards of to NATO guide membership a flexible approach could be to NATO must return to several historical precedents to welcomed into the Alliance with the understanding navigate to the future of an allied Georgia. The that Article 5 and the Washington Treaty would not be commitment among allies that an attack on one will be applicable to the occupied territories of Abkhazia and considered an attack on all is enshrined in Article 5 of South Ossetia. Alliance members would continue to the Washington Treaty, which established the Alliance recognize Georgia’s territorial integrity. in 1949. Even then, American diplomats were concerned that European entanglements would Accepting this principle, even well before Georgia become a security liability for the United States. Georgia (assuming it makes progress on reforms) a MAPqualifies in the for near membership, term. MAP would would pave then the provide way to the grant the security guarantee will hold, specifying the framework to further prepare Georgia for Article 6 was crafted to specifically limit areas where treaty’s applicability to Europe and North America and membership. “islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.” At the same time, this approach would restore the After much debate, the treaty negotiators also acceded credibility of the Bucharest summit commitment that to France’s request that the treaty include Algeria as it Georgia will become a member of NATO. was fully integrated into French structures, but rejected a similar Belgian request to include Congo.3

highly prosperous and secure West Germany would exert an irresistible 4 Adenauer presented a coherent theory about national reunification: that a 2 NATO, “Study on NATO Enlargement,” September 3, 1995, http://www. “magnetic attraction” on East Germans. William Patch, “Konrad Adenauer . and the Cold War,” Woodrow Wilson Center, April 4, 2006, http://www. 3 In 1963, the North Atlantic Council declared the Algeria provision wilsoncenter.org/article/conference-report-western-integration-german- nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24733.htm inapplicable. .

unification-and-the-cold-war-the-adenauer-era

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 3 Prospects for Reconciliation They were wrong. The security, stability, and In turn, the viability of Georgia’s NATO aspirations predictability of embedding the Baltic states within offers the best prospect for making progress on NATO is what has allowed for the normalization in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. For a Georgia that joins relations between these former Soviet republics and the Alliance while also pursing normal ties with Russia. At that time, each of these nations also had Moscow, Russia over time is more likely to reconcile to Russian troops stationed on their territory. Today, the reality that the occupied territories will never be Estonia has a border treaty with Russia, Latvia is widely recognized as independent states. cooperating with Russia on facilitating transit to Afghanistan, and Vladimir Putin has welcomed Such a scenario also opens the prospect for more direct Lithuania’s leaders in Moscow. This outcome would not engagement with the people of Abkhazia and South have been possible without US leadership, as well as the Ossetia. A secure and prosperous Georgia will be active engagement of Germany and the Nordic attractive to Abkhazians and South Ossetians, who are countries. deeply reliant on Russian subsidies and, despite their Moscow-midwifed independence, bristle under Russia’s Furthermore, in light of the growing concern about political and military domination. North Caucasus, a Georgia in NATO could be a net plus If Russia believes that its continued occupation would forjihadist Russia fighters in terms transiting of containing between violent Syria extremism. and the prevent Georgia’s NATO membership, then that occupation threatens to become permanent. By imaging a democratic Georgia within NATO and welcoming the nation into MAP, the Alliance can help In fact, today’s ambiguity is what provides for a Georgia consolidate reforms, strengthen the Alliance, potentially combustible situation. Moscow’s interest in and help stabilize the broader Black Sea region. a successful Sochi Winter Olympics has dissuaded European security, long thought to be the backwater of Russian authorities from seeking to destabilize global security challenges, has returned to the Georgia. However, after the Olympics and the perceived forefront as a newly emboldened and revanchist Russia setback of their interests in Ukraine, and in the run-up under Vladimir Putin seeks to take advantage of the to the next NATO summit in September 2014, some in ambiguity casting a shadow over Europe’s East. Moscow may see a window of opportunity to return to an old playbook of raising tensions in the region to A clear and coordinated transatlantic strategy toward “remind” those in allied capitals that investing in the region, including keeping an extended hand to Georgia is too risky. Russia as part of a vision of a Europe whole and free, can help ensure near-term stability and security. Stability and Enlargement Inviting Georgia to begin the MAP process is the best Ambiguity, including no decision, brings risks. Granting starting point to achieve this and will require creative Georgia a MAP and starting a process that can lead to thinking, effective diplomacy, and US leadership. membership will help stabilize the region.

If Russia believes that its continued occupation would prevent Georgia’s NATO membership, then that occupation threatens to become permanent.

During debates on NATO enlargement in the 1990s, policymakers in allied capitals, including Washington, scoffed at the idea of the Baltic states joining the Alliance, arguing that such a step was too provocative and destabilizing.

4 ATLANTIC COUNCIL Atlantic Council Board of Directors CHAIRMAN Thomas M. Culligan Wendy W. Makins John C. Whitehead *Jon M. Huntsman, Jr. Nelson Cunningham Mian M. Mansha David A. Wilson Ivo H. Daalder William E. Mayer Maciej Witucki CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL Gregory R. Dahlberg Eric D.K. Melby Mary C. Yates ADVISORY BOARD *Paula J. Dobriansky Franklin C. Miller Dov S. Zakheim Brent Scowcroft Christopher J. Dodd *Judith A. Miller HONORARY DIRECTORS Conrado Dornier *Alexander V. Mirtchev PRESIDENT AND CEO David C. Acheson Patrick J. Durkin Obie L. Moore *Frederick Kempe Madeleine K. Albright Thomas J. Edelman *George E. Moose James A. Baker, III VICE CHAIRS Thomas J. Egan, Jr. Georgette Mosbacher Harold Brown *Robert J. Abernethy *Stuart E. Eizenstat Bruce Mosler Frank C. Carlucci, III *Richard Edelman Julie Finley Thomas R. Nides Robert M. Gates *C. Boyden Gray Lawrence P. Fisher, II Franco Nuschese Michael G. Mullen *Richard L. Lawson Alan H. Fleischmann Sean O’Keefe William J. Perry *Virginia A. Mulberger Michèle Flournoy Hilda Ochoa-Brillembourg Colin L. Powell *W. DeVier Pierson *Ronald M. Freeman Ahmet Oren Condoleezza Rice *John Studzinski *Robert S. Gelbard Ana Palacio Edward L. Rowny *Sherri W. Goodman Thomas R. Pickering TREASURER James R. Schlesinger *Stephen J. Hadley *Andrew Prozes *Brian C. McK. George P. Shultz Mikael Hagström Arnold L. Punaro Henderson John W. Warner Ian Hague Kirk A. Radke SECRETARY William H. Webster Frank Haun Joseph W. Ralston *Walter B. Slocombe Rita E. Hauser Teresa M. Ressel LIFETIME DIRECTORS DIRECTORS Michael V. Hayden Jeffrey A. Rosen Carol C. Adelman Stephane Abrial Annette Heuser Charles O. Rossotti Lucy Wilson Benson Odeh Aburdene Marten H.A. van Heuven Stanley O. Roth Daniel J. Callahan, III Peter Ackerman Jonas Hjelm Robert Rowland Brian Dailey Timothy D. Adams Karl Hopkins Harry Sachinis Kenneth W. Dam John Allen Robert Hormats William O. Schmieder Lacey Neuhaus Dorn *Michael Ansari *Mary L. Howell John P. Schmitz Stanley Ebner Richard L. Armitage Robert E. Hunter Anne-Marie Slaughter Chas W. Freeman *Adrienne Arsht Wolfgang Ischinger Alan J. Spence Carlton W. Fulford, Jr. Reuben Jeffery, III John M. Spratt, Jr. Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr. Elizabeth F. Bagley Robert Jeffrey James Stavridis John A. Gordon David D. Aufhauser Ralph Bahna *James L. Jones, Jr. Richard J.A. Steele Barbara Hackman Sheila Bair George A. Joulwan James B. Steinberg Franklin Stephen R. Kappes *Paula Stern Robert L. Hutchings *Thomas L. Blair Maria Pica Karp Robert J. Stevens Roger Kirk *Rafic Bizri Julia Chang Bloch Francis J. Kelly, Jr. John S. Tanner Geraldine S. Kunstadter Francis Bouchard Zalmay M. Khalilzad Peter J. Tanous James P. Mccarthy Myron Brilliant Robert M. Kimmitt *Ellen O. Tauscher Jack N. Merritt *R. Nicholas Burns Henry A. Kissinger Karen Tramontano Philip A. Odeen *Richard R. Burt Peter Kovarcik Clyde C. Tuggle William Y. Smith Michael Calvey Franklin D. Kramer Paul Twomey Marjorie Scardino James E. Cartwright Philip Lader Melanne Verveer William H. Taft, IV Ahmed Charai David Levy Enzo Viscusi Ronald P. Verdicchio Wesley K. Clark Henrik Liljegren Charles F. Wald Carl E. Vuono John Craddock *Jan M. Lodal Jay Walker Togo D. West, Jr. David W. Craig *George Lund Michael F. Walsh R. James Woolsey Tom Craren *John D. Macomber Mark R. Warner * Executive Committee Members *Ralph D. Crosby, Jr. Izzat Majeed J. Robinson West

List as of January 17, 2014 The Atlantic Council is a nonpartisan organization that ­promotes constructive US leadership and engagement in ­international ­affairs based on the central role of the Atlantic community in ­meeting today’s global ­challenges.

© 2014 The Atlantic Council of the United States. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Atlantic Council, except in the case of brief quotations in news articles, critical articles, or reviews. Please direct inquiries to:

1030 15th Street, NW, 12th Floor, Washington, DC 20005 (202) 778-4952, AtlanticCouncil.org