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Lacan and Philosophy The New Generation re.press Lorenzo Chiesa Lacan and Philosophy Anamnesis Anamnesis means remembrance or reminiscence, the collection and re- collection of what has been lost, forgotten, or effaced. It is therefore a matter of the very old, of what has made us who we are. But anamnesis is also a work that transforms its subject, always producing something new. To recollect the old, to produce the new: that is the task of Anamnesis. a re.press series Lacan and Philosophy: The New Generation Lorenzo Chiesa, editor re.press Melbourne 2014 re.press PO Box 40, Prahran, 3181, Melbourne, Australia http://www.re-press.org © the individual contributors and re.press 2014 This work is ‘Open Access’, published under a creative commons license which means that you are free to copy, distribute, display, and perform the work as long as you clearly attribute the work to the authors, that you do not use this work for any commercial gain in any form whatso- ever and that you in no way alter, transform or build on the work outside of its use in normal aca- demic scholarship without express permission of the author (or their executors) and the publisher of this volume. For any reuse or distribution, you must make clear to others the license terms of this work. For more information see the details of the creative commons licence at this website: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Lacan and philosophy : the new generation / edited by Lorenzo Chiesa. 9780992373412 (paperback) Series: Anamnesis. Subjects: Lacan, Jacques, 1901-1981. Philosophy. Chiesa, Lorenzo, editor. 190 Designed and Typeset by A&R This book is produced sustainably using plantation timber, and printed in the destination market reduc- ing wastage and excess transport. Contents Editorial Introduction Towards a New Philosophical-Psychoanalytic Materialism and Realism 7 Lorenzo Chiesa Realism in Psychoanalysis 21 Alenka Zupančič Accesses to the Real: Lacan, Monotheism, and Predestination 35 Felix Ensslin On Deep History and Lacan 63 Adrian Johnston Structure and Genesis in Derrida and Lacan: Animality and the Empirical Sciences 85 Michael Lewis Jacques Lacan’s Onto-Graphy 115 Matteo Bonazzi The Subject of Logic: The Object (Lacan with Kant and Frege) 133 Guillaume Collett Metapsychology of Freedom: Symptom and Subjectivity in Lacan 149 Raoul Moati Wounds of Testimony and Martyrs of the Unconscious: Lacan and Pasolini contra the Discourse of Freedom 165 Lorenzo Chiesa The Field and Function of the Slave in the Écrits 193 Justin Clemens 5 6 Lacan and Philosophy The School and the Act 203 Oliver Feltham Lacking Subjects and the Subject of Lack: Basaglia and Lacan 221 Alvise Sforza Tarabochia Contributors 239 Editorial Introduction: Towards a New Philosophical-Psychoanalytic Materialism and Realism Lorenzo Chiesa I am attacking philosophy? That’s greatly exaggerated! (Lacan, Seminar XVII) I Much has been written about Lacan’s dialogue with philosophy as well as the reasons for his dismissal of it. Commentators often rightly argue that nowhere is psychoanalysis more vehemently opposed to the love of wisdom than in the theory of discourses formulated starting from Seminar XVII (1969-1970). Here Lacan strictly associates philosophy with the discourse of the master: a philoso - pher is not a master but the one who inspired in the master the ‘desire to know’ and, in doing so, paved the way for the discourse of the University, the contem- porary figure of mastery that has appropriated the practical, almost animal, knowledge of the slave by means of a—epistemological and political—theft. In- sofar as the master can be regarded as the ‘other side’ [l’envers] of psychoanaly- sis, which is, in spite of an as yet embryonic development, the only discourse that can function as his ‘counterpoint’, philosophy (by now fully phagocyticised by the University) cannot, and should not, be resuscitated. But Lacan importantly adds that, in bringing the discourse of the master to a close, psychoanalysis also remains symmetrical to it. For this, moving from the theorisations originating in its clinical practice (as a new servile form of know-how), psychoanalysis ultimate- ly ‘extend[s] the philosophical discourse very much beyond the point at which it was most properly effaced’. Such a paradoxical prolongation does not merely ‘transform’ philosophy, in the sense of keeping its tradition alive, but promotes a ‘different discourse’ that is, nonetheless, philosophically problematic.1 II Against an increasing interest in Lacan’s ‘anti-philosophical’ vocation wit- nessed by both psychoanalytic secondary literature and the independent work 1. Lacan 2006, pp. 20-24, p. 99, p. 146. 7 8 Editorial Introduction of well-known thinkers (in primis Alain Badiou’s)—which is as such not mistak- en yet should be adequately dialecticised—the present collection of essays pri- marily focuses on the fact that the condemnation of philosophy expressed in the theory of discourses goes together with the elaboration of a new ontology, or better, a para-ontology. This rather unpredictable connection is already en- visaged in Seminar XVII but becomes fully evident only in Seminar XX (1972- 1973). If, on the one hand, philosophy epitomises the discourse of the m’être, of the delusional belief of being the master [maître] of myself, or, more precisely, of being-me-to-myself [m’être à moi même],2 on the other, psychoanalysis should replace this old ontology of mastery—which amounts to an ‘I-cracy’ [je-cratie], ‘the myth of the ideal I, of the I that masters, of the I whereby at least some - thing is identical to itself, namely, the speaker’3—with a discourse of the par- être, a discourse on being as para-being, as ‘being beside’ [être à côté].4 What is para-ontology? First and foremost, it is a lateral ontology concerned with the contingency and materiality of the signifier (qua letter) and, consequently, of the linguistic laws that rest on it. Two passages from Seminar XX perfectly capture this crucial point: No signifier is produced [se produit] as eternal. That is no doubt what, rath- er than qualifying it as arbitrary, Saussure could have formulated. It would have been better to qualify the signifier with the category of contingency. The signifier repudiates the category of the eternal and, nevertheless, odd- ly enough [singulièrement], it is intrinsically. Ontology is what highlighted in language the use of the copula, isolating it as a signifier. To dwell on the verb ‘to be’—a verb that is not even, in the complete field of the diversity of languages, employed in a way we could qualify universal—to produce it as such is a highly risky enterprise. In or - der to exorcise it, it might perhaps suffice to suggest that when we say about anything whatsoever that it is what it is, nothing in any way obliges us to isolate the verb ‘to be’. That is pronounced ‘it is what it is’ [c’est ce que c’est], and it could just as well be written, ‘idizwadidiz’ [seskecé]. In this use of the copula, we would see nothing at all. We would see nothing whatsoever if a discourse, the discourse of the master, m’être, didn’t emphasize the verb ‘to be’ [être]. (Lacan 1998, p. 40, p. 31 [my emphases]) In other words, the signifier is utterly contingent, and its true contingency— which is far from being reducible to the linguistic criterion of arbitrariness 5—its para-ontological status, can only emerge, beneath the discourse of mastery epito- mised by traditional ontology (i.e. the fundamental fantasy of Western thought), as the domain of the material letter. 2. Ibid., p. 152. 3. Ibid., p. 63. 4. Lacan 1998, p. 44. 5. Lacan would relate linguistic arbitrariness to the domain of theautomaton , that is, probabilistic chance within the network of signifiers, as opposed to the field of tyche, the absolute contingency of the void of structure to be understood as its material cause (that is, as the cause of the very network of sig- nifiers). I have developed this argument in ‘Hyperstructuralism’s Necessity of Contingency’ (Chiesa 2010a, pp. 159-177). Lorenzo Chiesa 9 Lacan also phrases this same argument in more conventional philosophical parlance when, in a succinct but original reading of Aristotle, he distinguishes para-ontological quiddity from ontological being:6 the former as a factical ‘what that is’, or ‘that which it is’ [ce que ça est] cannot be confined to the latter as a ‘what would have been produced if that which must have been tout-court had come into Be- ing’ [ce qui se serait produit si était venu à être, tout-court, ce qui était à être], that is, to a linguistic dimension of being, or better a hegemonic dit-mension, which always by necessity—by definition—involves the (failed) submission of contingency to the order of the Master (‘it’s quite simply being at someone’s heel, being at some- one’s beck and call’).7 And yet, obviously, rendering the ‘idizwadidiz’ [seskecé] in the guise of quiddity runs itself the risk of turning para-ontology again into some form of necessary ontology, the ontology of the necessity of literal contingency, whereby the anti-philosophical ‘exorcism’ of the letter might after all prove in- sufficient. Lacan is well aware of this risk, for instance when, in Seminar XVII, he reminds us that ‘from every academic statement by any philosophy whatso- ever, even by a philosophy that strictly speaking could be pointed to as being the most opposed to it—namely, if it were philosophy, Lacan’s discourse—the I-cra - cy emerges, irreducibly’.8 However, he is nonetheless equally aware of the fact that he cannot avoid it (or, similarly, that he cannot completely dispel the impres- sion that his psychoanalytic discourse remains also, on some level, a discourse of Ur-mastery).