Brucker's Practice I

CHAPTER TWO

BRUCKER’S PRACTICE I: HIS EXPOSITION OF BRUNO1

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Brucker paid special attention to Bruno and his philosophy, because he regarded Bruno as an innovator of eclectic philosophy. Nevertheless, Brucker scholars have not examined his exposition of Bruno and asked which features made Bruno and his philosophy appear so important in the eyes of Brucker.2 Answers to this question may shed some light upon the historiographical perspective through which Brucker approached his material. Bruno scholars, on the other hand, have almost completely ignored Brucker’s exposition of Bruno.3 This omission is remarkable, since Brucker was the ﬁ rst

1 This chapter is based on a paper presented at the Early modern philosophy and the scientifi c imagination seminar, organized by Stephen Clucas. The paper was given in Sen- ate House, University of London, 5th of March, 2005. I should like to thank Stephen Clucas, Judith Fields, Peter Forshaw, Dilwyn Knox, Jill Kraye and Valery Rees and for their comments. 2 For Brucker’s expositions of Bruno, see references p. 36 n. 5 below. In the following studies on Brucker’s Historia critica philosophiae, Brucker’s treatment of Bruno is passed over: Freyer, Geschichte der Geschichte der Philosophie im achtzehnten Jahurhundert, pp. 21–49; Santinello, ‘Il problema metodologico nella storia critica della fi losofi a di Jakob Brucker’, pp. 293–315; Garin, ‘La storia “critica” della fi losofi a nel Settecento’, pp. 245–246, 275–278; Garin, ‘Il compendio dell’Historia critica del Brucker’, pp. 201–202; Braun, Histoire de l’histoire de la philosophie, pp. 119–137; Longo, ‘Le storie generali dell fi losofi a in Germania 1690–1750’, pp. 527–635; Longo, Historia philosophiae philosophica, 103–117. Schmidt-Biggemann, ‘Jacob Bruckers philosophiegeschichtliches Konzept’, pp. 113, 115, comments briefl y on Brucker’s exposition of Bruno. 3 One exception is Spampanato, Vita di G. Bruno, pp. ix–xii, 42, 45, 288, 797. Ibid., p. xi, Spampanato states that “egli [Brucker] lasciò insolute quasi tutte le quistioni che intendeva spiegare; fece congetture che oggi risultano infondate”. Spampanato continues, ibid., p. xii: “Ció nondimeno, il Brucker . . . è lodato pe’ ‘profondi, imparziali, esatti e ampi giudizi’ . . . ed è tuttora citato piú di qualunque suo contemporaneo, piú di molti storici posteriori.” (Salvestrini may refer to nineteenth-century scholars like Bartholmèss, Jordano Bruno, vol. 1, pp. 268 n. 1, 274 n. 2, 275, 276–277, and vol. 2, pp. 10, 27, 56, and Cousin, ‘Douzième leçon. Des historiens de la philosophie’, p. 263: “Brucker est certainement un des hommes les plus savants de son temps. Son impartialité n’est pas moindre que son érudition.”) Another exception is Ricci, who has referred to Brucker’s exposition of Bruno, though primarily focusing on Heumann’s interpretation of Bruno’s philosophy as a background for Brucker’s exposition; see Ricci, ‘Bruno “spinozista”: Bruno “martire luterano”. La polemica tra Lacroze e Heumann’, pp. 42–43, 59 n. 83; Ricci, La fortuna del pensiero di Giordano Bruno 1600–1750, pp. 17 n. 11, 267, 357–358, 382–388, 391. However, neither Spampanato nor Ricci has examined

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historian of philosophy to take Bruno seriously and to integrate him in the history of philosophy, and since Brucker’s interpretation of Bruno as an innovative philosopher, developing a system of philosophy, has remained infl uential right up till our times.4 By looking at Brucker’s exposition of Bruno, we may learn something about Brucker’s general, historiographical assumptions, and, at the same time, become aware of his interpretation of Bruno’s philosophy. In this chapter I fi rst describe the exposition of Bruno and his philosophy in Brucker’s Historia critica philosophiae. Thereafter I identify Brucker’s historiographical concept ‘system of philosophy’ and its implications in Brucker’s exposition of Bruno’s philosophy. On the background of this case study, I shall discuss the usefulness of Brucker’s historiographical concept ‘system of philosophy’ in the fi nal chapter.

I. Brucker’s Exposition of Bruno’s Philosophy and Earlier Histories of Philosophy

Brucker dedicated a considerable amount of space to Bruno and his philosophy in his German and Latin works on the history of philosophy, most of them dating from the 1730s and 1740s.5 In his Historia critica philosophiae, published in ﬁ ve volumes between 1742 and 1744, Brucker lavished ﬁ fty pages on Bruno’s philosophy, which was appreciated as a turning point in the entire history of philosophy.6 Other highlights in the history of philosophy were given less attention—Francis Bacon (1561–1626), for instance, was conceded only sixteen pages. Compatriots like Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) and Christian Thomasius (1655–1728), on the other hand, were given more attention—Leibniz was bestowed hundred and eleven pages, Thomasius seventy-three

Brucker’s employment of the concept ‘system of philosophy’ on Bruno’s philosophy. Spampanato, in fact, also uses it uncritically, e.g. Spampanato, Vita di G. Bruno, p. ix. 4 For Brucker’s interpretation of Bruno’s philosophy as a system of philosophy, see pp. 50–54 below. For recent interpretations of Bruno’s system of philosophy, see references p. 61 n. 99 below. 5 Brucker deals with Bruno and his philosophy in the following texts: Brucker, Kurtze Fragen, vol. 6, pp. 514–517; id., Historia critica philosophiae, vol. 5, pp. 6.15–19, 7.34–38, 9.21–10.7, 12.9–62.18, and vol. 6, pp. 809.25–816.29; id., Institutiones historiae philosophicae usui Academicae iuventutis adornatae, 3rd ed., 1790, pp. 694–701. 6 Id., Historia critica philosophiae, vol. 5, p. 38.15–20, as quoted p. 27 n. 75 above.

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