Transnistria’s call to join Russia: A bluff in troubled times and for what consequences?
Iulian Mihalache Junior Research Fellow, Europe Programme [email protected]
Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies 20-22 Wenlock Road, London N1 7GU, United Kingdom www.cgsrs.com ⏐ [email protected]
16th September 2016
n September 7, Evgheny Shevchuk, president of the As a first measure, this implies aligning the Transnistrian O separatist republic of Transnistria, announced by legal system with Russian legislation. Shevchuk’s presidential decree that he will move to enact a 2006 seemingly radical move generated a lot of attention in referendum in which 97% of the population of the Moldova, the country Transnistria is formally part of, and breakaway territory opted for unification with Russia in the region, particularly in neighbouring Romania. The (Radio Liberty Radio Free Europe, 9 September 2016). announcement comes after sustained Russian military drills in the breakaway republic over the summer, which have raised strong criticism from the Moldovan foreign ministry (Radio Liberty Radio Free Europe, 18 August 2016). Coupled with these exercises, Shevchuk’s decree seems to paint a worrying picture and suggests a change in the status quo of this long-standing frozen conflict. However, this paper argues that the decree is not a Russian geopolitical move, but rather the result of domestic politics. Despite this, the decree could have significant implications for Moldova and its breakaway territory. Analysts in Moldova (e.g. Că lugă reanu, 2016) and abroad (e.g. Ernst, 2016) agree that the announcement is a populist move by Shevchuk, who faces a strong challenge in the Transnistrian presidential elections Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:TransnistrianRegionMap.png scheduled for December 11 this year and requires all the Iulian Mihalache 2 political capital he can muster. Shevchuk and his had rejected Russian influence in their country, but in government’s popularity levels are dwindling as Moldova, Russia can realistically hope for the return of a Transnistria’s economy is in a deep crisis. The breakaway friendly government after the October 30 presidential republic has an aging, pro-Russian population that is to a elections. Furthermore, Crimea is strategically much more large extent nostalgic for the Soviet times, when important than Transnistria, and Russia would not risk a standards of living were higher, and fearful of Moldova’s further deterioration in relations with the West given the pro-EU path. 135,000 of Transnistria’s roughly 300,000 international context. Russia has been seeking a inhabitants are pensioners, about 180,000 have Russian normalisation of relations with the West and the removal citizenship, and many young people are migrating to of sanctions, which were recently extended by the EU. Russia (Lungu, 2016). The 2006 referendum was unrecognized by international institutions or the EU, only An annexation of Transnistria being considered legitimate by the Russian Duma. However, it suggests that a large proportion of the would completely antagonise population really does support joining Russia. In this context, Shevchuk’s announcement should be a very Moldova’s population and push popular move before the December 11 elections. He will be facing parliament speaker Vadim Krasnoselski, who is the post-Soviet republic towards running on behalf of the Obnovlenie (Renewal) party, an inflexible, pro-EU direction. which already has parliamentary majority since the 2015 elections. Obnovlenie is the political arm of the Sheriff Thus, while gaining territory, group, Transnistria’s most important company, which is involved in many different sectors of the economy. Russia would lose its leverage Furthermore, Shevchuk was accused in June 2016 by Russian officials of siphoning off Russian aid to over the rest of the country Transnistria (Ernst, 2016), so the decree could also be a way of diverting interest from this scandal. Annexing additional territory would prove counterproductive towards that end. Logistically, too, Russia’s interests in the region also show that Shevchuk’s annexing Transnistria would imply significant challenges, move was the result of domestic pressures rather than a as the breakaway territory borders pro-European Ukraine ploy directed by Moscow. Russia sees the whole of and Moldova, but not Russia. Furthermore, the Moldova as part of its required “sphere of influence” or experience of Crimea only shows that the economic costs buffer zone against the West. Since the early 1990s, the of annexation are a heavy burden, particularly in the separatist regime in Transnistria has represented a useful context of relatively low oil and gas prices and Western lever through which Moscow can control Moldova’s sanctions. Russia is already in effect propping the future and put pressure on Chisinau when necessary breakaway republic. Transnistrian security is guaranteed (Popescu and Litra, 2012). In effect, the frozen conflict by about 1,500 Russian troops (Pugsley and Wesslau, on Moldova’s territory ensures that the country will not 2016), Gazprom transfers for free up to $400 million be a member of NATO and will incur considerable costs worth of gas to the territory annually (Całus, 2016) and if it seeks to move closer to the EU. The recent military Russia subsidises every pensioner in Transnistria by paying exercises in Transnistria aimed to show precisely that them a monthly supplement of $10 (Lungu, 2016). It is Russia remains the main military power in the region, unlikely that Russia will be willing to invest further including on Moldova’s territory, and can therefore financial resources in the territory, given that its current influence Moldova’s domestic politics. involvement is enough for fulfilling its goals described above. However, changing the status quo would not be in Russia’s favour. An annexation of Transnistria would The bluff of Shevchuk’s presidential decree can also be completely antagonise Moldova’s population and push inferred from the official replies of relevant actors in the the post-Soviet republic towards an inflexible, pro-EU region. By the time of writing, the Russian presidential direction. Thus, while gaining territory, Russia would lose administration made no statement on the issue and its leverage over the rest of the country. Crimea’s Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov declined to annexation took place after the majority of Ukrainians comment (Independent.md, 10 September 2016),
Copyright © ‘The Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies’ (CGSRS) 2016 Iulian Mihalache 3 signalling that Russia does not want to instrumentalise Igor Dodon has already tried to capitalise on Shevchuk’s the event. Ukrainian authorities, too, have remained announcement. He promised that he would annihilate quiet. Moldovan Prime Minister Pavel Filip Transnistrian unionism if he becomes president while (Independent.md, 8 September 2016), Romanian claiming that the breakaway republic’s fears are fuelled Foreign Minister Lazar Comanescu (Realitatea.net, 2016) by the Moldovan government’s pro-EU and pro-NATO and the Romanian Presidential Administration (Deac, attitude. Dodon’s preconditions for reuniting the country 2016) have taken a similar approach, arguing that are Moldovan neutrality and restoring friendly relations Shevchuk’s decree is a populist, provocative move that with Russia (Independent.md, 9 September 2016). There must be taken in the context of the Transnistrian is a danger that people will believe this kind of discourse, presidential elections. particularly in the context of attacks on the EU and NATO by the pro-Russian media. Romania and Moldova, which That being said, it is very likely that the decree will have share a common language, have been accused of significant consequences both for Moldova and its intending to unite, despite the fact that this is not on the breakaway territory. In Transnistria, it is unclear whether agenda of either government (Bugajski and Doran, Shevchuk’s move will be enough to win him the elections, 2016). Spreading such fears was instrumental in given his unpopularity and the fact that he is battling the Transnistria’s break from Moldova following a war in the territory’s largest economic actor. Considering that an early 1990s (Hill, 2010) and this argument could also be actual unification is extremely unlikely, the decree could used in driving a wedge between Moldova and the EU. also backfire and undermine the Transnistrian president’s Thus, Shevchuk’s decree could help the Kremlin by legitimacy. This is because union with Russia would be an making people believe that Moldova could only acknowledgement of the fact that the government is too reintegrate Transnistria by re-entering the Russian orbit weak to be independent and that the breakaway republic and turning its back to the EU and its values. relies on Russia for survival. Under these circumstances, I believe the best course of Moldova, too, could be affected by the decree. Moldova action for the EU is the one it has taken, namely to ignore is holding its own presidential elections on October 30, the decree and try not to escalate the situation. The EU and the result will be of utmost importance to the has already been successful in its relations with country’s future on the geopolitical arena. The current Transnistria. It managed to quietly ensure that the government, led from the background by oligarch breakaway region gradually joins the EU’s Deep and Vladimir Plahotniuc, is seen by many people as corrupt Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with Moldova and and the pro-European parties have until now failed to continues to trade with the EU (Całus, 2016). select a common candidate. In these conditions, the Transnistria already exports more goods to the EU than candidate of the pro-Russian Socialist Party, Igor Dodon, to Russia (Lungu, 2016). Economic cooperation is the could become the winner. Recent polls (e.g. Europa best answer to Transnistria’s call to join Russia, as Liberă , 2016, Realitatea.md, 2016) put Dodon ahead of economic business elites will come to terms with the prospective pro-EU candidate Maia Sandu and suggest merits of good relations with the EU. The EU must the two could compete in the second round. The danger continue to exercise its soft power as the Transnistrian of a new pro-Russian president is real: a May 2016 poll leadership will probably want to derive economic benefits found that, if they had to choose between the two from both Russia and the EU after the elections. options, 46.8% of Moldovans would opt for the Eurasian However, cooperation in other fields or a change in the Union and only 35.6% for the EU. This is all the more frozen conflict’s status quo is unlikely as this would draw worrying considering that in 2009, 73% of Moldovans a negative reaction from Russia. were in favour of joining the EU (Independent.md, 8 May, 2016).
Copyright © ‘The Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies’ (CGSRS) 2016 Iulian Mihalache 4
REFERENCES
Bugajski, J. and Doran, P. (2016) Black Sea Rising - Russia’s Strategy in Southeast Europe, in the Center for European Policy Analysis. Available at: http://cepa.org/files/?id_plik=2096
Călugăreanu, V. (2016, 9 September) Șevciuk stresează Chișinăul cu alipirea Transnistriei la Rusia, in Deutsche Welle Chișinău [in Romanian]. Available at : http://www.dw.com/ro/%C8%99evciuk-streseaz%C4%83- chi%C8%99in%C4%83ul-cu-alipirea-transnistriei-la-rusia/a-19539118?maca=rum-CB_rom_hotnews_md- 6046-html-cb
Całus, K. (2016) The DCFTA in Transnistria: Who gains?, in New Eastern Europe. Available at: http://neweasterneurope.eu/articles-and-commentary/1861-the-dcfta-in-transnistria-who-gains
Deac (2016, 8 September) România afirmă că declarațiile de la Tiraspol privind unirea cu Rusia reprezintă o provocare [in Romanian], in România Liberă. Available at: http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/international/romania-afirma-ca-declaratiile-de-la-tiraspol-privind- unirea-cu-rusia-reprezinta-o-provocare-427535
Ernst, I. (2016, 9 September) Transnistria’s president issues decree on unification with Russia, in BNE IntelliNews. Available at: http://www.intellinews.com/transnistria-s-president-issues-decree-on-unification-with-russia- 105737/?source=romania
Europa Liberă (2016, 27 June) Sondaj Fondul Opiniei Publice: Igor Dodon și Maia Sandu ar avea șansele cele mai mari în alegerile prezidențiale [in Romanian]. Available at: http://www.europalibera.org/a/27822883.html Hill, W. (2010) Reflections on Negotiation and Mediation - The Frozen Conflicts and European Security, in Demokratizatsiya. Available at: https://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/demokratizatsiya%20archive/GWASHU_DEMO_18_3/C51642K16 76786P1/C51642K1676786P1.pdf
Independent.md (2016, 8 May) (SONDAJ) Uniunea Europeană vs Uniunea Eurasiatică: Tot mai puțini moldoveni aleg vectorul occidental [in Romanian]. Available at: http://independent.md/sondaj-uniunea-europeana-vs- uniunea-eurasiatica-tot-mai-putini-moldoveni-aleg-vectorul-occidental/#.V9XkQ6250cZ
Independent.md (2016, 8 September) Pavel Filip: Decretul lui Șevciuc privind unirea Transnistriei cu Rusia este populist [in Romanian]. Available at: http://independent.md/pavel-filip-decretul-lui-sevciuc-privind-unirea- transnistriei-cu-rusia-este-populist/#.V9XeKK250cZ
Independent.md (2016, 9 September) Dodon promite să „anihileze” unionismul dacă ajunge președinte [in Romanian]. Available at: http://independent.md/dodon-promite-sa-anihileze-unionismul-daca-ajunge- presedinte/#.V9Vb06250cY
Independent.md (2016, 10 September) Moscova nu crede în independenţa Transnistriei [in Romanian]. Available at: http://independent.md/moscova-nu-crede-in-independenta-transnistriei/#.V9XdDa250cY
Copyright © ‘The Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies’ (CGSRS) 2016 Iulian Mihalache 5
Lungu, K. (2016) Transnistria: From entropy to exodus, in European Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: http://www.ecfr.eu/article/essay_transnistria_from_entropy_to_exodus
Popescu, N. and Litra, L. (2012) Transnistria: A Bottom-up Solution, in European Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR63_TRANSNISTRIA_BRIEF_AW.pdf
Pugsley, S. and Wesslau, F. (2016) Russia in the Gray Zones, in European Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: http://www.ecfr.eu/wider/specials/russia_in_the_grey_zones
Radio Liberty Radio Free Europe (2016, 18 August) Moldova Protests Russian Military Exercise In Transdniester. Available at : http://www.rferl.org/content/moldova-protests-russian-exercises-transdniester/27931559.html
Radio Liberty Radio Free Europe (2016, 9 September) Moldova Rejects Call For Transdniester To Join Russia. Available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/moldova-rejects-transdniester-joining-russia/27977403.html
Realitatea.md (2016, 2 June) Un nou sondaj NDI: Igor Dodon și Maia Sandu s-ar putea ”bate” în turul doi pentru fotoliul de președinte [in Romanian]. Available at: http://www.realitatea.md/un-nou-sondaj-ndi-igor-dodon-i- maia-sandu-s-ar-putea-bate-in-turul-doi-pentru-fotoliul-de-pre-edinte_40090.html
Realitatea.net (2016, 8 September) Comănescu, despre Transnistria: Integritatea Republicii Moldova, convenită în Formatul "5 +2" [in Romanian]. Available at: http://www.realitatea.net/comanescu-despre-transnistria- integritatea-republicii-moldova-convenita-in-formatul-5-2_1979772.html#ixzz4JzSd7Z9a
Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies 20-22 Wenlock Road, London N1 7GU, United Kingdom www.cgsrs.com ⏐ [email protected]
Copyright © ‘The Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies’ (CGSRS) 2016