Protecting the Games The International Olympic Committee and Security, 1972-1984

Austin Duckworth and Thomas M. Hunt *

When Palestinian terrorists took eleven Israeli athletes hostage at the 1972 Munich , the image of the Olympics as an arena of global harmony shat- tered. The International Olympic Committee (IOC), which posited the view that the Games remained above political squabbles, faced a new, complex issue and had no clear precedent to draw upon. This article examines how IOC policy toward security at the Olympics changed following the initial attack at Munich to the years leading up to the 1984 in . Drawing upon IOC Meeting Minutes, personal correspondence between IOC members, and media reports, this paper argues that previous interpretations of Olympic security over- state the role of President in altering IOC security policy following his election. This examination emphasizes the role of Indian IOC Mem- ber Ashwini Kumar as the driving force behind a shift in IOC policy towards secu- rity prior to the 1984 Games in and Los Angeles. ❖

Introduction

Early on the morning of September 5, 1972, eight members of the Palestinian organization Black September stormed the compound hous- ing members of the Israeli Olympic team. The terrorists took eleven Israelis hostage and after hours of negotiations, a botched rescue attempt by German authorities to save the Israelis resulted in the deaths of all hostages and five of the terrorists. In the ensuing debate over whether to continue the Games, the President of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), , stood firm. Standing before the watching world, he uttered the now notorious phrase, “The Games must go on.”1 Now, towards the end of nearly two decades at the helm of the IOC, Brundage and the organization he led faced a new crisis. He touted the IOC and the Olympic Games as entities above the fray of global politics. While pre- vious boycotts and issues over recognition briefly highlighted the connections between the Olympic Games and international politics, the attack by Black

* Doctoral student Austin Duckworth and corresponding author Thomas M. Hunt are with the Department of Kinesiology and Health Education at the University of Texas at Austin, USA.

68 Olympika XXV (2016), 68-87 September quite forcefully showed the watching world the inextricable links between the Olympic Games and global political quandaries. This paper highlights the IOC’s lack of response to the terrorist attack at the Munich Olympic Games and posits a previously unheralded figure as the driving force behind the IOC’s eventual reaction to security threats. After Munich, the IOC placed responsibility for security with the respective Orga- nizing Committees of the Olympics.2 As will be shown, it is clear that the IOC knew about potential threats yet deferred responsibility to the Olympic Orga- nizing Committees. While the access of Organizing Committees to local and national law enforcement makes this a plausible rationale, it is instructive to examine how the IOC’s policy towards security evolved. The primary focus of this work is to track IOC policy changes towards security at the Olympic Games from devolving responsibility after 1972 to actively acting as a security liaison between national governments and Organizing Committees in 1984. The following discussion does not contain a lengthy account of the implemen- tation of security measures but, in order to provide context, observations on some alterations to the execution of security at the Olympics are provided. While a burgeoning field, the study of terrorism and security at the Olym- pic Games is a subject with rich potential for scholarship. The introduction to a recently published edited volume titled Securing and Sustaining the Olympic City noted, “Olympic security has, surprisingly, received scant attention in aca- demic circles.”3 Scholars in sociology and sport management provide the bulk of works regarding security and the Olympics.4 While this scholarship offers insightful viewpoints, there is not yet a comprehensive, archival-based study on the development of Olympic security either before or after Munich. The few his- torically based monographs on security skim the surface of the decision-mak- ing or focus solely on the security measures employed.5 Certain themes also elicit more attention from scholars. One trend is to try and predict potential threats towards host cities while another is to exam- ine the relationship between security for a host city and civil liberties for its citizens.6 The most covered event is the attack at the Munich Olympic Games, which forms a base of scholarship; even so, these studies generally do not examine the long-term effects of the event.7 This paper adds to the current scholarship by arguing that the Munich tragedy in 1972 should have served as a “focusing event” for the IOC.8 Yet there were almost no policy-related dis- cussions until 1983. It took an intrepid and knowledgeable member of the IOC, Ashwini Kumar, finally to push the issue of security to the forefront. His- torian Guy Sanan provided three related explanations for the IOC’s silence on security problems subsequent to the Munich tragedy:

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First, a reluctance of present IOC members to pass judgment on previous IOC Presidents’ actions, particularly in an area in which they do not possess expertise. Second, the less transparent nature IOC Presidency (sic) under Samaranch’s predecessor Brundage and Killanin, coupled with the sensitivity of the security issues, left security policy closed to wider exposure. Lastly, the perception amongst many top IOC members in the 1970s that security and counter-terrorism (which were novel and developing concepts at the time) were not within the realm of the IOC and should rather be left to the police and military of the host governments.9 Without testimony from current or former IOC members, it is difficult to grapple with the first theory. This paper shows that the second theory, that a more opaque leadership style omitted IOC members from knowing about responses to security, is not plausible. The third theory is the most plausible. Yet, Thomas M. Hunt’s description of the IOC’s early response to doping is a more accurate framework to utilize when analyzing the IOC’s views on secu- rity. Hunt argued in his book Drug Games that in regards to doping, “the IOC leadership tended to try to shift responsibility to other organizations in the Olympic governance system.”10 In the case of security, the Organizing Com- mittees initially received this responsibility. While the massacre at Tlatelolco in 1968 four years prior provides another security event to examine, this discussion begins with the 1972 Games because the attack at Munich led the IOC to officially assign responsibility of security to the Organizing Committees. The article begins with a discussion of the IOC’s initial response to the Munich attack and covers the Summer and Win- ter Olympic Games in 1976 and 1980. A combination of archival evidence and media reports serve to identify the IOC’s hands-off approach to security during these years. The paper concludes with the in Sarajevo and Summer Olympics in Los Angeles and discusses the rise of Indian IOC member Ashwini Kumar, who has previously not received enough recognition for his role in focusing the IOC’s attention on security.

Despite the Tragedy: Munich 1972

In order fully to understand the position of the IOC following the Munich attacks, it is necessary to examine the organization’s initial response. Immedi- ately following news of the attack, Avery Brundage called the IOC’s Executive Board to an emergency meeting. The Meeting Minutes note that at the conclu- sion of this discussion the group “agreed that the IOC was getting involved in internal problems which did not concern it and it was their opinion that the Games must continue at all costs.”11 It is difficult to ascertain how the mem- bers of the Executive Board convinced themselves that an attack on athletes competing at the Olympic Games was not a problem for the IOC. Equally

70 Protecting the Games unclear is the classification of a Palestinian attack on an Israeli team as an internal problem for Germany. In the midst of the meeting, erroneous reports filtered in of a successful rescue attempt that ended with the rescue of all hostages and the deaths of the terrorists. IOC Member, and President of the 1972 Organizing Committee, Willi Daume suggested a day of mourning prior to restarting the Games. His IOC colleague Prince Alexander de Merode contradicted Daume, arguing that “the Olympic movement belonged to the IOC and the Organising Committee were their agents. The Games must continue and as soon as possible.”12 The general concern expressed was how to ensure that the Games finished on schedule. The stenographer recording the notes of the meeting described Daume’s reaction to the comments from his fellow IOC members as “shocked.”13 On the subsequent morning, the severity of the situation reached the Executive Board: a failed rescue attempt had ended with the deaths of all the Israeli athletes. Even after this news the IOC struggled to decide how to respond adequately. The Board engaged in a “full discussion” to reach the decision temporarily to postpone the Games.14 These deliberations seem to show that concern over the safety of the athletes was lower in priority than scheduling. IOC member Lord Michael Morris Killanin expressed his true feelings in a letter to Daume less than two weeks later. He encouraged Daume, observing that, “[d]espite the tragedy of the Israeli athletes there were many highlights … it was amongst the 10,000 athletes, of whom [Daume and Kill- anin] read little, that the real Olympic spirit existed.”15 Killanin’s attitude sheds light on the IOC’s later decision to define specific limits on its responsibility for security. The events at Munich were merely a “tragedy” that detracted from what the IOC wanted to sell: the notion of the Olympic spirit. Killanin’s opin- ion seemingly vacillated, as there is evidence that he recognized the political morass the Olympics threatened to be absorbed by. He wrote IOC Director Madame Berlioux in January of 1973, admitting that “In the past, [the IOC had] rather grandly stated that [it was] above politics, but [had] always found [itself] in their midst.”16 Following such a catastrophic event, and as Killanin recognized after he replaced Brundage as IOC president, the IOC could not simply extricate itself from political considerations. Yet there is scant evidence of concern among IOC members about security for the 1976 and 1980 Olympic Games.17 The few passages mentioning security in IOC records involved the safety of committee members or the IOC headquarters in Lausanne. The sole IOC member to express even a remote concern was Soviet IOC member Vitaly Smirnov who expressed fears about an attack on Soviet athletes visiting North America for the at Lake Placid and the 1984 Summer Games in Los Angeles.18

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It took the emergence of Ashwini Kumar in the buildup to the 1984 Olympic Games in Sarajevo and Los Angeles to position security as a more pertinent issue on the IOC’s agenda. Born in 1920 in the Indian city of Jullun- dur (present-day Jallandahar) near the India-Pakistan border, Kumar was a decorated police officer with a fairly extensive background in Olympic gover- nance. He served as the Deputy Chef de Mission at the 1956 Olympic Games in Melbourne and subsequently as the Chef de Mission at the 1960 and 1964 Games before being nominated to the IOC in 1973.19 Prior to joining the IOC, Kumar served as the Director General of India’s Border Security Force and fought in the 1971 war between India and Pakistan. He received the Padma Bhushan, the third-highest civilian award in India, “for outstanding service” during the fighting.20 While the emergence of Kumar instigated IOC policymaking on security, the Black September attack spurred the government to immedi- ate action. On September 11, 1972, President Richard Nixon’s Secretary of State, William Rogers, sent a circular detailing the problem to foreign minis- ters across the globe. Rogers pointed to the Munich attacks as evidence that “dramatically demonstrated once more that the nations of the world are not yet prepared to protect innocent people from the senseless and criminal activ- ities of terrorist groups.”21 Nixon and his team were not the only people in Washington whose policy perceptions changed in the aftermath of Munich. A later publication outlining the history of the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) response to terrorism highlights the importance of the Munich Olympic Games as a focusing event for the Agency. The Munich attack “provided the impetus for getting the carriage of counter-terrorism rolling throughout the US government’s foreign affairs and security establishment.”22 Nixon created the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, staffed by various department heads, among them the Secretary of Defense, the directors of the CIA and of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. While this Committee focused on national security threats in general rather than the Olympics alone, the quick reaction by the United States government stood in sharp contrast to the IOC’s muted response to the threat of terrorism. The creation of this com- mission was not kept secret. The Los Angeles Times announced the news with the headline “Nixon Establishes Panel to Combat Terrorism” and detailed the responsibilities of the group.23 — The IOC, however, remained silent.

Innsbruck and Montreal 1976: An Encampment under Siege

In the years leading up to the 1976 in and the Summer Olympic Games in Montreal, security received almost no atten- tion in IOC meetings outside of reports from the Organizing Committees.24 Lord Killanin, in 1973, “stressed the importance of security” to Roger Rous-

72 Protecting the Games seau, the President of the Montreal Games.25 Even when the IOC discussed security, the topics focused predominantly on the protection of IOC members rather than of the athletes. For example, Willi Daume emphasized efficient seating for IOC members in the “A” stand in case several IOC members arrived simultaneously. The records are unclear whether Daume viewed this as a secu- rity precaution. After receiving some assurance from Howard Radford, the Secretary Treasurer of the Montreal Olympic Organizing Committee (COJO), that an efficient entry into the stand was a priority but security control came first, Killanin stepped in and “stressed the importance of giving priority to security.”26 It is clear that Killanin was aware of significant concerns regarding the possibility of another attack, at Montreal. He wrote a note to Canadian IOC member James Worrall in November 1975 and attached a clipping from the Irish Times predicting a potential terrorist plot. Killanin’s sole comment on the article was that trepidation over a repeat of Munich “[was] the position at the time of writing as reported from almost every country.”27 Yet, full control of the IOC notwithstanding, he did nothing. He better explicated his position a letter to Madame Berlioux. Killanin noted that he discussed “various security stories” with Worrall but believed “[security] of course [was] completely a matter for the Canadians, but.[that the IOC] should be kept fully informed.”28 These comments contradict Sanan’s argument referred to above that the less transparent presidencies of Brundage and Killanin explain the IOC’s silence on security after Munich. The assignment for hosting the first post-Munich Olympic Games fell to Innsbruck, a mountain town in the Austrian Alps. A mere one hundred miles from Munich, security was a significant issue for the Organizing Committee. A report by the Committee prior to the Games warned, “considering the Munich incident and developments since then, [security] measures [at Inns- bruck would] have to be particularly extensive. These precautions [could] only, however, be taken for the Olympic Village.”29 A profile of the Olympic Village in The Washington Post provides a sense of the heightened security around the athletes. In comparison to Munich, where the attackers scaled a fence to access the Israeli accommodations, an eight-foot high electric fence surrounded the Innsbruck Village and armed guards protected the stairways leading to the athlete quarters.30 Outside of the fence, spectators saw one “machine-gun toting policeman” stationed every 100 feet.31 Visitors and ath- letes alike noticed the increased security at this edition of the Olympic Games. The Times reported that the nearly 3,000 soldiers “with their Ger- man shepherds and machine guns, created a weird atmosphere.”32 Security precautions went beyond increasing personnel. The Innsbruck Olympic Organizing Committee (IOOC) Director Karl Heinz Klee noted, “[b]orders [were] being watched and reports made on movements of suspi-

73 Duckworth and Hunt cious groups.”33 Klee did not provide specific details on the groups his security detail monitored. The IOOC final report shed further light on the intensity of the security measures. Athletes in the Olympic Village were “most enthusiastic about the excellent catering service” which in turn “enabled the athletes to for- get that from the outside the Olympic Village resembled an encampment under siege due to the necessary security precautions.”34 In order to give an impression of the level of security at Innsbruck, the American press resorted to calling on imagery from Nazi Germany. One Associated Press reporter praised the Austrian security forces for their professionalism as “police, fierce dogs, and electric barbed wire fences prophesied ‘Gestapo Olympics’.” However, as the reporter noted, “[that] was never the case.”35 The efficient implementation of security for the Innsbruck Games did not assuage worries of a repeat of Munich at Montreal. A remarkable trend in the reporting leading up to Montreal expressed an apprehension of some form of an attack. One article warned of an “outbreak of terrorism,”36 and that the Games coincided with the United States’ bicentennial celebrations only height- ened the anxiety. One Washington Post report claimed that there was a “mod- ern Trojan horse,” a tanker truck redesigned so that its interior “[held] a terrorist office, dormitory, and arsenal,” aimed at disrupting the Olympics and the bicentennial.37 Some of the haphazard planning for security at Montreal might have given rise to concerns. Nancy Scannell, a reporter for The Washington Post, informed the newspaper’s readership about sparse precautions taken to pre- vent another Munich. She argued that those responsible knew that “very little of significance had been accomplished in the past two years to guarantee there [would] be no repeat of Munich.”38 As noted above, the IOC designated the responsibility for security to the Olympic Organizing Committees, in this case the Montreal Committee (COJO). In 1973 Roger Rousseau, President of COJO, said security “was the responsibility of the Organizing Committee and not of the IOC.”39 Recent evi- dence brings the role of his organization in the planning of security into ques- tion; sociologist Dominique Clément convincingly argued the COJO “played no role in security planning.”40 In 1976 Soviet IOC member Vitaly Smirnov questioned COJO President Rousseau in an Executive Board meeting at Innsbruck about security threats. Rousseau assured Smirnov that the potential for an attack “was being closely studied with both American and Canadian security services.”41 Rousseau’s unequivocal answer to Smirnov differs sharply from complaints coming from Canada’s Security Service. One memorandum noted that those working in the Security Service “should have no illusions over COJO’s interest in security, which [was] nil.”42 Within days of his country’s main intelligence agency not- ing COJO’s lack of concern for security, Rousseau announced a small portion

74 Protecting the Games of the plans for securing the 1976 Montreal Olympics. The entire operation would constitute the largest military endeavor in Canada since the conclusion of World War II. As a comparison, 12,500 Canadian troops fought in the Korean War. The plan cited a force of over 16,000 soldiers with an “additional 7,000 military personnel involved in other Olympic operations.”43 Yet even with such a large force employed, apprehension lingered. The Austin Ameri- can-Statesman noted that, “despite the size of the force, none of the police or military officers … could offer any guarantee against a recurrence of the Munich terrorist raid.”44 Some of the security breaches at Montreal display how, despite the mas- sive number of troops, planning errors hindered security procedures. One pre- caution involved limiting access to certain areas, like the Olympic Village, by issuing color-coded passes. In order to reduce confusion, COJO printed post- ers showing which pass granted entry to which restricted site. This relatively simple plan failed when, as one newspaper reported, “the color-coded pass specimens on the posters look[ed] all too much like the real thing” and could pass as authentic.45 While COJO did not record a direct security breach caused by this error, one actual incident involved a friend of several Canadian track and field Olympians using his identification cards to enter and exit the Olym- pic Village.46 After this episode, a Royal Canadian Mounted Police officer pointed out that “[s]ecurity measures were set up to protect the athletes … [but the] athletes know where the weaknesses are.”47 In spite of these mishaps, the Montreal Games saw no major incidents and COJO declared in its Official Report that it “would not hesitate to adopt the same security measures.”48

Significant Gaps: Lake Placid/ 1980

Over the course of the Olympics at Lake Placid, American athletes remarked that Soviet athletes interacted with other those from other countries differ- ently than at previous Olympics. While it was not uncommon for athletes, even American and Soviet athletes, to exchange clothing or pins, at Lake Placid the Los Angeles Times reported that Soviet athletes “[did not] appear to be exchanging anything with anybody…they [kept] to themselves.”49 The predominant theory was that the aloofness of the Soviet athletes was a direct response to the threat of an American boycott of the Moscow Olym- pics later that year.50 , the captain of the American team, posited a different idea. In an interview he stated that perhaps the Sovi- ets were “concerned about terrorism. How [could you] not be when you [saw] all the security?51” For the athletes residing in the Olympic Village at Lake Placid, it was difficult to ignore the pervasive security. Surrounded by a twelve-foot high chain link fence, the Olympic Village later saw use as a

75 Duckworth and Hunt medium security prison and anyone entering on foot passed through a metal detector.52 The IOC remained silent on matters of security in the buildup to the Games. Lake Placid Olympic Organizing Committee (LPOOC) President Reverend Bernard J. Fell spoke to IOC leaders in October of 1977, assuring them that “[s]ecurity, a phase in Olympic planning that [has] become increas- ingly important in the past few years, [is] receiving the careful attention of [LPOOC] security staff.”53 However, Fell may have overstated just how careful the LPOOC security staff planned for the Lake Placid Games. One particularly notable incident characterized the security planning for Lake Placid. With less than a month to go until the opening ceremonies, the New York Times reported that a New York State Senate Select Committee on Crime described security planning as having “significant gaps.”54 Even this was, at best, an understatement. Mistakes went far beyond a mere oversight in planning. The LPOOC contracted with a company called Communication Control Systems, Inc., to provide a variety of weapons and technology to aid security procedures. There was only one slight problem. This group, as reported by the New York Times, was “under investigation by Federal authorities for allegedly supplying arms to terrorist groups.55” To compound matters, the LPOOC did not conduct a background check of the company before awarding the contract. Nicholas Giangualano, the State Inspector in charge of planning security argued, “The Olympic Committee canceled the contract with [Communication Control Systems] …no one [from Communication Control Systems] was ever involved in the security plan- ning.56” While a significant procedural mistake, this incident did not lead to any specific changes in security policy at the Lake Placid Games. The in Moscow showed that security did not always concentrate on international terrorist threats. While the three Olym- pics after Munich focused heavily on protecting against a repeat of the Pales- tinian attack, security at Moscow focused on a much different matter. Kenneth Reich of the Los Angeles Times wrote, “many felt the security here was directed not so much at preventing such an attack as at isolating ordinary Russians from foreigners.”57 This policy of separating Russian citizens from foreigners occurred even without the presence of the Soviets’ greatest antagonist, the United States, which boycotted the Games. Even though the United States did not send a team, the CIA studied potential security threats. In a wider intelligence assess- ment about the feasibility of Moscow as a host, the Agency noted that “[t]he possibility of any kind of terrorist strike like that at Munich in 1972 seems minimal, given the strictness of the Soviets’ system and the controls placed on the influx of tourists.”58

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As the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games concluded without the United States, eyes turned towards Los Angeles and Sarajevo, the hosts of the 1984 Summer and Winter Olympics, respectively. The Los Angeles edition of the Olympic Games in particular promised to be different. These Games would be the first to be privately funded, while also utilizing existing facilities in order to help avert the massive financial losses suffered by Montreal and Moscow. The organization of Los Angeles was not the only major change in the Olympic movement after 1980. A shakeup in the leadership of the IOC heralded new policies and a new approach to running the Olympic Games. Juan Antonio Samaranch replaced Lord Killanin as President of the IOC on July 18, 1980. In the years immediately following his election, there was a significant increase in discussion on security. Samaranch appointed Cornelis Kerdel, the Chief of Protocol, to assist the Organizing Committees of Sarajevo and Los Angeles with matters of security.59 Samaranch was important for increasing the IOC’s attention to security after 1980, as he was the President and had the power to determine which top- ics received the organization’s consideration. According to Guy Sanan, Sama- ranch wanted to know why the security operation failed at Munich.60 In his biography with David Miller, Samaranch recounted a visit with Israeli intelli- gence, who informed him that a lack of cooperation explained the Munich disaster. Sanan argues that this visit led Samaranch to appoint someone to monitor the coordination of security for the Olympic Games.61 Samaranch’s correspondence with the new head of security for the IOC, Aswhini Kumar, does not bear out Sanan’s observation.

Arranging Ideas: Ashwini Kumar and the IOC

On April 15, 1983, Samaranch wrote to Kumar to inform him of his appoint- ment as the new Chairman of the IOC Radio Commission. In response, Kumar explained to the IOC President that he “[had] spent a lot of time lately in arranging ideas about security."62 Clearly, Kumar initiated the conversation on security with Samaranch, and Samaranch created a new position for Kumar: IOC Security Delegate. In this position, he was to be “responsible for all matters relating to security for the IOC.”63 Soon after his promotion in July 1983, Kumar discussed the IOC’s role in security with Director Madame Berlioux. The details of these discussions illu- minate the failure of the IOC to respond to the threat of terrorism. Kumar believed that although responsibility for security fell to the respective Organiz- ing Committees, this did not absolve the IOC of responsibility. He argued that the role of the IOC was that of liaison between the host country and nations participating in the Olympic Games.64 In Kumar’s view, the organization had failed in that mission since the 1972 Olympics. He wrote that since the

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“Munich massacre, [and] despite the incredible growth of international terror- ism, firm steps for a [sic] efficient system of security had not been taken, due to lack of liaison.”65 While bringing considerable vigour to his new post, he soon found potential roadblocks to significant progress. His first challenge as IOC Security Delegate were the Sarajevo Winter Olympics and Los Angeles Summer Olympic Games in 1984. With less than a year left until the Opening Ceremonies for both Games, Kumar told Samaranch that he wanted to prepare a list of “DOs and DONTs on security for various countries” but cautioned that “[a] lot of ground ha[d] to be covered.”66 Part of Kumar’s focus was the security of the IOC leadership. Within three weeks of his appointment, Kumar recommended a private security guard for the President of the IOC to “constantly travel with the President…and ensure basic security arrangements that are normally made for the VVIPs [sic].”67 There is evidence that the assassinations and kidnappings of major political leaders influenced Kumar’s policy-making. In one note on security he men- tioned six separate incidents from the previous decade targeting major politi- cal leaders that had been facilitated by groups ranging from Black September to the Irish Republican Army.68 A key element of Kumar’s ideas was the assumption that by virtue of the global prominence of the Olympic Games, terrorists would target the IOC President. If publicity was the primary aim of terrorism, then logically “terror- ist incidents [could] take place anywhere and [be] directed against any VIP.”69 Some of Kumar’s concerns seem out of proportion when read against his anal- ysis of the potential effects. He wrote that assassinations lacked value politi- cally and that kidnappings had “seldom gained public sympathy.”70 While he may have been skeptical about the effectiveness of the strategies employed by terrorists, Kumar planned for the worst-case scenarios. He also quickly learned that the Cold War made seemingly straightforward matters more difficult. In a letter to Samaranch, Kumar noted that Madame Berlioux brought to his attention the “difficulties of having a security dialogue with an ‘Iron Curtain’ country like Yugoslavia.”71 Kumar did not specify the exact prob- lems Berlioux cited. Berlioux’s comment concerned the upcoming 1984 Winter Olympics in Sarajevo, the capital of Yugoslavia. Yet the first meeting on security between a representative of the IOC and an Olympic Organizing Committee occurred from September 7- 9, 1983. Kumar travelled to Sarajevo to act as the liaison between the IOC and the Sarajevo Olympic Organizing Committee (SOOC). The meeting’s agenda makes it abundantly clear that international ter- rorism was not the only security concern for the group. Among the various other topics discussed were how to ensure the safety of the athletes’ food as well as “law and order problems and control of any demonstrations.”72 Over the course of the discussions, Bruno Mikulic, the President of the SOOC, told Kumar of one plan to diminish the threat of a terror attack at Sara-

78 Protecting the Games jevo. Kumar reported to Berlioux that Mikulic "had contacted Federal Author- ities, who had promised to handle terrorism from the Palestinian Group by contacting [the Palestinian] leaders at the highest level."73 This tactic set a new precedent for assessing and handling potential threats to the Games.74 A potential attack by Palestinian groups, however, was not the IOC’s only con- cern. Mikulic informed Kumar that he worried about West German terrorists representing an organization named the Bader-Meinhof group, and that he planned to utilize security agencies in West Germany to address the threat.75 Mikulic also wanted help since he saw “international terrorists [as] the main hazard of the Games;” he requested from the IOC “any information about the movement of terrorists.”76 Kumar did not record his response to this request, but it would draw the organization further into the intricate tangles of interna- tional politics. An Executive Board meeting in Lausanne, November 24-25, 1983, marked one of the turning points in the formulation of IOC security policies. Kumar presented a security report of nearly fifty pages; it included a list of terrorist organizations that might attack the Games. Kumar’s report extended beyond the threat of international terrorism, and for the first time considered a domestic terrorist attack, particularly against the Soviet team. Kumar showed extensive concern with the potential for a terrorist attack. He pointed to the fact that “international terrorist groups existed throughout the world and ter- rorism had recently increased fourfold.”77 Furthermore, terrorism had evolved in the eleven years since the Munich attacks. As countries globally reacted to prevent terror attacks with new prevention techniques, Kumar warned that terrorist groups started to “protect themselves more and were thus becoming more brutal.”78 The personal security of the IOC President became a recurring theme in Kumar’s presentation. He informed IOC members present that the “President and some of the IOC members could be targets for terrorist attacks.”79 IOC member Julian Roosevelt was the first to respond to Kumar’s presen- tation. He asked Kumar about press reports in the United States that detailed an alleged pact between rival Los Angeles gangs. According to the rumors, the gangs would focus on attacking foreign tourists visiting the Games rather than targeting one another. Kumar assured Roosevelt that “measures had already been envisaged in [that] field.”80 Kumar faced resistance from some who still thought the IOC should not involve itself with security matters. Canadian Dick Pound contended that “if the IOC, as an amateur, entered into a profes- sional area, the action could be counter-productive.”81 Romanian IOC member Alexandru Siperco’s comments reflected an inherent contradiction at the heart of IOC security policies. He noted that terrorists attacked when “guaranteed maximum effect, normally in the world of politics” yet claimed that the IOC “was, of course, outside politics” and that security at Los Angeles formed a pri-

79 Duckworth and Hunt ority for the IOC.82 As shown by the attack at Munich, the notion that the IOC existed outside of politics did not matter to terrorists. Kumar realized this and best expressed this sentiment during his speech to the Executive Board when he remarked, “The Games would be an excellent platform upon which … ter- rorists could express their grievances.”83 There was one nation that Kumar did not completely trust to co-operate internationally on the prevention of terrorist attacks: the Soviet Union. He noted that “[t]heoretically the Soviets do not approve of terrorism and offi- cially condemn it as adventurist and individualistic.”84 But Kumar, whose pri- mary responsibility it must be noted was to anticipate possible threat scenarios, remained unconvinced. The Soviet Union, he argued, could be tempted. He contended that terrorists provided the Soviets “surrogates in the cold war against the capitalist powers.”85 He argued that such strategy served a dual purpose for the Soviets: “providing [terrorist] groups the training and weapons [meant] the Soviet Union could keep a certain measure of control over them and prevent them from turning their attention to action within the USSR.”86 Unfortunately, the available IOC records fail to mention the Soviet delegation’s response to these comments. In the context of this debate, the protection of the IOC headquarters in Lausanne was raised as a point of concern.87 Samaranch instructed Kumar to coordinate with the police in Lausanne and Bern “to discuss security measures for the IOC President and the IOC Headquarters.”88 Kumar’s comments earlier in the meeting perhaps fueled the tension in the room over the safety of the IOC President and the attending members. Kumar warned those present that “It was known that the President and some of the IOC members could be tar- gets for terrorist attacks.”89 There was no lack of interest when discussing per- sonal safety rather than the safety of those athletes competing at the Olympics.

Changing the IOC’s Stance on Security Policies

While Kumar’s report to the IOC did not convince every committee member that the IOC should be involved in planning security, his appointment initi- ated a significant change in the IOC’s policy on security at the Olympic Games. While previously the IOC devolved responsibility for security issues to the Olympic Organizing Committees, following his appointment Kumar argued, “overall responsibility for security at any Olympic Meet is entirely and absolutely that of the Government of the country where the Meet will take place.”90 This position represented a subtle but significant shift in IOC policy as it recognized the essential role played by national governments in minimiz- ing threats as opposed to relying on the Organizing Committees. This is not to discount the role played by Juan Antonio Samaranch whose attention to secu- rity dwarfed those of his predecessors’. Under Samaranch’s leadership Ashwini

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Kumar helped alter the IOC’s policies on threat prevention at the Olympic Games. In the span of eleven years, the IOC stance towards security at the Olym- pic Games evolved dramatically. These policy shifts reflected a changing lead- ership at the higher echelons of the organization. Under Lord Killanin, the IOC viewed responsibility as the purview of respective Olympic Organizing Committees. When Juan Antonio Samaranch assumed the helm of the IOC, this policy started changing. With the aid of Indian IOC Member Ashwini Kumar, the IOC began taking a more active role in coordinating security pol- icy at the Olympics between national governments, the Organizing Commit- tees, and the IOC. Kumar’s insistence that security worked more efficiently with the IOC acting as the liaison transformed the IOC’s role in security at the Olympics. To some extent the 1972 attack did serve as a focusing event for the IOC as it led Lord Killanin to officially assign responsibility for security at the Olympics. This event, however, was not enough for the IOC leadership to insert the organization, as Kumar later accomplished, as the liaison between the heads of nations and Organizing Committees for the Olympic Games.

Endnotes 1 Red Smith, “Again the Sandbox,” New York Times, September 8, 1972. 2 This policy is most clearly stated in a letter from Lord Michael Morris Kil- lanin to Madame Monique Berlioux, 1 May 1976, Montreal Olympic Organizing Committee (COJO): correspondance janvier-mai 1976, Folder: COJO correspondance janvier 1976, International Olympic Com- mittee Library (hereafter IOCL). The idea of protecting athletes did not arise in response to the Munich attacks. Police patrolled the first Olympic Village at the Los Angeles Summer Olympics in 1932. Arthur Daley of the New York Times reported on July 24, 1932, that the job of the police was to “guarantee privacy for the stars” with access to the Village restricted to athletes and select journalists who were not “permitted to stray way from the one bungalow they [were] permitted to visit.” 3 Pete Fussey et al., Securing and Sustaining the Olympic City (London and New York: Routledge, 2016). 4 For an analysis of risk management and terrorism at the Olympics see Kristine Toohey and Tracy Taylor, “Mega Events, Fear, and Risk: Terror- ism at the Olympic Games,” Journal of Sport Management 22 (2008): 451– 89. Kristine Toohey and Millicent Kennelly demonstrate the relationship between Olympic security and the precautionary principle in Millicent Kennelly and Kristine Toohey, “Terrorism and the Olympics: ‘The Games Have Gone On,’” Sporting Traditions 24, no. 1–2 (2007): 1–22. A more

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recent study and state of the field can be found in Ramón Spaaij, “Terror- ism and Security at the Olympics: Empirical Trends and Evolving Research Agendas,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 33, no. 4 (2016): 451–68. 5 On civil liberties see David Hassan, “Securing the Olympics: At What Price?,” Sport in Society 17, no. 5 (2014): 628–39.While it focuses solely on Montreal, one of the best recent historical studies is by sociologist Domi- nique Clément, “The Transformation of Security Planning for the Olym- pics: The 1976 Montreal Games,” Terrorism and Political Violence 27, no. 2 (2015): 1–25; The most comprehensive historical study is Guy R. Sanan, Olympic Security, 1972-1996: Threat, Response, and International Coop- eration (Ph.D. diss., St. Andrews University, 1997). Sanan’s work relies heavily on interview material rather than archival documents. Robert Cottrell wrote a brief paper outlining the type of security at each Olym- pics since Munich in “The Legacy of Munich 1972: Terrorism, Security and the Olympic Games,” in The Legacy of the Olympic Games 1984-2000, ed. M. de Moragas, C Kennett, and N Puig (Lausanne, Switzerland: Inter- national Olympic Committee, 2003), 309–13. 6 For example see David Charters on the 1984 Olympic Games in “Terror- ism and the 1984 Olympics,” Conflict Quarterly 3, no. 4 (1983): 37–47; on the 2000 Sydney Olympics see Alan Thompson, “Security,” in Staging the Olympics: The Event and Its Impact, ed. Richard Cashman and Anthony Hughes (Sydney: University of New South Wales, 1999). 7 See, for example, Christopher Elzey, “Munich 1972: Sport, Politics, and Tragedy” (Purdue University, 2004). 8 John W. Kingdon provides a superb description of “focusing events” in Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 2003), 94-100. 9 Sanan, “Olympic Security,” 137. 10 Thomas M. Hunt, Drug Games: The International Olympic Committee and the Politics of Doping (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 2011), 25 11 Minutes of the IOC General Session, Munich, August 21st-24th, 1972, IOCL. 12 Minutes of the IOC General Session, Munich, August 21st-24th, 1972, IOCL, 58. 13 Minutes of the IOC General Session, Munich, August 21st-24th, Septem- ber 5th 1972, IOCL, 59. 14 Ibid. 15 Letter from Lord Michael Killanin to Willi Daume, 18 September 1972, Correspondence of Michael Killanin September-October 1972, Folder: 12-29 September 1972, IOCL.

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16 Letter from Lord Killanin to Madame Berlioux, 25 January 1973, Corre- spondance of Michael Killanin (Pres) 1973, Folder:18-31 janvier 1973, IOCL. 17 Some IOC records contain reports from Organizing Committees that mention the presence of security. For examples see, Minutes of the Meet- ing of the 79th I.O.C. Session, June 15th-18th, 1977, IOCL, 63-64; Agenda for the 76th Session of the International Olympic Committee, Lausanne, May 21st-23rd, 1975, IOCL, 37; Agenda for the 77th Session of the I.O.C., February 2nd-3rd, 1976, IOCL, 9. 18 Minutes of the Meetings of the I.O.C. Executive Board, January 30th-31st, February 5th-12th, 14th-15th, 1976, IOCL, 16. 19 “Ashwini Kumar,” Biography, cuttings, and writings of Ashwini Kumar, Folder: Biographie, IOCL. 20 “Ashwini Kumar,” Biography, cuttings, and writings of Ashwini Kumar, Folder: Biographie, IOCL; Sankar Sen, ed., Reflection and Reminiscences of Police Officers (New Delhi: Ashok Kumar Mittal Concept Publishing Company, 2006), 9. 21 United States Department of State, Secretary of State William Rogers, Confidential Cable, “Subj: Secretary's Letter to Foreign Minister on Con- sultation regarding International Measures against Terrorism” September 11, 1972, Digital National Security Archive Collection: Terrorism and U.S. Policy, 1968-2002 (available via library subscription at: http://nsar- chive.gwu.edu/publications/dnsa.html). 22 Anon., “Terrorism Analysis in the CIA: The Gradual Awakening (1972- 1980),” Studies in Intelligence 51, no. 1, accessed July 8, 2016, http://nsar- chive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB431/docs/intell_ebb_017.PDF. (The author’s name is redacted in the document.) 23 Robert Toth, “NIXON ESTABLISHES CABINET PANEL TO FIGHT TERRORISM,” Los Angeles Times, September 26, 1972, sec. A1. 24 At times the word “security” appears in the IOC Meeting Minutes but not in relation to how the IOC might prepare for a potential threat to the Olympic Games. For example, when the IOC discussed replacing a pass- port with the Olympic identity card, Killanin and Soviet IOC member Konstantin Andrianov argued this idea “presented certain security prob- lems” yet no further discussion ensued. Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, , October 18th-24th, 1974, IOCL, 8. 25 Minutes of the IOC General Session, Varna, October 5th-7th, 1973, IOCL, 24. 26 Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Montreal, October 4th-6th, 1975, IOCL, 23. 27 Letter from Lord Killanin to James Worrall, 11 November 1973, James Worrall correspondance 1967-1977, Folder: Correspondance 1975-1977, IOCL.

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28 Letter from Lord Killanin to Madame Berlioux, 1 May 1976, COJO: correspon- dance janvier-mai 1976, Folder: COJO correspondance janvier 1976, IOCL. 29 Minutes of the IOC General Session, Lausanne, May 21st-23rd, 1975, IOCL, 37. 30 Leonard Shapiro, “The Winter Olympics—An Armed Camp in Scenic ,” The Washington Post, February 2, 1976. 31 Ibid. 32 Bernard Kirsch, “U.S. Hopes Are Dim in Olympic Winter Games Open- ing Wednesday,” New York Times, February 1, 1976. 33 Leonard Shapiro, “The Winter Olympics.” 34 Minutes of the IOC General Session, Montreal, July 13th-17th, 19th, 1976, IOCL, 88. 35 Minutes of the IOC General Session, Montreal, July 13th-17th, 19th, 1976, IOCL, 89. 36 “Montreal on Guard,” COJO: correspondance janvier-mai 1976, Folder: COJO correspondance janvier 1976, IOCL. 37 Jack Anderson, “Terrorist ‘Fish’ in a Sea of Tourists,” The Washington Post, May 16, 1976. 38 Nancy Scannell, “’76 Montreal Olympics Could Be Another Munich: 1976 Olympiad Promises to Be ‘Vie in the Sky,’” The Washington Post, October 23, 1974. 39 Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Lausanne, February 2-5, 1973, IOCL, 17. 40 Clément, “The Transformation of Security Planning," 7. 41 Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Innsbruck, January 30th-31st and February 5th-12th, 14th-15th, 1976, IOCL, 16. 42 Quoted in Clément, “The Transformation of Security Planning,” 7. 43 “Security force will be biggest since the war,” COJO: correspondance jan- vier-mai 1976, Folder: COJO correspondance fevrier-mars 1976, IOCL. 44 “Olympic Security Tight to Avert Munich Repeat,” The Austin American Statesman, March 24, 1976, sec. E1. 45 “Olympics pass? Do it yourself,” 22 July 1976, unidentified newspaper clipping; Pétitions demandant que le sport reste a politique, Folder: peti- tions août 1976, IOCL. 46 Gerald Redmond, “Olympic Security is the Real Hoax,” The Ottawa Jour- nal, July 24, 1976, sec A; Imposter hoax scares security,” The Ottawa Jour- nal, July 23, 1976. 47 “Security Tightened,” New York Times, July 24, 1976, sec. 18. 48 “Olympic Official Report Montreal 1976 Volume One part 2,” 571 (accessed online: http://library.la84.org/6oic/OfficialReports/1976/ 1976v1p2.pdf).

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49 Ted Green, “Soviets Waging Modern Cold War at Lake Placid,” Los Ange- les Times, February 12, 1980, sec. D1. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 Leonard Shapiro, “Village Security Forces Try to Maintain Low Profile,” The Washington Post, February 13, 1980. 53 Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Lausanne, October 19th-20th, 1977, IOCL, 64 54 Selwyn Raab, “Security Choice for Lake Placid Called Slipshod: Albany Panel Cites Lack of Check on Contractor,” New York Times, January 25, 1980, sec. B1. 55 Ibid. The head of CCS, Ben Jamil, later pleaded guilty to selling equip- ment to Syria, Guinea, Switzerland, and Greece. The federal government dropped the charges in exchange for Jamil becoming a secret informant. Mark Hosenball, “Spy-Shop Owner Said to Lead Double Life: Jamil Called Accomplice In ‘Sting’ to Snare Agents,” The Washington Post, September 16, 1985, sec. B1. 56 Barbara Basler, “Olympic Security Involving 1,000 U.S. and State Agents,” New York Times, January 26, 1980. 57 Kenneth Reich, “Moscow’s Un-Spartan Olympics May Foil L.A.’s Plans for 1984 Games,” Los Angeles Times, August 3, 1980, sec. D1. 58 In 2011 the CIA released a sanitized version of this report via the CIA Records Electronic Research Tool (CREST) at the National Archives in College Park, MD (hereafter NACP); Memorandum for President Jimmy Carter, “USSR: Olympics Preparations,” January 9, 1980, CREST, NACP. 59 Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Los Angeles, February 23rd-24th, 1981, IOCL, 8. Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Lausanne, April 9th, 1981, IOCL, 20. 60 Sanan, “Olympic Security,” 138. 61 A summary of Samaranch’s account can be found in Sanan, “Olympic Security,” 138. Sanan relied heavily on interviews with Samaranch. David Miller, Olympic Revolution: The Olympic Biography of Juan Antonio Samaranch (London: Pavilion Books Ltd, 1994), 128. 62 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, 29 April 1983, Ashwini Kumar Correspondance, Folder: janvier-juin 1983, International Olympic Committee Library, Lausanne, Switzerland [hereafter IOCL]. 63 Letter from Juan Antonio Samaranch to Ashwini Kumar, 13 June 1983, Ashwini Kumar Correspondance, Folder: janvier-juin 1983, IOCL. 64 Letter From Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, 1 July 1983, Ashwini Kumar Correspondance 1983, Folder: juillet-decembre, IOCL. 65 Ibid. Letter from Ashwini Kumar to JAS 1 July 1983, AK correspondance 1983 file: juillet-decembre

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66 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, August 29 1983, Ashwini Kumar Correspondance 1983: Folder: janvier-juin 1983, IOCL. 67 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Madame Berlioux, September 12 1983, Ashwini Kumar Correspondance 1983: Folder: janvier-juin 1983, IOCL . 68 “Protection: Chariman of International Olympic Committes,” Securite aux Jeux Olympiques: rapports et correspondance, 1981-1985, Folder: Rapport sur le risqué terroriste 1984, IOCL. An account of the Black Sep- tember assassination can be found in John K. Cooley, Green March, Black September: The Story of the Palestinian Arabs, 2nd ed. (New York: Rout- ledge, 2015), 123. Jerrold M. Post provides a brief history of the IRA during this era in The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to Al-Qaeda (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 48-51. 69 “Protection: Chariman of International Olympic Committes,” Securite aux Jeux Olympiques: rapports et correspondance, 1981-1985, Folder: Rapport sur le risqué terroriste 1984, IOCL. 70 “Protection: Chariman of International Olympic Committes,” Securite aux Jeux Olympiques: rapports et correspondance, 1981-1985, Folder: Rapport sur le risqué terroriste 1984, IOCL. 71 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, September 12 1983, Ashwini Kumar Correspondance 1983: Folder: janvier-juin 1983, IOCL. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 In a January 1988 letter to Juan Antonio Samaranch, Willi Daume inquired whether “the IOC has possibilities to influence the Soviet gov- ernment via the NOC of the USSR, so that Moscow in turn [could] urge the North Korean government to refrain from that kind of criminal plans, which would set the whole world against the North Korea regime,” Poli- tique aux Jeux Olympiques d’été de Séoul 1988 correspondance, File: cor- respondance, janvier-février 1988. 75 Ibid. According to Kumar’s report on international terrorism, Bader Meinhof went “back to the social revolutionary student movements in Europe in the sixties.” “Known Terrorist Groups,” Securite aux Jeux Olympiques: rapports et correspondance, 1981-1985, Folder: rapport sur le risqué terroriste 1984, 4, IOCL. 76 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Madame Berlioux, September 12 1983, Ashwini Kumar Correspondance 1983: Folder: janvier-juin 1983, IOCL 77 Minutes of the IOC Executive Board, Lausanne, November 24th-25th, 1983, IOCL, 44. 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid.

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81 Ibid. 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid. 84 Ashwini Kumar, “Terror Report,” securite aux Jeux Olympiques: rapports et correspondance, 1981-1985, Folder: rapport le risqué terroriste 1984, IOCL. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid. 87 Minutes of the IOC Executive Board, Lausanne, November 24th-25th, 1983, IOCL, 45. 88 Ibid. Underlined in original. 89 Ibid, 44. 90 Kumar, “Terror Report.”

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