Protecting the Games The International Olympic Committee and Security, 1972-1984 Austin Duckworth and Thomas M. Hunt * When Palestinian terrorists took eleven Israeli athletes hostage at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games, the image of the Olympics as an arena of global harmony shat- tered. The International Olympic Committee (IOC), which posited the view that the Games remained above political squabbles, faced a new, complex issue and had no clear precedent to draw upon. This article examines how IOC policy toward security at the Olympics changed following the initial attack at Munich to the years leading up to the 1984 Summer Olympic Games in Los Angeles. Drawing upon IOC Meeting Minutes, personal correspondence between IOC members, and media reports, this paper argues that previous interpretations of Olympic security over- state the role of President Juan Antonio Samaranch in altering IOC security policy following his election. This examination emphasizes the role of Indian IOC Mem- ber Ashwini Kumar as the driving force behind a shift in IOC policy towards secu- rity prior to the 1984 Games in Sarajevo and Los Angeles. ❖ Introduction Early on the morning of September 5, 1972, eight members of the Palestinian organization Black September stormed the Olympic Village compound hous- ing members of the Israeli Olympic team. The terrorists took eleven Israelis hostage and after hours of negotiations, a botched rescue attempt by German authorities to save the Israelis resulted in the deaths of all hostages and five of the terrorists. In the ensuing debate over whether to continue the Games, the President of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), Avery Brundage, stood firm. Standing before the watching world, he uttered the now notorious phrase, “The Games must go on.”1 Now, towards the end of nearly two decades at the helm of the IOC, Brundage and the organization he led faced a new crisis. He touted the IOC and the Olympic Games as entities above the fray of global politics. While pre- vious boycotts and issues over recognition briefly highlighted the connections between the Olympic Games and international politics, the attack by Black * Doctoral student Austin Duckworth and corresponding author Thomas M. Hunt are with the Department of Kinesiology and Health Education at the University of Texas at Austin, USA. 68 Olympika XXV (2016), 68-87 September quite forcefully showed the watching world the inextricable links between the Olympic Games and global political quandaries. This paper highlights the IOC’s lack of response to the terrorist attack at the Munich Olympic Games and posits a previously unheralded figure as the driving force behind the IOC’s eventual reaction to security threats. After Munich, the IOC placed responsibility for security with the respective Orga- nizing Committees of the Olympics.2 As will be shown, it is clear that the IOC knew about potential threats yet deferred responsibility to the Olympic Orga- nizing Committees. While the access of Organizing Committees to local and national law enforcement makes this a plausible rationale, it is instructive to examine how the IOC’s policy towards security evolved. The primary focus of this work is to track IOC policy changes towards security at the Olympic Games from devolving responsibility after 1972 to actively acting as a security liaison between national governments and Organizing Committees in 1984. The following discussion does not contain a lengthy account of the implemen- tation of security measures but, in order to provide context, observations on some alterations to the execution of security at the Olympics are provided. While a burgeoning field, the study of terrorism and security at the Olym- pic Games is a subject with rich potential for scholarship. The introduction to a recently published edited volume titled Securing and Sustaining the Olympic City noted, “Olympic security has, surprisingly, received scant attention in aca- demic circles.”3 Scholars in sociology and sport management provide the bulk of works regarding security and the Olympics.4 While this scholarship offers insightful viewpoints, there is not yet a comprehensive, archival-based study on the development of Olympic security either before or after Munich. The few his- torically based monographs on security skim the surface of the decision-mak- ing or focus solely on the security measures employed.5 Certain themes also elicit more attention from scholars. One trend is to try and predict potential threats towards host cities while another is to exam- ine the relationship between security for a host city and civil liberties for its citizens.6 The most covered event is the attack at the Munich Olympic Games, which forms a base of scholarship; even so, these studies generally do not examine the long-term effects of the event.7 This paper adds to the current scholarship by arguing that the Munich tragedy in 1972 should have served as a “focusing event” for the IOC.8 Yet there were almost no policy-related dis- cussions until 1983. It took an intrepid and knowledgeable member of the IOC, Ashwini Kumar, finally to push the issue of security to the forefront. His- torian Guy Sanan provided three related explanations for the IOC’s silence on security problems subsequent to the Munich tragedy: 69 Duckworth and Hunt First, a reluctance of present IOC members to pass judgment on previous IOC Presidents’ actions, particularly in an area in which they do not possess expertise. Second, the less transparent nature IOC Presidency (sic) under Samaranch’s predecessor Brundage and Killanin, coupled with the sensitivity of the security issues, left security policy closed to wider exposure. Lastly, the perception amongst many top IOC members in the 1970s that security and counter-terrorism (which were novel and developing concepts at the time) were not within the realm of the IOC and should rather be left to the police and military of the host governments.9 Without testimony from current or former IOC members, it is difficult to grapple with the first theory. This paper shows that the second theory, that a more opaque leadership style omitted IOC members from knowing about responses to security, is not plausible. The third theory is the most plausible. Yet, Thomas M. Hunt’s description of the IOC’s early response to doping is a more accurate framework to utilize when analyzing the IOC’s views on secu- rity. Hunt argued in his book Drug Games that in regards to doping, “the IOC leadership tended to try to shift responsibility to other organizations in the Olympic governance system.”10 In the case of security, the Organizing Com- mittees initially received this responsibility. While the massacre at Tlatelolco in 1968 four years prior provides another security event to examine, this discussion begins with the 1972 Games because the attack at Munich led the IOC to officially assign responsibility of security to the Organizing Committees. The article begins with a discussion of the IOC’s initial response to the Munich attack and covers the Summer and Win- ter Olympic Games in 1976 and 1980. A combination of archival evidence and media reports serve to identify the IOC’s hands-off approach to security during these years. The paper concludes with the 1984 Winter Olympics in Sarajevo and Summer Olympics in Los Angeles and discusses the rise of Indian IOC member Ashwini Kumar, who has previously not received enough recognition for his role in focusing the IOC’s attention on security. Despite the Tragedy: Munich 1972 In order fully to understand the position of the IOC following the Munich attacks, it is necessary to examine the organization’s initial response. Immedi- ately following news of the attack, Avery Brundage called the IOC’s Executive Board to an emergency meeting. The Meeting Minutes note that at the conclu- sion of this discussion the group “agreed that the IOC was getting involved in internal problems which did not concern it and it was their opinion that the Games must continue at all costs.”11 It is difficult to ascertain how the mem- bers of the Executive Board convinced themselves that an attack on athletes competing at the Olympic Games was not a problem for the IOC. Equally 70 Protecting the Games unclear is the classification of a Palestinian attack on an Israeli team as an internal problem for Germany. In the midst of the meeting, erroneous reports filtered in of a successful rescue attempt that ended with the rescue of all hostages and the deaths of the terrorists. IOC Member, and President of the 1972 Organizing Committee, Willi Daume suggested a day of mourning prior to restarting the Games. His IOC colleague Prince Alexander de Merode contradicted Daume, arguing that “the Olympic movement belonged to the IOC and the Organising Committee were their agents. The Games must continue and as soon as possible.”12 The general concern expressed was how to ensure that the Games finished on schedule. The stenographer recording the notes of the meeting described Daume’s reaction to the comments from his fellow IOC members as “shocked.”13 On the subsequent morning, the severity of the situation reached the Executive Board: a failed rescue attempt had ended with the deaths of all the Israeli athletes. Even after this news the IOC struggled to decide how to respond adequately. The Board engaged in a “full discussion” to reach the decision temporarily to postpone the Games.14 These deliberations seem to show that concern over the safety of the athletes was lower in priority than scheduling. IOC member Lord Michael Morris Killanin expressed his true feelings in a letter to Daume less than two weeks later. He encouraged Daume, observing that, “[d]espite the tragedy of the Israeli athletes there were many highlights … it was amongst the 10,000 athletes, of whom [Daume and Kill- anin] read little, that the real Olympic spirit existed.”15 Killanin’s attitude sheds light on the IOC’s later decision to define specific limits on its responsibility for security.