CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION ...... 1

2 DESCRIPTION OF THE SITE ...... 1

3 HAZARDS ...... 7

4 SAFETY MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM ...... 11

5 OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING THE CROSSING ...... 13

6 OPTIONS EVALUATED ...... 14

7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 15

8 APPROVAL ...... 18

9 APPENDIX A ...... 19

10 APPENDIX B ...... 21

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Reason for the risk assessment

Network Rail has a responsibility and legal duty under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 for the health, safety and welfare of its employees and for protecting others against risk.

Network Rail also has a legal responsibility under the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999. Section 3 focuses on the requirement for suitable and sufficient assessments of risk to health and safety of employees and others in connection with their undertaking.

Network Rail is committed to reducing the risk on the railway and has identified that one of its greatest public risks is at level crossings. This is where the railway has a direct interface with other elements e.g. vehicles and/or pedestrians. Network Rail is working to reduce this risk to as low as is reasonably practicable.

2 DESCRIPTION OF THE SITE

2.1 details

Name of crossing Cotton Mill Lane Type FPK Engineers Line Reference (ELR) WSA Mileage 6miles 19chains OS grid reference TL149060 Number of lines crossed 1 Line speed (mph) 50 Electrification Yes Signal box Junction SCC Risk assessment next due date 02/03/2018

As part of a level crossing risk assessment, data is entered into the industry accepted risk modelling support tool (All Level Crossing Risk Model) which enables Network Rail to compare risk at all level crossings throughout the network. Results for this level crossing are provided below; see Appendix A for further details on how this is calculated.

ALCRM Risk Details Risk Score D2 FWI 0.028882016

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Cotton Mill Lane level crossing is an unprotected crossing. This means the crossing is not protected from train movements and therefore trains can traverse the crossing whether it is clear or not.

Cotton Mill Lane level crossing is also known as a passive crossing as there is no method of warning of an approaching train. The crossing relies upon users actively stopping, looking and listening for approaching trains before deciding if it is safe to cross.

At present, there are 700 level crossings on the LNW route. Out of this figure Cotton Mill Lane crossing is ranked number 6. However, if you compare this level crossing to other crossings of a similar type it is ranked 1st out of 20.

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Upside approach of Cotton Mill Lane Crossing

Down side approach of Cotton Mill Lane Crossing

Additional photographs of the surrounding environment are provided in Appendix B.

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2.3 Crossing environment Cotton Mill Lane level crossing is in , a city in , England with a population of 57,795. It lies east of Hemel Hempstead and west of Hatfield, about 20 miles north-northwest of central London, 8 miles southwest of Welwyn Garden City and 11 miles south-southeast of Luton. There is a retail complex comprising several retail outlets and a supermarket located 300m to the North West of Cotton Mill Lane level crossing. St Albans Abbey Railway Station is located 600m to the North West. Adjacent to the station on the west side is a business park. To the east of the level crossing there is a woodland area and a children’s play area. St. Columba’s College, a Catholic Boys school for 4-18 year olds is about 600m to the north-west of the crossing, St. Peters primary school is 600m north of the crossing and Mandeville primary school is located at 600m south of the crossing.

Currently the level crossing is included on the Sustrans routes (The Green Ring) for cyclists within St Albans. However, cycling is not permitted across the level crossing. The cyclist dismount signs displayed at the crossing would suggest no formal agreement is in place between Network Rail and the National Cycle Network Route. The signs are present mandating cyclists to dismount when using the crossing.

2.4 Approach to crossing This crossing is located between St Albans Abbey station and How Wood station. At this location the crossing spans 1 line with a maximum line speed of 50 mph; however there is a speed restriction of 20 mph in place at the crossing since 2015 due to the numerous near misses and deliberate misuses identified. The railway is orientated from north to south.

Approaching the crossing from the west the first track met is the down side. Approaching the crossing from the east the first track met is the up side.

The crossing approach from the east originates at Cotton Mill Lane through Berners Drive using the public footpaths with reasonable flat surface leading to the crossing wooden gate. Once through the gate, the path continues straight to the wooden deck to traverse the crossing for Supermarket, Retail Park, public housing and other amenities. The approach from the west originates at Griffiths Way; using a public footpath with reasonable flat surface to Grindcobbe leading to the crossing wooden gate. Once through the gate, the path continues to the wooden deck to go over the crossing to Cotton Mill Lane, Berners Drive and Public Park.

The deck is highlighted yellow and there are marked decision points on both approaches. Low level lightings were installed to illuminate the decking during the hours of darkness and the crossing had a facelift to renew the signage and removed old signs which left it cluttered.

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2.5 Crossing usage Normal passenger services run between the hours of 06:10 and 22:42 with approximately 56 services per day. The number and frequency of services can fluctuate depending on operational requirements, engineering works or during times of disruption.

At some level crossings, there is a chance that a second train may pass the crossing within 20 seconds of the first train. At this location, there is a chance this will never happen.

Additionally, the chance that a second approaching train may not be seen until the first train has passed is impossible.

A nine day census was completed between 21st July 2015 and 2nd of August 2015. See data describing the numbers of daily users here.

User Type Number Pedal / Motor Cycles 221 Pedestrians 788

The tableted figures describe the daily usage, there were 9077 users in total over this census period; of this figure 1988 were cyclists and pedestrians were 7089.

Unaccompanied children use the crossing during the day, due to the location of the youth club and retail park which includes a McDonalds. There is also a play park and a wooded area to the east of the crossing which will attract children. Also the level crossing gives residence access to 3 local schools all within 600m of the level crossing. User total for this group is 108.

The recent census visually identified vulnerable users such as unaccompanied children, children in pushchairs and mobility scooter / wheelchair users. However it must be noted that a visual census does not fully identify all users with protected characteristics. This figure equates to 7.8% of the overall known usage. As such the traverse has been increased by 50%.

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3 HAZARDS

3.1 Sighting and traverse A decision point is a position where an individual would reasonably make a decision to cross the railway.

Sighting is the distance that can be seen in both directions for approaching trains. At this crossing the sighting is greater than required for the time needed to allow an able bodied person to traverse the crossing.

The length of the crossing from a safe place on one side of the railway to a safe place on the other side of the crossing is 6.5 metres when crossing from the up side and 6.5 metres when crossing from the down side.

The time required to traverse the crossing from the up side is 5.47 seconds for a pedestrians. The time required to traverse the crossing from the down side is 5.47 seconds for a pedestrian. These times have been calculated using the Network Rail sighting calculation tool. As this crossing is used by mothers with pushchair and their children to access and egress the local Schools, shopping, other amenities and also used by other vulnerable people in the local community, the traverse time is increased to 8.2 seconds.

The sighting at the crossing is sufficient to provide suitable warning of an approaching train to enable the user to cross. However, whistle boards are located on the approach to the crossing in both directions so that the driver of the train sounds the horn to warn potential users. Details of sighting distance and traverse times is available below.

Whistle boards place the onus onto the train driver to sound a warning which can lead to either no warning being sounded or inconsistent warning times (based on whether the train driver sounds the horn on approach to the board, at the board or beyond the board). Furthermore, since December 2016, train horns are not used between the hours of 00:00hrs and 06:00hrs – the night time quiet period (NTQP).

Due to the 20mph temporary speed restriction imposed, the whistle boards in both directions were relocated to 117meters from the centre point of the crossing.

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Decision Traverse Measured from point (m) length (m) Up side 2m 6.5 Edge of fence Down side 2m 6.5 Edge of fence

Traverse Time Up Traverse Time Down

Side (seconds) Side (seconds) Pedestrians 8.2 8.2

Minimum Warning time Available sighting provided by sighting Measured to distance sighting distance distance (m) required (m) (seconds) Upside looking Beyond whistle towards up 122 241 26.96 board at 241m train approach Upside looking Beyond whistle towards down 122 298 33.34 board at 258 m train approach Down side looking 27.18 122 243 OLE Structure towards up train approach Down side looking Beyond whistle 29.98 122 268 towards down board at 258m train approach

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3.2 Identified hazards and risks

Hazard Potential impact Mitigations Trains Fatality or serious injury  Level crossing signage.  Minimum required sighting available.  Train warning given Slip, trip, falls Fatality or serious injury  Appropriate crossing decking for crossing type and location.  Regular crossing inspections and maintenance regime in place.  Vegetation management plan in place. Difficulty on hearing Fatality or serious injury  Level crossing signage. approaching trains  Vegetation management plan in place. due to inclement  Train warning given. weather Darkness Fatality or serious injury  Review of night time usage completed. Vegetation growth Fatality or serious injury  Vegetation management plan in place. between visits  Regular inspection and maintenance reducing the ability regime in place. to see trains approaching crossing Unfamiliar users Fatality or serious injury  Standard crossing layout, compliant with ORR (Office of Rail and Road) guidance.  Instructional signage at crossing  Level crossing safety awareness days. Crossing near the Fatality or serious injury  Level crossing signage. station  Vegetation management plan in place.  Train warning given.

The risk assessment is based on data collected at the crossing and entered into ALCRM. This is a computer-based application used by Network Rail to assist in the risk management of level crossings. The risk result consists of a ‘letter’ and ‘number’ classification of safety risk, giving the ‘letter’ (A-M for individual risk) or ‘number’ (1-13 for collective risk) band. These rankings represent the range of risk across all types of crossings where A and 1 are the highest and M and 13 are the lowest

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Safety Risk Individual Risk D Collective Risk 2

Ind Risk Ind Risk Collective User Type (Fraction) (Numeric) Risk Cyclist / Motorcyclist 1 in 25656 3.90E-05 0.006288181 Pedestrian 1 in 25656 3.90E-05 0.022421207 Passengers 0 Staff 1.73E-04 Total 0.028882016

Collision Frequencies User Train / User Equipment Other Pedestrian: 0.034525504 0.008846774 0.024233217

Collision Risk User Train / User Equipment Other Pedestrian: 0.02803471 1.42E-04 5.33E-04

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4 SAFETY MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM

4.1 Network Rails internal safety management information systems have been interrogated and revealed that during the previous 5 years there have been numerous reported incidents at the crossing, see details below.

26/02/2011: At 12:27 Route Controller advised that the driver of their 2F19 12:01 Watford Jcn - St Albans Abbey reported a near miss at Cotton Mill Crossing on the St Albans Branch line. The driver reported that as they approached the crossing a member of public went to cross the line, hesitated and then crossed forcing the driver to apply the brakes in an emergency.

11/02/2012: At 17:12 Watford Signaller advised that the driver of 2F32 reported a near miss with people using the Cotton Mill lane crossing. Driver had to apply emergency brakes but was ok to continue. BTP informed ref 372.

24/03/2012: At 10:00 Watford PSB advised that 2F13 reported a near miss while approaching Cotton mill lane user crossing. A person crossed with a child in front of 2F13. The driver used the horn when a second woman crossed with a pushchair and the emergency brake was applied, driver was O.K to continue but shaken.

26/07/2012: At 10:00 Watford PSB Signaller advised that when 2F13 approached Cotton mill foot crossing a Female, (Description given), stepped out in front of the train onto the crossing then stepped back out of the way at the last second. Driver booked off duty when back at Watford. Driver reports that the person took no notice even after he repeated the whistle blow and that he missed them by about 5 to 10 feet.

09/04/2013: A 17:35 Approaching Cotton Mill Crossing, the driver of London Midland 2F33 17:21 Watford to St. Albans Abbey sounded the horn and a youth ran across in front of the train. The youth slipped, but regained his feet clearing the track just before the train hit him. The driver had applied the emergency brake to avoid an accident, coming to a stop on the crossing. The youth was seen to clear the area afterwards. The train then continued to St Albans Abbey.

14/05/2013: At 21:55 Watford PSB advised that the driver of LM 2F43 21:31 Watford to St Albans had reported a near miss at Cotton Mill crossing on the approach to St Albans Abbey. The driver reported that a female was crossing and that he blew his horn and that the female jumped out of the way. The female then left the area.

26/03/2014: At 14:00 the driver of 2F24 13:52 St Albans Abbey - Watford Jcn, reported that whilst travelling on the single line at Cotton Mill Crossing near Albans Abbey, he saw 6 youths standing in front of the train, 3 males and 3 females. One was wearing a grey top and another one was wearing a blue top. As the driver

11 approached the crossing, the group of youths walked off the crossing towards the local Sainsbury’s. The driver was ok to continue and had done so. BTP ref. 271.

14/06/17 at 07:39 the driver (BY200) has called LM Control to advise he has suffered some near miss incidents this morning. Firstly whilst working 2F05 at Watford North and then when at Cotton Mill Lane, then whilst working 2F07 at Cotton Mill Lane. All incidents have been between 20 -25ft of the train. The driver has not reported any of the incidents to the signaller and has been requested to do so. Service cancelled UFN. 25/07/17 at 19:58 driver on the St Albans/Abbey line, reports a near miss (driver sounded horn and applied emergency brake) at Cotton Mill crossing. The driver reports seeing three kids crossing the line in front of the service. The first two children traversed the crossing but the third, stopped in the four foot and waited for the train to stop, where by the child then verbally abused the driver.

During the 9 days census in 2015, the surveillance camera captured incidents of loitering around the level crossing. People were seen to be spending a prolonged amount of time at the crossing in a position that again put them and others at risk had a train approached. One instance of this is a group of youths loitering at the crossing for approximately 6 minutes and they only moved out of the path of an approaching train just as it reached the crossing. On another occasion a young female is seen to sit down with her legs crossed directly on the centre of the crossing. She then proceeded to lie down, placing herself at great risk and had a train approached the crossing at this time, the young lady would have struggled to get herself clear of the approaching train and could have been seriously injured or killed Further instances include a person leaving the level crossing to walk down and trespass onto the operational railway and another person putting themselves at great risk by stopping directly on the level crossing to tie their shoelaces.

Following the results of the 9 day census, Network Rail took steps to temporarily close the level crossing on grounds of safety. The crossing was closed between Monday 24th August 2015 and Wednesday 9th September 2015. A meeting was held with St Albans District Council and Bedfordshire County Council on Friday 4th September 2015 and a number of measures were recommended to be implemented to reduce risk to a user at Cotton Mill Lane level crossing to facilitate the reopening of the public highway over the crossing. These recommendations are as follows: • Implement a Temporary Speed Restriction at the crossing – this was implemented on 9th September 2015 at 20 mph • Install new yellow glass reinforced plastic (GRP) anti slip crossing surface with edge lines highlighted • Refresh signage at the crossing, install ‘remove headphones’ signs and work with local authority to highlight approaching level crossing on their infrastructure • Marked decision point at the crossing

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• Education package delivered in the community in conjunction with the local authority, local police and media – initial safety awareness days was carried out at the crossing in the days following reopening. • Relocation of whistle boards • Reinstall cameras at the crossing to monitor usage A follow up meeting with St Albans District Council and Bedfordshire County Council was held on Thursday 17th September 2015 at this meeting a long term solution was discussed as the above mitigations are very much an interim measure. All of the above were effectively implemented and in August 2017 another 9 days surveillance camera was deployed and several deliberate misuses were identified.

5 OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING THE CROSSING

5.1 At the time of this assessment there were no other factors that affected the crossing.

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7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Provision of pedestrian stepped or ramped over bridge The construction of a pedestrian stepped or ramped over bridge may require acquisition of land; however this will close the crossing, remove crossing risk and misuse. St Albans District Council and Bedfordshire County Council vehemently refused to accept this option when the stepped foot bridge choice was presented to them at a meeting with Network Rail.

Provision of pedestrian underpass The construction of a pedestrian underpass may require acquisition of land, however this option should also be considered as construction would close the crossing, remove crossing risk and misuse. Conversely, an underpass introduces new risks such as potential flooding due to the water reservoir in close proximity and anti-social behaviour issues. With the constraints at this location and the complexity of the development, this option was discounted.

Closure by diversion (work) The diversion of the footpath away from the crossing would close the crossing, remove crossing risk and misuse. This is the preferred option by St Albans District Council and Bedfordshire County Council. It will entail constructing a footpath along the up side cess to Holywell Hill Road (A5183) adjacent to St Albans Abbey station at approximately 655m. The down side diversion will utilise the current footpath to Griffiths Way onto Holywell Hill road. The diversion is step free with no gradient and approximately 660m.

Introduction of miniature stop lights The installation of miniature stop lights has been considered but due to the proximity of St Albans Abbey station the installation of these would be complex. The location of the crossing in relation to the station may also cause the lights to enter dark mode which may cause confusion. It should also be noted that pedestrian users will often ignore the signals if a train is not visible on approach. The introduction of MSLs

15 assumes that all users of the crossing pay attention to the warning given by the lights and that they are not ignored. Research from the RSSB states that:

‘When in a group of people, individuals are prone to following the ‘herd mentality’, paying less attention to their surroundings and following the decision-making of the group as a whole. This may be particularly problematic at footpath and bridleway crossings on routes used often by ramblers. Young people in groups also exhibit more risky behaviour. A young person’s attitude to risk tends to be one of a ‘risk adopter’. Although most young people will not engage in extremely dangerous behaviour, peer group dynamics can encourage them to behave more dangerously than they would when on their own.

Consequently, a cost benefit analysis has not been completed as this is not a viable option.

Installation of VAMOS Overlay System VAMOS is an overlay system which is similar to the Miniature Stop Light (MSL) system. VAMOS provides a visual indication of a train approach via a red or green light; if the system displays a red indication, a train is approaching meaning it is not safe to cross, whereas if the system displays a green indication there are no trains in section meaning it is safe for a user to cross.

The system is similar to MSL, however is far more cost effective as it does not link into the signalling system. Instead, treadles are overlaid onto the track allowing a train to ‘strike in’ at a designated point. Once a train strikes in the system will display a red indication which shows a user it is not safe to cross. After the train has passed over the level crossing, it will ‘strike out’ changing the indication to green, showing a user it is safe to cross.

Due to the close proximity of the signals on St Albans Abbey station a VAMOS installation would not be possible so this option has been discounted.

Provide COVTEC This an overlay system that enhances the current arrangements but does not replace the whistle boards located on the approach to the crossing. COVTEC does play a localised audible alarm at the decision point to mirror that of the train sounding its horn at the whistle board. Hearing impairments may reduce the audibility of the warning. The crossing remains open for pedestrian use and the reduction in risk is low as such it is not supported on LNW. A cost benefit analysis has not been completed as this is not a viable option.

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7.2 Network Rail is subject to the requirements of the Health and Safety at Work Act etc. 1974 to reduce risk ‘so far as is reasonably practicable’. In simple terms this means that the cost, time and effort required in providing a specific risk reduction measure needs to be commensurate with the safety benefit that will be obtained as a result of its implementation.

Following the completion of the risk assessment and having reviewed all relevant information and options, the assessor recommends that the closure by diversion option is the most suitable as this will close the crossing, remove crossing risk and misuse, however this option is subject to funding.

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10 APPENDIX B

Additional photographs of crossing environment

Upside looking up Up side looking down

Down side looking up Down side looking down

Yellow glass reinforced plastic (GRP) Marked decision point

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