Putting Goats amongst the Wolves: Appointing Ministers from outside Parliament Dr Ben Yong and Professor Robert Hazell Constitution Unit January 2011 ISBN: 978-1-903903-59-9 Published by The Constitution Unit Department of Political Science UCL (University College London) 29-30 Tavistock Square London WC1H 9QU Tel: 020 7679 4977 Fax: 020 7679 4978 Email: [email protected] Web: www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/ © The Constitution Unit, UCL 2010 This report is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, hired out or otherwise circulated without the publisher’s prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser. First published January 2011 2 Foreword By Professor Robert Hazell The title of this report refers to Gordon Brown’s decision to appoint half a dozen Ministers from outside Parliament in order to build a ‘government of all the talents’ – leading such Ministers to be called Goats. It provoked a wave of interest in appointing more Ministers from outside Parliament, with senior politicians like John Major and Douglas Hurd supporting such a move. But not all the Goats proved successful, and interest in the topic has largely died away; although the new coalition government has also appointed a small number of Ministers from outside Parliament, as this report shows. Although seemingly a small change, appointing more Ministers from outside Parliament raises quite big constitutional issues: about how much separation there should be between the Executive and Parliament; how Ministers from one House might be made more accountable to the other; and what accountability mechanisms might be devised if Ministers sat in neither House. This is why we decided to embark on this study, when Peter Scott generously offered to fund a research project. It has been very ably led by Dr Ben Yong, with support from two sets of interns – Ian Jordan and Jessica Carter, and Rachel Heydecker and Nadina Fejes. Particular thanks should go to Rachel Heydecker for her work on the report overall. We are grateful to all those former Ministers and others who kindly agreed to be interviewed; to the Institute for Government for hosting a seminar to discuss our draft report; and to the overseas experts who patiently explained the arrangements in their own countries. As so often happens, these proved to be more complex, more interesting, and less utopian than UK commentators fondly suppose. This is why comparative research is so endlessly fascinating. We are very grateful to Peter Scott for funding this study, and to all those who have kindly helped with it. 3 Preface By Peter Scott QC My decision to support this report was motivated by a growing interest in the constitution and conventions of the United Kingdom. Personally, I would find it difficult to describe fully or accurately the rules under which our government functions. A general idea perhaps, an imperfect understanding of the detail, and disappointment when the system fails to deliver what seems, not necessarily rightly, to be the right outcome is the best I can do. I suspect that many of us could not do much more. If my suspicion is well-founded, any institution which seeks in a scholarly and non- political fashion to understand, explain and improve the unwritten basis upon which we are governed plainly deserves support. The Constitution Unit of UCL headed by Professor Robert Hazell certainly qualifies handsomely in this respect. I had a more specific interest as well. A key function of Parliament is to hold the Executive to account. Parliamentarians, especially MPs, typically and rightly put this at or very near the top of the list when describing their role. It is what we all expect. But how well does this work in practice? Are the existing arrangements the best to achieve such a complex and difficult task as challenging constructively and when appropriate thwarting the wish of the Executive. Would, for example, the decisions of government in recent years in relation to Iraq have been different if examined, and if appropriate thwarted, under different constitutional arrangements. To what extent is the legislature independent of the Executive when seeking to hold ministers to account? There are now almost 120 ministers. They are all members of Parliament, more than 90 of them in the House of Commons. All are by definition members of the Executive. Many backbenchers have, perfectly legitimately, ministerial ambitions. The whip system is available when needed to provide powerful support for the government and tales of the persuasive ability of government whips to do this are commonplace. Is a body so constituted the ideal one for holding government to account? And should it try to do so on issues of complexity and national importance by speeches and individual questions across a chamber with over 600 members? This report does not embark on such far-reaching matters, but it does deal with the question of the accountability of ministers albeit in rather special circumstances, and the underlying research indicates that systems of other countries may provide some help in exploring interesting possibilities. Encouragingly, it also suggests that ministers appointed rather than elected are no less willing than elected colleagues to do what seems necessary to make themselves accountable to elected members. The views expressed in the report are those of the authors and not mine, but I hope the result is a step towards the aims of the Unit which I entirely share. 4 Contents Summary of Key Points..................................................................................................7 1. Introduction ...............................................................................................................9 2. Ministerial Selection, Expertise and Accountability ................................................13 3. United Kingdom .......................................................................................................22 4. The Experience of Ministers Recruited from outside Parliament ...........................30 5. The Comparative Experience...................................................................................48 6. The Netherlands.......................................................................................................50 7. France.......................................................................................................................58 8. Sweden.....................................................................................................................66 9. United States............................................................................................................74 10. Conclusion..............................................................................................................84 11. Recommendations.................................................................................................86 Appendix: Biographies of Outsiders ............................................................................88 Bibliography .................................................................................................................95 5 6 Summary of Key Points In 2007 Gordon Brown appointed several ministers with no previous political or parliamentary experience. This prompted a debate about the desirability of appointing ministers from outside Parliament. Advocates of such ministers point to the limited talent pool in the House of Commons, and argue that outsiders can significantly widen the skills and experience available to the government. The size and complexity of modern government requires ministers with more technocratic skills. Opponents point to the high failure rate of such ministers, measured by their short time in office. Their lack of political and parliamentary skills was said to be a serious handicap. This study set out to explore the arguments for appointing ministers from outside Parliament, and to study the experience of such appointees. It also looked at the overseas experience, in countries where such appointments are more common. We found a wide range of views and experience. A few of these new UK ‘outsider’ ministers were regarded as successful, and several as failures. Most were given little or no induction. Some felt that too much emphasis was placed on the parliamentary role. Many were critical of the lack of clear delegation or objectives. The overseas experience also proved less distinctive than generally supposed. Many of those appointed from technocratic backgrounds turned out to have significant political experience as well, at local and regional level, or as party officials. There were no special problems of accountability at Westminster, since all such outsiders were appointed as junior peer ministers and so became accountable to the House of Lords. The main complaint arose in relation to Lords Mandelson and Adonis, who were not directly accountable to the House of Commons. The Commons could have devised accountability mechanisms, but chose not to do so, because they did not want to facilitate the appointment of more Secretaries of State in the Lords. The government’s plans for an elected second chamber would put an end to the practice of appointing outsider ministers to the Lords. Outsider ministers, if appointed at all, would have to be wholly ‘outside’ Parliament. This would be a far more radical