Keeping State Policy Public: Meeting Accountability in Commission Governance
by Scott S. Stauffer
MPP Essay Submitted to Oregon State University
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Public Policy
Presented April 29th, 2009 Commencement June 13th, 2009 i
“The strongest democracies flourish from frequent and lively debate, but they endure when people of every background and belief find a way to set aside smaller differences in service of a greater purpose.” ‐ Barack Obama, February 9, 2009
“Our goal is to make… government both less expensive and more efficient, and to change the culture of our national bureaucracy… We intend to redesign, reinvent, to reinvigorate… government.” ‐ Bill Clinton, March 3, 1993
“A governing board is a social invention developed in many times and at many places to provide control and sponsorship for a governmental or private function.” ‐ Cyril O. Houle, Governing Boards
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Introduction ...... 1 2. Literature Review ...... 4 2.1.1 Considering Corporate Board Best Practices . . 7 2.1.2 Rise and Fall of the Chief Executive Officer . . . 10 2.1.3 The Corporate Board Re‐Emerges and Re‐Evaluates Itself . 12 2.2.1 Public Governance: A Critically Un‐Examined Issue . . 16 2.2.2 The Transportation Commission . . . . 20 2.3.1 The Board Meeting: Where Accountability Can Occur . 24 3. Methods ...... 29 3.1.1 The 2005‐07 OTC Agenda Analysis . . . . 31 3.1.2 The Formal Meeting by ODOT Division and Action Type . 33 3.1.3 The Formal Meeting by Board Responsibility Categories . 34 3.2.1 The State Transportation Commission Survey . . 35 4. Results ...... 39 4.1 The OTC Agenda Analysis: The Highway Division Steals the Show 39 4.2 The Literature Review: Mostly Corporate Best Practices . 48 4.3 The STCS: Despite Mobility, Commissions Lack Identity . 51 5. Discussion and Recommendations for Future Research . 58 5.1 Key Conclusions: State Policy Needs Our Attention! . . 60 5.2 Key Recommendations: Who are We? . . . 62 6. Conclusion ...... 65 Works Cited ...... 68 References ...... 71 7. Appendices ...... 73 7.1 Appendix I ...... 73 7.2 Appendix II ...... 74 7.3 Appendix III ...... 82 7.4 Appendix IV ...... 84
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TABLE OF BOXES 1. Robert Moses of New York . . . . . 5 2. Glenn L. Jackson of Oregon . . . . . 6 3. ODOT Revenue Sources 2007‐2009 . . . . 23 4. Oregon Transportation Commission Work Session Summary . 48
TABLE OF GRAPHS 1. Formal Meeting Time Spent (by Division) . . . 40 2. Time Spent by Board Responsibility Categories . . . 41
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ABSTRACT Despite their widespread use and presence at all levels of government, public commissions and boards are rarely given much attention, by the general public, academia, or surprisingly by public policy and agency experts. As a state infrastructure governing entity transportation commissions often deal with controversy, but do we really understand the roles and responsibilities of these important oversight mechanisms of typically massive state transportation agencies? And more importantly, do the usually volunteer members of these important policymaking and activity monitoring boards know what they are supposed to be doing? How would a transportation commission chair know her commission is carrying out their statutorily mandated duties in an efficient and effective way? To answer these questions, and to collect basic data about the current state of our transportation commissions nationally, this essay analyzes the time management practices of one state transportation commission, reviews existing literature on public and corporate governance, and considers the results of a nation‐wide survey of state transportation commission administrative assistants. The results support the prevailing conclusion that there is a lack of literature on public commission government and that because of their often un‐distinguished role in relation to the agency, a profound lack of independence and identity exists which ought to be corrected if the intent of these boards is to provide policy leadership and accountability to the citizens they represent and serve. By reconsidering how they run their regular meetings, focusing on the key agency‐commission relationships, and devoting time to consider their own performance and expectations, transportation commissions can better assert themselves in their necessary public duty of ensuring efficient and effective government. This essay sheds light on the present condition of our transportation commissions and considers how transportation commissions ought to manage their time for effective public policy creation and oversight.
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1. INTRODUCTION OF A PROBLEM: Transportation Governance and Leadership
Popular depictions of public service seldom include the thousands of boards and commissions that do so much to shape daily life (Houle 1989). Although transportation agencies provide critical infrastructure we depend on, transportation commission meetings rarely gain attention unless a serious service failure has occurred. Despite repeated nationwide calls for significant financial investment in aging highways, bridges, rail lines, and seaports (Cambridge 2005; National Surface
Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission 2007; National Surface
Transportation Infrastructure Financing Committee 2009) the public response often lacks any sense of urgency, and more importantly, or new financial resources. The embarrassing reality is that we and our elected leaders generally only pay attention to the needs of our physical infrastructure, the domain of transportation departments and commissions, when something goes wrong; a fact sadly supported by the tragedy of the Minneapolis, Minnesota Interstate 35 bridge collapse, which during rush hour plunging unsuspecting commuters into the Mississippi River below
(Sherman 2008). Despite the very real threat to our way of life, as we go scurrying from home to work or school we place an incredible amount of faith in pivotal infrastructure agencies, and their associated oversight bodies – our state transportation commissions. And yet, these vital mechanisms of accountability continue to be critically under evaluated by public administration and governance paradigms that are increasingly outdated for modern circumstances (Carver 1997;
Frederickson and Smith 2003). Without a crisis, and aside from the groans of
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2 constant road maintenance projects, the needs and behavior of transportation agencies do not capture the attention of most Americans, and that’s a tragedy.
This graduate essay grew from a series of self‐assessment work sessions conducted in late 2007 and early 2008 by the Oregon Transportation Commission
(OTC). As a result of these exercises the OTC members found it not only helpful to identify what state law required them to do, but what unspoken assumptions each commission member held about their time management practices, relationships, and policy goals (Oregon Transportation Commission 2008). The only readily available reference on best practices for the OTC’s self‐assessment was a 2005 report prepared by the University of Kentucky’s Transportation Research Center (KTC), which provides the findings of an analysis of all 50 state departments of transportation (DOTs) in the form of a Roles and Responsibilities outline (O’Connell et al. 2005, see Appendix I).
The University of Kentucky outline helped the OTC in its discussion by providing an adaptable framework for defining the unique characteristics of the OTC (Oregon
Transportation Commission 2008) as the oversight arm of major infrastructure service agency. Other research to assess public oversight entities, specifically in the field of public transit agencies, have recently been published and hold promise for providing tools for public boards to evaluate their performance (AECOM 2004). The work sessions and exercises conducted by the OTC in 2007 and 2008 provide the key question my graduate work addresses.
Finding literature on transportation governance, specifically at the state level, is not an easy task, although there have been moments in the last century when the
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3 formal structure and behavior of transportation government were front and center in the minds of public administration researchers (Shafritz et al. 2005), as evidenced by the aging work of W. L. Haas, who in 1947 examined state highway organization.
There was also, at least in Oregon, a more recent period of administrative reform when the body known as the State Highway Commission was reorganized in 1969 into the Department of Transportation (Merriam 1992). Today because of work by the Transportation Research Board and other industry and academic groups there are encouraging signs of renewed attention in transportation administration research, but despite periodic attention there has just not been much consistent focus on transportation commissions as governance bodies (O’Connell et al. 2005). Because of this lack of attention, there has been little scrutiny of the oversight system that governs public transportation, creating a status quo atmosphere with little accountability by public transportation agencies.
In a world that demands cost effective, responsive service from such agencies, what practices can public boards and commissions employ to manage their agency’s resources for effectiveness and accountability? How can commission members know they are doing what they are charged to do: to oversee vast agencies that provide critical services every day? This essay examines current time management practices of transportation commissions, reviews the existing literature on public and corporate governance, and suggests future areas of research. This analysis is about time management in public commission meetings, how it is currently done and how we might endeavor to do it better, or at least more effectively.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW: What Corporate America Can Teach Us
Since at least the 1940s and 1950s, a heyday era for governance and organizational research (Shafritz et al. 2005), state transportation agencies have been predominantly run by commissions, a model supported by post‐war era public administration literature that has historically favored a strong executive authority serving at the pleasure of the elected governor, alongside a vaguely identified board or commission (Shafritz et al. 2005). Although in wide use by the end of the New
Deal era (approximately 1945), the invention of the public commission ‐ intended to encourage public participation in government – finds much of its theoretical heritage in the writings of Progressive era authors (Shafrtiz et al. 2005; Ward 1997). As a very specific branch of such public administration roots, transportation commissions have had a varied history of success, failure, neglect and abuse. To preface this examination of contemporary public governance, we briefly reflect upon the careers of two prominent transportation leaders of the twentieth century, who impacted their respective states and regions profoundly, although they remain unknown to many.
There was a time in American life when a forceful personality with connections and a little political luck could dominate public agencies (see Box 1 and
Box 2). From urban bosses to rural judges, there are plenty of examples of officials acting like medieval lords rather than public servants. State transportation departments have not been immune to such personalities. In two very different styles, and in two very different settings, Robert Moses of New York, and Glenn
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Jackson of Oregon, came to dominate their state’s transportation and parks departments, and importantly the large budgets associated with infrastructure agencies. Over the course of their careers both men came to be regarded as giants – for better or worse – and while not identical in their paths to power, they exemplify how public board and commissions have wielded great power.
Box 1: Robert Moses of New York. Robert Moses by most accounts was a brilliant sculptor of one the world’s elite urban areas – New York (Caro 1975). The Moses style was aggressive and demanding, and as he worked his way up through the ranks of various New York state agencies, he established a reputation for acting quickly and only explaining himself later when forced to by officials of higher officer or at times of extreme public dissatisfaction (Caro 1975). Although he was never an elected official, having failed in a bid for the governorship, Moses reached his pinnacle of power as the habitually reappointed commissioner of New York’s parks, and eventually highways (Caro 1975). While officially he was chair of various parks and highway commissions, Moses seldom took his co‐commissioners seriously; instead relying upon hand picked and tirelessly worked assistants to do his bidding (Caro 1975). By the end of his career in the 1960s, Moses could look back on a city and state infrastructure he had almost single handedly created (Caro 1975). He could also reflect on the national and international reputation he had created, and importantly the great influence he had exerted on the geographic and political designs of other major cities. Robert Moses, or “RM”, was a one man show, an all‐in‐one master builder, who ultimately failed to grasp the importance of public disclosure, who was rarely held accountable for his actions to either the politicians who appointed him or the public (Caro 1975). But no one can deny the impact of the power Moses wielded through his roles on public commissions.
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Box 2: Glenn L. Jackson of Oregon. In a state very different from urban New York, Glenn Jackson – as much an Oregonian as Moses was a New Yorker – came to hold similar political power and influence. Rising through the ranks of a southern Oregon utility corporation, Jackson worked his way into positions of delegated authority more from a conviction of civic duty, as a member of the dominating energy industry, than from any lust for power (Dierdorff 1971). The affable Jackson was not shy about making decisions, but he was also more interested in getting people together and building some form of policy consensus (Merriam 1992, Walth 1994). He was a business leader with bipartisan connections and was rewarded with the chairmanship of the Oregon Highway Commission, which in 1958 also oversaw the state parks system (Merriam 1992). Unlike Moses, who struggled for decades to put the pieces of New York’s infrastructure governance together under his command (Caro 1975), Jackson was given the reigns with little struggle, more as a reward for a career dedicated to private interests, than a desire to concentrate and wield power. With a little more personal finesse, and perhaps the assistance of a state that allowed for less prominence for highway commissioners, Glenn Jackson – “Mr. Oregon” – oversaw the creation of much of Oregon’s modern highway and parks system, leaving his mark – and literally his name – on his efforts.
Both Moses and Jackson had the capacity and personality to make decisions quickly and without much consultation with others; something in their character, and their station in government, allowed them to operate as contemporary emperors of parks and highways. It is also worth noting that Moses and Jackson held power at moments in American history when public – political – leadership was generally trusted, accepted, and held in high esteem, though occasionally they were forced to let go of a project, or step back from a debate, more often then not, when “RM” or
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“Mr. Oregon” wanted something done, the question wasn’t if, but when and how
(Caro 1975, Walth 1994). Their ability to command action from the organs of government was thus being a product of who they were and the era in which they governed. Today, bridges and buildings bear their names, but do we understand what Moses and Jackson represent for public governance? The problem of concentrating power in one man is that no one, save that one man, really knows what is going on. The legacies of Robert Moses and Glenn Jackson characterize a reliance on strong, charismatic public leaders as the ideal of public governance during their time in power. Perhaps the collective reaction to the legacies of such public servants, once broader governance concerns became important in the public conscience, prompted the move for more open public governance and accountability.
2.1.2 Considering Governance Board Best Practices
A flow chart of trends of the last fifty years in commission governance would begin with autocrats like Robert Moses and Glenn Jackson, and end with increasingly active boards, who attempt to carefully examine their roles and responsibilities based on legal standards and public expectations. This shift in governance did not occur in an unbroken straight line, there were many reform efforts, natural changes, and structural reconfigurations that took governing boards on detours, dead ends, and off track completely. Because of government’s famous inability to evolve quickly, and a lack of public governance analysis, combined with high profile scandals, like Enron, corporate board behavior has been analyzed, critiqued, and ultimately changed
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8 faster. In addition, most members of public agency governing boards have served on a variety of private and non‐profit boards and base their approaches on their prior experiences. Any analysis of commission governance, therefore, would be incomplete without a review of the extensive literature on corporate and non‐profit board accountability and behavior.
The importance, and ultimately rise in popularity, of governing bodies is rooted in public concern about the actions and behaviors of government; I have found Cyril O. Houle’s definition, and perhaps simple justification, for governing boards to be the most efficient definition of these authoritative entities: “A governing board is a social invention developed in many times and at many places to provide control and sponsorship for a governmental or private function” (Houle 1989). In ways often not fully understood or left purposely vague, the men and women purposely associated with the organization they are charged to supervise, are rarely regularly involved in daily operations of the organization, and have historically been left with little guidance as to what they are to supposed to do with these prominent positions of authority (Houle 1989; Ward 1997). From time to time there have been efforts to define the purpose of these boards, as President Bill Clinton and Vice
President Al Gore attempted to do in the early 1990s, with what was often called
Total Quality Management or “Reinventing Government”, the high‐minded effort to make governing “…both less expensive and more efficient…” meant “to redesign, reinvent, to reinvigorate…” government operations (Shafrtiz et al. 2005). But what do these, and similar idealist calls for public service heard more recently from
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President Barack Obama, mean for governing boards? How do the members of these commissions translate efficiency and reinvigoration into actions and behaviors in practice? While not ignoring their statutorily mandated responsibilities, the demands of their agency and the general public, the men and women who serve on the countless boards and commissions – in public and corporate America – often struggle to understand their role.
Both public and private governing bodies are accountable to the people who are impacted by board decisions and actions (Carver 1997); these bodies differ in how they are monitored and the consequences they suffer as a result of their mistakes (Carver 1997). Private boards deal more directly with the livelihood and personal resources of private citizens, so they are forced to respond quickly to scandal, corruption, board inadequacies, or the possibility of corporate fiscal failure, often the result of Chief Executive Office (CEO) actions (Ward 1997). Occurring in tandem with the age of Moses and Jackson was a similar corporate preference for charismatic leaders; men like Lee Iacocca of Chrysler, Kenneth Lay of Enron, and Jack
Welch of General Electric, were able to rise in power as weak corporate boards acquiesced to their actions (Ward 1997). In the post‐World War II era, corporate
America, like public America, willingly went along with the guy who could talk well, trusting their actions were honest and in the best interest of the firm (Ward 1997).
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2.1.2 Rise and Fall of the Chief Executive Officer
The relationship between the CEO and the board of directors is older than
United States itself, and certainly as old as the exchanging of money for goods and services (Ward 1997). As a matter of historical development, the place of the board in the legal structure of an organization has changed over time. Only recently have corporations begun to explore using the board beyond moments of traditional ceremony or crisis, when the CEO required credibility with the shareholders (Ward
1997). It typically happens that weak boards developed partially as a result of membership being a reward for loyal years of service to the corporation or personal relationships with the CEO they were to oversee. Thus board members seldom rocked the boat or asked tough questions of their long time colleagues (Ward 1997).
The functional lack of board oversight gave rise to the CEO as a nearly “absolute authority”, contemporary kings of industry rarely held to account for their actions by men who were their friends‐in‐cahoots more often than their auditors (Minow and
Monks 1996). Certainly by the mid‐twentieth century the corporate board room was a place dedicated to preserving the status quo and usually the authority of the CEO.
It was apparent by the 1960s and 1970s however, that this dominant executive and weak board relationship was changing, along with the culture of
America. The cynicism toward authority figures and decision makers at‐large, that gained prominence in this era known for social turmoil, eventually spread to the board room as tough questions of unethical practices and accountability were asked and CEOs failed to respond quick enough or well enough for the public (Ward 1997).
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The previously acceptable board ignorance of CEO activities, coupled with growing concern for American production power and the high‐profile corruption lead shareholders to demand more from those who were supposed to monitor the behavior of the organization (Ward 1997; Minow and Monks 1996). More was expected from boards that were ill prepared for such an active oversight role, and had relied so heavily upon these same previously less questioned CEOs (Minow and
Monks 1996).
By the 1990s change had come, as much of the preceding decade had shown the light brightly on the problems of single authority administration of large corporations and organizations, resulting in new programs and paradigms on leadership designed to encourage good governance through a functioning board room (Ward 1997). Although corporate, public, and nonprofit boards share many common traits, private corporations have received more attention in the literature on governing practices (Carver 1997). Being a board member no longer meant occasional meetings at the country club; corporations were looking for new management energy to ensure oversight mechanisms were in place. The move to active boards had occurred (Ward 1997; Conger 2001). It is no coincidence that the rise of professionalism in board governance happened in tandem with the late twentieth century focus on corporate board rooms (Ward 1997); the once awkwardly under utilized appendage of corporate America had found a purpose, and that purpose required redefinition for the real tasks of governing.
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2.1.3 The Corporate Board Re‐Emerges and Re‐Evaluates Itself
Eventually, public sensitivity to CEO scandals intensified and by the early twenty‐first century, in the wake of shocking corporate scandals, corporate board rooms appeared unable to control the beasts they had created and were supposed to supervise. Finally, in the wake of loud cries for greater accountability, Congress enacted shareholder rights legislation over concerns about corporate management practices. In 2002 Congress passed the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (“SOX”) which effectively placed corporate CEOs on notice that the growing discontent over their more questionable actions would be addressed not only through legal proceedings, but by the boards who had for so long overlooked such behavior (Ward 1997; BoardSource et al. 2003). Additionally SOX placed greater emphasis on procedures for auditing
CEO and corporate fiscal activities, spelling out in minute detail internal procedures to protect whistle blowers, protect documents from destruction, and how to avoid conflict of interest issues to name but a few of the sixty‐six page act’s provisions
(BoardSource et al. 2003; Government Printing Office 2002). The build‐up of more professional and active boards had been a long time coming and SOX symbolizes the effort to decentralize the power so tightly invested in CEOs by way of reinventing and utilizing the board room (Ward 1997). Because of the failure of private boards to protect their shareholder interests, and because an increasingly partisan political world found common cause in regulating corporate behavior, the public stepped into the board room.
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This recently revived public scrutiny requires corporate and non‐profit boards to reassess what a board is supposed to do. As boards have been forced, by law, to re‐examine their relationship to their CEO, employees and shareholders, they have also turned the focus on themselves, asking such questions as what are we doing, is this what we are supposed to be doing, can we do this better, and what has been done before?
In response to such self‐examination, much of the literature on governance focuses on board best practices, which come from informal interviews with long time board members as well as thoroughly‐researched analytical summaries of corporate statistics, resulting in best practice checklists that range from broadly defined categorizations to detailed processes boards should follow to increase their ability to function effectively as a group. On the one hand is Peter Drucker’s book, Managing the Non‐Profit, which offers guiding principles for effective board leadership, that includes defining the organizational mission, knowing the business of the organization, managing for results performance, and maintaining key board‐CEO‐staff relationships (Drucker 1990). On the other end are recommendations from a veteran board member in Cyril Houle’s book, Governing Boards: Their Nature and Nurture, that includes “the board member must insist on full discussion of each important issue,” “the board member must act as an effective intermediary between the agency and any special group he represents” and “the board member must support the board as long as he remains a part of it” (Houle 1989). There are a number of ways a board member can understand his or her role, as existing literature can be digested
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14 through diagrams, flow charts, checklists or fairly random tidbits from the brains of past board members; varying formats for advice on what a governing board ought to be and do. Other studies offer similar results, but the drive to craft a codified set of guiding principles makes up the bulk of corporate governance literature.
Along side the redefinition of corporate best practices is a renewed interest in specific roles and responsibilities, an often more in‐depth sidebar than the larger examination of successful boards. Because such identifiable roles and responsibilities depend on the nature of the organization’s work, developing anything that might be called universal role descriptions is hard to do in any generalized review format; but the need to go through such exercises is a consistent recommendation of the literature on governance practices (Carver 1997). As a tool for board evaluation and possible reform, defining the legal, traditional, and expected roles and responsibilities of an organization can be helpful, for the details it brings out and the big picture perspective it can provide.
There are, however, key differences between private and public organizations in general that should be noted when the two are compared. Foremost among these is ownership accountability. Ownership is relatively straightforward in the corporate world; those who purchase stock or are otherwise associated voluntarily with the organization have a stake in corporate success or failure. For public agencies, ownership is much more ambiguous, as many state services – namely transportation
– are for the benefit of all members of society including anyone who resides in a state or is merely passing through. What goods and services the government ought to
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15 provide, and what goods and services might be produced by private firms in a free market, is a popular topic of public administration and policy (Wilson 1989). Despite periodic questioning of who provides what services, it is clear that some services have been and will continue to be provided by the public sector because of a lack of ability in defining a certain owner or group of owners (Wilson 1989; Shafritz et al.
2005). Interstate highways, roads, and bike lanes are public goods, available to all and the impossibility of identifying a single owner, or group of owners, leads to the necessity of government agencies – bureaucracies – and defines the public agency as different from private firms (Shafritz et al. 2005).
So the question of who is accountable to whom shifts between private and public sectors: are you, as a board member, accountable to those whose money you manage, or to those who depend on your agency for public infrastructure to function? Answering the second part of this question, especially in the transportation field becomes rather messy as the OTC is legally responsible to the citizens of Oregon who daily utilize the many services the Oregon Department of
Transportation (ODOT) provides, but it is also the case that commuters who live in neighboring states like Washington also use the roads, rails, and waterways administered by ODOT. Clearly the OTC is not directly held to account by citizens of the Portland suburb of Vancouver, WA, despite the very real consideration given by
ODOT engineers and policymakers to the number of vehicles from Vancouver that cross the Glenn Jackson and Interstate‐5 bridges every day. Similarly, ODOT sets policy for cities, counties, special districts, rail road companies, and other
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16 transportation providers. Governing agencies like ODOT force the oversight commission to deal with this less defined but crucial set of owners, who at times can make themselves quite vocal, and at others times completely absent.
2.2.1 Public Governance: A Critically Un‐Examined Issue
In popular political science theory the idea of the classic “iron triangle” of agency‐legislative‐interest group pressure is very much in play with this commission accountability question. Public commissions, especially those authorized by law to set agency policy and distribute resources, are a very real part of the classic “iron triangle” model of public administration literature. The notion of a three‐player arena harkens back to, perhaps, simpler times in governing, when powerful figures like Robert Moses and Glenn Jackson could wield their authority via seemingly direct and durable relationships with recognized interest groups and government entities.
However those who observe and participate in governing today have taken due notice of the growing evidence that such “iron triangles” have morphed into four, five, or more player relationships as increases in the size of government along with recognition of citizen initiated law suits has lead to the increased presence and influence of interest groups and the judicial system in practiced public policy (Lunch
2001). There is plenty of reason to suspect that classic public administration theories, like the “iron triangle” are increasingly relics of a by‐gone era in government as well as transportation leadership, as complex globally connect world requires the input and recognition of more and more players at the tables of power.
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In our American system of agonizingly slow change and focus on maintaining the status quo, attempts to clarify who a commission is accountable to is a part of the system (Lunch 2001). It is not hard to identify the very real need for public accountability which emerges out of the fear that the absence of some type of oversight mechanism will lead agents – in this case commission – to behave in ways that do not meet public expectations (Miller 2002; Frederickson and Smith 2003).
Just as private groups pay attention to those who administer their personal resources, society‐at‐large should require that attention be given to those who administer our shared assets. With growing recognition in public administration literature that new models of the actions, behavior, and culture of government is needed, a concern for commission governments in particular is their ability to quickly react and take action in a highly‐wired and rapid environment. Can we conclude that today’s commission governments are serving their intended constituency in an efficient and effective way? Understanding who governments are responsible to, who the shareholders are, is complicated by our American Federal system and the many diverse purposes for public commission governing bodies.
With a uniquely government‐centric outlook, there have been calls in recent public administration scholarship for reassessments of the roles, responsibilities, scope, and size required for effective governance in an era of widely held distrust of those placed in charge of large bureaucratic agencies (Frederickson and Smith 2003).
Along similar lines as corporate and nonprofit boards, public agency oversight authorities have had to deal with changed expectations and sometimes changes in
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18 organizational structures (Frederickson and Smith 2003). Much like their corporate colleagues, public commissioners and board members have – for several decades now – been struggling to identify themselves and their job descriptions in the face of social and political realities that tend to favor limited government intervention while simultaneously demanding optimum agency output.
Yet even with calls for increased attention it is clear that, as George
Frederickson and Kevin Smith note in their concluding thoughts on governance theory, the term governance seems to presently symbolize the present reforms and changes occurring in what was once called “public administration” or “public management” (Frederickson and Smith 2003). Although most recent changes in how we govern ourselves has focused on corporate boards, public commissions and authorities have also begun to re‐evaluate themselves and their way of operating
(BoardSource et al. 2003). As state and local governments struggle with shrinking revenues and increasing demand for services, as well as the same public cries for reform that corporate entities are dealing with, the governance and accountability processes of public agency boards has received renewed attention in fairly limited academic circles (Frederickson and Smith 2003). At the time of their creation, commission governance models were thought to improve citizen access to government while streamlining the protocols of agency administration since commissions were expected to delegate much of their authority to the departmental executive, who would be able to act quickly in times of crisis (Haas 1947). This might work if it is assumed that agency executives truly behave as honest public servants.
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However experience has taught us otherwise about the realities of human nature.
Governance trends shifted significantly toward decentralization after the Watergate era, as the risks of single executive authority proved too susceptible to corruption
(Conger 2001; Ward 1997; Frederickson and Smith 2003). Despite the corporate focus in much of the literature on governance, recent trends in public administration literature reflect the changes in leadership frameworks; attention to the problems of centralized authority has resulted in decentralization and a decrease in the importance of hierarchy (Frederickson and Smith 2003). Today, one side effect in the public sector movement away from single executive authority, are the 34 state transportation agencies that continue to use some type of commission‐style governance. Although to‐date literature on how to maintain DOT bureaucratic efficiency with a commission is almost non‐existent, with only the University of
Kentucky study providing any analysis; it appears that the commission model remains popular, if un‐examined.
A key conclusion of this graduate essay is the general lack of research on the behavior and trends of public commission governance. This is not to say that there has been no thought given to this topic or comparable subjects in academia at large.
There is a wealth of public administration literature that has examined government leadership models, from the bureaucratic insights of Max Weber over a hundred years ago, through the mid‐twentieth century’s focus on organizational definition, to the reformist movements of gendering and Total Quality Management (Shafritz et al.
2005; Frederickson and Smith 2003). There are many prominent names in the world
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20 of public administration theory that have spent their time considering the dynamics and purposes, and consequences, of specific organizational structures and inter‐ official relationships that combine to create governing successes and failures.
However, despite generalized public administration considerations – and corporate governance evaluations – there remains a lack of true analysis and study of governing boards on the state level, and specifically in the transportation field (Simon and
Simon 2002).
2.2.2 The Transportation Commission
Unique among public agencies, state transportation departments (DOTs) stand out prominently because of their shear size, dedicated source of funding, and are necessary for social functioning. When a new bridge is proposed, a major highway project is undertaken, or a change in driver licensing is proposed, DOTs are front and center in the public’s attention, and all too often under less than hospitable circumstances. Certainly there is controversy in a policy field that requires so much capital and fiscal resources to provide basic infrastructure services. And although modern society depends heavily on transportation agencies for safe and secure modes of transit, how these giant organizations are governed is seldom considered by folks outside of the DOTs themselves (Simon and Simon 2002). It may be that little has been done to examine transportation commissions because their formal structure is dictated by statute (Simon and Simon 2002) and members serve at the pleasure of the governor who appoints commission members and is accountable to
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21 the voting public. Since the first studies and scholarly articles on what were then often called state highway departments appeared early in the twentieth century
(Haas 1947), there has been periodic interest in and analysis of transportation governance, but few publications directly discuss the characteristics and practices of transportation commissions (Simon and Simon 2002). With the rise of regional transit agencies in major urban areas over the last four decades, there have been attempts to expand what we know about organizing and managing large public infrastructure agencies; various studies have focused on the closely related cousin of the state transportation commission, the public transit agency and their governing boards (Simon and Simon 2002).
Particularly helpful in the development of recent transportation scholarship has been the Transportation Research Board (TRB) of the National Academies. It has been responsible for extensive research on transportation issues – on a wide range of topics – and has produced the only nationwide examination of transportation oversight authorities (Simon and Simon 2002), aside from the University of Kentucky study. One conclusion often noted by reports produced by the Transportation
Research Information Service, a branch of the TRB, confirms the prevailing lack of analysis on transportation governance. In conjunction with the TRB, state and federal transportation agencies have vigorously noted the increasing importance of understanding our DOT commissions and boards as booming populations demand more from our aging transit infrastructure, which will require massive amounts of public funding to repair and maintain in the future (ODOT 2006; Texas DOT 2007;
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National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission 2007;
National Surface Transportation Infrastructure Financing Commission 2009).
Just about everything government does is political, and how public agencies receive the funding to fulfill their missions and duties is very much a political process of jockeying for legislative attention and influence to ensure not only the agency’s existence, but the amount of power they wield relative to other agencies (Wildavsky
1979). As the fiscal allotment process means competing for the agency’s “base” – that is continual funding – and ensuring that they receive their “fair share” of the overall budget proceeds, agencies are in effect vying with each for influence and authority – in the form of financial resources – to exercise power, and it is not too hard to connect larger budget shares to greater authority within government
(Wildavsky 1979). As a large department, transportation agencies receive a sizable amount of money from a variety of Federal, state and local governments (ODOT
2008). What makes transportation funding unique is that much of the money received by agencies like ODOT are often referred to as dedicated funds, in that they are from certain revenue sources (taxes and fees) and are for the sole discretionary use of ODOT for usually specific projects or programs. In the case of ODOT dedicated funding comes from sources like the gas tax, licensing fees, and the State Highway
Fund (ODOT 2008); see Box 3. These dedicated funds provide reliable and nearly constant resources that support ODOT’s mission and authority, unlike other agencies that are forced to compete with each other during legislative sessions for fluctuating and always limited amounts of money. Despite this relatively secure funding there
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23 will be growing concern about such sources of revenue like the gas tax, which will be subject to changes in the future as the auto industry diversifies fuel types, which would impact present forms of taxing gas consumption.
Additionally, transportation budgets and their governing bodies are also part of much larger interaction with the Federal government, providing access to large
Box 3. Oregon Department of Transportation sources of funding other agencies Revenue Sources 2007 – 2009 Revenue Source $ Millions and commissions are not. Twenty Beginning Balance 391 Motor Fuels Taxes 890 percent of ODOT’s 2007‐2009 Driver and Vehicle Licenses 67 and Fees budget comes from the Federal Weight-Mile Tax 506 Transfers to the Department 136 government (ODOT 2008), a State General Funds 4 Oregon Lottery Proceeds 46 significant amount of revenue not only because of the projects and programs fundedAll Other Revenue 39 Sales and Charges for 22 by the Federal government, but because of the complicated relationship these Services Subtotal State Funds 2,602 represented financial resources represent. The presence of the national government, Federal Funds 863 State Highway and Oregon 909 through the Federal Highway Administration and the Department of Transportation Lottery Revenue Bonds TOTAL REVENUE 4,374 as well as others, (Funding Facts ODOTsuggests that a significant national voice ought to be present when 2008)
Oregon’s transportation budget is crafted. A logical notion not necessarily supported by the practices and behaviors of state transportation commissions. Despite questions of the cooperative ownership interactions of the transportation world, the relative security of dedicated funds puts transportation commissions, often the fiscal policy makers of DOTs, in an important role as the distributers of resources; a prominent position that turns board members, usually volunteers, into great wielders of considerable authority and power independent from the agency itself.
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Because of the very serious nature of the services provided by transportation agencies, and because the funding for transportation projects is dedicated to their projects, factors likely to intensify with the growing decay of our infrastructure systems, the prominence and importance of state transportation commissions, boards, and authorities will increase. The urgency of the issues facing such governing bodies also raises the question, addressed later, about the independence of transportation commissions, who arguably need a certain amount of agency freedom to be fair and accountable auditors of transportation activities. And as future DOT attention will require serious decisions about major projects, it is in the best interest of commission members and society in general to better understand the purpose and behavior of effective transportation governance.
2.3.1 The Board Meeting: Where Accountability Can Occur
The arena of activity for governing boards and commissions is the regular formal meeting, held periodically, where the board members conduct their business.
Their oversight function is critical for not only the agency, but the many associated social networks and interest groups (Doyle and Straus 1976). For public commissions and boards the formal meeting is where they hold their agency accountable, and the commission itself is held accountable by the decisions they make and the ways they spend their time. Historically, the board meeting has been the common identifying characteristic of governance authority and power, giving to such institutions its very name: the board. Seventeenth century firm owners used actual wood boards to sit
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25 around and make strategic decisions, and the meeting leader was known as the chairman because he was ensured the use of the only chair, the other members present sat on wooden benches (Ward 1997; Houle 1989). In the ongoing war against corruption, immoral behavior, and resource waste, the regular – often public or open – formal meeting is the board’s primary vehicle for action. Armed with
Robert’s Rules of Order, or some version of parliamentary procedure, as the titular decision makers for organizational strategy, policy making, financial management, and occasionally CEO appraisal, the board meeting is where business is conducted and the board should makes itself heard.
As important as the board meeting is for the success of an organization, it is surprising to consider just how painful meetings can be for participants and observers alike, especially as organizations grow and deal with increasingly complex issues and decisions (Doyle and Straus 1976; Lencioni 2004). In The Policy Governance
Fieldbook, Caroline Oliver et al. list several common “traps” boards fall into that throw meetings off and impede the group’s ability to function. Such traps include hot political issues that dominate public and commission attention to the detriment of other agency business, and CEO proposals and priorities that can eclipse the desires of less independent boards (Oliver 1999). Anyone who has ever attended a meeting of any kind – at school, work, or social group – should be able to identify with the many painfully slow and seemingly wasteful amounts of time spent talking about things most people could care less about. All of the books reviewed for this essay note the universal groan heard at the when a meeting is proposed (Doyle and Straus
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1976). Meetings can be reduced from productive work sessions to lessons in futility if there is a lack of single‐leader control, there is excessive pandering to what the leader wants to hear, the agenda items are not clearly defined or are chaotically interwoven, the decision making processes are ill‐defined, or the end goal is not understood (Doyle and Straus 1976; Lencioni 2004). Just about anyone who has been involved in any kind of organization has some experience with meetings, and its not hard for even the least experienced meeting participants to appreciate the problems with meetings. Yet despite their reputation as pointless, we are, as Michael Doyle and David Strauss observe, a meeting society. Meetings are essential to how we function and how our organizations, agencies, and firms operate.
Since meetings are easily infected with maladies that throw the participants off track, finding a way to organize an effective agenda is important, especially for governing bodies that typically meet only monthly or less and thus rely upon the meeting time to get their job done. The importance of a well crafted agenda and a well‐run meeting is placed squarely on the board chair, their staff, or those responsible for running the meeting (Doyle and Straus 1976; Carver 1997). Just about any book or article on meetings or corporate governance will at some point reference agenda setting, and there are many methods and tips for conducting well‐prepared and efficient meetings.
The pre‐meeting work seems to be the most important, especially if the meeting is to be held in public, as any unexpected event can not only throw off the pace of the meeting, but can cause serious damage to the board’s credibility when
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27 making decisions and overseeing the organization (Doyle and Straus 1976; Carver
1997; Oliver 1999). There is even a school of thought that suggests the pre‐meeting is the most important part of governance, getting the decisions made before hand makes for smooth operations in front of outside observers and organization employees who are affected by the behavior of the board (Houle 1989). Although this recommendation seems contrary to open meeting laws, the point that certain questions ought to be asked and discussed before the actual meeting is important.
Efficiently managed meetings rely on being able to answer questions like (Carver
1997; Oliver 1999):
What are the issues, and what have we done on this before?
What will we be talking about, and in what order?
How long do we have to discuss this?
What is the process for making this decision?
How is this related to the big organizational picture and policies?
What do we anticipate the outcome of this to be?
Answering these questions not only allows the chair to conduct the formal meeting effectively, but it allows participants and observers to know what will happen, giving all a chance to be ready for the discussions or decisions to be made (Doyle and Straus
1976; Schwarz 2002). In the worlds of public and corporate governance these questions are often handled during pre‐meeting huddles with the board members, the CEO, and the executive staff. Establishing the ground rules for the formal meeting – how the issue before the board will be handled – is just as important as
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28 actually making the decision (Schwarz 2002). The bottom line is that the more a board gets done before the actual meeting typically leads to more productive, and less painful, meetings.
With a solid agenda, the effectiveness of the governing board can be maximized to avoid the many common traps that sideline meetings. At the least a carefully prepared agenda improves the odds of successfully handling any situation that occurs during the meeting (Oliver 1999). The literature suggests effective meetings are related to effective governance and leadership. In their seminal 2005 transportation governance study, O’Connell et al. at the KTC, linked board effectiveness, and the adoption of a set of best practices employed during public meetings where decisions are made, to improved performance and accountability.
Meetings are social functions, susceptible to all the hang‐ups and influences that inhibit a board’s ability to operate. As part of recommended best practices from corporate, nonprofit and public governance literature, running well‐prepared public meetings is a vital part of effective organization oversight and accountability.
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3. METHODS
As the arena where transportation commissions conduct their business is the regularly scheduled formal meeting, and because these meetings are usually well documented by commission or agency administrative employees, my evaluation of commission governance focuses on these public meetings. Because, as public entities, transportation commissions provide agendas and minutes to the public, I was able to access the OTC provided information, as well as inquire about such information with the thirty‐four state transportation commissions and boards, through the State Transportation Commissions Survey (STCS). For practical reasons the basic unit of analysis for quantifying and categorizing time management behaviors of the transportation governing bodies included in this essay is time in minutes, the standard unit used to allocate time for an agenda item and to quantify the total length of meetings. The use of time in minutes provides basic information about what the commission most considers to be important, as presumably the commission will spend more time on what is important – per the commission, agency executive staff, or on occasion the general public when a particular issue captures their attention and emotion.
The literature reviewed on governance provides several interpretations of the phrase “roles and responsibilities” of how to, in practice, best serve the leadership and oversight functions of a governing board. To compare the conclusions and advice from corporate authors and public administration scholars and theorists, the research projects undertaken in the last year incorporated something of a “top ten” best
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30 practices list, which is employed in the OTC agenda analysis and STCS to categorize the activities, or agenda items considered. To organize and compare the focal areas of the OTC each commission agenda item was 1) categorized by agency division and by the broad role and responsibility categories and 2) quantified in minutes as provided by the agendas and personal knowledge of commission staff in the case of the STCS. By quantifying each commission action into minutes, and categorizing the same actions into the board responsibility categories from the literature, conclusions can be made about commissions and their time use practices, to explain what transportation commissions currently spend their formal meeting time on. And because each action is also categorized into broad role and responsibility areas, conclusions can be made about how commissions presently operate in comparison to the best practices recommended in the literature and as prescribed by state law. By categorizing and quantifying the available public data on transportation commissions, we can identify where commissions might focus their agendas in the future for more effective and efficient leadership.
In order to assess what transportation commissions do today, I undertook two related studies: (1) I examined two years of public meetings of a state transportation commission to see how the commission spent its time; and (2), I prepared and reviewed the initial results of a survey on board practices and time management sent to the administrative staff of the 34 states that presently have transportation commissions. The results of these analyses should help establish a baseline of public
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31 commission activity and behavior, to judge where we presently are, and where we should go in the future.
3.1.1 The 2005‐07 OTC Agenda Analysis
To assess current state transportation commission time management practices, an examination of the OTC was conducted through an empirical analysis of
24 monthly meeting agendas from December 2005 to November 2007. As commissions mostly operate in open public meetings where decisions are made and the agency’s business is conducted, I focused on board time management during these regularly held events. Effective public governance must include efficient time allocation practices, and to establish a baseline set of statistics for how the OTC spent its official formal – public – meeting time, an assessment and analysis of current practices of this one transportation commission was undertaken. The result of such an examination is not only of value to the OTC’s present members, but to other commissions who might use these findings to compare their own time management trends.
The OTC 2005‐07 agenda analysis was provoked by Chair Gail Achterman, who as a member of the OTC since 2000 (ODOT 2009), was concerned that the OTC was not spending its time on matters where volunteer commission members added value and accountability. The OTC analysis was conducted by Scott Stauffer and John
Miaso, graduate students at Oregon State University, during the winter quarter of
2007‐2008.
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Generally OTC agendas include three main components: a pre‐meeting gathering where the agenda is reviewed; the formal meeting which includes routine director and commission reports, public comment, various informational presentations, and ODOT policy or project items requiring commission approval; and a consent calendar of various action items to be approved, or rejected, as an omnibus package at the end of the formal meeting. Because Stauffer and Miaso were not past employees of ODOT, or in any way OTC experts, they relied upon the advice of Chair
Achterman to categorize the agenda, if enough information was not provided by the agenda item or through the ODOT website.
Each of the 24 agendas reviewed were divided into three assessment sections, aimed at current OTC focus areas, and to identify statutorily mandated and general governing categories:
Formal meeting time by ODOT division (measured in minutes) o Sub‐divided by type of action required: action or informational
Formal meeting time by board responsibility categories (measured in minutes)
Consent agenda items (measured in number of items per category)
Meeting location was also recorded to track the physical movements of board meetings around geographically diverse Oregon. Formal meeting time was analyzed by ODOT division and board responsibility categories to identify what statutorily assigned tasks received the OTC’s attention (ODOT divisions) and what, based on common public board duties, was the focus of OTC time in the bigger agency‐wide picture. Because each agenda item requires different attention from the OTC, each
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33 was also identified as either an action decision or an informational presentation to the commission not requiring immediate action. The board responsibility categories were based on seven areas defined by OTC Chair Achterman and Stauffer and Miaso, based on prior informal research on governing board best practices literature.
For purposes of establishing a time measurement reference, ODOT divisional and responsibility categories were quantified in terms of time, usually minutes, spent on each item on the agenda. Chair Achterman provided input on how long routine items and various presentations would take in terms of minutes if the OTC agenda did not specify an allotted amount of time. Routine items, like director and commission reports and other administrative tasks, were all given equal amounts of time in each meeting. Because consent calendar items do not receive individual attention and are included in the formal meeting time, each consent item was categorized by the nature of the action being taken: administrative tasks, property
(project right‐of‐way acquisitions), emergency board actions taken since the last OTC meeting, and items related to the Statewide Transportation Improvement Program
(STIP). The consent calendar items were quantified by the number of items in each category noted, to present a less detailed picture of what kind of actions the consent calendar included.
3.1.2 The Formal Meeting by ODOT Division and Action Type
There are seven divisions of ODOT, each with a director and staff responsible for administering different types of transportation modes or agency focus areas.
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Some divisions are much bigger than others in terms of staff and budget. The agenda items were assigned to a particular division based on the nature of the item and/or the agency staff involved in presenting the agenda item. The seven ODOT divisions include: Rail, Driver and Motor Vehicles, Highway, Public Transit, Transportation
Safety, Motor Carrier Transportation, and Transportation Development. An agenda item either requires action or provides information to the OTC, so each item was also identified as one that required a decision or action, or was purely informative in providing some background or data to the OTC to fulfill the OTC’s oversight duties.
3.1.3 The Formal Meeting by Board Responsibility Categories
When an informational or action item was categorized by ODOT division it was also classified under one of the seven broad board responsibility areas. Based largely on the board responsibilities identified by the 2005 KTC study (see Appendix
I), the areas included:
Policy: regulations and guidelines for agency activities.
Oversight: implementation of projects and policies.
Strategic Investment: prioritization of major capital projects.
Risk Management: assessment of financial exposure.
Financial Management: funding allocations for projects and budget issues.
CEO Evaluation: review and oversight specifically of the ODOT director.
Public Engagement: time spent interacting with – hearing from, responding to
– the general public during the course of the meeting.
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Several of these broad categories overlap on specific agenda items, for example a
Policy item could involve Strategic investment and Financial Management issues; therefore the total time for an agenda item was included in multiple categories if the topic could be included in more than one category. This accounts for the total time discrepancy between ODOT divisional (4020) and board category breakdown (6505) by minutes. Taken together, this breakdown of the 2005‐2007 OTC agendas shows the patterns, trends, and focal areas of one state’s transportation governing commission.
3.2.1 The State Transportation Commissions Survey
The State Transportation Commissions Survey (STCS) was created to establish a baseline set of statistics and characteristics of how transportation oversight and governance boards operate. The questions were designed based on the literature of governing board best practices, as described above. Specifically, the survey was intended to provide basic information on how transportation commissions, boards, or authorities, spend their time, particularly in their regularly occurring public meetings. The goal of the survey was to identify any possible best practices for state transportation commissions, similar to those used by private corporate boards.
The questions chosen were based on the literature review conducted over the last year for this essay, as well as the work conducted by Stauffer and Miaso as interns working for OTC Chair Actherman. Using various lists of questions identified as important for governing boards to ask themselves from governance literature, a
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36 set of 18 questions regarding basic board characteristics, agenda creation, and self‐ assessment areas, were crafted. These questions were reviewed by OTC Chair
Achterman, Dr. Brent Steel of Oregon State University, and Barnie Frank and Amanda
Pietz of the ODOT Research Unit.
The deployment of the STCS’ online format – the critical method for reaching
34 state transportation commission administrators – was administered by Amanda
Pietz, with the ODOT Research Unit. Her assistance with the STCS was vital to our limited time table, which included finalizing the survey questions, entering them into the online‐based Survey Monkey software, sending the link via email to the 34 state transportation commission support staff employees, and monitoring the survey as it was completed between March 4, 2009 and March 23, 2009. The emails with the
Survey Monkey link were sent out in OTC Chair Gail Actherman’s name, in the hopes that using the name of a transportation agency official would encourage the response rate of the targeted recipients. Ms. Pietz was also instrumental in providing the written summary and Microsoft Excel spreadsheet containing the raw STCS results.
The ideal STCS respondents were the individuals most directly involved in the routine operations of the state transportation commission. Because it is likely that the actual members of state transportation commissions, authorities, or boards, would not have the time, or direct knowledge, of all the details asked in this survey, we targeted each commission’s administrative staff, either dedicated to the board or shared with the executive officers. I found that not all states have transportation commissions; many appear to have single executive authority entities, often referred
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37 to as Transportation Secretaries or Commissioners, with no prominent or noted oversight body. I was able to identify 34 state transportation commissions, boards, or authorities, with the stated duties of oversight or governance of transportation agencies. To locate contact information, and to establish the existence of the 34 state transportation commissions I visited each of the 51 DOT websites (including the
District of Columbia) and searching for links to agency organizational charts or using various search engines at each website to find any governing commission, board, or authority, that met the broad definition of an oversight or advisory board for the transportation agency. While conducting this internet‐based search method I employed various terms to locate the governing entity and their associated staff, looking for administrative titles like Secretary to the Board, Executive Administrator, etc., to find a contact person, preferably not a commission member, who would be knowledgeable about the commission. Attention was given specifically to commission meetings and agenda set‐up as well as general administrative duties. It was often the case that full contact information (name, title, phone number and email) was not available online; in such cases I worked my way through the agency general phone numbers to locate a solid contact person for the commission. This work was conducted during the winter quarter of 2009, when I served as an intern with ODOT, working with Amanda Pietz of the ODOT Research Unit.
Because the data being collected is public information, and because the STCS is relatively short, we estimated that a reasonable return rate would be 50% of survey recipients, or 16 surveys. Given the nature of this graduate essay, and the
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38 relatively recent date of deployment of the survey, the desired response rate, for reporting purposes here, was linked to the tentative essay timeline. For use in this essay the survey results were prepared, sent out, and returned during February and
March 2009. Surveys returned after March 2009 may still be useful in later research and adaptations of this essay.
Since the data being collected from this survey is intended to establish basic qualitative data, this initial analysis is limited to basic frequencies and Microsoft
Excel‐based pivot table. The more informative results are the qualitative conclusions about common trends or responses from state transportation commissions.
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4. RESULTS
For all the existing literature on governance, for all the corporate boards and public commissions, the fact remains that we know very little about these organizations, especially for transportation infrastructure agencies. To identify not only the present status of transportation governance, but also at where further research might focus, this essay reports on three projects undertaken in the last year aimed at exploring this area of public policy: (1) the analysis of the OTC’s time management practices; (2) the cumulative results of a literature review on governance; and (3), the preliminary results of a survey sent to the 34 state transportation commissions. These projects point to a lack of consistency in governance activity and research, a lack of independent commission identity separate from the agency, and the need for further investigation and exploration of governance best practices for state commissions.
4.1 The OTC Agenda Analysis: The Highway Division Steals the Show
The goal of the agenda analysis project was to identify time management trends broken down by ODOT division and board responsibility areas, to determine what topics occupy OTC formal meeting time. This analysis found that the Highway
Division and informational items dominated the agenda; it also concludes that the
OTC spent near equal amounts of time in their roles to engage the public, oversee
ODOT activities, and to craft or amend agency policy. For the full details of the agenda analysis refer to Appendix II.
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The prevailing suspicion that the Highway Division captures the bulk of the
OTC’s public time was
strongly confirmed in
the analysis of agendas
from December 2005 to
November 2007. Fifty‐
three percent of formal meeting minutes were spent on approval and informational items regarding the
Highway Division, followed by 21% on routine administrative tasks. All other divisions received between 3% and 6%. This suggests that, as one might have guessed, motor vehicle transportation services and the high‐profile capital projects associated with them are the chief focus of the OTC. This confirms the belief by Chair
Achterman, that the volunteer commission members primarily consider the activities of just one of the seven ODOT divisions. This is not surprising given the historical focus and budget allocation to highways, rather then other transportation modes.
OTC agenda items during the formal meeting are either informational, providing background or updates on ODOT projects or studies, or require approval of an appropriation or decision recommended by the agency. Sixty‐four percent of all agenda items during the formal OTC meetings were spent on informational items.
The only division that presented the commission with mostly approval items was the
Motor Carrier Transportation Division. It is reasonable to conclude that the information only or required approval break down by division depends upon the
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41 nature of the division’s work and its size relative to the rest of ODOT. It is important to note that the public meetings are not the only place divisions report to the OTC; therefore it is likely some divisional reporting or approving is not captured in this analysis, although commission meetings are the primary and most public setting for the OTC. However, the finding that the volunteer commissioners spend a majority of their time receiving information, confirms a pattern identified by Chair Achterman as a persistent issue the OTC should address, reflecting the OTC’s reactive position.
Of the seven categories of board responsibilities, those broadly defined areas governing bodies ought to spend their time on, the OTC spent nearly equal amounts of time on Public Time Spent by Board Responsibility Engagement (23%), Categories Publi Policy Engagementc Oversight (23%), and 23 22 % % Policy Creation (22%). Fin. 17 Mgmt. Oversight These areas were followed Risk% 23 Mgmt. 1 Strategi % % by Financial Management Investmentc 14 % (17%), Strategic
Investment (14%), Risk Management (1%), and CEO Evaluation (0%). Since Oversight and Policy creation agenda items overlap frequently, we can conclude that almost half of OTC time is spent monitoring the agency and focusing on where the agency is going in a big picture way. The OTC is not responsible for evaluating the ODOT director, who is appointed by the governor and therefore serves at the pleasure of the state’s chief executive, with the advice of the OTC; this is why no time was spent
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42 in the two year period reviewed assessing the job performance of the agency director.
Of the 229 Consent Agenda items approved by the OTC in an omnibus package at the end of the formal meeting, 110 were administrative rules and 69 were changes in the Statewide Transportation Improvement Program (STIP), which is the highway capital expenditure plan. Again it seems that the Consent Agenda also largely deals with Highway Division programs and projects.
These conclusions, along with the detailed reports, were presented to the
OTC in January 2008, during the course of a public work session in Salem, Oregon.
The work session was audio recorded and the review presented here is based on those recordings. The agenda analysis was presented to the commissioners and agency staff as a part of Chair Achterman’s efforts to identify “what the commission ought to be working on” (OTC 2008). It was also noted that the agenda analysis was something of precursor to the literature review to be done later in 2008. The presentation by Stauffer and Miaso came at a time when the OTC was developing a comprehensive Work Plan for the commission and the agency, and was especially important as the commission prepared to welcome two new board members, then scheduled to take their seats at the commission’s February 2008 meeting (OTC 2008).
At the time of the presentation the OTC only had three of its five positions filled, as two commissioners had just resigned and the governor was in the process of appointing two replacement commissioners.
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Generally, commissioners and agency staff accepted the conclusions from the formal agenda analysis presented by Stauffer and Miaso. Particularly for Chair
Actherman, the results confirmed her suspicion that the commission was spending too much time, during the formal meeting, on specifically Highway Division informational matters. Commissioner Mike Nelson concluded that the analysis report yielded “good stuff” (OTC 2008). Motor Carrier Transportation division director Greg Dal Ponte appreciated the new information, saying the new data was
“edifying and adds value” to the discussion of OTC roles and responsibilities (OTC
2008). ODOT Director Matthew Garrett also pointed out that the findings of the agenda analysis was “surprising because we didn’t know” what would be found, although he noted the conclusions about what divisions occupied OTC formal meeting time was along the lines they might have guessed (OTC 2008), a sentiment shared by Chair Achterman.
However, commissioners and agency senior staff also pointed out some of the analysis’ shortcomings and areas that might need further definition. Director Dal
Ponte emphasized that formal meeting time fails to reflect the many informal ways – like ODOT committees and designated commissioner liaisons ‐ that the OTC employs to stay informed of divisional activity and thus serves its oversight charge. Director
Dal Ponte was specifically concerned that the agenda analysis reflected very little
Motor Carrier Transportation division time during the formal commission meeting
(OTC 2008). Director Garrett and Chair Actherman agreed with Director Dal Ponte, noting that the concern was valid, and explained that Stauffer and Miaso has been
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44 asked to analyze what amounts to only one data point of OTC and ODOT activity.
Director Garrett noted that the monthly OTC meeting was only one way the OTC performs its job (OTC 2008).
Similarly, Commissioner Nelson and Central Services Deputy Director Lorna
Young noted that the analysis finding of very little OTC formal time spent on Risk
Management issues might be seen as a call for more OTC attention to such agency risk issues. However they noted that because of the lack of a specifically transportation background on the part of Stauffer and Miaso, certain agenda items that actually did include Risk Management issues might not have been classified as appropriately (OTC 2008). As a way to go forward with further risk management oversight in the future, Deputy Director Young suggested that the commission might find it “helpful” to better define risk management in individual projects and programs the OTC considers (OTC 2008).
It was also noted by both commissioners and agency staff that the informational and approval break down of each agenda item is important to consider, given that the OTC is trying to identify what it ought to be doing as opposed to what it is doing presently. Commissioner Wilson and ODOT Director Garrett pointed out that since the OTC spends a lot of their formal time on informational items, “a lot of informational items eventually yield an approval,” suggesting that a lot of the informational items are preparation for the commission make a decision (OTC 2008).
As a primary concern for Chair Achterman was the amount of time spent on
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45 informational items, this suggestion may alter perceptions of the informational nature of OTC time management practices.
Bringing the conversation to the big‐picture level, Director Garrett noted that what the agenda analysis, along with the OTC’s examination of their roles and responsibilities, gets at is “what is the commission engaging in and how is the commission engaging in this…” by asking if the OTC as an example commission is an anomaly, in terms of behavior and activity compared to other transportation commissions (OTC 2008). He continued to say that balancing agency and commission oversight priorities is “a balance between the commission’s role, [and] the
CEO/senior management…”when deciding if the situation calls for “boards that rubber stamp and those that are hands on…”; Director Garrett suggested that for
ODOT the right balance was “in the middle”(OTC 2008). Director Garrett also noted that as he reports directly to the governor, he found the 0% of OTC time spent on
CEO evaluation to be the perfect amount of time, a comment that received the anticipated chuckle from audience members (OTC 2008).
Summing up the OTC’s response to the agenda analysis, Commissioner Wilson noted that the goal was to look at their authority, their roles and responsibilities, and how they spend their time; despite several limitations, and suggesting that the formal agenda items only show “about a 1/3 of commission time,” Commissioner Nelson found that the analysis “…allows us to have a snapshot to say, based on what our responsibilities are, based on what we are spending our time on…” the results will be
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46 beneficial “…for deeper conversations… about what the roles of the commission are”
(OTC 2008).
As a part of the OTC’s long‐term effort to identify its legal and informal oversight roles and responsibilities, the agenda analysis discussion eventually gave way to a continuation of a conversation the commission began in late 2007 about defining their roles and responsibilities. Commissioner Nelson reiterated what he considered to be a common board concern about orienting new members to the purpose of the OTC, as he had experienced “concern as a new commission member as to what our role was…”(OTC 2008). The agency directors’ perspective on what is expected by the OTC was expressed by the Driver and Motor Vehicle director, who explained that as a divisional director she “takes [her] cue from the commission as to what they want to see, if they want to know more from each division the commission should request it and the divisions can provide that…” concluding that “[divisional directors] won’t show unless we have to” (OTC 2008). In large part the discussion placed the focus on the motivation of the OTC to function in the terms Director
Garrett illustrated, as a “rubber stamp” or very “hands on”, but preferably at some happy middle place.
By the January 2008 work session the OTC had already drafted a set of eight responsibility roles, with the guidance of designated senior staff, external consultations, public comments, and armed with findings of the OTC agenda analysis and the 2005 KTC study roles and responsibility report (see Appendix I). As a work‐in‐ progress project, occurring as the OTC was undergoing changes in membership and
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47 leadership, the document referred to as the “Role and of the OTC” was a way for commission members and ODOT senior staff to reflect on the operations of the commission and to put their brainstorming sessions through a public review processes, allowing time for consideration of the drafted roles and responsibilities and receiving input along the way. During the January 2008 work session the commissioners and agency directors informally approved the eight areas they had identified and agreed to set future time for further development of each responsibility area (OTC 2008). The eight role areas as approved by the OTC in March
2008 are presented in Box 4 (for roles with authorizing statutes see Appendix III). The identified roles embody what Commissioner Wilson explained as what “we are trying to do, what are we trying to accomplish” (OTC 2008).
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Box 4: Oregon Transportation Commission Work Session Summary. (Fall 2007, January 24, 2008 and February 21, 2008, Finalized March 19, 2008) Role of the Oregon Transportation Commission The principal functions of the commission, along with current commission priorities are: 1. Policy development a) Land use and transportation integration b) Federal transportation act reauthorization c) Intermodal integration d) Governance across all transportation ownerships and jurisdictions e) Systems optimization-mobility services 2. Strategic planning a) Strategic investment analysis and project investment criteria b) Rail assessment and action strategy c) Climate change plan implementation 3. Oversight of operations (performance measures and tracking) a) Project delivery performance b) Cost accountability 4. Strategic transactions (major projects/corridors) a) Columbia River Crossing b) Central Oregon c) Other major Portland metro projects 5. Financial management (revenue and expenses) a) Future funding strategies i) Tolling ii) Value capture iii) Odometer-based tax b) Gap analysis of funding shortfalls across all jurisdictions c) Revenue allocation 6. Risk management 7. External relations (independent eyes and ears, independent advocate for transportation needs) a) Communications b) Intergovernmental relations c) Stakeholder/citizen relations 8. Review of director’s effectiveness
4.2 The Literature Review: Mostly Corporate Best Practices
From the existing public, corporate, and nonprofit governance scholarship,
John Miaso and I were able to construct a working list of best practices. Based on the literature reviewed, a “Top 10” list of board best practices has been compiled for use by both public and private governing entities. Although they do not proceed in any Stauffer
49 particular order, this list is based on the outlines of the studies reviewed. The use of this master best practices list is intended for public governance bodies, most directly for application in the transportation field, where issues of accountability and time management are of particular concern.
1. What will we be doing? Boards should establish a clear mission, to be
periodically reviewed under new circumstances. It is useful for boards to put in
writing their individual and group expectations for the agency and themselves.
2. Are we on track? Consistently apply the mission to decisions. Has the board
been guided by its mission? Program monitoring should consider the initial goals.
Using “dashboard” measurement tools is an effective way to maintain and review
the agency’s mission through key performance areas over time.
3. Do we know the agency financially and strategically? Oversight includes
understanding the present and historic needs of the agency, which shows an
appreciation for the agency and can build relationships with employees and
provides the board with important background for decision making.
4. Are we up‐to‐date? Develop board self‐evaluation practices to understand what
the board is doing and highlight to improve. Staying technologically current aids
the board in keeping in contact with each other and the agency.
5. Are we dealing with change? Provide orientation and training sessions and
materials for new, and veteran, board members.
6. Can’t we all just get along? Maintain an open dialogue with the agency staff to
enable board members to know where they are needed most.
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7. Can they see us? Boards should be redundantly transparent in presenting their
performance indicators to the public, agency, and legislative entities.
8. Do we play favorites? Conduct neutral and open meetings to avoid the
appearance of influences that may hurt the board’s oversight of the agency.
9. Are we too risky? Evaluate the board’s role in the agency’s risk management.
10. Do we oversee what we are supposed to oversee? If the board is responsible for
CEO selection, the process and desired criteria should be reviewed. For public
boards, understand the executive’s (governor’s) expectations. You are there to
hold others accountable, so ask questions and get answers.
The key to the success for any governing body lies in its ability to adapt in an organic and elastic way, within the well‐established boundaries and expectations of the board, the executive, and the agency. It is important for board members to know their role in the bigger picture of the organization and be willing to roll with the inevitable punches. The ability of the board to work together depends largely on the relationships built, and tested; by simply working together which goes as far as any tool or technique in determining the success of governance and oversight. Board failures, it seems, occur not as a result of poor planning, but due to a lack of communication and camaraderie between board members, the agency staff, the executive, and the public.
Most important of these best practices, for application to the transportation commission setting, are the recommendations to know the agency, maintain open dialogue with the agency staff, be redundantly transparent, and conduct neutral and
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51 open meetings. Some of the concerns of OTC Chair Achterman were consistent with these popularly identified areas where other boards and commissions have gotten off track. The need to maintain neutrality and transparency during formal meetings, by avoiding too much preoccupation with a particular ODOT division, maybe remedied by diversify the existing OTC agenda and including divisions and issues from other areas of agency policy influence. This recommendation is largely to be implemented at the discretion of those who craft the agenda, which varies with each agency, but emphasizes the importance of understanding the roles within the commission and agency that most influence the function and ultimately performance success or failure.
4.3 The STCS: Despite Mobility, Commissions Lack Identity
State transportation commissions typically have their own staff or access to agency staff support that set commission agendas; most commissions are able to get around their state for meetings; and most commissions spend little time conducting self‐assessments. They appear to be true to what literature and experience have suggested: vaguely understood oversight mechanisms that are dependent upon the agency and state they serve, and do not spend much time thinking about who they are and what they do.
Thirty‐four states have some form of transportation governing body, be it a commission, board, or authority; for each of the 34 state transportation governing entity an administrative staff member was identified for participation in the STCS; of
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52 the 34 administrative staff members who received the STCS invitation via email 26, or
76%, responded. As this is above the predicted 50% or 17 respondents mark the return rate is better than expected and adds to the weight and meaning of our conclusions about how state transportation governing bodies behave in terms of staffing, agenda setting, and basic routine activities. Thanks to the essential assistance of Amanda Pietz, with the ODOT Research Unit, a full compilation and basic summary of these results are included in this essay (see Appendix IV).
The results of the STCS are presented here in general conclusion bullet point format. The points are grouped by the broad areas the survey was organized by.
Who the STCS Respondents Were and Commission Support
• Ninety‐Two percent of STCS respondents were either dedicated commission
support staff or executive. 50% identified themselves as commission dedicated,
and 42.3% identified themselves as agency staff, suggesting they are not
commission designated and likely perform other agency support tasks as well. 15
of the 26 respondents reported that their transportation commission has some
type of dedicated staff; there seems to be some commission staff members who
serve dual commission‐agency functions. The Montana Transportation
Commission Secretary summarized the existence of this dual‐role situation with
her comment that “there are many department staff that assist with the
Commission but one designated Commission staff person.”
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• The largest reported full‐time commission dedicated staff was 17 and one
respondent reported 0; 50% of commission aides reported a staff of 1 or 2
people.
Agenda Setting and Meeting Time
• Most commission meetings last about 2 hours and require between 1 and 8 hours
of preparation time. The Secretary to the Georgia State Transportation Board
noted that she spends 10‐12 hours per monthly meeting, adding that what is
required varies with “each board chair… some want more input than others.” This
echoes similar findings from the OTC agenda analysis discussions, where the
Driver and Motor Vehicle Director suggested that formal agenda patterns depend
on the expectation of the commission chair. Suggesting that despite efforts to
reform single person authority, especially in the commission setting, the enabling
forces that brought such men as Robert Moses and Glenn Jackson to prominence
remain in place and in potential practice.
• Seventy‐six percent of commission agendas are created by dedicated or agency
executive staff.
• Ninety‐two percent of commissions meetings are mobile, and travel to various
parts of the state to hold meetings. To encourage “public participation” the
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Transportation Commission’s administrative officer
reported that his commission holds about five public hearings every two years.
The executive assistant to the Florida Transportation Commission (FTC) reports
the FTC is required by law to meet four times a year, but in practice meets 6 times
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a year at “various locations around the state.” The Secretary to the Mississippi
Transportation Commission reports that that body meets twice a month. These
comments, and this high percentage rate of traveling meetings, suggests that
commissions find moving around to different locations to be a good way of being
transparent and accessible to different parts of the public.
• Creating and using annual work plans, or some form of a master calendar, is hit or
miss. 54.2% of commission staff members reported using an annual work plan,
and 45.8% reported that they did not. This finding reinforces the notion that not
much time is given to the big‐picture purposes of transportation commissions,
and that a general vagueness remains about the point these oversight
mechanisms. This may however also mean that different DOT agencies have
different administrative practices and behavior as a part of their operational
culture, and commissions may share calendars with other agency offices, or the
agency may rely upon state laws to dictate when they meet.
• Commissions very rarely meet alone, without executive staff or the public.
According to the Secretary to the Missouri Highway and Transportation
Commission, that body has not met alone for “several years now.” This finding is
most intriguing as it suggests a lack of commission independence, separate from
agency staff and executive branch influences. A key finding of governing board
literature, especially since the days of Ken Lay and SOX legislation, is the need for
commissions to exercise a certain amount of independence from those they
oversee (Oliver 1999). As transportation commissions are called upon to render a
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key accountability role, the commission from time to time, ought to separate
itself and form some unique identity and cohesion.
Commission Self‐Administration Activities
• Eighty‐Seven and a‐half percent of commissions do not conduct self‐
assessments, and 75% of commissions do not hold annual retreats. Both of
these findings are counter to what the literature suggests are keys ways to
strengthen board performance (Houle 1989; Drucker 1990; Minow and Monks
1996; Oliver 1999). These statistics also reinforce the idea that little attention is
paid to commissions, even by commission members. Starting with internal
reviews is a good place to turn the tide of the lack of review and independence of
the commission as an organ of good governance practices.
• A bit more than half, 56.5%, of commissions maintain member job descriptions;
65.2% of commissions report maintaining and using some form of a member
manual for training of information purposes; 69% of commission report training
new commission members. Following through on these simple housekeeping
chores should go a long way in helping establish independence in the key auditing
body with large DOT organizations. It is encouraging that more than half of
existing transportation commissions practice these tasks.
Taken together these results paint a world of transportation governance that might have been predicted, with most bodies not concerning themselves with their own job performance, although there are signs of efforts to be accessible. Half of
STCS respondents reported an interest in being kept informed of this survey’s results,
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56 and this essay’s larger examination of transportation governance; this suggests that there is at least some minimal internal concern about the governance practices of transportation agencies, if for no other reason than because these folks work in this specific field and have a direct interest. There may also be a growing need to
“clarify” the roles of these boards, to explore what the Secretary to the Georgia State
Transportation Board referred to as “gray area.”
The STCS suggests that transportation governance bodies remain entities operating without much serious reflection about their agenda and performance. It seems that in many ways the STCS identifies boards and commissions that are merely extensions of the agencies they are supposed to hold accountable, partly due to the varying legal formulas used to select members, and partly because they are usually not responsible for what their agenda presents them, they rely upon support staff that may work for the agency, and they usually don’t spend anytime as independently for any purpose, let alone self‐assessment.
The suspected disconnect between recommended best practices, based on corporate and public administration literature, and what transportation commissions do in reality seems to be confirmed by the STCS findings. Particularly when it comes to board independence, essential for critical auditing duties in the post‐SOX era
(Oliver 1999), and self‐evaluation activities, which many corporate authors suggest is essential for effective governing boards (Houle 1989; Drucker 1990; Minow and
Monks 1996; Oliver 1999). These findings indicate that transportation commissions are not utilizing the governance lessons and practices of other fields, particularly the
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57 corporate world where governing bodies have been forced to be more responsive to the rights of shareholders and government regulators. And indeed it may take not only active commission members, but a more attentive and concerned public for transportation commissions to take themselves, and their roles, more seriously.
Given this commission behavior, it is easy to see how a Robert Moses or Glenn
Jackson – powerful and charismatic personalities invested with the powers of a chairman – could dominate the activities of a commission. It is also easy to see how there might be frustration amongst present commission members and chairs, or their staff, who would appreciate a little more clarity and explanation in the purpose of transportation governance from a commission standpoint. Of course a lot of these questions are readily answered on a state‐by‐state basis, with actual practices yielding to the traditions of each agency and the momentary fancies of the appointing governor or electing public. But if nothing else, the STCS reinforces that there is a lack of consistency in what transportation commissions are doing, and what we as a public, can take away from governing transportation agencies – agencies that consume and expend vast amounts of public resources.
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5. DISCUSSION & RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The picture painted by the OTC agenda analysis and the STCS, suggests that the historical description of the governing board – as vaguely understood and inconsistently used accountability entities – remains more or less in effect, despite the valiant efforts of reformers through the last several decades. These noble efforts at bringing out governance paradigm shifts, organizational remodeling, and behavior altering practices, is well documented in the literature review of corporate governance and public administration. And yet, as the STCS and OTC agenda presentation made clear, there remains a distinct disconnect between what we believe our transportation commissions ought to be doing and what they are actually doing. More importantly there remains a lack of independence, a lack of willingness to spend time on examining themselves that exists within transportation commissions that should concern the observer as well as those who have more directly at stake in the activities of government accountability. Unfortunately for OTC
Chair Achterman, it would appear that her pre‐existing suspicions about a lack of effective time management does indeed bear some truth in the practices of not only her commission, but in the behavior of commissions across the country.
There is a practical need to study and assess how transportation commissions should, and do operate, not only as statutorily mandated oversight mechanisms of large public agencies, but as the setting for human interactions on political and social terms. Areas for future commission research ought to focus on include: the broad area of commission culture, the other 2/3 of commission time not captured in
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59 meeting agendas or minutes; the critical Federal‐state relationship ought to be explored deeper, especially given the lack of attention for the Federal role in transportation funding, which this essay found to be none‐existent in a post‐“iron triangle” world; the real concern about commission responsiveness to constituency groups; and the overall satisfaction rate of commission members. The role of our public commissions in many fields of interest, who do so much to regulate, protect, and promote, our civil society, is still lacking and un‐explored, a surprising state affairs despite the widespread presence of these government bodies.
In a not too‐far stretched way, governing boards like transportation commissions reflect popular ideas and values expressed by the interested, attentive, active, and perhaps general public. Various commissions and boards, to a degree, reflect what we in society find to be important, and how they spend their time matters not only because it may lead to where money is spent, or what highway is repaved, but it also reflects the sacrifices we are willing to make in the name of filling a pot hole, building a new bridge, or licensing a new group of drivers. Understanding how much time the OTC spends on the new Columbia River Crossing (project name for the future expansion of the Interstate‐5 Bridge between Portland, OR and
Vancouver, WA) is one way to identify the importance of that issue for Oregon and its citizenry. At present we can conclude that Oregon cares about its highways, a finding found in the guesses of agency insiders and the supported by the OTC agenda analysis. But is this truly accurate, or are there organizational forces at work? Or is this just a reflection of 1/3 of OTC time data, as suggested by ODOT staff?
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As with so many studies this attempt at answering rather broad questions about meeting accountability in the state transportation commission setting, has yielded more questions. However, armed with the findings presented here, future assaults on our lack of transportation governance knowledge will know that there is somewhere else to go!
5.1 Key Conclusions: State Policy Needs Our Attention!
From the two projects and literature review I have reported here in this graduate essay, I have come to some general conclusions about public governance presently.
It’s a Good Idea to Question the Diversity of Your Agenda. A basic finding of the
OTC agenda analysis was that the Highway Division receives a lot of attention,
and it’s a finding that was predicted by those who ought to know. As this is
identified as a problem from the standpoint of addressing all the concerns of a
complex transportation agency, as well as from the perspective of a volunteer
commissioner wanting to be as helpful as possible, it would seem wise to explore
the possibilities of opening up and diversifying commission agenda items to
match key strategic issues. This can incorporate commission movement around
the state; time spent on specific highway projects. But of course caution must be
emphasized, as a commission would not want to act too boldly in its zealous
efforts to be diverse and lose sight of it’s agency’s needs; the question however
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must be asked in a fair tone: does the highway division need 53% of the
commission’s time?
Building Key Relationships is Critical for Successful Fulfillment of Your Duties.
So much of the literature I reviewed on governance focused whole chapters and
many pages to the importance of developing the three primary relationships a
governing board has: with executive powers, with agency staff, and with the
public. And I would add a fourth: with itself. The ability to govern appears to be
so dependent upon how well the commission gets along with the agency senior
and executive staff, as well as with itself as a supposedly quasi‐independent
entity, that time should be spent on just building up the dialogue and knowledge
of the folks at commission meetings. With open lines of communication the
commission can better understand the agency, be better informed on key issues,
and hopefully foster new ideas and activities that encourage better and more
effective policy governance.
When Practicing the Art of Governance, Do as We Hope, Not as We Really Do. It
seems to me that there are two worlds co‐existing around public governance: tips
and lessons from past leaders and academics in the know, and the trends and
practices of what this essay has identified as the reality of public governance.
How we go about breaching the gap that exists between these two worlds has –
and will – consume many pages and many hours of research. The goal of this
essay was to establish a picture of where we are today and identify “best
practices” for commissions to use going forward. This picture is filled with “gray
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area” but we know that there are key areas where more can be done to improve
the effectiveness of volunteer commissioner’s time. Commissions ought to do
more self‐exploration of their activities and behaviors; in the hopes that such self‐
assessment might inspire increased independence from those they are to
oversee, and to promote unity and cohesion as a group.
5.2 Key Recommendations: Who are We?
I have also come across some critical areas future studies ought to go in the continuing dialogue on governance, public administration, and accountability.
Research on Public – State Transportation – Governance is Needed! The present
extent of analysis on the behavior of public governance models is critically
lacking, particularly for transportation agencies. As we continue to move farther
away from the 20th century heydays of attention to commission government, it
becomes increasingly critical for a reassessment of this apparently still popular
form of public oversight; research should be pursued in academic and
professional arenas with urgency. One such application, taken from these pages,
might be some more general agenda analysis of all 34 state transportation
commissions. The STCS conducted for this essay yielded critical information, but
it did not dive deep enough to run across regular meeting time management
practices: the question ought to be asked if Mississippi, Florida, Pennsylvania,
and Washington all spend a majority of time on highway division informational
items?
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o The Bigger Picture. Despite my best efforts to capture the activities and
behaviors of the OTC, as Director of Motor Carrier Transportation Dal Ponte
pointed out during the work session discussion of the agenda analysis, there is
a lot of work and reporting done outside of the formal meeting. Future
efforts to quantify and evaluate commission governance should find ways to
incorporate the out‐of‐meeting work and meeting patterns, where perhaps
the style and tradition of a given commission may influence their collective
ability to lead and to function.
Utilize What We Already Have Going… Anyone who has visited the TRB website
realizes that there is a lot of good research going on in the transportation field.
The problem for students of public policy is that very little of this vast research
field seems to be paying close attention to the decision making processes,
although the two TRB authored studies referenced in this essay both cite the
urgency of further research, which is based on the critical lack of study so far, on
the municipal, county, regional, state, and national levels.
Do You Hear that Echo? Take Time for Yourself. For as much writing I can do as
a graduate student assessing the lack of research, and for as much lecturing and
writing academics and industry experts can do, there are really only a few people
who can effect the changes suggested in the literature review, agenda analysis,
and commission survey. The men and women who serve on the 34 state‐level
transportation commissions across the country are – in theory – the ones with the
power to make what they do count, to ensure that their time is used wisely, and
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to bridge the gap between the literature and what happens in practice. The most
essential recommendations for action, in my opinion, are board self‐assessment,
relationship building, and knowing your agency. Steps that can come in many
forms, in many ways, at many different times, but all require commitment and
investment of time and energy, something that perhaps is the real culprit in
governing success: can volunteers be counted upon to put into the job what we
idealistically say we want? Or is the cynical bet that the answer is ‘no’ really the
desired outcome?
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6. CONCLUSION
It seems that transportation commissions are at an eternal crossroads, and governing in general is at a never‐ending junction of consequences and expectations.
As executives and boards at the top of major corporations and public agencies are called to answer before the court of public opinion, it seems appropriate that we should launch a massive reevaluation of one of our largest taxpayer supported – and utilized – institutions: transportation departments. The crossroads these governing authorities find themselves at however is not one they are likely to completely cross any time soon. The argument could be made that this lack of identity, both internally and externally, has existed since the creation of public governance, and perhaps even intentionally. There are those who suggest that the very system of American governance is designed to stall decision making that James Madison, an author of the influential Federalist papers, sought to minimize rapid‐action government (Lunch
2001). Original intent aside and perhaps only because of a few “squeaky wheel” members of these commissions, the need to assess public governance is presented, and the picture painted supports the lack of identity and consistency that seem to characterize such governing bodies.
This essay relies upon a comprehensive governance literature review, an analysis of OTC agendas over two years, and the results of a survey sent to thirty‐four state transportation commissions’ administrative employees. The results of these efforts describe the realities of disconnect between written “best practices” mainly from other fields, and the widespread lack of transportation commission
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66 independence and self‐assessment. The fact that so many commissions fail to consider their actions or what it is they spend their time doing every month suggests that these governing boards are largely ignored by the agencies they serve and are, inline with OTC Chair Achterman’s primary concern, not focusing on what they ought to be. The fact that there is a lack of specific research on transportation commissions is thus likely a result of the little interest transportation commissions have in assessing themselves.
We do however know that there are general steps to be taken that can strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of a transportation commission in any state, and these are the lessons transferred from corporate board rooms. Namely it is in the best interest of everyone associated with a transportation commission to have solid working relationships with the commission members and the agency staff; and to that end the conversation about what is on the agenda is a good starting place for building the dialogue between the commission, agency, and general public. It should not be taken for granted that the agenda is the same month after month, year after year; unless there are specific state laws requiring the inclusion of certain agenda items it should be fair for commission members and agency directors to propose adding and editing the formal agenda. Implementing these and other internal activities shouldn’t require any grand act of state, but it does need the willingness of commissions and agencies to be open to new ideas, a bold idea in a field of public policy that has become stale with routine.
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If this essay succeeds in nothing else, let it be a call for further study and analysis of public governance, particularly in the area of state transportation agencies. Because the task before state transportation departments in the future will include massive capital projects – as aging infrastructure systems are replaced – the need to understand how they function becomes even more critical. We have neglected this widely used organ of state government for too long, it is time to re‐ evaluate what we are doing, how we are doing it, and ask ourselves what we ought to be doing. And that process begins with the commissions themselves.
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Herman, Robert D. and David O. Renz (2000). Board Practices of Especially Effective and Less Effective Local Nonprofit Organizations, pp. 146‐160 in American Review of Public Administration, Vol. 30 No. 2. Retrieved June 2, 2008 at http://arp.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/30/2/146.
Hilton, George W. (1972). The Basic Behavior of Regulatory Commissions, pp. 47‐54 in American Economic Review, Vol. 62 Is. 2. Retrieved February 6, 2008 at http://www.jstor.org/pss/1821523.
Innes, Judith E. and Judith Gruber (2005). Planning Styles in Conflict: The Metropolitan Transportation Commission, pp. 177‐188 in Journal of the American Planning Association, Vol. 71 No. 2. Retrieved Spring 2008 at http://www‐ iurd.ced.berkeley.edu/pub/WP‐2001‐09.PDF.
Larson, Mark C. (2005). Organizing for Performance Management, Transportation Research Board, Washington DC, pp 99‐120. Retrieved Spring 2008 at http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/conf/CP36.pdf.
Mitchell, Jerry (1997). Representation in Government Boards and Commissions, pp. 160‐167 in Public Administration Review, Vol. 57 Is. 2. Retrieved Spring 2008 at http://0‐ apps.isiknowledge.com.oasis.oregonstate.edu/full_record.do?product=WOS&search _mode=GeneralSearch&qid=2&SID=1DhmjgdjpOb2PcM7npl&page=1&doc=2
Oregon, State of (2008). Self‐Assessment, pp. 14‐16 in Oregon Boards and Commissions Membership Handbook, Executive Appointments, Office of the
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Governor, Salem OR. Retrieved Spring 2008 at http://www.oregon.gov/Gov/pdf/forms/Handbook.pdf. Siwek, Sara J. & Associates (1999). Statewide Transportation Planing Under ISTEA: A New Framework for Decision Making, Federal Highway Administration, Washington, D.C. Retrieved Spring 2008 at www.fhwa.dot.gov/hep10/state/guide5.pdf.
Texas, State of, Department of Transportation (2008). Horizon: The Future of Transportation, Austin TX. Retrieved Spring 2008 at ftp://ftp.dot.state.tx.us/pub/txdot‐info/gbe/horizon/horizon_winter2008.pdf.
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7.1 Appendix I: Roles and Responsibilities of Transportation Commissions
Roles and Responsibilities of Transportation Commissions
From Today’s DOT and the Quest for More Accountable Organizational Structures Kentucky Transportation Center College of Engineering University of Kentucky December 2005
Policy making Policy making encompasses determining statewide transportation policy, in addition to departmental policies such as rules and regulations pertaining to the administration and operations of the Department of Transportation. Short-term planning Short-term planning is defined as transportation planning activities with durations less than 10 years. Long-range planning Long-range planning is defined as planning activities with time horizons beyond 10 years. This includes comprehensive and balanced statewide transportation planning and long-term multimodal planning. Project selection Project selection encompasses all activities related to the selection, ranking and prioritization of projects and the matching of these projects to the budget and other funding sources. Financial management and oversight Financial management and oversight involves all fiscal activities related to the financing and managing of transportation systems. It includes budget development, resource allocation, bond issuance and financial audits. Selection of the Department of Transportation director Statute states that commission either nominates candidates or selects the candidates for director of the Department of Transportation.
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7.2 Appendix II: Oregon Transportation Commission Agenda Analysis
DATE: January 22, 2008
TO: Oregon Transportation Commission
FROM: Gail L. Achterman, Chair
SUBJECT: Time Allocation at Commission Meetings
Requested Action: Informational
Background: Commission Chair Gail Achterman asked John Miaso and Scott Stauffer, graduate students at Oregon State University, in the Master of Public Policy program, to analyze the Commission’s agendas for the last two years, including all monthly agendas from December 12, 2005, to November 15, 2007. John Miaso and Scott Stauffer were asked to analyze the agendas and report on the amount of time the Commission spent on each division of the Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT), the amount of time the Commission spent on seven board responsibility categories, and to provide a total number of consent agenda items.
The results of the agenda analysis found the following:
- 53% of Formal Meeting minutes were spent on approval and informational items regarding the Highway Division. After the Highway Division, administrative tasks received 21% of the Commission’s attention. All other ODOT divisions received between 3 and 6 %. - 64% of Formal Meeting minutes were spent on informational items. Broken down by division, all but the Motor Carrier Transport (MCT) division presented the Commission with primarily informational items. The majority of MCT items required board approval. - Of the 229 Consent Agenda items approved by the Commission, 110 were administrative and 69 were in regards to the Statewide Transportation Improvement Program (STIP). - Of the seven board responsibility categories, the Commission spent nearly equal amounts of time on Public Engagement (23%), Oversight (23%), and Policy (22%). Other categories included Financial Management (17%), Strategic Investment (14%), Risk Management (1%), and CEO Evaluation (0%).
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Time Spent by Board Responsibility Categories Public Polic Engagement y23 22% %
Fin. Mgmt. 17% Oversigh Risk t 23% Mgmt.1% Strategi Investmentc 14%
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INSERT: “OTC 2005‐07 Agendas” Excel Spreadsheet Page 1
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INSERT: “OTC 2005‐07 Agendas” Excel Spreadsheet Page 2
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INSERT: “OTC 2005‐07 Agendas” Excel Spreadsheet Page 3
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7.3 Appendix III: Oregon Transportation Roles and Responsibilities (Statutes)
Roles and Responsibilities of the Oregon Transportation Commission – 2008
1. Policy Development – Policy making and adoption of administrative rules related to highways, motor carriers, motor vehicles, public transit, rail, and other transportation programs, encompassing statewide transportation policy and department operations. Examples: • Project Selection Criteria • Driver License Issuance Policies • Tolling Policies Authority: ORS 184.618(1); also ORS 184.616(1), 184.618(2), 184.619, 366.205, 366.215 and 366.220.
2. Strategic Planning – Specific initiatives or work items targeted at long-term transportation improvements or advancements. Examples: • Oregon Transportation Plan • Governor’s Initiatives • Inter-Modal Integration Authority: ORS 184.618(2); also ORS 184.612(1), 184.618(1), 284.575, 802.010 and 802.310.
3. Oversight of Operations – Monitor Performance Measures established by the agency and the Legislature. Examples: • Performance Measures (i.e. Project Delivery Performance) • Targeted Questions such as the Benchmarking Study Recently done by DMV • Asset Management Authority: ORS 184.617(1) and (3); also ORS 184.634, 366.205, 366.215 and 366.220.
4. Strategic Projects/Programs – Direct involvement and briefing on major projects or issues. Examples: • Columbia River Crossing • Pioneer Mountain • OTIA III Bridge • Major Computer/Program Updates Authority: ORS 184.633; also ORS 366.155, 366.205, 366.215 and 366.220.
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5. Financial Management – Financial management and oversight of fiscal activities related to the financing and managing of transportation systems, including budget development, resource allocation, bond issuance and financial audits. Examples: • Approval of Biennial Budget • Quarterly Monitoring of Overall Budget • Monitor of specific key programs such as OTIA III Bridge • Transportation Funding Options (tolling, mileage fees) Authority: ORS 184.656 through 184.666, Transportation Spending Accountability Act; also, ORS 184.617(4), 184.618(3), 184.636, 184.637, 184.638, 184.651, 366.506, 366.517, 366.518, Chapter 377 and 802.110.
6. Risk Management – Managing uncertainty through risk assessment, developing strategies to manage risk and mitigate identified risks. Examples: • Interchange Area Management Plans • Errors and Omissions Policies • Targeted Internal Audits Authority: ORS 184.617(1) and (3); also, 184.633(4), 184.639, 184.649, 366.155(2), 366.205, 802.310(2), 810.010 and 810.030.
7. External Relationships – Using existing contacts and relationships to be independent eyes and ears and independent advocates for Oregon transportation. Examples: • Meeting with local elected officials and legislators • Speaking to and meeting with local community leaders and organizations • Meeting with concerned citizens, as needed Authority: ORS 184.612(1) and 184.635(1).
8. Sounding Board for the Director – Provide the Director support as he leads the organization. Example: • Ad-hoc conversations with the Director as needed on issues of concern and importance to the day-to-day activities of the agency.
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7.4 Appendix IV: State Transportation Commission Survey Summary of Results Amanda Pietz (2009) Oregon Department of Transportation Research Unit
State Transportation Commission Survey – Summary of Results
Response rate A total of 34 state transportation commissions, boards, or authorities were identified. An email was sent to the primary contact for each organization requesting them to complete the survey. A total of 26 organizations replied, representing a response rate of 76%.
RESULTS
Please indicate your organization or affiliation. Most respondents were either Governance board support staff (50%) or State Transportation Agency staff (42.3%). Frequency Percent Executive Secretary - State Highway 1 3.8 Commission Governance board (commission) member 1 3.8 Governance board (commission) support staff 13 50.0 State Transportation Agency staff 11 42.3 Total 26 100.0
For a typical meeting, who prepares the board’s agenda?
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On average, how long are the board’s regular meetings? Responses ranged from 1 to 16 hours, with a mean of 3.68 hours. The most common response (44%) was 2 hours.
Does the board hold meetings at different places throughout the state? Frequency Percent Yes 15 60.0 No 2 8.0 Sometimes 8 32.0 Total 25 100.0
Does the board prepare an annual work plan to guide calendar development? Frequency Percent Yes 13 54.2 No 11 45.8 Total 24 100.0
How often does the board meet in executive session, without agency staff or the public (times per year)? Responses ranged from 0 to 20 times per year, with a mean of 3.25 times. The most common response (33%) was 0 times, followed by 1 time (25%) and 2 times (12.5%).
Do board members conduct periodic self-assessments? Most organizations do not conduct periodic self-assessments. Of those that do, the assessments are conducted only once a year. Frequency Percent Yes 3 12.5 No 21 87.5 Total 24 100.0
Does the Board evaluate the performance of the agency director? Frequency Percent Yes 9 37.5 No 13 54.2 Not applicable 2 8.3 Total 24 100.0
Does the board have an annual retreat? Frequency Percent Yes 3 12.5 Yes, but not annually 3 12.5 No 18 75.0 Total 24 100.0
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Who prepares the agenda for the retreat? Frequency Percent The Board Chair 1 14.3 The Executive staff 4 57.1 The Board’s dedicated staff 2 28.6 Total 7 100.0
What percentage of time at the retreat is spent on the following activities?
Percent of time spent on presentations by agency staff Frequency Percent 0 1 16.7 10 1 16.7 20 2 33.3 30 1 16.7 60 1 16.7 Total 6 100.0
Percent of time spent on presentations by outside consultants Frequency Percent 0 3 60.0 5 1 20.0 20 1 20.0 Total 5 100.0
Percent of time spent on workshops with agency staff Frequency Percent 0 4 100.0
Percent of time spent on workshops with outside consultants
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Frequency Percent 0 4 100.0
Percent of time spent on workshops with local government or other partners Frequency Percent 0 3 75.0 5 1 25.0 Total 4 100.0
Percent of time spent on board/agency strategic planning discussions Frequency Percent 0 1 16.7 30 1 16.7 40 1 16.7 50 1 16.7 60 1 16.7 80 1 16.7 Total 6 100.0
Percent of time spent on board/agency management or budget discussions Frequency Percent 0 1 25.0 10 2 50.0 40 1 25.0 Total 4 100.0
Percent of time spent on board only discussions Frequency Percent 0 1 33.3 10 1 33.3 100 1 33.3 Total 3 100.0
Percent of time other Frequency Percent 0 1 100.0
Does the board have dedicated staff that work exclusively with/for the board? Frequency Percent Yes 15 65.2 No 8 34.8 Total 23 100.0
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If the board has dedicated staff, how many are employed full-time? (please include staff that work for other DOT offices aside from the Board) The full-time staff ranges from 0 to 17 people. The mean number of staff is 3.79 people. Frequency Percent 0 1 7.1 1 4 28.6 2 3 21.4 3 1 7.1 4 1 7.1 5 1 7.1 7 2 14.3 17 1 7.1 Total 14 100.0
Please indicate the number of part-time employees Frequency Percent 0 5 71.4 1 2 28.6 Total 7 100.0
On average, how many hours of preparation time per board member do board meetings require? The hours of prep time range from 1 to 25. The mean number of hours is 4.81. Frequency Percent 1 4 19.0 2 8 38.1 3 3 14.3 8 4 19.0 15 1 4.8 25 1 4.8 Total 21 100.0
Does the board maintain member job descriptions? Frequency Percent Yes, as mandated by statute 11 47.8 Yes, as unofficial board guidelines 2 8.7 No 9 39.1 Don't know 1 4.3 Total 23 100.0
Do board members have and use informational, training, or member manuals? Frequency Percent Yes 15 65.2
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No 7 30.4 Don't know 1 4.3 Total 23 100.0
Do you offer orientation or training for new and veteran board members? Frequency Percent New members 20 69.0 Veteran members 6 20.7 Neither 2 6.9 Don't know 1 3.4 Total 29 100.0
Comments
We [Florida] have 9 Governor appointees who serve 4-year terms. They are confirmed by the Senate. Agendas are built by the Executive Director with guidance from the Chairman of the Commission. (The Chairman is elected by the Commissioners to serve a one-year term.) The Commission is required by Florida Statute to hold a minimum of 4 meetings per year, though the FTC traditionally meets an average of 6 times per year at various locations around the state. The agency report (given by FDOT Secretary) is a statutory mandate for each meeting. We work with the Agency to develop the list of topics to cover to ensure that all issues of relevance are covered. We bring in experts from local, state and national positions to convey information that would prove useful in policy deliberations by Commissioners. Commission recommendations on transportation policy, FDOT performance, production and fiscal management are made directly to the Governor and Legislature. The Commission also has oversight of 15 transportation, transit, tolling and expressway authorities in Florida.
Every two years, the Pennsylvania State Transportation Commission conducts approximately 5 public hearings throughout the state to gain public participation in the development of the Commonwealth's Transportation Program.
We [Mississippi] have 3 elected Transportation Commissioners representing each of the 3 Supreme Court districts. The Commission appoints the Executive Director of MDOT and the Secretary to the Commission. They also each have an administrative assistant and an assistant to the Commissioner who work in each of their respective offices. They meet on the 2nd and 4th Tuesday of each month. The Executive Staff give their items to the Secretary to the Commission, who in turn creates the agenda. Special call meetings are handled by the Secretary on an as-needed basis.
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[Question] #6 - annual work plan; I'm [Idaho] not sure if this would be considered an "annual work plan", but every year I prepare a list of items that I expect at each meeting. (The board meets every month.) This list is based on things such as board policies that require staff to report on a specific topic annually. I use this list when drafting the meeting agenda.
The Missouri Highways and Transportation Commission meets monthly. At each regularly scheduled meeting there is both a scheduled open and closed session. The question about closed meetings was a little confusing for me. If you were asking if the Commission holds closed meetings with just the Commissioners present and no one else, then that hasn't occurred for several years now. The Director, Chief Counsel and I are always present at closed meetings. So I may not have answered your question correctly.
My [Georgia] answer to question #13 could be a bit misleading.. we have 13 Board members. Though, I estimate that I spend 10-12 hours per board meeting (monthly) preparing. As for agenda creation, as Board secretary, I compile and finalize Board meeting agendas with staff, then run it past our Board Chair. Each Board chair is different though.. some want more input than others. I also make sure the other 12 board members know what is on the agenda well in advance. By law, I have to send out a "Board mail out" with agendas, previous month's meeting minutes and resolutions to be considered for the upcoming meeting to each Board members 10 days in advance of the meeting. Regarding our Board members, they are elected to 5-year terms by the legislators within their congressional district, hence the reason we have 13 Board members. We are a policy Board, though the Board has some operational-type duties (such as approving our monthly letting). There has been a lot of discussion about the need to clarify the role of the Board and our Commissioner, as that has always been a gray area. The Board elects our Commissioner, Treasurer and Board secretary and has approval over the Commissioner's recommendations for Deputy Commissioner and Chief Engineer. The Board elects its Chair and Vice Chair annually, and the Chair may serve a maximum of 2 consecutive years. The Board must have a Secretary (me), and I have an assistant. That is generally how we're set up, but if you have any other questions, please contact me. I'm very interested in the outcome of your project.
[Montana] Transportation Commission members are appointed by the Governor and serve 4 year terms. There are many department staff that assist with the Commission but on one designated Commission staff person.
The California Transportation Commission consists of eleven voting members and two non-voting ex-officio members. Of the eleven voting members, nine are appointed by the Governor, one is appointed by the Senate Rules Committee, and one is appointed by the Speaker of the Assembly. The two ex-officio non-voting members are appointed from the State Senate and Assembly, usually the respective
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chairs of the transportation policy committee in each house. The members are not full time employees of the Commission. They are paid per diem per meeting only. The Commission is responsible for the programming and allocating of funds for the construction of highway, passenger rail and transit improvements throughout California. The Commission, also advises and assists the Secretary of Business, Transportation and Housing Agency and the Legislature in formulating and evaluating state policies and plans for California’s transportation programs. The Commission is also an active participant in the initiation and development of State and Federal legislation that seeks to secure financial stability for the State’s transportation needs. Commission staff works with the California Department of Transportation staff to develop the agenda. The Commission is an independent agency and is not part of the California Department of Transportation.
The Nebraska State Highway Commission acts as a liaison between the public and personnel of the Nebraska Department of Roads; however, the Commission is advisory in the establishment of broad policies; conducts hearings and studies related to the State's highway system. The Commission is comprised of eight members which serve a six-year term and are appointed by the Governor. The Commission meets monthly and with the exception of one outstate meeting, all meeting are held in the Capital City, Lincoln, Nebraska.
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