‘Putting Knowledge in Power’: Learning and Innovation in the British army of the First World War by Aimée Elizabeth Fox-Godden A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of History School of History and Cultures College of Arts and Law University of Birmingham April 2015 ! University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. ABSTRACT' Learning is critical to battlefield success. Ceteris paribus, victory becomes more likely when militaries adapt faster and more effectively than their opponents. This thesis examines the effectiveness of the British army’s process for learning and adaptation across six different operational theatres during the First World War. Using a series of case studies, it considers how the army shared knowledge, responded to change, and integrated newcomers. It finds that the army’s attitudes towards learning were more thoroughgoing than hitherto thought. With its pre- war ethos and increased fluidity in wartime, the army displayed organisational and cultural flexibility across all theatres, encouraging a culture of innovation through the promotion of informal learning and tactical diversity. In a broader sense, the thesis does three things. First, it moves beyond the standard Western Front narrative of learning in the First World War, offering a more rounded examination of the army’s experience. Secondly, it highlights the complexity of military learning, considering that which occurs institutionally, between formations, and between theatres. Finally, it reflects on the importance of an organisation’s ethos when faced with uncertainty. This thesis, therefore, offers a point of departure for future studies of traditionally bureaucratic institutions and their ability to learn and innovate. ! ' ! ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS' This thesis has benefitted from the advice, guidance, and support of many individuals. First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisors at the University of Birmingham, Dr Jonathan Boff and Professor Nicholas Crowson, who not only provided much needed advice and guidance, but also challenged me and inspired me to become a better historian. Their patience and support has been unwavering and invaluable throughout. In addition to my supervisory team, I would also like to thank the staff, and my fellow postgraduate students, in the Centre for War Studies and the wider Department of History. This thesis would not have been possible without financial assistance. I would, therefore, like to thank the Arts and Humanities Research Council for the award of a doctoral studentship, as well as additional funding to support a research trip to Australia. Thanks are also due to Universitas21, the National Army Museum, and the College of Arts and Law’s Postgraduate Support Fund. I am particularly grateful to Professor Jeffrey Grey at the University of New South Wales, and to Ashley Ekins and Dr Meleah Hampton at the Australian War Memorial, for hosting me during my research trip to Canberra in early 2014. I would also like to acknowledge the invaluable assistance provided by the staff and archivists at the following repositories: the Australian War Memorial; the British Library; Churchill Archives Centre; the Imperial War Museum; Institution of Civil Engineers; Institution of Engineering and Technology; Institution of Mechanical Engineers; Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives; National Army Museum; the National Archives of the United Kingdom; the National Library of Australia; and the Royal Artillery Institution. A special thanks is due to Katherine Davies (née Swinfen Eady) who kindly shared with me the personal papers of her great-grandfather, Colonel Harold Mynors Farmar. I have been lucky enough to receive support from many other individuals – both inside and outside the academy - who have contributed to the production of this thesis in so many different ways. While there are too many names to list in full, I would like to offer particular ! thanks to Tessa Cockcroft, Dr Matthew Francis, Dr Steven Gray, Dr Victoria Henshaw, Lynelle Howson, Dr Ross Mahoney, Sarah McCook, Dr Stuart Mitchell, Dr Christopher Phillips, Dr Klaus Richter, and Dr Dan Whittingham. Whether by reading drafts, offering advice, or simply chatting over a coffee, their constant encouragement throughout the project has been invaluable. My deepest gratitude is reserved for my family. I thank my parents whose bottomless love, encouragement, and moral support has spurred me on throughout my academic career; my brother, Tom, for his support whilst undertaking his own postgraduate studies; and, finally, my husband, Tim, who has been a source of love, inspiration, and cheer. I submitted my PhD application a week before our wedding: he has lived this thesis with me. Without him, I would not have started, nor got anywhere near to finishing this project. He has my love and appreciation.!! ! TABLE'OF'CONTENTS' Abbreviations Note on Style List of Figures Introduction 1 Chapter 1: The legacy of the past 25 Chapter 2: Learning from the present 59 Chapter 3: A culture of innovation? 96 Chapter 4: ‘War has become a business’ 137 Chapter 5: Learning and unlearning 180 Chapter 6: ‘Never at heart a Regular soldier’ 215 Conclusion 257 Bibliography 266 ' ! ' ! ABBREVIATIONS' AAQMG Assistant Adjutant Quartermaster-General AIF Australian Imperial Force AIT Assistant Inspector of Training ANZAC Australian and New Zealand Army Corps APSS Army Printing and Stationery Service ASC Army Service Corps ASE Amalgamated Society of Engineers AWM Australian War Memorial BEF British Expeditionary Force BGGS Brigadier-General, General Staff BGRA Brigadier-General, Royal Artillery BM Brigade Major BSF British Salonika Force CBSO Counter-Battery Staff Officer CDS Central Distribution Section CEF Canadian Expeditionary Force CGS Chief of the General Staff CinC Commander-in-Chief CIGS Chief of the Imperial General Staff CMF Commonwealth Military Forces DDW Deputy Director of Works DFW Director of Fortifications and Works DGT Director-General of Transportation DST Director of Supplies and Transport EEF Egyptian Expeditionary Force ! ERSC Engineer and Railway Staff Corps ESR Egyptian State Railways FSR Field Service Regulations GHQ General Headquarters GOC General Officer Commanding GRO General Routine Order GSO General Staff Officer IAE Institution of Automobile Engineers ICE Institution of Civil Engineers IEE Institution of Electrical Engineers IEF Italian Expeditionary Force IGC Inspector-General of Communications IGF Inspector-General of the Forces IGT Inspector-General of Training IMechE Institution of Mechanical Engineers IWM Imperial War Museum IWT Inland Water Transport LHCMA Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives LSE London School of Economics MEF Mediterranean Expeditionary Force MGGS Major-General, General Staff MGO Master-General of the Ordnance MGRA Major-General, Royal Artillery NAA National Archives of Australia NAM National Army Museum NCO Non-Commissioned Officer NZEF New Zealand Expeditionary Force ! OR Other Rank PWD Public Works Department psc passed Staff College QMG Quartermaster-General RAI Royal Artillery Institution RE Royal Engineers REC Railway Executive Committee RFC Royal Flying Corps RIEC Royal Indian Engineering College RUSI Royal United Services Institute SS Stationery Service TNA The National Archives of the United Kingdom ! NOTE'ON'STYLE' Where possible, I have retained the original spelling and punctuation of primary source material. I have also refrained from using sic where possible, as such usage would obscure the significance of some of the extracts. Editorial interventions have been used to explain certain military abbreviations, i.e. G[eneral] O[fficer] C[ommanding]. Editorial omissions from original source material are denoted by use of an ellipsis (…). When referring to an individual’s rank and appointment, I have taken the decision to use the rank and appointment they held at the time of writing. This explains why certain individuals hold different ranks and positions throughout the course of this study. ! ' ! LIST'OF'FIGURES' Figure 1: Breakdown of Royal Society’s List of Scientific and Technical Men by Corps 113 in August 1915 Figure 2: Breakdown of Engineer and Railway Staff Corps Membership by Occupation 143 in July 1914 Figure 3: Pre-war Background of Officers Serving as Directorate Heads in the 152 Transportation Directorate ! INTRODUCTION' The man in the street might do well to consider whether the great departments of the Government, such as the War Office and the Army, should for ever be entrusted to men who have not even a nodding acquaintance with the business which their departments have to transact, the business of war. Success in that as in other business depends on putting knowledge in power.1 Spenser Wilkinson There was a rigidity and restrictiveness about the methods employed which allowed no play for initiative, imagination and inventiveness… The men on the heights offered no encouragement or chances to genius