Russia's Identity Relations with Europe, the EU, and the United States: 1991-2007 Ted Hopf, Ohio State University August 2007
[email protected] One can identify several waves of Russian identity relations with the world since 1991. These periods are 1992, 1993-2001 2001-5, and 2005-present. In the first period, there was, simply speaking, a Liberal identification with the West, in particular the United States. This was rapidly supplanted by a Centrist identification with the West, in particular with Europe, but also with an idealized Soviet past and an emerging Russian uniqueness. 911 cemented this Centrist identity, while simultaneously reinforcing a proto-Soviet identification with the US as the other superpower in the Global War On Terror (GWOT). Finally, since about 2005, a Russian dis-identification has occurred with both Europe and the US, and a growing stress on Russia as Russia has emerged. Russia’s Identities from 1991-911 There were three main discourses on Russian identity in the 1990s in Moscow: liberal, conservative, and centrist. The categorizations in Table One compare each discourse and its elements of identification. Each understood Russia with respect to internal, external, and historical Others.1 Liberals identified Russia’s future, at first with the American, and then with the European, present. They identified against the Soviet past and against the internal representation of that Other: the conservative discourse of communists and far right national patriots. They recognized the weakness of the Moscow federal centre vis-à-vis its 89 federal subjects, but felt economic prosperity within a democratic market economy would secure Russia from threats.